

What Do Philosophers Believe?

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Abstract

What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on thirty central philosophical issues. This article documents the results. It also reveals correlations among philosophical views and between these views and factors such as age, gender, and nationality. A factor analysis suggests that an individual's philosophical views factor into a few underlying factors that predict much of the variation in those views. The results of a meta-survey also suggest that many of the results of the survey are surprising: philosophers as a whole have quite inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of philosophical views in the profession.

1 Introduction

What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? Are more philosophers theists or atheists? Physicalists or non-physicalists? Deontologists, consequentialists, or virtue ethicists? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine the answers to these and other questions. This article documents the results.

Why should the answers to these sociological questions be of interest to philosophers or to anyone else? First, they have obvious sociological and historical interest. Philosophy as practiced is a human activity, and philosophers have a strong interest in the character of this human activity, past and present. Historians of philosophy are interested in the dominant philosophical views of various eras, and in how these views

changed over time. Contemporary philosophy can be seen as the leading edge of the history of philosophy, and a proper understanding of today's philosophical views can feed into an understanding of historical trends. Furthermore, today's sociology is tomorrow's history, and one can reasonably hope that answers to these sociological questions will be of some use to the historians of the future.

Second, one could argue that these sociological facts can play an evidential role in answering philosophical questions. On this view, the prevalence of views among philosophers can serve as a guide to their truth. After all, philosophers had had the benefit of years of reflection on these questions and might be taken as experts on them. In science, we often take the prevalence of scientific views among experts as strong evidence about which views are correct (consider questions about evolution or climate change, for example). It could be suggested that expert views should play a similar role with respect to philosophical questions. Many will be skeptical about this analogy, however. It is arguable that there is less convergence over time in philosophy than in science, for example. So we do not make the evidential claim here.

Third, it is clear that sociological views play a methodological role within the practice of philosophy. In philosophical discussion it is inevitable that some views are presupposed, other views are the focus of attention and argument, while still others are ignored. At a given time in a given community, some views have the status of "received wisdom". These views are often used as premises of arguments, and if they are rejected, it is usually acknowledged that doing so requires argument. Other views are often ignored or set aside without argument. When they are acknowledged, they are rarely used as premises of arguments. To assert them requires considerable justification.

One might suggest that the received wisdom within a given community is determined by what most people in the community believe: views that are widely accepted require less argument than views that are widely rejected. A moment's reflection, however, suggests that received wisdom is more likely to be determined by what most people believe most people believe. If the members of a community mistakenly believe that most members believe p , then it is more likely that assertions of p rather than assertions of $\neg p$ will receive default status. If most philosophers believe that most philosophers are

physicalists when in fact most philosophers are dualists, for example, then the norms of the community will typically require that asserting dualism requires more argument than asserting physicalism.

Insofar as sociological beliefs play this role within philosophy, it is better for them to be accurate. For example: suppose that a philosopher accepts the analytic-synthetic distinction and thinks the arguments against it fail. Suppose that she is writing a paper in which she thinks that (sociology aside) an appeal to the distinction would strengthen the paper. Suppose that she nevertheless does not appeal to the distinction in the paper, solely on the grounds that she thinks a large majority of philosophers reject the distinction. Suppose that in fact, a large majority of philosophers accept the distinction. Then her decision will have been grounded in a false sociological belief, and the paper will be weaker by her own lights as a result. True sociological beliefs would put her in a position to write a better paper by her own lights.

Spurred by this sociological, historical, and methodological interest, we conducted a survey of the views of professional philosophers in late 2009. The PhilPapers Survey surveyed professional philosophers worldwide about their views on thirty key philosophical questions. We also surveyed them on demographic questions concerning gender, age, nationality, and areas of specialization. This allows more reliable answers than previously available about the views of professional philosophers and about how they vary with the various demographic factors, yielding a richer picture of the philosophical character of the contemporary philosophical community.

We simultaneously conducted the PhilPapers Metasurvey, asking philosophers for their predictions about the distribution of answers to the PhilPapers Survey. This metasurvey allowed us to measure the accuracy of philosophers' sociological beliefs about views within the field. It also provides a measure of just how surprising or unsurprising are the results of the PhilPapers Survey. To foreshadow the results that follow, we found that many of the results are quite surprising, both on an individual and a community level. The sociological beliefs of individual philosophers are typically quite inaccurate, and the community as a whole substantially overestimates or underestimates the popularity of a number of important philosophical positions. By rectifying these inaccurate

sociological beliefs, the PhilPapers Survey provides a useful corrective to those aspects of the practice of philosophy that are grounded in them.

2 Setup and methodology

The PhilPapers Survey was conducted online from November 8, 2009 to December 1, 2009. The Metasurvey began immediately after the Survey and ended on December 8, 2009. We begin by describing the setup and methodology of the Survey and the Metasurvey. We will then describe and discuss the main results of the two surveys.

2.1 Survey population

Ideally, a survey such as this one would be sent to every professional philosopher in the world. However, it is not easy to determine just who is in this group and to gather contact details for this group. National philosophical associations typically do not give out contact details for their members, for example.

Instead, we chose as a target group all regular faculty members in 99 leading departments of philosophy. These include the 86 Ph.D.-granting departments in English-speaking countries rated 1.9 or above in the Philosophical Gourmet Report. They also include ten departments in non-English-speaking countries (all from continental Europe) and three non-Ph.D.-granting departments. These thirteen departments were chosen in consultation with the editor of the Gourmet Report and a number of other philosophers, on the grounds of their having strength in analytic philosophy comparable to the other 86 departments. The overall list included 62 departments in the US, 18 in the UK, 10 in Europe outside the UK, 7 in Canada, and 5 in Australasia.

It should be acknowledged that this target group has a strong (although not exclusive) bias toward analytic or Anglocentric philosophy. As a consequence, the results of the survey are a much better guide to what analytic/Anglocentric philosophers (or at least philosophers in strong analytic/Anglocentric departments believe) believe than to what philosophers from other traditions believe. We conceived of the survey that way from the start, in part because that is where our own expertise lies. It is also not clear how much can be learned by requiring (for example) specialists in Anglocentric phi-

losophy to answer questions drawn from Asian philosophy or vice versa. Furthermore, attempting full representation of philosophers worldwide from all traditions would require linguistic resources and contact details that were unavailable to us.

To determine the membership of the target group, we used faculty lists drawn from the Gourmet Report, supplemented with information from department websites. The final target group included 1,972 philosophers. A research assistant compiled e-mail addresses from departmental websites. Every member of the target group was sent an initial email invitation to take the survey, and additional email requests after one week and two weeks if they had not yet responded.

In addition to inviting the target group, we allowed anyone to take the survey, including professional philosophers from other departments, students, and others. The Survey was advertised to all registered PhilPapers users (approximately 15,000 users at the time) through one direct email announcement, and was also announced on the PhilPapers website and in other places on the web. This group is less well-controlled than the target group, however, so we concentrate mainly on results from the target group in what follows.

2.2 Main questions and survey interface

Mind: non-physicalism or physicalism?

☐ Accept: non-physicalism

☒ Lean toward: non-physicalism

☐ Accept: physicalism

☐ Lean toward: physicalism

☐ Other

Comment (optional but appreciated):

Or: [Skip this question](#)

Figure 1: Example question screen

The main part of the PhilPapers Philosophical Survey consisted of thirty philosophical questions plus additional background questions. Each of the thirty philosophical

questions was presented along with multiple choice answers as shown in Figure 1.

The thirty philosophical questions asked, and the answers proposed, were the following:

1. A priori knowledge: yes or no?
2. Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
3. Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
4. Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
5. Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
6. External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
7. Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
8. God: theism or atheism?
9. Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
10. Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
11. Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
12. Logic: classical or non-classical?
13. Mental content: internalism or externalism?
14. Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
15. Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
16. Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
17. Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
18. Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
19. Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
20. Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?
21. Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?
22. Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
23. Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
24. Proper names: Fregean or Millian?
25. Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?
26. Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?

