Introduction to the C. S. Lewis Course

"Coruscation" – a sudden flash of brilliance as in lightning coruscating on the horizon during a storm, or fireflies coruscating across the lawn on a humid summer evening.

C. S. Lewis wrote:
"Gratitude exclaims very properly, 'How good of God to give me this!' but adoration asks, 'What must that Being be like whose far off and momentary coruscations are like this!' One's mind runs back up the sunbeam to the sun."
Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer Chapter 17.

"I believe in Christianity as I believe the sun is risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else." C. S. Lewis *Is Theology Poetry*

"The whole man was in all his judgments and activities, and a discriminating zest for life, for 'Common Life', informs every page he wrote. 'Grete Clerke' As he was, he was never willfully esoteric: quotations and illusions rose unbidden to the surface of his full and fertile mind, but whether they are to Tristram Shandy or James Thurber, they elucidate, not decorate, his works are all of a piece. A book in one genre will correct, illumine or amplify what is latent in another." -- J.A.W. Bennett, speaking at his inaugural address for the Chair of Medieval and Renaissance Literature, Cambridge University (Also a former student of C. S. Lewis)

The goal of this course is to have the student be exposed to the width of C. S. Lewis's thought and work. It will be discovered that he sought to connect two halves to himself, the Romantic and the Rational (the heartfelt and the intellectual) and that he thought Christianity was the supreme way to do this. Consequently this course will explore his thought romantically then rationally, this will be done by looking at his pilgrimage to faith. These sections will be followed by material concerning Lewis's approach to the problem of evil, the religions of the world and Lewis's literary critical approach.

C. S. Lewis: Course Notes—Table of Contents

I. A Romantic Approach To Theology

A. Definitions from the preface to The Pilgrim's Regress:
"I think we can distinguish at least seven kinds of things which are called Romantic." P. 6

1. Stories about dangerous adventure

    a. Dangerous adventure in past or remote places

    b. Alexander Dumas is classified under this category (i.e., The Three Musketeers; The Count of Monte Cristo

    c. Lewis liked this category very little

2. The marvelous is 'Romantic'

    a. Magicians, ghosts, fairies, witches, dragons, nymphs, and dwarfs

    b. Qualifier: ". . . provided it does not make part of the believed religion." P. 6

    c. Lewis always loved this type

3. The art of dealing with 'Titanic' characters

    a. Used the word 'Romanesque' to describe this type

    b. Dryden's heroic dramas; The works of Rostand and Sidney; The art of Michelangelo

    c. Lewis acquired a taste for this after he was grown up

4. 'Romanticism' can also mean the indulgence in abnormal, and finally in anti-natural moods

    a. The macabre, interest in torture, and a love of death

    b. The works of Poe, Wagner's opera Tristan, surrealism

    c. Lewis detested this type

5. Egoism and subjectivism are 'Romantic'

    a. Rousseau's Confessions, The works of Byron and Proust

b. Lewis detested this type

6. Every revolt against existing civilization and conventions whether it look forward to revolution, or backward to the 'Primitive' is called 'Romantic' by some people

   a. D.H. Lawrence, Walt Whitman and Wagner are in this sense romantic

   b. Lewis does not specifically comment on his like or dislike of this category

7. Sensibility to natural objects, when solemn and enthusiastic, is 'Romantic'

   a. Wordsworth <u>The Prelude</u>, Keats, Shelly and Goethe

   b. Again Lewis makes no comment about likes or dislikes

8. Lewis introduces an eighth category

   a. ". . . What I meant by "Romanticism" when I wrote <u>The Pilgrim's Regress</u> . . was a particular recurrent experience which dominated my childhood and adolescence and which I hastily called 'Romantic' because inanimate nature and marvelous literature were among the things that evoked it. I still believe the experience is common, commonly misunderstood, and of immense importance; but I know now that in other minds it arises under other stimuli and is entangled with other irrelevancies and that to bring it into the forefront of consciousness is not so easy as I once supposed. I will now try to describe it sufficiently . . ." P. 7

   b. "The experience is one of intense longing. It is distinguished from other longings by two things." P. 7

      1) "In the first place, though the sense of want is acute and even painful, yet the mere wanting is felt to be somehow a delight. Other desires are felt as pleasures

only if satisfaction is expected in the near future: Hunger is pleasant only while we know (or believe) that we are soon to eat. But this desire, even when there is no hope of possible satisfaction, continues to be prized, and even to be preferred to anything else in the world, by those who have once felt it. This hunger is better than any other fullness; this poverty better than all other wealth. And thus if it comes about, "That if the desire is long absent, it may be itself desired, and that new desiring becomes a new instance of the original desire, though the subject may not at once recognize the fact and thus cries out for his lost youth of soul at the very moment in which he is being rejuvenated. This sounds complicated, but it is simple when we live it. 'Oh to feel as I did then!' we cry, not noticing that even while we say the words the very feeling whose loss we lament is rising again in all its old bitter-sweetness. For this sweet Desire cuts across our ordinary distinctions between wanting and having, to have it is, by definition, a want: To want it, we find, is to have it." PP. 7&8

2)" In the second place, there is a peculiar mystery about the object of this Desire. Inexperience people (and inattention leave some inexperienced all their lives) suppose, when they feel it, that they know what they are desiring. Thus if it comes to a child while he is looking at far-off hillside he at once thinks 'if only I were there'; if it comes when he is remembering some event in the past, he thinks 'if only I could go back to those days'. If it comes (a little later) while he is reading a "Romantic' tale or poem of 'Perilous seas and faerie lands forlorn', he thinks he is wishing that such places really existed and that he could reach them. If it comes (later still) in a context with erotic suggestions he believes he is desiring the perfect beloved. If he falls upon literature (like Maeterlinck or the early Yeats) which treats of spirits and the like with some show of serious belief, he may think he is hankering for real magic and occultism. When it darts out at him from his studies in history or science, he may confuse it with the intellectual craving for knowledge. But everyone of these impressions is wrong. The sole merit I claim for this book is that it is written by one who has proved them all to be wrong. . . . it is fools, they say, who learn by experience. But since they do at last learn, let a fool bring his

experience into the common stock that wiser men may profit by it."

c. "Everyone of these supposed objects for the Desire is inadequate to it." P. 9

1) I fled Him, down the nights and down the days;
I fled Him down the arches of the years;
I fled Him down the labyrinthine ways
Of my own mind; and in the midst of tears
I hid from Him, and under running laughter.
Up vistaed hopes I sped;
And shot, precipitated,
Adown titanic glooms of chasmed fears,
From those strong Feet that followed, followed after.
But with unhurrying chase
And unpreturbed pace,
Deliberate speed, majestic instancy,
They beat—and a Voice beat
More instant than the Feet—
"All things betray thee, who betrayest Me."
….
"Naught shelters thee, who wilt not shelter Me."
….
"Lo naught contents thee, who content'st not Me."
….

Now of that long pursuit
Comes on at hand the bruit;
That Voice is round me like a bursting sea:
"And is thy earth so marred,
Shattered in shard on shard?
Lo, all things fly thee, for thou flyest Me!
Strange, piteous, futile thing,
Wherefore should any set thee love apart?
Seeing none but I makes much of naught" (He said),
"And human love needs human meriting:
How hast thou merited—
Of all man's clotted clay the dingiest clot?
Alack, thou knowest not
How little worthy of love thou art!
Whom wilt thou find to love ignoble thee
Save Me, save only Me?
All which I took from thee I did but take,

Not for thy harms,
But just that thou might'st seek it in My arms.
All which thy child's mistake
Fancies as lost, I have stored for thee at home;
Rise clasp my hand, and come!"

Halts by me that footfall:
Is my gloom, after all,
Shade of His hand, outstretched caressingly?
"Ah, fondest, blindest, weakest,
I am He, Whom thou seekest!
Thou dravest love from thee, who dravest Me."

--Francis Thompson, "The Hound of Heaven"

2) "Few things are necessary, really only one."
--Jesus Luke 10:42

3) ". . . The Human soul was made to enjoy some object that is never fully given." P. 10

d. "This desire was, in the soul, as the Siege Perilous in Arthur's castle--the chair in which only one could sit. And if nature makes nothing in vain, the <u>one</u> who can sit in this chair must exist. I knew only too well how easily the longing accepts false objects and through what dark ways the pursuit of them leads us; but I also saw that the Desire itself contains the corrective of all these errors. The only fatal error was to pretend that you had passed from desire to fruition, when in reality, you had found either nothing, or desire itself, or the satisfaction of some different desire. The dialectic of Desire, faithfully followed, would retrieve all mistakes, head you off from all false paths, and force you not to propound, but to live through a sort of ontological proof. This lived dialectic, and the merely argued dialectic of my philosophical progress, seemed to have converged on my one goal; accordingly I tried to put them both into my allegory <u>[The Pilgrim's Regress]</u> which thus became a defense of Romanticism (in my peculiar sense) as well as of Reason and Christianity." P. 10

B. Biographical development of a 'Romantic' approach to theology

1. Recognized that this 'Romantic' impulse was part of his experience from childhood. "What neither [my father] nor my mother had the least taste for was that kind of literature to which my allegiance was given the moment I could choose books for myself. Neither had ever listened for the horns of Elfland. . . . If I am a Romantic my parents bear no responsibility for it." Surprised by Joy P. 5

a.". . . Absence of beauty, now that I come to think of it, is characteristic of our childhood. No pictures on the walls of my father's house ever attracted--and indeed none deserved--our attention. We never saw a beautiful building nor imagined that a building could be beautiful. My earliest experiences, if indeed they were aesthetic, were not of that kind; they were already incurably romantic, not formal." Surprised By Joy PP 6&7

1) Formal

a) Plato's "Cave"

b) Aristotle's "Four Causes": Formal, Material, Efficient and Final

2) "Meditation in a Tool Shed," God in the Dock
Two ways to know about a thing (cf. Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity).

3) Illustrations:

a) The Place of The Lion, Charles Williams--The difference between Damaris Tighe and her father

b) That Hideous Strength --Mr. Bultitude PP. 362-363

b. "Once in those very early days my brother brought into the nursery the lid of a biscuit tin which he had covered with moss and garnished with twigs and flowers so as to make it a toy garden or a toy forest. That was the first beauty I ever knew. What the real garden had failed to do the toy garden did. It made me aware of nature--not, indeed as a storehouse of forms and colors but as something cool, dewy, fresh, exuberant. I do not think the impression was very important at the moment, but it soon became important in memory. As long as I live my imagination of paradise will retain something of my brother's toy garden. Surprised by Joy P. 7

c. Other examples from Lewis' childhood and youth

1) The green hills (The Castle Reagh Hills) which the young Lewis could see from his nursery windows. Surprised by Joy P. 7

a) "Thus if it comes to a child while he is looking at far-off hillside he at once thinks 'if only I were there'. . ." Pilgrim's Regress P. 8

b) "They [the hills] taught me longing--Sehnsucht; Made me for good or ill, and before I was six years old, a votary of the Blue Flower."Surprised by Joy.

P. 7.

2) What C. S. Lewis called "Imaginative . . .Experiences" (Chronicled on PP. 16-18 Surprised by Joy)

a) "The first is itself the memory of a memory. As I stood beside a flowering currant bush on a summer day there suddenly arose in me without warning, and as if from a depth not of years but of centuries, the memory at the Old House when my brother had brought his toy garden into the nursery. It is difficult to find words strong enough for the sensation which came over me; Milton's "Enormous Bliss" of Eden . . . comes somewhat near to it. It was a sensation, of course, of desire; but desire for what? Not, certainly, for a biscuit tin filled with moss, nor even (though it came into it) for my own past. . . . And before I knew what I desired, the desire itself was gone, the whole glimpse withdrawn, the world turned commonplace again, or only stirred by a longing for the longing that had just ceased. It had taken only a moment of time; and in a certain sense everything else that ever happened to me was insignificant in comparison." Surprised by Joy P. 16

b)" The second glimpse came through Squirrel Nutkin . . .with what I can only describe as the Idea of Autumn. .. . The experience was one of intense desire. And one went back to the book, not to gratify the desire. . . But to reawake it." Surprised by Joy P. 16-17

c) "The third glimpse came through poetry. I had become fond of Longfellow's Saga of King Olaf . . . . . .There came a moment when I idly turned the pages of the book and found the unrhymed translation of "Tegner's Drapa' and read

I heard a voice that cried,
Balder the beautiful

is dead, is dead—

> "I knew nothing about Balder; but instantly I was uplifted into huge regions of Northern Sky, I desired with almost sickening intensity something never to be described (except that it is cold, spacious, severe, pale and remote) and then, as in the other examples, found myself at the very same moment already falling of that desire and wishing I were back in it." Surprised by Joy P. 17

3) Lewis summarized these 'Imaginative Experiences' as follows:

> "The reader who finds these three episodes of no interest need read this book no further, for in a sense the central story of my life is about nothing else. For those who are still disposed to proceed I will only underline the quality common to the three experiences, it is that of an unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction. I call it Joy, which is here a technical term and must be sharply distinguished both from Happiness and from Pleasure. Joy (in my sense) has indeed one characteristic; and one only, in common with them the fact that anyone who has experience it will want it again. Apart from that, and considered only in its quality, it might equally be called a particular kind of unhappiness or grief. But then it is a kind we want. I doubt whether anyone who has tasted it would ever if both were in his power, exchange it for all the pleasures in the world. But then Joy is never in our power and pleasure often is."
> Surprised by Joy PP. 17-18

a) Explanation of "The Brown Girls" in The Pilgrims Regress Chapters 4-6

b) "Joy is not a substitute for sex; sex is very often a substitute for Joy. I sometimes wonder

whether all pleasure are not substitute for Joy." Surprised by Joy P. 170

c) The Weight of Glory P. 2
"Our Lord finds our desires, not too strong, but too weak. We are half-hearted creatures, fooling around with drink and sex and ambition when infinite Joy is offered us, like an ignorant child who wants to go on making mud pies in a slum because he cannot imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday at sea.We are far too easily pleased.

4) His interest in Wagner and in the Arthur Rackham illustrated, Siegfried and the Twilight of the Gods, rekindled some of his Joy. Surprised by Joy, "Renaissance".

5) "Turning to the Bookstall, I picked out an Everyman in a dirty jacket, Phantatees, A Faerie Romance, by George MacDonald." Surprised by Joy P. 179
"That night my imagination was, in a certain sense baptized; the rest of me, not unnaturally, took longer. I had not the faintest notion what I had let myself in for by buying Phantastees. Ibid. P. 181

d. Lewis found that all of his reading began to close in on him.

1) "In reading Chesterton, as in reading MacDonald, I did not know what I was letting myself in for. A young

man who wished to remain a sound Atheist cannot be too careful of his reading. There are traps everywhere--"Bibles laid open, millions of surprises," as Herbert says, "fine nets and stratagems," God is, if I may say it, very unscrupulous." Surprised by Joy P. 191

2) "I must have been as blind as a bat not to have seen, long before, the ludicrous contradiction between my theory of life and my actual experiences as a reader. George MacDonald had done more to me than any other writer; of course it was a pity he had that bee in his bonnet about Christianity. He was good *in spite of it.* Chesterton had more sense than all the other moderns put together; bating, of course his Christianity. Johnson was one of the few authors who I felt I could trust utterly; curiously enough, he had the same kink. Spencer and Milton by a strange coincidence had it too. Even among ancient authors the same paradox was to be found. The most religious (Plato, Aeschylus, Virgil) were clearly those on whom I could really feed. On the other hand, those writers who did not suffer from religion and with whom in theory my sympathy ought to have been complete--Shaw and Wells and Mill and Gibbon and Voltaire--all seems a little thin; what as boys we called "tinny." It wasn't that I didn't like them. They were all (especially Gibbon) entertaining; but hardly more. There seemed to be no depth in them. They were too simple. The roughness and density of life did not appear in their books.

Now that I was reading more English, the paradox began to be aggravated. I was deeply moved by the *Dream of the Road*, more deeply still by Langland; intoxicated (for a time) by Donne; deeply and lastingly satisfied by Thomas Browne. But the most alarming of all was George Herbert. Here was a man who seemed to me to excel all the authors I had ever read in conveying the very quality of life as we actually live it from moment to moment; but the wretched fellow, instead of doing it all directly, insisted on mediating it through what I would still have called "the Christian mythology." On the other

hand most of the authors who might be claimed as precursors of modern enlightenment seemed to me very small beer and bored me cruelly. I thought Bacon (to speak frankly) a solemn, pretentious ass, yawned my way through Restoration Comedy, and, having manfully struggled on to the last line of *Don Juan*, wrote on the end leaf "Never again." The only non-Christians who seemed to me really to know anything were the Romantics; and a good many of them were dangerously tinged with something like religion, even at times with Christianity. The upshot of it all could nearly be expressed in a perversion of Roland's great line in the *Chanson*--

Christians are wrong, but all the rest are bores.

The natural step would have been to inquire a little more closely whether the Christians were, after all wrong." Surprised by Joy PP. 213-215

Lewis, of course, made this inquiry and came to believe in God in 1929 and in Christianity in 1931. He was led by the imagination and a concern for meaning and significance. (cf. Italian playwright, Luigi Pirandello's "Six Characters in Search of an Author").

2. Lewis described his conversion by using poetic imagery
llustration: Hamlet and Shakespeare [Consider a further development of this idea as mediated through Lewis's concept of *Transposition*.

3. The use of romantic symbols, poetic language, metaphor and imagination as a means to meaningful communication

a. "The man who does not consciously use metaphors talks without meaning." --C.S. Lewis, "Bluspels and Flalansferes," Selected Literary Essays P. 262

b. "When we pass beyond pointing to individual sensible objects, when we begin to think of causes, relations of mental states or acts, we become incurably metaphorical." Ibid. P. 263

c. "I doubt if we shall find more than a beggarly five per-cent of meaning in the pages of some celebrated 'tough-minded' thinkers, and how the account of Kant or Spinoza stands, none knows but heaven." Ibid. PP. 264-5

d. "But it must not be supposed that I am in any sense putting forward the imagination as the organ of truth. We are not talking of truth, but of meaning: meaning which is the antecedent condition both of truth and falsehood, whose antithesis is not error but nonsense. I am a rationalist. For me, reason is the natural organ of meaning. Imagination, producing new metaphors or revivifying old, is not the cause of truth, but its condition." Ibid. P. 265

e. More definitions:

1) **Metaphor** (Meta/with or after + Pherein/to bear or, to bring = an after bearing or after bringing, it speaks of the bringing of meaning or significance).

Definition – a figure of speech in which one thing is likened to another, different thing, by being spoken of as if it were that other or, it possessed qualities of that other. It is an implied comparison, in which a word or phrase ordinarily and primarily used of one thing is applied to another.

a. Illustration.
b. Lewis quotes # 895, 1062, 1063, 1064.
c. In *Selected Literary Essays*, "Bluespells and Flalansferes," Lewis writes of two types of metaphors (p. 140, para. 6-9).
    1) The master's metaphor—that in which the master, understanding a concept, creates a metaphor to help a pupil grasp the concept.
    2) The pupil's metaphor—that in which the pupil seeks to invent a thing he does not yet grasp but thinks he has an inkling about.
    3) "For all of us there are things which we cannot fully understand at all, but of which we can get a faint inkling by means of metaphor."
    4) Truth gained depends upon 3 conditions:
        a) "That the imagery is originally well chosen."
        b) "That we should apprehend the exact imagery."
        c) "That we should know the metaphor is a metaphor."

2) **Simili**—(Latin for "liken" or, "both" as in Luther's "simil iustus et peccador" — both justified and sinner).

Definition – a figure of speech in which one thing is likened to another dissimilar thing by use of the word "like" or, "as." It is distinguished from a metaphor in that the comparison is explicit.

a. "He's got a heart as big as all outdoors."
b. "The Kingdom of Heaven is like…" Matthew 13.

3) **Myth** (muthos = story).

Definition – It is story itself. It is directed towards understanding the significance, usually behind some natural phenomenon; but the grand myth is the grand story which explains the significance of all phenomena. It bears a hint or, a suggestion of God's meaning or purpose. Viktor Frankl in *Man's Search for Meaning* wrote, "If there is a meaning in life at all, then there must be a meaning in suffering." (p. 88).

a. Lewis quotes # 1108, 1109, 1110 ["The Myth Became Fact" –Lewis's thoughts about the Christian story], 1111, 907.
b. Again muthos simply means story. The word has been used metaphorically to speak of a falsehood. We must break out of the idea that myth is simply a synonym for falsehood or, lie.
c. Lucy's "Spell for the Refreshment of the Spirit".

4) **Allegory** (allos/another of the same kind + agora/market place = another market place).

Definition – It is the story of one thing told in a different "market place." It is useful to compare or, contrast, allegory with parable (parable: para/beside + bole/to cast = to cast along side). Thus, it is a story cast beside to clarify or, extend meaning in a particular way). The difference between allegory and parable:

a. An allegory teaches many things.
b. A parable <u>tends</u> to teach one thing.
c. Lewis quotes concerning allegory #36, 37, 39, 33, 34.

5) **Symbol** (sun/together + Ballõ/to cast or, throw = to throw together).

Definition – It is a throwing together and in this sense, all language is symbolic. A thing or an idea is arbitrarily represented by a symbol (or a collection of sounds). To make communication possible, that which begins as arbitrary, ends in a non-arbitrary fashion.
Lewis quotes #35, 1448.

6) Fantasy as a special genre -Tolkien's Essay on "Fairy Stories"

1. Background

    a. The Andrew Lang Lectures at St. Andrew's University 1938

1) Andrew Lang (1844-1912)

St. Andrew's Scotland
Balliol College, Oxford
Fellow at Merton College, Oxford
Translator of Homer's Iliad and Odyssey
Collected and published 12 volumes of world fairy stories.

2) Tolkien invited to deliver the Andrew Lang lectures

b. Essays Presented to Charles Williams ed. C. S. Lewis, 1947 (see also The Tolkien Reader or Tree and Leaf).

2. Three questions asked by the Essay

a. "What is a fairy story?" P. 38

No definition given in the Oxford English Dictionary

b. "What are the origins of fairy stories?

1) Very old (As old as man himself?) Tolkien says: "To ask what is the origin of stories. . . is to ask what is the origin of language and of the mind." P. 47

2) The analogy of "Soup and Bones" (P. 49 & 53) Sometimes called by Tolkien "The cauldron of story [which] has always been boiling, and to it have continually been added new bits, dainty and undainty." P. 53]

a) Illustration "Bone Soup" i.e., "Nail Soup"

b) Soup =The Story "As . . . served up by its author."

c) Bone and added elements "Its sources or material.' P. 49

c) "Mythology is not a disease at all, though it may like all human things become diseased." P. 50

d) C. S. Lewis on the uniqueness of a Medieval book.
(the art of embellishment).

3) "Man becomes a sub-creator" P. 51

a) "The human mind, endowed with the powers of generalization and abstraction, sees not only *green-grass*, discriminating it from other things (and finding it fair to look upon), but sees that it is *green* as well as being grass. But how powerful, how stimulating to the very faculty that produced it, was the invention of the adjective: No spell or incantation in Faerie is more potent. And that is not surprising: Such incantations might indeed be said to be only another view of adjectives, a part of speech in a mythical grammar. The mind that thought of *light, heavy, grey, yellow, still, swift*, also conceived of magic that would make heavy things light and able to fly, turn grey lead into yellow gold, and the still rock into swift water. If it could do the one, it could do the other; it inevitably did both. When we can take green from grass, blue from heavens, and red from blood, we have already an enchanter's power--upon one plane; and the desire to wield that power in the world external to our minds awakes. It does not follow that we shall use that power well upon any plane. We may put a deadly green upon a man's face and produce a horror; we may make the rare and terrible blue moon to shine; or we may cause woods to spring with silver leaves and rams to wear fleeces of gold, and put hot fire into the belly of the cold worm. But in such 'Fantasy,' as it is called, new form is made; Faerie begins; Man becomes a subcreator." PP. 50-51.

4) <u>Poem</u> cf. <u>Notes</u>

"'*Dear Sir,' I said--'Although now long estranged,*
Man is not wholly lost nor wholly changed,
Disgraced he may be, yet is not de-throned,
and keeps the rag's of lordship once he owned:
Man, Sub-Creator, The refracted Light

through whom is splintered from a single White
to many hues, and endlessly combined
in living shapes that move from mind to mind.
Though all the crannies of the world we filled
with Elves and Goblins, though we dared to build
Gods and their houses out of dark and light,
and sowed the seeds of dragons--" ' twas our right
(used or misused). That right has not decayed:
we make still by the law in which we're made."
PP. 71-72

a) "Fantasy is a natural human activity. It certainly does not destroy or even insult reason; and it does not either blunt the appetite for, nor obscure the perception of scientific verity. On the contrary, the keener and the clearer is the reason, the better fantasy will it make." P. 72

b) "Fantasy remains a human right: We make in our measure and in our derivative mode, because we are made, but made in the image and likeness of a Maker." P. 72

5) The three faces of fairy story P. 53

a) The mystical - Toward the supernatural

b) The magical - Toward nature

c) The mirror of scorn and pity - toward man

6) Prohibition P. 57

Tolkien calls it ". . . the great mythical significance of prohibition.'

cf. G. K. Chesterton's "Fairy Stories,"
All things Considered

If you really read the fairy tales, you will observe that one idea runs from one end of them to the other—the idea that peace and happiness can only exist on some condition. This idea, which is the core of ethics, is the core of the nursery-tales. The whole happiness of fairyland hangs upon a thread, upon one thread. Cinderella may have a dress woven on supernatural looms and blazing with unearthly brilliance; but she must be back when the clock strikes twelve. The king may invite fairies to the christening, but he must invite all the fairies or frightful results will follow. Bluebeard's wife may open all doors but one. A promise is broken to a cat, and the whole world goes wrong. A promise is broken to a yellow dwarf, and the whole world goes wrong. A girl may be the bride of the God of Love himself if she never tries to see him; she sees him, and he vanishes away. A girl is given a box on condition she does not open it; she opens it, and all the evils of this world rush out at her. A man and woman are put in a garden on condition that they do not eat one fruit: they eat it, and lose their joy in all the fruits of the earth.

This great idea, then, is the backbone of all folk-lore—the idea that all happiness hangs on one thin veto; all positive joy depends on one negative. Now, it is obvious that there are many philosophical and religious ideas akin to or symbolised by this; but it is not with them I wish to deal here. It is surely obvious that all ethics ought to be taught to this fairy tale tune; that, if one does the thing forbidden, one imperils all the things provided. A man who breaks his promise to his wife ought to be reminded that, even if she is a cat, the case of the fairy-cat shows that such conduct may be incautious. A burglar just about to open some one else's safe should be playfully reminded that he is in the perilous posture of the beautiful Pandora: he is about to lift the forbidden lid and loosen evils unknown. The boy eating some one's apples in some one's apple tree should be a reminder that he has come to a mystical moment of his life, when one apple may rob him of all others. This is the profound morality of fairy tales; which, so far from being lawless, go to the root of all law. Instead of finding (like common books of ethics) a rationalistic basis for each Commandment, they find the great mystical basis for all Commandments. We are in this fairyland on sufferance; it is not for us to quarrel with the conditions under which we enjoy this wild vision of the world. The vetoes are indeed extraordinary, but then so are the concessions. The idea of property, the idea of some one else's apples, is a rum idea; but then the idea of there being any apples is a rum idea. It is strange and weird that I cannot with safety drink ten bottles of champagne; but then the champagne itself is strange and weird, if you come to that. If I have drunk of the fairies' drink it is but just I should drink by the fairies' rules. We may not see the direct logical connection between three beautiful silver spoons and a large ugly policeman; but then who in fairy tales ever could see the direct logical connection between three bears and a giant, or between a rose and a roaring beast? Not only can these fairy tales be enjoyed

because they are moral, but morality can be enjoyed because it puts us in fairyland, in a world at once of wonder and of war.

