DEVSECCIOS BOOTCAMP

BUILDING RUGGED SOFTWARE

YEAR ONE / WEEK SIX / LESSON THREE

Agenda

AWS IAM



Quick IAM Overview

- Users
- Groups
- Roles
- Policies
 - Effect
 - Actions
 - Resources
 - Condition
- Allows for very granular control over access to specific parts of the AWS API (if you RTFM)
- Lots of JSON





The Good

- Policy is specifically created for the application
- Least privilege
- Made to be as granular as possible

```
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
"Effect": "Allow",
   "Action": "ec2:DescribeInstances",
   "Resource": "*"
  "Effect": "Allow",
   "Action": [
     "ec2:StopInstances",
     "ec2:StartInstances"
   "Resource": [
   "arn:aws:ec2:us-west-2:987654321098:instance/i-98765432",
},
   "Effect": "Allow",
   "Action": "ec2:TerminateInstances",
   "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:us-west-2:987654321098:instance/i-98765432",
   "Condition": {
      "StringEquals": {
         "ec2:ResourceTag/purpose": "foobar"
```

The Bad

- ec2:*
- iam:*
- anything:*

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    |"Action": "iam:*",
    "Resource": "*"
  }
}
```

The Ugly

- All access
- Great for dev
- Bad for security

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "*:*",
    "Resource": "*"
  }
}
```

Instance Roles

- Storing access keys on your instance is a bad idea
- Keeps keys off your instance
- Allow very granular access to the AWS API from an instance
- One of the best "security features" AWS has implemented



AWS Account Takeover

- Overly permissive instance role
 + the right API calls = ATO
- ATO is a full account compromise

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 Only way to be 100% sure is to scrap the account and start over



Questions?



Lab 3 – AWS Account Takeover