27. Time: A-theory or B-theory?
28. Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?
29. Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
30. Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?

The order in which the questions were presented was randomized for each respondent.

The order in which the answer options were presented was also randomized.

Respondents could indicate that they “accept” or “lean toward” any of the options mentioned in the question (see Figure 1). They could also choose one of a number of other responses or could skip the question using a link provided. These additional possible responses were as follows (with minor variations for non-binary questions¹):

- Accept both
- Reject both
- Accept an intermediate view
- Accept another alternative
- The question is too unclear to answer
- There is no fact of the matter
- Insufficiently familiar with the issue
- Agnostic/undecided
- Other

The questions and the response options were determined by three rounds of beta testing with about fifty philosophers from various fields in the weeks before the survey was conducted. The questions focus on widely discussed topics within analytic philosophy. (It was apparent from an early stage that continental philosophy does not lend itself easily to the survey format.) We decided on the format involving brief labels for three reasons. First, spelling out the views at more length would require many more arbitrary choices on the part of the survey designers. Second, although many of these labels are

¹In non-binary cases, these options were added: “Accept more than one,” “Reject one, undecided between others.”

ambiguous, longer descriptions would introduce new ambiguities in turn. Third, it was inevitable that the results would be reported using brief labels (“ $n\%$ of philosophers are Platonists”), and these reports would be least misleading if the labels themselves were used in posing the questions.

The questions focus especially in five “core” areas of analytic philosophy, in part because these appeared to be the most accessible to philosophers outside the area. There are five questions from each of epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind, and three from the philosophy of language. There is also one question each from aesthetics, decision theory, logic, metaphilosophy, philosophy of action, philosophy of science, and political philosophy.

Of course there were numerous arbitrary decisions in deciding on both questions and options. The survey designers allowed themselves one “pet question” each (questions 21 and 30 respectively) on their own research areas. The wording for a number of questions (those on aesthetics, personal identity, and truth, for example) underwent considerable refinement in response to feedback during the beta testing process. It was particularly difficult to formulate a question within political philosophy: the most obvious questions involved “liberalism”, but this term is too ambiguous in an international context to be useful. We would have liked to have included questions from the philosophy of gender and race and from the history of philosophy, but it proved difficult to find questions that worked in the survey format. For more discussion of the choice of questions, see the survey’s web site.²

2.3 Orientation and background questions

Respondents were also asked to provide information on their philosophical orientation and on various background properties. They were asked the following questions about philosophical orientation:

- *Areas of specialization.* Respondents had to choose from the following list of areas (the primary areas in the PhilPapers category system): 17th/18th Century Philosophy, 19th Century Philosophy, 20th Century Philosophy, Aesthetics,

²<http://philpapers.org/surveys>

African/Africana Philosophy, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Applied Ethics, Asian Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Decision Theory, European Philosophy, General Philosophy of Science, Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, Meta-Ethics, Metaphilosophy, Metaphysics, Normative Ethics, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Computing and Information, Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Physical Science, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Social Science, Philosophy of the Americas, Social and Political Philosophy.

- *Philosophical tradition.* Respondents could choose either “analytic”, “continental” or “other.” When selecting “other” they could enter a tradition as free text.
- *For which nonliving philosophers X would you describe yourself or your work as X -ian, or the equivalent? List in order, and choose "other" to specify a new option.* Respondents could choose from a list of well-known philosophers or select “other” to specify philosophers manually. The list was based on surveys, conducted on the Leiter Reports weblog, of the greatest philosophers of the last 200 years and of all time. The list included: Anscombe, Aquinas, Aristotle, Augustine, Berkeley, Carnap, Davidson, Descartes, Frege, Hegel, Heidegger, Hobbes, Hume, Husserl, Kant, Kierkegaard, Leibniz, Lewis, Locke, Marx, Mill, Moore, Nietzsche, Plato, Quine, Rawls, Rousseau, Russell, Socrates, Spinoza, Wittgenstein.

Respondents were also asked the following background questions:

- Year of birth
- Nationality
- Gender (male or female)
- Doctorate in philosophy (respondents could indicate that they hold a doctorate in philosophy, and specify the granting institution and year).
- Primary affiliation and secondary affiliation (respondents could specify the institution, discipline, and their role: undergraduate student, graduate student, postdoc, research staff, faculty, or administrator)

The Survey was anonymous. Under consent guidelines approved by the ANU Human Ethics Panel, respondents were told how their answers would be used, and at the end of the survey were asked to consent to the use of their answers.

2.4 Metasurvey questions and interface

In the Metasurvey, respondents had to estimate what percentages of respondents in the primary target population would either accept or lean toward any of the main positions mentioned in the Survey. For the question on a priori knowledge, for example (question #1 above), respondents had to assign percentages to the following three sets of responses:

- Accept: yes, Lean toward: yes
- Accept: no, Lean toward: no
- Accept both, Reject both, Accept an intermediate view, Accept another alternative, The question is too unclear to answer, There is no fact of the matter, Insufficiently familiar with the issue, Agnostic/undecided, Other, Skip

Question 1 of 30

Background

Original survey question:

Proper names: Millian or Fregean?

Note that both questions and possible answers were randomly ordered for each participant. Click [here](#) to view the original interface in a new window.

Question

What percentage of the target group (?) do you think will choose answers among the following sets:

Accept: Millian or Lean toward: Millian

% 

Accept: Fregean or Lean toward: Fregean

% 

Other (one of: Accept both, Reject both, Accept an intermediate view, Accept another alternative, The question is too unclear to answer, There is no fact of the matter, Insufficiently familiar with the issue, Agnostic/undecided, Other, Skip)

%

[Submit answer](#)

Or: [Skip this question](#)

Figure 2: Metasurvey interface

Respondents therefore had to specify three percentages for each question. The Metasurvey interface is shown in Figure 2. Answer options were randomized wherever they appeared. Respondents were explained the nature and sampling method of the target group at the beginning of the Metasurvey.

3 Main Survey Results

931 of the 1,972 members of the target faculty group completed the Survey (a 47% response rate). Including the uncontrolled survey group, 3,226 individuals from all populations completed the survey. The following list summarizes the results for the target faculty group, collapsing answers that "accept" and "lean toward" for a given view and collapsing all "other" answers. More fine-grained results can be found in Appendix 1.

1. A priori knowledge: yes 71.1%; no 18.4%; other 10.5%.
2. Abstract objects: Platonism 39.3%; nominalism 37.7%; other 23.0%.
3. Aesthetic value: objective 41.0%; subjective 34.5%; other 24.5%.
4. Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes 64.9%; no 27.1%; other 8.1%.
5. Epistemic justification: externalism 42.7%; internalism 26.4%; other 30.8%.
6. External world: non-skeptical realism 81.6%; skepticism 4.8%; idealism 4.3%; other 9.2%.
7. Free will: compatibilism 59.1%; libertarianism 13.7%; no free will 12.2%; other 14.9%.
8. God: atheism 72.8%; theism 14.6%; other 12.6%.
9. Knowledge claims: contextualism 40.1%; invariantism 31.1%; relativism 2.9%; other 25.9%.
10. Knowledge: empiricism 35.0%; rationalism 27.8%; other 37.2%.
11. Laws of nature: non-Humean 57.1%; Humean 24.7%; other 18.2%.
12. Logic: classical 51.6%; non-classical 15.4%; other 33.1%.
13. Mental content: externalism 51.1%; internalism 20.0%; other 28.9%.
14. Meta-ethics: moral realism 56.4%; moral anti-realism 27.7%; other 15.9%.