3. What if any are the values and functions of fairy stories now? P. 57

a. Truth and desirability

1) "'Is it true?' Is the great question children ask," Lang said. They do ask that question, I know; and it is not one to be rashly or idly answered." P.61 [Tolkien says in a footnote: "Far more often they have asked me: 'Was he good? Was he wicked?' That is they were more concerned to get the Right side and the wrong side clear. For that is a question equally important in History and in Faerie." P. 61]

2) "Fairy-stories were plainly not primarily concerned with possibility, but with desirability. If they awakened desire, satisfying it while often whetting it unbearably, they succeed." P. 62

"Fantasy, the making or glimpsing of Other-worlds, was the heart of the desire of Faerie." P. 63

b. Four particular elements of fairy stories

1) Fantasy - Awaking desire for other worlds

a) Desire "if it comes . . .while he is reading a 'romantic' tale or poem of 'perilous seas and faerie lands forlorn' he thinks he is wishing that such places really existed and that he could reach them." –C.S. Lewis The Pilgrim's Regress P. 8

b) "To construct plausible and moving 'other worlds' you must draw on the only real 'other world' we know, that of the spirit."—C. S. Lewis, "On Stories."

Essays Presented to Charles Williams P. 98

c) The example of Tolkien's The Hobbit.

d) Other Examples:
"Piper at the Gates of Dawn,"
Grahame's Wind and the Willows

The Voyage of the Dawn Treader
"This was the very reason why you were brought to Narnia, that by knowing me here for a little, you may know me better there." P. 188

2) Recovery—. . .is a re-gaining—regaining of a clear view. I do not say 'seeing things as they

are' and involve myself with the philosophers, though I might venture to say 'seeing things as we are (or were) meant to see them—As things apart from ourselves. We need, in any case, to clean our windows; so that the things seen clearly may be freed from the drab blur of triteness or familiarity--from possessiveness. . . . This triteness is really the penalty of 'appropriation': The things that are trite, or (in a bad sense) familiar, are the things which once attracted us by their glitter, or their color, or their shape, and we laid hands on them, and then locked them in our hoard, acquired them, and acquiring ceased 'to look at them"' Tolkien P. 74

a) George MacDonald's introduction to The Princess and the Goblin

b) George MacDonald's The Light Princess

c) G.K. Chesterton's Poem, "The Donkey"

d) Queen Orual in, Till We Have Faces,
"I am Ungit"
"I am Psyche"

e) Other examples:

Miss Manners, Common Courtesy:
Miss Manners Solves the Problem
That Baffled Mr. Jefferson

Children and Their Christmas Toys

Marriage and Family

"Mrs. Fidget" The Four Loves C. S. Lewis

"The Sermon and the Lunch" God in the Dock
C. S. Lewis

3) Escape - "I have claimed that Escape is one of the main functions of fairy-stories, and since I do not disapprove of them, it is plain that I do not accept the tone of scorn or pity with which 'Escape' is now so often used: A tone for which the uses of the world outside literary criticism give no warrant at all, in what the misusers of escape are fond of calling real life, escape is evidently as a rule very practical, and may even be heroic. . . .
Why should a man be scorned, if finding himself in prison, he tries to get out and go home? Or if, when he cannot do so, he thinks,

and talks about other topics than jailers and a prison--walls? The world outside has not become less real because the prisoner cannot see it. . . . they confound the escape of the prisoner with the flight of the deserter. . . "
. . . Chesterton truly remarked that, as soon as he heard that anything 'had come to stay', he knew that it would be very soon replaced--indeed regarded as pitiably obsolete and shabby. . . . Fairy-stories, at any rate, have many more permanent and fundamental things to talk about.

. . . In any case the expression 'real life' in this context seems to fall short of academic standards. The notion that motor-cars are more 'alive' than say, centaurs or dragons is curious; that they are more 'real' than, say, horses is pathetically absurd. How real, how startling alive is a factory chimney compared with an elm tree: poor obsolete thing, insubstantial dream of an escapist! For my part, I cannot convince myself that the roof of Bletchley Station is more "Real" than the clouds. Tolkien Pp. 75-77

a) C. S. Lewis, Of Other Worlds PP. 28-30

b) C. S. Lewis, The Silver Chair PP. 151-159

c) C.S. Lewis, The Voyage of the Dawn Treader,
"The Dark Island" PP. 142-144
The way out of the dark island, where your dreams come true and you discover the nightmares they truly are;
"Lucy looked along the beam . . .At first it looked like a cross. . . it was an albatross. . . As it circled the mast it whispered to her 'courage dear heart' and the voice she

felt sure, was Aslan's…."

d) C. S. Lewis, The Voyage of the Dawn Treader, "The Magician's Book" ". . . A spell 'for the refreshment of the spirit.' . . . "It was about a cup and a sword and a tree and a green hill. . . " P. 121.

. . . She never could remember; and ever since that day what Lucy means by a good story is a story which reminds her of the forgotten story in the Magician's Book." P. 123-124.

e) Other examples:

f) Consolation-- "The Happy Ending."

"Eucatastrophe. The eucatastrophic tale is the true form of Fairy-tale, and its highest function. P. 81
"It does not deny the existence of discatastrophe, of sorrow and failure: the possibility of these is necessary to the Joy of deliverance; it denies (in the face of much evidence, if you will) universal final defeat and in so far is evangelism, giving a fleeting glimpse of Joy, Joy beyond the walls of the world, Poignant as grief." P. 82.

"A tale that in any measure succeeds in this point has not wholly failed, whatever flaws it may possess, and whatever mixture or confusion of purpose." P. 82
"In such stories when the sudden "turn" comes we get

a piercing glimpse of joy, and heart's desire, that for a moment passes outside the frame, rends indeed the very web of story, and lets a gleam come through." P. 82 "The peculiar quality of the 'Joy'' in successful fantasy can thus be explained as a sudden glimpse of the underlying reality or truth. It is not only a 'consolation' For the sorrow of this world, but a satisfaction, and an answer to that question 'is it true?' The answer to this question that I gave at first was (quite rightly): If you have built your little world well, yes: it is true in that world.' That is enough for the artist (or the artist part of the artist). But in the 'Eucatastrophe' we see in a brief vision that the answer may be greater--it may be a far off gleam or echo of evangelism in the real world. The use of this word gives a hint of my epilogue. It is a serious and dangerous matter. I am a Christian, and so at least should not be suspected of willful irreverence. Knowing my own ignorance and dullness it is perhaps presumptuous of me to touch upon such a theme; but if by grace what I say has in any respect any validity, it is, of course only one facet of a truth incalculably rich: finite only because the capacity of Man for whom this was done is finite." P. 83.

a) Tolkien's Epilogue

b) The story of Comos in
George MacDonald's Phantastes, chapter XIII.

c)Conclusion of the Last Battle

D. "The language of Religion," Christian Reflections, C. S. Lewis

The Abolition of Man

A. Preliminary Consideration

1. The Real Books

a. The Green Book by 'Gaius' and "Titius' was actually, The Control of Language (1940) by Alec King and Martin Ketley (cf.. C. S. Lewis: A Biography, Green, Hooper p. 219.

b. The book by "Orbilius' was actually, The Reading and Writing of English (1936) by E. G. Biaggini.

2. Presuppositions

a. Chance vs. cause approaches to philosophy

1) Gambling is not pure chance -- The laws of probability govern such things (cf.. Pascal's purpose for developing the laws of probability

a. To save the fortune of his friend the Chevalier de Mere',

b. To prove his wager)

2) Illustration the roulette wheel:

a. The French wheel—37 spaces: 1 green and 36 others (black and red equally divided and equally numbered odd or even). Thus the house edge is 2.7%. There are no 50-50 bets, it is 52.7% to 47.3%.

b. The American wheel—38 spaces: 2 green and 36 others. Thus the house edge is 5.3%. There are no 50-50 bets, it is 55.3% to 44.7%.

c. There is no randomness to gambling. it is all based on odds. Were the odds not stacked in the casino's favor, there would be no opulent casinos.

d. This is randomness i.e. Chance:

i. Drop the ball on to the wheel and it falls into space 18 red.

ii. The next time you drop the ball wheel and it lands in Chicago.

iii. The next time you drop the ball on to the wheel and it goes through the wheel, through the table, through the floor, through the earth and winds up in Borneo as a banana tree.

iv. The next time you drop the ball on to the wheel and it explodes in mid-air.

v. The next time you drop the ball and it flies out into outer space growing in size as it goes and becomes a second moon orbiting the earth.

vi. Now this is random!

e. Chance—no direction—no goals—no purpose—no meaning

f. Cause—direction—goals—purpose—meaning

g. Lewis writes of those he refutes in this book: "By the logic of their position they must just take their impulses as they come from chance." C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man p.79

b. No cause means no ethics. Morality dies, man dies; thus the abolition of man.

Contrast The Brothers Karamazov by Fyodor Dostoevsky with Jean Paul Sartre's Essay, 'Existentialism.'

c. Simple outline of the book

1) *Chapter One*—Reality exists independent of my thoughts about it. What I think is true when it corresponds with reality. This is the basis of objective values.

2) *Chapter Two*—Those who deny objective values substitute arbitrary values in the place of objectivity. These arbitrary values are drawn from:

a) utility

b) Instinct

c) economics

3) *Chapter Three*—When objective value dies man dies. The will to power becomes all important and tyranny follows.

B. The argument of the book set forth by chapters and illustrated

I. Chapter One

a. Coleridge at the Waterfall p. 14 [Taken originally from Dorothy Wordsworth's
Grassmere Journals 1903]

> "You remember that there were two tourists present: that one called it 'sublime' and the other 'pretty': and that Coleridge mentally endorsed the first judgment and rejected the second with disgust. Gaius and Titius comment as follows: "When the man said That is sublime, he appeared to be making a remark about the waterfall . . . Actually . . . he was not making a remark about the waterfall, but a remark about his own feelings. What he was saying was really I have feelings associated in my mind with the word "Sublime," or shortly, I have sublime feelings.' They add: 'This confusion is continually present in language as we use it. We appear to be saying something very important about something: and actually we are only saying something about our own feelings.'"

1) Quote p. 15

"The schoolboy who reads this passage in The Green Book will believe two propositions: firstly, that all sentences containing a predicate of value are statements about the emotional state of the speaker, and, secondly, that all such statements are unimportant."

2) Problem—Truth is lost—Values dissolve

a) Illustration - The play Angel's Fall
Parable of the publican and Pharisee

b) Illustration - Whittier College "That's a value judgment"

3) Quote p. 16.

"The very power of Gaius and Titius depends on the fact that they are dealing with a boy: a boy who thinks he is 'doing' his English prep' and has no notion that ethics, theology, and politics are all at stake."

c.f. Media influence, etc.

b. Quote p. 22-23

"I have hitherto been assuming that such teachers as Gaius and Titius do not fully realize what they are doing and do not intend the far-reaching consequences it will actually have. There is, of course, another possibility. What I have called (presuming on their concurrence in a certain traditional system of values) the 'trousered ape' and the 'urban blockhead' may be precisely the kind of man they really wish to produce. The differences between us may go all the way down. They may really hold that the ordinary human feelings about the past or animals or large waterfalls are contrary to reason and contemptible and ought to be eradicated. They may be intending to make a clean sweep of traditional values and start with a new set. That position will be discussed later. If it is the position which

Gaius and Titius are holding, I must for the moment, content myself with pointing out that it is a philosophical and not a literary position. In filling their book with it they have been unjust to the parent or headmaster who buys it and who has got the work of amateur philosophers where he expected the work of professional grammarians. A man would be annoyed if his son returned from the dentist with his teeth untouched and his head crammed with the dentist's *obiter dicta* on bimetallism or the Baconian theory. But I doubt whether Gaius and Titius have really planned, under cover of teaching English, to propagate their philosophy. I think they slipped into it for the following reasons."

[Note: Consider the above in contrast with Lewis's letter to Sister Penelope 9 July 1939, "I think…great ignorance might be a help to the evangelization of England; any amount of theology can now be smuggled into people's minds under the cover of romance without their knowing it." Letters of C. S. Lewis, ed. W. H. Lewis P.167.]

1) Quote pp. 23-24

> "In the first place, literary criticism is difficult, and what they actually do is very much easier. To explain why a bad treatment of some basic human emotion is bad literature is, if we exclude all question-begging attacks on the emotion itself, a very hard thing to do. . . . To 'debunk' the emotion on the basis of a commonplace rationalism, is within almost anyone's capacity."

2) Quote p. 24

> "In the second place, I think Gaius and Titius may have honestly misunderstood the pressing educational need of the moment. They see the world around them swayed by emotional propaganda--they have learned from tradition that youth is sentimental--and they conclude that the best thing they can do is to fortify the minds of young people against emotion. My own experience as a teacher tells an opposite tale. For every one pupil who needs to be guarded from a weak excess of sensibility there are three who need to awakened from the slumber of cold vulgarity. The task of the modern educator is not to cut down jungles but to irrigate deserts. The right defense against false sentiments is to inculcate just sentiments. By starving the sensibility of our pupils we only make them easier prey to the

propagandist when he comes. For famished nature will be avenged and a hard heart is no infallible protection against a soft head."

a) Emotional propaganda . . . "By starving the sensibility of our pupils we only make them easier prey to the propagandist when he comes." p. 24

i. World War II propaganda

ii. Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

1) Logos - Content

2) Ethos - Credibility

3) Pathos - Emotion

iii. Something rushes in to fill the vacuum - Hoo Hoos

b) "The right defense against false sentiments is to inculcate just sentiments. By starving the sensibility of our pupils we only make them easier prey to the propagandist when he comes. For famished nature will be avenged and a hard heart is no infallible protection against a soft head." p. 24

3) Quote p. 25-26

"The reason why Coleridge agreed with the tourist who called the cataract sublime and disagreed with the one who called it pretty was of course that he believed inanimate nature to be such that certain responses could be more 'just' or 'ordinate' or 'appropriate' to it than others. And he believes(correctly) that the tourists thought the same. The man who called the cataract sublime was not intending simply to describe his own emotions about it: he was also claiming that the object was one which merited those emotions. But for this claim there would be nothing to agree or disagree about. To disagree with This is pretty if those words simply described the lady's feelings, would be absurd: if she had said I feel sick Coleridge would hardly have replied No; I feel quite well."

a) Lord Brentford's gardener (pretty vs. magnificent)

b) The Oregon Coast

c) C. S. Lewis <u>The Personal Heresy</u>
Chapter V, paragraph 2, p. 97

"'Symbols' I do not object to; but the suggestion is that all symbols are of the same order as counters--that a beautiful woman (or for that matter a glow-worm) has no value in

herself, receives all her significance from the poets, as little disks of colored bone receive their value from the arbitrary agreement of the gamblers. Two kinds of symbol must surely be distinguished. The algebraical symbol comes naked into the world of mathematics and is clothed with value by its masters. The poetic symbol--like the Rose, for Love, in Guillaume de Lorris—comes trailing clouds of glory from the real world, clouds whose shape and colour largely determine and explain its poetic use. In an equation, X and Y will do as well as a and b; but the *Romance of the Rose* could not, without loss, be re-written as the *Romance of the Onion* , and if a man did not see why, we could only send him back to the real world to study roses, onions, and love, all of them still untouched by poetry, still raw."

C. Examples

1) Traherne - "Can you be righteous unless you be just in rendering to things their due esteem? p. 26

2) Augustine - *ordo amoris* p. 26

3) Aristotle - "says that the aim of education is to make the student like and dislike what he ought. When the age for reflective thought comes, the pupil who has been thus trained in "ordinate affections' or just sentiments' will easily find the first principles in ethics: but to the corrupt man they will never be visible at all and he can make no progress in that science." p. 26

[cf. Aristotle's, Nicomachan Ethics 1104 B, 1095 B "...vice is unconscious of itself...." Lewis writes in The Preface to Paradice Lost, p. 11; " ...Continued disobedience to conscience

makes conscience blind." G.K. Chesterton, observed that, "Vice demands a sort of virginity." The Apostle Paul wrote. "...they suppress the truth in their unrighteousness...." Romans 1:18. See Aristotle's ideas on *Akrasia* "without command". *Akrasia* is the lack of command over one's character and the accompanying tendency to justify or rationalize bad behavior.]

4) Lewis uses examples from Plato, early Hinduism, Wordsworth, the Indian masters, the Chinese, the Jews, The Analects of Confucius ("in ritual it is harmony with nature that is prized").

5) "This conception in all its forms, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and oriental alike, I shall henceforth refer to for brevity simply as 'The Tao'" p. 29

6) The Tao is defined as ". . . The Doctrine of Objective Value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kinds of things we are." p. 29

d. "And because our approvals and disapprovals are thus recognitions of objective value or responses to an objective order, therefore emotional states can be in harmony with reason (when we feel liking for what out to be approved) or out of harmony with reason (when we perceive that liking is due but cannot feel it.). p. 29

[An aside: 3 views of the emotions

1) Reason should rule over emotion - Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, etc.

2) Reason should eliminate the emotions - stoic philosophy, Zeno, Epictitus, Marcus Aurelius.

3) Emotion should rule over reason - Epicurian philosophy, German romanticism]

e. Quote p. 31

"Hence the educational problem is wholly different according as you stand within or without the Tao. For those within, the task is to train in the pupil those responses which are in themselves appropriate, whether anyone is making them or not, and in making which the very nature of man consists. Those without, if they are logical, must regard all sentiments as equally non-rational, as mere mists between us and the real objects. As a result, they must either decide to remove all sentiments, as far as possible from the pupil's mind: or else to encourage some sentiments for reasons that have nothing to do with their intrinsic 'justness' or 'ordinacy.' The latter course involves them in the questionable process of creating in others by 'suggestion' or incantation a mirage which their own reason has successfully dissipated."

1) Quote pp. 32-33

"If they embark on this course the difference between the old and the new education will be an important one. Where the old initiated, the new merely 'conditions.' The old dealt with its pupils as grown birds deal with young birds when they teach them to fly: the new deals with them more as the poultry-keeper deals with young birds--making them thus or thus for purposes of which the birds know nothing. In a word, the old was a kind of propagation--men transmitting manhood to men: the new is merely propaganda.

2) The operation of The Green Book and its kind is to produce what may be called Men without Chests. ". . . their heads are no bigger than the ordinary: it is the atrophy of the chest beneath that makes them seem so." pp. 34-35

3) Quote p. 35

"And all the time--such is the tragi-comedy of our situation--we continue to clamor for those very qualities we are rendering impossible. You can hardly open a periodical without coming across the statement that what our civilization needs is more 'drive,' or dynamism, or self-sacrifice, or 'creativity.' In a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and demand the function. We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and enterprise. We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We castrate and bid the geldings be fruitful.

a) Illustration - Adulterers expect fidelity

b) Illustration - Milton's Paradise Lost Satan's headquarters are found at Pandemonium (inordinate affections are capricious and chaotic).

2. Chapter Two

a. "The practical result of education in the spirit of The Green Book must be the destruction of the society which accepts it." p. 39

b. Quote pp. 39-41

"However subjective they may be about some tradition value, Gaius and Titius have shown by the very act of writing The Green Book that there must be some other values about which they are not subjective at all. They write in order to produce certain states of mind in the rising generation, if not because they think those states of mind intrinsically just or good, yet certainly because they think them to be the means to some state of society which they regard as desirable. It would not be difficult to collect from various passages in The Green Book what their ideal is. But we need not. The important point is not the precise nature of their end, but the fact that they have an end at all. They must have, or their book (being purely practical intention) is written to no purpose. And this end must have real value in their eyes. To abstain from calling it 'good' and to use, instead, such predicates as 'necessary or 'progressive' or 'efficient' would be a subterfuge. They could be forced by argument to answer the questions 'necessary for what?', 'progressing towards what?', 'effecting what?'; in the last resort they would have to admit that some state of affairs was in their opinion good for its own sake. And this time they could not maintain that 'good' simply described their own emotions about it. For the whole purpose of their book is so to condition the young reader that he will share their approval, and this would be either a fool's or a villain's undertaking unless they held that their approval was in some way valid or correct. In actual fact Gaius and Titius will be found to hold, with complete uncritical dogmatism, the whole system of values which happened to be in vogue among moderately educated young men of the professional classes during the period between the two wars. Their skepticism about value is on the surface; it is for use on other people's values: about the values current in their own set they are not nearly skeptical enough. And this phenomenon is very usual. A great many of those who 'debunk' traditional or (as they would say) 'sentimental' values have in the background values of their own which they believe to be immune from the debunking process."

c. The innovator of values

1) Utilitarianism pp. 42-44 - What is useful becomes the supreme ideal

a) Note the abortion debate

b) Jeremy Bentham the father of utilitarian thought

2) Instinct pp. 44-54

a) Quote pp. 48-49

"Telling us to obey instinct is like telling us to obey 'people.' People say different things: so do instincts. Our instincts are at war. If it is held that the instinct for preserving the species should always be obeyed at the expense of other instincts, whence do we derive this rule of precedence? To listen to that instinct speaking in its own cause and deciding in its own favour would be rather simple minded. Each instinct, if you listen to it, will claim to be gratified at the expense of all the rest. By the very act of listening to one rather than to others we have already prejudged the case. If we did not bring to the examination of our instincts a knowledge of their comparative dignity we could never learn it from them. And that knowledge cannot itself be instinctive: the judge cannot be one of the parties judged: or, if he is, the decision is worthless and there is no ground for placing the preservation of the species above self-preservation or sexual appetite. The idea that, without appealing to any court higher than the instincts themselves, we can yet find grounds for preferring one instinct above its fellow dies very hard."

b) Quote p. 53

"If nothing is self-evident, nothing can be proved. Similarly, if nothing is obligatory for its own sake, nothing is obligatory at all."

c) Quotes p. 54

". . . all the values which he uses in attacking the Tao, and even claims to be substituting for it, are themselves derived from the Tao."

"The question therefore arises what title he has to select bits of it for acceptance and to reject others. For if the bits he rejects have no authority, neither have those he retains: if what he retains is valid, what he rejects is equally valid too."

i) Double standards - Dad's with dating daughters

ii) "If you believe this why don't you believe more, if you don't believe this why don't you believe less." Dr. J. I. Packer on all sub-Biblical faith.

3) Economic value p. 55

a) Fighting wars for Exxon

b) Fighting wars for Northern industrialists

c) The economic problems with:

i) Z.P.G.

ii) Abortion

iii) Cambodia under the Khymer Rouge

iv) China's one baby policy

d) Conclusions

1) Quote pp. 56-57

"I draw the following conclusions. This thing which I have called for convenience the Tao, and which others may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes, is not one among the series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgments. If it is rejected, all value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained. The effort to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is self-contradictory. There never has been, and never will be, a radically new judgment of value in the history of the world. What purport to be new systems or (as they now call them) 'ideologies,' all consist of fragments from the Tao itself, arbitrarily wrenched from their context in the whole and then swollen to madness in their isolation, yet still owing to the Tao and to it alone such validity as they possess. If my duty to my parents is a superstition, then so is my duty to posterity. If justice is a superstition, then so is my duty to my county or my race. If the pursuit of scientific knowledge is a real value, then so is conjugal fidelity. The rebellion of new ideologies against the Tao is a rebellion of the branches against the tree: if the rebels could succeed they would find that they had destroyed themselves. The human mind has no more power of inventing a new value than of imagining a new primary colour, or, indeed, of creating a new sun and a new sky for it to move in.

2) Quote pp. 58-59

". . . the Tao admits development from within. There is is a difference between a real moral advance and a mere innovation. From the Confucian 'Do not do to others what you would not like them to do to you' to the Christian 'Do as you would be done by' is a read advance. The morality of Nietzcsche is a mere innovation. The first is an advance

because no one who did not admit the validity of the old maxim could see reason for accepting the new one, and anyone who accepted the old world at once recognize the new as an extension of the same principle. If he rejected it, he would have to reject it as a superfluity, something that went too far, not as something simply heterogeneous from his own ideals of value. But the Nietzchean ethic can be accepted only if we are ready to scrap traditional morals as a mere error and then to put ourselves in a position where we can find no ground for any value judgments at all. It is the difference between a man who says to us: 'You like your vegetables moderately fresh; why not grow your own and have them perfectly fresh?' and a man who says, 'throw away that load and try eating bricks and centipedes instead.'"

3) Quote pp. 60

"An open mind, in questions that are not ultimate, is useful. But an open mind about the ultimate foundations either of Theoretical or of Practical Reason is idiocy. If a man's mind is open on these things, let his mouth at least be shut. He can say nothing to the purpose. Outside the Tao there is no ground for criticizing either the Tao or anything else.

3. Chapter Three

a. Quote p. 72

"For the power of man to make himself what he pleases means, as we have seen, the power of some men to make other men what they please."

1) Quote p. 77

"Stepping outside the Tao, they have stepped into the void. Nor are their subjects necessarily unhappy men. They are not men at all:

they are artifacts. Man's final conquest has proved to be the Abolition of Man."

a) "When all that says 'it is good' has been debunked, what says 'I want' remains." p. 78

b) "The Conditions, therefore, must come to be motivated simply by their own pleasure." p. 78

2) "Religion without science is lame, but science without religion is blind." Albert Einstine, quoted by Michael Aeschliman, *The Restitution of Man, C. S. Lewis and the Case Against Scientism*, p. 19

b. Quote p.78

"I am very doubtful whether history shows us one example of a man who, having stepped outside traditional morality and attained power, has used that power benevolently."

c. Quote pp 84-85

"Either we are rational spirit obliged forever to obey the absolute values of the Tao, or else we are mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new shapes for the pleasures of masters who must, by hypothesis, have no motive but their own 'natural' impulses. Only the Tao provides a common human law of action which can over-arch rulers and ruled alike. A dogmatic belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny or an obedience which is not slavery."

1) Illustration: Canaries and cages

2) Illustration: Trains and tracks

3) Illustration: Charlie Steinmetz

Applications of *The Doctrine of Objective Value* to Beauty and Morality

1. Beauty

A. Thomas Aquinas and Mortimer Adler distinguish the objective and the subjective in beauty.

1. Admirable Beauty—Intrinsic to the object itself. It is there whether or not one perceives it as so.

2. Enjoyable Beauty—The subjective capacity to perceive and enjoy what is objectively present.

3. Regarding the objective and subjective nature of beauty one can begin to understand the validity of expert opinion when it comes to matters of Beauty and the capacity to take pleasure in it. Cf. Picasso.

B. Thomas Aquinas recognizes three objective characteristics intrinsic in objects themselves by which one judges an object admirably beautiful.

1. Integrity

2. Proportion

3. Clarity

2. Morality

A. Lewis: All judgments imply a standard. *De Futilitate*. Without a standard morality will drift towards: relativism and anarchy or tyranny.

B. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* as an example of an objective approach to morality; there is a reality that merits an objective response.

C. Virtue as a reasonable response to reality. Virtue (as Lewis notes in *Mere Christianity*) is an integrated whole made up of Courage, Temperance, Justice and Wisdom.

1. Courage: The habitual ability to suffer pain and hardship; it is endurance fortitude and staying power.

Clarifying comment: Courage is the ability to say "Yes" to right action even in the teeth of pain.

Illustrations: Winston Churchill's speech at Harrow: "Young gentlemen, never give up". Life is not a sprint, its an endurance race.

2. Temperance: The habitual ability resist the enticement of immediate pleasure in order to gain the greater though more remote good.

Clarifying comment: If Courage is the ability to say "Yes" to right action even in the teeth of pain; then Temperance is the ability to say "No' to wrong action even in the jaws of pleasure.

Illustrations: Giving my kids the choice between a piece of penny candy right now or, a $10.00 toy the next day. Their inability to make the better of the two choices revealed not only a lack of temperance but also a lack of maturity; for an intemperate person is immature.

3. **Justice:** The habit of being law abiding and concerned for the common good and general welfare of one's society. Justice seeks to:

   a. Secure and protect natural rights.
   b. Be fair.
   c. Render to others their due.

   Illustrations: The ring of Gyges (from Herodotus and Plato's *Republic*)

4. **Wisdom:** The habit of being careful about the decisions one makes; it seeks counsel and advice.

