

INTENSIONAL SEMANTICS

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About these lecture notes

These lecture notes have been evolving for years now, starting with some old notes from the early 1990s by Angelika Kratzer, Irene Heim, and Kai von Fintel, which have since been modified and expanded many times by Irene and/or Kai.

We encourage the use of these notes in courses at other institutions. Of course, you need to give full credit to the authors and you may not use the notes for any commercial purposes. If you use the notes, we would like to be notified and we would very much appreciate any comments, criticism, and advice on these materials.

Link to the latest full version (currently the 2011 edition):

<http://kvf.me/intensional>

GitHub repository with the current development version:

<https://github.com/fintelkai/fintel-heim-intensional-notes>

Homepage of the class these notes are designed for:

<http://stellar.mit.edu/S/course/24/sp16/24.973>

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Some advice

1. These notes presuppose familiarity with the material, concepts, and notation of the Heim & Kratzer textbook.
2. There are numerous exercises throughout the notes. It is highly recommended to do all of them and it is certainly necessary to do so if you at all anticipate doing semantics-related work in the future.
3. The notes are designed to go along with explanatory lectures. You should ask questions and make comments as you work through the notes.
4. Students with semantic ambitions should also at an early point start reading supplementary material (as for example listed at the end of each chapter of these notes).
5. Lastly, prospective semanticists may start thinking about how *they* would teach this material.

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CHAPTER ONE

BEGINNINGS

Language is the main instrument
of man's refusal to accept the world
as it is.

George Steiner, *After Babel*, p. 228

We introduce the idea of extension vs. intension and its main use: taking us from the actual here and now to past, future, possible, counterfactual situations. We develop a compositional framework for intensional semantics.

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1.1 Displacement

Hockett (1960) in a famous article (and a follow-up, Hockett & Altmann (1968)) presented a list of DESIGN FEATURES OF HUMAN LANGUAGE. This list continues to play a role in current discussions of animal communication. One of the design

Charles F. Hockett. 1960.
The origin of speech. *Scientific American* 203. 89–96

features is **DISPLACEMENT**. Human language is not restricted to discourse about the *actual here and now*.¹

How does natural language untie us from the actual here and now? One degree of freedom is given by the ability to name entities and refer to them even if they are not where we are when we speak:

- (1) Thomas is in Hamburg.

This kind of displacement is not something we will explore here. We'll take it for granted.

Consider a sentence with no names of absent entities in it:

- (2) It is snowing (in Cambridge).

On its own, (2) makes a claim about what is happening right now here in Cambridge. But there are devices at our disposal that can be added to (2), resulting in claims about snow in displaced situations. Displacement can occur in the **TEMPORAL** dimension and/or in what might be called the **MODAL** dimension. Here's an example of temporal displacement:

- (3) At noon yesterday, it was snowing in Cambridge.

This sentence makes a claim not about snow now but about snow at noon yesterday, a different time from now.

Here's an example of modal displacement:

- (4) If the storm system hadn't been deflected by the jet stream, it would have been snowing in Cambridge.

This sentence makes a claim not about snow in the actual world but about snow in the world as it would have been if the storm system hadn't been deflected by the jet stream, a world distinct from the actual one (where the system did not hit us), a merely **POSSIBLE WORLD**.

Natural language abounds in modal constructions. (4) is a so-called **COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONAL**. Here are some other examples:

- (5) **MODAL AUXILIARIES**
It may be snowing in Cambridge.
- (6) **MODAL ADVERBS**
Possibly, it will snow in Cambridge tomorrow.
- (7) **PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES**
Jens believes that it is snowing in Cambridge.

The terms **MODAL** and **MODALITY** descend from the Latin *modus*, "way", and are ancient terms pertaining to the way a proposition holds, necessarily, contingently, etc.

See Kratzer (1981, 1991) for more examples of modal constructions.

¹ Steiner (1998, p. 226) writes: "Hypotheticals, 'imaginaries', conditionals, the syntax of counterfactuality and contingency may well be the generative centres of human speech".

- (8) HABITUALS
Jane smokes.
- (9) GENERICS
Bears like honey.

In this chapter, we will put in place the basic framework of INTENSIONAL SEMANTICS, the kind of semantics that models displacement of the point of evaluation in temporal and modal dimensions. To do this, we will start with one rather special example of modal displacement:

(10) In the world of Sherlock Holmes, a detective lives at 221B Baker Street.

(10) doesn't claim that a detective lives at 221B Baker Street in the actual world (presumably a false claim), but that in the world as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, a detective lives at 221B Baker Street (a true claim, of course). We choose this example rather than one of the more run-of-the-mill displacement constructions because we want to focus on conceptual and technical matters before we do serious empirical work.

The questions we want to answer are: How does natural language achieve this feat of modal displacement? How do we manage to make claims about other possible worlds? And why would we want to?

To make displacement possible and compositionally tractable, we need meanings of natural language expressions, and of sentences in particular, to be displaceable in the first place. They need to be “portable”, so to speak, able to make claims about more than just the actual here and now. And need we need other natural language expressions that take that portable meaning and apply it to some situation other than the actual here and now. That is what intensionality is all about.

The basic idea of the account we'll develop is this:

- expressions are assigned their semantic values relative to a possible world;
- in particular, sentences have truth-values in possible worlds;
- in the absence of modal displacement, we evaluate sentences with respect to the “actual” world, the world in which we are speaking;
- modal displacement changes the world of evaluation;
- displacement is effected by special operators, whose semantics is our primary concern here.

A terminological note: we will call the sister of the intensional operator its PREJACENT, a useful term introduced by our medieval colleagues.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherlock_Holmes

1.2 An Intensional Semantics in 10 Easy Steps

1.2.1 Laying the Foundations

STEP I: POSSIBLE WORLDS. Our first step is to introduce possible worlds. This is not the place to discuss the metaphysics of possible worlds in any depth. Instead, we will just start working with them and see what they can do for us. Basically, a possible world is a way that things might have been. In the actual world, there are two coffee mugs on my desk, but there could have been more or less. So, there is a possible world — albeit a rather bizarre one — where there are 17 coffee mugs on my desk. We join Heim & Kratzer in adducing this quote from [D. Lewis \(1986, 1f.\)](#):



David Lewis

The world we live in is a very inclusive thing. Every stick and every stone you have ever seen is part of it. And so are you and I. And so are the planet Earth, the solar system, the entire Milky Way, the remote galaxies we see through telescopes, and (if there are such things) all the bits of empty space between the stars and galaxies. There is nothing so far away from us as not to be part of our world. Anything at any distance at all is to be included. Likewise the world is inclusive in time. No long-gone ancient Romans, no long-gone pterodactyls, no long-gone primordial clouds of plasma are too far in the past, nor are the dead dark stars too far in the future, to be part of the same world. . . .

The way things are, at its most inclusive, means the way the entire world is. But things might have been different, in ever so many ways. This book of mine might have been finished on schedule. Or, had I not been such a commonsensical chap, I might be defending not only a plurality of possible worlds, but also a plurality of impossible worlds, whereof you speak truly by contradicting yourself. Or I might not have existed at all — neither myself, nor any counterparts of me. Or there might never have been any people. Or the physical constants might have had somewhat different values, incompatible with the emergence of life. Or there might have been altogether different laws of nature; and instead of electrons and quarks, there might have been alien particles, without charge or mass or spin but with alien physical properties that nothing in this world shares. There are ever so many ways that a world might be: and one of these many ways is the way that this world is.

Previously, our “metaphysical inventory” included a domain of entities and a set of two truth-values and increasingly complex functions between entities, truth-values, and functions thereof. Now, we will add possible worlds to the inventory. Let’s assume we are given a set W , the set of all possible worlds, which

is a vast space since there are so many ways that things might have been different from the way they are. Each world has as among its parts entities like you and me and these coffee mugs. Some of them may not exist in other possible worlds. So, strictly speaking each possible worlds has its own, possibly distinctive, domain of entities. What we will use in our system, however, will be the grand union of all these world-specific domains of entities. We will use D to stand for the set of all possible individuals.

Among the many possible worlds that there are — according to Lewis, there is a veritable plenitude of them — is the world as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. In that world, there is a famous detective Sherlock Holmes, who lives at 221B Baker Street in London and has a trusted sidekick named Dr. Watson. Our sentence *In the world of Sherlock Holmes, a detective lives at 221B Baker Street* displaces the claim that a famous detective lives at 221B Baker Street from the actual world to the world as described in the Sherlock Holmes stories. In other words, the following holds:²

- (11) The sentence *In the world of Sherlock Holmes, a detective lives at 221B Baker Street* is true in a world w iff the sentence *a detective lives at 221B Baker Street* is true in the world as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories.

What this suggests is that we need to make space in our system for having devices that control in what world a claim is evaluated. This is what we will do now.

STEP 2: THE EVALUATION WORLD PARAMETER. Recall from H&K that we were working with a semantic interpretation function that was relativized to an assignment function g , which was needed to take care of pronouns, traces, variables, etc. From now on, we will relativize the semantic values in our system to possible worlds as well. What this means is that from now on, our interpretation function will have two superscripts: a world w and an assignment g : $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket^{w,g}$.

So, the pre-jacent embedded in (10) will have its truth-conditions described as follows:³

- (12) $\llbracket \text{a famous detective lives at 221B Baker Street} \rrbracket^{w,g} = 1$
iff a famous detective lives at 221B Baker Street in world w .

It is customary to refer to the world for which we are calculating the extension of a given expression as the EVALUATION WORLD. In the absence of any shifting

² We will see in Section 1.3.2 that this is not quite right. It'll do for now.

³ Recall from H&K, pp.22f, that what's inside the interpretation brackets is a mention of an object language expression. They make this clear by bold-facing all object language expressions inside interpretation brackets. In these notes, we will follow common practice in the field and not use a special typographic distinction, but let it be understood that what is interpreted are object language expressions.

devices, we would normally evaluate a sentence in the actual world. But then there are shifting devices such as our *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*. We will soon see how they work. But first some more pedestrian steps: adding lexical entries and composition principles that are formulated relative to a possible world. This will allow us to derive the truth-conditions as stated in (I2) in a compositional manner.

STEP 3: LEXICAL ENTRIES. Among our lexical items, we can distinguish between items which have a WORLD-DEPENDENT semantic value and those that are world-independent. Predicates are typically world-dependent. Here are some sample entries.

- (I3) For any $w \in W$ and any assignment function g :
- a. $\llbracket \text{famous} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda x \in D. x \text{ is famous in } w.$ ^{4,5}
 - b. $\llbracket \text{detective} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda x \in D. x \text{ is a detective in } w.$
 - c. $\llbracket \text{lives-at} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda x \in D. \lambda y \in D. y \text{ lives-at } x \text{ in } w.$

The set of detectives will obviously differ from world to world, and so will the set of famous individuals and the set of pairs where the first element lives at the second element.

Other items have semantic values which do not differ from world to world. The most important such items are certain “logical” expressions, such as truth-functional connectives and determiners:

- (I4) a. $\llbracket \text{and} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda u \in D_t. \lambda v \in D_t. u = v = \mathbf{I}.$
 b. $\llbracket \text{the} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda f \in D_{\langle e,t \rangle} : \exists! x [f(x) = \mathbf{I}]. \text{ the } y \text{ such that } f(y) = \mathbf{I}.$
 c. $\llbracket \text{every} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda f_{\langle e,t \rangle}. \lambda h_{\langle e,t \rangle}. \forall x_e : f(x) = \mathbf{I} \rightarrow h(x) = \mathbf{I}.$
 d. $\llbracket \text{a/some} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda f_{\langle e,t \rangle}. \lambda h_{\langle e,t \rangle}. \exists x_e : f(x) = \mathbf{I} \ \& \ h(x) = \mathbf{I}.$

Note the ruthless condensation of the notation in (c) and (d): variables are subscripted with the type of the domain that their values are constrained to come from.

Note that there is no occurrence of w on the right-hand side of the entries in (I4). That’s the tell-tale sign of the world-independence of the semantics of these items.

We will also assume that proper names have world-independent semantic values, that is, they refer to the same individual in any possible world.

- (I5) a. $\llbracket \text{Noam Chomsky} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \text{Noam Chomsky}.$

4 Of course, “ $\lambda x \in D. \dots$ ” is short for “ $\lambda x : x \in D. \dots$ ”. Get used to semanticists condensing their notation whenever convenient! A further step of condensation is taken below: “ $\lambda x : x \in D_e. \dots$ ” becomes “ $\lambda x_e. \dots$ ”.

5 Always make sure that you actually understand what the notation means. Here, for example, we are saying that the semantic value of the word *famous* with respect to a given possible world w and a variable assignment g is that function that is defined for an argument x only if x is a member of the domain of individuals and that, if it is defined, yields the truth-value \mathbf{I} if and only if x is famous in w .

- b. $\llbracket \text{Sherlock Holmes} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \text{Sherlock Holmes.}$
- c. $\llbracket 221B \text{ Baker Street} \rrbracket^{w,g} = 221B \text{ Baker Street.}$

STEP 4: COMPOSITION PRINCIPLES. The old rules of Functional Application, Predicate Modification, and λ -Abstraction can be retained almost intact. We just need to modify them by adding world-superscripts to the interpretation function. For example:

- (I6) FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION (FA)
 If α is a branching node and $\{\beta, \gamma\}$ the set of its daughters, then, for any world w and assignment g : if $\llbracket \beta \rrbracket^{w,g}$ is a function whose domain contains $\llbracket \gamma \rrbracket^{w,g}$, then $\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \beta \rrbracket^{w,g}(\llbracket \gamma \rrbracket^{w,g})$.

