From 9c2ff15b9aa9f20c2340ad69cbf2300528db9a44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: stratakis Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2023 17:42:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] [3.8] gh-102153: Start stripping C0 control and space chars in `urlsplit` (GH-102508) (GH-104575) (GH-104592) (#104593) (#104895) `urllib.parse.urlsplit` has already been respecting the WHATWG spec a bit GH-25595. This adds more sanitizing to respect the "Remove any leading C0 control or space from input" [rule](https://url.spec.whatwg.org/GH-url-parsing:~:text=Remove%20any%20leading%20and%20trailing%20C0%20control%20or%20space%20from%20input.) in response to [CVE-2023-24329](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24329). I simplified the docs by eliding the state of the world explanatory paragraph in this security release only backport. (people will see that in the mainline /3/ docs) (cherry picked from commit d7f8a5fe07b0ff3a419ccec434cc405b21a5a304) (cherry picked from commit 2f630e1ce18ad2e07428296532a68b11dc66ad10) (cherry picked from commit 610cc0ab1b760b2abaac92bd256b96191c46b941) (cherry picked from commit f48a96a28012d28ae37a2f4587a780a5eb779946) Co-authored-by: Miss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Illia Volochii Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google] --- Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst | 38 +++++++++++- Lib/test/test_urlparse.py | 61 ++++++++++++++++++- Lib/urllib/parse.py | 12 ++++ ...-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst | 3 + 4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst diff --git a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst index a6cfc5d3dc13a1..7dda121f26164f 100644 --- a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst +++ b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst @@ -147,6 +147,10 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. ParseResult(scheme='http', netloc='www.cwi.nl:80', path='/%7Eguido/Python.html', params='', query='', fragment='') + .. warning:: + + :func:`urlparse` does not perform validation. See :ref:`URL parsing + security ` for details. .. versionchanged:: 3.2 Added IPv6 URL parsing capabilities. @@ -312,8 +316,14 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is decomposed before parsing, no error will be raised. - Following the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, ASCII newline - ``\n``, ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are stripped from the URL. + Following some of the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, leading C0 + control and space characters are stripped from the URL. ``\n``, + ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are removed from the URL at any position. + + .. warning:: + + :func:`urlsplit` does not perform validation. See :ref:`URL parsing + security ` for details. .. versionchanged:: 3.6 Out-of-range port numbers now raise :exc:`ValueError`, instead of @@ -326,6 +336,9 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. .. versionchanged:: 3.8.10 ASCII newline and tab characters are stripped from the URL. + .. versionchanged:: 3.8.17 + Leading WHATWG C0 control and space characters are stripped from the URL. + .. _WHATWG spec: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser .. function:: urlunsplit(parts) @@ -402,6 +415,27 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string. or ``scheme://host/path``). If *url* is not a wrapped URL, it is returned without changes. +.. _url-parsing-security: + +URL parsing security +-------------------- + +The :func:`urlsplit` and :func:`urlparse` APIs do not perform **validation** of +inputs. They may not raise errors on inputs that other applications consider +invalid. They may also succeed on some inputs that might not be considered +URLs elsewhere. Their purpose is for practical functionality rather than +purity. + +Instead of raising an exception on unusual input, they may instead return some +component parts as empty strings. Or components may contain more than perhaps +they should. + +We recommend that users of these APIs where the values may be used anywhere +with security implications code defensively. Do some verification within your +code before trusting a returned component part. Does that ``scheme`` make +sense? Is that a sensible ``path``? Is there anything strange about that +``hostname``? etc. + .. _parsing-ascii-encoded-bytes: Parsing ASCII Encoded Bytes diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py index 0f99130f5da8ac..0ad3bf128bbf60 100644 --- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py +++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py @@ -660,6 +660,65 @@ def test_urlsplit_remove_unsafe_bytes(self): self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https") self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "https://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment") + def test_urlsplit_strip_url(self): + noise = bytes(range(0, 0x20 + 1)) + base_url = "http://User:Pass@www.python.org:080/doc/?query=yes#frag" + + url = noise.decode("utf-8") + base_url + p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url) + self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "http") + self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "User:Pass@www.python.org:080") + self.assertEqual(p.path, "/doc/") + self.assertEqual(p.query, "query=yes") + self.assertEqual(p.fragment, "frag") + self.assertEqual(p.username, "User") + self.assertEqual(p.password, "Pass") + self.assertEqual(p.hostname, "www.python.org") + self.assertEqual(p.port, 80) + self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), base_url) + + url = noise + base_url.encode("utf-8") + p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url) + self.assertEqual(p.scheme, b"http") + self.assertEqual(p.netloc, b"User:Pass@www.python.org:080") + self.assertEqual(p.path, b"/doc/") + self.assertEqual(p.query, b"query=yes") + self.assertEqual(p.fragment, b"frag") + self.assertEqual(p.username, b"User") + self.assertEqual(p.password, b"Pass") + self.assertEqual(p.hostname, b"www.python.org") + self.assertEqual(p.port, 80) + self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), base_url.encode("utf-8")) + + # Test that trailing space is preserved as some applications rely on + # this within query strings. + query_spaces_url = "https://www.python.org:88/doc/?query= " + p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(noise.decode("utf-8") + query_spaces_url) + self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https") + self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "www.python.org:88") + self.assertEqual(p.path, "/doc/") + self.assertEqual(p.query, "query= ") + self.assertEqual(p.port, 88) + self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), query_spaces_url) + + p = urllib.parse.urlsplit("www.pypi.org ") + # That "hostname" gets considered a "path" due to the + # trailing space and our existing logic... YUCK... + # and re-assembles via geturl aka unurlsplit into the original. + # django.core.validators.URLValidator (at least through v3.2) relies on + # this, for better or worse, to catch it in a ValidationError via its + # regular expressions. + # Here we test the basic round trip concept of such a trailing space. + self.assertEqual(urllib.parse.urlunsplit(p), "www.pypi.org ") + + # with scheme as cache-key + url = "//www.python.org/" + scheme = noise.decode("utf-8") + "https" + noise.decode("utf-8") + for _ in range(2): + p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url, scheme=scheme) + self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https") + self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "https://www.python.org/") + def test_attributes_bad_port(self): """Check handling of invalid ports.""" for bytes in (False, True): @@ -667,7 +726,7 @@ def test_attributes_bad_port(self): for port in ("foo", "1.5", "-1", "0x10"): with self.subTest(bytes=bytes, parse=parse, port=port): netloc = "www.example.net:" + port - url = "http://" + netloc + url = "http://" + netloc + "/" if bytes: netloc = netloc.encode("ascii") url = url.encode("ascii") diff --git a/Lib/urllib/parse.py b/Lib/urllib/parse.py index f0d9d4d803c4e3..979e6d2127c037 100644 --- a/Lib/urllib/parse.py +++ b/Lib/urllib/parse.py @@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ scenarios for parsing, and for backward compatibility purposes, some parsing quirks from older RFCs are retained. The testcases in test_urlparse.py provides a good indicator of parsing behavior. + +The WHATWG URL Parser spec should also be considered. We are not compliant with +it either due to existing user code API behavior expectations (Hyrum's Law). +It serves as a useful guide when making changes. """ import re @@ -77,6 +81,10 @@ '0123456789' '+-.') +# Leading and trailing C0 control and space to be stripped per WHATWG spec. +# == "".join([chr(i) for i in range(0, 0x20 + 1)]) +_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE = '\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\t\n\x0b\x0c\r\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f ' + # Unsafe bytes to be removed per WHATWG spec _UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE = ['\t', '\r', '\n'] @@ -431,6 +439,10 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True): url, scheme, _coerce_result = _coerce_args(url, scheme) url = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(url) scheme = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(scheme) + # Only lstrip url as some applications rely on preserving trailing space. + # (https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser would strip both) + url = url.lstrip(_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE) + scheme = scheme.strip(_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE) allow_fragments = bool(allow_fragments) key = url, scheme, allow_fragments, type(url), type(scheme) cached = _parse_cache.get(key, None) diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..e57ac4ed3ac5d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +:func:`urllib.parse.urlsplit` now strips leading C0 control and space +characters following the specification for URLs defined by WHATWG in +response to CVE-2023-24329. Patch by Illia Volochii.