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Create main.tf #5

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@ZIJ ZIJ commented May 28, 2025

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infrabaseai bot commented May 28, 2025

🛡️ Security Analysis Results

Found 21 security issues:

Severity Issue File Line Recommendation
🔴 Critical S3 Bucket Allows Public Read Access via ACL app/main.tf:32 32 Set acl = "private" for the S3 bucket. If public access...
🔴 Critical S3 Bucket Lacks Server-Side Encryption app/main.tf:30 30 Enable server-side encryption for the S3 bucket. Add a `s...
🔴 Critical S3 Bucket Public Access Block Not Enforced app/main.tf:40 40 Set block_public_acls = true, `block_public_policy = tr...
🔴 Critical IAM User Policy Grants Excessive Permissions app/main.tf:63 63 Replace wildcard permissions with specific actions and re...
🔴 Critical Security Group Allows Unrestricted Inbound Traffic app/main.tf:80 80 Restrict inbound rules to only necessary ports, protocols...
🔴 Critical Hard-coded Plaintext Password for RDS Instance app/main.tf:105 105 Store the RDS password in a secure secret management serv...
🔴 Critical RDS Instance is Publicly Accessible app/main.tf:106 106 Set publicly_accessible = false unless absolutely neces...
🔴 Critical RDS Instance Lacks Storage Encryption app/main.tf:97 97 Enable storage encryption for the RDS instance by setting...
🟡 Warning Raw aws_s3_bucket Resource Used app/main.tf:30 30 Consider encapsulating S3 bucket creation logic within a ...
🟡 Warning Raw aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block Resourc... app/main.tf:38 38 Incorporate S3 public access block configurations within ...
🟡 Warning Raw aws_iam_user Resource Used app/main.tf:49 49 Consider using or creating an IAM module for managing use...
🟡 Warning Raw aws_iam_access_key Resource Used app/main.tf:53 53 If managing IAM users via Terraform, include access key c...
🟡 Warning Raw aws_iam_user_policy Resource Used app/main.tf:57 57 Define IAM policies within a dedicated IAM module or use ...
🟡 Warning Raw aws_security_group Resource Used app/main.tf:76 76 Use or create modules for defining security groups to ens...
🟡 Warning RDS Instance Skips Final Snapshot on Deletion app/main.tf:109 109 Set skip_final_snapshot = false to ensure a final snaps...
🟡 Warning Raw aws_db_instance Resource Used app/main.tf:97 97 Consider using or creating an RDS module to manage databa...
🔵 Info Excessive Comment Header app/main.tf:1 1 Reduce the size and decoration of comment headers. Use si...
🔵 Info Excessive Comment Header for S3 Bucket Section app/main.tf:24 24 Reduce the size and decoration of comment headers. Use si...
🔵 Info Excessive Comment Header for IAM User Section app/main.tf:46 46 Reduce the size and decoration of comment headers. Use si...
🔵 Info Excessive Comment Header for Security Group Sec... app/main.tf:69 69 Reduce the size and decoration of comment headers. Use si...
🔵 Info Excessive Comment Header for RDS Instance Section app/main.tf:94 94 Reduce the size and decoration of comment headers. Use si...
📋 Detailed Descriptions

🔴 S3 Bucket Allows Public Read Access via ACL

File: app/main.tf (Line 32)

Description: The S3 bucket 'aws_s3_bucket.public_assets' is configured with acl = "public-read", making its objects publicly readable. This violates the principle of least privilege and the rule that S3 buckets must block public access unless explicitly for website static data.

💡 Recommendation: Set acl = "private" for the S3 bucket. If public access is required for specific objects, use bucket policies with specific conditions or CloudFront Origin Access Identity (OAI). Also, ensure the bucket's purpose is clearly for static website hosting if public access is intended, otherwise it should be private.


🔴 S3 Bucket Lacks Server-Side Encryption

File: app/main.tf (Line 30)

Description: The S3 bucket 'aws_s3_bucket.public_assets' does not have server-side encryption explicitly enabled. Data at rest in this bucket will not be encrypted by default using AWS S3-managed keys (SSE-S3) or AWS KMS-managed keys (SSE-KMS).