15. Metaphilosophy: naturalism 49.8%; non-naturalism 25.9%; other 24.3%.
16. Mind: physicalism 56.5%; non-physicalism 27.1%; other 16.4%.
17. Moral judgment: cognitivism 65.7%; non-cognitivism 17.0%; other 17.3%.
18. Moral motivation: internalism 34.9%; externalism 29.8%; other 35.3%.
19. Newcomb’s problem: two boxes 31.4%; one box 21.3%; other 47.4%.
20. Normative ethics: deontology 25.9%; consequentialism 23.6%; virtue ethics 18.2%; other 32.3%.
21. Perceptual experience: representationalism 31.5%; qualia theory 12.2%; disjunctivism 11.0%; sense-datum theory 3.1%; other 42.2%.
22. Personal identity: psychological view 33.6%; biological view 16.9%; further-fact view 12.2%; other 37.3%.
23. Politics: egalitarianism 34.8%; communitarianism 14.3%; libertarianism 9.9%; other 41.0%.
24. Proper names: Millian 34.5%; Fregean 28.7%; other 36.8%.
25. Science: scientific realism 75.1%; scientific anti-realism 11.6%; other 13.3%.
26. Teletransporter: survival 36.2%; death 31.1%; other 32.7%.
27. Time: B-theory 26.3%; A-theory 15.5%; other 58.2%.
28. Trolley problem: switch 68.2%; don’t switch 7.6%; other 24.2%.
29. Truth: correspondence 50.8%; deflationary 24.8%; epistemic 6.9%; other 17.5%.
30. Zombies: conceivable but not metaphysically possible 35.6%; metaphysically possible 23.3%; inconceivable 16.0%; other 25.1%.

3.1 Demographics of target faculty

Figure 3 shows the distribution of ages among the respondents from the target faculty group who provided their age. 77.2% of respondents specified “male” as gender, 17.4% specified “female,” and 5.3% did not specify a gender.

There are three geographical parameters in the survey: nationality, location of Ph.D. department, and location of current affiliation. For simplicity we group locations into six main groups: Australasia, Canada, (continental) Europe, UK, US, and Other. The target faculty who provided this information break down as indicated in Table 1.

	Australasia	Canada	Continental Europe	United Kingdom	United States	Other
Nationality	52	65	116	154	464	70
Affiliation	42	79	58	178	563	1
PhD	30	27	46	116	496	0

Table 1: Regions: nationality, PhD, affiliation




Figure 3: Years of birth and target faculty

3.2 Correlations

The surveys revealed a number of interesting correlations between answers to the 30 main questions and demographic factors such as gender, age, and geographical location. For each main view on each main question, we converted the answer to that question to a score (+2 for accepting the view, +1 for leaning toward it, -1 for leaning toward another view, and -2 for accepting another view). “Other” answers were treated as indicated in Table 2.

Choice	Value
Accept/reject both	Set to 2/-2
Accept another alternative	Set to -2
Accept more than one	Don't count
Reject one, undecided between others	Don't count
Skipped	Don't count
Other answers	Set to 0

Table 2: Conversion scheme for "other" answers

For the 21 binary questions, the scores for the two main views will be perfectly correlated (one is the negation of the other) so we need only focus on one view in each

case. We summarize and discuss the correlations we found in what follows.

To illustrate the significance of the correlations reported, take the correlation coefficient between metaphilosophical naturalism and non-cognitivism about moral judgments, which is .204. This coefficient is derived from the distribution of answers summarized in Table 3. Note that 70.2% of non-cognitivists are naturalists, while only 51.7% of cognitivists are naturalists. This illustrates the fact that a correlation coefficient of approximately .2 reflects a strong correlation. Contingency tables such as Table 3 are available for all answers pairs on the survey site.³

	Naturalism	Non-naturalism
Cognitivism	51.7%	34%
Non-cognitivism	70.2%	19%

Table 3: Distribution of answers for Metaphilosophy: naturalism and Moral judgments: cognitivism

For those who are interested in statistical significance: a correlation of 0.2 over a body of 931 responses indicates a statistical significance (p-value) of approximately 7×10^{-10} . Statistical significances of 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 correspond to correlations of 0.107, 0.084, and 0.064 respectively. We did not set out to test hypotheses concerning correlations, however, so these analyses should be seen as exploratory, and claims about statistical significance should be interpreted cautiously. There are 2023 potentially correlated pairs of main answers that are relevant to the following discussion, so we should expect about 20 significant results at the 0.01 level by chance alone and two at the 0.001 level. In what follows, all correlations displayed are significant at the 0.01 level, and the large majority are significant at well beyond the 0.001 level.

3.3 Correlations between philosophical views

The survey revealed many correlations between philosophical views. The highest correlations are summarized in Table 4. Many more correlations are available on the Survey site.⁴

³<http://philpapers.org/surveys>

⁴<http://philpapers.org/surveys>

Answer A	Answer B	r
Moral judgment: cognitivism	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.562
Metaphilosophy: non-naturalism	Mind: non-physicalism	0.497
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes	A priori knowledge: yes	0.467
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Aesthetic value: objective	0.411
Mind: physicalism	God: atheism	0.393
Science: scientific realism	External world: non-skeptical realism	0.393
Mind: non-physicalism	Free will: libertarianism	0.386
God: theism	Free will: libertarianism	0.385
A priori knowledge: yes	Knowledge: rationalism	0.383
Teletransporter: survival	Personal identity: psychological view	0.375
Truth: correspondence	Science: scientific realism	0.362
Metaphilosophy: non-naturalism	Knowledge: rationalism	0.36
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	God: atheism	0.351
Metaphilosophy: non-naturalism	Free will: libertarianism	0.343
Epistemic justification: internalism	Mental content: internalism	0.342
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Abstract objects: Platonism	0.335
Moral judgment: non-cognitivism	Aesthetic value: subjective	0.333
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Laws of nature: non-Humean	0.329
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Abstract objects: nominalism	0.321
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Science: scientific realism	0.32
Abstract objects: Platonism	Knowledge: rationalism	0.307
Abstract objects: nominalism	Laws of nature: Humean	0.303
Knowledge: empiricism	Mind: non-physicalism	-0.302
Science: scientific anti-realism	Laws of nature: Humean	0.299
Truth: correspondence	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.294
Meta-ethics: moral anti-realism	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.288
Truth: correspondence	Laws of nature: non-Humean	0.287
Moral judgment: non-cognitivism	Laws of nature: non-Humean	-0.286
Normative ethics: consequentialism	Trolley problem: switch	0.284
A priori knowledge: yes	Metaphilosophy: non-naturalism	0.276
Time: B-theory	Free will: libertarianism	-0.271
Laws of nature: non-Humean	Knowledge: rationalism	0.268
Abstract objects: Platonism	Knowledge claims: invariantism	0.26
Meta-ethics: moral anti-realism	Knowledge: empiricism	0.258
Moral judgment: cognitivism	Science: scientific realism	0.257
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Aesthetic value: subjective	0.257
Science: scientific realism	Abstract objects: Platonism	0.255
A priori knowledge: yes	Laws of nature: non-Humean	0.253
Aesthetic value: objective	Abstract objects: nominalism	-0.253
Normative ethics: consequentialism	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.252
Normative ethics: consequentialism	Mind: physicalism	0.252
Moral judgment: non-cognitivism	Abstract objects: nominalism	0.249
Zombies: metaphysically possible	Mind: non-physicalism	0.248
A priori knowledge: no	Abstract objects: Platonism	-0.248
Perceptual experience: representationalism	Mind: physicalism	0.247
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Laws of nature: Humean	0.245
Mind: physicalism	Abstract objects: nominalism	0.244
Time: B-theory	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.243
Moral judgment: non-cognitivism	Knowledge: empiricism	0.243
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Free will: libertarianism	0.24

Table 4: 50 highest correlations between philosophical views.

