

**UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL**

**JANUARY 2014 Examination Period**

**FACULTY OF ENGINEERING**

**Examination for the Degree of  
Bachelor and Master of Engineering and Bachelor and Master of Science**

**COMS30002J  
CRYPTOGRAPHY A**

**TIME ALLOWED:  
2 Hours**

This paper contains *four* questions.  
*All* answers will be used for assessment.  
The maximum for this paper is *60 marks*.

**Other Instructions:**

- 1. Calculators must have the Faculty of Engineering Seal of Approval.**

**TURN OVER ONLY WHEN TOLD TO START WRITING**

**Q1.** This question focuses on the Damgård ElGamal encryption scheme, which is a variation on the original ElGamal scheme. The scheme is defined as follows:

**Key generation**  $\text{Kg}$  generates a cyclic group  $G_q$  of prime order  $q$  with generator  $g$ . A private decryption key  $\text{sk}$  consists of two elements  $x, \omega \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  both sampled independently and uniformly at random. The public key consists of the group description  $(G_q, q, g)$  together with the group elements  $h \leftarrow g^\omega$  and  $y \leftarrow g^x$ .

**Encryption**  $\text{Enc}$  takes as input a public key  $\text{pk}$  and a message  $m \in G_q$ , uniformly at random selects  $r$  from  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  and computes the ciphertext  $c \leftarrow (g^r, h^r, m \cdot y^r)$ .

**Decryption**  $\text{Dec}$  takes as input a private key  $\text{sk}$  and a ciphertext  $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$ . It checks whether  $c_1^\omega = c_2$  and if and only if this is the case, it returns  $m' \leftarrow c_3 c_1^{-x}$ .

(a) Prove the correctness of the scheme.

[4 marks]

(b) The scheme is malleable. Explain what malleability means in general, demonstrate the malleability of this scheme, and comment on the implications in terms of security.

[4 marks]

(c) This scheme is derived from ElGamal. Explain how Damgård ElGamal differs from ElGamal.

[4 marks]

(d) ElGamal itself can be shown to be IND-CPA secure under the DDH assumption. Give the definition of IND-CPA security.

[3 marks]

(e) Prove that if ElGamal is IND-CPA secure, then so is Damgård ElGamal.

[5 marks]

**Q2.** This question focuses on building a message authentication code from an authenticated encryption scheme. To this end, let  $(\text{Kg}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  be an authenticated encryption scheme and consider the MAC scheme  $(\text{Kg}, \text{Tag}, \text{Vrfy})$  where key generation  $\text{Kg}$  for the MAC scheme is exactly the same as that of the authenticated encryption scheme, and

**Tagging**  $\text{Tag}$  takes as input a key  $k$  and a message  $m$ . It computes  $\tau \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k, m)$ .

**Verification**  $\text{Vrfy}$  takes as input a  $k$ , a message  $m$ , and a tag  $\tau$ . It computes  $m' \leftarrow \text{Dec}(k, \tau)$  and accepts iff  $m' = m$ .

(a) Prove the correctness of the MAC scheme, assuming correctness of the authenticated encryption scheme.

[2 marks]

(b) Comment on the efficiency and tag size of the MAC scheme.

[2 marks]

(c) Katz and Lindell gave three principles of modern cryptography. Name these principles (no explanation needed) and identify each of these principles in the statement:

(cont.)

The MAC scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA secure) if the underlying authenticated encryption scheme satisfies integrity of ciphertext (INT-CTXT secure).

[4 marks]

- (d) Give the definition of EUF-CMA security for a MAC scheme.

[3 marks]


- (e) Compare the definition of INT-CTXT security for a symmetric encryption scheme with that of EUF-CMA security for MACs: what are the differences and what are the similarities?

[5 marks]

- (f) Consider the MAC scheme as described above, but where the verification routine is changed as follows:  $\text{Vrfy}'$  takes as input a  $k$ , a message  $m$ , and a tag  $\tau$ . It computes  $m' \leftarrow \text{Dec}(k, \tau)$  and accepts iff  $m' \neq \perp$ . How does this modification affect security? Argue your answer.

[3 marks]

**Q3.** This question focuses on substitution-permutation networks. These are commonly used to build blockciphers. A blockcipher typically consists of several rounds of an SP network, with  $S$  and  $P$  fixed and the various round keys generated from the master key using some key schedule. Below is an illustration of a single round of an SP-network.



- (a) What is a blockcipher and what is meant by its block-length? [2 marks]
- (b) Explain Kerckhoffs's principle in terms of a blockcipher built from an SP-network. What are the implications on the block-length and the key-length when a security level of 128-bit is desired (assuming a single round-key uniquely determines the overall blockcipher key)? [3 marks]
- (c) One round (as depicted above) is insufficient as a blockcipher. Give an attack that is strong yet efficient, and describe what kind of attack it is. [3 marks]
- (d) Why is omitting the S-boxes (from a multi-round SP-network) a bad idea? [3 marks]

**Q4.** This question focuses on a family of RSA-inspired signature schemes, defined as follows:

**Key generation** Kg selects 1023-bit prime numbers  $p'$  and  $q'$  such that  $p \leftarrow 2p' + 1$  and  $q \leftarrow 2q' + 1$  are both prime as well. Let  $N \leftarrow pq$ . Denote with  $Q_N$  the group of quadratic residues modulo  $N$ , that is  $x \in Q_N$  iff  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  and there is some  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$  such that  $x \equiv y^2 \pmod{N}$ . Key generation also selects a function  $f$  from the message space into  $Q_N$  (how this function is selected is immaterial to this question). The public key consists of  $N$  and the function  $f$ ; the private key is  $(p', q')$ .

**Signing** Sign takes as input a private key and a message  $m$ . It computes  $y \in Q_N$  and  $e$  some 128-bit prime number such that  $y^e = f(m) \pmod{N}$ . The signature is the pair  $(y, e)$ .

**Verification** Vrfy takes as input a public key  $\text{pk} = (N, f)$ , a message  $m$ , and a purported signature  $(y, e)$ . It accepts iff  $y^e = f(m) \pmod{N}$ .

- (a) Show how to implement the signing algorithm, i.e. describe an efficient algorithm to compute the signature  $(y, e)$  using knowledge of the private key. You may assume an efficient routine GenPrime that on input  $\ell$  outputs a random prime of length  $\ell$ . [4 marks]
- (b) Argue why your algorithm is efficient. [3 marks]
- (c) Argue why your algorithm is correct, namely that the signatures that are generated will pass verification. [3 marks]

**END OF PAPER**