@@ -122,18 +122,7 @@ Roughly speaking, the prima facie conflict in perceptual content is the appearan Despite these changes in apparent color, and despite specular colors, perceivers are usually able to recognize, say, that the car is a uniform and unchanging red. \ldots\ We see the uniformity despite, or behind or beneath (as it were), the variable appearance. We do not confuse changes in the apparent color as color critical conditions change with changes in the underlying actual color. \ldots\ We experience color as that which is, in a wide range of cases, \emph{invariant} amid the apparent variation. \citep[127]{Noe:2004fk} \end{quote} -It is important to emphasize that this conflict \emph{could only be prima facie}. Consider cases of simultaneous color constancy, as when an uniformly colored surface is unevenly illuminated. If the conflict were genuine, then our experience of the uniform color despite its variable appearance would be like an experience of an impossible scene, such as Penrose's \citeyearpar{Penrose:1958kx} impossible triangle (see \autoref{fig:triangle}), or a scene depicted by an Escher drawing. - \begin{figure}[htbp] - \centering - \includegraphics[scale=1]{triangle.jpg} - \caption{Impossible Triangle} - \label{fig:triangle} - \end{figure} -However, in cases of simultaneous color constancy, our experience of the invariant color amid the variable appearances is not incoherent in this way, nor does it have the requisite tension that results from such incoherence. Nor does successive color constancy give rise to any visual puzzlement. And that means that the apparent conflict within or between experience could only be apparent. The conflict arises solely in how we might be tempted to describe the phenomenology of stability and flux. - -What, then, more precisely, is the prima facie conflict in perceptual content? - -A closer look at some of Noë's examples is revealing: +What, then, more precisely, is the prima facie conflict in perceptual content? A closer look at some of Noë's examples is revealing: \begin{quote} For example, suppose you enter a room and see that the wall is a uniform shade of white. You also see that the wall is brighter here, where it falls in direct sunlight, than it is there, where it falls in shadow. Differences in brightness, however, mean differences in color. You see the uniformity of color despite the evident nonuniformity of different parts of the wall's surface \citep[127]{Noe:2004fk} \end{quote} @@ -141,7 +130,6 @@ and again: \begin{quote} Crucially, we can experience the wall as uniform in color \emph{and} as differently colored across its surface. Just as we can see that the plate looks circular \emph{and} elliptical, so we can see the color is uniform \emph{and} variable. \citep[129]{Noe:2004fk} \end{quote} - Specular highlights are another case: \begin{quote} For example, the specular highlights on the surface of a clean, new automobile vary as viewing geometry changes \ldots\ As you move in relation to the car, or as it moves in relation to you, the apparent color of the car's surface may visibly change. \citep[125]{Noe:2004fk} @@ -150,6 +138,15 @@ And yet the color of the car appears uniform and unaltered with the change in vi The prima facie conflict, then, is this: The wall appears uniformly white and yet parts of the wall appear gray. The car appears uniformly red and yet parts of the car appear white. But nothing can have a visible surface that is uniformly white and partly gray and nothing can have a visible surface that is uniformly red and partly white. So we have a prima facie conflict in perceptual content. +It is important to emphasize that this conflict \emph{could only be prima facie}. Consider cases of simultaneous color constancy, as when an uniformly colored surface is unevenly illuminated. If the conflict were genuine, then our experience of the uniform color despite its variable appearance would be like an experience of an impossible scene, such as Penrose's \citeyearpar{Penrose:1958kx} impossible triangle (see \autoref{fig:triangle}), or a scene depicted by an Escher drawing. + \begin{figure}[htbp] + \centering + \includegraphics[scale=1]{triangle.jpg} + \caption{Impossible Triangle} + \label{fig:triangle} + \end{figure} +However, in cases of simultaneous color constancy, our experience of the invariant color amid the variable appearances is not incoherent in this way, nor does it have the requisite tension that results from such incoherence. Nor does successive color constancy give rise to any visual puzzlement. And that means that the apparent conflict within or between experience could only be apparent. The conflict arises solely in how we might be tempted to describe the phenomenology of stability and flux. + This prima facie conflict in perceptual content grounds the necessity in acknowledging the dual aspect in perceptual content. The attribution of the dual aspect is meant to resolve this prima facie conflict. On the one hand, what we strictly speaking see are \emph{apparent colors}. The unevenly illuminated white wall varies in apparent color. This is evidently a technical term since it departs from ordinary usage. Ordinarily, the apparent color of an object is the color it appears to have. On this, ordinary, understanding of the phrase, the apparent color of the wall is white, even where it is shadowed---so long as the difference in illumination is within the bounds of human color constancy. Apparent colors, in Noë's technical sense, are objective if relational properties of things. A white wall in shadow has the relational property, being gray in shadow. On the other hand, while we strictly speaking see apparent colors, we do not strictly speaking see colors, though we experience them thanks to our practical understanding of how apparent colors change in different circumstances of perception, or ``color critical'' conditions. Colors themselves are not objective if relational properties of things, but are rather patterns of these relational looks or appearances, or ``color aspect profiles''. While nothing can have a visible surface that is uniformly white and partly gray, there is nothing inconsistent with something having a visible surface that is uniformly white a portion of which has the relational property apparent gray. Indeed part of what it is for the wall to be white is for it to manifest apparent grayness when in shadow. % section conflicting_appearances (end) enactedcolor.tex 8b889bace511fb31d6e7d13f72a1b96cadb9d645 PhilGeek eli@markelikalderon.com http://github.com/PhilGeek/enactedcolor/commit/4e9420e0ac47c70614b218483d0bf45ef6ee9820 4e9420e0ac47c70614b218483d0bf45ef6ee9820 2008-08-28T19:29:50-07:00 2008-08-28T19:29:50-07:00 Rearranged material in section three 7e00e1436cf95430dfff06abf08c602e6c565968 PhilGeek eli@markelikalderon.com