3.4 Gender effects

Gender is strongly correlated with a number of views. The strongest correlations (positive correlations indicate a correlation with being female) are shown in Table 5. Correlations between gender and background questions and philosophical orientation can be found on the survey’s website. Most of these correlations were less than 0.1, except for a 0.22 correlation with Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality and a -0.10 correlation with Metaphysics.

Answer	r
Truth: epistemic	0.147
Trolley problem: don’t switch	0.141
Knowledge claims: invariantism	-0.126
Truth: correspondence	-0.123
A priori knowledge: no	0.116
Science: scientific anti-realism	0.116
Knowledge: empiricism	0.116
Abstract objects: nominalism	0.115
Politics: libertarianism	-0.115
Analytic-synthetic distinction: no	0.112
Moral judgment: non-cognitivism	0.111
Laws of nature: Humean	0.109
External world: idealism	0.101
Zombies: metaphysically possible	-0.098

Table 5: Highest correlations between gender:female and main answers.

3.5 Age effects

We found strong correlations between year of birth and philosophical views. The strongest correlations are summarized in Table 6. Note that positive correlations with year of birth are equivalent to negative correlations with age. Correlations between year of birth and background questions and philosophical orientation can be found on the survey’s website. The strongest positive correlations (0.1 to 0.15) are with UK affiliation, continental European nationality, USA PhD, identification with Lewis, and analytic tradition. The strongest negative correlations (-0.1 to -0.15) are with USA affiliation and nationality, identification with Aristotle and Wittgenstein, and a specialization in Continental Philosophy.

Answer	r
Laws of nature: Humean	0.146
Mental content: externalism	0.145
Time: B-theory	0.143
Teletransporter: survival	0.136
Knowledge claims: invariantism	0.12
Knowledge claims: contextualism	-0.096

Table 6: Main correlations between year of birth and main answers.

3.6 Geographic effects

In general, birth location, PhD location, and current location are strongly correlated in unsurprising ways, and all three exhibit fairly similar correlations with philosophical answers. We list results for current affiliation in Table 7; the other results can be found on the web.

Region & view	r
Australasia	
Time: B-theory	0.149
Normative ethics: consequentialism	0.132
Normative ethics: deontology	-0.119
Perceptual experience: representationalism	0.109
Teletransporter: survival	0.102
Trolley problem: switch	0.09
Mind: physicalism	0.087
Canada	
Free will: libertarianism	-0.106
God: atheism	0.086
Continental Europe	
Proper names: Fregean	0.146
United Kingdom	
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism	0.203
A priori knowledge: yes	0.135
Knowledge claims: contextualism	-0.116
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes	0.115
Knowledge claims: invariantism	0.105
Perceptual experience: representationalism	-0.103
Teletransporter: survival	0.093
United States	
Proper names: Millian	0.149
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism	-0.142
Normative ethics: deontology	0.137
Zombies: metaphysically possible	0.103
Normative ethics: consequentialism	-0.093
Epistemic justification: internalism	0.087
Teletransporter: death	0.085
Analytic-synthetic distinction: no	0.085

Table 7: Highest correlations between main answers and geographic affiliations

3.7 Specialization effects

Table 8 shows the main correlations between areas of specializations and philosophical views. It is also interesting to compare the answers of individuals specializing in areas relevant to a question with those not specializing in these areas. We will refer to these groups as “specialists” and “non-specialists,” respectively. In comparing specialist and non-specialist answers, we ignore “other” answers and normalize the other answers so they sum to 100%. This is necessary because answers such as “insufficiently familiar with the issue” vary significantly between specialists and non-specialists for reasons that are independent of what we want to measure. After normalization, the mean absolute difference between the percentages of specialist and non-specialist answers is 9.31% across all questions, with a standard deviation of 11.53%. Table 9 shows the answers exhibiting differences greater than the mean. These results suggest that there is such a thing as specialist opinion in philosophy, whether or not specialists are more likely to be right.

View	Specialization	<i>r</i>
God: theism	Philosophy of Religion	0.351
Free will: libertarianism	Philosophy of Religion	0.262
Mental content: externalism	Philosophy of Language	0.218
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Philosophy of Cognitive Science	0.205
Mind: physicalism	Philosophy of Religion	-0.193
Politics: communitarianism	Normative Ethics	-0.191
Metaphilosophy: non-naturalism	Philosophy of Religion	0.19
Perceptual experience: sense-datum theory	Philosophy of Mind	-0.19
Knowledge: empiricism	General Philosophy of Science	0.181
Knowledge: empiricism	Philosophy of Biology	0.176
Normative ethics: virtue ethics	Ancient Greek Philosophy	0.175
Zombies: metaphysically possible	Philosophy of Mind	-0.175
Moral judgment: cognitivism	Continental Philosophy	-0.167

Table 8: Highest correlations between views and specializations

Interestingly, specialists were more likely than non-specialists to reject the dichotomies posed. One might count the following “other” answers as rejecting dichotomies: “The question is too unclear to answer,” “Accept another alternative,” “Accept an intermediate view,” “Accept both,” “There is no fact of the matter,” “Reject both,” “Accept more than one,” “Reject all.” Across all questions, specialists reject dichotomies 15.4% of the time compared to 12.2% for non-specialists. Nine questions have dichotomies rejected by more than 20% of specialists: objectivism vs subjectivism about aesthetic value (36.9%), internalism vs externalism about epistemic justification (25%) and about mental content

Answer	Area	Non-specialists	Specialists	Abs. diff.
God: atheism	Philosophy of Religion	86.78%	20.87%	65.90%
Knowledge claims: invariantism	Epis. & Phil. of Language	32.78%	61.40%	28.63%
Politics: egalitarianism	Social and Political Phil.	56.49%	77.27%	20.79%
Aesthetic value: subjective	Aesthetics	46.36%	26.12%	20.24%
Laws of nature: Humean	Phil. of Science	28.22%	45.91%	17.68%
Epistemic justification: internalism	Epistemology	35.29%	51.32%	16.03%
Abstract objects: Platonism	Metaphysics	47.11%	61.70%	14.59%
Zombies: metaphysically possible	Phil. of Mind	34.71%	20.20%	14.51%
Normative ethics: deontology	Normative ethics	36.08%	50.07%	13.99%
Knowledge claims: contextualism	Epis. & Phil. of Language	58.59%	44.67%	13.92%
Knowledge: rationalism	Epistemology	42.04%	55.72%	13.68%
Moral motivation: externalism	Philosophy of Action	45.39%	57.63%	12.24%
Politics: communitarianism	Social and Political Phil.	25.68%	13.64%	12.05%
Truth: correspondence	Epistemology	57.77%	69.51%	11.74%
Normative ethics: virtue ethics	Normative ethics	28.65%	17.30%	11.34%
Newcomb's problem: two boxes	Decision Theory	59.07%	70.38%	11.31%

Table 9: Greatest differences between specialists and non-specialists

(24%), empiricism vs rationalism (38.8%), classical vs non-classical logic (20.6%), personal identity (22.7%), politics (33%), proper names (23.4%), scientific realism (22.4%). These high rejection rates suggest that finer or clearer distinctions may be especially useful in these debates.

3.8 Identification effects

The highest correlations between philosophical views and identification with past philosophers are listed in Table 10. Respondents were also asked whether they identify with the analytic tradition, the continental tradition, or another tradition. We converted these answers into an analytic/continental variable (1 for analytic, 0 for other, -1 for continental) in order to calculate correlations with other variables. The strongest relationships with philosophical views are as shown in Table 11.

3.9 Relative importance of demographic factors

Table 12 gives the ten highest average absolute correlation coefficients between background factors and main answers. Age, gender, and geography all exhibit correlations of roughly similar strength.