   Illustrations: Hampton Court Maze. Wisdom is the perspective of the Scaffold.

D. One more item of note relative to the Moral Law and the Character of God

The Euthyphro Dilemma: God and the Moral Law

The Problem could be stated something like this:

Does God simply make Laws arbitrarily and is thus above them and free to change them at will; or does God have to submit to laws and thus the Law transcends Him i.e., Law is God and He must obey it. If so, where did the Law that transcends God come from? This is known as the Euthyphro dilemma.

Imbedded in this is what is known as the *Fallacy of the Complex Question*—which makes a simplistic "either-or" out of a more complex issue. Usually this fallacy leads to some form of equivocation which results in nonsense.

The Equivocation is something like the nonsense question "If God is all powerful can He make a rock so big He could not move it"? Those who propound such a question expect us to find a contradiction in God. If he is all powerful then He should be able to make a rock too big for Him to move. But, if He made a rock bigger than He could move He would no longer be all powerful. Those silly folks who set this proposition forth think they have

forever turned talk of God into a nonsensical discussion; yet, they fail to see that it is not a problem with God, but one with the weakness of their reason. The problem arises as a definitional one. Failure to define clearly leads to the uncritical acceptance of two mutually exclusive propositions. The proposition, God's Omnipotence means that He can simply do anything, is nonsensical and in fact this is not what His Omnipotence means. Scripture does assert that God is Omnipotent but this does not mean He can do anything. He is love, but He cannot be unloving. He is Just, so He cannot be unfair. He is Immutable and Unchanging, so He cannot be capricious. In other words, God is All-powerful to do all that is consistent with His character, but He cannot do anything contrary to His character. He can do no act that moves Him beyond His capacity to do that which is consistent with His Omnipotence. To assert, that He could make a rock so big He couldn't move it, sets forth mutually exclusive and contradictory propositions that: one, He is Omnipotent; two, He is not Omnipotent. This is nonsense.

Of such nonsense questions C. S. Lewis wrote:

"Can a mortal ask questions God finds unanswerable? Quite easily, I should think. All nonsense questions are unanswerable. How many hours are there in a mile? Is yellow square or round? Probably half the questions we ask—half our great theological and metaphysical problems—are like that". *A Grief Observed*. P. 55.

Further insight from Lewis about the question of God making Law, or God obeying Law:

"How is the relation between God and the moral law to be represented? To say that the law is God's law is no final solution. Are these things right because God commands them or does God command them because they are right? If the first, if good is to be *defined* as what God commands, then the goodness of God Himself is emptied of all meaning and the commands of an omnipotent fiend would have the same claim on us as those of the 'righteous Lord'. If the second, then we seem to be admitting a cosmic diarchy, or even making God Himself the mere executor of a law somehow external and antecedent to His own being. Both views are intolerable.

…It is therefore possible that the duality which seems to force itself upon us when we think, first, of our Father in Heaven, and, secondly, of the self-evident imperatives of the moral law, is not a mere error but a real (though inadequate and creaturely) perception of things that would necessarily be two in any other mode of being which enters our experience, but which are not so divided in the absolute being of the superpersonal God. When we attempt to think of a person and a law, we are compelled to think of this person either as obeying or as making it.

And when we think of Him as making it we are compelled to think of Him either as making it in conformity to some yet more ultimate pattern of goodness (in which case the pattern, and not He, would be supreme) or else making it arbitrarily…(in which case He would be neither good nor wise). But it is probably just here that our categories betray us. It would be idle, with our merely mortal resources, to attempt a positive correction of our categories…. But it might be permissible to lay down two negations: that God neither *obeys* nor *creates* the moral law. The good is uncreated; it never could have been otherwise; it has in it no shadow of contingency; it lies, as Plato said, on the other side of existence. …. God is not merely good, but goodness; goodness is not merely divine, but God." –C. S. Lewis *Christian Reflections*, "The Poison of Subjectivism" Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans. P. 79-80.

In essence Lewis is saying the Law and God are one; or, the law is merely the unarbitrary extension of the very immutable character of God.

III. A Reasoned Approach to Theology (continued)

1. The Nature of Reality - Continued

   a. The basic metaphysical/ontological issue - If anything exists, something must be eternal.

      1) It is clear that there never was a time when nothing existed; otherwise nothing would exist now."
         - C.S. Lewis *Miracles* pp. 27-28

2) "If anything exists something must be eternal; if any reason exists some reason must be self-existent, non-contingent. -C. S. Lewis, *Miracles,* pp.27-28

3) Heracletus

b. Three basic ontological/metaphysical options

1) Matter is self created

a) Carl Sagan's *Cosmos*

b) Aaron's Golden Calf - Exodus 32:1-4, 21-24

c) Crayon markings on the wall

d) It's all nonsense

2) Matter is eternal (Lewis calls this "The Naturalist" position)

a) "The naturalist believes that a great process, or becoming," exists 'on its own' in space and time, and that nothing else exists..." *Miracles* p. 14, #11

b) This poses a real problem for people who think they are in love, or think they are doing science, or think they are rational.

c) "Reason is something more than cerebral biochemistry." *Miracles, Chapt. 6.*

e) The error of the Evolutionist

i.) It appeals to every part of me except my reason. . . . I believe it no longer. *Christian Reflections* "The Funeral of a Great Myth" (1945?), chap. 7, para. 23, p. 93.

ii.) An egg which came from no bird is no more "natural" than a bird which had existed from all eternity. And since the egg-bird-egg sequence leads us to no plausible beginning, is it not reasonable to look for the real origin somewhere outside sequence altogether. You have to go outside the sequence of engines, into the world of men, to find the real originator of the rocket. Is it not equally reasonable to look outside Nature for the real Originator of the natural order? *God in the Dock* , "Two Lectures" (1945), para. 10, p.211

iii.) [This is] a truth which the incurably evolutionary or developmental character of modern thought is always urging us to forget. What is vital and healthy does not necessarily survive. Higher organisms are often conquered by lower ones. Arts as well as men are subject to accident and violent death. *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century,* Bk. I. I. I. para. 68, p.113

f) The Error of the Radical Empiricist

"I'd say, with the radial empiricist, that only factual statements have validity is to be not only dogmatic but self-contradictory, since the statement itself is not factual." [Nor is it empirically perceived.] –Michael D. Aeschiliman, *The Restitution of Man: C. S. Lewis and the Case Against Scientism* p. 20 Eerdmans 1983

Illustration: The Biochemistry student at Brown University who claimed as her principle for life that she would not believe anything that could not be demonstrated empirically.

3. God is Eternal

a) Hebrews 11:3 "By faith we understand that the worlds were prepared by the word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things which are visible."

b) ". . .One seldom meets people who have grasped the existence of a supernatural God and yet deny that He is the creator. All the evidence we have points in that direction, and difficulties spring up on every side if we try to believe otherwise. No philosophical theory which I have yet come across is a radical improvement on the words of *Genesis,* that 'in the beginning God made Heaven and Earth.'" *Miracles,* "Nature and

Supernature" para. 15, p. 33.

Atheism

1. Encounter with Madeline Murray O'Hare at Whittier College

a. To prove the non-existence of a thing requires greater knowledge than proving the existence of a thing.
(Illustration: Thomas Edison, after discovering 1000 things that wouldn't work as filaments for the incandescent electric light bulb.)

Illustration: If I lost my keys in a room (or so I had thought), to say conclusively that the keys are not in the room would require greater knowledge than that necessary to find them in a given spot.Have you ever noticed that what you are looking for is always in the last place you look? That's because you found it and have no need to look further.

b. Considering a bright Atheist's Objections: How come theists say they can find Him at a spot and an atheist cannot—don't you assert that he is omnipresent?

1) You must meet the conditions of perception.

2) Illustration: T.V. and radio waves are not perceivable without meeting the condition of their perceptions, i.e. setup a TV or radio receiver.

Note Further: There are numerous things that can cloud perception.

See Plato's Theatetus "The mind is like a block of wax." The condition of the wax/mind will effect perception.

Hot and soupy—it does not hold an impression.

Cold and hard—no impression can be made.

Full of impurities—the impression will be distorted.

See Aristotle's . . "Vice is unconscious of itself," *Ethics* vii, 8 (also Romans 1:18 and also Lewis's "Continued disobedience to conscience makes conscience blind.") *akrasia*—an unwholesome temperature or climate.

3) Jeremy's bedtime question (at age 5): "If God is everywhere, how come we can't see Him?"

Material omnipresence would displace all other material objects:

Illustration: The Lead mold image extended to fill a room full of lead, no room for anything else. So too with the universe.

No such condition is true with immaterial things (cf. Medieval debate over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.)

2. C. S. Lewis "The Seeing Eye" *Christian Reflections*

Yuri Garagin - lst man in space: God does not exist, I was in outer space and I didn't see Him."

W. A. Criswell's Comment

C. S. Lewis, "The Seeing Eye" *Christian Reflections* pp. 167-168.

"The Russians, I am told, report that they have not found God , or been found by God, here on earth. The conclusion some want us to draw from these data is that God does not exist. As a corollary, those who think they have met Him on earth were suffering from a delusion.

But other conclusions might be drawn.

1. We have not yet gone far enough in space. There had been ships on the Atlantic for a good time before America was discovered.

2. God does exist but is locally confined to this planet.

3. The Russians did find God in space without knowing it, because they lacked the requisite apparatus for detecting Him.

4.God does exist but is not an object either located in a particular part of space nor diffused, as we once thought 'ether' was, throughout space.

The first two conclusions do not interest me. The sort of religion for which they could be a defense would be a religion for savages: the belief in a local deity who can be contained in a particular temple, island, or grove. That, in fact, seems to be the sort of religion about which the Russians—or some Russians—and a good many people in the West—are being irreligious. It is not in the least disquieting that no astronauts have discovered a god of that sort. The really disquieting thing would be if they had.

The third and fourth conclusions are the ones for my money. Looking for God--or Heaven--by exploring space is like reading or seeing all Shakespeare's plays in the hope that you will find Shakespeare as one of the characters or Stratford as one of the places. Shakespeare is in one sense present at every moment in every play. But he is never present in the same way as Falstaff or Lady Macbeth. Nor is he diffused through the play like a gas.

If there were an idiot who thought plays existed on their own, without an author (not to mention actors, producer, manager, stagehands, and what not), our belief in Shakespeare would not be much affected by his saying, quite truly, that he had studied all the plays and never found Shakespeare in them.The rest of us, in varying degrees according to our perceptiveness, 'found Shakespeare' in the plays. But it is a quite different sort of 'finding' from anything our poor friend has in mind. Even he has in reality been in some way affected by Shakespeare, but without knowing it. He lacked the necessary apparatus for detecting Shakespeare.

d. Agnosticism -- “Amiable agnostics will talk cheerfully about “Man’s search for God.” To me, as I then was, they might as well have talked about the mouse’s search for the cat.” -C. S. Lewis, *Surprised by Joy* p. 227

Three categories of agnostics

1) Dogmatic

2) Disinterested
cf. Pascal’s Wager

3) Dissatisfied

e. Theism

1) Five naturalistic arguments for God's existence

a) ontological argument (cf. Notes: A Romantic Approach to Theology)

> "As for proof, I sometimes wonder whether the ontological argument did not itself arise as a partially unsuccessful translation of an experience without concepts or words. I don't think we can initially argue from the concept of Perfect Being to its existence. But did they really inside argue from the experienced glory that it could not be generated subjectively
> -C. S. Lewis, "The Language of Religion," *Christian Reflections* p. 141

b. Cosmological Argument (see separate sheet)

c. Teleological Argument
(Cosmological and Teleological Proofs Aristotle's 4 Causes & Aquinas's 5 ways)

d. Moral Argument (cf. *Mere Christianity)*

e. Pragmatic Argument

f. Other Religions (see Appendix II

g. Monotheistic Trinitarianism

". . . We must remind ourselves that Christian Theology does not believe God to be a person. It believes him to be such that in Him a trinity of persons is consistent with a unity of Deity. In that sense it believe Him to be something very different from a person, just as a cube, in which six squares are consistent with unity of the body, is different from a square. (Flatlanders, attempting to imagine a cube, would either imagine the six squares coinciding, and thus destroy their distinctness, or else imagine them set out side by side, and thus destroy the unity. Our difficulties about the Trinity are of much the same kind.)"-C. S. Lewis, *The Poison of Subjectivism*. Christian Reflections, pp. 79-80

Non-Trinitarian monotheistic positions:
". . . They deny love to God except by means of His creation."
-Charles Williams, *The Descent of the Dove* p. 40

h. Miracles

1) Once you have established the existence of God, the existence of Miracles is no longer a difficult problem.

2) Paul in Acts 26:8 asks,
"Why is it considered incredible among you people that God if does raise the dead?

3) ". . . It is mere confusion of thought to suppose that advancing science has made it harder for us to accept miracles. We always knew they were contrary to the natural course of events; we know still that if there is something beyond Nature they are possible. Those are the bare bones of the question; time and progress and science and civilization have not altered them in the least. The grounds for belief and disbelief are the same today as they were two thousand--or ten thousand years ago. Miracles, *A Chapter of Red Herrings*, para. 5, p. 49

4) "The popular 'Religion' excludes miracles because it excludes the 'Living God' of Christianity and believes instead in a kind of God who obviously would not do miracles, or indeed anything else. This popular 'Religion' may roughly be called Pantheism, and we must now examine its credentials." Miracles, *Christianity and Religion* para. 2, p. 84.

i. God as Communicator to Man

1) General Revelation

a) Nature - Romans 1; Psalm 19

b) Conscious - Romans 2

2) Special Revelation

a) The Word of God Incarnate
Illustration: Hamlet and Shakespeaare

b) The Word of God Written
C. S. Lewis on Scripture

Appendecies

Appendix I

C. S. LEWIS AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SUFFERING

I. Burkian Parlor for the Problem of Evil as it relates to C. S. Lewis on this topic (what others have said):

1. Kilby, Clyde S. The Christian World of C. S. Lewis. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1964.

   "Lewis is fully aware that in this book [The P. of P.] he does not solve all the problems entailed in pain and evil." P. 70.

   If this is so then Lewis must have believed his work was a work in progress, not a last word on the subject, but the best word he could offer at the time.

2. Cunningham, Richard B. C. S. Lewis Defender of the Faith. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. 1967.

   Cunningham says his goal is "to avoid what Lewis suggests is a frequent tendency of critics—to read into the author what we want, as has been done to Lewis, but rather to make him say neither more nor less nor other than what he says." P. 17-8.

   "As an apologist, Lewis does not do certain things in his writings. He creates no comprehensive, all-embracing apologetic system, and yet he deals with a surprising number of apologetic problems." P. 20

   "Nor does he thoroughly, systematically, and exhaustively deal with objections to the Christian faith. Instead he generally isolates and deals only with the main problems of a given question." P. 20.

   Thus Lewis is not writing a last word on this subject [P. of P.], it is a work in progress. The view of the pre-Christian, Atheist Lewis is that the matter was settled, since there is pain and evil there can be no God. The view of the Christian Lewis has changed, not only can there be a God even though there is evil in the world, it is the primary way we can make the most sense of the phenomenon of evil. Nevertheless, Lewis is not expecting to fully resolve the matter. He sets out to present a "good enough" explanation, a work in progress.

3. Willis, John Randolph. Pleasures Forevermore: The Theology of C. S. Lewis. Chicago: Loyola University Press. 1983.

"Lewis shows that the universe is small indeed compared with Ultimate Reality; so how much smaller earth is when compared to the universe, and man when compared to the earth." P. 25.

"Lewis always reminds us that when we speak of the attributes of God, we speak in a supereminent fashion. What God is in actuality is simply beyond all human imagination. God is his mercy and much more; God is his justice and much more…" P. 25.

4. Peters, John. C. S. Lewis: The Man and His Achievement. Exeter: Paternoster Press. 1985.

   "Lewis recognizes too that there is no easy solution to the problem of pain, and that no intellectual solution or formula can do away with the need for patience, fortitude and courage." P. 62.

5. Christopher, Joe R. C. S. Lewis. Boston: Twayne Publishers. 1987.

   Christopher notes an image that Lewis introduces in The Problem of Pain several places; it is that of a dance. He feels this image ties the book together. It is a significant observation and underscores the incompleteness of the book; at least it is not for Lewis a last word or a simple formula. P. 67-8. Of William Morris he said, "in morris there are no conclusions…balance is attained and immediately lost; everything is beginning over again: it is a dance, not a diagram. It can no more be seized in an epigram, summed up and docketed, than experience itself." Lewis Selected Literary Essays. P. 229.

6. Wilson, A. N. C. S. Lewis: A Biography. London: Collins. 1990.

   "It is a book which vigorously displays, from its opening paragraphs, all Lewis's strengths and weaknesses as a religious apologist." P. 162. [Note how much of Lewis's apologetics centers around his own autobiographical struggles—thus all of it grows out of personal questions and represents a work in progress]. On the one hand, its strength is displayed, according to Wilson with "a style of rhetoric which seems more reminiscent of the Belfast police courts." P. 163. On the other hand Wilson says it displays the work of "a rhetorical trickster who is not thinking at all." P. 163. It is a unfortunate remark for Wilson to display, it would not detract from his own creditability if he would have said it was a weak point, but to say Lewis was not thinking at all, is unfortunate.

7. Sims, John A. Missionaries to the Skeptics C. S. Lewis, Edward John Carnell, and Reinhold Niebuhr: Christian Apologists for the Twentieth Century. Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press. 1995.

   Concerning Natural Evil, Sims sees Lewis's answer incomplete and yet "The only answer that Lewis could offer to this perpetual and perplexing question was that

nature does not always act benevolently or even-handedly because matter has a fixed nature and obeys constant laws." P. 60. He adds, "Christianity does not offer an easy solution or a quick fix for the pain and suffering that is experienced through nature." P. 60.

"Lewis warned that it is not our experiences, our subjectivity, our ideas that are all-important. If this were true, some of them would break us. There must be some objective truth that we can trust that transcends our experience. It was a truth that Lewis would learn first-hand through the death of his wife." P. 64.

Re: A Grief Observed, Sims writes, though Lewis doubted during this time, "He did not succumb to doubt. His trust in God's objective reality pulled him through this most difficult time in his life. His enduring conviction was that it is Christ, the object of our faith, that is ultimately important—not our subjectivity, our emotions, or our arguments." P. 65.

"He had learned through experience what he already knew in his head: that the Christian cannot live out of his experiences or his circumstances. The only sure foundation is the objective reality of God and His promises." P. 66.

8. Peters, Thomas C. Simply C. S. Lewis: A Beginner's Guide to the Life and Works of C. S. Lewis. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books. 1997. [See notes attached]

9. Como, James. Branches to Heaven: The Geniuses of C. S. Lewis. Dallas: Spence Publishing Company 1998.

   Refers to the Johari Window and then notes that Lewis is not always exactly right in telling his own story. "The consideration of C. S. Lewis's self is a very great challenge. He at once hid it absolutely, distorted it, and invented parts of it to parade forth; he repressed, explored, and denied it; he indulged and overcame it; certainly he would transform, and then transcend it; almost always he used it. And always he coyly warned us against discussing it." P. 54.

   Yet Como points out that Lewis turns to his own life to find the *topoi* for his arguments. Where but to life—that is, to thought, reading, and experience—would he turn when looking for *topoi*, the "places" for argument, his subject matter, suitable as the raw material of his invention? P. 140.

10. Nicholi, Armand M. The Question of God: C. S. Lewis and Sigmund Freud Debate God, Love, Sex and the Meaning of Life. New York: The Free Press. 2002.

    As a Psychiatrist and a Harvard Professor teaching a course comparing the philosophies of Freud and Lewis, Nicholi says, that as a Psychiatrist, he noticed three major changes that occurred after Lewis's conversion: 1. The "process, Lewis writes involves losing yourself in your relationship to the creator." P. 115.

In other words Nicholi says, “He turned outward instead of inward to ‘find himself.’” P. 116. 2. Second he learned how to love his neighbor, which “also took Lewis outside of himself. He developed a capacity to step out of his own needs sufficiently to become aware of the needs of others and to exercise his will to meet those needs.” P. 116. 3. His “new worldview changed his valuation of people.” He tended to see them in a new light as valuable and extraordinary. P. 116.

II. Preliminary Considerations

A. A Problem of perspective

1. How the matter affects us personally may be different than how it affects another. It may also affect us one way at first and another way as time passes.

2. Reality is iconoclastic. There are *severe mercies*.

3. There are no last words.

B. The problem of good.

C. We are not above the problem

'Why doesn't God smite this dictator dead?' is a question a little remote from us. Why, madam, did He not strike you dumb and imbecile before you uttered that baseless and unkind slander the day before yesterday? Or me, before I behaved with such cruel lack of consideration to that well-meaning friend? And why, sir, did He not cause your hand to rot off at the wrist before you signed your name to that dirty little bit of financial trickery? You did not quite mean that? But why not? Your misdeeds and mine are none the less repellent because our opportunities for doing damage are less spectacular that those of some other people. Do you suggest that your doings and mine are too trivial for God to bother about? That cuts both ways; for, in that case, it would make precious little difference to His creation if He wiped us both out tomorrow. –Dorothy Sayers *The Triumph of Easter*. Creed or Chaos?

Some have paid me an undeserved compliment by supposing that my *Letters* were the ripe fruit of many years' study in moral and ascetic theology. They forgot that there is an equally reliable, though less creditable way of learning how temptation works. "My heart" -- I need no other's -- "showeth me the wickedness of the ungodly." – C. S. Lewis Introduction. The Screwtape Letters

D. Definitions

1. The problem defined

2. Attempts at solutions

3. Traditional Christian responses

III. Free Will Theodicy

A. Revisiting the concept of Omnipotence

1. “Nothing which implies a contradiction exists in the divine Omnipotence.” Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologica*

2. Misjudgments in an ordered world.

> The inexorable "laws of Nature" which operate in defiance of human suffering or desert, which are not turned aside by prayer, seem, at first sight, to furnish a strong argument against the goodness and power of God. I am going to submit that not even Omnipotence could create a society of free souls without at that same time creating a relatively independent and "inexorable" Nature. – C. S. Lewis The Problem of Pain

3. What are we asking God to do when we expect Him to remove the consequences of evil choices?

4. What about natural disasters?

B. Revisiting the concept of Goodness

1. What is the opposite of God?

2. What is the opposite of good?

a. “Evil is spoiled goodness.”

b. For the purposes of analogy [like most analogies, this is not a true fit, but it has value none the less for helping us to grasp a concept]: “Evil compares to good like _____.

c. Penicillin.

d. The Cross.

3. Quotes:

a. Charles Williams, writing of Satan, in his play, *The Golden Legend*:

> The Son of Mystery;
> And since God suffers him to be,
> He, too, is God's minister,
> And labours for some good
> By us not understood!

b. C. S. Lewis

C. S. Lewis's Latin Letters 20 September 1947

"Satan is without doubt nothing else than a hammer in the hand of a benevolent and severe God. For all, either willingly or unwillingly, do the will of God: Judas and Satan as tools or instruments, John and Peter as sons." [Of course it makes a great deal of difference to us if we are functioning as mere tools or instruments to accomplish God's will, or as daughters and sons.]

C. S. Lewis *A Preface to Paradise Lost* Chapter 10, para. 2-5.

"God shows His benevolence in creating good Natures, He shows His justice in *exploiting* evil wills…. Whoever tries to rebel against God produces the result opposite to his intention."

c. Augustine

Augustine *Enchridion* XI.

"Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His work unless His Omnipotence and Goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil. This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist and out of it produce good."

Augustine *The City of God* XI. 23.

"The sinful will, though it violated the laws of its own nature did not on that account escape the laws of God who justly orders all things for good."

d. George MacDonald, *Phantastes* (the last lines of the book).

"Yet I know that good is coming to me – that good is always coming; though few have at all times the simplicity and courage to believe it. What we call evil is only the best shape, which, for the person and his condition at the time, could be assumed by the best good."

e. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *The Cost of Discipleship* (from the Introduction).

If it be ours to drain the cup of grieving
Even to the dregs of pain at Thy command,
We will not falter, thankfully receiving
All that comes from Thy loving hand.

*

IV. Soul making Theodicy

A. Is it possible that love and goodness could be compatible with pain and suffering.

1. Hebrews 5:8

He learned obedience from the things that He suffered.

2. Lewis's examples:

a. The artist and his work.

The potter and the clay.

b. The animal husbandman and his animal.

In its state of nature it has a smell, and habits, which frustrate the man's love: he washes it, house-trains it, teaches it not to steal [from the table], and is so enabled to love it completely. To the puppy the whole proceeding would seem, if it were a theologian, to cast grave doubts on the "goodness" of man: but the full-grown and full-trained dog, larger, healthier, and longer-lived than the wild dog, and admitted as it were by Grace, to a whole world of affections, loyalties, interests, and comforts entirely beyond its animal destiny, would have no such doubts. – C. S. Lewis <u>The Problem of Pain</u>

c. The parent and the child.

Every son whom his father loves, he reproves and disciplines him. Hebrews 12.

c. The groom and the bride.

Does any woman regard it as a sign of love in a man that he neither knows nor cares how she is looking? Love may, indeed,

> love the beloved when her beauty is lost: but not because it is lost. Love may forgive all infirmities and love still in spite of them: but Love cannot cease to will their removal. Love is more sensitive than hatred itself to every blemish in the beloved.... – C. S. Lewis The Problem of Pain

3. Other examples:

4. Edna St. Vincent Millay's *Baccalaureate Hymn 1917*.

   "O Lord, let us suffer that we may grow kind."

5. Faith, Love, Compassion, Trust, and Character.

   "Innocence is not goodness. Even Divine Nature even in her prime cannot make of virtue a gift." C. S. Lewis *The Allegory of Love* p. 60.

6. The undragoning of Eustace Clarance Scrubb. Note his father confessor.

V. Some weaknesses in Lewis's theodicy.

A. Issues related to natural evil, particularly animal pain.

1. They suffer but do not have wills like human wills.

2. They suffer but their souls are not necessarily improved by it.

Note: Austin Farrer's observation in *The Christian* Apologist, in Light on C. S. Lewis, Farrer is sympathetic to Lewis's argument in The Problem of Pain, but at this point he simply writes,

> Imagination has slipped from the leash of reason….

3. The weaknesses in the argument do not indicate that the argument is utterly flawed.

C. "…there is no getting beyond a thing without first getting as far." Lewis *Kipling's World*. Selected Literary Essays. P. 239.

VI. Farrer ends his treatment of Lewis's Theodicy with a section from Lewis's Poem *The Apologist's Evening Prayer*, I shall do the same.

> From all my lame defeats and oh! Much more
> From all the victories that I seem to score;
> From cleverness shot forth on Thy behalf
> At which, while angels weep, the audience laugh;
> From all my proofs of Thy divinity,
> Thou, who wouldst give no sign, deliver me.
>
> Thoughts are but coins. Let me not trust, instead
> Of Thee, their thin-warn image of Thy head.
> From all my thoughts, even from my thoughts of Thee,
> O thou fair Silence, fall, and set me free.
> Lord of the narrow gate and the needle's eye,
> Take from me all my trumpery lest I die.

