From 3447c973d094dcd3cb578b099f6bf56f9ac2f407 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Stenberg Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2015 17:40:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] schannel: re-indented file to follow curl style better white space changes only --- lib/vtls/schannel.c | 187 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/vtls/schannel.c b/lib/vtls/schannel.c index 7e2bd774f4c3e2..e9f455e44511b8 100644 --- a/lib/vtls/schannel.c +++ b/lib/vtls/schannel.c @@ -125,56 +125,56 @@ schannel_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) /* certificate validation on CE doesn't seem to work right; we'll do it following a more manual process. */ schannel_cred.dwFlags = SCH_CRED_MANUAL_CRED_VALIDATION | - SCH_CRED_IGNORE_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK | - SCH_CRED_IGNORE_REVOCATION_OFFLINE; + SCH_CRED_IGNORE_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK | + SCH_CRED_IGNORE_REVOCATION_OFFLINE; #else schannel_cred.dwFlags = SCH_CRED_AUTO_CRED_VALIDATION | - SCH_CRED_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN; + SCH_CRED_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN; #endif infof(data, "schannel: checking server certificate revocation\n"); } else { schannel_cred.dwFlags = SCH_CRED_MANUAL_CRED_VALIDATION | - SCH_CRED_IGNORE_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK | - SCH_CRED_IGNORE_REVOCATION_OFFLINE; + SCH_CRED_IGNORE_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK | + SCH_CRED_IGNORE_REVOCATION_OFFLINE; infof(data, "schannel: disable server certificate revocation checks\n"); } if(!data->set.ssl.verifyhost) { schannel_cred.dwFlags |= SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK; infof(data, "schannel: verifyhost setting prevents Schannel from " - "comparing the supplied target name with the subject " - "names in server certificates. Also disables SNI.\n"); + "comparing the supplied target name with the subject " + "names in server certificates. Also disables SNI.\n"); } switch(data->set.ssl.version) { - default: - case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT: - case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: - schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_TLS1_0_CLIENT | - SP_PROT_TLS1_1_CLIENT | - SP_PROT_TLS1_2_CLIENT; - break; - case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: - schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_TLS1_0_CLIENT; - break; - case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: - schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_TLS1_1_CLIENT; - break; - case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: - schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_TLS1_2_CLIENT; - break; - case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3: - schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_SSL3_CLIENT; - break; - case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2: - schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_SSL2_CLIENT; - break; + default: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: + schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_TLS1_0_CLIENT | + SP_PROT_TLS1_1_CLIENT | + SP_PROT_TLS1_2_CLIENT; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: + schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_TLS1_0_CLIENT; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: + schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_TLS1_1_CLIENT; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: + schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_TLS1_2_CLIENT; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3: + schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_SSL3_CLIENT; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2: + schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = SP_PROT_SSL2_CLIENT; + break; } /* allocate memory for the re-usable credential handle */ connssl->cred = (struct curl_schannel_cred *) - malloc(sizeof(struct curl_schannel_cred)); + malloc(sizeof(struct curl_schannel_cred)); if(!connssl->cred) { failf(data, "schannel: unable to allocate memory"); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -182,9 +182,12 @@ schannel_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) memset(connssl->cred, 0, sizeof(struct curl_schannel_cred)); /* http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa374716.aspx */ - sspi_status = s_pSecFn->AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL, (TCHAR *)UNISP_NAME, - SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND, NULL, &schannel_cred, NULL, NULL, - &connssl->cred->cred_handle, &connssl->cred->time_stamp); + sspi_status = + s_pSecFn->AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL, (TCHAR *)UNISP_NAME, + SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND, NULL, + &schannel_cred, NULL, NULL, + &connssl->cred->cred_handle, + &connssl->cred->time_stamp); if(sspi_status != SEC_E_OK) { if(sspi_status == SEC_E_WRONG_PRINCIPAL) @@ -213,12 +216,12 @@ schannel_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) /* setup request flags */ connssl->req_flags = ISC_REQ_SEQUENCE_DETECT | ISC_REQ_REPLAY_DETECT | - ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY | ISC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY | - ISC_REQ_STREAM; + ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY | ISC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY | + ISC_REQ_STREAM; /* allocate memory for the security context handle */ connssl->ctxt = (struct curl_schannel_ctxt *) - malloc(sizeof(struct curl_schannel_ctxt)); + malloc(sizeof(struct curl_schannel_ctxt)); if(!connssl->ctxt) { failf(data, "schannel: unable to allocate memory"); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -313,7 +316,7 @@ schannel_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) CURL_SCHANNEL_BUFFER_FREE_SIZE) { /* increase internal encrypted data buffer */ reallocated_length = connssl->encdata_offset + - CURL_SCHANNEL_BUFFER_FREE_SIZE; + CURL_SCHANNEL_BUFFER_FREE_SIZE; reallocated_buffer = realloc(connssl->encdata_buffer, reallocated_length); @@ -354,7 +357,7 @@ schannel_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) } infof(data, "schannel: encrypted data buffer: offset %zu length %zu\n", - connssl->encdata_offset, connssl->encdata_length); + connssl->encdata_offset, connssl->encdata_length); /* setup input buffers */ InitSecBuffer(&inbuf[0], SECBUFFER_TOKEN, malloc(connssl->encdata_offset), @@ -439,21 +442,21 @@ schannel_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) if(inbuf[1].BufferType == SECBUFFER_EXTRA && inbuf[1].cbBuffer > 0) { infof(data, "schannel: encrypted data length: %lu\n", inbuf[1].cbBuffer); /* - There are two cases where we could be getting extra data here: - 1) If we're renegotiating a connection and the handshake is already - complete (from the server perspective), it can encrypted app data - (not handshake data) in an extra buffer at this point. - 2) (sspi_status == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) We are negotiating a - connection and this extra data is part of the handshake. - We should process the data immediately; waiting for the socket to - be ready may fail since the server is done sending handshake data. - */ + There are two cases where we could be getting extra data here: + 1) If we're renegotiating a connection and the handshake is already + complete (from the server perspective), it can encrypted app data + (not handshake data) in an extra buffer at this point. + 2) (sspi_status == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) We are negotiating a + connection and this extra data is part of the handshake. + We should process the data immediately; waiting for the socket to + be ready may fail since the server is done sending handshake data. + */ /* check if the remaining data is less than the total amount and therefore begins after the already processed data */ if(connssl->encdata_offset > inbuf[1].cbBuffer) { memmove(connssl->encdata_buffer, (connssl->encdata_buffer + connssl->encdata_offset) - - inbuf[1].cbBuffer, inbuf[1].cbBuffer); + inbuf[1].cbBuffer, inbuf[1].cbBuffer); connssl->encdata_offset = inbuf[1].cbBuffer; if(sspi_status == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { doread = FALSE; @@ -683,9 +686,9 @@ schannel_send(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, /* check if the maximum stream sizes were queried */ if(connssl->stream_sizes.cbMaximumMessage == 0) { sspi_status = s_pSecFn->QueryContextAttributes( - &connssl->ctxt->ctxt_handle, - SECPKG_ATTR_STREAM_SIZES, - &connssl->stream_sizes); + &connssl->ctxt->ctxt_handle, + SECPKG_ATTR_STREAM_SIZES, + &connssl->stream_sizes); if(sspi_status != SEC_E_OK) { *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; return -1; @@ -700,7 +703,7 @@ schannel_send(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, /* calculate the complete message length and allocate a buffer for it */ data_len = connssl->stream_sizes.cbHeader + len + - connssl->stream_sizes.cbTrailer; + connssl->stream_sizes.cbTrailer; data = (unsigned char *) malloc(data_len); if(data == NULL) { *err = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -733,19 +736,19 @@ schannel_send(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, len = outbuf[0].cbBuffer + outbuf[1].cbBuffer + outbuf[2].cbBuffer; /* - It's important to send the full message which includes the header, - encrypted payload, and trailer. Until the client receives all the - data a coherent message has not been delivered and the client - can't read any of it. - - If we wanted to buffer the unwritten encrypted bytes, we would - tell the client that all data it has requested to be sent has been - sent. The unwritten encrypted bytes would be the first bytes to - send on the next invocation. - Here's the catch with this - if we tell the client that all the - bytes have been sent, will the client call this method again to - send the buffered data? Looking at who calls this function, it - seems the answer is NO. + It's important to send the full message which includes the header, + encrypted payload, and trailer. Until the client receives all the + data a coherent message has not been delivered and the client + can't read any of it. + + If we wanted to buffer the unwritten encrypted bytes, we would + tell the client that all data it has requested to be sent has been + sent. The unwritten encrypted bytes would be the first bytes to + send on the next invocation. + Here's the catch with this - if we tell the client that all the + bytes have been sent, will the client call this method again to + send the buffered data? Looking at who calls this function, it + seems the answer is NO. */ /* send