View	Identification	r
Laws of nature: Humean	Hume	0.31
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Hume	0.242
Meta-ethics: moral anti-realism	Hume	0.228
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes	Quine	-0.22
External world: non-skeptical realism	Kant	-0.218
Normative ethics: deontology	Kant	0.215
Normative ethics: virtue ethics	Aristotle	0.214
Knowledge: empiricism	Hume	0.211
Abstract objects: nominalism	Hume	0.211
A priori knowledge: yes	Quine	-0.21
Science: scientific realism	Kant	-0.206
Perceptual experience: representationalism	Wittgenstein	-0.203
Time: A-theory	Lewis	-0.202
Time: A-theory	Aristotle	0.195
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Quine	0.193
Mind: non-physicalism	Plato	0.184
Mind: physicalism	Hume	0.182
Politics: communitarianism	Rawls	-0.181
Abstract objects: Platonism	Plato	0.174
Normative ethics: consequentialism	Lewis	0.173
Normative ethics: consequentialism	Hume	0.166

Table 10: Highest correlations between views and identifications

View	r
External world: non-skeptical realism	0.238
Science: scientific realism	0.21
Trolley problem: switch	0.195
External world: idealism	-0.192
Truth: epistemic	-0.186
Knowledge claims: invariantism	0.17
Mind: physicalism	0.169
God: atheism	0.163
Truth: correspondence	0.159
Normative ethics: consequentialism	0.156
Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.143
Perceptual experience: representationalism	0.134
Knowledge claims: contextualism	-0.13
Mental content: externalism	0.128
Logic: classical	0.114
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.101

Table 11: Correlations between views and identification with the analytic tradition

Factor	avg. $ r $
Nationality: United.States	0.091
PhD region: United.States	0.091
Year of birth	0.089
Gender: female/male	0.087
Affiliation: United.States	0.085
Affiliation: Australasia	0.084
Year of PhD	0.083
Nationality: continental Europe	0.083
Nationality: Australasia	0.083
Affiliation: continental Europe	0.075

Table 12: Highest average absolute correlations between background factors and main answers.

3.10 Factor analysis

To better understand these correlations, we performed exploratory factor analyses (Spearman 1904, Gorsuch 1983) and principal component analyses (Pearson 1901, Jolliffe 2002) on the target faculty responses using a range of methods. The aim of both of these types of statistical analyses is to isolate a relatively small number of factors or components (we will use these terms interchangeably) that can be used to predict as much as possible of the variation in a larger number of observed variables (in this case, answers to survey questions). Any given factor is a linear combination of the observed variables. The numerical loading for each variable is the correlation between the factor and the variable.

Table 13 shows the components we extracted using principal component analysis. A varimax rotation (which produces mutually uncorrelated factors that tend to be highly loaded on a limited number of variables) was applied. We restricted the analysis to 30 answers in total (one per question). Some answers were combined: relativism and contextualism were combined, as were idealism and skepticism. Otherwise, the number of answers was reduced by eliminating one or more answer per question. This was necessary in order to remove uninteresting dependencies between answers. The number of extracted components was restricted to seven.⁵

Similar results were obtained using five different factor analysis methods and other

⁵The number of components to extract (seven) was determined by using a parallel analysis (Horn 1965). See Appendix 2 for details. The number of components this analysis suggests also yields the more interpretable results and the simplest loading matrix.

	Comp 1	Comp 2	Comp 3	Comp 4	Comp 5	Comp 6	Comp 7
Anti-naturalism							
Free will: libertarianism	0.66						
Mind: non-physicalism	0.63						
God: atheism	-0.63						0.27
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.57		-0.33				
Zombies: metaphysically possible	0.47						0.26
Personal identity: further-fact view	0.48						0.26
Objectivism							
Moral judgment: cognitivism		0.74					
Meta-ethics: moral anti-realism		-0.72					
Aesthetic value: objective		0.66					
Abstract objects: Platonism		0.38	0.28				0.3
A priori knowledge: yes			0.79				
Rationalism							
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes			0.72				
Knowledge: rationalism		0.26	0.57				
Truth: epistemic				0.65			
Anti-realism							
Science scientific: anti-realism		-0.28		0.6			
External world: idealism or skepticism				0.53			
Laws of nature: Humean		-0.28	-0.34	0.43			
Proper names: Fregean				0.35			
Externalism							
Mental content: externalism					0.66		
Epistemic justification: externalism					0.64		
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism					0.55		
Moral motivation: externalism		0.27			0.5		
Teletransporter: death						0.69	
PC6							
Normative ethics: deontology						0.52	
Trolley problem: don't switch						0.47	
Time: A-theory	0.28					0.41	
PC7							
Newcomb's problem: one box							-0.58
Logic: classical							0.48
Knowledge claims: invariantism							0.48
Politics: egalitarianism	-0.32			0.29			0.33

Table 13: Components extracted using principal component analysis with varimax rotation. Only loadings of a magnitude .25 or more are shown. The variables are grouped according to their main contributions to extracted components. The bold headings give our interpretations of the first five components.

rotations.⁶ The first five factors extracted and the relative importance of their component variables were essentially the same in all cases except for small variations in the order of the factors. Factor analysis and principal component analysis yield different results only for the sixth and seventh factors, and the sixth and seventh factors extracted by factor analysis are still similar to those displayed in Table 13. The factors depend on the choice of survey questions, so we do not claim that these seven factors represent the most important factors underlying philosophical views in general, but they appear

⁶Minimum residuals, weighted least squares, weighted least squares, principal axis factoring, and maximum likelihood.

to be robustly linked to the answers to the thirty main questions surveyed here.

While interpreting the results of such analyses is inherently difficult, the first five components showed in Table 13 are not too hard to characterize. The first component, dominated by theism, a rejection of naturalism, libertarianism about free will, and non-physicalism about the mind, seems to be reflect rejection of a naturalistic world view. The second component combines realism and cognitivism about moral judgments with objectivism about aesthetic values. It is also associated with Platonism and a non-Humean view of causation. It seems to reflect a propensity to acknowledge the objectivity of normative and evaluative facts and the reality of controversial entities in ontology. The third component combines a priori knowledge, analytic truths, and rationalism. The connection may be explained by the fact that a priori knowledge is typically associated with either analytic truths or rational intuition. The fourth component seems to be the kind of anti-realism associated with epistemic theories of truth, while the fifth component clearly captures a broadly externalist tendency. We will label the preceding components “anti-naturalism,” “objectivism,” “rationalism,” “anti-realism,” and “externalism.” The labels are only rough approximations, however, and it should be noted that these components are only imperfectly correlated with explicit endorsement of naturalism, rationalism, and so on.

Components six and seven must be interpreted with additional care because they differ between the analyses conducted. It is also harder to put a label on them. Component six groups the view that one dies in the teletransporter case with deontology, the A-theory of time, and the view that one should not switch in the trolley case. Not switching has a natural connection with deontology, but the connection between deontology, teletransporter death, and the A-theory of time is more mysterious. The seventh component is dominated by two-boxing on Newcomb’s problem, upholding classical logic, and invariantism about knowledge claims. Again, it is unclear exactly what this component captures. The correlations between our two last components and identification with certain philosophers may be useful in helping to interpret those components.

Table 14 shows the main correlations between background questions and the seven extracted components. The correlations between our two last components and identifi-

cation with certain philosophers suggest that these components might reflect the views of these philosophers.