The rule simply passes the world parameter down.

STEP 5: TRUTH. Lastly, we will want to connect our semantic system to the notion of the TRUTH OF AN UTTERANCE. We first adopt the “Appropriateness Condition” from Heim & Kratzer (p.243):

- (I7) APPROPRIATENESS CONDITION
 A context c is *appropriate* for an LF ϕ only if c determines a variable assignment g_c whose domain includes every index which has a free occurrence in ϕ .

We then intensionalize Heim & Kratzer’s definition of truth and falsity of utterances:

- (I8) TRUTH AND FALSITY CONDITIONS FOR UTTERANCES
 An utterance of a sentence ϕ in a context c in a possible world w is *true* iff $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{w,g_c} = 1$ and *false* if $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{w,g_c} = 0$.

EXERCISE 1.1: Compute under what conditions an utterance in possible world w_7 (which may or may not be the one we are all living in) of the sentence *a famous detective lives at 221B Baker Street* is true. [Since this is the first exercise of the semester, please do this in excruciating detail, not skipping any steps.] \square

1.2.2 Intensional Operators

So far we have merely “redecorated” our old system inherited from last semester. We have introduced possible worlds into our inventory, our lexical entries and our old composition principles. But with the tools we have now, all we can do so far is to keep track of the world in which we evaluate the semantic value of an expression, complex or lexical. We will get real mileage once we introduce INTENSIONAL OPERATORS which are capable of shifting the world parameter. We mentioned that there are a number of devices for modal displacement. As

advertised, for now, we will just focus on a very particular one: the expression *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*. We will assume, as seems reasonable, that this expression is a sentence-modifier both syntactically and semantically.

STEP 6: A SYNCATEGOREMATIC ENTRY. We begin with a heuristic step. We want to derive something like the following truth-conditions for our sentence:

- (19) $\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes,}$
 $\text{a famous detective lives at 221B Baker Street} \rrbracket^{w,g} = 1$
 iff the world w' as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories is such
 that there exists a famous detective in w' who lives at 221B Baker Street
 in w' .

We would get this if in general we had this rule for *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*:

- (20) For any sentence ϕ , any world w , and any assignment g :
 $\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes } \phi \rrbracket^{w,g} = 1$
 iff the world w' as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories is such
 that $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{w',g} = 1$.

This is a so-called SYNCATEGOREMATIC treatment of the meaning of this expression. Instead of giving an explicit semantic value to the expression, we specify what effect it has on the meaning of a complex expression that contains it. In (20), we do not compute the meaning for *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*, ϕ from the combination of the meanings of its parts, since *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* is not given a separate meaning, but in effect triggers a special composition principle. This format is very common in modal logic systems, which usually give a syncategorematic semantics for the two modal operators (the necessity operator \Box and the possibility operator \Diamond). When one only has a few closed class expressions to deal with that may shift the world parameter, employing syncategorematic entries is a reasonable strategy. But we are facing a multitude of displacement devices. So, we will need to make our system more modular.

So, we want to give *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* its own meaning and combine that meaning with that of its prejacent by a general composition principle. The Fregean slogan we adopted says that all composition is function application (modulo the need for λ -abstraction and the possible need for predicate modification).⁶ So, what we will want to do is to make (19) be the result of functional application. But we can immediately see that it cannot be the result of our usual rule of functional application, since that would feed to *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* the semantic value of *a famous detective lives in 221B Baker Street* in w , which would be a particular truth-value, 1 if a famous detective lives at 221B

The diamond \Diamond symbol for possibility is due to C.I. Lewis, first introduced in C. I. Lewis & Langford (1932), but he made no use of a symbol for the dual combination $\neg\Diamond\neg$. The dual symbol \Box was later devised by F.B. Fitch and first appeared in print in 1946 in a paper by his doctoral student Barcan (1946). See footnote 425 of Hughes & M.J. Cresswell (1968). Another notation one finds is L for necessity and M for possibility, the latter from the German *möglich* 'possible'.

6 See Heim & Kratzer, Section 4.3, pp. 63–72 for a reminder about the status of predicate modification.

Baker Street in w and o if there doesn't. And whatever the semantics of *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* is, it is certainly *not* a truth-functional operator.

So, we need to feed something else to *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*. At the same time, we want the operator to be able to shift the evaluation world of its prejacent. Can we do this?

EXERCISE 1.2: How would you show that *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* is not a truth-functional operator? \square

STEP 7: INTENSIONS. We will define a richer notion of semantic value, the INTENSION of an expression. This will be a function from possible worlds to the extension of the expression in that world. The intension of a sentence can be applied to any world and give the truth-value of the sentence in that world. Intensional operators take the intension of their prejacent as their argument, that is we will feed the intension of the embedded sentence to the shifting operator. The operator will use that intension and apply it to the world it wants the evaluation to happen in. Voilà.

Now let's spell that account out. Our system actually provides us with two kinds of meanings. For any expression α , we have $\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{w,g}$, the semantic value of α in w , also known as the EXTENSION of α in w . But we can also calculate $\lambda w. \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{w,g}$, the function that assigns to any world w the extension of α in that world. This is usually called the INTENSION of α . We will sometimes use an abbreviatory notation⁷ for the intension of α :

As before in H&K, we make no claim that the semantic values that are attributed to expressions in our framework fully capture what is informally meant by “meaning”. But certainly, intensions come close to “meaning” than extensions.

$$(21) \quad \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_{\text{c}}^g := \lambda w. \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{w,g}.$$

It should be immediately obvious that since the definition of intension abstracts over the evaluation world, intensions are not world-dependent.^{8,9}

Note that strictly speaking, it now makes no sense anymore to speak of “*the* semantic value” of an expression α . What we have is a semantic system that allows us to calculate extensions (for a given possible world w) as well as intensions for all (interpretable) expressions. We will see that when α occurs in a particular bigger tree, it will always be determinate which of the two “semantic values” of α is the one that enters into the compositional semantics. So, that

7 The notation with the subscripted cent-sign comes from Montague Grammar. See e.g. D. Dowty, Wall & Peters (1981, p. 147).

8 Since intensions are by definition not dependent on the choice of a particular world, it makes no sense to put a world-superscript on the intension-brackets. So don't ever write “ $\llbracket \dots \rrbracket_{\text{c}}^{w,g}$ ”; we'll treat that as undefined nonsense.

9 The definition here is simplified, in that it glosses over the fact that some expressions, in particular those that contain PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS, may fail to have an extension in certain worlds. In such a case, the intension has no extension to map such a world to. Therefore, the intension will have to be a partial function. So, the official, more “pedantic”, definition will have to be as follows: $\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_{\text{c}}^g := \lambda w: \alpha \in \text{dom}(\llbracket \dots \rrbracket^{w,g}). \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{w,g}$.

one — whichever one it is, the extension or the intension of α — might then be called “*the* semantic value of α in the tree β ”.

It should be noted that the terminology of EXTENSION vs. INTENSION is time-honored but that the possible worlds interpretation thereof is more recent. The technical notion we are using is certainly less rich a notion of meaning than tradition assumed.¹⁰

STEP 8: SEMANTIC TYPES AND SEMANTICS DOMAINS. If we want to be able to feed the intensions to lexical items like *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*, we need to have the appropriate types in our system.

Recall that W is the set of all possible worlds. And recall that D is the set of all POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS and thus contains all individuals existing in the actual world *plus* all individuals existing in any of the merely possible worlds.

We now expand the set of semantic types, to add intensions. Intensions are functions from possible worlds to all kinds of extensions. So, basically we want to add for any kind of extension we have in our system, a corresponding kind of intension, a function from possible worlds to that kind of extension.

We add a new clause, (22c), to the definition of semantic types:

- (22) SEMANTIC TYPES
- a. e and t are semantic types.
 - b. If σ and τ are semantic types, then $\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle$ is a semantic type.
 - c. If σ is a semantic type, then $\langle s, \sigma \rangle$ is a semantic type.
 - d. Nothing else is a semantic type.

We also add a fourth clause to the previous definition of semantic domains:

- (23) SEMANTIC DOMAINS
- a. $D_e = D$, the set of all possible individuals
 - b. $D_t = \{0, 1\}$, the set of truth-values
 - c. If σ and τ are semantic types, then $D_{\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle}$ is the set of all functions from D_σ to D_τ .
 - d. INTENSIONS: If σ is a type, then $D_{\langle s, \sigma \rangle}$ is the set of all functions from W to D_σ .

Clause (d) is the addition to our previous system of types. The functions of the schematic type $\langle s, \dots \rangle$ are intensions.¹¹ Here are some examples of intensions:

¹⁰ For example, Frege’s “modes of presentation” are not obviously captured by this possible worlds implementation of extension/intension.

¹¹ Note a curious feature of this set-up: there is no type s and no associated domain. This corresponds to the assumption that there are no expressions of English that take as their extension a possible world, that is, there are no pronouns or names referring to possible worlds. We will

The Port-Royal logicians distinguished EXTENSION from COMPREHENSION. Leibniz preferred the term INTENSION rather than COMPREHENSION. The notion probably goes back even further. See [Spencer \(1971\)](#) for some notes on this. The possible worlds interpretation is due to [Carnap \(1947\)](#).

- The intensions of sentences are of type $\langle s, t \rangle$, functions from possible worlds to truth values. These are usually called PROPOSITIONS. Note that if the function is total, then we can see the sentence as picking out a set of possible worlds, those in which the sentence is true. More often than not, however, propositions will be PARTIAL functions from worlds to truth-values, that is functions that fail to map certain possible worlds into either truth-value. This will be the case when the sentence contains a presupposition trigger, such as *the*. The famous sentence *The King of France is bald* has an intension that (at least in the analysis sketched in Heim & Kratzer) is undefined for any world where there fails to be a unique King of France.
- The intensions of one-place predicates are of type $\langle s, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$, functions from worlds to set of individuals. These are usually called PROPERTIES.
- The intensions of expressions of type e are of type $\langle s, e \rangle$, functions from worlds to individuals. These are usually called INDIVIDUAL CONCEPTS.

STEP 9: A LEXICAL ENTRY FOR A SHIFTER. We are ready to formulate the lexical entry for *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*:¹²

$$(24) \quad \llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \\ \lambda p_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \text{ the world } w' \text{ as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories} \\ \text{is such that } p(w') = 1.$$

That is, *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* expects as its argument a function of type $\langle s, t \rangle$, a proposition. It yields the truth-value 1 iff the proposition is true in the world as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories.

All that's left to do now is to provide *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* with a proposition as its argument. This is the job of a new composition principle.

STEP 10: INTENSIONAL FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION. We add the new rule of Intensional Functional Application.

$$(25) \quad \text{INTENSIONAL FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION (IFA)} \\ \text{If } \alpha \text{ is a branching node and } \{\beta, \gamma\} \text{ the set of its daughters, then, for} \\ \text{any world } w \text{ and assignment } g: \text{ if } \llbracket \beta \rrbracket^{w,g} \text{ is a function whose domain} \\ \text{contains } \llbracket \gamma \rrbracket_e^g, \text{ then } \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \beta \rrbracket^{w,g}(\llbracket \gamma \rrbracket_e^g).$$

actually question this assumption in a later chapter. For now, we will stay with this more conventional set-up.

¹² This is not yet the final semantics, see Section 1.3 for complications. One complication we will not even start to discuss is that obviously it is not a necessity that there are Sherlock Holmes stories in the first place and that the use of this operator *presupposes* that they exist; so a more fully explicit semantics would need to build in that presuppositional component. Also, note again the condensed notation: “ $\lambda p_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \dots$ ” stands for the fully official “ $\lambda p: p \in D_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \dots$ ”.

This is the crucial move. It makes space for expressions that want to take the intension of their sister as their argument and do stuff to it. Now, everything is in place. Given (24), the semantic argument of *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* will not be a truth-value but a proposition. And thus, *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* will be able to check the truth-value of its prejacent in various possible worlds. To see in practice that we have all we need, please do the following exercise.

EXERCISE 1.3: Calculate the conditions under which an utterance in a given possible world w_7 of the sentence *in the world of the Sherlock Holmes stories, a famous detective lives at 221B Baker Street* is true. \square

EXERCISE 1.4: What in our system prevents us from computing the extension of *Watson is slow*, for example, by applying the intension of *slow* to the extension of *Watson*? What in our system prevents us from computing the extension of *Watson is slow* by applying the intension of *slow* to the intension of *Watson*? \square

Please think about this exercise before looking at Section 1.4, which explores this issue.

EXERCISE 1.5: What is wrong with the following equation:

$$(26) \quad (\lambda x. x \text{ is slow in } w) (\text{Watson}) = \text{Watson is slow in } w.$$

[Hint: there is nothing wrong with the following:

$$(27) \quad (\lambda x. x \text{ is slow in } w) (\text{Watson}) = 1 \text{ iff Watson is slow in } w.] \square$$

1.3 Comments and Complications

1.3.1 Intensions All the Way?

We have seen that to adequately deal with expressions like *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*, we need an intensional semantics, one that gives us access to the extensions of expressions across the multitude of possible worlds. At the same time, we have kept the semantics for items like *and*, *every*, and *a* unchanged and extensional. This is not the only way one can set up an intensional semantics. The following exercise demonstrates this.

EXERCISE 1.6: Consider the following “intensional” meaning for *and*:

$$(28) \quad \llbracket \text{and} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \lambda q_{\langle s,t \rangle}. p(w) = q(w) = 1.$$

With this semantics, *and* would operate on the intensions of the two conjoined sentences. In any possible world w , the complex sentence will be true iff the component propositions are both true of that world.

