Tibet: An Unfinished Story. LEZLEE BROWN HALPER and STEPHAN HALPER. London: Hurst, 2013. xix + 367 pp. £20.00. ISBN 978-1-84904-359-5

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Kong's social conditions out of the public's gaze. This allowed policy makers and politicians to propagate false claims about the calamitous effects of CSSA benefits on work incentives and the work ethic on which economic success was built. Better data is slowly being generated (as evidenced by the recent release of a comprehensive report on poverty by the Commission on Poverty) but Hong Kong is still a woeful laggard when it comes to releasing the data so that researchers and others in the community can put government claims to the test and explore alternative policy options. Progress is being made, but painfully slowly and this book illustrates the grave dangers associated with allowing that process to continue.

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Tibet: An Unfinished Story begins with a discussion of the evolution of Tibet's "Shangri-La" mystique, and then moves on to focus on Tibetan history since the Second World War, emphasizing Tibet's place in America's Cold War policy, including the CIA's covert support for Tibetan insurgents starting at the end of 1956. The book ends with a short discussion of Tibet in the post-Cold War era.

The authors' perspective can be seen clearly in the first few pages where they write that their book, "[tells] the harsh story of Cold War perfidy, a Tibet seduced and eventually abandoned by its friends, buffeted by treacherous political currents and now a part of China" (p. xxii). And a page later, "With the end of World War II an isolated and naïve Tibet, unschooled in political-military realities, was caught in the Cold War process over which it had little control. Unable to decipher the nuanced diplomacy between its two giant neighbours, India and China, or to rely on Britain debilitated by war, or upon Washington constrained by Cold War realities, Lhasa succumbed to China's invasion in 1950" (p. 1).

The strength of the book lies in its examination of the internal dynamics of US foreign and domestic policy with respect to Tibet, e.g. the role of the China Lobby, the Catholic Church and Indo-American relations. The book is well written and referenced, and includes a number of previously unavailable US government documents as well as a few Chinese Foreign Office documents on Sino-Indian relations. The authors also conducted a number of relevant oral history interviews for the book.

However, while the book adds useful context and new information on specific issues and incidents, it does little to change our overall understanding of America's relationship with Tibet since the Second Word War. And as a book about *Tibetan history*, it suffers from a number of serious shortcomings. One of the most important of these is its assertion that Tibet attempted to join the world stage only after the Second World War. For example, on page 27, the authors state that they will now [at the time of the Second World War] turn their attention to: "Tibet's entry on the world stage, and its attempt to join the family of nations. Not surprisingly it is to America that the Dalai Lama turns." And later on they state, "The story of modern Tibet begins with the fact that when he [Dalai Lama] assumed responsibility … in 1950" (p. 235).

The story of modern Tibet, however, actually began decades earlier during the reign of the previous (13th) Dalai Lama who fled into exile in Mongolia in 1904 to escape an invading British army. However, when he finally returned to Lhasa at the end of 1909, a few months later he again had to flee to escape an invading Chinese army, but this time went to exile to Darjeeling, India. These years in exile, particularly the two years in Darjeeling where he developed a close friendship with Sir Charles Bell, the Colonial Indian government's political officer in Sikkim (who dealt with Tibet), led the 13th Dalai Lama to realize the importance of foreign relations and the need for Tibet to modernize its armed forces, build infrastructure and prepare to join the world stage. So while still in India, the Dalai Lama sent four aristocratic youths to England to study English and technical skills at the Rugby School chaperoned by a well-known official (Lungshar), who was "invested with power to discuss matters of interest to the Tibetan government" (IOR, L/PS,14/400, REGISTER NO. 1968, Translation of credentials of Lungshar, 24 December 1912, cited in Goldstein *A History of Modern Tibet: The Demise of the Lamaist State,* 1989, pp. 157–63). The Dalai Lama was also interested in learning about Japan, so at roughly the same time sent a bright young lama from an aristocratic family (Tshatru Rinpoche) to study there.