(a)	r	(b)	r	(c)	r
Anti-naturalism		Anti-naturalism		Anti-naturalism	
Nat.: Australasia	-0.11	Hume	-0.14	Phil. of Religion	0.3
Objectivism		Tradition: analytic	-0.14	Phil. of Cognitive Science	-0.18
Nat.: cont. Europe	-0.14	Plato	0.13	Phil. of Mind	-0.17
Rationalism		Lewis	-0.13	Ancient Greek Phil.	0.11
Gender: female	-0.15	Aristotle	0.12	Objectivism	
Affil.: UK	0.12	Quine	-0.12	General Phil. of Science	-0.13
Anti-realism		Leibniz	0.1	Phil. of Biology	-0.13
Gender: female	0.17	Objectivism		Continental Phil.	-0.12
Year of birth	0.15	Hume	-0.2	Normative Ethics	0.12
Externalism		Carnap	-0.12	Ancient Greek Phil.	0.1
Affil.: UK	0.1	Plato	0.1	Phil. of Religion	0.1
Year of birth	0.1	Rationalism		Rationalism	
PC6		Quine	-0.25	Phil. of Biology	-0.14
Affil.: Australasia	-0.18	Frege	0.18	Metaphysics	0.14
Nat.: Australasia	-0.16	Kant	0.12	Phil. of Cognitive Science	-0.1
Affil.: USA	0.13	Hume	-0.12	Anti-realism	
Ph.D: Australasia	-0.12	Mill	-0.11	Metaphysics	-0.2
Nat.: USA	0.11	Anti-realism		Normative Ethics	0.16
Year of birth	-0.1	Kant	0.23	Social and Political Phil.	0.16
PC7		Tradition: analytic	-0.17	Phil. of Mind	-0.15
None	-	Rawls	0.14	Phil. of Language	-0.14
		Russell	-0.11	17th 18th Century Phil.	0.11
		Hume	0.11	19th Century Phil.	0.11
		Externalism		Externalism	
		None	-	17th 18th Century Phil.	-0.13
		PC6		PC6	
		Lewis	-0.13	None	-
		Hume	-0.12	PC7	
		Tradition: analytic	-0.11	Epistemology	0.16
		PC7		19th Century Phil.	-0.12
		Tradition: analytic	0.19	Phil. of Language	0.12
		Hegel	-0.12	17th 18th Century Phil.	-0.12
		Aristotle	-0.11	Continental Phil.	-0.11
		Wittgenstein	-0.1		
		Lewis	0.1		

Table 14: Main correlations between extracted components and (a) background, (b) philosophical identification, and (c) specialization.

4 Metasurvey results

Of the target group, 216 philosophers responded to the Metasurvey. The lower number is not surprising, as the cognitive load of the Metasurvey is much higher than that of the Survey. Of the overall group, 727 responded. We will present the results for the target group here.

One consistent effect is that respondents greatly underestimate the number of “other” answers. This effect may have more to do with errors about others’ survey-answering

Answer	Mean estimate	Actual	Mean error	error > 20%
A priori knowledge: yes	62.3%	79.5%	20.3%	39%
Abstract objects: nominalism	56.5%	49.0%	16.0%	37%
Aesthetic value: subjective	67.7%	45.7%	24.4%	63%
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes	50.0%	70.6%	23.2%	58%
Epistemic justification: externalism	54.7%	61.8%	12.4%	20%
External world: non-skeptical realism	76.7%	89.9%	14.9%	27%
External world: skepticism	13.6%	5.3%	9.4%	12%
Free will: compatibilism	56.7%	69.4%	16.4%	28%
Free will: libertarianism	24.9%	16.2%	11.8%	15%
God: atheism	76.0%	83.3%	11.1%	15%
Knowledge claims: invariantism	43.4%	42.0%	14.1%	25%
Knowledge claims: contextualism	39.0%	54.1%	18.0%	43%
Knowledge: empiricism	66.5%	55.7%	15.4%	30%
Laws of nature: non-Humean	52.1%	69.8%	20.4%	38%
Logic: classical	72.4%	77.0%	13.4%	18%
Mental content: externalism	62.7%	71.9%	13.6%	26%
Meta-ethics: moral realism	52.9%	67.0%	17.4%	33%
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	67.0%	65.8%	13.5%	21%
Mind: physicalism	72.4%	67.6%	11.7%	17%
Moral judgment: cognitivism	60.1%	79.5%	21.3%	49%
Moral motivation: internalism	54.0%	54.0%	12.1%	22%
Newcomb's problem: two boxes	60.0%	59.6%	15.7%	32%
Normative ethics: consequentialism	41.5%	34.9%	12.0%	19%
Normative ethics: deontology	34.4%	38.3%	10.9%	15%
Perceptual experience: representationalism	41.3%	54.5%	17.4%	43%
Perceptual experience: qualia theory	25.8%	21.2%	10.8%	16%
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism	20.4%	19.0%	9.0%	6%
Personal identity: psychological view	48.5%	53.6%	13.0%	26%
Personal identity: biological view	31.7%	26.9%	11.4%	17%
Politics: egalitarianism	50.1%	59.0%	14.9%	28%
Politics: communitarianism	26.0%	24.2%	9.1%	11%
Proper names: Millian	55.6%	54.6%	14.6%	29%
Science: scientific realism	67.0%	86.6%	20.3%	41%
Teletransporter: survival	54.5%	53.7%	15.6%	33%
Time: B-theory	58.5%	63.0%	12.9%	16%
Trolley problem: switch	70.5%	89.9%	20.8%	42%
Truth: correspondence	47.3%	61.6%	17.6%	39%
Truth: deflationary	34.6%	30.1%	11.5%	18%
Zombies: conceivable but not m. possible	41.0%	47.5%	15.3%	30%
Zombies: metaphysically possible	36.5%	31.1%	14.1%	24%

Table 15: Community-level errors for Metasurvey answers

psychology than about their philosophical views. To eliminate this effect, we normalize both the Survey results and individual answers to the Metasurvey questions by eliminating the “other” category and normalizing the remaining categories so they sum to 100%. In the results that follow, we compare individuals’ normalized answers to the normalized Survey results.

Community-level results for specific answers are as indicated in Table 15.

As well as measuring community-level effects, we can also measure mean absolute errors by individuals. For all individuals across all questions, the mean absolute error is

14.79% ($\sigma=12.4\%$). Figure 4 shows the frequency of absolute error levels across all Meta-




Figure 4: Distribution of error levels across questions and target faculty

survey answers from the target faculty group (i.e. across all questions and respondents for this group).

The performance of professional philosophers outside the target faculty group was a little worse. This category includes all respondents to the Metasurvey who declared a faculty-level affiliation in philosophy or a PhD in philosophy, but were not part of the target group. The mean absolute error is 16.66 for this group ($\sigma=14.11\%$). The difference between the target group and this group is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$).

4.1 Metasurvey analysis

It is striking that for many of the questions, Metasurvey results show a community-level error of around 20% (see Figure 5). For binary questions, an error of 20% corresponds to the difference between a 50/50 distribution and a 30/70 distribution. 20% is a substantial error. Metasurvey questions with error levels of around 20% therefore show that the corresponding Survey results are surprising. The Metasurvey results themselves are also interesting and perhaps surprising, though in the absence of a Metametasurvey we cannot quantify just how surprising.




Figure 5: Questions per absolute normalized error rate

The Metasurvey results on the thirty questions break down into five types: In four cases, the population gets the leading view wrong: predicting subjectivism rather than objectivism about aesthetic value, invariantism instead of contextualism about knowledge claims, consequentialism instead of deontology about normative ethics, nominalism instead of Platonism about abstract objects. In three cases, respondents predict a fairly close result when in fact a large majority support the leading view: the underestimated majority views here are the analytic-synthetic distinction, non-Humeanism, moral realism. In sixteen cases, significant support for a majority view is predicted but its degree is underestimated by 4-21%: the underestimated majority views here are scientific realism, switching on trolley problem, cognitivism, compatibilism, non-skeptical realism, a priori knowledge, representationalism, correspondence theory, egalitarianism, content and epistemic externalism, atheism, psychological view, B-theory, classical logic, and the view that zombies are conceivable but metaphysical impossible. In two cases, a minority view is underestimated by 4-11%: the underestimated minority views are rationalism and non-physicalism. In five cases, the estimates are within 1.2% of the actual result: the issues here are naturalism, moral motivation, Newcomb's problem, proper names, and teletransportation.