Compute the truth-conditions of the sentence *In the world of Sherlock Holmes, Holmes is quick and Watson is slow* both with the extensional meaning for *and*

given earlier and the intensional meaning given here. Is there any difference in the results? \square

There are then at least two ways one could develop an intensional system.

- (i) We could “generalize to the worst case” and make the semantics deliver intensions as *the* semantic value of an expression. Such systems are common in the literature (see [D. Lewis 1970](#), [Max Cresswell 1973](#)).
- (ii) We could maintain much of the extensional semantics we have developed so far and extend it conservatively so as to account for non-extensional contexts.

We have chosen to pursue (ii) over (i), because it allows us to keep the semantics of extensional expressions simpler. The philosophy we follow is that we will only move to the intensional sub-machinery when triggered by an expression that creates a non-extensional context. As the exercise just showed, this is more a matter of taste than a deep scientific decision.

1.3.2 Why Talk about Other Worlds?

Why would natural language bother having such elaborate mechanisms to talk about other possible worlds? While having devices for spatial and temporal displacement (talking about Hamburg or what happened yesterday) seems eminently reasonable, talking about worlds other than the actual world seems only suitable for poets and the like. So, why?

The solution to this puzzle lies in a fact that our current semantics of the shifter *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* does not yet accurately capture: modal sentences have empirical content, they make CONTINGENT claims, claims that are true or false depending on the circumstances in the actual world.

Our example sentence *In the world of Sherlock Holmes, a famous detective lives at 221 Baker Street* is true in this world but it could easily have been false. There is no reason why Sir Arthur Conan Doyle could not have decided to locate Holmes’ abode on Abbey Road.

To see that our semantics does not yet capture this fact, notice that in the semantics we gave for *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*:

- (29) $\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes} \rrbracket^{w,g} =$
 $\lambda p_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \text{ the world } w' \text{ as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories}$
 $\text{is such that } p(w') = 1.$

there is no occurrence of w on the right hand side. This means that the truth-conditions for sentences with this shifter are world-independent. In other words, they are predicted to make non-contingent claims that are either true no-matter-what or false no-matter-what. This needs to be fixed.

The fix is obvious: what matters to the truth of our sentence is the content of the Sherlock Holmes stories as they are in the evaluation world. So, we need the following semantics for our shifter:

- (30) $\llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes} \rrbracket^{w,g} =$
 $\lambda p_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \text{the world } w' \text{ as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories}$
in w is such that $p(w') = 1$.

We see now that sentences with this shifter do make a claim about the evaluation world: namely, that the Sherlock Holmes stories as they are in the evaluation world describe a world in which such-and-such is true. So, what is happening is that although it appears at first as if modal statements concern other possible worlds and thus couldn't really be very informative, they actually only talk about certain possible worlds, those that stand in some relation to what is going on at the ground level in the actual world. As a crude analogy, consider:

- (31) My grandmother is sick.

At one level this is a claim about my grandmother. But it is also a claim about me: namely that I have a grandmother who is sick. Thus it is with modal statements. They talk about possible worlds that stand in a certain relation to the actual world and thus they make claims about the actual world, albeit slightly indirectly.

1.3.3 The Worlds of Sherlock Holmes

So far, we have played along with colloquial usage in talking of *the* world of Sherlock Holmes. But it is important to realize that this is sloppy talk. D. Lewis (1978) writes:

[I]t will not do to follow ordinary language to the extent of supposing that we can somehow single out a single one of the worlds [as the one described by the stories]. Is the world of Sherlock Holmes a world where Holmes has an even or an odd number of hairs on his head at the moment when he first meets Watson? What is Inspector Lestrade's blood type? It is absurd to suppose that these questions about the world of Sherlock Holmes have answers. The best explanation of that is that the worlds of Sherlock Holmes are plural, and the questions have different answers at different ones.

The usual move at this point is to talk about the set of worlds "COMPATIBLE WITH the (content of) Sherlock Holmes stories in w ". We imagine that we ask of each possible world whether what is going on in it is compatible with the stories as they were written in our world. Worlds where Holmes lives on Abbey Road are not compatible. Some worlds where he lives at 221B Baker Street are compatible (again not all, because in some such worlds he is not a famous detective but

an obscure violinist). Among the worlds compatible with the stories are ones where he has an even number of hairs on his head at the moment when he first meets Watson and there are others where he has an odd number of hairs at that moment.

What the operator *in the world of Sherlock Holmes* expresses is that its complement is true throughout the worlds compatible with the stories. In other words, the operator *universally quantifies* over the compatible worlds. Our next iteration of the semantics for the operator is therefore this:

$$(32) \quad \llbracket \text{in the world of Sherlock Holmes} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \\ \lambda p_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \forall w' \text{ compatible with the Sherlock Holmes stories in } w: \\ p(w') = 1.$$

At a very abstract level, the way we parse sentences of the form *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*, ϕ is that both components, the *in*-phrase and the prejacent, determine sets of possible worlds and that the set of possible worlds representing the content of the fiction mentioned in the *in*-phrase is a subset of the set of possible worlds determined by the prejacent. We will see the same rough structure of relating sets of possible worlds in other intensional constructions.

This is where we will leave things. There is more to be said about fiction operators like *in the world of Sherlock Holmes*, but we will just refer to you to the relevant literature. In particular, one might want to make sense of Lewis' idea that a special treatment is needed for cases where the sentence makes a claim about things that are left open by the fiction (no truth-value, perhaps?). One also needs to figure out how to deal with cases where the fiction is internally inconsistent. In any case, for our purposes we're done with this kind of operator.

1.4 *Issues with an informal meta-language

Exercise 1.5 asks what is wrong with writing something like¹³

$$(33) \quad (\lambda x. x \text{ is slow in } w) (\text{Watson}) = \text{Watson is slow in } w.$$

Think about it. On the left hand side of the “=” sign is a meta-language expression consisting of a λ -expression (so some kind of function) applied to an individual (contributed by the meta-language name “Watson”). The function is a function from individuals to truth-values that will deliver the truth-value 1 iff the individual is slow in world w . So, what we have on the left hand side is the result of a function from individuals to truth-values applied to an individual. In other words, on the left hand side we have a truth-value, namely the truth-value 1 if Watson is slow in w and the truth-value 0 if Watson is not slow in w .

Starred sections are optional on a first pass.

¹³ Thanks to Magda Kaufmann, Angelika Kratzer, and Ede Zimmermann for discussion on the issues explored in this section.

Now, what do we have on the right hand side of the “=”? We have the meta-language sentence “Watson is slow in w ”. That is not nor does it contribute a truth-value. It is a statement of fact. Truth-values are not the same as statements of fact.

The proper thing to do is to write

$$(34) \quad (\lambda x. x \text{ is slow in } w) (\text{Watson}) = 1 \text{ iff Watson is slow in } w.$$

There are actually two ways to parse the statement in (34), both legitimate it appears.

On one parse, the major connective is the meta-language expression “iff”. On its left hand side is a meta-language statement (that applying the function to the individual Watson gives the truth-value 1) and on the right hand side of the “iff” we have another meta-language statement (that Watson is slow in w). So, the whole thing says that these two statements are equivalent: (i) that function applied to that individual gives us the truth-value 1, and (ii) that Watson is slow in w .

The other parse is perhaps more conspicuously represented as follows:

$$(35) \quad (\lambda x. x \text{ is slow in } w) (\text{Watson}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if Watson is slow in } w \\ 0 & \text{if Watson is not slow in } w \end{cases}$$

Here, the “=” sign is the major connective. The left hand side is a meta-language expression that resolves to a truth-value and the right hand side as well contributes a truth-value: 1 if such and such and 0 if such and such.

H \mathcal{E} K, of course, introduced a convention that allowed meta-language statements to be used in a place where a truth-value was expected (p.37, (9)):

Read “[$\lambda\alpha: \phi. \gamma$]” as either (i) or (ii), whichever makes sense.

(i) “the function which maps every α such that ϕ to γ ”

(ii) “the function which maps every α such that γ to 1, if γ , and to 0 otherwise”

Since it never makes sense to map anything to a meta-language statement, no ambiguity will ever arise.

So, one might want to extend this leeway and use it in the case of (33) as well. We could say that in general, meta-language statements supply truth-values wherever that makes sense. In that case, (33) is just shorthand for (34).

Alternatively, one can introduce a new notation that indicates that a meta-language statement is being used to contribute a truth-value:

$$(36) \quad \vdash \alpha \dashv = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \alpha \\ 0 & \text{if otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Lastly, one could abandon the H \mathcal{E} K informal meta-language approach altogether and introduce a rigidly formalized meta-language.

Is this weird? It turns out that natural language, not just our semi-formal meta-language, has conditionals that seem very similar: *I fear [the consequences if we fail]*. See Lasersohn 1996 for some discussion.

This is the approach of von Stechow 1991.

This is the approach Ede Zimmermann (pc) advocates and has been using in his classes.

These lecture notes will proceed to follow H&K's approach and will not introduce any further innovations. So, (33) is illicit and only (34) is acceptable.

1.5 Supplemental Readings

There is considerable overlap between this chapter and Chapter 12 of Heim & Kratzer's textbook:

Irene Heim & Angelika Kratzer. 1998. *Semantics in generative grammar*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Here, we approach intensional semantics from a different angle. It would probably be beneficial if you read H&K's Chapter 12 in addition to this chapter and if you did the exercises in there.

Come to think of it, some other ancillary reading is also recommended. You may want to look at relevant chapters in other textbooks:

David Dowty, Robert Wall & Stanley Peters. 1981. *Introduction to Montague semantics*. Kluwer. [Chapters 5 & 6].

L. T. F. Gamut. 1991. *Logic, language, and meaning*. Chicago University Press. [Volume II: Intensional Logic and Logical Grammar].

Gennaro Chierchia & Sally McConnell-Ginet. 2000. *Meaning and grammar: An introduction to semantics (2nd edition)*. MIT Press. [Chapter 5: Intensionality].

Thomas Ede Zimmermann & Wolfgang Sternefeld. 2013. *Introduction to semantics: An essential guide to the composition of meaning*. de Gruyter Mouton.

The *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy* is always a good resource. Here's the entry on possible worlds:

Christopher Menzel. 2016. Possible worlds. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*, Spring 2016. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/>.

A couple of influential philosophical works on the metaphysics and uses of possible worlds:

Saul Kripke. 1980. *Naming and necessity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

David Lewis. 1986. *On the plurality of worlds*. Oxford: Blackwell.

An interesting paper on the origins of the modern possible worlds semantics for modal logic:

B. Jack Copeland. 2002. The genesis of possible worlds semantics. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 31(2). 99–137. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1015273407895>.

A personal history of formal semantics:

Barbara H. Partee. 2005. Reflections of a formal semanticist as of Feb 2005. ms. (longer version of introductory essay in 2004 book). http://people.umass.edu/partee/docs/BHP_Essay_Feb05.pdf.

A must read for students who plan to go on to becoming specialists in semantics, together with a handbook article putting it in perspective:

Richard Montague. 1973. The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English. In Jaako Hintikka, Julius Moravcsik & Patrick Suppes (eds.), *Approaches to natural language*, 221–242. Reprinted in Portner & Partee (2002), pp. 17–34. Dordrecht: Reidel. http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL/Images/Content_store/Sample_chapter/9780631215417/Portner.pdf.

Barbara H. Partee & Herman L.W. Hendriks. 1997. Montague grammar. In Johan van Benthem & Alice ter Meulen (eds.), *Handbook of logic and language*, 5–91. Elsevier.

To learn more about discourse about fiction, read Lewis:

David Lewis. 1978. Truth in fiction. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 15(1). Reprinted with postscripts in D. Lewis (1983), pp. 261–280, 37–46. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009693>.

Recent reconsiderations:

Andrea Bonomi & Sandro Zucchi. 2003. A pragmatic framework for truth in fiction. *Dialectica* 57(2). Preprint <http://filosofia.dipafilo.unimi.it/~bonomi/Pragmatic.pdf>, 103–120. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2003.tb00259.x>.

Richard Hanley. 2004. As good as it gets: Lewis on truth in fiction. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 82(1). 112–128. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659790>.

Inconsistencies in fictions and elsewhere are discussed in:

Achille Varzi. 1997. Inconsistency without contradiction. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 38(4). 621–638. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1039540773>.

David Lewis. 1982. Logic for equivocators. *Noûs* 16(3). Reprinted in D. Lewis (1998, pp. 97–110), 431–441. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2216219>.

Some other interesting work on stories and pictures and their content:

Jeff Ross. 1997. *The semantics of media* (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy (SLAP) 64). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Sandro Zucchi. 2001. Tense in fiction. In Carlo Cecchetto, Gennaro Chierchia & Maria Teresa Guasti (eds.), *Semantic interfaces: Reference, anaphora and aspect*, 320–355. CSLI Publications. <http://tinyurl.com/5ulwxwg>.

Ben Blumson. 2009. Pictures, perspective and possibility. *Philosophical Studies*.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9337-2>.

Astonishingly, Lewis' doctrine of the reality of the plurality of possible worlds is being paralleled (pun absolutely intended) by theoretical physicists in a number of ways. There is a controversial "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics, for example. Other terms found are the "multiverse" and "parallel universes". See for starters, Kai's blog entry on a popular book on the issue, <http://kaivonfintel.org/2011/01/25/many-worlds/>, MIT physics professor Max Tegmark's page on the topic, <http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/crazy.html>, and a Fresh Air interview with physicist Brian Greene, who just wrote a book called *The Hidden Reality: Parallel Universes and the Deep Laws of the Cosmos*: <http://www.npr.org/2011/01/24/132932268/a-physicist-explains-why-parallel-universes-may-exist>.