*Examples of this tradition would include 1) Augustine. *Enchridion XCVI.* Nor can we doubt that God does well even in the permission of what is evil. For He permits it only in the justice of His judgment. And surely all that is just is good. Although, therefore, evil, in so far as it is evil, is not good; yet the fact that evil as well as good exists, is a good. For if it were not a good that evil should exist, its existence would not be permitted by the omnipotent Good, who without doubt can as easily refuse to permit what He does not wish, as bring about what He does wish. And if we do not believe this, the very first sentence of our creed is endangered, wherein we profess to believe in God the Father Almighty. For He is not truly called Almighty if He cannot do whatsoever He pleases, or if the power of His almighty will is hindered by the will of any creature whatsoever. (Schaff, Phillip. ed. A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of The Christian Church. Vol. III. p. 267). 2) "God Almighty! There is some soul of goodness in

things evil, would men observingly distill it out... thus may we gather honey from the weed, and make a moral of the devil himself." Shakespeare. *King Henry V*. Act IV, Scene I, LL. 3-5, 11-12. 3) "And high permission of all ruling heaven left him [Satan] at large to do his own dark designs, that with reiterated crimes he might heap on himself damnation, while he sought evil to others, and enraged might see how all his malice served but to bring forth infinite goodness, grace and mercy shewn on Man by him seduced, but on himself treble confusion, wrath, and vengeance poured." Milton, John. *Paradise Lost.* Book I. *Great Books of the Western World.* Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952. Vol. 32. p. 105. 4) "Yet I know that good is coming to me - that good is always coming; though few have at all times the simplicity and courage to believe it. What we call evil, is the only and best shape, which for the person and his condition at the time, could be assumed by the best good." MacDonald, George. *Phantastes and Lilith.* Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1971. P. 182. 5) [Referring to Satan as "The Son of Mystery", Charles Williams wrote]

"The son of mystery;
And since God suffers him to be,
He, too, it God's minister,
And labors for some good
By us not understood!"

Charles Williams. Quoted from Anne Ridler's Introduction in *The Image of the City*. London: Oxford, 1958. pp. xiii-xiv. 6) "Satan is without doubt nothing else than a hammer in the hand of a benevolent and severe God. For all, either willingly or unwillingly, do the will of God: Judas and Satan as tools or instruments, John and Peter as sons." - C.S. Lewis. *Letters/C.S. Lewis/Don Giovanni Calabria. A Study In Friendship.* Translated and edited by Martin Moynihan. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Servant, 1988.

A further note: Biographical details of Lewis's life, indicating that he suffered much throughout his life, can be reconstructed from several sources these include autobiography, biography and personal remembrances. **I. Autobiography.** There are three sources for Lewis's autobiographical information. A. Lewis's autobiographies: 1. His allegorical autobiography: *The Pilgrims Regress: An Allegorical apology for Christianity, Reason and Romanticism.* London: J.M. Dent, 1933. *Surprised By Joy: The Shape of My Early Life.* New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956. B. Lewis's Diary: *All My Road Before Me: The Diary of C.S. Lewis 1922-1927.* Edited by Walter Hooper. San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1991. C. Lewis's Letters: 1. *Letters of C.S.* Lewis Edited by W.H. Lewis. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1966. 2. *Letters To An American Lady.* Edited by Clyde S. Kilby. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1967. 3. *They Stand Together: The Letters of C.S. Lewis To Arthur Greeves (1914-1963).* Edited by Walter Hooper. London: Collins. 1979. 4. *C. S. Lewis Letters To Children.* Edited by Lyle Dorsett and Marjorie Lamp Mead. New York: Macmillan, 1985. 5. *Letters C.S. Lewis Don Giovanni Calabria A Study In Friendship.* Translated and edited by Martin Moynihan. London: Collins 1989. **II. Biography.** These include: A. *C.S. Lewis: A Biography.* By Green, Roger Lancelyn

and Walter Hooper. London: Collins, 1974. B. *The Inklings: C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, Charles Williams and their Friends.* By Carpenter Humphrey. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979. C. *And God Came In: The extraordinary Story of Joy Davidman, Her Life and Marriage to C.S. Lewis.* By Lyle Dorsett. New York: Macmillan, 1983. D. *Clive Staples Lewis: A Dramatic Life*. By William Griffin. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986. E. *Jack: C.S. Lewis and His Times*. By George Sayer. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988. F. *C.S. Lewis: A Biography.* By A. N. Wilson. London: Collins, 1990. **III. Remembrances:** *A. Light On C.S. Lewis.* Edited by Jocelyn Gibb. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1965. B. *C.S. Lewis: Speaker and Teacher*. Edited by Carolyn Keefe. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1971. C. *A Severe Mercy.* By Sheldon Vanauken. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977. D. *C.S. Lewis At the Breakfast Table and Other Reminiscences.* Edited by James T. Como. New York: Macmillan, 1979. E. *Brothers and Friends An Intimate Portrait of C.S. Lewis: The Diaries of Major Warren Hamilton Lewis.* Edited by Clyde S. Kilby and Marjorie Lamp Mead. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1982. F. *Lenten Lands: My Childhood with Joy Davidman and C.S. Lewis.* By Douglas H. Gresham. New York: Macmillan, 1988. This list is not exhaustive, but it is enough to provide a substantial composite of biographical detail in order to exhume an honest portrayal of Lewis's life. Such a composite is necessary to avoid sympathetic hagiography on the one hand and unsympathetic inaccuracy on the other.

Appendix II

C.S. LEWIS AND THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD

What about the other religions of the world?

Anyone who has ever shared his or her faith in Christ has encountered the question, "What about the other religions of the world, what do Christians have to say about them?" If you have ever been asked that question, or wondered about it yourself, perhaps you have also thought, "Where can I go for answers?" In his popular book, Mere Christianity, C.S. Lewis observed, "If you are a Christian you do not have to believe that all the other religions are simply wrong all through."[1] Of course new questions immediately follow. If Christians maintain that the atonement of Christ alone can provide access to God, what could someone like Lewis have in mind when he asserts there are points common to all religions? What are those points which are shared by Christianity and the other great (and by great, I mean widely practiced) religions of the world?

Three common characteristics in all the world religions.

Taking his lead from the book The Idea of the Holy, by Rudolph Otto, C. S. Lewis identified three characteristics common to the world religions and a fourth peculiar to Christianity.[2] First, all these religions believe in some kind of Divine Essence. Otto called it the *Numinous*. Of course each religion will have their variations of the *Numinous*, contingent on whether they are animistic, pantheistic, polytheistic, dualistic, monotheistic, or monotheistic Trinitarian. In the presence of the *Numinous* the adherents of the particular religion feel a sense of awe.[3] However differently they may unpackage it, all the world religions believe in a Divine Essence.

Second, all of the world religions believe in some kind of absolute moral law, which people characteristically break. Lewis writes that all the religions "...agree in prescribing a behavior which their adherents fail to practice." All men stand under

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[1]Lewis, C.S. Mere Christianity. London: Geoffrey Bles. 1953. p.29.

[2]Lewis, C.S. The Problem of Pain. London: Fount. 1977. pp.14-20.

[3]Lewis, attempting to awaken in his readers a sense of this awe, reminds them of the passage in Kenneth Graham's Wind and the Willows ("The Piper at the Gates of Dawn," Chapter VII). In this chapter Rat and Mole find themselves on an all-night search for Portly, the young son of their friend Otter. They are led by pipe music to the very place where Portly will be found, but not until Rat and Mole have an encounter with Pan, the demigod and protector of animals. Their experience, as it is written by Graham, captures, for Lewis, a literary expression of this awe before the *Numinous.* Lewis cites other examples from Genesis, Ezekiel, AEschylus, the Apocalypse, Virgil, Malory and Wordsworth's *Prelude*. Ibid. p. 15.

condemnation, and this condemnation does not come "...by alien codes of ethics, but by their own, and all men therefore are conscious of guilt." [4] Third, all the world religions believe that the Divine Essence or *Numinous*, is the custodian of the moral law, so that offenses against the law are offenses against God. Out of this, the religious adherent senses an authority which condemns his guilt; it is also an authority whose behavior bears no resemblance to our own. Religious believers cannot be accused of desiring the existence of this authority as mere wish fulfillment. If this was the case it would be difficult to understand why believers would desire the presence of one who is offended by their deficiencies.[5]

The Uniqueness Christianity.

There is a fourth element peculiar to Christianity which distinguishes it from the rest of the world religions. While the Christian can agree with the existence of something like the *Numinous*, the moral law, and the *Numinous* as custodian of that moral law; he cannot agree with the other religions as to what ought to be done to fix the problem created by failing to keep the moral law. There is estrangement between man and God. The other world religions attempt to resolve the difficulty by developing additional moral codes. If the adherent will simply live up to the new code perfectly, he will merit some kind of peace between himself and God. The Christian looks at the problem differently. If a man could not live up to the first code, how, or by what means, will he now be able to live up to the new code?

Lewis believed that only God could restore what was broken in man. In the days before Lewis's own conversion to Christianity, he had reasoned his way through the morass of atheism and agnosticism. He thought through the claims of the various religions of the world, and settled on Theism. At that time however he thought that he could no more know God personally than Hamlet could know Shakespeare.[6] Two years later Lewis became a Christian. He later wrote in his autobiography, that he came to realize that his analogy concerning Hamlet and Shakespeare was a good one. In fact, if Hamlet were ever to know Shakespeare the author, it could never depend upon Hamlet the character breaking out of the play to meet the playwright. But in fact it would certainly be possible for Shakespeare the author to write himself into the play as

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[4]Lewis, The Problem of Pain. p. 17.

[5]Ibid. p.18.

[6]Lewis, C.S. Surprised by Joy. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 1955. p. 223.

Shakespeare the character, thus making the introduction possible.[7] C.S. Lewis believed that an event something like this is what happened in the Incarnation, when God wrote Himself into the drama of human existence and became a man. Lewis understood that the God must be the initiator when it comes to a relationship between God and man.

> All the initiative has been on God's side; all has been free, unbounded grace. And all will continue to be free, unbounded grace. .... Bliss is not for sale; cannot be earned. 'Works' have no 'merit,' though of course faith, inevitably, even unconsciously, flows out into works of love at once. He is not saved because he does works of love: he does works of love because he is saved. It is faith alone that has saved him: faith bestowed by sheer gift.[8]

Other religions may set the stage, but the full drama of redemption and reconciliation is only manifest fully in Christianity. For Lewis the significant difference between Christianity and the other religions was that of an historic event. God the Son became a man, in order to set man right before God.

Other Characteristics Distinguishing Christianity from the Religions of the World.

In a short essay titled, *Some Thoughts,* Lewis clarifies another distinctive which sets Christianity apart from the other religions of the world. This distinctive he calls, "...the blessedly two-edged character, of Christianity."[9] Lewis classifies these two edges, firstly by calling Christianity, "one of the world-affirming religions"[10] By this Lewis means that Christianity concerns itself with the sick and infirm, engages in cultural activities, cares for the disenfranchised--the widow, the orphan, the poor--and others marginalized by society, it affirms marriage, and looks on matters of the body, and all its cares, with dignity. But secondly, Christianity is also ready to show its other edge, thereby making it what Lewis calls, "one of the world-denying religions."[11] It is not so attached to this world that it cannot deny, when necessary, inordinate longing for temporal things. It looks forward to a life beyond mere earthly existence. The Christian is not devastated by death, failing to see it as the worst thing one could experience.

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[7] Ibid. p.227.

[8] Lewis, C.S. English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama. London: Oxford. 1968. p. 33.

[9] Lewis, C.S. God in the Dock. *Some Thoughts.* Walter Hooper, editor. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1970. p.147.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid. p.148.

Damnation is to be more highly feared than death. As a result Christians can mortify the flesh, abstain from pleasures and embrace solitude, meditation and the monastic life. But since Christianity also affirms life, it therefore stands in stark contrast with religions that are pantheistic. Lewis noted that pantheists never look at the universe as something which God has made.[12] Their Universe and God are one. Whatever is, is God. God is not transcendent in the pantheist's scheme of things.

When Christian asceticism seeks to live in denial of this life, it is also in contrast with all forms of Polytheism where "the gods are usually the product of a universe already in existence."[13] Lewis observes,

> Polytheism is always, in the long run, nature-worship; Pantheism always, in the long run, hostility to nature. None of these beliefs really leaves you free *both* to enjoy your breakfast *and* to mortify your inordinate appetites—much less to mortify appetites recognized as innocent at present lest they should become inordinate.[14]

Lewis recognized that Christian doctrine will not give license to calling the immaterial good and the material bad. Both are essentially good. He continues,

> Because God created the Natural -- invented it out of His love and artistry—it demands our reverence; because it is only a creature and not He, it is, from another point of view, of little account. And still more because Nature, and especially human nature, is fallen it must be corrected and the evil within it must be mortified. But its essence is good; correction is something quite different from Manichaean repudiation or Stoic superiority. Hence in all true Christian asceticism, that respect for the thing rejected which, I think, we never find in pagan asceticism. Marriage is good, though not for me; wine is good though I must not drink it; feasts are good, though today we fast.[15]

Lewis, in this particular essay, claims that these two edges are the result of the Christian doctrines of Creation and the Fall.[16] These elements are peculiar to Christianity, setting it apart from the other religions.

"This also is Thou: Neither is this Thou."

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[12] Ibid. p.149.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid. pp. 148-149.
[16] Ibid. p.149.

Taking a lead from his friend Charles Williams, Lewis finds another support for "the blessed two-edged character of Christianity." He writes that "...of each creature we can say, "This also is Thou: neither is this Thou."[17] Here the emphasis is on God's immanence and His transcendence. Lest I be tempted to worship the thing that motivates me to say "This also is Thou," I must remember in the same breath, 'neither is this Thou." Because God is present in all that He has made, the Christian can say, "This also is Thou." But since he is no pantheist and because God transcends what He has made, the Christian must add, "Neither is this Thou." The two ways of Christian spirituality have flowed from this. The first way is the way of affirmation. It worships with eyes wide open, eager not to miss any message, or hint of the Divine presence, which God has on display in His creation. This way leads to more than mere gratitude. Lewis wrote that,

> Gratitude exclaims, very properly: "How good of God to give me this." Adoration says: "What must be the quality of that Being whose far-off and momentary coruscations are like this!" One's mind runs back up the sunbeam to the sun.[18]

The Way of Affirmation takes its cues from data gathered empirically from the material world. It turns sights and color, smells and fragrances, textures, sounds and even tastes ("taste and see that the Lord is good") into occasions for worship.

The second way is the Way of Negation. It worships with eyes closed. It seeks to shut out all distractions in its attempts to concentrate on the God Transcendent. It remembers, to say of all things made, "Neither is this Thou." It is the ascetic way. For the Christian, affirming the immanence and transcendence of God, both ways are legitimate. Because of this, Christianity remains unique among the great religions of the world. Thus the danger of other religions is manifest by what they lack, more than what they possess. To the degree that they emphasize immanence, without emphasizing transcendence, they risk becoming self-indulgent. To the degree that they emphasize transcendence, without immanence, they become proud, austere and pharisaical.

One is always fighting on at least two fronts. When one is among

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[17]Lewis, C.S. Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer. London: Geoffrey Bles. 1964. p.99. (In Charles Williams, see, The Descent of the Dove: A Short History of the Holy Spirit in the Church. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans. 1974. p. viii. Also see Williams's book, The Figure of Beatrice: A study in Dante. London: Faber & Faber. 1953. p. 37).

[18]Ibid. p. 118.

Pantheists one must emphasize the distinctness, and relative independence, of the creatures. Among Deists ...one must emphasize the divine presence in my neighbor, my dog, my cabbage-patch.[19]

Either way, isolated from the checks and balance of the other, produces a kind of idolatry, expressed in a different way. Often the failure of religion occurs when a "both-and" is reshaped into an "either-or."

The Fact of Desire.

The practitioners of the Eastern Religions, seek to gain merit by denying all desire, they attempt to disassociate themselves from material goods and earthly pleasure. Theirs is the way of renunciation. They practice the suppression of desire and detachment from things. In the Dhammapada, it is said that, "The disciple who is fully awakened delights only in the destruction of all desires."[20] Later it says, "Him I call Brahmin for whom there is nothing before, behind, or between, who has nothing and is without attachment."[21]

The practitioners of the non-Trinitarian monotheisms of the Middle East seek triumph over the world through regulation and law, in an attempt to achieve merit before God. Theirs is not so much the renunciation of self as it is the enlargement of self. Legalistic religion produces two kinds of people: 1) the guilty who know they cannot keep the law, and 2) the arrogant who think they can. These religions, produce, among the arrogant, a perfectionism which can become both rigid and domineering. While commenting on the poetry of Charles Williams, Lewis observes:

Islam denies the Incarnation. It will not allow that God has descended into flesh or that Manhood has been exalted into Deity. It is "the sharp curved line of the Prophet's blade that cuts the Obedience from the Obeyed." It stands for all religions that are afraid of matter and afraid of mystery....[22]

In the Incarnation, Lewis sees the superiority of Christianity over the religions of the world, the fulfillment of all that might be perceived as true in these religions, can be found in Christianity alone.

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[19]Ibid.

[20]The Dhammapada,. "Buddhavaggo--The Buddha (The Awakened). XIV. 9. Translated by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, 1888. London: Oxford. 1974. p.121.

[21]Ibid. "Brahmanavaggo--The Brahmin." XXVI.28. p.184.

[22]Lewis, C.S. Arthurian Torso: Williams and the Arthuriad. "The Golden Age in Logres." Oxford: Oxford. 1948. p.124.

Contrary to the Eastern religions, Lewis finds that desire, properly followed, may lead to God. It is not a thing to be suppressed or denied, only rightly guided. He would affirm the statement made by Thomas Traherne, that,

> The noble inclination whereby man thirsteth after riches and dominion is his highest virtue, when rightly guided; and carries him as a triumphant chariot, to his sovereign happiness. Men are made miserable only by abusing it. Taking a false way to satisfy it, they pursue the wind. [23]

So contrary from denying the pursuit of pleasure or suppressing desire, Lewis believed these ought to be properly pursued. There is a desire, he believed, so characteristically human, that our dignity is recovered only in following its lead till we find the very object of that desire. He wrote,

> It appeared to me therefore that if a man diligently followed this desire, pursuing the false objects until their falsity appeared and then resolutely abandoning them, he must come out at last into the clear knowledge that the human soul was made to enjoy some object that is never fully given....The only fatal error was to pretend that you had passed from desire to fruition, when, in reality, you had found either nothing, or desire itself, or the satisfaction of some different desire. The dialectic of Desire, faithfully followed, would retrieve all mistakes, head you off from all false paths, and force you not to propound, but to live through, a sort of ontological proof.[24]

To the degree that the religions of the world seek to suppress all desire, their asceticism also shuts out God. In truncating desire, they renounce the path to God. The Psalmist wrote, "Thou wilt make known to me the path of life, in thy Presence is fullness of joy, at thy right hand there are pleasures forever." (Psalm 16:11).

What hope have those who follow other religions?

Lewis is not a Universalist but he speculates that the door may be opened for some who follow other religions, to find themselves in heaven after death. The most alarming presentation of Lewis's position meets us in *The Last Battle*, the seventh and final book of his Narnian Chronicles. Emeth, a Calolrmene warrior and follower of the false god Tash, finds himself, to his great surprise, in Narnian heaven. Emeth tells others the story of his encounter with Aslan, the Christ figure in Lewis's Narnia.

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[23]Traherne, Thomas. Centuries. London: Faith Press. 19 I. 23. p.12.

[24]Lewis, C.S. The Pilgrim's Regress. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans. 1981. pp. 204-205.

> ...the Glorious One bent down his golden head and touched my forehead with his tongue and said, Son, thou art welcome. But I said, Alas, Lord, I am no son of Thine but the servant of Tash. He answered, Child, all the service thou hast done to Tash, I account as service done to me. Then by reason of my great desire for wisdom and understanding, I overcame my fear and questioned the Glorious One and said, Lord is it then true, as the Ape said that thou and Tash are one? The Lion growled so that the earth shook (but his wrath was not against me) and said, It is false. Not because he and I are one, but because we are opposites, I take to me the services which thou hast done to him, for I and he are of such different kinds that no service which is vile can be done to me, and none which is not vile can be done to him. Therefore if any man swear by Tash and keep his oath for the oath's sake, it is by me that he has truly sworn, though he know it not, and it is I who reward him. And if any man do a cruelty in my name, then though he says the name Aslan, it is Tash whom he serves and by Tash his deed is accepted. Dost thou understand, Child? I said, Lord thou knowest how much I understand. But I said also(for the truth constrained me), Yes I have been seeking Tash all my days. (Beloved, said the Glorious One, unless thy desire had been for me thou wouldst not have sought so long and so truly. For all find what they truly seek.[25]

Some, to be sure, have thought that Lewis went too far in this passage. They wonder if he did not flirt with universalism. Earlier, in The Last Battle, he clearly points out that this is not the case. At the climax of Narnian history we read of a long queue before an open Door. Aslan stands at the Door and all must face him. In that moment, those in the precession turn and enter into the Door to be with Aslan or they turn away preferring eternal darkness and death to the Lion. Choices are made and they have eternal consequences.

Lewis was certainly not a universalist. Nevertheless what we discover in Emeth is nothing more than Lewis's imagination engaged in hopeful theological speculation. Perhaps, it was an unfortunate choice to speculate on the *ordo salutis* in, of all places, a children's book. George MacDonald, the Scottish Congre-gationalist, whose books had a profound influence on Lewis's thought, was a Universalist. Although C.S. Lewis says of him:

> He hopes, indeed, that all men will be saved; but that is because he hopes that all will repent. He knows (none better) that even Omnipotence cannot save the unconverted. He never trifles with eternal impossibilities.[26]

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[25]Lewis, C.S. The Last Battle. New York: Macmillan. 1956. pp.156-157.

[26]George MacDonald: An Anthology . Edited with an Introduction by C.S. Lewis. London: Geoffrey Bles. 1970. p. 20.

But both Lewis, to a lesser degree, and Macdonald, to a greater degree, trifle with eternal possibilities. MacDonald would believe no matter how long or how much suffering it might take, eventually all will make it into heaven. Lewis leaves a door open to the possibility that some, perhaps, might complete the process of conversion in the next life. But it is only for those who have begun the process in this life. If a regenerate soul still unconverted could die before conversion, could they be given an opportunity to complete in the next life what God had begun in them in this life? Some might object saying, but if God began the process in this life, certainly He could so superintend the life of the regenerate, keeping them from death until they completed the process leading to conversion. While the objection is a strong and a worthy one, Lewis appears to be proposing nonetheless, that if a person in such a process did die before completing that process there still may be hope for him.[27] I think this is at the core of Lewis's story of Emeth. It might well be argued that a children's book is not a good place to do speculative theology. On the other hand one might retort that perhaps it is legitimate to begin, as early as childhood, recognizing that there are elements of our faith that are shrouded in mystery. The best we can say is that we do not know for sure. Moses reminds us that, "The secret things belong to God, but the things revealed belong to us and to our children forever." (Deuteronomy 29:29).

There may be some element of mystery surrounding the eternal destiny of some followers of other faiths. Two things appear certain from Scripture: 1) no one gets into heaven apart from faith in God's provision for sin in the finished work of Jesus Christ and 2) some do not make it. So what comes of the faithful and sincere follower of another religion? Lewis told a group of seminarians, "...woe to you if you do not evangelize."[28] Since Lewis, believed that damnation was possible, he thought it proper to be zealous in his evangelistic endeavors. God has said it is the responsibility of those who know, to tell those who have not yet heard. Whether it is apostate westerners or errant easterners, all need to hear clearly the claims of Christ:

> ...claims which, it not true, are those of a megalomaniac, compared with whom Hitler was the most sane and humble of men. There is no half-way house and there is no parallel in other religions. If you had gone to Buddha

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[27]Lewis, maintains a similar hope for the Egyptian Pharaoh and monotheist, Akhenaten, and also for Virgil and Plato. cf. Reflections on the Psalms. London: Geoffrey Bles 1958. pp. 89& 108.

[28]Lewis, C.S. Christian Reflections. ed. Walter Hooper. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans. 1967. p.152.

> and asked him, "Are you the son of Bramah?" he would have said, "My son, you are still in the vale of illusion." If you had gone to Socrates and asked, "Are you Zeus?" he would have laughed at you. If you had gone to Mohammed and asked, "Are you Allah?" he would first have rent his clothes and then cut your head off. If you had asked Confucius, "Are you Heaven?" I think he would have probably replied, "Remarks which are not in accordance with nature are in bad taste." The idea of a great moral teacher saying what Christ said is out of the question. In my opinion, the only person who can say that sort of thing is either God or a complete lunatic suffering from that form of delusion which undermines the whole mind of man. If you think you are a poached egg, when you are looking for a piece of toast to suit you, you may be sane, but if you think you are God, there is no chance for you. We may note in passing that He was never regarded as a mere moral teacher. He did not produce that effect on any of the people who actually met Him. He produced mainly three effects--Hatred--Terror--Adoration. There was not trace of people expressing mild approval.[29]

Final Observations

Lewis did not write a formal Philosophy of Religion. Nor does he provide for his readers an exhaustive comparison of the world religions. Nevertheless from his writings it is possible to glean some valuable insight, helpful in under- standing how Christianity interfaces with other religions.

In light of the three common elements Lewis identifies in all religions, Lewis believed that Christianity provided more substance than could be found in the others. This is because of the historic element found in the Incarnation. Thus the *Numinous* becomes articulate in Christ, "the Word made flesh." Morality also finds a clearer expression in Christianity. In his autobiography, Surprised by Joy, Lewis explains that he came to the place, before his conversion, where he thought the choice of religions would most likely fall between Hinduism or Christianity. He chose Christianity over Hinduism, in part, because he thought that Hinduism was deficient in its ability to articulate a mature moral philosophy.[30] On the other hand, with the appearance of Christ in the Incarnation,

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[29]Lewis. God in the Dock. pp. 157-158.

[30]Lewis. Surprised by Joy. pp. 235-236. After Lewis's conversion to Christianity, he revealed in two letters what he thought stood behind the moral deficiency in Hinduism. In one letter he wrote, "Your Hindus certainly sound delightful. But what do they deny? That has always been my trouble with Indians--to find any proposition they would pronounce false. But truth must surely involve exclusions." (Lewis, C.S. Letters of C.S. Lewis. ed. W.H..... Lewis. London: Geoffrey Bles. 1966. p.267). In the other letter, Lewis wrote, "Thanks for *Christ in India.* It confirms what I had, less clearly, thought already that the difficulty in preaching Christ in India is that there is no difficulty. One is up against true Paganism--the best sort as well as the worst--hospitable to all gods, naturally religious,

there is the bold affirmation that the Law is true and its demands must be fulfilled. Christ alone could bear its burden and meet its demands.

The *Numinous* as the guardian of morality also finds its clearest expression in Christ. Christianity acknowledges the authority which condemns, and it provides hope in the face of the guilt which prohibits access to the Presence of God. The religions of the world acknowledge the inability of man to meet the demands of their various moral and ethical codes. They admit the distance that separates them from the *Numinous*. But what then? In a letter to Sheldon Van Auken, Lewis wrote,

> Have you read the *Analects* of Confucius? He ends up by saying 'This is the Tao [moral law]. I do not know if anyone has ever kept it.' That's significant. One can really go direct from there to the *Epistle to the Romans*.[31]

And this leads to the Incarnation, that peculiar and most significant feature which separates Christianity from the other religions. Lewis highlights the uniqueness of Christ.

> The things He says are very different from what any other teacher has said. Others say, "This is the truth about the Universe. This is the way you ought to go," but He says, "I am the Truth, and the Way, and the Life." He says, "No man can reach absolute reality, except through Me. Try to retain your own life and you will be inevitably ruined. Give yourself away and you will be saved." He says, "If you are ashamed of Me, if, when you hear this call, you turn the other way, I also will look the other way when I come again as God without disguise. If anything whatever is keeping you from God and Me, whatever it is throw it away. If it is your eye, pull it out. If it is your hand, cut it off. If you put yourself first you will be last. Come to Me everyone who is carrying a heavy load, I will set that right. Your sins, all of them, are wiped out, I can do that. I am Re-birth, I am Life. Eat Me, drink Me, I am your Food. And finally, do not be afraid, I have overcome the whole Universe." That is the issue. [32]

The existence of the other religions does not mean that things have gotten out of hand and that God has somehow lost sovereign control of some corners of the Universe. Other religions are not an affront to His power and purposes. He still works all things after the council of His own will. In his Latin letters, Lewis wrote,

> Satan is without doubt nothing else than a hammer in the hand of a

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ready to take any shape but able to retain none." (Ibid. p. 285).

[31]Van Auken, Sheldon. A Severe Mercy. San Francisco: Harper & Row. 1977. p. 90.