It is possible to correlate individual's Metasurvey scores with their answers to other questions. Full results are on the web, but a high metasurvey accuracy correlates most strongly with: year of birth (0.286); a priori knowledge: yes (0.24); trolley problem: switch (0.22); PhD from the United States (0.21); year of PhD (0.204); moral judgment: cognitivism (0.196), analytic-synthetic distinction: yes (0.189); time: B-theory (0.178); meta-ethics: moral realism (0.158); science: scientific realism (0.141); knowledge: rationalism (0.141).

The overlap between the views best correlated with Metasurvey accuracy and the views that were most underestimated in the Metasurvey is striking. However, we did not find a significant tendency to underestimate views opposed to one's own across the whole of the Metasurvey. On the contrary, we found a statistically significant tendency to underestimate the popularity of one's views ($p < 0.001$). Across all answers, the mean error for participants' own views is -2.52% ($\sigma = 13.08$, $n = 4600$), while it is 1.37% ($\sigma = 12.11$, $n = 8474$) for opposing views.

5 Summary of conclusions

There is famously no consensus on the answers to most major philosophical questions. Still, some of the questions on the survey came closer to drawing a consensus than others. In particular, the following views all had normalized positive answer rates of approximately 70% or more: a priori knowledge, the analytic-synthetic distinction, non-skeptical realism, compatibilism, atheism, non-Humeanism about laws, cognitivism about moral judgment, classicism about logic, externalism about mental content, scientific realism, and trolley switching.

The Metasurvey indicates that a number of the preceding positions were not expected to reach this level of agreement: a priori knowledge, the analytic-synthetic distinction, non-Humeanism about laws, cognitivism about moral judgment, scientific realism, and trolley switching were all predicted to achieve rates at least 15% lower. For most of these questions, respondents to the Metasurvey underestimated agreement on the leading positions. Two notable exceptions are subjectivism about aesthetic value (estimate: 67.7%, actual: 45.7%) and empiricism (estimate: 66.5%, actual: 55.7%).

The correlations and principal component analysis reported in the preceding sections suggest that philosophical views tend to come in packages. Our analysis reveals five major choice points in logical space: naturalism vs anti-naturalism, objectivism vs subjectivism, rationalism vs empiricism, realism vs anti-realism (of the kind associated with epistemic theories of truth), internalism vs externalism. Of course, the packages depend on the choice of questions, and different surveys may have yielded different packages. Still, much of one's position on the questions we asked appears to be determined by one's view on these five issues. Positions on these issues are significantly affected by respondents' professional backgrounds, their specializations, and their orientations as philosophers.

The Metasurvey suggests that philosophers often have highly inaccurate sociological beliefs. The Survey itself may contribute to the project of correcting these beliefs. Given the important roles that sociological beliefs sometimes play in philosophy, there may well be room for more surveys of the philosophical views of professional philosophers.

Appendix 1: Detailed survey results

The following tables show the main answers of the 931 target faculty participants with a 95% confidence interval. We show the aggregate percentage of respondents for each of the main available position, with a breakdown of the specific options. Options that did not reach 2% are omitted.

A priori knowledge: yes or no?

Yes	71.1±1.7%	Accept (50.8%), Lean toward (20.3%)
No	18.4±0.9%	Lean toward (12.1%), Accept (6.2%)
Other	10.5±0.7%	The question is too unclear to answer (4.6%)

Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?

Platonism	39.3±1.3%	Accept (19.8%), Lean toward (19.5%)
Nominalism	37.7±1.3%	Lean toward (22.6%), Accept (15.1%)
Other	23.0±1.0%	Agnostic/undecided (5.0%), Accept another alternative (4.9%), Reject both (3.7%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (2.8%), Accept an intermediate view (2.3%), The question is too unclear to answer (2.0%)

Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?

Objective	41.0±1.3%	Lean toward (27.1%), Accept (14.0%)
Subjective	34.5±1.2%	Lean toward (19.4%), Accept (15.0%)
Other	24.5±1.0%	Accept an intermediate view (6.6%), The question is too unclear to answer (4.5%), Agnostic/undecided (3.2%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (3.1%), Accept another alternative (2.6%), Accept both (2.6%)

Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?

Yes	64.9±1.6%	Accept (36.8%), Lean toward (28.0%)
No	27.1±1.1%	Lean toward (14.6%), Accept (12.5%)
Other	8.1±0.6%	The question is too unclear to answer (2.5%)

Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?

Externalism	42.7±1.3%	Lean toward (26.7%), Accept (16.0%)
Other	30.8±1.1%	Accept an intermediate view (6.9%), Agnostic/undecided (6.0%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (4.7%), Accept both (4.6%), The question is too unclear to answer (3.0%), Accept another alternative (2.1%)
Internalism	26.4±1.1%	Lean toward (17.3%), Accept (9.1%)

External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?

Non-skeptical realism	81.6±1.8%	Accept (61.4%), Lean toward (20.2%)
Other	9.2±0.6%	Accept another alternative (2.6%)
Skepticism	4.8±0.5%	Lean toward (3.0%), Accept (1.8%)
Idealism	4.3±0.4%	Lean toward (2.7%), Accept (1.6%)

Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?

Compatibilism	59.1±1.6%	Accept (34.8%), Lean toward (24.3%)
Other	14.9±0.8%	Agnostic/undecided (4.1%), The question is too unclear to answer (2.8%)
Libertarianism	13.7±0.8%	Accept (7.7%), Lean toward (6.0%)
No free will	12.2±0.7%	Lean toward (6.6%), Accept (5.7%)

God: theism or atheism?

Atheism	72.8±1.7%	Accept (61.9%), Lean toward (11.0%)
Theism	14.6±0.8%	Accept (10.6%), Lean toward (4.0%)
Other	12.6±0.7%	Agnostic/undecided (5.5%)

Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?

Contextualism	40.1±1.3%	Lean toward (28.0%), Accept (12.0%)
Invariantism	31.1±1.2%	Lean toward (19.7%), Accept (11.5%)
Other	25.9±1.1%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (9.0%), Agnostic/undecided (5.7%), The question is too unclear to answer (2.5%)
Relativism	2.9±0.4%	Lean toward (1.7%), Accept (1.2%)

Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?

Other	37.2±1.3%	Accept an intermediate view (11.4%), The question is too unclear to answer (9.8%), Accept both (6.3%), Reject both (3.5%), Accept another alternative (2.7%)
Empiricism	35.0±1.2%	Lean toward (21.4%), Accept (13.6%)
Rationalism	27.8±1.1%	Lean toward (17.2%), Accept (10.6%)

Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?

Non-Humean	57.1±1.5%	Accept (29.2%), Lean toward (27.9%)
Humean	24.7±1.0%	Lean toward (16.0%), Accept (8.7%)
Other	18.2±0.9%	Agnostic/undecided (6.4%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (5.5%)

Logic: classical or non-classical?

Classical	51.6±1.5%	Accept (27.6%), Lean toward (24.0%)
Other	33.1±1.2%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (12.0%), Agnostic/undecided (5.6%), Accept both (5.2%), The question is too unclear to answer (3.4%), There is no fact of the matter (3.2%)
Non-classical	15.4±0.8%	Lean toward (7.9%), Accept (7.4%)

Mental content: internalism or externalism?