The Dalai Lama's thinking about a more modern Tibet continued after he returned to power in Lhasa in 1913. There, under the lead of one of his closest favourites, Tsarong, the development of a modern army was begun. Tsarong, and a group of young aristocratic military officials under him, believed that although China was too weak to threaten Tibet then, at some point Tibet would have to defend its de facto independence. As a result, a new military organizational structure was created and many new regiments were recruited. New weapons, including artillery and machine guns, were obtained from the British, and Tibetan officers and soldiers were sent for military training to the British military enclave in Gyantse (Tibet) and to Quetta in India. Furthermore, at the request of the Tibetan government, the British provided assistance in building a telegraph line between Gyantse and Lhasa and in training Tibetan telegraphers, which meant Lhasa became telegraphically linked to India. Machinery for a hydroelectric plant was also purchased from India and work on the plant began just outside of Lhasa. A new mint was constructed. And critically, to start to give its future officials a modern education, the Tibetan government hired a British headmaster to head Tibet's first English-style modern school. It opened in 1924 enrolling several dozen young aristocratic youths. Symbolically, the military officers under Tsarong showed their modernity by doing things like cutting their hair in the Western style and by wearing British-style uniforms rather than traditional official's robes and hair knots. On the international arena, Tibet participated with China and Britain/British India in 1913–14 in an important tripartite conference (in Simla, India) to try to settle the Sino-Tibetan conflict. So when Tibet first started to modernize, it was to the British, not to the Americans, that they initially turned.

This push to modernize, however, was strongly opposed by the powerful monastic segment as well as by some conservative aristocratic officials who feared that these developments threatened the dominance of religion and monasticism. By the end of 1924, they were able to persuade the 13th Dalai Lama that the new Western-style army was a greater threat to him and Tibetan Buddhism than China, so the Dalai Lama demoted the entire set of pro-change military officers and put the brakes on Tsarong's energetic push to modernize Tibet, including closing the government's English school in 1926. Tibet, therefore, was backward and possessed a poorly led and trained army when it came face-to-face with Communist China in 1950–51, not because modernization had not reached Tibet, but rather because of the failed

attempt of the modernizers in the 1920s. Tibet in 1950 cannot be understood without understanding that the Tibetan leadership decades earlier had made critical strategic decisions not to continue the modernization programme that was then underway. (This period is discussed in detail in Goldstein *A History of Modern Tibet: The Demise of the Lamaist State,* 1989, pp. 161ff).

Another of the book's shortcomings is its simplistic and often incorrect treatment of the internal policies, tactics and actions of both Tibetans and Chinese in the early cold war era (1947–59). Let me present just a few of the many examples of this.

Regarding the Chinese Communists, the book states that, "The hardened People's Liberation Army (PLA) sought nothing less than to deconstruct traditional Tibet, unseat the Dalai Lama, and absorb Tibet … into the People's Republic. In the course of a few years Chinese soldiers destroyed hundreds of monasteries and religious sites, imprisoned thousands of Buddhist monks and nuns, … in the Tibet Autonomous Region" (p. 1). The book also states that, "the 17-Point Agreement [1951] had ushered in far-reaching change – which began with the creation of a Military and Administrative Committee … [and that] with the creation of the Military District Headquarters [in Lhasa] in February 1952, the Tibetan Army was incorporated into the PLA…" (p. 130).

However, although the 17-Point Agreement called for a new military and administrative committee, it was never started because the Tibetan government objected to its creation so strongly that the Chinese chose not to proceed. Similarly, although the Chinese wanted to merge the Tibetan army into the PLA under a new Military Area Headquarter as indicated in the Agreement, the Tibetan government again successfully objected, and right up to the uprising in 1959 the Tibetan army was a separate entity completely under the control of the Tibetan Government's own Military Headquarters (Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet,* Volume 2, 2007, pp. 301–305).

Moreover, although Beijing ultimately wanted to reform and socialize Tibet, during the course of a "few years" following the 17-Point Agreement, Chinese soldiers did not destroy hundreds of monasteries and imprison thousands of monks and nuns in Tibet. To the contrary, the Dalai Lama and his government continued to administer Tibet internally in most sectors until the failed 1959 uprising. Tibet's manorial estate system with its bound (serf-like) peasants, and the presence of a vast monastic segment with tens of thousands of monks, continued to function as before, without any changes or interference from the Chinese. The Tibetan government continued to collect its traditional taxes, print and use its own money, and operate its legal and criminal system as it had before incorporation into China in 1951. There were, of course, also significant changes, but the Dalai Lama and his government continued until 1959 (Goldstein, Volume 2, 2007, and Goldstein Volume 3, 2013).