[32]Lewis. God in the Dock. p. 60.

> benevolent and severe God. For all, either willingly or unwillingly, do the will of God: Judas and Satan as tools or instruments, John and Peter as sons.[33]

While Lewis does not fail to see the inadequacies of rival religions: rather, he succeeds in understanding that these too, can be tools by which God will accomplish His purposes and plans.

[33]Lewis, C.S. Letters: C.S. Lewis Don Giovanni Calabria. Translated and edited by Martin Moynihan. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Servant. 1988. pp.33-35.

Appendix III: CHRONOLOGY OF THE LIFE OF C. S. LEWIS

1898 Clive Staples Lewis was born on November 29 in Belfast to Albert J. Lewis (1863-1929) and Florence Augusta Hamilton Lewis (1862-1908). His brother Warren Hamilton had been born on June 16, 1895.

1905 The Lewis family moved to their new home, "Little Lea," on the outskirts of Belfast, where he remained until December.

1908 Flora Hamilton Lewis died on August 23, Albert Lewis' birthday. During this year Albert Lewis' father and brother also died. In September CSL was enrolled at "Belsen" (="Oldie's School"), i.e., Wynyard School, Watford, Hertfordshire. His brother had entered in May 1905.

1910 C. S. Lewis left "Belsen" in June and in September was enrolled at Campbell College, Belfast, where he remained until December.

1911 CSL began at "Chartres," i.e., Cherbourg House, a prep school for Malvern College; he remained there until June 1913. It was during this time that he ceased to be a Christian. He entered "Wyvern," i.e., Malvern College, in September 1913 and stayed until the following June.

1914 In April he met Arthur Greeves (1895-1968), of whom he said in 1933: "After my brother, my oldest and most intimate friend" On September 19 he met W. T. Kirkpatrick, "The Great Knock," with whom he was to remain until April 1917. William T. Kirkpatrick (l848-1921) was headmaster of Lurgan College, Co. Armagh, in 1874-99. Albert Lewis attended Lurgan in 1877-79 and later was Kirkpatrick's solicitor. Kirkpatrick retired from Lurgan in 1899 and began taking private students. He was settled in Great Bookham, Surrey, by 1912.

1916 In February CSL first read George MacDonald's *Phantastes*. He made his first visit to Oxford in December, to take a scholarship examination.

1917 From April 26 until September, CSL was a student of University College, Oxford. His room-mate was Paddy Moore, from Clifton. He was commissioned an officer in the 3rd Battalion, Somerset Light Infantry, on September 25, and reached the front line on his birthday.

1918 On April 15 CSL was wounded on Mount Bernenchon during the Battle of Arras. He recuperated and was returned to duty in October, being assigned to Ludgershall, Andover. He was discharged in December.

1919 The February issue of *Reveille* contained "*Death in Battle*," Lewis' first publication other than in school magazines. The issue had poems by Robert Bridges, Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Grave, and Hilaire Belloc. From January 1919 until June 1924 he was a student at University College. He received a First in

Honour Moderations (Greek and Latin Literature) in 1920; a First in Greats (Philosophy and Ancient History) in 1922; and a First in English in 1923. His tutors during this time included A. B. Poynton for Honour Mods, E. F. Carritt for Philosophy, F. P. Wilson and George Gordon in the English School, and E. E. Wardale for Old English.

1920 During the summer Mrs. Janie King Moore (1873-1951) and her daughter Maureen moved to Oxford, renting a house in Headington Quarry. Lewis lived with them from June 1921. In August 1922 they moved to "Hillsboro," Western Road, Headington; and in October 1930 they moved to "The Kilns," where Warren Lewis joined them in 1932.

1921 W. T. Kirkpatrick died in March. "*Optimism*" won the Chancellor's English Essay Prize in May.

1924 From October 1924 until May 1925, Lewis was a philosophy tutor at University College, replacing E. F. Carritt who was spending the year in America

1925 On May 20, Lewis was elected a Fellow of Magdalen College as a tutor in English Language and Literature

1926 Lewis met J. R. R. Tolkien for the first time on May 11; they were soon meeting in each other's rooms.

1929 Albert Lewis died on September 24. "In the Trinity Term of 1929 I gave in, and admitted that God was God, and knelt and prayed ..."

1931 September 28: "When we set out I did not believe that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, and when we reached the zoo I did."

1935 At the suggestion of Prof. F. P. Wilson, Lewis agreed to write the volume on 16th Century Literature in the O.H.E.L. series.

1936 In February, Lewis read Charles Williams' *The Place of the Lion* at the urging of Nevill Coghill; he praised the book very highly to Arthur Greeves, A. C. Harwood and Owen Barfield.

1937 Lewis received the Gollancz Memorial Prize for Literature, in recognition of *The Allegory of Love*

1939 At the outbreak of war in September, Charles Williams moved with the Oxford University Press from London; he was thereafter a regular member of the Inklings.

1941 From May 2 until November 28, *The Guardian* published 31 Screwtape Letters in weekly installments. Lewis was paid 2 pounds for each, and gave the money to

charity. In August he gave 4 live radio talks over the BBC on Wednesday evenings, 7:45 to 8:00. An additional 15 minute session, answering questions received in the mail, was broadcast on September 6. These talks were known as "Right and Wrong."

1942 In January and February, Lewis gave 5 live radio talks on Sunday evenings, 4:45 to 5:00. These were known as "What Christians Believe." The first meeting of the Oxford Socratic Club was held on January 26. On 8 consecutive Sundays, September 20 to November 8, at 2:50-3:05 PM, Lewis gave (live) the talks known as "Christian Behaviour."

1943 On February 24 Lewis gave the Riddell Memorial Lectures (Fifteenth Series) at the University of Durham, subsequently published as *The Abolition of Man.*

1944 On 7 consecutive Tuesdays, February 22 to April 4, at 10:15 to 10:30 PM, Lewis gave (prerecorded) the talks known as "Beyond Personality." From November 10, 1944 to April 14, 1945, *The Great Divorce* was published in weekly installments in *The Guardian.* (*The Guardian* ceased publication in 1951; the newspaper now known by that name was then *The Manchester Guardian*.)

1945 Charles Williams died on May 15.

1946 Lewis was awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity by the University of St Andrews.

1948 On February 2, G. E. M. Anscombe read her "A Reply to Mr. C. S. Lewis' Argument that 'Naturalism is Self-refuting'" to the Socratic Club; Lewis revised Chapter 3 of *Miracles* when it was reprinted by Fontana in 1960. Later in the year, Lewis was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.

1951 Mrs. Moore died on January 12. Since the previous April she had been in a nursing home in Oxford, where Lewis visited her daily. She is buried in the yard of Holy Trinity Church in Headington Quarry. Lewis lost the election for the position of Professor of Poetry at Oxford to C. Day Lewis. In December he declined an offer to be made a Commander of the Order of the British Empire.

1952 Lewis was awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters by Laval University, Quebec. In September, he met Joy Davidman for the first time.

1954 In June, Lewis accepted the Chair of Medieval and Renaissance Literature at Cambridge. He gave his Inaugural Lecture, "De Descriptione Temporum," on his 56th birthday, and gave his last tutorial at Oxford on December 3.

1955 Lewis assumed his duties at Cambridge in January. During his years at Cambridge he lived at Magdalene College during the week in term, and at the Kilns on

weekends and on vacations. Lewis was elected an Honorary Fellow of Magdalene College, Oxford, and was also elected a Fellow of the British Academy.

1956 Lewis received the Carnegie Medal in recognition of *The Last Battle.* On April 23, he married Joy Davidman at the Oxford Registry Office; she and her sons thereby became British citizens. In December a bedside marriage according to the rites of the Church of England was performed in Wingfield Hospital.

1958 Lewis was elected an Honorary Fellow of University College, Oxford. On August 19 and 20, he made tapes of 10 Talks on Love, in London.

1959 Lewis was awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Literature by the University of Manchester.

1960 From April 3 to April 14, Lewis and Joy, together with Roger Lancelyn Green and his wife June, went to Greece, visiting Athens, Mycenae, Rhodes, Herakleon, Knossos; there was a one-day stop in Pisa on the return. Joy died on June 13.

1963 Lewis died on Friday, November 22, at 5:30 PM, at The Kilns. He had resigned his position at Cambridge during the summer and was then elected an Honorary Fellow of Magdalene College. His grave is in the yard of Holy Trinity Church. His brother died on Monday, April 9, 1973. Their names are on a single stone bearing the inscription, "Men must endure their going hence."

Copies of this Bibliography-Chronology are available from

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Ossining, New York 10562

Appendix IV Chronology of Joy Davidman's Life

Born Helen Joy Davidman, in New York City, April 18, 1915.

Received a B. A. in English at Hunter College, New York City, 1934.

Received an M. A. At Columbia University, 1935.

Published her first book of poems, *Letter to a Comerade*, 1938, at 23 years old.

Published the novel *Anya*, in 1940, at 25 years old.

Edited *War Poems of the United Nations*, 1923.

Married William Lindsay Gresham, in New York, August 2, 1942.

Birth of David Lindsay Gresham, in New York, March 27, 1944.

Birth of Douglas Howard Gresham, in New York, November 10, 1945.

Joy meets C. S. Lewis for the first time at the Eastgate Hotel in Oxford, September 24, 1952. Joy was 37 years old; Lewis was

Joy spends Christmas holidays with Lewis at the Kilns, December 1952.

Publishes *Smoke on the Mountain: An Interpretation of the Ten Commandments* 1953.

Joy returns to England with her sons in November 1953.

Joy and William Gresham divorce, August 5, 1954.

Lewis writes his "Severe Mercy" letter to Sheldon VanAuken after the death of VanAuken's wife Davy, May 8, 1955.

Joy moves to Oxford with her boys, August 1955.

Joy and Lewis marry at the Oxford Registry office on St. Giles, April 23, 1956.

Joy and Lewis marry in a religious ceremony at the Wingfield-Morris Hospital, Oxford, March 21, 1857. The Reverend Peter Bide, a former student of Lewis's, performed the ceremony.

Joy recovers from cancer sufficiently enough to move into the Kilns in May 1957.

The Lewis's belated honeymoon at the Crawfordsburn Inn, Crawfordsburn, North Ireland, July 1958.

Joy and C. S. L. travel to Greece with Roger Lancylen Green and his wife, June, April 1960.

Death of Joy Davidman Lewis July 13, 1960, at 10:15 P.M.

Funeral service for Joy Davidman Lewis, July 18, 1960; officiated by Lewis's friend Rev. Austin Farrer, philosopher, fellow Inkling and Warden of Keble College.

Appendix V The instructor's points of disagreement with C. S. Lewis

1. Kilby letter May 7th, 1959 where Lewis gives reasons for his belief that the Scriptures contain errors:
    a. Discrepancies in the two genealogies of Jesus in Matthew 1 and Luke 3.
        1) Lewis fails to *save the appearances* while interpreting the text. There are no apparent discrepancies, the differences are blatantly different.
        2) This could better be accounted for by the simple interpretation that the genealogies are of Jesus mother Mary and his earthly father Joseph.
    b. I Corinthians 7 on divorce.
        1) v.10 "I give this charge (not I, but the Lord)"
        2) v.12 "I say (I, not the Lord)"
        3) v.40 "and I think that I too have the Spirit of God."
        4) Lewis sees this as evidence that Paul was denying Divine inspiration. It is more likely that he was building on Jesus's teaching on divorce in Matthew 5 and 19. Furthermore, Peter seems to believe that Paul was inspired and places his epistles in the same category as inspired Scripture: II Peter 3:15-16.

    [Out of fairness to Lewis it must be observed that while he was no inerrantist Lewis still maintained a high view of Scripture, several examples could be supplied:
    a.Letters 28 May 1952 p. 242. "Yes, Pascal does contradict several passages in Scripture and must be wrong."
    b. "Cross Examination" God in the Dock
        1) Though he is sympathetic to Billy Graham's work, he does not share his view of the Scriptures.
        2) But he also refuses to accept Dewey Beagle's view that some of the hymns of Isaac Watts are more inspired than The Song of Solomon.
    c. Doesn't shy away from the "imprecatory" Psalms and sees reasons to suspect their inspiration.]

2. Reflections on the Psalms pp. 109-111. Lewis does not accept Job and Jonah as historical; this does not mean he denies their inspiration however, he merely sees them something like parables.
    a. Lewis neglects Jesus statement about Jonah where He appears to refer to him as an historic person, cf. Matthew 12:39.
    b. Lewis neglects Ezekiel's comments about Noah, Daniel and Job which appears to refer to them as historical figures, cf. Ezekiel 14:14.

3. Christological ambiguities in The Problem of Pain p.107. Lewis wrote "I certainly think that Christ in the flesh was not Omniscient—if only because a human brain could not, presumably, be the vehicle of Omniscient Consciousness, and to say that Our Lord's thinking was not really conditioned by the size and shape of His brain might be to deny the real Incarnation and become a Docetist."

a. While one can appreciate Lewis's grasp of the Docetic heresy, one fears, at this point in his life he may have come close to the Apollinarian heresy [a position that maintained that Christ's humanity only resided in His body and His soul, whereas His Deity existed in His Spirit: thus 2/3rds man and 1/3rd God. This heresy was condemned by the Church at the Council of Constantinole in 381 A. D.]
b. There seems to be a confusing of the two Natures of Christ by Lewis. If His brain couldn't contain Omniscience, how could His body contain Divinity? Lewis has not resolved the problem. He seems unmindful (at least at the time of his writing this passage) of the Kenosis,
c. Philippians 2:5-11 in Christ's humanity there was an "emptying" of Himself
    1) Voluntary surrender of the outward manifestation of His Glory.
    2) Voluntary surrender of the independent use of His Divine attributes.
    3) More could be developed along these lines, i.e., could Jesus have made non-moral mistakes during the days of His Incarnation? Will we be able to make non-moral mistakes in Heaven? I believe it is possible.

4. Disagree with his view that Jesus power was limited by the unbelief of the Galileans. In Letters C. S. Lewis Don Giovanni Calabria A Study in Friendship. Translated by Martin Moynihan. Servant: Grand Rapids. 1988. 25 November 1947. (Letter 5) p. 37. "…is it not a frightening truth that the free will of a bad man can resist the will of God? For He has, after a fashion, restricted His own Omnipotence by the very fact of creating free creatures; and we read that the Lord was *not able* to do miracles in some place because people's faith was wanting."
    a. Was this a limiting of Jesus power because people failed to believe in Him? [Something similar to James M. Barrie's Tinker Bell in Peter Pan whose power is restored to her when children believe in her.]
    b. This would portray a Christ who, as the Son of God, is a contingent Being and not a non-contingent Being.
    c. Ambiguities related to the Kenosis are also a concern here.

5. His view that the Jews in the O.T. did not have a belief in the Resurrection. Reflections on the Psalms. "It seems quite clear that in most parts of the Old Testament there is little or no belief in a future life." P. 36.
    a. Failure on Lewis's part to understand Job 42 and Job's two-fold restoration.
    b. Failure on Lewis's part to understand Jesus's response to the Sadducees in Mark 12:18-37 where He chides them for their lack of belief in the Resurrection, saying it was due to:
        1) Denial of the Scriptures [where Jesus believes these things are clearly taught]
        2) Denial of the Power of God

3) Neglect of Jesus statement, "If He is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, is He the God of the living or the dead?"

6. His use of *Emeth* in The Last Battle.
    a. A calorman who worshipped the false god Tash and yet still manages to get into Narnian Heaven.
    b. *Emeth* is the Hebrew word for *Truth* something Lewis understands and indicates as such in The Abolition of Man and in Reflections on the Psalms
    c. Lewis appears to be doing speculative theology on the *ordo salutis* as he does in a similar passage in Reflections on the Psalms cf. pp. 80-89,108.
    d. My disagreement is not with his doing speculative theology (it is necessary to do this if we are to extend either our understanding of doctrine or its applications to daily life), my disagreement is that I'm not convinced children's literature is the place for such speculation of a rather controversial nature. [If this is so am I consistent with his use of *supposals* in creating his worlds of fiction?]

7. Less objectionable to me but certainly controversial to some:
    a. His belief in Purgatory cf. Letters to Malcolm
        1) For Lewis, Purgatory is not so much a place of punishment as a place of cathartic cleansing.
        2) Note: I Corinthians 3:10-17 the text about the believer's judgment:
            a) Either, "Well done, enter."
            b) Or, "Enter, well done."

8. His outrageous view concerning the Resurrection of the pets of Christians
    a. Note The Problem of Pain and "Animal Pain" in God in the Dock, and Letters to an American Lady, where Lewis summarizes the view as it was published in earlier form, "I ventured the supposal—it could be nothing more—that as we are raised *in* Christ, so at least some animals are raised *in* us. Who knows, indeed, but that a great deal even of inanimate creation is raised *in* the redeemed souls who have, during this life, taken its beauty into themselves? That may be the way in which the "new heaven and the new earth" are formed. Of course we can only guess and wonder."
    b. Note the response it evoked even from people sympathetic to his other work:
        1) Evelyn Underhill The Letters of Evelyn Underhill edited by Charles Williams—Underhill, who liked the over all effort in The Problem of Pain, questions Lewis's views, on animal Resurrection, in a letter she wrote to Lewis.
        2) Austin Farrer's article in Light on C. S. Lewis "Imagination has slipped from the leash of reason—even if it is a traditionalist imagination." P. 42.

9. *Mere Christianity* p. 48 “There are three things that spread the Christ life to us: Baptism, Belief, and…the Lord’s Supper.”

10. More

Appendix VI Lewis's References to Plato

All my Road Before me

Saturday, April 8, 1922

After supper I read most of the 5th book of the Republic.

Tuesday, April 11, 1922

Put in a good morning's work on Gk. History and read most of the 6th book of the Republic after lunch.

Monday, April 17, 1922

After supper I finished the 7th and began the 8th book of the Republic.

Friday, April 28, 1922

Blunt said that Plato was born too soon and was fitted by nature for an orthodox English parson. I said I didn't think we was as bad as that

Saturday, June 10, 1922

Back to the Schools at two o'clock for a paper on translation from Plato and Aristotle which suited me down to the ground and could hardly have been better…

Wednesday, June 21, 1922

heard from Carritt that one of the examiners had said to him "One of your men seems to think that Plato is always wrong." Carrit guessed several people. Finally the other said "No: - Lewis. Seems and able fellow anyway" - which I suppose is good news…

Friday, July 28, 1922

he asked what I meant by the contradiction of the pleonexia, why I applied the word "disgusting" to my quotation from Pater, how I would distinguish a schoolmaster's from a state's right to punish, and if I could suggest any way of making "poor old Plato" less ridiculous than he appeared in my account, of "the lie in the Soul". I showed some forgetfulness of the text in answering this, but I don't think it was serious. The whole show took about five minutes. From the phrase "poor old Plato" I fancy Joseph must have been Carritt's informant.

Thursday, September 29, 1922

here we did Philosophical Unseens - a piece of Plato, one of Aristotle, and one of Tertullian. I could make very little of the latter and to leave it unfinished.

Friday, February 29, 1924

Ziman read a poor pater on "Some Heresies". The discussion however was very good. Ziman had said that pleasure was always adjectival to the satisfactions of desire - desire being the instinct reflected upon. We challenged him on Plato's flower smells from the *Philebus*. he fell back upon unconscious or potential desire. This led to my usual move re potentiality.

Sunday, May 4, 1924

At Dessert I was beside Pritchard who condemned Jane Austen, or rather the life presented by Jane Austen, for its narrowness and triviality. I, and a very nice man with one arm, tried to defend her and pleaded that one had to use historical imagination to get over this, as one did to get over the vices in Plato. But we did not make much of it.

Tuesday, February 8, 1927

Also read the myth from the *Politicus* in Jowett's crib, which worried me by being so anthroposophical, till it occurred to me that of course Steiner must have read Plato. A pest on all this nonsense which has half spoiled so much beauty and wonder for me, degraded pure imagination into pretentious lying, and truths of the spirit into mere matters of fact, slimed everything over with the trail of its infernal mumbo-jumbo! How I would have enjoyed this myth once: mow behind Plato's delightful civilised imagination I always have the picture of dark old traditions picked up from mumbling medicine-men, professing to be "private information" about facts.

Saturday, February 26, 1927

…read Plato's *Erastae* after supper, which contains a very comic little account of the ideal Greek gentleman - very like the renaissance one, in a way.

Letters

Owen Barfield, Feb. 8, 1939

I don't know if Plato did write the *Phaedo*: the canon of these ancient writers, under the surface, is still quite chaotic. It is also a very corrupt text. Bring it along by all means, but don't pitch your hopes too high. We are both getting so rusty that we shall make very little of it - and my distrust of all lexicons and translations is increasing. Also of Plato - and of the human mind.

Dom Bede Griffiths, O.S.B., Jan. 17, 1940

the Platonic and neo-Platonic stuff has, no doubt, been reinforced (a) By the fact that people not very morally sensitive or instructed by trying to do their best recognise temptations of appetite as temptations but easily mistake all the spiritual (and worse) sins for harmless or even virtuous states of mind: hence the illusion that the "bad part" of oneself is the body. (b) by a misunderstanding of the Pauline use of σαρζ, which in reality cannot mean the body (since envy, witchcraft, and other spiritual sins are attributed to it) but, I suppose, means the unregenerate manhood as a whole. (You have no doubt noticed that σωμα is nearly always used by St Paul in a good sense.) (c) by equating "matter" in the ordinary sense with υλη or materia in the scholastic and Aristotelian sense, i.e. equating the concrete corporeality of flesh, grass, earth or water with "pure potentiality". The latter, being nearest to not being and furthest from the Prime Reality can, I suppose, be called the "least good" of things. but I fear Plato thought the concrete flesh and grass bad, and have no doubt he was wrong.

Dom Bede Griffiths, O.S.B., Apr. 16, 1940

One thing we want to do is kill the word "spiritual" in the sense in which it is used by writers like Arnold and Croce. Last term I had to make the following remark to a room full of Christian undergraduates "A man who is eating or lying with his wife or preparing to go to sleep, in humility, thankfulness, and temperance, is, by Christian standards, in an infinitely higher state than one who is listening to Bach or reading Plato in a state of pride" - obvious to you, but I could see it was quite a new light to them.

Letters to Arthur Greeves

Oct. 12, 1915

You ask me how I spend my time… At 5, we do Plato and Horace, who are both charming…

Jan. 9, 1930

What a glory-hole is the commentary of an old author. One minute you are puzzling out a quotation from a French medieval romance: the next, you are being carried back to Plato…

Jan. 30, 1930

And if as Plato thought, the material world is a copy or mirror of the spiritual, then the central feature of the material life (=sex), must be a copy of something in the Spirit: and when you get a faint glimpse of the latter, of course you find it like the former: an Original is like its copy: a man is like his portrait.

Jun. 22, 1930

By the way, about the 'Moving Image' I should warn you that there is going to be a great deal of conversation: in fact it is to be almost a Platonic dialogue in a fantastic setting with story intermixed. If you take the *Symposium*, *Phantastes*, *Tristram Shandy* and stir them all together you will about have the recipe.

Nov. 8, 1931

My memories of the *Phaedrus* are vague - mainly of the beautiful scene in which the discussion takes place and of the procession of the gods round the sky.

Sep. 1, 1933

Read Plato's *Gorgias*, and am reading a long *Histoire de la Science Politique* (!!) by Janet -- surprisingly interesting. Almost everything is, I find, as one goes on.

Letters to an American Lady

Aug. 3, 1956

I think all that extreme refinement and that spirituality which takes the form of despising matter, is very like Pythagoras and Plato and Marcus Aurelius. Poor dears: they don't know about the Sacraments nor the resurrection of the body.

Letters to Children

Mar. 27, 1963

Nietzsche was a better poet than a philosopher. I give Plato better marks on both papers.

Allegory of Love

Chap. 1, par. 5

Plato will not be reckoned an exception be those who have read him with care. In the *Symposium*, no doubt, we find the conception of a ladder whereby the soul may ascend from human love to divine. But this is a ladder in the strictest sense; you would reach the higher rungs by leaving the lower ones behind. the original object of human love - who

incidentally is not a woman - has simply fallen out of sight before the soul arrives at the spiritual object. The very first step upwards would have made a courtly lover blush, since it consists in passing on from the worship of the beloved's beauty to that of the same beauty in others. those who call themselves Platonists at the Renaissance may imagine a love which reaches the divine without abandoning the human and becomes spiritual while remaining also carnal; but they do not find this in Plato.

Chap. 2, par. 3

Symbolism comes to us from Greece. It makes its first effective appearance in European thought with the dialogues of Plato.

Chap. 2, par. 41

The school of Chartres is Platonic, as Platonism was understood in those days, when Chalcidius' translation of the *Timaeus*, and the pseudo-Dionysius, were the important texts. It was humane in both senses of the word. It was a school of naturalism, and this again in the double sense of studying and of reverencing nature. Thus Thierry of Chartres - like some of his Platonic descendants at the Renaissance will reconcile *Genesis* and the *Timaeus*; while in the poets of the school of Nature appears, not to be corrected by Grace, but as the goddess and the *vicaria* of God, herself correcting the unnatural. It goes without saying that in such a school, on the theological side, immanence is more stressed that transcendence; and I have read that be two of its philosophers - Thierry and William of Conches - the Holy Ghost is identified with the *Anima Mundi* of the Platonists.

Chap. 2, par. 44

…Bernardus, following Plato himself, finds room both for the Platonic and for the Aristotelian type of universal. The next step is to separate the elements, and when this is done, Noys proceeds to generate soul: for the Macrocosm, here as in Plato, is a lively and reasonable animal, whose indwelling spirit comforts and protects against the elemental catastrophes which would otherwise speedily unmake it again.

Chap. 2, par. 53

The ideas derive, of course, from Bernardus, and ultimately from Plato, but they are set forth with conviction and with dignity, and here, at least, the greatest of the mater keeps the rhetorician within the bounds of *mesura*.

Chap. 3, par. 20

The courtly life, symbolized by the garden, is neither a purely moral entity, as Plato's aristocracy might have been, not a purely animal one, like the aristocracy of a school, nor purely economic, like the 'society' of our own times.

Chap. 6, par. 38

It seems but natural, not only to those who love Plato but to those who love poetry also, that the young man, so solicited by ear and eye, should forget the high pre-natal charge of *Natura*,...

Chap. 7, par. 29

When Catholicism goes bad it becomes the world-old, world -wide *religio* of amulets and holy places and preistcraft: Protestantism, in its corresponding decay, becomes a vague mist of ethical platitudes. Catholicism is accused of being much too like the other religions; Protestantism of being insufficiently like a religion at all. Hence Plato, with his transcendent Forms, is the doctor of Protestants; Aristotle, with his immanent Forms, the doctor of Catholics.

Chap. 7, par. 32

[Spencer] had learned from Seneca and the Stoics about the life according to Nature; and he had learned from Plato to see good and evil as the real and the apparent. Both doctrines were congenial to the rustic and humble piety of his temper - that fine flower of Anglican sanctity which meets us again in Herbert of Walton.

Chap. 7, par. 39

I have very little doubt that Dr. Janet Spens is right in supposing that Glory would have been spiritualized and Platonized into something very like the Form of the Good, or even the glory of God;

Chap. 7, par. 42

For this all-embracing interpretation of love Spencer, of course, has precedent in ancient philosophy, and specially in the *Symposium*.

Chap. 7, par. 46

And we know that the Sun is an image of the Good for Plato, (*Republic*, 507 D et seq.) and therefore God for Spenser.

Chap. 7, par. 53

To Spenser, in fact, as to Shelly or Plato, there is no essential difference between poetic beauty and the beauty of characters, institutions, and behavior, and all alike come from the 'daughters of sky-ruling Jove'. (F. Q. vi. Ii. 2.)

The Problem of Pain

Chap. 3, par. 17

None of these conditions is present in the relation of God to man. God has no needs. Human love , as Plato teaches us, is the child of Poverty - of a want or lack; it is caused by a real or supposed good in its beloved which the lover needs or desires.

