### UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL

### **JANUARY 2018 Examination Period**

### **FACULTY OF ENGINEERING**

**Examination for the Degree of Bachelor and Master of Engineering and Bachelor and Master of Science** 

## COMS-30002(J) CRYPTOGRAPHY A

# TIME ALLOWED: 2 Hours

This paper contains *three* questions. *All* answers will be used for assessment. The maximum for this paper is *50 marks*.

### **Other Instructions:**

1. Calculators must have the Faculty of Engineering Seal of Approval.

## TURN OVER ONLY WHEN TOLD TO START WRITING

**Q1**. For each of the questions below, four possible answers are presented. Select *all* the answers that you believe apply, or write "none" if you believe none apply. You do not need to justify your answer.

For each question, you can receive up to 3 points, with 3 points only for the perfect answer and one point deducted per incorrect classification, to a minimum of 0 points per question (e.g. if the correct answer is "A and B" then answering "B" leads to 2 points, whereas answering "B and C" only leads to 1 point).

[15 marks]

- (a) Which of the following modes most closely mirrors the one-time pad?
  - A. CTR
  - B. CBC
  - C. CFB
  - D. OFB
- (b) Which of the following statements is accurate?
  - A. AES is an SP Network
  - B. AES is a Feistel cipher
  - C. AES is an iterated cipher
  - D. AES uses key-whitening
- (c) In the sentences below, "harder than" should be interpreted as "known to be equally hard as or strictly harder than".
  - A. Solving the DDH problem is harder than solving DLP
  - B. Solving the DDH problem is harder than solving the CDH problem
  - C. Solving the CDH problem is harder than solving DLP
  - D. Solving DLP is harder than solving the DDH problem.
- (d) Which of the following schemes are homomorphic?
  - A. Vanilla ElGamal
  - B. Vanilla RSA Encryption
  - C. RSA-OAEP
  - D. Hybrid ElGamal
- (e) The Chinese Remainder Theorem is commonly used to speed up
  - A. RSA encryption
  - B. RSA decryption
  - C. ElGamal encryption
  - D. ElGamal decryption

- **Q2**. The one-time pad can be proven to be perfectly secret.
  - (a) Describe the three algorithms Kg, Enc, and Dec of the one-time pad.

[3 marks]

(b) Give the definition of perfect secrecy as a formal, probabilistic statement and describe in words what that statement intuitively captures.

[3 marks]

(c) There is an equivalent formalisation of perfect secrecy. Provide that statement and its intuitive meaning.

[2 marks]

(d) The one-time pad is seldom used directly and on its own in practice, say for secure e-mail. Why is this?

[5 marks]

(e) Imagine that one would create OTP-MAC in a similar way to CBC-MAC, by encrypting a message of arbitrary length and outputting the final 128 bits (padded with zeroes if needed) as the tag. Why is this OTP-MAC a bad idea?

[2 marks]

- Q3. Schnorr signatures are a way of creating signature scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem in Schnorr subgroups of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ . Key generation and signing work as follows.
  - **Key generation** Kg Selects random 2048-bit p and 256-bit q prime numbers such that q divides p-1. It selects a random element  $g \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  of order q. Let  $\mathsf{G}_q \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  be the group of order q generated by g and let  $\mathsf{H} : \mathsf{G}_q \times \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{Z}_q$  be a hash function. Finally, it selects a random exponent  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  and sets  $h \leftarrow g^x \mod p$ . Publish  $(p,q,g,h,\mathsf{H})$

as the verification key vk and keep (p, q, g, x, H) as the private signing key sk.

**Signing** Sign Takes as input the private signing key  $\mathsf{sk} = (p, q, g, x, \mathsf{H})$  and a message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ . It selects a random element  $w \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  and sets  $a \leftarrow g^w \mod p$  followed by  $c \leftarrow \mathsf{H}(a, m)$ . Set  $r \leftarrow w - cx \mod q$ . Return (c, r) as the signature on m.

With a suitable verification algorithm, Schnorr signatures can be proven secure—for some relevant notion of security—in the random oracle model based on the discrete logarithm problem.

(a) State the discrete logarithm problem.

[2 marks]

(b) Describe and motivate a relevant security notion for signature schemes.

[6 marks]

(c) In the security reduction, what component of the signature scheme would be modelled by the random oracle?

[1 mark]

(d) Describe a suitable verification algorithm (hint: recompute a).

[3 marks]

For a chosen-prefix preimage attack against the hash function H, an adversary is given a target digest  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  and target prefix  $a \in \mathsf{G}_q$ , and has to find an m such that  $z = \mathsf{H}(a,m)$ .

(e) Prove that if H is collision resistant, then it is also resistant against chosen-prefix preimage attacks.

[4 marks]

(f) Show how susceptibility of H against chosen-prefix preimage attacks leads to a vulner-ability against the signature scheme; name the attack against the signature scheme as precisely as possible.

[4 marks]

#### **END OF PAPER**