Externalism	51.1±1.5%	Lean toward (25.7%), Accept (25.5%)
Other	28.9±1.1%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (5.7%), Agnostic/undecided (5.6%), Accept an intermediate view (4.4%), Accept both (3.9%), The question is too unclear to answer (3.0%), Accept another alternative (2.3%)
Internalism	20.0±0.9%	Lean toward (12.6%), Accept (7.4%)

Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?

Moral realism	56.4±1.5%	Accept (32.2%), Lean toward (24.2%)
Moral anti-realism	27.7±1.1%	Lean toward (14.5%), Accept (13.2%)
Other	15.9±0.8%	The question is too unclear to answer (2.9%), Accept another alternative (2.7%), Agnostic/undecided (2.6%), Accept an intermediate view (2.5%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (2.5%)

Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?

Naturalism	49.8±1.4%	Accept (30.5%), Lean toward (19.3%)
Non-naturalism	25.9±1.1%	Accept (14.8%), Lean toward (11.1%)
Other	24.3±1.0%	The question is too unclear to answer (9.7%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (6.8%), Agnostic/undecided (2.7%)

Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?

Physicalism	56.5±1.5%	Accept (34.6%), Lean toward (21.9%)
Non-physicalism	27.1±1.1%	Accept (14.2%), Lean toward (12.9%)
Other	16.4±0.8%	The question is too unclear to answer (6.3%), Agnostic/undecided (2.5%), Accept an intermediate view (2.4%)

Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?

Cognitivism	65.7±1.6%	Accept (40.5%), Lean toward (25.2%)
Other	17.3±0.9%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (4.7%), Accept an intermediate view (4.0%), Agnostic/undecided (2.1%)
Non-cognitivism	17.0±0.9%	Lean toward (11.3%), Accept (5.7%)

Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?

Other	35.3±1.2%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (14.8%), Agnostic/undecided (6.0%), The question is too unclear to answer (4.8%), Accept an intermediate view (3.5%), Skip (2.1%)
Internalism	34.9±1.2%	Lean toward (22.0%), Accept (12.9%)
Externalism	29.8±1.1%	Lean toward (16.5%), Accept (13.2%)

Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?

Other	47.4±1.4%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (23.5%), Agnostic/undecided (13.3%), Skip (4.7%), The question is too unclear to answer (2.0%)
Two boxes	31.4±1.2%	Accept (20.5%), Lean toward (10.8%)
One box	21.3±1.0%	Accept (11.7%), Lean toward (9.6%)

Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?

Other	32.3±1.2%	Accept more than one (8.4%), Agnostic/undecided (5.2%), Accept an intermediate view (4.0%), Accept another alternative (3.5%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (3.3%), Reject all (2.7%)
Deontology	25.9±1.1%	Lean toward (16.0%), Accept (9.9%)
Consequentialism	23.6±1.0%	Lean toward (14.0%), Accept (9.7%)
Virtue ethics	18.2±0.9%	Lean toward (12.6%), Accept (5.6%)

Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?

Other	42.2±1.3%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (16.2%), Agnostic/undecided (8.4%), Accept another alternative (3.9%), Reject all (3.3%), The question is too unclear to answer (2.6%), Reject one or two, undecided between others (2.3%), Skip (2.3%)
Representationalism	31.5±1.2%	Lean toward (21.2%), Accept (10.3%)
Qualia theory	12.2±0.7%	Lean toward (9.0%), Accept (3.2%)
Disjunctivism	11.0±0.7%	Lean toward (7.4%), Accept (3.5%)
Sense-datum theory	3.1±0.4%	Lean toward (1.8%), Accept (1.3%)

Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?

Other	37.3±1.3%	Agnostic/undecided (8.5%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (6.2%), There is no fact of the matter (4.2%), Accept more than one (4.0%), Accept another alternative (3.9%), The question is too unclear to answer (2.8%), Accept an intermediate view (2.7%), Reject all (2.6%)
Psychological view	33.6±1.2%	Lean toward (22.7%), Accept (11.0%)
Biological view	16.9±0.9%	Lean toward (11.3%), Accept (5.6%)
Further-fact view	12.2±0.7%	Lean toward (7.8%), Accept (4.4%)

Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?

Other	41.0±1.3%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (10.7%), Agnostic/undecided (5.5%), The question is too unclear to answer (4.5%), Accept more than one (4.0%), Accept another alternative (4.0%), Accept an intermediate view (3.8%), Reject all (3.4%), Skip (2.0%)
Egalitarianism	34.8±1.2%	Lean toward (20.5%), Accept (14.3%)
Communitarianism	14.3±0.8%	Lean toward (11.6%), Accept (2.7%)
Libertarianism	9.9±0.7%	Lean toward (7.0%), Accept (2.9%)

Proper names: Fregean or Millian?

Other	36.8±1.3%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (13.7%), Agnostic/undecided (6.3%), Accept an intermediate view (4.2%), Accept another alternative (3.4%), The question is too unclear to answer (2.6%), Reject both (2.4%)
Millian	34.5±1.2%	Lean toward (18.7%), Accept (15.8%)
Fregean	28.7±1.1%	Lean toward (18.0%), Accept (10.6%)

Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?

Scientific realism	75.1±1.7%	Accept (47.0%), Lean toward (28.0%)
Other	13.3±0.8%	Accept an intermediate view (3.2%), The question is too unclear to answer (2.5%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (2.0%)
Scientific anti-realism	11.6±0.7%	Lean toward (8.3%), Accept (3.3%)

Teletransporter: survival or death?

Survival	36.2±1.2%	Lean toward (22.7%), Accept (13.5%)
Other	32.7±1.2%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (9.2%), Agnostic/undecided (8.6%), There is no fact of the matter (6.0%), The question is too unclear to answer (3.7%), Skip (2.0%)
Death	31.1±1.2%	Accept (17.4%), Lean toward (13.7%)

Time: A-theory or B-theory?

Other	58.2±1.6%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (30.8%), Agnostic/undecided (10.5%), Skip (5.7%), Accept both (3.1%), The question is too unclear to answer (2.0%)
B-theory	26.3±1.1%	Accept (15.8%), Lean toward (10.5%)
A-theory	15.5±0.8%	Lean toward (9.5%), Accept (6.0%)

Trolley problem: switch or don't switch?

Switch	68.2±1.7%	Accept (45.1%), Lean toward (23.1%)
Other	24.2±1.0%	Agnostic/undecided (6.4%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (4.5%), There is no fact of the matter (3.7%), The question is too unclear to answer (2.9%)
Don't switch	7.6±0.6%	Lean toward (4.8%), Accept (2.8%)

Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?

Correspondence	50.8±1.5%	Accept (26.2%), Lean toward (24.6%)
Deflationary	24.8±1.0%	Lean toward (15.8%), Accept (9.0%)
Other	17.5±0.9%	Agnostic/undecided (3.4%), Insufficiently familiar with the issue (3.0%), Reject all (2.5%), Accept another alter- native (2.1%)
Epistemic	6.9±0.5%	Lean toward (5.0%), Accept (1.8%)

Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not m. pos., or m. pos.?

Conceivable but not m. possible	35.6±1.2%	Lean toward (20.5%), Accept (15.0%)
Other	25.1±1.0%	Insufficiently familiar with the issue (9.0%), Agnostic/undecided (6.6%), The question is too unclear to answer (4.3%)
Metaphysically possible	23.3±1.0%	Accept (12.4%), Lean toward (11.0%)
Inconceivable	16.0±0.8%	Lean toward (8.8%), Accept (7.2%)

Appendix 2: Details of principal component analysis and factor analysis




Figure 6: Parallel Analysis Scree Plots

SS Loadings:	2.53	2.21	2.04	1.84	1.56	1.39	1.38
Proportion Variance:	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05
Cumulative Variance:	0.08	0.16	0.23	0.29	0.34	0.39	0.43

Table 16: SS Loadings and variance explained by extracted principal components

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