Chap. 4, par. 12

Are we not really an increasingly cruel age? Perhaps we are: but I think we have become so in the attempt to reduce all virtues to kindness. For Plato rightly taught that virtue is one. You cannot be kind unless you have all the other virtues.

Chap. 6, par. 15

The doctrine of death which I describe is not particular to Christianity… the Greek philosopher tells us that the life of wisdom is "a practice of death." (*Phaedo*, 81, A)

Chap. 6, par. 15

Christianity demands only that we set right a misdirection of our nature and has no quarrel, like Plato, with the body as such, nor with the physical elements in our make-up.

Mere Christianity

Book II, Chap. 1, par. 2

The first big division of humanity is into the majority, who believe in some kind of God or gods, and the minority who do not. On this point Christianity lines up with the majority - lines up with Ancient Greeks and Romans, modern savages, Stoics, Platonists, Hindus, Mohammedans, etc. against the western European materialist.

Book IV, Chap. 1, par. 7

It is quite true that is we took Christ's advice we should soon be living in a happier world. You need not even go as far as Christ. If we did all that Plato or Aristotle or Confucius told us, we should get on a great deal better than we do.

Book IV, Chap. 7, par.

Put right out of your head the idea that theses are only fancy ways of saying that Christians are to read what Christ said and try to carry it out - as a man may read what Plato or Marx said and try to carry it out.

A Preface to Paradise Lost

Chap. 15, par. 2

The great change of philosophical thought in that period which we call the Renaissance had been from Scholasticism to what contemporaries described as Platonic Theology. Modern students, in the light of later events, are inclined to neglect this Platonic theology in favour of what they regard as the first beginnings of the scientific or experimental spirit; but at the time this so-called 'Platonism' appeared the more important of the two. Now one of the points in which it differed from Scholasticism was this: that it believed all created spirits to be corporeal.

Chap. 15, par. 3

The root idea of the Platonic Theologians was that they were recovering from the ancient writers a great secret wisdom which was in substantial agreement with Christianity. Plato was only the last and most elegant of the six *summi theologi*, the others being Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, and Pythagoras, and all these said the same thing (Ficino, *Theologia Platonica*, XVII, I). that is why a Christian like Puttenham calls Trismegistus 'the holiest of Priests and Prophets' (*Arte of English Poesie*, I. viii).

The Abolition of Man

Chap. 1, par. 10

Plato before [Aristotle] said the same. [The aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought.] The little human animal will not at first have the right responses. It must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust, and hatred at those things which really are pleasant, likeable, disgusting and hateful. (laws 653) In the Republic, the well nurtured you is one "who would see most clearly whatever was amiss in ill-made works of man or ill-grown works of nature, and with a just distaste would blame and hate the ugly even from his earliest years and would give delighted praise to beauty, receiving it into his soul and being nourished by it , so that he becomes a man of gentle heart. All this before he is of an age to reason; so that when Reason at length comes to him, then, bred as he has been, he will hold out his hands and welcome and recognize her because of the affinity he bears to her." (Republic, 402 A.)
Chap. 1, par. 10

As Plato said that the Good was "beyond existence" and Wordsworth said that through virtue the stars were strong, so the Indian masters say that the gods themselves are born of the *Rta* and obey it.

Chap. 1, par. 11

This conception in all its forms, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental alike, I shall henceforth refer to for brevity simply as "the *Tao*."

Chap. 1, par 16

We were told it all long ago by Plato. As the king governs by his executive, so reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the "spirited element." (*Republic*, 442 B. C.)

Chap. 3, par. 6

…how Plato would have every infant "a bastard nursed in a bureau,"…

Appendix 2, 15

"Has it escaped you that, in the eyes of gods and good men, your native land deserves from you more honour, worship, and reverence than your mother and father and all your ancestors? That you should give a softer answer to its anger than to a father's anger? That if you cannot persuade it to alter its mind you must obey it in all quietness, whether it binds you or beats you or sends you to a war where you may get wounds or death? (*Crito* 51 a. b.)

Appendix 8, 15

"Is not the love of Wisdom a practice of death?" (*Phaedo* 81 A.)

Miracles

Chap. 11, par. 4

The Greeks rose above [pantheism] only at their peak, in the thought of Plato and Aristotle; their successors relapsed into the great Pantheistic system of the Stoics.

Chap. 16, par. 29

There is thus in the history of human thought as elsewhere, a patter of death and rebirth. The old, richly imaginative though which survives in Plato has to submit to the deathlike, but indispensable, process of logical analysis: nature and spirit, matter and mind, fact and myth, the literal and the metaphorical, have to be more and more sharply separated, till at last a purely mathematical universe and a purely subjective mind confront one another across an unbridgeable chasm.

English Literature of the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama

Intro., par. 16-18

…Centuries of courtly love had prepared a place for lofty erotic mysticism: it might be supposed that Plato's doctrine, which in its own day had found no better soil than Greek pederasty, would now find the very soil it required. But on a deeper level this is not so. The thought of the *Symposium*, like all Plato's thought, is ruthless, and the more fervid, the more ruthless. The lowest rung of his ladder is perversion; the intermediate rungs are increasing degrees of asceticism and scientific clarity; the topmost rung is mystical contemplation. A man who reaches it has, by hypothesis, left behind for ever the original human object of desire and affection... Hence the so-called Platonism of the love poets often amounts to little more than an admission that the lady's soul is even more beautiful than her person and that both are images of the First Fair.

But however the value of this erotic Platonism is assessed, it was not of this that an Englishman of that period thought exclusively, or even thought first, when Platonism was mentioned. If he had, he would have been puzzled when Drayton said (*Polyolbion*, v. 178) that he would not 'play the humorous Platonist' by maintaining that Merlin's father was an *incubus daemon*: for the loves of such a creature are by definition not 'Platonic'. Drayton writes thus, as the following lines make clear, because Platonism primarily means to him the doctrine that the region between earth and moon is crowded with airy creatures who are capable of fertile unions with our own species. Platonism, in fact, is for him a system of daemonology. And Drayton's view, though incomplete, is not very far wrong.

I have called this system, as Ficino himself calls it, 'Platonic theology', to distinguish it from the Platonism on which lectures are given in a modern university. It is not sufficiently distinguished even by the term 'neo-Platonism'. It is a deliberate syncretism based on the conviction that all the sages of antiquity shared a common wisdom and that this wisdom can be reconciled with Christianity. If Plato alone had been in question the Florentines would in fact have been attempting to 'baptise' him as Aquinas had 'baptised' Aristotle.

Intro., par 38

…Plato's influence was one of doctrine not of form: he affected philosophers and philosophizing poets.

Book 2, Ch. 1, par. 6

[John Fisher] is almost a purely medieval writer, though scraps of what may be classified as humanistic learning appear in his work - a reference to 'the Georgycke' (that is the *Gorgias*) of Plato, to the virtue of 'epicheia', (επιεικεια) to the Platonic desire for philosophic kings,… and a sympathetic mention of the Cabala.

Book 2, Ch. 3, par. 22

The gift [of giving to reported conversation that appearance of reality which we demand of conversations in fiction] is extremely rare; neither Spence nor Eckermann had it in a comparable degree, and in Plato we suspect a larger element of fiction.

Book 2, Ch. 3, par. 26

…Thrasymachus' definition of justice as the interest of the stronger 'is not so far oute of the waie as Plato would make it'

Book 2, Ch. 3, par. 52

In [Sir Humphrey Gilbert's *Discourse*] we recapture the moment, so rich in suggestion, at which ancient tradition or myth and recent exploration, seemed on the point of joining hands; when 'Plato *in Timaeo*', Philo, Cartier, and Cabot could all equally be called as witnesses.

Book 3, Ch. 1, par. 4

It was, of course, Plato who opened this debate, and he made two very different contributions to it. On the one hand, in the *Ion* and the *Phaedrus*, he stated in an extreme form the doctrine of inspiration. He denied that poetry was an art. It was produced in a divine alienation of mind by men who did not know what they were doing.... On the other hand, in the *Republic* he condemned poetry along with all the other 'mimetic' or representational arts... Nature, the phenomenal world, is in Plato's dualism a copy of the real and supersensuous world. Dialectic leads us up from unreal Nature to her real original. But the arts which imitate Nature lead us down, further away from reality, to 'the copy of a copy'.

Book 3, Ch. 1, par. 63

If Phaedrus and Phaedo and Xenophon and Cicero are all confused in a single passage, as one scholar maintains, we cannot thence conclude with certainty that he had never read Plato.

Book 3, Ch. 1, par. 80

…the picture of tyranny supported by foreign mercenaries, though it may glance at the probable results of a marriage with Alencon, may also be merely general political wisdom from classical sources such as *Republic*, 567d.

Book 3, Ch. 1, par. 92

The birth of Love and his cosmic operations owe much to the *Symposium*, though the dreadful blunder which gives Love three parents was not Plato's fault.

Book 3, Ch. 1, par. 92

Plato's doctrine that the beloved finds his own beauty mirrored in the lover is used at 176. Spencer, envisaging of course a heterosexual love, wants this to be reciprocal, and that, I believe, was the real meaning of lines 190-6 in the previous hymn. In the lady the lover sees his potential and more beautiful self. But Spenser sadly bungles the idea by likening the two lovers to two mirrors which face one another. Surely the results would be very uninteresting. Lines 211-31 tell us that the lover, in his imagination, fashions the beloved fairer than she really is. If this led him to pass on from her to all beautiful bodies and thence to the beauty of laws and sciences we should at last have our feet on the Platonic ladder. But it does nothing of the sort.

Book 3, Ch. 1, par. 94

In the *Heavenly Love* we bid farewell to Platonism almost completely. Most of this poem is a straight account of the Creation, Fall, and Redemption, such as any child in a Christian family learns before he is twelve. The earlier stanzas can be pressed into something Platonic (and heretical) if great skill and force are applied to them.

Book 3, Ch. 1, par. 95

Having ascended through the spheres we pass, as Dante does in *Paradiso* XXX and Plato dreams of doing in *Phaedrus*, 247 c, beyond the Primum Mobile into the 'super-celestial place'… In the present life it is the reminders of Beauty that especially inflame us. And Plato explains why. Not because Beauty in herself is more desirable than the others, but because the reminders of Beauty are visual, and sight is the clearest of our faculties. If the reminders of Wisdom could come home to our senses in the same way - why, then δεινουσ αν παρειχεν ερωτασ, terrible would be the fire of longing in which we should burn.

Book 3, Ch. 1, par. 109

Some Scholars believe that in parts of the *Faerie Queene* they can find Spenser systematically expounding the doctrines of a school. But if so, the school can hardly be defined as anything narrower than Platonized Protestantism.

Book 3, Ch. 1, par. 109

St. George's return from the mountain of Contemplation is quite as close to the return of Plato's 'gaurdians' (*Republic*, 519 d et seq.) as to anything in Protestant theology.And in any case, St. George in the poem must return because the story must go on. It is equally true that Spenser asserts total depravity ('If any strength we have, it is to ill', I. X. I.) and 'loathes' this world 'this state of life so tickle' (*Mut*. viii. I), and this fits well enough with Calvinist theology. But hardly less well with Lutheran. Indeed expressions very similar can be found in nearly all Christian writers. And something not unlike them can be found even in Platonism. When scholars claim that there is a profound difference of temper between Platonism and these world-renouncing attitudes, I do not know what they mean. There is difference of course; but few pagan systems adapt themselves so nearly to total depravity and *contemptus mundi* as the Platonic. The emotional overtones of the words 'Renaissance Platonism' perhaps help us to forget that Plato's thought is at bottom other-worldly, pessimistic, and ascetic; far more ascetic than Protestantism. The natural universe is for Plato, a world of shadows, of Helens false as Spenser's false Florimell (*Rep*. 586 A-C); the soul has come into it at all only because she lost her wings in a better place (*Phaedr*. 246 D - 248 E); and the life of wisdom, while we are here, is a practice or exercise of death (*Phaed*. 80 D - 81 A).

Book 3, Ch. 1, par. 110

We feel that the man who could weld together, or think that he had welded together, so many diverse elements, Protestant, chivalric, Platonic, Ovidian, Lucretian, and pastoral, must have been very vague and shallow in each. But here we need to remember the difference between his basic assumption and ours. It is scepticism, despair of objective truth, which has trained us to regard diverse philosophies as historical phenomena, 'period pieces', not to be pitted against one another but each to be taken in its purest form and savoured on the historical palate. Thinking thus, we despise syncretism as we despise Victorian Gothic. Spenser could not feel thus, because he assumed from the outset that the truth about the universe was knowable and in fact known. If that were so, then of course you would expect agreements between the great teachers of all ages just as you would expect agreements between the reports of different explorers. The agreement are the important thing, the useful and interesting thing. Differences, far from delighting us as precious manifestations of some unique temper or culture, are mere errors which can be neglected. Such intellectual optimism may be mistaken; but granted the mistake, a sincere and serious poet is bound to be, from our point of view, a syncretist.

Book 3, Ch. 2, par. 45

All the remaining specimens of this rhetorical *genre* are by Greene. The *Planetomachia* (1585) departs from pure colloquy only by having two inset 'tragedies'. *Morando the Tritameron of Love* (1587) is closer to Whetstone's work, a dialogue in a country house; and though Greene is no Plato nor even Castiglione, not ungraceful.

Book 3, Ch. , par. 45

It matters nothing that the historical Lucretia would have known neither Plato nor Boethius: the Elizabethan Lucrece ought not to have displayed her learning at that moment. For of course the characters are to be judged as Elizabethans throughout: even Christianity creeps in at 624 and 1156-8.

Surprised By Joy

Chap. 7, par. 12

A perversion was the only chink left through which something spontaneous and uncalculating could creep in. Plato was right after all. Eros, turned upside down, blackened, distorted, and filthy, still bore the traces of his divinity.

Chap. 14, par. 3

The most religious (Plato, Aeschylus, Virgil) were clearly those on whom I could really feed.

Chap. 14, par. 17

And nearly everyone was now (one way or another) in the pack; Plato, Dante, MacDonald, Herbert, Barfield, Tolkien, Dyson, Joy itself. Everyone and everything had joined the other side.

Chap. 15, par. 7

And no person was like the Person [the Gospels] depicted; as real, as recognizable, through all that depth of time, as Plato's Socrates or Boswell's Johnson (ten times more so than Echermann's Goethe or Lockhart's Scott), yet also numinous, lit by a light from beyond the world, a god.

Reflections on the Psalms

Chap. 8, par. 5

We do of course find in Plato a clear Theology of Creation in the Judaic and Christian sense; the whole universe - the very conditions of time and space under which it exists - are produced by the will of a perfect, timeless, unconditioned God who is above and outside all that He makes. But this is an amazing leap (though not made without the help of Him who is the Father of lights) by an overwhelming theological genius; it is not ordinary Pagan religion.

Chap. 8, par. 16

[Akhenaten] did not as a man of that age might have been expected to do, even identify God with the Sun. The visible disc was only His manifestation. It is an astonishing leap, more astonishing in some ways than Plato's, and, like Plato's, in sharp contrast to ordinary Paganism.

Chap. 10, par. 9-10

Plato in his Republic is arguing that righteousness is often praised for the rewards it brings - honour, popularity and the like - but that to see it in its true nature we must separate it from all these, strip it naked. He asks us therefore to imagine a perfectly righteous man treated by all around him as a monster of wickedness. We must picture him, still perfect, while he is bound, scourged and finally impaled (the Persian equivalent of crucifixion). At this passage a Christian reader starts and rubs his eyes. What is happening? Yet another of these lucky coincidences? But presently he sees that there is something here which cannot be called luck at all.

…Plato is talking and knows he is talking, about the fate of goodness in a wicked and misunderstanding world. But that is not something simply different than the Passion of Christ. It is the very same thing of which the Passion of Christ is the supreme illustration. If Plato was in some measure moved to write of it by the recent death - we may almost say the martyrdom - of his master Socrates then that again is not something simply other than the Passion of Christ. The imperfect, yet very venerable, goodness of Socrates led to the easy death of the hemlock, and the perfect goodness of Christ led to the death of the cross, not by chance but for the same reason; because goodness is what it is, and because of the fallen world is what it is. If Plato, starting from one example and from his insight into the nature of goodness and the nature of the world, was led on to see the possibility of a perfect example, and thus to depict something extremely like the Passion of Christ, this happened not because he was lucky but because he was wise. If a man who knew only England and had observed that, the height a mountain was, the longer it retained the snow in early spring, were led on to suppose a mountain so high that it retained the snow all the year round, the similarity between his imagined mountain and the real Alps would not be a merely a lucky accident. he might not know that here were any such mountains in reality; just as Plato probably did not know that the ideally perfect instance of crucified goodness which he had depicted would ever become actual and historical. But if that man ever saw the Alps he would not say "what a curious coincidence". He would be more likely to say "there! what did I tell you?"

Chap. 10, par. 12

But when I meditate on the Passion while reading Plato's picture of the Righteous One, or on the Resurrection while reading Adonis or Balder, the case is altered. There is a real connection between what Plato and the mythmakers most deeply were and meant and what I believe to be the truth. I know the connection and they do not. But it is really there.

Chap. 12, par. 15

But of course there was to come a Sufferer who was in fact holy and innocent. Plato's imaginary case was to become actual.

Chap. 12, par. 17

…the later conception (later in Christian thought - Plato had reached it) of the timeless as an eternal present has been achieved.

The Four Loves

Intro., par. 3

And what, on the other hand, can be less like anything we believe of God's life than Need-love? He lacks nothing, but our Need-love, as Plato saw, is "the son of Poverty."

Intro., par. 7

I do not say that man can never bring to God anything at all but sheer Need-love. Exalted souls may tell us of reach beyond that. But they would also, I think, be the first to tell us that those heights would cease to be true Graces, would become Neo-Platonic or finally diabolical illusions, the moment a man dared to think that he could live on them and henceforth drop our the element of need.

Eros, par. 33

Plato will have it the "falling in love" is the mutual recognition on earth of souls which have been singled out for one another in a previous and celestial existence. To meet the Beloved is to realise "we loved before we were born. " As a myth to express what lovers feel this is admirable. But if on accepted it literally one would be faced by an embarrassing consequence. We should have to conclude that in that heavenly and forgotten life affairs were no better managed that here. For Eros may unite the most unsuitable yokefellows; many unhappy, and predictably unhappy, marriages were love-matches.

Eros, par. 35

Neither the Platonic nor the Shavian type of erotic transcendentalism can help a Christian. We are not worshippers of the Life force and we know nothing of previous existences.

Charity, par. 11

I think that this passage in the Confessions is less a part of St. Augustine's Christendom than a hangover from high-minded Pagan philosophies in which he grew up. It is closer to Stoic "apathy" or neo-Platonic mysticism than to Charity.

Studies in Words

Ch. 2, par. 36

Christianity involves a God as transcendent as Aristotle's, but adds (this was what it inherited from Judaism and could also have inherited from Plato's *Timaeus*) the conception that this God is the Creator of *phusis.*

Ch. 2, par. 50

Things may be in a satisfactory condition either by nature (*phusei*) or by art (*techne*), in Plato (Republic, 381 a.)

Ch. 2, par. 55

Man is represented both in the *Timaeus* and in *Genesis* as the subject of a separate and special creation; as something added, by a fresh act of God, to the rest of *nature*…

Ch. 2, par. 70-71

In plain prose the antithesis takes the following form. Someone in Plato's *Gorgias* (482e) speaks of things 'which are laudable (*kala*) not by *phusis* but by law or convention (*nomo*)'. Or Cicero says 'If, as it is naturally (*natura*), so it were in men's thoughts, and each regarded nothing human as alien from him'. Plato's *phusis* could here be rendered 'really':…

Secondly, we now have the conception 'law of *phusis*'. I am not at all sure what Plato meant by this second *phusis*: but it would seem at least to mean 'reality'…

Ch. 9, par. 30

For [Plato *aion*] means 'eternity' in the strictest sense; not indefinite or even infinite time but the timeless. The Creator, he says (*Timaeus* 37d), made a movable model of *aion* and this model is what we call time. Time is a model of *aion* because it attempts, by incessantly replacing its transitory 'present moments', to compensate for this transience and symbolise, or parody, the actual plentitude of the changeless reality - like trying to imitate omnipresence by visiting as many places as possible in rapid succession.

Ch. 9, par. 37

The Greeks thought they were calling the universe *kosmos* because it was the adornment, the arranging, (*Gorgias*, 508 a.), the embellishment of what had originally been ugliness, disorder, chaos.

Ch. 9, par. 34

Plato and Aristotle both maintained that there was only one *kosmos.*

Ch. 10, par. 68

Plato, as everyone remembers, talked as if Justice or Goodness were entities not only as real as particular just acts or good men but incomparably more so. Most emphatically of all, he talked thus about Beauty. The place where he does so is hackneyed, but so germane that I must recall it. The pupil, we are told, should begin by loving beautiful bodies. He must then learn to love beautiful souls; then the beauty embodied in laws and manners; then, that in the sciences. He will then be ready to turn to 'the main sea of Beauty'. After that comes the vision. He will 'see' a wonder; Beauty itself, which neither grows nor decays, which knows nothing of more and less, without body, without discourse of reason, 'itself in itself eternally existing in pure homogeneity'. (*Symposium* 210 b-211 b.)

Ch. 10, par. 70

If we want to know what it felt like to be Plato thinking about Beauty, we can get some inkling by noticing how people use Life (Biological).

Ch. 10, par. 68

In order that *Life (Biological)* can be called 'orgiastic' and 'pleasurable' it must be given the same status as Plato's Beauty. It must be the plenitude and perfection whereof only dim traces are found in actual living things.

Ch. 12, par. 7

The reversed temporal process in 11. 97-103 ('We have passed Age's icy caves' etc.) borrowed from Plato's *Politicus* (269 c sq.), marks the fact that at this moment the whole cycle is reversed and the cosmos begins anew.

Letters to Malcolm

Chap. 6, par. 10

Vidler and you and I (and Plato) think it [the doctrine that man is a two-fold creature] a fact. Tens of thousands, perhaps millions, think it a fantasy.

Chap. 16, par. 11

Plato was not so silly as the Moderns think when he elevated abstract nouns - that is, adjectives disguised as nouns - into the supreme realities - the Forms.

Chap. 18, par. 1

Aren't these intrinsically vicious pleasures, as Plato said, "mixed"? To use his own image, given the itch, one wants to scratch it. And if you abstain, the temptation is very severe, and if you scratch there is a sort of pleasure in the momentary and deceptive relief. But one didn't want the itch. the scratch is not a pleasure simply, but only by comparison with the context. In the same way resentment is pleasant only as a relief from, or alternative to, humiliation.

The Discarded Image

Ch. 1, par. 5

Plato [in his pnumatology] was modifying, in the interests of ethics and monotheism, the mythology he had received from his ancestors.

Ch. 3, par. 2

Plato's *Republic*, as everyone knows, ends with an account of the after-life, put into the mouth of one Er the Armenian who had returned from the dead.

Ch. 3, par. 6

This prohibition of suicide is Platonic. I think Cicero is following a passage in Plato's *Phaedo* where Socrates remarks of suicide, 'They say it is unlawful' (61c), even one of those few acts which are unlawful in all circumstances (62a). He goes on to explain. Whether we accept or not the doctrine taught in the Mysteries (that the body is a prison and we must not break from it), at any rate we men are certainly the property (κτηματα) of the gods, and property must not dispose itself (62b-c). That this prohibition makes part of Christian ethics is indisputable; but many, not unlearned, people have been unable to tell me when or how it became so.

Ch. 3, par. 27

Lactantius in his commentary on the *Thebaid* says that Statius 'means δημιουργον, the god whose name it is unlawful to know'. This is plain sailing: the demiurge (workman) being the Creator in the *Timaeus*.

Ch. 3, par. 32

The idea that even the highest created spirits - the gods, as distinct from God - were, after their own fashion, incarnate, had some sort of material 'vehicle', goes back to Plato. He had called the true gods, the deified stars, ζωα, animals. (*Timaeus* 38 e.) Scholasticism, in regarding the angels - which is what the gods or aetherial creatures are called in Christian language - as pure or naked spirits, was revolutionary.

Ch. 3, par. 37

One [principle of Apuleius] is what I call the Principle of the Triad. The clearest statement of it in Plato himself comes from the *Timaeus*: 'it is impossible that two things only should be joined together without a third. There must be some bond in between both to bring them together' (31b-c). The principle is not stated but assumed in the assertion of the *Symposium* that god does not meet man. They can encounter one another only indirectly; there must be some wire, some medium, some introducer, some bridge - a third thing of some sort - in between them. Daemons fill the gap. We shall find Plato himself, and the medievals, endlessly acting on their principle; supplying bridges as it were, 'third things' - between reason and appetite, soul and body, king and commons.

Ch. 4, par. 10-23

The religion of Chalcidius has been questioned. In favour of his Christianity we note:

(1) The dedication to Osius (always assuming that he really was the Bishop)
(2) He calls the biblical account of Adam's creation 'the teaching of the holier sect' (*sectae sancioris*).
(3) After glancing at a supposed astrological doctrine in Homer, he mentions the star of the Nativity as something vouched for by 'a holier and more venerable story'.
(4) He describes himself as deriving from 'the divine law' truths to which Plato had been guided 'by the impulse (*instinctus*) of truth herself'. (CLXXVI, p225)…

Of the deep discrepancy between his neo-Platonic Trinity and the fully Christian doctrine I believe him to have been unaware.

Ch. 4, par. 24

The *Timaeus* has none of the erotic mysticism we find in the *Symposium* or the *Phaedrus,* and almost nothing about politics. And though the Ideas (or Forms) are mentioned, their real place in Plato's theory of knowledge is not displayed. For Chalcidius they become 'ideas' almost in the modern sense; thoughts in the mind of God. (CCCIV, p. 333.) It thus came about that, for the Middle Ages, Plato was not the logician, nor the philosopher of love, nor the author of the *Republic*. He was, next to Moses, the great monotheistic cosmogonist, the philosopher of creation; hence, paradoxically, the philosopher of that Nature which the real Plato so often disparaged.

Ch. 4, par. 26-27

Plato clearly said (Timaeus 42b) that the souls of wicked men may be re-incarnated as women, and if that doesn't cure them, finally as beasts. But we are not, says Chalcidius, to suppose that he meant it literally. He only means that, by indulging your passions, you will, in this present life, become more and more like an animal.

In *Timaeus* 40d-41a Plato, after describing how God created the gods - not the mythological ones but those he really believed in, the animated stars - asks what is to be said about the popular pantheon. He first degrades them from the rank of gods to that of daemons. He then proceeds, in words almost certainly ironical, to decline any further discussion of them. It is, he says, 'A task quite beyond me. We must accept what was said about them by our ancestors who, according to their own account, were actually their descendants. Surely they must have been well informed about their own progenitors! And who could disbelieve the children of the gods?' Chalcidius takes all this *au pied de la lettre.* By telling us to believe our forebears Plato is reminding us that *credulitas* must precede all instruction.

Ch. 4, par. 28

A very brief reference to dreams in the original (45e) leads to seven chapters on them in the commentary. They are of interest for two reasons. In the first place, they include a translation of *Republic* 571c, and thus hand on, ages before Freud, Plato's ur-Freudian doctrine of the dream as the expression of a submerged wish.

Ch. 4, par. 32

Then, following the *Timaeus* (69c-72d) and the *Republic* (441d-442d), he finds the same triadic pattern repeated in the ideal state and in the human individual. In his imagined city Plato assigned the highest parts to his philosophical rulers who command. After them comes the warrior caste which carries out their orders. Finally, the common people obey. So in each man. The rational part lives in the body's citadel (*capitolium*), that is, the head. In the camp or barracks (*castra*) of the chest, warrior-like, the 'energy which resembles anger', that which makes a man high-spirited, has its station. Appetite, which corresponds to the common people, is located in the abdomen below them both.