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CHAPTER TWO

CONDITIONALS, FIRST TRIES

We develop a possible worlds semantics for conditionals that treats the if-clause as an intensional operator, with a bit of context-dependency thrown in.

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2.1 The Material Implication Analysis

Consider the following example:

- (1) If I am healthy, I will come to class.

The simplest analysis of such conditional constructions is the so-called MATERIAL IMPLICATION analysis,¹ which treats *if* as contributing a truth-function operating on the truth-values of the two component sentences (which are called the ANTECEDENT and CONSEQUENT — from Latin — or PROTASIS and APODOSIS — from Greek). The lexical entry for *if* would look as follows:

- (2) $\llbracket \text{if} \rrbracket = \lambda u \in D_t. \lambda v \in D_t. u = 0 \text{ or } v = 1.$

Applied to example in (1), this semantics would predict that the example is false just in case the antecedent is true, I am healthy, but the consequent false, I do not come to class. Otherwise, the sentence is true. We will see that there is much to complain about here. But one should realize that under the assumption that *if* denotes a truth-function, *this one* is the most plausible candidate.

Suber (1997) does a good job of persuading (or at least trying to persuade) recalcitrant logic students:

Note that as a truth-functional connective, this *if* does not vary its denotation depending on the evaluation world. It's its arguments that vary with the evaluation world.

¹ Quoth the Stoic philosopher Philo of Megara: “a true conditional is one which does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent” (according to Empiricus (c. 200, pp. II, 110–112)).

After saying all this, it is important to note that material implication does conform to some of our ordinary intuitions about implication. For example, take the conditional statement, *If I am healthy, I will come to class*. We can symbolize it: $H \supset C$.²

The question is: when is this statement false? When will I have broken my promise? There are only four possibilities:

H	C	$H \supset C$
T	T	?
T	F	?
F	T	?
F	F	?

- In case #1, I am healthy and I come to class. I have clearly kept my promise; the conditional is true.
- In case #2, I am healthy, but I have decided to stay home and read magazines. I have broken my promise; the conditional is false.
- In case #3, I am not healthy, but I have come to class anyway. I am sneezing all over you, and you're not happy about it, but I did not violate my promise; the conditional is true.
- In case #4, I am not healthy, and I did not come to class. I did not violate my promise; the conditional is true.

But this is exactly the outcome required by the material implication. The compound is only false when the antecedent is true and the consequence is false (case #2); it is true every other time.

Despite the initial plausibility of the analysis, it cannot be maintained. Consider this example:

- (3) If there is a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow, my house will collapse.

If we adopt the material implication analysis, we predict that (3) will be false just in case there is indeed a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow but my house fails to collapse. This makes a direct prediction about when the negation of (3) should be true. A false prediction, if ever there was one:

² The symbol \supset which Suber uses here is called the “horseshoe”. We have been using the right arrow \rightarrow as the symbol for implication. We think that this is much preferable to the confusing horseshoe symbol. There is an intimate connection between universal quantification, material implication, and the subset relation, usually symbolized as \subset , which is the other way round from the horseshoe. The horseshoe can be traced back to the notation introduced by [Peano \(1889\)](#), a capital C standing for ‘consequenza’ facing backwards. The C facing in the other (more “logical”) direction was actually introduced first by [Gergonne \(1817\)](#), but didn’t catch on.

- (4) a. It's not true that if there is a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow, my house will collapse.
 b. \neq There will be a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow, and my house will fail to collapse.

Clearly, one might think that (4a) is true without at all being committed to what the material implication analysis predicts to be the equivalent statement in (4b). This is one of the inadequacies of the material implication analysis.

These inadequacies are sometimes referred to as the “paradoxes of material implication”. But that is misleading. As far as logic is concerned, there is nothing wrong with the truth-function of material implication. It is well-behaved and quite useful in logical systems. What is arguable is that it is not to be used as a reconstruction of what conditionals mean in natural language.

EXERCISE 2.1: Under the assumption that *if* has the meaning in (2), calculate the truth-conditions predicted for (5):

- (5) a. No student will succeed if he goofs off.
 b. No student λx (if x goofs off, x will succeed)

State the predicted truth-conditions in words and evaluate whether they correspond to the actual meaning of (5). \square

2.2 The Strict Implication Analysis

If *if* is not a truth-functional connective, it seems we should treat it as an intensional operator.

Some of the problems we encountered would go away if we treated *if* as introducing a modal meaning. The simplest way to do that would be to treat it as a universal quantifier over possible worlds. If p, q would simply mean that the set of p -worlds is a subset of the q -worlds. This kind of analysis is usually called STRICT IMPLICATION. The difference between *if* and *must* would be that *if* takes an overt restrictive argument. Here is what the lexical entry for *if* might look like:

- (6) $\llbracket \text{if} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p \in D_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \lambda q \in D_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \forall w': p(w') = 1 \rightarrow q(w') = 1.$
 (in set talk: $p \subseteq q$)

Applied to (3), we would derive the truth-conditions that (3) is true iff all of the worlds where there is a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow are worlds where my house collapses.

There are some obvious and immediate problems with this analysis. For one, while it's easy to imagine circumstances where the conditional (3) is judged to be true, there surely are possible worlds where there's an earthquake but my house

does not collapse: perhaps, the builders in that world used all the recommended best practices to make the building earthquake-safe, perhaps it's a world where I'm simply unreasonably lucky, or the house is immediately adjacent to much sturdier neighboring buildings which keep it propped up, or Harry Potter flies by and protects the house at the last minute (he owes me a favor, after all). This problem (that the house doesn't in fact collapse in *all* possible worlds where there's an earthquake but that the conditional can still be judged true in some worlds) is accompanied with another problem: whether the conditional is true depends on what the world is like. Was the house built to exacting standards? Is it propped up by its neighbors? Does Harry Potter owe me a favor?

We can build dependence on the evaluation world in by saying that *if* only operates on worlds that are “relevant like” the evaluation world:

$$(7) \quad \llbracket \text{if} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p \in D_{\langle s,t \rangle} . \lambda q \in D_{\langle s,t \rangle} . \\ \forall w' : p(w') = 1 \ \& \ w' \text{ is relevantly like } w \rightarrow q(w') = 1.$$

Obviously, this is a semantics with a “placeholder”, because what does “relevantly like” mean precisely? Now, just because the semantics is therefore rather vague and context-dependent doesn't mean it is wrong. As [D. Lewis \(1973\)](#) writes:

Counterfactuals are notoriously vague. That does not mean that we cannot give a clear account of their truth conditions. It does mean that such an account must either be stated in vague terms—which does not mean ill-understood terms—or be made relative to some parameter that is fixed only within rough limits on any given occasion of language use.

In a later chapter, we will revisit the formulation in (7) and fill it out more explicitly.

EXERCISE 2.2: What prediction does the strict implication analysis in (7) make about the negated conditional in (4a)? \square

CHAPTER THREE

MODALITY

We turn to modal auxiliaries and related constructions. We see more context-dependency. We still quantify over possible worlds.

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3.1 The Quantificational Theory of Modality

We will now be looking at modal auxiliaries like *may*, *must*, *can*, *have to*, etc. Most of what we say here should carry over straightforwardly to modal adverbs like *maybe*, *possibly*, *certainly*, etc. We will make certain syntactic assumptions, which make our work easier but which leave aside many questions that at some point deserve to be addressed.

3.1.1 Syntactic Assumptions

We will assume, at least for the time being, that a modal like *may* is a RAISING predicate (rather than a CONTROL predicate), i.e., its subject is not its own argument, but has been moved from the subject-position of its infinitival complement. So, we are dealing with the following kind of structure:

- (1) a. Ann may be smart.
 b. [Ann [λ_1 [may [t_1 be smart]]]]

Actually, we will be working here with the even simpler structure below, in which the subject has been reconstructed to its lowest trace position. (E.g., these could be generated by deleting all but the lowest copy in the movement chain.) We will be able to prove that movement of a name or pronoun never affects truth-conditions, so at any rate the interpretation of the structure in (1b) would be the same as of (2). As a matter of convenience, then, we will take the reconstructed structures, which allow us to abstract away from the (here irrelevant) mechanics of variable binding.

- (2) may [Ann be smart]

So, for now at least, we are assuming that modals are expressions that take a full sentence as their semantic argument.¹ Now then, what do modals mean?

3.1.2 Quantification over Possible Worlds

The basic idea of the possible worlds semantics for modal expressions is that they are quantifiers over possible worlds. Toy lexical entries for *must* and *may*, for example, would look like this:

- (3) $\llbracket \text{must} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \forall w': p(w') = 1.$
 (4) $\llbracket \text{may} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \exists w': p(w') = 1.$

This analysis is too crude (in particular, notice that it would make modal sentences non-contingent — there is no occurrence of the evaluation world on the right hand side!). But it does already have some desirable consequences that we will seek to preserve through all subsequent refinements. It correctly predicts a number of intuitive judgments about the logical relations between *must* and *may* and among various combinations of these items and negations. To start with some elementary facts, we feel that *must* ϕ entails *may* ϕ , but not vice versa:

¹ We will assume that even though *Ann be smart* is a non-finite sentence, this will not have any effect on its semantic type, which is that of a sentence, which in turn means that its semantic value is a truth-value. This is hopefully independent of the (interesting) fact that *Ann be smart* on its own cannot be used to make a truth-evaluable assertion.

The issue of raising vs. control will probably be taken up later. If you are eager to get started on it and other questions of the morphosyntax of modals, read the handout from an LSA class Sabine and Kai taught a few years ago: <http://web.mit.edu/fintel/lsaz20-class-2-handout.pdf>.

We will talk about reconstruction in more detail later.

This idea goes back a long time. It was famously held by Leibniz, but there are precedents in the medieval literature, see Knuuttila (2003). See Copeland (2002) for the modern history of the possible worlds analysis of modal expressions.

- (5) You must stay.
Therefore, you may stay. VALID
- (6) You may stay.
Therefore, you must stay. INVALID
- (7) a. You may stay, but it is not the case that you must stay.²
b. You may stay, but you don't have to stay. CONSISTENT

We judge *must* ϕ incompatible with its “inner negation” *must* [*not* ϕ], but find *may* ϕ and *may* [*not* ϕ] entirely compatible:

- (8) You must stay, and/but also, you must leave. (leave = not stay).
CONTRADICTIONARY
- (9) You may stay, but also, you may leave.
CONSISTENT

We also judge that in each pair below, the (a)-sentence and the (b)-sentences say the same thing.

- (10) a. You must stay.
b. It is not the case that you may leave.
You aren't allowed to leave.
(You may not leave.)³
(You can't leave.)
- (11) a. You may stay.
b. It is not the case that you must leave.
You don't have to leave.
You don't need to leave.
(You needn't leave.)

² The somewhat stilted *it is not the case*-construction is used in to make certain that negation takes scope over *must*. When modal auxiliaries and negation are together in the auxiliary complex of the same clause, their relative scope seems not to be transparently encoded in the surface order; specifically, the scope order is not reliably negation \succ modal. (Think about examples with *mustn't*, *can't*, *shouldn't*, *may not* etc. What's going on here? This is an interesting topic which we must set aside for now. See the references at the end of the chapter for relevant work.) With modal *main* verbs (such as *have to*), this complication doesn't arise; they are consistently inside the scope of clause-mate auxiliary negation. Therefore we can use (b) to (unambiguously) express the same scope order as (a), without having to resort to a biclausal structure.

³ The parenthesized variants of the (b)-sentences are pertinent here only to the extent that we can be certain that negation scopes over the modal. In these examples, apparently it does, but as we remarked above, this cannot be taken for granted in all structures of this form.

Given that *stay* and *leave* are each other's negations (i.e. $\llbracket \text{leave} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \text{not stay} \rrbracket^{w,g}$, and $\llbracket \text{stay} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \text{not leave} \rrbracket^{w,g}$), the LF-structures of these equivalent pairs of sentences can be seen to instantiate the following schemata:⁴

- (I2) a. $\text{must } \phi \equiv \text{not } [\text{may } [\text{not } \phi]]$
 b. $\text{must } [\text{not } \psi] \equiv \text{not } [\text{may } \psi]$
- (I3) a. $\text{may } \phi \equiv \text{not } [\text{must } [\text{not } \phi]]$
 b. $\text{may } [\text{not } \psi] \equiv \text{not } [\text{must } \psi]$

Our present analysis of *must*, *have-to*, ... as universal quantifiers and of *may*, *can*, ... as existential quantifiers straightforwardly predicts all of the above judgments, as you can easily prove.

More linguistic data regarding the “parallel logic” of modals and quantifiers can be found in Larry Horn’s dissertation (Horn 1972).

- (I4) a. $\forall x \phi \equiv \neg \exists \neg \phi$
 b. $\forall x \neg \phi \equiv \neg \exists x \phi$
- (I5) a. $\exists x \phi \equiv \neg \forall x \neg \phi$
 b. $\exists x \neg \phi \equiv \neg \forall x \phi$

3.2 Flavors of Modality

3.2.1 Contingency

We already said that the semantics we started with is too simple-minded. In particular, we have no dependency on the evaluation world, which would make modal statements non-contingent. This is not correct.

If one says *It may be snowing in Cambridge*, that may well be part of useful, practical advice about what to wear on your upcoming trip to Cambridge. It may be true or it may be false. The sentence seems true if said in the dead of winter when we have already heard about a Nor’Easter that is sweeping across New England. The sentence seems false if said by a clueless Australian acquaintance of ours in July.

