this repo is dedicated to an offering; namely to the public domain, domain schemas for working with act tasks using protocol-level actions according to the hypermedia-orientation. action semantics are partially informed by existing vocabularies (dublincore.org, schema.org, dbpedia.org, w3.org, etc.).
my goal is to bring forth the obvious, how the "document object model" like shared
vocabularies can be incorporated into the approach of using protocol-level
actions (e.g., how the disabled attribute can be featured as a property in
the API along with
skip and limit) to deliver hypermedia as the engine of application state more easily.
i don't think we need as much javascript as we do today to manipulate the DOM if we'd just plan eventual interactivity more thoroughly. plus, the cached execution of javascript is a performance bottleneck. javascript to call and faithfully deliver task-based interfaces in the response text? great. javascript to perform weird DOM manipulations, traversals, creations, and deletions? not the best. that's why apps increasingly come to perform with jankiness and wonkiness after our purposeful use. the very nature of how we solve interface design opportunities does not necessarily align with our purpose in use. purpose and the "developer experience" can fall out of alignment since the developer is concerned with concealing and revealing work done by the programs in question. some solutions are apt, others are not. the hypermedia-orientation is a paradigmatic strategy for handling distributed applications such that the dependency on languages like javascript can be focused on "layer" mechanism rather than "application" mechanism, where other languages like css, and logical document planning, can shine (without, or with significantly less, DOM manipulation, etc.; i.e., freer).
act tasks described in tense, modal, affective and veridictive marker annotations.
see signaling and the levels of communicative acts within and between architectural and learning styles.
(my goal here is in making specializability and concretizability target quality properties of web architecture.)
.
.
"Gregory Bateson - Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology". Jason Aronson. 1987.
there are as many heads as there are opinions.
spinoza, or someone like him.
a fortiori, there are as many [architectures, or architectural styles] as [there are learning].
- PhoeticAction
- PhaticAction
- RheticAction
- LocutionaryAction
- IlluctionaryAction
- PerlocutionaryAction
- NoeticAction
- SomaticAction: gesturing, posing.
- DoxasticAction: using the beliefs "℘ is ♣"; i.e., bdi agents and attitudinal semantics à la paul saka.
- ChromaticAction: using the colors #______, etc.
- PhantomaticAction: using sense-events in threat-assemblages.
- IronicAction: metarepresentation, viz. non-parodic irony.
- EchoicAction: (ibid.).
- EpistemicAction: using the structure of the application of the rule of play; how much of setting up arithmetic involves prefixed number theory, re: numerical identity, compossibility, identity of indiscernibles, the structure of necessaneity, etc.?
- NomicAction: using the structure of the rule of play; what constitutes rule divergence, decomposition.
- PragmaticAction: using modal forces, the structure of the space of possibility (delanda, nanay), etc.
- ParadigmaticAction
- CymaticAction
- ImprovizmaticAction
- EstimaticAction
- MimeticAction
- ApologeticAction
- AxiomaticAction
- EromaticAction
- PathomaticAction
- MathematicAction
- LogomaticAction
"communication performs. actions express."
communicative praxis and the spac of subjectivity. calvin o. schrag.
communicative acts imply realizable or unrealizable tasks.
projectable predicates, etc.
sentences bear subjects of multiple modalities, fundamentally in no particular arrangement or architecture between themselves. aboutness itself is an acentered conjecture of something about something. sentences reveal subjects as agents or topics, or form in general that is structured. minimally a well-formed sentence may express one subject, namely of which whom or what acts on an object or through an object given. at once the sentence could relate a topic as-subject or as-structure according to its ensembling in action.
at one level a sentence relates one thing, some agent, say. at another it relates, perhaps, a truth-apt claim about something. are sentences always and everywhere about this business? sometimes they are. for whom the sentence is about is again here at once a question that underscores a manner of acontextuality; how does one become acontextual in such a way as we relate between sentences as do their speakers ex hypothesis? can we merely grant that we are composing anything from the structure of the space of possibility? contexts are structured, but structure itself, obviously, is not (just) another context.
(a) this is not (just) a structure.
(b) this is not (just) a pattern [of the space of possibility]
what's workable for this analysis?
L1* Lying is a sign.
P1* If [lying is wrong], then [to teach your little brother to lie is wrong].
P2* [Lying is wrong].
————————————————————————————–
C* [To teach your little brother to lie is wrong].
a point here is to draw out models or semantics for assemblages in medium specificity.
labeling begets learnability. suppose L1* Lying is a sign. now here asserted
attitudinal disposition is presupposed, but only with arrangement and activity;
however mere assertion, mere arrangement, and mere supposition of activity
(i.e., conceivability) confers not a model that is an analogy with the agency
of reasons (talk of projectability, desirability) or advantage of
proposition (warrantability; i.e., warrant to infer; median utility,
probabilitistic contents), which are matters having to concern the structure
of credences and fitness of belief (assentability not to be confused
with aptness).
"labeling" is not so much a confession to annotate with abandon (proliferation of metadata signifiers) but to elaborate the structure of circumstance as a condition of the model, for, and between peerless, autonomous tasks in eventual interactivity or joint epistemic sponteneity.
yes and no. we could see modalism as a gesture toward some realism about something or other. it is really true that we want to outline who disagrees and who does not, but that's not only it. traceability, adjustability, and incrementability of belief or desire play roles as descriptive indicators of the motion that is disagreement. spatiotemporal description leaves us wanting for what follows logically from disagreement. modality tells us when there is a change in the quality properties of meaningful truth (or say, contribution thereto its realization). that a sign may change is a constant reality of the measure of disagreement, how near or far those in disagreement or agreement relate to one another given some other existing notional stability of attendant or co-governing sense. modes for graph traversal, often represented as conceivability, become undone given radical change or difference of advantage of proposition between agents.
typically speakers do not speak as though certain objects would not exemplify
properties; their speech is not a stipulaion that quality properties do not
hold but rather should. obviously we presume to some extent a likeness of
ourselves to those who would exemplify qualities coherent with our descriptions.
to say the least, if it is true that lying is wrong, we do not as speakers
typically seek to point that out about ourselves merely in virtue of a sentence
possessing certain qualities by other speakers arrangements, assertions, or
active uses (in a discourse). we may call ourselves liars but that's got
very little to do with lying is wrong appearing in an argument somewhere
because it happens to be a premise. more important, it demands that exemplification
be a quality property of arguments which, so then, presupposees the existence
of labels for those whom or what exemplify in nature according to the arguments.
not just anyone exemplifies that lying is wrong when so considered, for there
is no fact of the matter to answer such a question while as yet, that's not
whom speakers are intending to search out as-if lurking around in their own
meaning.
def=: (consideration for future consequences)
- cfc
- time preferences
- temporalism
- educology and [ learnability ][garson]
- [ cooperative ethos ][roemer]
def=: (identification of future consequeces)
- modal spotlight theory; moving spotlight theory, by brad skow. (y'know, but with modalism).
- role
- The Language of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Language: a Symbiotic Paradigm
- fourthness
- typicality
- specularizability
e.g.,
)
def=: (recognition for future consequences)
- non-classical systematicity
- metonymic structure; metonymies are more literal than metaphors.
def=: (attention for future consequences)
- see metaphors for attention, by mark johnson and george lakoff.
- criteriological occurrence and consciousness, p.m.s. hacker and bennett
- occasion as “prehension” (comprehensibility), “objective data” (specializability), “present satisfaction” (satisfiability), “concrescence” (concretizability)
(wip)
obviously none of these are "real" yet.