Ch. 4, par. 53

It is the 'negative Theology' of those who take in a more rigid sense, and emphasise more persistently than others, the incomprehensibility of God. It is already well rooted in Plato himself, as we see from *Republic* 509b and the Second Epistle (312e-313a), and central in Plotinus. Its most striking representative in English is *The Cloud of Unknowing*. Some German Protestant Theology in our own time, and some Theistic Existentialism, has perhaps a remote affinity with it.

Ch. 4, par. 53

In contradiction to the Platonic view that the Divine and the human cannot meet except through a *tertium quid*, prayer is a direct *commercium* between God and Man.

Ch. 5, par. 44

The older view was that the Intelligence is 'in' the sphere as the soul is 'in' the body, so that the planets are, as Plato would have agreed, ζωα - celestial animals, animate bodies or incarnate minds.

Ch. 7, par. 51

Spirits then, are the 'subtle *gumphus*' required by Plato and Alanus to keep body and soul together, or as Donne says, 'the subtile knot which makes us man.'

Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature

Ch. 3, par. 2

In reality we know that [the author of the *Brut*] is getting it all from a book, from Geoffrey of Monmouth's Latin History of the Kings of Britain, and that Geoffrey is getting it from the second-century *De Deo Socratis* of Apuleius, who in his turn, is reproducing the pnumatology of Plato.

Ch. 3, par. 7

All Plato had disappeared except part of the *Timaeus* in a Latin version: one of the greatest, but also one of the least typical, of the dialogues.

Ch. 3, par. 35

The effort now sometimes made to lead a civilized life on reason alone, rejecting the emotions, the attempt of the monarchic head to rule the plebian belly without the aid of that aristocracy in the thorax, would have seemed to Plato a rash venture; like what motorists call 'driving on your brakes'.

Ch. 4, par. 13

Thus, the passage already quoted about Time as a downward growing tree whose roots are in the Primum Mobile is effective by itself, especially to readers who remember Plato's conceit of man's root being in his head.

Ch. 6, par. 5

Something that might almost be called an accident - the loss of Plato's other works and the partial survival of the *Timaeus* - had concentrated attention on the cosmogonic

elements in Plato. Nature not made much of in the *Timaeus* itself, had been personified on a large scale by Bernarus Silvestris and after him by Alanus ab Insulis;…

Ch. 9, par. 36

Spencer wrote primarily as a (Protestant) Christian and secondarily as a Platonist. Both systems are united with one another and cut off from some - not all - modern thought by their conviction that Nature, the totality of phenomena in space and time, is not the only thing that exists: is, indeed, the least important thing. Christians and Platonists both believe in an 'other' world. They differ, at least in emphasis, when they describe the relations between that other wold and Nature. For a Platonist the contrast is usually that between an original and a copy, between the real and the merely apparent, between the clear and the confused: for a Christian, between the eternal and the temporary, or the perfect and the partially spoiled. The essential attitude of Platonism is aspiration or longing: the human soul, imprisoned in the shadowy, unreal world of Nature, stretches out its hands and struggles towards the beauty and reality of that which lies (as Plato says) 'on the other side of existence'... In Christianity, however, the human soul is not the seeker but the sought: it is God who seeks, who descends from the other world to find and heal Man; the parable about the Good Shepherd looking for and finding the lost sheep sums it up. Whether in the long run there is any flat contradiction between the two pictures need not be discussed here It is certainly possible to combine and interchange them for a considerable time without finding a contradiction...

Ch.11, par. 13

It is, as Plato's 'myths' were to Plato himself, a not unlikely tale.

God in the Dock

Christian Apologetics, par. 28

It must be pointed out how very improbable a thing [the Incarnation] is among the Jews and how different to anything that happened with Plato, Confucius, Buddha, Mohammed.

On the Transmission of Christianity, par. 8

We are often told that education is a key position. That is very false in one sense and very true in another. If it means that you can do any great thing by interfering with existing schools, altering curricula and the like, it is very false. As the teachers are, so they will teach. Your 'reform' may incommode and overwork them, but it will not radically alter the total effect of their teaching. Planning has no magic whereby it can elicit figs from thistles or choke-pears from vines. The rich, sappy, fruit-laden tree will bear sweetness and strength and spiritual health: the dry, prickly, withered tree will teach hate, jealousy, suspicion, and inferiority complex - whatever you tell it to teach. They will do it unknowingly and all day long. But if we mean that to make adult Christians

now and even beyond that circle, to spread the immediately sub-Christian perceptions and virtues, the rich Platonic or Virgilian penumbra of the Faith, and thus to alter the type who will by teachers in the future - if we mean that to do this is to perform the greatest of all services for our descendents, then it is very true.

Religion Without Dogma, par. 21-22

Nor do I see how such a religion [less dogmatic, like Islam], if it became a vital force, would long be preserved in its freedom from dogma. Is its God to be conceived pantheisticly, or after the Jewish, Platonic, Christian fashion?…Those who have come to his minimal religion from Christianity will conceive God in the Jewish, Platonic, Christian way; those who have come from Hinduism will conceive Him pantheisticly;

Religion Without Dogma, par. 23

For religious experience can be made to yield almost and sort of God. I think Professor Price assumed a certain sort of God because he has been brought up in a certain way: because Bishop Butler and Hooker and Thomas Aquinas and Augustine and St Paul and Christ and Aristotle and Plato are, as we say, 'in his blood'.

What Are We to Make of Jesus Christ?, par. 5

Apart from bits of the Platonic dialogues, there are no conversations that I know of in ancient literature like the Fourth Gospel.

On the Reading of Old Books, par. 1

…I have found as a tutor in English Literature that if the average student wants to find out something about Platonism, the very last thing he thinks of doing is to take a translation of Plato off the library shelf and read the Symposium. He would rather read some dreary modern book ten times as long, all about 'isms' and influences and only one in twelve pages telling him what Plato actually said.... The simplest student will be able to understand, if not all, yet a very great deal of what Plato said; but hardly anyone can understand some modern books on Platonism.

The Decline of Religion, par. 4

I am anxious here not to be misunderstood. I do not mean that Scott was not a brave, generous, honourable man and a glorious writer. I mean that in his work, as in that of most of his contemporaries, only secular and natural values are taken seriously. Plato and Virgil are, in that sense, nearer to Christianity than they.

Spencer's Images of Life

Intro., p. 8

Working over this hieroglyphic tradition - and over Plutarch's anthropological syncretism and Plato's philosophical mythology besides - come the Florentine Platonists Marsilio Focino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. They believed not only that all myths and hieroglyphics had profound meaning but also that this ancient pagan under-meaning is really in agreement with Christianity.

p.43

Two aspects of Venus are touches on here. In the second line, clearly, she is the planetary deity who by influencing men and beasts to amorousness replenishes the world. The first, however, expresses a less obvious and more audacious idea. To understand it we must turn to Timaeus 29, where Plato argues from the beauty of the cosmos that it was made from a pattern no less than eternal.

P 58

…both passages clearly stem from Phaedrus 250-3, where Plato develops a doctrine of affinities in love. Every lover looks for qualities in the beloved that remind him of the god he followed in a former life. They 'keep their eyes fixed upon the god, and as they reach and grasp him by memory they are inspired and receive from him character and habits, so far as it is possible for a man to have part in God'

Appendix VII Lewis's References to Aristotle

All My Road Before Me

April 3, 1922 Monday

I worked on Roman History notes all the morning and at Adamson's chapters on Aristotle after lunch. A rather depressing day:…

May 4, 1922 Thursday

Worked at an English text of the *Politics* in the afternoon, with some interest,...

May 19, 1922 Friday

A damp morning: I worked on the Revolution of the 400, comparing Thucydides with Aristotle.

June 10, 1922 Saturday

Back to the School at two o'clock for a paper on translation from Plato and Aristotle which suited me down to the ground and could hardly have been better.

September 28, 1922 Thursday

Here we did philosophical Unseens- a piece of Plato, one of Aristotle, and one of Tertullian. I could make very little of the latter and had to leave it unfinished

January 30, 1923 Tuesday

I reached the Senior Common Room just as the dons were preparing to move in to dinner. There were a good many present - an American pianist called Antony, Carlyle, Stevenson, Keir, a man unknown, Allen Emmet, and Carritt. Farquharson, who was in the chair for the night, came in late and said he had been delayed by a lady who wanted him to explain Aristotle's dictum about poetry being more philosophical than history.

March 22 1923 Thursday

After breakfast I walked into town. I went to Carritt's room and returned his Aristotle.

May 1 1926 Saturday

After tea worked on Aristotle. Supper at home and then back to College to spend the evening with Hardie on Aristotle. To bed about 11.30, very tired, and had a terrifying dream in the night which I can't remember.

May 2 1926 Sunday

Home again and had supper. Worked on Aristotle afterwards, tracking a passage down

May 3 1926 Monday

A beautiful bright windy day. Worked on Aristotle all morning for Boddington who came at 12.
May 17 1926 Monday

I worked a little on Aristotle in the morning and read Marlowe's Edward II: nothing so good or so bad.

May 18 1926 Tuesday

Boddington at 10 on Aristotle, then Spencer on Lydgate and Hoccleve: the latter a good hour I hope.

January 22 1927 Saturday

Up rather earlier and bussed into town after breakfast for Collections. I found Weldon lolling in the smoking room and learned from him that I am to keep the Greats men this term (whom I thought I was to hand over) and to take them through Aristotle, which is a nasty surprise.

January 22 1927 Saturday

Back to College after dinner and sat down to finish Collection papers afterward - the Aristotle one raising points which took me a good deal of time.

January 27 1927 Thursday

I went out to the Davenant to order a copy of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

January 31 1927 Monday

Wrote up arrears of diary after breakfast. Then came Hetherington with an essay on Aristotle's criticism of the Ideas, not one of his best, but we put in (I hope) a fairly good hour.

Letters

August 7 1921, His Brother

All the books were uniformly bound, and I was surprised to see such unlikely tidbits as the *Ethics of Aristotle* and the works of the Persian epic poet Firdausi. I solved the mystery by finding out that they were a uniform series of Lubbock's Hundred Best Books!!! How I abominate such culture for the many, such tastes ready made, such standardization of the brain.

June 7 1934, Sister Madeleva C. S. C. of Notre Dame, Indiana

I suppose you will have access to a complete Aristotle wherever you are working? He is often useful.

January 17 1940, Dom Bede Griffiths

…by equating "matter" in the ordinary sense with υλη or *materia* in the scholastic and Aristotelian sense, i.e. equating the concrete corporeality of flesh, grass, earth or water with "pure potentiality"… being nearest to not-being and the furthest from the Prime Reality can, I suppose, be called the "least good" of things.

April 18 1940, a Former Pupil

your phrase about the "slave-wife" is mere rhetoric, because it assumes a servile subordination to be the only kind of subordination. Aristotle could have taught you better. "The householder governs his slave despotically. He governs his wife and children as being both free - but he governs the children as a constitutional monarch, and the wife politically" (i.e. as the democratic magistrate governs a democratic citizen.)

June 2 1940, Owen Barfield

This is from Lady Julian of Norwich whom I have been reading lately and who seems, in the Fifteenth century, to have rivaled Thomas Aquinas' reconciliation of Aristotle and Christianity by nearly reconciling Christianity with Kant.

July 16 1940, Dom Bede Griffiths

A lot of work and an illness have kept me from answering your letter, but I have been intending ever since I got it to let you know that I think your criticisms on my Aristotelian idea of leisure are largely right. I wouldn't write that essay now… The Greek error was a punishment for their sin in owning slaves and their consequent contempt for labour.

Letters to Arthur Greeves

Mar. 6, 1926

It is then a desire that something which I recognize as my own should be publicly found good: whether it is known by others to be mine is of course of comparatively little importance. Is it then what Aristotle says? I desire public praise as a proof that it really is good: i.e. I wish to be able to think that I am a good poet and desire applause (though not paid to my name) as a means to that end.

Jan. 2, 1930

Aristotle's *Ethics* all morning, walk after lunch, and then Dante's *Paradiso* for the rest of the day.

Jun. 22, 1930

I am reading the Politics of Aristotle which contains one of the few reasoned defenses of slavery in ancient literature - most of the ancients taking it for granted and therefore feeling no need to defend it.

The Allegory of Love

Chap. 1 par. 4

Odysseus loves Penelope as he loves the rest of his home and possessions, and Aristotle rather grudgingly admits that the conjugal relation may now and then rise to the same level as the virtuous friendship between good men.

Chap. 1 par. 13

Thomas Aquinas, whose thought is always so firm and clear in itself, is a baffling figure for our present purpose. He seems always to take away with one hand what he holds out to us with the other. Thus he has learned from Aristotle that marriage is a species of *amicitia*. (Contra Gentiles, iii. 125.)

Chap. 2 par. 1

Evil and misery were deep and dark from the first. Pain is black in Homer, and goodness is a middle point for Alfred no less than for Aristotle.

Chap. 2 par. 18

The allegorization of the pantheon is thus seen to depend on causes that go beyond merely literary history; and the same may be said of the flourishing of the

personifications. They also depend upon a profound change in the mind of antiquity; but this time it is a change of a moral experience rather than of thought. A ready way of indicating its nature - for I have foresworn any attempt to explain its causes - will be to remind the modern student of a certain surprise which he probably felt when he first read the *Ethics* of Aristotle… Aristotle coolly remarks that the man who is temperate at a cost is profligate: (Ethic. Nicom. 1104 B.) the really temperate man abstains because he likes abstaining. The ease and pleasure with which good acts are done, the absence of a moral 'effort' is for him the symptom of virtue. (Ibid. 1099A)

Chap. 2 par. 23

A few pages ago I quoted passages from Seneca to show the kind of moral experience which separates him from Aristotle;…

Chap. 2 par. 41

In dealing with the Middle Ages we are often tricked by our imagination. We think of plate armour and Aristotelianism… Aristotle is before all the philosopher of divisions. His effect on his greatest disciple, as M. Gilson has traces it, was to dig new chasms between God and the world, between human knowledge and reality, between faith and reason. Heaven began, under this dispensation, to seem farther off. The danger of Pantheism grew less: the danger of mechanical Deism came a step nearer. It is almost as if the first, faint shadow of Descartes, or even of 'our present discontents' had fallen across the scene.

Chap. 2 par. 44

…so that Bernardus, following Plato himself, finds room both for the Platonic and for the Aristotelian type of universal.

Chap. 4 par. 27

Such is Chaucer's Cryseide; a tragic figure in the strictest Aristotelian sense, for she is neither very good nor execrably wicked.

Chap. 6 par. 30

[Deguileville] is more concerned to exclude than to draw in; and one of the most important parts of his poem is the debate in which Grace Dieu overthrows first Nature, and then the human reason, which is represented by Aristotle.

Chap. 6 par. 32

[Deguileville's] characters, like those whom Aristotle condemns, utter 'not what the tale, be what the poet, desires'.

Chap. 7 par. 29

When Catholicism goes bad it becomes the world-old, world -wide *religio* of amulets and holy places and preistcraft: Protestantism, in its corresponding decay, becomes a vague mist of ethical platitudes. Catholicism is accused of being much too like the other religions; Protestantism of being insufficiently like a religion at all. Hence Plato, with his transcendent Forms, is the doctor of Protestants; Aristotle, with his immanent Forms, the doctor of Catholics.

Chap. 7 par. 33

This is what moderns tend to mean by Nature - the primitive, or original, and Spencer knows what it is like. But most commonly he understands Nature as Aristotle did - the 'nature' of anything being its unimpeded growth from within to perfection, neither checked by accident nor sophisticated be art.

Chap. 7 par. 50

The modern reader is apt to start from an egalitarian conception; to assume, in fact, that the fair way of dividing a cake between two people is to cut it into two equal pieces. But to this Aristotle, and the most reputable political thinkers between Aristotle's time and Spencer's would have replied at once 'It all depends who the two people are. If A is twice as good a man as B, then obviously justice means giving A twice as much cake as B. For justice is not equality *simpliciter* but proportional equality.'

Chap. 7 par. 53

We are to conceive of courtesy as the poetry of conduct, an 'unbought grace of life' which makes its possessor immediately loveable to all who meet him, and which is the bloom (as Aristotle would say) - the supervenient perfection - on the virtues of charity and humility.

Chap. 7 par. 56

The state of affairs which [the Titaness] would fain upset in heaven and has already upset in earth, is precisely that state which Spenser (or Aristotle) would have described as just and harmonious,…

The Problem of Pain

Chap. 3 par. 17

…I think that nothing marks off Pagan theism from Christianity so sharply as Aristotle's doctrine that God moves a lover.(Met., XII, 7) But for Christendom "Herein is love not that we loved God but that God loved us." (I john iv. 10.)

Chap. 6 par. 11

Yet against Kant stands the obvious truth, noted by Aristotle, that the more virtuous a man becomes, the more he enjoys virtuous actions.

Chap. 6 par. 13

We therefore agree with Aristotle that what is intrinsically right nay well be agreeable, and that eh better a man is the more he will like it;

Chap. 9

[Lewis begins the chapter on Animal Pain with the following quote from Aristotle's Politics, I, v, 5.] to find out what is natural, we must study specimens which retain their nature and not those which have been corrupted.

Chap. 10 par. 7

Aristotle has told us that a city is a unity of unlikes (Politics, II, 2,4.), and St. Paul that a body is a unity of different members. (I Cor. Xii, 12-30) Heaven is a city and a Body, because the blessed remain eternally different.

The Screwtape Letters

Screwtape Proposes a Toast, Par. 38

It is our function to encourage the behavior, the manners, the whole attitude of mind, which democracies naturally like and enjoy, because these are the very things which, if unchecked will destroy democracy. You would almost wonder that even humans don't see it themselves. Even if they don't read Aristotle (that would be undemocratic) you would have thought that the French revolution would have taught them that the behavior aristocrats naturally like is not the behavior that preserves aristocracy. They might have applied the same principle to all forms of government.

Mere Christianity

Book 3, Chap. 3, par. 6

There is one bit of advice given us by the ancient heathen Greeks, and by the Jews in the Old Testament, and by the Great Christian teacher of the Middle Ages,… not to lend money at interest… Some people say that when Moses and Aristotle and the Christians agreed in forbidding interest (or "usury" as they called it), they could not foresee the joint stock company, and were only thinking of the private moneylender, and that, therefore, we need not bother about what they said...

Book 4, Chap. 1, par. 7

It is quite true that if we took Christ's advice we should soon be living in a happier world. You nee not even go as far as Christ. If we did all that Plato or Aristotle or Confucius told us, we should get on a great deal better than we do. And so what? We have never followed the advice of the great teachers. Why are we likely to begin now?

A Preface to Paradise Lost

Chap. 1, par. 7

Let us now consider Milton's (A), the Epic. His distinction between 'Diffuse' and 'Brief' has already been referred to. More difficult is his contrast between following Aristotle and following Nature. The 'rules' of Aristotle for Epic, in so far as they are relevant here, amount to the precept of *unity*.

Chap. 1, par. 7

In his *Discourses on the Heroic Poem* Tasso raises the whole problem of multiplicity or unity in an epic plot, and says that the claims of unity are supported by Aristotle, the ancients, and Reason, but those of multiplicity by usage, the actual taste of all knights and ladies, and Experience (op. cit., III). By 'experience' he doubtless means such unhappy experiences as that of his father who wrote an *Amadis* in strict conformity to the rules of Aristotle, but found that the recitation of it emptied the auditorium, from which 'he concluded that unity of action was a thing affording little pleasure'…I believe therefore, with very little doubt, that Milton's hesitation between 'the rules of Aristotle' and 'following Nature' means, in simpler language, 'shall I write an epic in twelve books with a simple plot, or shall I write something in stanzas and cantos about knights and ladies and enchantments?'

Chap. 8, par. 2

The proper use [of Rhetoric] is lawful and necessary because, as Aristotle points out, intellect of itself 'moves nothing': the transition from thinking to doing, in nearly all men at nearly all moments, needs to be assisted by appropriate states of feeling. Because the end of rhetoric is in the world of action, the objects it deals with appear foreshortened and much of their reality is omitted.

Chap. 8, par. 4

Once again, the old critics were quite right when they said that poetry 'instructed by delighting', for poetry was formerly one of the chief means whereby each new generation learned, not to copy, but by copying to make, (footnote: "We learn to do things by doing the things we are learning how to do" as Aristotle observes (Ethics, II, ii.).) the good Stock responses.

Chap. 11, par.3

Aristotle tells us that to rule and to be ruled are things according to Nature…the sort of questions we now ask - whether democracy or dictatorship is the better constitution - would be senseless to Aristotle. He would ask 'Democracy for whom?' 'Dictatorship for whom?'… Aristotle was thinking mainly of civil society. the applications of the Hierarchical conception to private, or to cosmic, life are to be sought in other writers.

The Abolition of Man

Chap. 1, par. 10

Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought. When the age for reflective thought comes, the pupil who has been thus trained in "ordinate affections" or Just sentiment" will easily find the first principles in Ethics: but to the corrupt man they will never be visible at all and he can make no progress in that science.

Chap. 1, par. 11

This conception in all its forms, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental alike, I shall henceforth refer to for brevity simply as "the *Tao*."

Chap. 2, par. 19

From within the Tao itself comes the only authority to modify the *Tao*… This is why Aristotle said that only those who have been well brought up can usefully study ethics: to the corrupted man, the man who stands outside the *Tao* the very starting point of this science is invisible. (*Eth. Nic*. 1905 B, 1140 B 1151 A.)

Appendix VIII

[from Eth. Nic. 1177 B.] "We must not listen to those who advise us 'being men to think human thoughts, and being mortal to think mortal thoughts,' but must put on immortality

as much as is possible and strain every nerve to live according to that best part of us, which, being small in bulk, yet much more in its power and honour surpasses all else."

Great Divorce

Chap. 1, par. 1

However far I went I found only dingy lodging houses, small tobacconists, hoardings from which posters hung in rags, windowless warehouses, goods stations without trains, and bookshops of the sort that sell *The works of Aristotle*. I never met anyone.

Miracles

Chap. 1

[quoted before chapter 1 'The Scope of this Book'] from *Metaphysics*: 'Those who wish to succeed must ask the right preliminary questions.'

Chap. 6

[quoted before the chapter 6 'Answers to Misgivings'] from Metaphysics: 'For as bats' eyes are to daylight so is our intellectual eye to those truths which are, in their own nature, the most obvious of all.

Chap. 11, par. 4

The Greeks rose above [pantheism] at their peak, in the thought of Plato and Aristotle; their successors relapsed into the great Pantheistic system of the Stoics

Chap. 16, par. 25

What enables us to distinguish these senses [of heaven] and hold them clearly apart is not any special spiritual purity but the fact that we are the heirs to centuries of logical analysis: not that we are sons ro Abraham but that we are sons to Aristotle.

English Literature of the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama

Introduction, par. 40

…We must not picture a straight fight in which humanism, with the new science as its ally, rebelled against 'the tyranny of Aristotle'. Humanists were seldom, even by

accident, allied with scientists: scientists did not always despise scholasticism; Aristotle and scholasticism are sometimes in opposition. In reality the humanists' revolt against medieval philosophy was not a philosophical revolt. What it really was can best be gauged by the language it used. Your philosophers, says Vives (*DeCausis*, I), are straw splitters, makers of unnecessary difficulties...

Introduction, par. 65

It seems however, quite certain that many ages (not barbarous) believed nothing of the sort. Aristotle (Politics, 1282b) explicitly ruled that the highest power should hardly legislate at all. Its function was to administer a pre-existing law. Any legislation there was should be directed to supplementing and particularizing that law where its necessary generality failed to meet some concrete situation. The main outlines of the law must be preserved. It creates, and is not created by, the state. I do not know that Aristotle ever tells us where this original and immutable law came from; but, whether derived from our ancestors or from some philosophical constitution-maker, it must be accepted by the State as a *datum*…

Introduction, par. 73

In one sense, and that the most profound, it must be admitted that the true subtlety and sagacity of Aristotle's *Ethics*, which had been preserved by Aquinas, were now being lost again…

Introduction, par. 74

The best elements in Aristotle's ethical thought contributed to this picture comparatively little [that is, the attempt to gain philosophical status and wisdom easily]…But what proved far more attractive was Aristotle's Magnanimous Man: the man who both had, and was entitled to have, a high opinion of his own worth. Hence, I believe, comes that astonishing absence of humility which separates Sidney's and Spencer's heroes so widely from those of Malory.

Introduction, par. 75

But, for many sixteenth-century men, as for the Stoics, Aristotle's Magnanimity was not magnanimous enough… They desired something far loftier, something as highly exalted as the magician, the prince, or the elect…but above all dependence on fortune, thus the Stoics sapiens, far more than the Aristotelian μεγαλοψυχος, is the image really potent in Elizabethan, and in much later literature.

Book I, Ch. I, par. 70

Everywhere, too, the author [of *Complaynt of Scotlande* (1549)] lets loose on us a flood of anecdote and authority, unknown to Chartier, from Sallust, Seneca, Livy, Plutarch, Aristotle, Thucydides, and who not?… Here, unforetold, unsucceeded, unexplained, tricked out in all its heterogeneous ornaments as in jewels 'that were the spoils of provinces', what we call the 'Renaissance' has come dancing, shouting, posturing, nay as it were sweating, into Scots prose.

Book II, Ch. I, par. 42

[Tyndale] also speaks with great harshness (as More had spoken with droll mockery) of scholasticism, and, unlike More, extends his disapproval to the real Aristotle and the pagan philosophers in general. Near the end of the *Wicked Mammon* he attributes to Aristotle views which I do not think Aristotle held. But later, in the *Obedience*, it appears that Tyndale's objection is not to Aristotle as such but to Aristotle as a substitute for, and contamination of, the Biblical revelation.

Book II, Ch. II, par. 68

The 'Invention' here is the 'conceit', or the 'idea', the thing that makes the poem different from what any man might say without being a poet. It secures in poetic thought that departure from the literal and ordinary (the κυριον and the ιδιωτικον) which Aristotle demands in poetic language.

Book II, Ch. III, par. 24

In contrast to Poynet we may place Sir Thomas Smith (1513-77), the humanist, the learned civilian, and the man of affairs… Smith's political thought is singularly free from moral and theological elements and he is not interested in Natural Law. The 'lawe already put' in any commonwealth seems to be almost the final standard by which conduct is to be judged...Ultimate questions, as whether rebellion is ever justifiable (I. v.) or whether every monarch have παμβασιλειαν 'if he would vse the same' (I. viii) are mentioned only to be waived. His beliefs about the origin of the State are largely derived from Aristotle.

Book III, Ch. I, par. 5,6

[in response to Plato's denial that poetry was an art] Two different answers were given… Aristotle gave his almost at once. Poetry, he maintained, does not copy the particulars of Nature; it disengages and represents her general characteristics. The poetic myth shows us what would necessarily or probably or possibly happen in all situations of a certain kind. If you like it reveals the universal and is thus more scientific (φιλοσοφωτερον) than history. The neo-Platonic answer, far later and more gradually, arose from prolonged reflection on sacred iconography; even, it would appear, from reflection on a singe sacred image. In the first century A. D. we find Dio Chrysostom putting into the mouth of Pheidias the words, 'What is hardest in making such a work as my Olympian Zeus is that the same image has to be preserved unchanged in the mind of the artist until

he has finished the statue, which may be a matter of years'. The model, apparently, is not a natural object, but an image in the artist's mind, invented says Dio, because 'wisdom and reason cannot be directly portrayed. Therefore, knowing the object in which they do occur, we have recourse to it and attach a human shape to wisdom and reason showing forth the invisible by the visible' (*Orat*. XII*, De Dei Cognitone*). This could, by a little manipulation, be reconciled with Aristotle, but is already pointing in a different direction…

Such unambiguous statements of the neo-platonic creed are not, however, very common. The men of that age were such inveterate syncretists, so much more anxious to reconcile authorities than to draw out their differences, that the Aristotelian and neo-Platonic views are not clearly opposed and compared, but are rather contaminated by each other and by many more influences as well. Aristotle himself was sometimes misinterpreted in a sense which brought him very close to Plotinus. Thus Fracastorius (1483-1553) in his *Naugerius* explains that while other writers give us the naked fact (*rem*), the poet gives us the form (*ideam*) clothed in all its beauties (*pulchritudinibus vestitam*) 'which Aristotle calleth the vniuersal'. These 'beauties' however are not very relevant to Aristotle's immanent universal - the general character in situations of a given kind, the 'sort of thing that might happen'; they have come in because Fracastorius is really thinking of a Platonic and transcendent from, a reality prior to, and exalted above, Nature. And Aristotle himself had unwittingly invited such a confusion when he allowed, in contexts which had nothing to do with poetry, that Nature often tends to or aims at (βουλεται ποιειν) a greater perfection than the indeterminacy of matter allows her to achieve (*De. Gen. Anim*. 778a; *Polit*. 1255b)...Aristotle was also contaminated by that late and vulgarized version of his own poetics which appears in Horace's *Ars Poetica*. here the doctrine of the universal has shrunk into a doctrine of fixed theoretical types, arbitrary rules abound and the seed of neo-classicism is sown.