The book's treatment of Chinese policies and activities in the 1950s also contains numerous misunderstandings, errors and omissions. For example, the book states that "The Dalai Lama left Yatung with his retinue [in 1951], under the watchful eye of general Chang Ching-wu [Zhang Jingwu], the newly appointed commissioner and administrator of Civil and Military Affairs for Tibet" (p. 119). However, although Zhang Jingwu had indeed wanted to return to Lhasa together with the Dalai Lama, the latter refused, so they travelled separately. Moreover, Zhang Jingwu did not come to Tibet to be the head official of civil and military affairs. He came as the representative of Mao and the Central Committee and was scheduled to quickly return to Beijing when the Tibet Work Committee (TWC, Xizang gongwei), the main Party office, was established. He ended up staying and heading the TWC (but not the army), because a serious dispute broke out in Lhasa between two other important Chinese commanders, Zhang Guohua and Fan Ming, over which of them should be the TWC's first secretary. As a result, in 1952, Beijing decided that the

best solution was to appoint neither and keep Zhang Jingwu in Lhasa as the first secretary. This internal struggle between Fan Ming and Zhang Guohua continued to be a *major* factor in Chinese policy in Tibet and led to a major shift in Mao's policy toward Tibet in September 1956. (This conflict is dealt with in detail in Goldstein. *A History of Modern Tibet, Volumes Two and Three*, 2007 and 2013).

Even with respect to the US government's involvement with Tibet and Tibetans, there are many problems. For example, while the role of Gyalo Thondup – the Dalai Lama's older brother – is emphasized, the important role of the Sikkimese royals (the Crown Prince and his sister Princess Coocoola) is ignored. As a consequently, the book fails to mention one of the major initiatives of 1956. While the Crown Prince was visiting Lhasa at the start of 1956 to invite the Dalai Lama to India on behalf of India's Buddhist community (the Maha Bodhi Society), he received a secret oral message for the US Government from advisors of the Dalai Lama. After returning, he transmitted this personally to R. Borden Reams, the American Consul General in Calcutta on 28 June 1956. This message, as Reams described it to the US Secretary of State in a cable, said, "The Dalai Lama is anxious to leave Tibet and despite obvious difficulties, his advisors believe that his flight can be arranged. GOI [Government of India] has been approached regarding asylum in India but response although favorable is not (repeat not) regarded by Tibetans as firm enough. Maharaj Kumar [the Crown Prince of Sikkim] wishes assurances that, in the event GOI asylum refused, Dalai Lama could be assured asylum elsewhere in addition to financial support." The message also talked of the need for weapons so that the uprising in Sichuan could be spread throughout Tibet, and asked about American help with training some Tibetans in the use of artillery and anti-aircraft guns (cited in Goldstein, 2013, pp. 393–394). This message from Lhasa arrived in Washington at a key juncture when the US government was in the early stages of discussing the possibilities of providing covert assistance to Tibetan insurgents.

In conclusion, although this book adds new information about America's Cold War engagement with Tibet, it fails to present a complete, balanced and accurate account of the complex history of modern Tibet.

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In the Land of the Eastern Queendom: The Politics of Gender and Ethnicity on the Sino-Tibetan Border
TENZIN JINBA
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Contemporary studies on Tibet and Sino-Tibetan relations almost always strike a contentious tone. With rare exceptions, most writings on modern Tibet often come with a particular set of political polemics. Without the frames of human rights, religious repression, the Dalai Lama and Free Tibet, it seems impossible to write a book on Tibet. This is why Tenzin Jinba's book on politics of ethnic tourism in a Tibetan region in China offers such a refreshing read, with its nuanced portrayal of identity complexities along the Sino-Tibetan border.

In the Land of the Eastern Queendom is a book about a controversy in ethnic tourism promotion among the Gyarong people, which is a subgroup of Tibetans in Danba county, Ganzi Tibetan autonomous prefecture, Sichuan province. What is