The contingency of modal claims is not captured by our current semantics. All the *may*-sentence would claim under that semantics is that there is some possible world where it is snowing in Cambridge. And surely, once you have read Lewis’ quote in Chapter 1, where he asserts the existence of possible worlds with different physical constants than we enjoy here, you must admit that there have to be such worlds even if it is July. The problem is that in our semantics, repeated here

$$(I6) \quad \llbracket \text{may} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \exists w': p(w') = 1.$$

4 In logicians’ jargon, *must* and *may* behave as DUALS of each other. For definitions of “dual”, see Barwise & Cooper (1981, p. 197) or Gamut (1991, vol.2,238).

there is no occurrence of w on the right hand side. This means that the truth-conditions for *may*-sentences are world-independent. In other words, they make non-contingent claims that are either true whatever or false whatever, and because of the plenitude of possible worlds they are more likely to be true than false. This needs to be fixed. But how?

Well, what makes *it may be snowing in Cambridge* seem true when we know about a Nor'Easter over New England? What makes it seem false when we know that it is summer in New England? The idea is that we only consider possible worlds COMPATIBLE WITH THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US. And since what evidence is available to us differs from world to world, so will the truth of a *may*-statement.

$$(17) \quad \llbracket \text{may} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p. \exists w' \text{ compatible with the evidence in } w: p(w') = 1.^5$$

$$(18) \quad \llbracket \text{must} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p. \forall w' \text{ compatible with the evidence in } w: p(w') = 1.$$

Let us consider a different example:

$$(19) \quad \text{You have to be quiet.}$$

Imagine this sentence being said based on the house rules of the particular dormitory you live in. Again, this is a sentence that could be true or could be false. Why do we feel that this is a contingent assertion? Well, the house rules can be different from one world to the next, and so we might be unsure or mistaken about what they are. In one possible world, they say that all noise must stop at 11pm, in another world they say that all noise must stop at 10pm. Suppose we know that it is 10:30 now, and that the dorm we are in has either one or the other of these two rules, but we have forgotten which. Then, for all we know, *you have to be quiet* may be true or it may be false. This suggests a lexical entry along these lines:

$$(20) \quad \llbracket \text{have-to} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p. \forall w' \text{ compatible with the rules in } w: p(w') = 1.$$

Again, we are tying the modal statement about other worlds down to certain worlds that stand in a certain relation to actual world: those worlds where the rules as they are here are obeyed.

A note of caution: it is very important to realize that the worlds compatible with the rules as they are in w are those worlds where nothing happens that violates any of the w -rules. This is not at all the same as saying that the worlds compatible with the rules in w are those worlds where the same rules are in force. Usually, the rules do not care what the rules are, unless the rules contain some kind of meta-statement to the effect that the rules have to be the way they are, i.e. that the rules cannot be changed. So, in fact, a world w' in which

⁵ From now on, we will leave off type-specifications such as that p has to be of type $\langle s, t \rangle$, whenever it is obvious what they should be and when saving space is aesthetically called for.

nothing happens that violates the rules as they are in w but where the rules are quite different and in fact what happens violates the rules as they are in w' is nevertheless a world compatible with the rules in w . For example, imagine that the only relevant rule in w is that students go to bed before midnight. Take a world w' where a particular student goes to bed at 11:30 pm but where the rules are different and say that students have to go to bed before 11 pm. Such a world w' is compatible with the rules in w (but of course not with the rules in w').

Apparently, there are different flavors of modality, varying in what kind of facts in the evaluation world they are sensitive to. The semantics we gave for *must* and *may* above makes them talk about evidence, while the semantics we gave for *have-to* made it talk about rules. But that was just because the examples were hand-picked. In fact, in the dorm scenario we could just as well have said *You must be quiet*. And, vice versa, there is nothing wrong with using *it has to be snowing in Cambridge* based on the evidence we have. In fact, many modal expressions seem to be multiply ambiguous.

Traditional descriptions of modals often distinguish a number of “readings”: EPISTEMIC, DEONTIC, ABILITY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL, DYNAMIC, . . . (Beyond “epistemic” and “deontic,” there is a great deal of terminological variety. Sometimes all non-epistemic readings are grouped together under the term ROOT MODALITY.) Here are some initial illustrations.

(21) EPISTEMIC MODALITY

A: Where is John?

B: I don't know. He *may* be at home.

(22) DEONTIC MODALITY

A: Am I allowed to stay over at Janet's house?

B: No, but you *may* bring her here for dinner.

(23) CIRCUMSTANTIAL/DYNAMIC MODALITY

A: I will plant the rhododendron here.

B: That's not a good idea. It *can* grow very tall.

How are *may* and *can* interpreted in each of these examples? What do the interpretations have in common, and where do they differ?

In all three examples, the modal makes an existentially quantified claim about possible worlds. This is usually called the MODAL FORCE of the claim. What differs is what worlds are quantified over. In EPISTEMIC modal sentences, we quantify over worlds compatible with the available evidence. In DEONTIC modal sentences, we quantify over worlds compatible with the rules and/or regulations. And in the CIRCUMSTANTIAL modal sentence, we quantify over the set of worlds which conform to the laws of nature (in particular, plant biology). What speaker B in (23) is saying, then, is that there are some worlds conforming to the laws of

nature in which this rhododendron grows very tall. (Or is this another instance of an epistemic reading? See below for discussion of the distinction between circumstantial readings and epistemic ones.)

How can we account for this variety of readings? One way would be to write a host of lexical entries, basically treating this as a kind of (more or less principled) ambiguity. Another way, which is preferred by many people, is to treat this as a case of context-dependency, as argued in seminal work by Kratzer (1977, 1978, 1981, 1991).

According to Kratzer, what a modal brings with it intrinsically is just a modal force, that is, whether it is an existential (possibility) modal or a universal (necessity) modal. What worlds it quantifies over is determined by context. In essence, the context has to supply a restriction to the quantifier. How can we implement this idea?

We encountered context-dependency before when we talked about pronouns and their referential (and E-Type) readings (H & K, chapters 9–11). We treated referential pronouns as free variables, appealing to a general principle that free variables in an LF need to be supplied with values from the utterance context. If we want to describe the context-dependency of modals in a technically analogous fashion, we can think of their LF-representations as incorporating or subcategorizing for a kind of invisible pronoun, a free variable that stands for a set of possible worlds. So we posit LF-structures like this:

$$(24) \quad [I' \ [I \text{ must } p_{\langle n, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle}] \ [VP \text{ you quiet}]]$$

$p_{\langle n, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle}$ here is a variable over (characteristic functions of) sets of worlds, which — like all free variables — needs to receive a value from the utterance context. Possible values include: the set of worlds compatible with the speaker's current knowledge; the set of worlds in which everyone obeys all the house rules of a certain dormitory; and many others. The denotation of the modal itself now has to be of type $\langle st, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle$ rather than $\langle st, t \rangle$, thus it will be more like a quantificational determiner rather than a complete generalized quantifier. Only after the modal has been combined with its covert restrictor do we obtain a value of type $\langle st, t \rangle$.

$$(25) \quad \begin{aligned} \text{a.} \quad & \llbracket \text{must} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \text{have-to} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \text{need-to} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \dots = \\ & \lambda p \in D_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \lambda q \in D_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \forall w \in W [p(w) = 1 \rightarrow q(w) = 1] \\ \text{b.} \quad & \llbracket \text{may} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \text{can} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \text{be-allowed-to} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \dots = \\ & \lambda p \in D_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \lambda q \in D_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \exists w \in W [p(w) = 1 \ \& \ q(w) = 1] \end{aligned}$$

in set talk: $p \subseteq q$

in set talk: $p \cap q \neq \emptyset$

On this approach, the epistemic, deontic, etc. “readings” of individual occurrences of modal verbs come about by a combination of two separate things. The lexical semantics of the modal itself encodes just a quantificational force, a *relation* between sets of worlds. This is either the subset-relation (universal quantification; necessity) or the relation of non-disjointness (existential quantifi-



Angelika Kratzer

It is well-known that natural language quantification is in general subject to contextual restriction. See Stanley & Szabó (2000) for a recent discussion.

We are using the notation for variables of types other than e , introduced by Heim & Kratzer.

See p. 213. An index on a variable now is an ordered pair of a natural number and a type.

Q: Can you think of overt anaphoric expressions that are arguably of the type $\langle s, t \rangle$, a proposition?

cation; possibility). The covert variable next to the modal picks up a contextually salient set of worlds, and this functions as the quantifier's restrictor. The labels "epistemic", "deontic", "circumstantial" etc. group together certain conceptually natural classes of possible values for this covert restrictor.

Notice that, strictly speaking, there is not just one deontic reading (for example), but many. A speaker who utters

(26) You have to be quiet.

might mean: 'I want you to be quiet,' (i.e., you are quiet in all those worlds that conform to my preferences). Or she might mean: 'unless you are quiet, you won't succeed in what you are trying to do,' (i.e., you are quiet in all those worlds in which you succeed at your current task). Or she might mean: 'the house rules of this dormitory here demand that you be quiet,' (i.e., you are quiet in all those worlds in which the house rules aren't violated). And so on. So the label "deontic" appears to cover a whole open-ended set of imaginable "readings", and which one is intended and understood on a particular utterance occasion may depend on all sorts of things in the interlocutors' previous conversation and tacit shared assumptions. (And the same goes for the other traditional labels.)

3.2.2 Epistemic vs. Circumstantial Modality

Is it all context-dependency? Or do flavors of modality correspond to some sorts of signals in the structure of sentences? Read the following famous passage from Kratzer and think about how the two sentences with their very different modal meanings differ in structure:

Consider sentences (27) and (28):

(27) Hydrangeas can grow here.

(28) There might be hydrangeas growing here.

The two sentences differ in meaning in a way which is illustrated by the following scenario.

"Hydrangeas"

Suppose I acquire a piece of land in a far away country and discover that soil and climate are very much like at home, where hydrangeas prosper everywhere. Since hydrangeas are my favorite plants, I wonder whether they would grow in this place and inquire about it. The answer is (27). In such a situation, the proposition expressed by (27) is true. It is true regardless of whether it is or isn't likely that there are already hydrangeas in the country we are considering. All that matters is climate, soil, the special properties of hydrangeas, and the like. Suppose now that the country we are in

Quoted from Kratzer (1991). In Kratzer (1981), the hydrangeas were *Zwetschenbäume* 'plum trees'. The German word *Zwetsche*, by the way, is etymologically derived from the name of the city Damascus (Syria), the center of the ancient plum trade.

has never had any contacts whatsoever with Asia or America, and the vegetation is altogether different from ours. Given this evidence, my utterance of (28) would express a false proposition. What counts here is the complete evidence available. And this evidence is not compatible with the existence of hydrangeas.

(27) together with our scenario illustrates the pure CIRCUMSTANTIAL reading of the modal *can*. [...]. (28) together with our scenario illustrates the epistemic reading of modals. [...] circumstantial and epistemic conversational backgrounds involve different kinds of facts. In using an epistemic modal, we are interested in what else may or must be the case in our world given all the evidence available. Using a circumstantial modal, we are interested in the necessities implied by or the possibilities opened up by certain sorts of facts. Epistemic modality is the modality of curious people like historians, detectives, and futurologists. Circumstantial modality is the modality of rational agents like gardeners, architects, and engineers. A historian asks what might have been the case, given all the available facts. An engineer asks what can be done given certain relevant facts.

Consider also the very different prominent meanings of the following two sentences, taken from Kratzer as well:

- (29) a. Cathy can make a pound of cheese out of this can of milk.
 b. Cathy might make a pound of cheese out of this can of milk.

EXERCISE 3.1: Come up with examples of epistemic, deontic, and circumstantial uses of the necessity verb *have to*. Describe the set of worlds that constitutes the understood restrictor in each of your examples. □

3.2.3 Contingency Again

We messed up. If you inspect the context-dependent meanings we have on the table now for our modals, you will see that the right hand sides again do not mention the evaluation world w . Therefore, we will again have the problem of not making contingent claims, indirectly about the actual world. This needs to be fixed. We need a semantics that is both context-dependent and contingent.

The problem, it turns out, is with the idea that the utterance context supplies a *determinate set of worlds* as the restrictor. When I understand that you meant your use of *must*, in *you must be quiet*, to quantify over the set of worlds in which the house rules of our dorm are obeyed, this does not imply that you and I have to know or agree on which set exactly this is. That depends on what the house rules in our world actually happen to say, and this may be an open question at the current stage of our conversation. What we do agree on, if I have understood

your use of *must* in the way that you intended it, is just that it quantifies over *whatever set of worlds it may be* that the house rules pick out.

The technical implementation of this insight requires that we think of the context's contribution not as a set of worlds, but rather as a function which for each world it applies to picks out such a set. For example, it may be the function which, for any world w , yields the set $\{w' : \text{the house rules that are in force in } w \text{ are obeyed in } w'\}$. If we apply this function to a world w_1 , in which the house rules read “no noise after 10 pm”, it will yield a set of worlds in which nobody makes noise after 10 pm. If we apply the same function to a world w_2 , in which the house rules read “no noise after 11 pm”, it will yield a set of worlds in which nobody makes noise after 11 pm.