Book III, Ch. I, par. 11

[in praise of Sidney] …He is a young man ambitious of learning, anxious to read Aristotle in the Greek, though French will do for Plutarch, sufficiently of his age to like the *Imprese* of Ruscelli and to quote Buchanan, yet independent enough of its worst folly to call Ciceronianism 'the cheife abuse of Oxford'.

Book III, Ch. I, par. 47-48

[Sidney's] central doctrine, that the poet is a second Creator producing a second Nature, is taken from Scaliger. The historical doctrine that poetry is the eldest of the arts probably comes from Minturno. Aristotle is misunderstood and pressed into the service of a *Poetics* different from his own. His 'universal' becomes 'what is fit to be said or done' and the unities of place and time are foisted upon him...

Sydney's own taste is that of a chivalrous, heroic, and romantic person, slightly modified at certain points by humanistic rule of thumb. Thus, on one hand, he welcomes, from Minturno, the idea, unknown to Aristotle, that tragedy should move admiration. He thinks 'high flying libertie of conciet' proper to a poet.

Book III, Ch. I, par. 50

[according to Sidney] This is [poetry's] share in the common function of all learnings, which is 'to lift up the minde…to the enjoying of his owne diuine essense'. To that end she is set free from Nature, not 'captived' like history to 'the trueth of a foolish world' but licensed to create 'things either better than nature bringeth forth, or quite anew, formes such as never were'. Or, if she is in some way dependent on Nature, she acts and plays not what Nature in fact produces, but what Nature 'will have set forth' (doubtless Aristotle's βουλεται ποιειν). Sidney is aware that this conception may seem megalomaniac - 'too saucy' are his own words. But it is seriously held.

Book III, Ch. I, par. 63

A full account of Spencer's reading would perhaps illuminate his work more than an account of his friendships. But it is not very easy to be sure what he had read… Aristotle's Ethics I think he read - or as the schoolboys say 'done' - probably with much help from a Latin version, but it was clearly not one of the books he had lived with.

Book III, Ch. I, par. 105

…But it is in Spencer that the myth of the visionary mistress effectively enters modern literature. His prince is the precursor of Novalis's Heinrich, of Alastor, and of Keats's Endymion. Allegorically, we are told, he is Magnificence; and it is clear that, in so far as this means anything Aristotelian, it mean Aristotle's Magnanimity. He is seeking Gloriana who is glory, and glory is honour, and honour is the goal of Aristotle's Magnanimous Man.

Book III, Ch. I, par. 107

In addition to the structural elements which I have already mentioned, Spenser at one time thought of stiffening his poem by dovetailing into it the Virtues out of Aristotle's *Ethics*. He was thinking that way when he wrote the letter to Raleigh as a preface for Fragment A. Presumably he had not thought of Aristotle when he wrote Book I, and had ceased thinking of Aristotle when he decided to write a legend of Constancy. Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean is (rather dully) allegorized in II. ii. But the Aristotelian influence on Spencer is fitful and superficial. The *Ethics* was not at all this kind of book. His treatment of Justice suggests that he had forgotten, or never read, most of what Aristotle says about it.

Surprised by Joy

Chap. 12, par. 12

I did not need to accept what Chesterton said in order to enjoy it. His humor was of the kind which I like best - not "jokes" imbedded in the page like currants in a cake, still less (what I cannot endure), a general tone of flippancy and jocularity, but the humor which is not in any way separable from the argument but is rather (as Aristotle would say) the "bloom" on dialect itself.

Four Loves

Friendship, par. 1

We admit, of course, that besides a wife and family, a man needs a few "friends." but the very tone of the admission and the sort of acquaintanceships which those who make it would describe as "friendships," show clearly that what they are talking about has very little to do with that *Philia* which Aristotle classified among the virtues...

Friendship, par. 25

…Friendship is both a possible benefactor and a possible danger to the community. And even as a benefactor it would have, not so much a survival value, as what we may call "civilisation-value"; would be something (in Aristotelian phrase) which helps the community not to live but to live well.

Studies in Words

Chap. 2, par.23

The noun *phusis* can hardly mean anything except 'beginning, coming-to-be'…The connection between this and the meaning of the verb *phuin* is not obvious, though as usual 'bridges' can be devised. Aristotle is trying his hand at one in his famous definition; 'whatever each thing is like *(hoion hekaston esti*) when its process of coming-to-be is complete, that we call the *phusis* of each thing'. (*Politics*, 1252 b.) On this view a thing's *phusis* would be what it grows into at maturity. This explanation does not seem to me at all improbable, but Aristotle's statement is no evidence for it, and Sir David Ross thinks it philologically wrong. Like all philosophers, Aristotle gives words the definitions which will be most useful for his own purpose and the history of his own language is one of the few subjects in which he was not a distinguished pioneer.

But already, before Aristotle wrote, *phusis* had taken on, in addition to the meaning 'sort', a new and quite astonishing sense.

Chap. 2, par. 35

Aristotle criticised thinkers like Parmenides because 'they never conceived of anything other than the substance of things perceptible by the senses'. Phusis he defines as that which has in itself a principle of change… But there are two things outside phusis. First, things which are unchangeable, but cannot exist 'on their own' ...[mathematics]... Secondly, there is one thing which is unchangeable and does exist on its own. This is God, the unmoved mover; and he is studied by a third discipline.

Chap. 2 par. 65

We have already learned form Aristotle that the phusis of anything is 'what it is like when its process of coming to be is complete'. We have learned also from Aristotle, that we must 'study what is natural from specimens which are in their natural conditions not from damaged ones'

Chap. 2 par. 66

…it merely records the particular, which as Aristotle had taught, is the function of history, not of tragedy.

Chap. 2 par. 79

We have already noticed that Aristotle speaks about things being 'in their natural condition': I.e. not damaged, or otherwise interfered with.

Chap. 2 par. 84-85

Aristotle's works were usually arranged in the following order; I. The *Oganon* (tool) or works on logic. 2. The scientific works or *phusika*. 3. A book or books on God, Unity, Being, Cause, and Potentiality. 4. Works on human activities (*Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric, Poetics*).... When these things ['the things after the *phusika*'] came (no doubt wrongly) to be regarded as one book, this book was now called 'the *Metaphysics*'

It would be easy to make an ironic point by saying that the word metaphysical, for all its grandiose suggestions, thus has no higher origin than a librarian's practical device for indicating a subdivision of the Aristotelian corpus which nobody could find a name for. But the name is not so unhappy and certainly not so foreign to Aristotle's' thought as this sally would suggest. We have already seen that he believed in realities outside what he called phusis and made them the subject of disciplines distinct from phusike (or *natural* philosophy). If the names are superficial, the division they express is genuinely Aristotelian... Aristotle's division of studies, or the divisions derived from it, lasted for centuries.

Chap. 2 par. 89

Phusike (*natural* philosophy) had from its beginning been 'principally concerned with bodies', as Aristotle notes. (*De Coelo* III 298 b.)

Chap. 4 par. 52

And most of us do not feel that the one *wit* and the other are what Aristotle calls 'things acccidentally homonymous'.

Chap. 5 par. 33

The contrast [between two concepts of 'free'] becomes explicit when Aristotle says in the Rhetoric 'of one's possessions those which yield some profit are the most useful, but those which exist only to be enjoyed are *eleutheria*'. This is the first step. Only he who is neither legally enslaved to a master nor economically enslaved by the struggle for subsistence, is likely to have, or to have the leisure for using, a piano or a library.

Chap. 5 par. 34-36

But there is a further development, which we owe (I believe) entirely to Aristotle; a brilliant conceit. (There is no reason why we should not attribute a conceit to him; he was a wit, and a dressy man, as well as a philosopher.) It comes from the Metaphysics. 'We call a man free whose life is lived for his own sake not for that of others. In the same way philosophy is of all studies the only free one; for it alone exists for its own sake.'

Here is an astonishing change. Up till now a study could be free because it was the characteristic occupation of a freeman. Aristotle now makes it 'free' in a quite new sense; namely, by analogy. It is a free study because it holds among other studies the same privileged position which a freeman holds among other men…

How far Aristotle's ideal is from a mere dilettancism can best be seen by giving it the background which two other passages supply. In Metaphysics we learn that the organisation of the universe resembles that of a household in which 'no one has so little chance to act at random as the free members. For them everything of almost everything proceeds according to a fixed plan (*tetaktai*), whereas the slaves and domestic animals contribute little to the common end and act mostly at random.' The attitude of any slave-owning society is and ought to be repellent to us, but it is worth while suppressing that repulsion in order to get the picture as Aristotle saw it. Looking from his study window he sees the hens scratching in the dust, the pigs asleep, the dogs hunting for fleas; the slaves, any of them who are not at that very moment on some appointed task, flirting, quarrelling, cracking nuts, playing dice, or dozing. He, the master, may use them all for the common end, the well-being of the family. They themselves have no such end, nor any consistent end, in mind. Whatever in their lives is not compelled from above is random – dependent on the mood of the moment. His own life is quite different; a systematised round of religious, political, scientific, literary and social activities; its very hours of recreation (there's an anecdote about them) deliberate, approved and allowed for; consistent with itself. But what is it in the structure of the universe that corresponds to this distinction between Aristotle, self-bound with the discipline of a freeman, and Aristotle's slaves, negatively free with a servile freedom between each job and the next? I think there is no doubt of the answer. It is the things in the higher world of aether which are regular, immutable, consistent; those down here are in the air that are subject to

change and chance and contingence.... Of course humanity is not often on the Aristotelian height.

Chap. 6 par. 41

[Hamlet] is making a clear and simple application of the maxim, originally Aristotelian, that 'the external senses are found in all creatures which have the power of locomotion'

Chap. 7, par. 7 (footnote)

My translations are very free because Aristotle's style is so telegraphic that fragments torn from their context and rendered at all literally would be hardly intelligible. I hope and believe I have not misrepresented his thought.

Chap. 9 par. 30

On the one hand, like *World, aion* can come to mean 'indefinite time' or 'ages and ages'. As Aristotle says, 'the totality that includes all the time there is … is called *aion*'. He connects it with *aei* (always).

Chap. 9 par. 85

Plato and Aristotle both maintained that here was only one *kosmos*.

Chap. 10 par. 13

Most often *bios* is *Life* (*Routine*), so that we have in Aristotle the nomadic the agricultural, the fisher's, or the huntsman's *bios*.

Chap. 10 par. 14

The three 'outstanding' *bioi*, according to Aristotle, are those of pleasure, of political activity, and of contemplation (or research). They are partly differences of *Routine* but also, no doubt, of ethical quality. It would be difficult to assign ancient conceptions of the happy (*eudaimon*) life either to *Life* (*Fortunes*) or to *Life* (*Ethical*)... Aristotle says that a man's *bios* will be *eudaimon* if his activities conform to the standards of excellence (*arete*). But this is not nearly so ethical as it looks. First, because Aristotle later admits that certain gifts of fortune are required for such a life: secondly, because *arete* itself is a far less narrowing moral term than English 'virtue'. *Arete* involves not simply 'being good' but being 'good *at*' a great many things (including morals), and Aristotle's conception of the happy life, in which the raw material (such as health, peace, and competence) provided by fortune is used be a master. Happiness is almost a style.

Chap. 10 par. 17

In Greek, Life (Common Lot) is bios. 'Tragedy', says Aristotle, 'is an imitation not of personalities but of action and *bios* and happiness.'

An Experiment in Criticism

Chap. 10, par. 1

But have I not made a startling omission? Poets and poems have been mentioned, but I have not said a word about poetry as such. Notice however, that nearly all the questions we have discussed would have been regarded by Aristotle, Horace, Tasso, Sidney and perhaps Boileau, as questions which, if they were to be raised at all, would properly come in a treatise 'On Poetry'.
Chap. 10, par. 5

The *Odyssey* and the *Comedy* have something to say that could have been said well, thought not equally well, without verse. Most of the qualities Aristotle demands of a tragedy could occur in a prose play.

Chap. 11, par. 28

Can I, honestly and strictly speaking, say with any confidence that my appreciation of any scene, chapter, stanza or line has been improved by my reading of Aristotle, Dryden Johnson, Lessing, Coleridge, Arnold himself (as a practicing critic), Pater, or Bradley? I am not sure that I can.

Chap. 11, par. 29

How should I know whether Aristotle's ideas about a good tragic plot were sound or silly unless I were able to say 'Yes, that is exactly how the *Oedipus Tyrannus* produces its effect'? The truth is not that we need the critics in order to enjoy the authors, but that we need the authors in order to enjoy the critics.

Epilogue, par. 2

Cooks and *bons viveurs* may very properly discuss cookery; it is not for them to consider whether, and why, it is important, and how important it is, that food should be deliciously cooked. That sort of question belongs to what Aristotle would call 'a more architectonic' inquiry;

Epilogue, par. 9

The relaxation, the slight (agreeable) weariness, the banishment of our fidgets, at the close of a great work all proclaim that it has done us good. That is the truth behind Aristotle's doctrine of *Katharsis* and Dr. I. A. Richards's theory that the 'calm of mind' we

feel after a great tragedy really means 'All's well with the nervous system here and now'. I cannot accept either. I cannot accept Aristotle's because the world has not yet agreed what it means. I cannot accept Dr. Richards's because it comes so near being a sanction for the lowest and most debilitating for of egoistic castle-building... But though I reject Aristotle and Dr. Richards, I think their theories are the right sort of theories...

Letters to Malcolm

Chap. 7, par. 11

one of these might have as huge a historical effect as Aristotle - or Hitler!

Chap. 19, par. 5

And I find 'substance' (in Aristotle's sense) when stripped of its own accidents and endowed with the accidents of some other substance, an object I cannot think.

Chap. 21, par. 11

If we were perfected, prayer would not be as a duty, it would be a delight… Why is this not so yet? We we know don't we? Aristotle has tought us that delight is the "bloom" on an unimpeded activity. But the very activities for which we were created are, while we live on earth, variously impeded: by evil in ouselves or in others.

The Discarded Image

Chap. 1, par. 6

By calling the superior *numen* Gracedieu the poet has worked in something of Christianity; but this is merely a 'wash' spread over a canvas that is not Christian but Aristotelian.

Chap. 1, par. 7

Aristotle, being interested both in biology and in astronomy, found himself faced with an obvious contrast… Apparently, then, the universe was divided into two regions. The lower region of change and irregularity he called Nature (φυσις). The upper he called Sky (ουρανος)... By the word divine Aristotle introduces a religious element; and the placing of the important frontier (between Sky and Nature, Aether and Air) at the Moon's orbit is a minor detail. But the concept of such a frontier seems to arise far more in response to a scientific than to a religious need.

Chap. 1, par. 14

[In Dante] Highly original and soaring philosophical speculation squeezes itself into a rigid dialectical pattern copied from Aristotle.

Chap. 2, par. 13

One difference between describing the Model and writing a history of thought has been, undesignedly, illustrated in the previous chapter. I there cited both Plato and Aristotle; but the role I had given them was philosophically humiliating - the one called as a witness to a scrap of daemonology, the other for some exploded physics...The history of thought as such would deal chiefly with the influence of great experts upon great experts - the influence not of Aristotle's physics, but of his ethics and his dialectical method on those of Aquinas.

Chap. 3, par. 18

… he [Scipio] has come to the great frontier, between Aristotle's 'Nature' and 'Sky'. This is clearly at the orbit of the moon,…

Chap. 3, par. 25

...Aristotle's Nature which covers only the sublunary. In that way the concept of Nature rendered possible a clear conception of the Supernatural (Aristotle's God is as supernatural as anything could be).

Chap. 4, par. 36

[Chalcidius] knows Aristotle but has little of the later reverence for him. Aristotle had passed over all save one of the species of dreams 'with his usual supercilious negligence'… He quotes and expands him, however, with more respect when arguing that matter, though not inherently evil, being the potentiality of all particular bodies, is doomed to (though logically distinct from) the privation of Form.

Chap. 5, par. 8

And beyond the *Primum Mobile* what? The answer to this unavoidable question had been given, in its first form, by Aristotle. 'Outside the heaven there is neither place nor void not time. Hence whatever is there is of such a kind as not to occupy space, nor does time affect it.' The timidity, the hushed voice is characteristic of the best Paganism. Adopted into Christianity, the doctrine speaks loud and jubilant. What is in one sense 'outside the heaven' is now, in another sense, 'the very Heaven', *caelum ipsum*, and full of God as Bernardus says.
Chap. 5, par.40-41

It was obvious to Aristotle that most things which move do so because some other moving object impels them… But it was also fundamental to his thought that no infinite series can be actual… There must in the last resort be something which, motionless itself, initiates the motion of all other things. Such a Prime Mover he finds in the wholly transcendent and immaterial God who 'occupies no place and is not affected by time'. How then does he move things? Aristotle answers, κινει ωσ ερωμενον, 'He moves as beloved'. He moves other things, that is, as an object of desire moves those who desire it…it would be easy to descant on the antithesis between Judaism (at its best) and Christianity. Both can speak about the 'love of God'. But in the one this means the thirsty and aspiring love of creatures for Him; in the other, His provident and descending love for them. The antithesis should not, however, be regarded as contradiction. A real universe could accommodate the 'love of God' in both senses. Aristotle describes the natural order, which is perpetually exhibited in the uncorrupted and translunary world. St. John ('herein' is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us') describes the order of Grace which comes into play here on earth because men have fallen. It will be noticed that when Dante ends the Comedy with 'the love that moves the Sun and the other stars', he is speaking of love in the Aristotelian sense.

Chap. 5, par. 50

There may perhaps as I have said before, be no absolute logical contradiction. One may say that the Good Shepherd goes to seek after the lost sheep because it is lost, not because it was the finest sheep in the flock. It may have been the least

Chap. 7, par. 35

The belief that to recognise a duty was to perceive a truth - not because you had a good heart but because you were an intellectual being - had its roots in antiquity. Plato preserved the Socratic idea that morality was an affair of knowledge; bad men were bad because they did not know what was good. Aristotle, while attacking that view and giving an important place to upbringing and habituation, still made 'right reason' (ορθος λογος) essential to good conduct.

Chap. 8, par. 1

In places readers may disagree as to how far a piece of cosmology or metaphysics constitutes a digression. The long dramatisation (in Christianised form) of Aristotle's' distinction between Nature and the realm above her which occupies Deguileville's *Pelerinage* from line 3344 to line 3936 (of Lydgate's version) may be thought relevant.

Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature

Ch. 2, par. 16-17

First of all, it might have been written by someone who had read Aristotle and learned that a narrative poet ought to speak as much as possible through the mouths of his characters and as little as possible through his own… But of course the author (or authors) of the *Brut* did not need to have read Aristotle...

Ch. 2, par. 21

The four virtues are daughters of God. *Mead* (*Temperantia*) is described as teaching *meosure* which is the middle point between two evils (49) - the 'golden middle way between much and little' (184) This scrap of Aristotle's ethical system had not occurred in the Latin.

Ch. 2, par. 3

In a French poem of the fourteenth century Nature personified appears as a character and has a conversation with another personage called… *Supernature*. And Nature says to Supernature 'The circle of the cold moon truly marks the boundary between your realm and mine forever'. Here again we might as well suppose the savage mind at work;... Yet, almost certainly that is not what is happening. The idea that the orbit of the Moon is a great boundary between two regions of the universe is Aristotelian...The part of the world we inhabit, the Earth, is the scene of generation and decay and therefore of continual change. Such regularities as he would observe in it seemed to him imperfect; …Above the variable sky there were the heavenly bodies which seemed to have been perfectly regular... The moon was obviously the lowest of these. Hence he divided the universe at the Moon; all above that was necessary, regular, and eternal, all below it, contingent, irregular and perishable. And of course, for any Greek, what is necessary and eternal is more divine. This, with a Christian colouring added, fully accounts for the passage we began with.

Ch. 3, par. 7

Aristotle's logic was at first missing [from the medieval man's collection of books], but you had a Latin translation of a very late Greek introduction to it. Astronomy and medicine, and (later) Aristotle, came in Latin translations of Arabic translations of the Greek.

Ch. 3, par. 10

I have already said that Aristotle thought the region above the Moon more divine than the airy watery, and earthly realm below it. He also thought it incomparably large. As he says in the *Metaphysics*, 'The perceptible world around us' - that is, the realm of growth, decay and weather - 'is, so to speak, a nothing if considered as part of the whole.'

Ch. 3, par. 18

The theology involved [of the Middle Ages] is, however, not that of the Bible, the Fathers, or the Councils, but that of Aristotle. Of course they thought it consistent with Christianity; whether they were right in so thinking is not my concern.

Ch. 3, par. 19

The infinite, according to Aristotle, is not actual. No infinite object exists; no infinite process occurs… All the movements of the universe must therefore, in the last resort, result from a compulsive force exercised by something immovable. He thought that such an Unmoved Mover could move other things only by being their end or object... as food moves the hungry man, as the mistress moves her lover, as truth moves the philosophical inquirer. He calls this Mover either 'God' or 'Mind'. It moves the Primum Mobile unmoved (which of course sets all of the inferior bodies in motion) by love. But notice that this does not mean what a Christian would naturally mean by the word. There is no question here of a beneficent Being loving the world He has created and descending to redeem it. God, in Aristotle, moves the world by being loved, not by loving; by being the supremely desirable object. This of course implies not only consciousness but high rationality on the part of that which is moved. Accordingly we find (not now by analogy, but in strictest fact) that in every sphere there is a rational creature called an Intelligence which is compelled to move, and therefore to keep his sphere moving, by his incessant desire for God.

Ch. 3, par. 31

The ordinary modern (I do not mean the modern scientist) would regard regularity - or if you like, monotony - as a symptom of inferiority. The fact that the heavenly bodies always behave in the same way, while men do this and that and change their minds, would be for him presumptive evidence that the former are irrational and inanimate and that we, we 'dew-drops' that think, are to that extent their betters... The Middle Ages inherited from the Greeks a very different view. Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* remarks that in a household (he is of course assuming a household with slaves) the free members are precisely those who have the least chance to live 'at random'. the slaves can do that; for the free people 'everything is mapped out'. It is a surprising picture but, I have no doubt, a true one; though Aristotle does not make it perfectly clear, scholars are agreed that he is intending to compare the heavenly bodies with the free people and the slaves with us. For the heavenly bodies 'everything is mapped out'; our liberty to live 'at random' marks our inferior status. We, like slaves, have or take 'spare time' and in it 'potter about', chatting, making love, playing games, cracking nuts or 'just sitting'; they, like Aristotle himself, have their strict programme.

Ch. 3, par. 42

Of the centre Beatrice says 'Heaven and all nature hangs upon that point' (*Paradiso*, XXVIII, 41-42); it is what Aristotle says in so many words of the Unmoved Mover.

Ch. 4, par. 10

In *Purgatorio*, XV, 64-75, Dante restates Aristotle's distinction between goods that are, and goods that are not, objects of competition. He uses the image of light which gives more of itself in proportion as the body it falls on is more highly polished, with the consequence that the greater the number of such bodies the more light there is for all.

Ch. 4, par. 13

The whole of Christian-Aristotelian theology is thus brought together. Every idea presented to the mind, as in a figure, repeats the subject in a slightly different way, and suggests further and further applications of it. It reverberates from that one imagined moment over all space and time and further.

Ch. 4, par. 13

(…for [Dante] is thinking of Aristotle) a man knows that he has increased in virtue when he finds increased pleasure in virtuous acts.

Chap. 8, par. 3

There is know doubt that Milton fully understood the critical problem of which Tasso's epic was the practical solution; he himself was deeply concerned with it and had pondered 'whether the rules of Aristotle are to be followed'.

Chap. 11, par.27

For Arthur is certainly neither Aristotle's Magnanimity nor his Magnificence. [in *Faerie Queen*]

Christian Reflections

Christianity and Culture, Par. 10

Of the great pagans Aristotle is on our side.

On Ethics, Par. 2

…when we speak of Stoical Ethics we mean the system which strongly commends suicide (under certain conditions) and enjoins Apathy in the technical sense, the extinction of the emotions: when we speak of Aristotelian ethics we mean the system which finds in Virtuous Pride or Magnanimity the virtue that presupposes and includes all other virtues; when we speak of Christian ethics we mean the system that commands humility, forgiveness, and (in certain circumstances) martyrdom.... Aristotelian ethics is

the system of eudaemonism: Christian ethics, the system which, whether by exalting Faith above Works, by asserting that love fulfils the Law, or by demanding regeneration, makes a self transcending concept and endeavors to escape from the region of mere morality.

God in the Dock

Religion Without Dogma, Par. 23

For religious experience can be made to yield almost any sort of God. I think Professor Price assumed a certain sort of God because he has been brought up in a certain way: because Bishop Butler and Hooger and Thomas Aquinas and Augustine and St. Paul and Christ and Aristotle and Plato are, as we say, 'in his blood'. He was not really starting from scratch. Had he done so, had God meant in his mind a being about whom no dogma whatever is held, I doubt whether he would have looked for even social salvation in such an empty concept.

Two Ways with the Self, Par. 1

Self-renunciation is thought to be, and indeed is, very near the core of Christian ethics. When Aristotle writes in praise of a certain kind of self-love, we may feel, despite the careful distinctions which he draws between the legitimate and the illegitimate *Philautia,* that here we strike something essentially sub-Christian.

The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, Par. 24

it is true that we must extend the term 'common man' to cover Locke, Grotius, Hooker, Poynet, Aquinas, Justinian, the Stoics, and Aristotle, but I have no objection to that; in one most important, and to me glorious, sense they were all common men.

Of Other Worlds

On Science Fiction, par. 17

The impossible - or things so immensely improbable that they have, imaginatively, the same status us the impossible - can be used in literature for many different purposes. I cannot hope to do more than suggest a few main types: the subject still awaits its Aristotle.

A Reply to Professor Haldane, par. 8

If Mammon were the only devil it would be another matter. But where Mammon vacates the throne, how if Moloch takes his place? As Aristotle said, 'Men do not become tyrants in order to keep warm.' All men, of course, desire pleasure and safety. But all men also desire power and all men desire the mere sense of being 'in the know' or the 'inner ring', of not being 'outsiders'

A Reply to Professor Haldane, par. 13

This false certainty comes out in Professor Haldane's article. He simply cannot believe that a man could really be in doubt about usury. I have no objection to his thinking me wrong. What shocks me is his instantaneous assumption that the question is so simple that there could be no real hesitation about it. It is breaking Aristotle's canon - to demand in every enquiry that degree of certainty which the subject matter allows. And not *on your life* to pretend that you see further than you do.

Spencer's Life Images

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Spencer writes in the Letter Ralegh that *The Faerie Queene* allegorizes the twelve virtues of Aristotle.

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…yet already in the First Part of your poem you have introduced Holiness and Chastity, which Aristotle would never have dreamed of including among his virtues

??

The crown of all virtues is for Aristotle a right Pride of Magnanimity, which deserves and claims the highest honour.

Appendix VIII Lewis Bibliography

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