💡 Recommendation: Enable server-side encryption for the S3 bucket. Add a server_side_encryption_configuration block, e.g., server_side_encryption_configuration { rule { apply_server_side_encryption_by_default { sse_algorithm = "AES256" } } }.


🔴 S3 Bucket Public Access Block Not Enforced

File: app/main.tf (Line 40)

Description: The aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block for 'aws_s3_bucket.public_assets' has block_public_acls = false and block_public_policy = false. This configuration allows public ACLs and policies to be applied to the bucket, potentially exposing data.

💡 Recommendation: Set block_public_acls = true, block_public_policy = true, ignore_public_acls = true, and restrict_public_buckets = true to enforce blocking of public access at the bucket level.


🔴 IAM User Policy Grants Excessive Permissions

File: app/main.tf (Line 63)

Description: The IAM user policy 'full_access' for user 'ci-user' grants Action = "*" and Resource = "*". This provides unrestricted access to all AWS services and resources, violating the principle of least privilege.

💡 Recommendation: Replace wildcard permissions with specific actions and resources required by the 'ci-user'. Follow the principle of least privilege.


🔴 Security Group Allows Unrestricted Inbound Traffic

File: app/main.tf (Line 80)

Description: The security group 'open_all' allows all inbound traffic (protocol = "-1", from_port = 0, to_port = 0) from any source (cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"]). This exposes any associated resources to the entire internet.

💡 Recommendation: Restrict inbound rules to only necessary ports, protocols, and source IP ranges. Follow the principle of least privilege for network access.


🔴 Hard-coded Plaintext Password for RDS Instance

File: app/main.tf (Line 105)

Description: The RDS instance 'public_db' has its password 'P@ssw0rd123' hard-coded in the Terraform configuration. This is a severe security risk as secrets should not be stored in plaintext in code.

💡 Recommendation: Store the RDS password in a secure secret management service (e.g., AWS Secrets Manager) and reference it using a data source or variable. Alternatively, use input variables marked as sensitive and provide the value through a secure mechanism at apply time.


🔴 RDS Instance is Publicly Accessible

File: app/main.tf (Line 106)

Description: The RDS instance 'public_db' is configured with publicly_accessible = true, making it reachable from the internet. Combined with other vulnerabilities (like open security group or weak/hardcoded password), this significantly increases the risk of unauthorized access.

💡 Recommendation: Set publicly_accessible = false unless absolutely necessary. If public access is required, ensure strong passwords, encryption, and tightly restricted security groups.


🔴 RDS Instance Lacks Storage Encryption

File: app/main.tf (Line 97)

Description: The RDS instance 'public_db' does not have storage encryption enabled (storage_encrypted is not set to true). Data at rest on this instance is not encrypted.

💡 Recommendation: Enable storage encryption for the RDS instance by setting storage_encrypted = true. Consider using a KMS key for enhanced control by specifying kms_key_id.


🟡 Raw aws_s3_bucket Resource Used

File: app/main.tf (Line 30)

Description: The aws_s3_bucket resource 'public_assets' is defined directly. Resources should be defined as modules whenever possible for better reusability, maintainability, and adherence to organizational standards.

💡 Recommendation: Consider encapsulating S3 bucket creation logic within a reusable module, especially if common configurations (like encryption, versioning, logging, public access blocks) are desired across multiple buckets.


🟡 Raw aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block Resource Used

File: app/main.tf (Line 38)

Description: The aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block resource 'disabled' is defined directly. This configuration is often part of a standard S3 bucket setup and could be included in an S3 module.

💡 Recommendation: Incorporate S3 public access block configurations within a reusable S3 bucket module to ensure consistent application of security settings.


🟡 Raw aws_iam_user Resource Used

File: app/main.tf (Line 49)

Description: The aws_iam_user resource 'ci' is defined directly. IAM resource management can benefit from modularization to enforce naming conventions, permission boundaries, and standard policies.

💡 Recommendation: Consider using or creating an IAM module for managing users, roles, and policies to ensure consistency and adherence to security best practices.