Suppose, then, that the covert restrictor of a modal predicate denotes such a function, i.e., its value is of type $\langle s, st \rangle$.

$$(30) \quad [{}_I [{}_I \text{ must } R_{\langle n, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle}] [{}_{VP} \text{ you quiet}]]$$

And the new lexical entries for *must* and *may* that will fit this new structure are these:

$$(31) \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{a.} & \llbracket \text{must} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \text{have-to} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \text{need-to} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \dots = \\ & \lambda R \in D_{\langle s, st \rangle} . \lambda q \in D_{\langle s, t \rangle} . \forall w' \in W [R(w)(w') = 1 \rightarrow q(w') = 1] \\ \text{b.} & \llbracket \text{may} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \text{can} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \llbracket \text{be-allowed-to} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \dots = \\ & \lambda R \in D_{\langle s, st \rangle} . \lambda q \in D_{\langle s, t \rangle} . \exists w' \in W [R(w)(w') = 1 \ \& \ q(w') = 1] \end{array}$$

in set talk: $(R(w) \subseteq q)$

in set talk: $(R(w) \cap q \neq \emptyset)$

Let us see now how this solves the contingency problem.

$$(32) \quad \text{Let } w \text{ be a world, and assume that the context supplies an assignment } g \text{ such that } g(R_{\langle 17, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle}) = \lambda w . \lambda w' . \text{ the house rules in force in } w \text{ are obeyed in } w'$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket \text{must } R_{\langle 17, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle} \text{ you quiet} \rrbracket^{w,g} = && \text{(IFA)} \\ & \llbracket \text{must } R_{\langle 17, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle} \rrbracket^{w,g} (\lambda w' \llbracket \text{you quiet} \rrbracket^{w'}) = && \text{(FA)} \\ & \llbracket \text{must} \rrbracket^{w,g} (\llbracket R_{\langle 17, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle} \rrbracket^{w,g} (\lambda w' \llbracket \text{you quiet} \rrbracket^{w'})) = && \text{(lex. entries } \textit{you}, \textit{quiet}) \\ & \llbracket \text{must} \rrbracket^{w,g} (\llbracket R_{\langle 17, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle} \rrbracket^{w,g} (\lambda w' . \text{you are quiet in } w')) = && \text{(lex. entry } \textit{must}) \\ & \forall w' \in W : \llbracket R_{\langle 17, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle} \rrbracket^{w,g}(w)(w') = 1 \rightarrow \text{you are quiet in } w' = && \text{(pronoun rule)} \\ & \forall w' \in W : g(R_{\langle 17, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle})(w)(w') = 1 \rightarrow \text{you are quiet in } w' = && \text{(def. of } g) \\ & \forall w' \in W [\text{the house rules in force in } w \text{ are obeyed in } w' \\ & \quad \rightarrow \text{you are quiet in } w'] \end{aligned}$$

As we see in the last line of (32), the truth-value of (30) depends on the evaluation world w .

EXERCISE 3.2: Describe two worlds w_1 and w_2 so that

$$\llbracket \text{must } R_{\langle 17, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle} \text{ you quiet} \rrbracket^{w_1,g} = 1 \text{ and } \llbracket \text{must } R_{\langle 17, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle} \text{ you quiet} \rrbracket^{w_2,g} = 0. \quad \square$$

EXERCISE 3.3: In analogy to the deontic relation $g(R_{\langle 17, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle})$ defined in (32), define an appropriate relation that yields an epistemic reading for a sentence like *You may be quiet*. \square

3.2.4 Iteration

Consider the following example:

- (33) You might have to leave.

What does this mean? Under one natural interpretation, we learn that the speaker considers it possible that the addressee is under the obligation to leave. This seems to involve one modal embedded under a higher modal. It appears that this sentence should be true in a world w iff some world w' compatible with what the speaker knows in w is such that every world w'' in which the rules as they are in w' are followed is such that you leave in w'' .

Assume the following LF:

- (34) $[I' [\text{might } R_{\langle 1, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle}] [VP [\text{have-to } R_{\langle 2, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle}] [IP \text{ you leave}]]]$

Suppose w is the world for which we calculate the truth-value of the whole sentence, and the context maps R_1 to the function which maps w to the set of all those worlds compatible with what is known in w . *might* says that some of those worlds are worlds w' that make the tree below *might* true. Now assume further that the context maps R_2 to the function which assigns to any such world w' the set of all those worlds in which the rules as they are in w' are followed. *have to* says that all of those worlds are worlds w'' in which you leave.

In other words, while it is not known to be the case that you have to leave, for all the speaker knows it might be the case.

EXERCISE 3.4: Describe values for the covert $\langle s, st \rangle$ -variable that are intuitively suitable for the interpretation of the modals in the following sentences:

- (35) As far as John's preferences are concerned, you *may* stay with us.
 (36) According to the guidelines of the graduate school, every PhD candidate *must* take 9 credit hours outside his/her department.
 (37) John *can* run a mile in 5 minutes.
 (38) This *has* to be the White House.
 (39) This elevator *can* carry up to 3000 pounds.

For some of the sentences, different interpretations are conceivable depending on the circumstances in which they are uttered. You may therefore have to sketch the utterance context you have in mind before describing the accessibility relation. \square

There is more to be said about which modals can embed under which other modals. See for some discussion the handout mentioned earlier: <http://web.mit.edu/fintel/lsaz20-class-2-handout.pdf>.

From now on, we will omit the type-designation of variables whenever we feel confident that their type is easy to figure out from the context.

EXERCISE 3.5: Collect two naturally occurring examples of modalized sentences (e.g., sentences that you overhear in conversation, or read in a newspaper or novel – not ones that are being used as examples in a linguistics or philosophy paper!), and give definitions of values for the covert $\langle s, st \rangle$ -variable which account for the way in which you actually understood these sentences when you encountered them. (If the appropriate interpretation is not salient for the sentence out of context, include information about the relevant preceding text or non-linguistic background.) \square

3.2.5 A technical variant of the analysis

In our account of the contingency of modalized sentences, we adopted lexical entries for the modals that gave them world-dependent extensions of type $\langle\langle s, st \rangle, \langle st, t \rangle\rangle$:

- (40) (repeated from earlier):
 For any $w \in W$: $\llbracket \text{must} \rrbracket^{w,g}$
 $\lambda R \in D_{\langle s, st \rangle}. \lambda q \in D_{\langle st, t \rangle}. \forall w' \in W [R(w)(w') = 1 \rightarrow q(w') = 1]$
 (in set talk: $\lambda R_{\langle s, st \rangle}. \lambda q_{\langle st, t \rangle}. (R(w) \subseteq q)$).

Unfortunately, this treatment somewhat obscures the parallel between the modals and the quantificational determiners, which have world-independent extensions of type $\langle et, \langle et, t \rangle \rangle$.

Let's explore an alternative solution to the contingency problem, which will allow us to stick with the world-independent type- $\langle st, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle$ -extensions that we assumed for the modals at first:

- (41) (repeated from even earlier):
 $\llbracket \text{must} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p \in D_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \lambda q \in D_{\langle st, t \rangle}. \forall w \in W [p(w) = 1 \rightarrow q(w) = 1]$
 (in set talk: $\lambda p \in D_{\langle s, t \rangle}. \lambda q \in D_{\langle st, t \rangle}. p \subseteq q$).

We posit the following LF-representation:

- (42) $[_I' [_I \text{ must } [_{R_{\langle 4, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle}} w^*]] [_{VP} \text{ you quiet}]]$

What is new here is that the covert restrictor is complex. The first part, $R_{\langle 4, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle}$, is (as before) a free variable of type $\langle s, st \rangle$, which gets assigned an accessibility relation by the context of utterance. The second part is a special terminal symbol which is interpreted as picking out the evaluation world:

- (43) For any $w \in W$: $\llbracket w^* \rrbracket^{w,g} = w$.⁶

Note that as soon as we're introducing an object language expression whose extension is a possible world, we will now have expressions of type s and should also introduce the domain of things of type s : $D_s = W$.

⁶ D. R. Dowty (1982) introduced an analogous symbol to pick out the evaluation *time*. We have chosen the star-notation to allude to this precedent.

When $R_{\langle 4, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle}$ and w^* combine (by Functional Application), we obtain a constituent whose extension is of type $\langle s, t \rangle$ (a proposition or set of worlds). This is the same type as the extension of the free variable p in the previous proposal, hence suitable to combine with the old entry for *must* (by FA). However, while the extension of p was completely fixed by the variable assignment, and did not vary with the evaluation world, the new complex constituent's extension depends on both the assignment and the world:

- (44) For any $w \in W$ and any assignment g :

$$\llbracket R_{\langle 4, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle}(w^*) \rrbracket^{w, g} = g(\langle 4, \langle s, st \rangle \rangle)(w).$$

As a consequence of this, the extensions of the higher nodes I and I' will also vary with the evaluation world, and this is how we capture the fact that (42) is contingent.

Maybe this variant is more appealing. But for the rest of this chapter, we continue to assume the original analysis as presented earlier. Nevertheless, make sure you understand what we just proposed, since it may turn out to be useful.

3.3 *Kratzer's Conversational Backgrounds

Angelika Kratzer has some interesting ideas on how accessibility relations are supplied by the context. She argues that what is really floating around in a discourse is a CONVERSATIONAL BACKGROUND. Accessibility relations can be computed from conversational backgrounds (as we shall do here), or one can state the semantics of modals directly in terms of conversational backgrounds (as Kratzer does).

A conversational background is the sort of thing that is identified by phrases like *what the law provides*, *what we know*, etc. Take the phrase *what the law provides*. What the law provides is different from one possible world to another. And what the law provides in a particular world is a *set of propositions*. Likewise, what we know differs from world to world. And what we know in a particular world is a set of propositions. The intension of *what the law provides* is then that function which assigns to every possible world the set of propositions p such that the law provides in that world that p . Of course, that doesn't mean that p holds in that world itself: the law can be broken. And the intension of *what we know* will be that function which assigns to every possible world the set of propositions we know in that world. Quite generally, conversational backgrounds are functions of type $\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle$, functions from worlds to (characteristic functions of) sets of propositions.

Now, consider:

- (45) (In view of what we know,) Brown must have murdered Smith.

The *in view of*-phrase may explicitly signal the intended conversational background. Or, if the phrase is omitted, we can just infer from other clues in the discourse that such an epistemic conversational background is intended. We will focus on the case of pure context-dependency.

How do we get from a conversational background to an accessibility relation? Take the conversational background at work in (45). It will be the following:

(46) $\lambda w. \lambda p. p$ is one of the propositions that we know in w .

This conversational background will assign to any world w the set of propositions p that in w are known by us. So we have a set of propositions. From that we can get the set of worlds in which all of the propositions in this set are true. These are the worlds that are compatible with everything we know. So, this is how we get an accessibility relation:

(47) For any conversational background f of type $\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle$, we define the corresponding accessibility relation R_f of type $\langle s, st \rangle$ as follows:
 $R_f := \lambda w. \lambda w'. \forall p [f(w)(p) = 1 \rightarrow p(w') = 1]$.

In words, w' is f -accessible from w iff all propositions p that are assigned by f to w are true in w' .

Kratzer uses the term **MODAL BASE** for the conversational background that determines the set of accessible worlds. We can be sloppy and use this term for a number of interrelated concepts:

- (i) the conversational background (type $\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle$),
- (ii) the set of propositions assigned by the conversational background to a particular world (type $\langle st, t \rangle$),
- (iii) the accessibility relation (type $\langle s, st \rangle$) determined by (i),
- (iv) the set of worlds accessible from a particular world (type $\langle s, t \rangle$).

Kratzer calls a conversational background (modal base) **REALISTIC** iff it assigns to *any* world a set of propositions that are all true in that world. The modal base *what we know* is realistic, the modal bases *what we believe* and *what we want* are not.

What follows are some (increasingly technical exercises) on conversational backgrounds.

EXERCISE 3.6: Show that a conversational background f is realistic iff the corresponding accessibility relation R_f (defined as in (47)) is reflexive. \square

EXERCISE 3.7: Let us call an accessibility relation **TRIVIAL** if it makes every world accessible from every world. R is **TRIVIAL** iff $\forall w \forall w': w' \in R(w)$. What would the conversational background f have to be like for the accessibility relation R_f to be trivial in this sense? \square

EXERCISE 3.8: The definition in (47) specifies, in effect, a function from $D_{\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle}$ to $D_{\langle s, st \rangle}$. It maps each function f of type $\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle$ to a unique function R_f of type $\langle s, st \rangle$. This mapping is not one-to-one, however. Different elements of $D_{\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle}$ may be mapped to the same value in $D_{\langle s, st \rangle}$.⁷

- Prove this claim. I.e., give an example of two functions f and f' in $D_{\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle}$ for which (47) determines $R_f = R_{f'}$.
- As you have just proved, if every function of type $\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle$ qualifies as a ‘conversational background’, then two different conversational backgrounds can collapse into the same accessibility relation. Conceivably, however, if we imposed further restrictions on conversational backgrounds (i.e., conditions by which only a proper subset of the functions in $D_{\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle}$ would qualify as conversational backgrounds), then the mapping between conversational backgrounds and accessibility relations might become one-to-one after all. In this light, consider the following potential restriction:

(48) Every conversational background f must be “closed under entailment”; i.e., it must meet this condition:

$$\forall w. \forall p [\cap f(w) \subseteq p \rightarrow p \in f(w)].$$

(In words: if the propositions in $f(w)$ taken together entail p , then p must itself be in $f(w)$.) Show that this restriction would ensure that the mapping defined in (47) will be one-to-one. \square

3.4 Supplementary Readings

The most important background readings for this chapter are the following two papers by Kratzer:

7 In this exercise, we systematically substitute sets for their characteristic functions. I.e., we pretend that $D_{\langle s, t \rangle}$ is the power set of W (i.e., elements of $D_{\langle s, t \rangle}$ are sets of worlds), and $D_{\langle st, t \rangle}$ is the power set of $D_{\langle s, t \rangle}$ (i.e., elements of $D_{\langle st, t \rangle}$ are sets of sets of worlds). On these assumptions, the definition in (47) can take the following form:

- (i) For any conversational background f of type $\langle s, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle$, we define the corresponding accessibility relation R_f of type $\langle s, st \rangle$ as follows:

$$R_f := \lambda w. \{w' : \forall p [p \in f(w) \rightarrow w' \in p]\}.$$

The last line of this can be further abbreviated to:

- (ii) $R_f := \lambda w. \cap f(w)$

This formulation exploits a set-theoretic notation which we have also used in condition (48) of the second part of the exercise. It is defined as follows:

- (iii) If S is a set of sets, then $\cap S := \{x : \forall Y [Y \in S \rightarrow x \in Y]\}.$

Angelika Kratzer. 1981. The notional category of modality. In Hans-Jürgen Eikmeyer & Hannes Rieser (eds.), *Words, worlds, and contexts: New approaches in word semantics* (Research in Text Theory 6), 38–74. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Angelika Kratzer. 1991. Modality. In Arnim von Stechow & Dieter Wunderlich (eds.), *Semantics: An international handbook of contemporary research*, 639–650. Berlin: de Gruyter. <https://udrive.oit.umass.edu/kratzer/kratzer-modality.pdf>.