entire message or fail */ @@ -850,7 +853,7 @@ schannel_recv(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, CURL_SCHANNEL_BUFFER_FREE_SIZE || connssl->encdata_length < len) { /* increase internal encrypted data buffer */ reallocated_length = connssl->encdata_offset + - CURL_SCHANNEL_BUFFER_FREE_SIZE; + CURL_SCHANNEL_BUFFER_FREE_SIZE; /* make sure that the requested amount of data fits */ if(reallocated_length < len) { reallocated_length = len; @@ -875,7 +878,8 @@ schannel_recv(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, size = connssl->encdata_length - connssl->encdata_offset; if(size > 0) { *err = Curl_read_plain(conn->sock[sockindex], - (char *) (connssl->encdata_buffer + connssl->encdata_offset), + (char *) (connssl->encdata_buffer + + connssl->encdata_offset), size, &nread); /* check for received data */ if(*err != CURLE_OK) @@ -920,7 +924,7 @@ schannel_recv(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, /* check if everything went fine (server may want to renegotiate or shutdown the connection context) */ if(sspi_status == SEC_E_OK || sspi_status == SEC_I_RENEGOTIATE || - sspi_status == SEC_I_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) { + sspi_status == SEC_I_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) { /* check for successfully decrypted data, even before actual renegotiation or shutdown of the connection context */ if(inbuf[1].BufferType == SECBUFFER_DATA) { @@ -929,7 +933,7 @@ schannel_recv(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, /* increase buffer in order to fit the received amount of data */ size = inbuf[1].cbBuffer > CURL_SCHANNEL_BUFFER_FREE_SIZE ? - inbuf[1].cbBuffer : CURL_SCHANNEL_BUFFER_FREE_SIZE; + inbuf[1].cbBuffer : CURL_SCHANNEL_BUFFER_FREE_SIZE; if(connssl->decdata_length - connssl->decdata_offset < size || connssl->decdata_length < len) { /* increase internal decrypted data buffer */ @@ -972,13 +976,13 @@ schannel_recv(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, /* check if the remaining data is less than the total amount * and therefore begins after the already processed data - */ + */ if(connssl->encdata_offset > inbuf[3].cbBuffer) { /* move remaining encrypted data forward to the beginning of buffer */ memmove(connssl->encdata_buffer, (connssl->encdata_buffer + connssl->encdata_offset) - - inbuf[3].cbBuffer, inbuf[3].cbBuffer); + inbuf[3].cbBuffer, inbuf[3].cbBuffer); connssl->encdata_offset = inbuf[3].cbBuffer; } @@ -1033,11 +1037,12 @@ schannel_recv(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, /* check if the server closed the connection */ if(ret <= 0 && ( /* special check for Windows 2000 Professional */ - sspi_status == SEC_I_CONTEXT_EXPIRED || (sspi_status == SEC_E_OK && - connssl->encdata_offset > 0 && connssl->encdata_buffer[0] == 0x15))) { - infof(data, "schannel: server closed the connection\n"); + sspi_status == SEC_I_CONTEXT_EXPIRED || + (sspi_status == SEC_E_OK && connssl->encdata_offset > 0 && + connssl->encdata_buffer[0] == 0x15))) { + infof(data, "schannel: server closed the conunection\n"); *err = CURLE_OK; - return 0; + retrn 0; } /* check if something went wrong and we need to return an error */ @@ -1131,18 +1136,18 @@ int Curl_schannel_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) InitSecBufferDesc(&outbuf_desc, &outbuf, 1); sspi_status = s_pSecFn->InitializeSecurityContext( - &connssl->cred->cred_handle, - &connssl->ctxt->ctxt_handle, - host_name, - connssl->req_flags, - 0, - 0, - NULL, - 0, - &connssl->ctxt->ctxt_handle, - &outbuf_desc, - &connssl->ret_flags, - &connssl->ctxt->time_stamp); + &connssl->cred->cred_handle, + &connssl->ctxt->ctxt_handle, + host_name, + connssl->req_flags, + 0, + 0, + NULL, + 0, + &connssl->ctxt->ctxt_handle, + &outbuf_desc, + &connssl->ret_flags, + &connssl->ctxt->time_stamp); Curl_unicodefree(host_name); @@ -1292,18 +1297,18 @@ static CURLcode verify_certificate(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) if(result == CURLE_OK) { CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *pSimpleChain = pChainContext->rgpChain[0]; DWORD dwTrustErrorMask = ~(DWORD)(CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED| - CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN); + CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN); dwTrustErrorMask &= pSimpleChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus; if(dwTrustErrorMask) { if(dwTrustErrorMask & CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN) failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain trust error" - " CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN"); + " CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN"); if(dwTrustErrorMask & CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT) failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain trust error" - " CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT"); + " CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT"); if(dwTrustErrorMask & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID) failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain trust error" - " CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID"); + " CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID"); failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain error mask: 0x%08x", dwTrustErrorMask); result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;