🟡 Raw aws_iam_access_key Resource Used

File: app/main.tf (Line 53)

Description: The aws_iam_access_key resource 'ci' is defined directly. Managing access keys is a sensitive operation and often benefits from being part of a broader IAM management module.

💡 Recommendation: If managing IAM users via Terraform, include access key creation within an IAM module. However, consider alternatives to long-lived static access keys for CI/CD, such as IAM roles for EC2/ECS/Lambda or OIDC providers.


🟡 Raw aws_iam_user_policy Resource Used

File: app/main.tf (Line 57)

Description: The aws_iam_user_policy resource 'full_access' is defined directly. Inline policies can be harder to manage and reuse compared to managed policies or policies defined within modules.

💡 Recommendation: Define IAM policies within a dedicated IAM module or use AWS managed policies where appropriate. This promotes reusability and centralized management of permissions.


🟡 Raw aws_security_group Resource Used

File: app/main.tf (Line 76)

Description: The aws_security_group resource 'open_all' is defined directly. Security group configurations, especially common patterns, are good candidates for modularization.

💡 Recommendation: Use or create modules for defining security groups to ensure consistent application of rules and to simplify management of network security policies. The prompt mentions an internal module for VPC; similar modules might exist or should be created for security groups.


🟡 RDS Instance Skips Final Snapshot on Deletion

File: app/main.tf (Line 109)

Description: The RDS instance 'public_db' is configured with skip_final_snapshot = true. This means no final backup will be created when the instance is deleted, potentially leading to data loss.

💡 Recommendation: Set skip_final_snapshot = false to ensure a final snapshot is taken before deletion, allowing for data recovery if needed. This is especially important for production databases.


🟡 Raw aws_db_instance Resource Used

File: app/main.tf (Line 97)

Description: The aws_db_instance resource 'public_db' is defined directly. RDS instance configurations often involve multiple related settings (parameter groups, option groups, security groups, subnet groups) that can be encapsulated in a module.

💡 Recommendation: Consider using or creating an RDS module to manage database instances. This helps in standardizing configurations like encryption, backup policies, instance types, and security settings.


🔵 Excessive Comment Header

File: app/main.tf (Line 1)

Description: The file contains a large multi-line comment header using '#####' which takes up significant visual space and can reduce readability. This occurs at the beginning of the file.

💡 Recommendation: Reduce the size and decoration of comment headers. Use simple, concise comments.


🔵 Excessive Comment Header for S3 Bucket Section

File: app/main.tf (Line 24)

Description: The S3 bucket section is preceded by a large multi-line comment header using '#####' which takes up significant visual space.

💡 Recommendation: Reduce the size and decoration of comment headers. Use simple, concise comments like # Public S3 bucket.


🔵 Excessive Comment Header for IAM User Section

File: app/main.tf (Line 46)

Description: The IAM user section is preceded by a large multi-line comment header using '#####' which takes up significant visual space.

💡 Recommendation: Reduce the size and decoration of comment headers. Use simple, concise comments like # IAM user with wildcard permissions.


🔵 Excessive Comment Header for Security Group Section

File: app/main.tf (Line 69)

Description: The Security Group section is preceded by a large multi-line comment header using '#####' which takes up significant visual space.

💡 Recommendation: Reduce the size and decoration of comment headers. Use simple, concise comments like # Security group open to the world.


🔵 Excessive Comment Header for RDS Instance Section

File: app/main.tf (Line 94)

Description: The RDS instance section is preceded by a large multi-line comment header using '#####' which takes up significant visual space.

💡 Recommendation: Reduce the size and decoration of comment headers. Use simple, concise comments like # Public, unencrypted RDS instance.

📊 Summary

  • 🔴 Critical: 8
  • 🟡 Warning: 8
  • 🔵 Info: 5

🤖 Analysis powered by Infrabase AI

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Infrabase AI found more than 20 potential problems in the proposed changes. Check the Files changed tab for more details.

@diggerhq diggerhq deleted a comment from try-terracotta bot May 28, 2025
@diggerhq diggerhq deleted a comment from try-terracotta bot May 28, 2025
@diggerhq diggerhq deleted a comment from try-terracotta bot May 28, 2025
@diggerhq diggerhq deleted a comment from try-terracotta bot May 28, 2025
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