Kratzer has been updating her classic papers for a volume of her collected work on modality and conditionals. These are very much worth studying: <http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/Tc2NjArM/>.

A major new resource on modality is Paul Portner's book:

Paul Portner. 2009. *Modality*. Oxford University Press.

You might also profit from other survey-ish type papers:

Kai von Fintel. 2005. Modality and language. In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), *Encyclopedia of philosophy – second edition*. MacMillan. <http://mit.edu/fintel/fintel-2005-modality.pdf>.

Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies. 2007. An opinionated guide to epistemic modality. In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), *Oxford studies in epistemology: Volume 2*, 32–62. Oxford University Press. <http://mit.edu/fintel/fintel-gillies-2007-ose2.pdf>.

Eric Swanson. 2008. Modality in language. *Philosophy Compass* 3(6). 1193–1207. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00177.x>.

Valentine Hacquard. 2009. Modality. ms, prepared for *Semantics: An international handbook of meaning*, edited by Klaus von Heusinger, Claudia Maienborn, and Paul Portner. http://ling.umd.edu/~hacquard/papers/HoS_Modality_Hacquard.pdf.

On the syntax of modals, there are only a few papers of uneven quality. Some of the more recent work is listed here. Follow up on older references from the bibliographies in these papers.

Rajesh Bhatt. 1997. Obligation and possession. In Heidi Harley (ed.), *Papers from the upenn/mit roundtable on argument structure and aspect*, vol. 32 (MIT Working Papers in Linguistics), 21–40. <http://people.umass.edu/bhatt/papers/bhatt-haveto.pdf>.

Susi Wurmbrand. 1999. Modal verbs must be raising verbs. *West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics (WCCFL)* 18. 599–612. <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.35.7442&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

Annabel Cormack & Neil Smith. 2002. Modals and negation in English. In Sjef Barbiers, Frits Beukema & Wim van der Wurff (eds.), *Modality and its interaction with the verbal system*, 133–163. Benjamins.

Jonny Butler. 2003. A minimalist treatment of modality. *Lingua* 113(10). 967–996. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0024-3841\(02\)00146-8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0024-3841(02)00146-8).

The following paper explores some issues in the LF-syntax of epistemic modals:

Kai von Fintel & Sabine Iatridou. 2003. Epistemic containment. *Linguistic Inquiry* 34(2). 173–198. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002438903321663370>.

Valentine Hacquard's MIT dissertation is a rich source of cross-linguistic issues in modality, as is Fabrice Nauze's Amsterdam dissertation:

Valentine Hacquard. 2006. *Aspects of modality*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology PhD thesis. http://people.umass.edu/hacquard/hacquard_thesis.pdf.

Fabrice Nauze. 2008. *Modality in typological perspective*. Universiteit van Amsterdam PhD thesis. <http://www.illc.uva.nl/Publications/Dissertations/DS-2008-08.text.pdf>.

The semantics of epistemic modals has become a hot topic recently. Here are some of the main references:

Ian Hacking. 1967. Possibility. *The Philosophical Review* 76(2). 143–168. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2183640>. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183640>.

Paul Teller. 1972. Epistemic possibility. *Philosophia* 2(4). 302–320. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02381591>.

Keith DeRose. 1991. Epistemic possibilities. *The Philosophical Review* 100(4). 581–605. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185175>.

Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson. 2005. Epistemic modals in context. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), *Contextualism in philosophy: Knowledge, meaning, and truth*, 131–170. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Andy Egan. 2007. Epistemic modals, relativism, and assertion. *Philosophical Studies* 133(1). 1–22. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9003-x>.

John MacFarlane. 2006. Epistemic modals are assessment-sensitive. ms, University of California, Berkeley, forthcoming in an OUP volume on epistemic modals, edited by Brian Weatherson and Andy Egan. <http://sophos.berkeley.edu/macfarlane/epistmod.pdf>.

Tamina Stephenson. 2007. Judge dependence, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal taste. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 30(4). 487–525. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-008-9023-4>.

John Hawthorne. 2007. Eavesdroppers and epistemic modals. ms, Rutgers University, to appear in the proceedings of the 2007 Sofia Conference in Mexico, in a supplement to *Noûs*.

Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies. 2008a. CIA leaks. *The Philosophical Review* 117(1). 77–98. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-025>.

Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies. 2008b. *Might* made right. To appear in a volume on epistemic modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, Oxford University Press. <http://mit.edu/fintel/fintel-gillies-2008-mm.pdf>.

A recent SALT paper by Pranav Anand and Valentine Hacquard tackles what happens to epistemic modals under attitude predicates:

Pranav Anand & Valentine Hacquard. 2008. Epistemics with attitude. *Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT)* 18. <http://dx.doi.org/1813/13025>.

Evidentiality is a topic closely related to epistemic modality. Some references:

Thomas Willett. 1988. A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticalization of evidentiality. *Studies in Language* 12(1). 51–97.

Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald. 2004. *Evidentiality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hans Bernhard Drubig. 2001. On the syntactic form of epistemic modality. ms, Universität Tübingen. <http://www.sfb441.uni-tuebingen.de/b2/papers/DrubigModality.pdf>.

Eleanor M. Blain & Rose-Marie Déchaine. 2007. Evidential types: Evidence from Cree dialects. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 73(3). 257–291. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/521728>.

Eric McCready & Norry Ogata. 2007. Evidentiality, modality and probability. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 30(2). 147–206. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-007-9017-7>.

Peggy Speas. 2008. On the syntax and semantics of evidentials. *Language and Linguistics Compass* 2(5). 940–965. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-818X.2008.00069.x>.

Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies. 2010. *Must* ... stay ... strong! *Natural Language Semantics* 18(4). 351–383. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11050-010-9058-2>.

Modals interact with disjunction and indefinites to generate so-called FREE CHOICE-readings, which are a perennial puzzle. Here is just a very small set of initial references:

Hans Kamp. 1973. Free choice permission. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series* 74. 57–74. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544849>.

- Thomas Ede Zimmermann. 2000. Free choice disjunction and epistemic possibility. *Natural Language Semantics* 8(4). 255–290. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1011255819284>.
- Katrin Schulz. 2005. A pragmatic solution for the paradox of free choice permission. *Synthese* 147(2). 343–377. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-1353-y>.
- Maria Aloni. 2007. Free choice, modals, and imperatives. *Natural Language Semantics* 15(1). 65–94. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11050-007-9010-2>.
- Luis Alonso-Ovalle. 2006. *Disjunction in alternative semantics*. University of Massachusetts at Amherst PhD thesis. http://alonso-ovalle.net/index.php?page_id=28.
- Danny Fox. 2007. Free choice and the theory of scalar implicatures. In Uli Sauerland & Penka Stateva (eds.), *Presupposition and implicature in compositional semantics*, 537–586. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. http://web.mit.edu/linguistics/people/faculty/fox/free_choice.pdf.
- Robert van Rooij. 2006. Free choice counterfactual donkeys. *Journal of Semantics* 23(4). 383–402. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffl004>.

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CHAPTER FOUR

CONDITIONALS

We integrate conditionals into the semantics of modal expressions that we are developing. We show that the material implication analysis and the strict implication analysis are inferior to the restrictor analysis. Our discussion will remain focussed on some simple questions and we refer you to the rich literature on conditionals for further topics.

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4.1 The Material Implication Analysis

Consider the following example:

- (1) If I am healthy, I will come to class.

The simplest analysis of such conditional constructions is the so-called MATERIAL IMPLICATION analysis,¹ which treats *if* as contributing a truth-function operating on the truth-values of the two component sentences (which are called the ANTECEDENT and CONSEQUENT — from Latin — or PROTASIS and APODOSIS — from Greek). The lexical entry for *if* would look as follows:

- (2) $\llbracket \text{if} \rrbracket = \lambda u \in D_t. \lambda v \in D_t. u = 0 \text{ or } v = 1.$

¹ Quoth the Stoic philosopher Philo of Megara: “a true conditional is one which does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent” (according to [Empiricus \(c. 200, pp. II, 110–112\)](#)).

Note that as a truth-functional connective, this *if* does not vary its denotation depending on the evaluation world. It's its arguments that vary with the evaluation world.

Applied to example in (1), this semantics would predict that the example is false just in case the antecedent is true, I am healthy, but the consequent false, I do not come to class. Otherwise, the sentence is true. We will see that there is much to complain about here. But one should realize that under the assumption that *if* denotes a truth-function, *this one* is the most plausible candidate.

Suber (1997) does a good job of persuading (or at least trying to persuade) recalcitrant logic students:

After saying all this, it is important to note that material implication does conform to some of our ordinary intuitions about implication. For example, take the conditional statement, *If I am healthy, I will come to class*. We can symbolize it: $H \supset C$.²

The question is: when is this statement false? When will I have broken my promise? There are only four possibilities:

H	C	$H \supset C$
T	T	?
T	F	?
F	T	?
F	F	?

- In case #1, I am healthy and I come to class. I have clearly kept my promise; the conditional is true.
- In case #2, I am healthy, but I have decided to stay home and read magazines. I have broken my promise; the conditional is false.
- In case #3, I am not healthy, but I have come to class anyway. I am sneezing all over you, and you're not happy about it, but I did not violate my promise; the conditional is true.
- In case #4, I am not healthy, and I did not come to class. I did not violate my promise; the conditional is true.

But this is exactly the outcome required by the material implication. The compound is only false when the antecedent is true and the consequence is false (case #2); it is true every other time.

Despite the initial plausibility of the analysis, it cannot be maintained. Consider this example:

2 The symbol \supset which Suber uses here is called the “horseshoe”. We have been using the right arrow \rightarrow as the symbol for implication. We think that this is much preferable to the confusing horseshoe symbol. There is an intimate connection between universal quantification, material implication, and the subset relation, usually symbolized as \subset , which is the other way round from the horseshoe. The horseshoe can be traced back to the notation introduced by Peano (1889), a capital C standing for ‘consequenza’ facing backwards. The C facing in the other “logical” direction was actually introduced first by Gergonne (1817), but didn't catch on.

- (3) If there is a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow, my house will collapse.

If we adopt the material implication analysis, we predict that (3) will be false just in case there is indeed a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow but my house fails to collapse. This makes a direct prediction about when the negation of (3) should be true. A false prediction, if ever there was one:

- (4) a. It's not true that if there is a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow, my house will collapse.
 b. \neq There will be a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow, and my house will fail to collapse.

Clearly, one might think that (4a) is true without at all being committed to what the material implication analysis predicts to be the equivalent statement in (4b). This is one of the inadequacies of the material implication analysis.

These inadequacies are sometimes referred to as the “paradoxes of material implication”. But that is misleading. As far as logic is concerned, there is nothing wrong with the truth-function of material implication. It is well-behaved and quite useful in logical systems. What is arguable is that it is not to be used as a reconstruction of what conditionals mean in natural language.

EXERCISE 4.1: Under the assumption that *if* has the meaning in (2), calculate the truth-conditions predicted for (5):

- (5) a. No student will succeed if he goofs off.
 b. No student λx (if x goofs off, x will succeed)

State the predicted truth-conditions in words and evaluate whether they correspond to the actual meaning of (5). \square

A problem that is not often raised for the material implication analysis is how badly it interacts with the analysis of modal expressions, once we look at sentences involving both a conditional clause and a modal. Consider:

- (6) If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
 (7) If you keep this fern dry, it cannot grow.

We need to consider two possible LFs for these sentences, depending on whether wider scope is given to the modal or to the conditional clause. For example, in the margin you see LFs A and B for (6).




Figure 4.1: LF A for (6)




Figure 4.2: LF B for (6)




Figure 4.3: A schematic map of the relevant area in Texas

The reading for (6) we have in mind is an epistemic one; imagine for instance that (6) is uttered in a car by Mary to Susan, while Susan is driving and Mary is looking at a map. The information provided by the map, together with other background knowledge, constitutes the relevant context for the modal *might* here. The accessibility relation is roughly this:

- (8) $\lambda w. \lambda w'. w'$ is compatible with what the map says in w and what Mary knows about the geography of the relevant area in w .

Let's suppose (6) is uttered in the actual world w_0 and we are interested in its truth-value at this world. We now proceed to show that neither of the LFs A and B represent the intuitively natural meaning of (6) if we assume the material implication analysis of *if*.

Consider first LF A. There are two respects in which the predicted truth-conditions for this LF deviate from intuitive judgment. First, suppose that Susan and Mary are not on Route 183 in w_0 . Then (6) is predicted to be true in w_0 , regardless of the geographical facts, e.g. even if Lockhart is nowhere near Route 183. This is counterintuitive. Imagine the following quite sensible dialogue:

- (9) Mary: If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
 Susan (stops the car and looks at the map): You are wrong. Look here, Route 183 doesn't run anywhere near Lockhart.

If Mary concedes Susan's claim that Route 183 doesn't go through Lockhart, she has to also concede that her original assertion was false. It wouldn't do for her to respond: "I know that 183 runs about 10 miles east of Lockhart, but maybe we are not on Route 183, so I may still be right." Yet we predict that this should be a reasonable way for her to defend (6).

A second inadequacy is this: we predict that the truth of the consequent of (6) is a sufficient condition for the truth of (6) as a whole. If this were right, it would take very little for (6) to be true. As long as the map and the rest of Mary's knowledge in w_0 don't rule out the possibility that they are in Lockhart, *we might be in Lockhart* will be true in w_0 — regardless, once again, of whether Lockhart is anywhere near 183. It should therefore be reasonable for Mary to continue the dialogue in (9) with the rejoinder: "But how can you be so sure we are not in Lockhart?" According to intuitive judgment, however, this would not be a

pertinent remark and certainly would not help Mary defend (6) against Susan's objection.

Now let's look at LF B, where the modal has widest scope. Given the material implication analysis of *if*, this is predicted to mean, in effect: "It might be the case that we are either in Lockhart or not on Route 183". This truth-condition is also far too easy to satisfy: All it takes is that the map and the rest of Mary's knowledge in w_0 are compatible with Mary and Susan not being on Route 183, or that they are compatible with their being in Lockhart. So as long as it isn't certain that they are on Route 183, Mary should be justified in asserting (6), regardless, once again, of her information about the relative location of Lockhart and Route 183.

EXERCISE 4.2: Show that similar difficulties arise for the analysis of (7). \square

4.2 The Strict Implication Analysis

Some of the problems we encountered would go away if we treated *if* as introducing a modal meaning. The simplest way to do that would be to treat it as a universal quantifier over possible worlds. *If* p , q would simply mean that the set of p -worlds is a subset of the q -worlds. This kind of analysis is usually called STRICT IMPLICATION. The difference between *if* and *must* would be that *if* takes an overt restrictive argument. Here is what the lexical entry for *if* might look like:

$$(IO) \quad \llbracket \text{if} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda p \in D_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \lambda q \in D_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \forall w': p(w') = 1 \rightarrow q(w') = 1.$$

(in set talk: $p \subseteq q$)

Applied to (3), we would derive the truth-conditions that (3) is true iff all of the worlds where there is a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow are worlds where my house collapses.

We immediately note that this analysis has the same problem of non-contingency that we faced with one of our early attempts at a quantificational semantics for modals like *must* and *may*. The obvious way to fix this here is to assume that *if* takes a covert accessibility function as one of its arguments. The antecedent clause then serves as an additional restrictive device. Here is the proposal:

$$(II) \quad \llbracket \text{if} \rrbracket^{w,g} = \lambda R \in D_{\langle s, \langle s,t \rangle \rangle}. \lambda p \in D_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \lambda q \in D_{\langle s,t \rangle}. \\ \forall w': (R(w)(w') = 1 \ \& \ p(w') = 1) \rightarrow q(w') = 1.$$

(in set talk: $R(w) \cap p \subseteq q$)

If we understand (3) as involving an epistemic accessibility relation, it would claim that among the worlds epistemically accessible from the actual world (i.e. the worlds compatible with what we know), those where there is a major earthquake in Cambridge tomorrow are worlds where my house collapses. This would appear to be quite adequate — although potentially traumatic to me.

EXERCISE 4.3: Can you come up with examples where a conditional is interpreted relative to a non-epistemic accessibility relation? □

EXERCISE 4.4: What prediction does the strict implication analysis make about the negated conditional in (4a)? □

What happens when we let this analysis loose on (6)? We again need to assess two LF's depending on the relative scope of *if* and *might*. Both LF's would have two covert variables over accessibility relations, one for *if* and one for *might*. Before we can assess the adequacy of the two candidate analyses, we need to decide what the contextually salient values for the accessibility relations might be. One would think that the epistemic accessibility relation that we have already encountered is the most likely value, and in fact for both variables.




Figure 4.4: LF A' for (6)




Figure 4.5: LF B' for (6)

Next, we need to consider the particular epistemic state that Mary is in. By assumption, Mary does not know where they are. Nothing in her visual environment helps her figure out where they are. She does see from the map that if they are on Route 183, one of the towns they might be in is Lockhart. But she doesn't know whether they are on Route 183. Even if they *are* on 183, she doesn't know that they are and her epistemic state would still be what it is: one of being lost.

Consider then LF A', with the modal in the scope of the conditional. Here, we derive the claim that all worlds w' compatible with what Mary knows in w and where they are on 183 are such that some world w'' compatible with what Mary knows in w' is such that they are in Lockhart. Is that adequate? Not really. We have just convinced ourselves that whether they are on 183 or not has no relevant influence on Mary's epistemic state, since she wouldn't know it either way. But that means that our analysis would predict that (6) is true as long as it is possible as far as Mary knows that they are in Lockhart. Whether they are on 183 or not doesn't change that. So, we would expect (6) to not be distinct in truth-value from something like:

(12) If we are on the Route 80, we might be in Lockhart.

But that is not right — Mary knows quite well that if they are on the Route 80, they cannot be in Lockhart.

Turning to LF B', with the modal having widest scope, doesn't help us either. Here, we would derive the claim that it is compatible with what Mary knows that from being on 183 it follows (according to what she knows) that they are in Lockhart. Clearly, that is not what (6) means. Mary doesn't consider it possible that if they are on 183, she knows that they are in Lockhart. After all, she's well aware that she doesn't know where they are.

4.3 *If*-Clauses as Restrictors

The problem we have encountered here with the interaction of an *if*-clause and the modal operator *might* is similar to others that have been noted in the literature. Most influentially, David Lewis in his paper "Adverbs of Quantification" showed how hard it is to find an adequate analysis of the interaction of *if*-clauses and ADVERBS OF QUANTIFICATION like *never*, *rarely*, *sometimes*, *often*, *usually*, *always*. Lewis proposed that in the cases he was considering, the adverb is the only operator at work and that the *if*-clause serves to restrict the adverb. Thus, it has much the same function that a common noun phrase has in a determiner-quantification.

The *if* of our restrictive *if*-clauses should not be regarded as a sentential connective. It has no meaning apart from the adverb it restricts. The *if* in *always if*..., ..., *sometimes if*..., ..., and the rest is on a par with the non-connective *and* in *between ... and* ..., with the non-connective *or* in *whether ... or* ..., or with the non-connective *if* in *the probability that ... if*.... It serves merely to mark an argument-place in a polyadic construction. D. Lewis 1975, p. 11

Building on Lewis' insight, Kratzer argued for a uniform treatment of *if*-clauses as restrictors. She claimed that

the history of the conditional is the story of a syntactic mistake. There is no two-place *if*... *then* connective in the logical forms of natural languages. *If*-clauses are devices for restricting the domains of various operators. (Kratzer 1986)

Let us repeat this:

(13) KRATZER'S THESIS

If-clauses are devices for restricting the domains of various operators.

Kratzer's Thesis gives a unified picture of the semantics of conditional clauses. Note that it is not meant to supplant previous accounts of the meaning of

conditionals. It just says that what those accounts are analyzing is not the meaning of *if* itself but the meaning of the operators that *if*-clauses restrict.

Let us see how this idea helps us with our Lockhart-sentence. The idea is to deny that there are two quantifiers over worlds in (6). Instead, the *if*-clause merely contributes a further restriction to the modal *might*. In effect, the modal is not quantifying over *all* the worlds compatible with Mary's knowledge but only over those where they are on Route 183. It then claims that at least some of those worlds are worlds where they are in Lockhart. We cannot anymore derive the problematic conclusion that it should also be true that if they are on the Route 80, they might be in Lockhart. In all, we have a good analysis of what (6) means.




Figure 4.6: LF C for
(6)

What we don't yet have is a compositional calculation. What does it mean in structural terms for the *if*-clause to be restricting the domain of the modal? We will assume a structure as in LF C. Here, the *if*-clause is the sister to what used to be the covert set-of-worlds argument of the modal. As you can see, we have chosen the variant of the semantics for modals that was discussed in Section 3.2.5. The idea now is that the two restrictive devices work together: we just feed to the modal the *intersection* of (i) the set of worlds that are R-accessible from the actual world, and (ii) the set of worlds where they are on Route 183.

EXERCISE 4.5: To make the composition work, we need to be able to intersect the set of accessible worlds with the antecedent proposition. This could be done in two ways: (i) a new composition principle, which would be a slight modification of the PREDICATE MODIFICATION rule, (ii) give *if* a functional meaning that accomplishes the intersection. Formulate such a meaning for *if*.

Alternatively, we could do without the w^* device and instead give *if* a meaning that takes a proposition p and then modifies an accessibility relation to give a new accessibility relation, which is restricted to p -worlds. Formulate such a meaning for *if*. □

What about cases like (3), now? Here there is no modal operator for the *if*-clause to restrict. Should we revert to treating *if* as an operator on its own? Kratzer proposes that we should not and that such cases simply involve covert modal operators.

Supplementary Readings

A short handbook article on conditionals:

Kai von Fintel. 2009. Conditionals. ms, prepared for *Semantics: An international handbook of meaning*, edited by Klaus von Heusinger, Claudia Maienborn, and Paul Portner. <http://mit.edu/fintel/fintel-2009-hsk-conditionals.pdf>.

Overviews of the philosophical work on conditionals:

Dorothy Edgington. 1995. On conditionals. *Mind* 104(414). 235–329. [10.1093/mind/104.414.235](https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/104.414.235).

Jonathan Bennett. 2003. *A philosophical guide to conditionals*. Oxford University Press.

A handbook article on the logic of conditionals:

Donald Nute. 1984. Conditional logic. In Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenther (eds.), *Handbook of philosophical logic. volume ii*, 387–439. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Three indispensable classics:

David Lewis. 1973. *Counterfactuals*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Robert Stalnaker. 1968. A theory of conditionals. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), *Studies in logical theory* (American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series 2), 98–112. Oxford: Blackwell.

Robert Stalnaker. 1975. Indicative conditionals. *Philosophia* 5(3). 269–286. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02379021>.

The Restrictor Analysis:

David Lewis. 1975. Adverbs of quantification. In Edward Keenan (ed.), *Formal semantics of natural language*, 3–15. Cambridge University Press.

Angelika Kratzer. 1986. Conditionals. *Chicago Linguistics Society* 22(2). 1–15. <https://udrive.oit.umass.edu/kratzer/kratzer-conditionals.pdf>.

The application of the restrictor analysis to the interaction of nominal quantifiers and conditionals:

Kai von Fintel. 1998. Quantifiers and ‘if’-clauses. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 48(191). 209–214. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00095>. <http://mit.edu/fintel/www/qandif.pdf>.

Kai von Fintel & Sabine Iatridou. 2002. If and when *If*-clauses can restrict quantifiers. ms, MIT. <http://mit.edu/fintel/fintel-iatridou-2002-ifwhen.pdf>.

James Higginbotham. 2003. Conditionals and compositionality. *Philosophical Perspectives* 17(1). 181–194. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2003.00008.x>.

Sarah-Jane Leslie. 2009. *If, unless, and quantification*. In Robert J. Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), *Compositionality, context and semantic values: Essays in honour of Ernie Lepore*, 3–30. Springer. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8310-5_1.

Janneke Huitink. 2009b. Quantified conditionals and compositionality. ms, to appear in *Language and Linguistics Compass*. <http://user.uni-frankfurt.de/~huitink/compass-conditionals-final.pdf>.

Syntax of conditionals:

Kai von Fintel. 1994. *Restrictions on quantifier domains*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts PhD thesis. <http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/jA3N2IwN/fintel-1994-thesis.pdf>, Chapter 3: “Conditional Restrictors”

Sabine Iatridou. 1993. On the contribution of conditional *Then*. *Natural Language Semantics* 2(3). 171–199. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01256742>.

Rajesh Bhatt & Roumyana Pancheva. 2006. Conditionals. In *The Blackwell companion to syntax*, vol. 1, 638–687. Blackwell. http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~pancheva/bhatt-pancheva_syncom.pdf.

A shifty alternative to the restrictor analysis:

Anthony S. Gillies. 2009. On truth-conditions for *if* (but not quite only *if*). *The Philosophical Review* 118(3). 325–349. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2009-002>.

Anthony S. Gillies. 2010. Iffiness. *Semantics and Pragmatics* 3(4). 1–42. <http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.3.4>.

The Belnap alternative:

Jr. Belnap Nuel D. 1970. Conditional assertion and restricted quantification. *Noûs* 4(1). 1–12. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214285>.

Jr. Belnap Nuel D. 1973. Restricted quantification and conditional assertion. In Hugues Leblanc (ed.), *Truth, syntax and modality: Proceedings of the Temple University conference on alternative semantics*, vol. 68 (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics), 48–75. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Kai von Fintel. 2007. *If*: The biggest little word. Slides from a plenary address given at the Georgetown University Roundtable, March 8, 2007. <http://mit.edu/fintel/gurt-slides.pdf>.

Janneke Huitink. 2008. *Modals, conditionals and compositionality*. Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen PhD thesis. <http://user.uni-frankfurt.de/~huitink/Huitink-dissertation.pdf>, Chapters 1 and 2 give a nice summary of what we’re covering in this class, while Chapter 5 is about the Belnap-method.

Janneke Huitink. 2009a. Domain restriction by conditional connectives. ms, Goethe-University Frankfurt. <http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/zg2MDM4M/Huitink-domainrestriction.pdf>.

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