

more compliant attitude, it would accept a majority decision on seating Peking if the Chinese Communists were to fulfil whatever the United Nations defines as 'substantial compliance' with its requirements."

In general, Mr. Barnett maintains that "what is needed to meet the challenge of Communist China is, fundamentally, not so much an effective China policy as an effective Asia policy." America's interest, he holds, is "to prevent the domination of Asia by any single state, to support the principles of independence in that area, and to encourage the political and economic growth of democratic non-Communist states." To attain these ends he argues that America should not try too hard to draw non-aligned countries into any system of alliances, but should "back them up and help them achieve their own aims as they see them." It remains to be seen how far American official policy will move in the direction indicated in this book, but there are signs that it is already developing more along such lines; at the time of writing this review, the issue of the Presidential election is still unknown, but the public controversy that has already taken place between the two candidates over the question of the offshore islands has put China again into the forefront of American national consciousness, and whoever is to be the next occupant of the White House, it will be a time for a fresh review of established policies.

G. F. HUDSON.

*Tibet Fights for Freedom. A White Book.* Edited by RAJA HUTHEESING. [Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1960. 241 pp. Maps, Illustrations. Rs. 15.00.]

*The Revolt in Tibet.* By FRANK MORAES. [New York: The MacMillan Company, 1960. 223 pp. Maps. \$3.95.]

*Tibet in Revolt.* By GEORGE N. PATTERSON. [London: Faber and Faber, 1960. 197 pp. Map, Illustrations, Index. 21s.]

THESE three books have much more in common than the word Tibet in their titles. They all reflect a sense of outrage and indignation over what Han expansionism, Communist ruthlessness, and materialistic cynicism have done to a freedom loving, hapless people. In each is told in the writer's own way the general outline of the causes and course of the Tibetan Revolt and the details of the Dalai Lama's flight from Lhasa to India; in each there is an awareness of the free world—but particularly the Asian free world, as audience and shocked spectator, which, at its own peril, must take to heart something which is more than a tale told for the telling, and each of the books has some degree of

endorsement, by the Dalai Lama himself—a young-old strangely appealing figure.

The White Book, *Tibet Fights for Freedom*, edited by Raja Hutheesing, is primarily a meticulous compilation of radio broadcasts and press dispatches bearing on the causes and course of the Tibetan revolt which culminated in the flight of the Dalai Lama from Lhasa. The coverage is world wide: Peking radio as well as Communist Chinese provincial papers speak their pieces equally with the press of India and the news dispatches which reach the columns of the *New York Times* or the *Manchester Guardian*. Nor have the essential official documents been neglected. Every shade of opinion has its say concerning each event or development in the tragedy which engulfed Tibet and suddenly sounded a warning to all Asian countries. The result of this pairing of viewpoints is not, however, a balanced stalemate of assertion and charge and countercharge but a most effective and damning record of ruthlessness, duplicity, and a callous disregard for truth. The Tibetan case is much the stronger and more clear for everyone to read by reason of this painstaking recording of all the bits and pieces which make up the news mosaic of events.

A foreword by the Dalai Lama, and some informed comment on various aspects of Tibetan society and culture, introduce the reader to the main portion of the book, and an analysis of the international aspects of the revolt and its suppression, and a statement of its effect upon Asian opinion, make a good ending.

*The Revolt in Tibet*, by Frank Moraes, is from the editor's chair: one degree removed from the headlined news story of the day or the latest dispatch, it seeks to establish a frame of reference and relate causes—both those which are immediate and those which lie far back in history—to the effects of today and their continuance into tomorrow. As such it is a well researched record of past events, and a penetrating analysis of the many problems of Tibet in this the time of what he fears is the death agony. Mr. Moraes writes with much wisdom about the significance—for the free world and for all of Asia—of the tragedy of Tibet. He discusses events in their relationship to the impassable gulf between the Communist world and the free world and also in their relationship to possible cleavages within the brutally put together solidarity of the Communist world. Much that he says is outstandingly pertinent. He, too, has felt the very great charm and appeal of the Tibetan people and communicates the warmth of his affection to the reader.

*Tibet In Revolt*, by George N. Patterson, takes the reader, in a somewhat confused manner, close to the heart of the Tibetan problem. He presents a very realistic and apt assessment of the attitude of the Tibetans of Amdo and Kham toward the Lhasa government: which

reflects a degree of distrust and dislike coupled paradoxically with a feeling of basic solidarity when confronted with the menace of the Chinese. He also tells of their corresponding rage and dismay when they were not even mentioned as Tibetans within the provisions of the Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1951. He places the proper valuation on the character and potential of the eastern Tibetans, and rightly points out that the revolt was primarily theirs. Undoubtedly he was closely involved in many of the events of 1951-59 and tells from first hand knowledge of startling events, plots, and counter plots. He writes with partisan feeling and passion, for unquestionably, and rightly, he feels himself very much one with the Tibetans and from that point of view charges that the Indian government has been gravely culpable in sacrificing the Tibetans in barter for a few years of illusive and dangerous peace. This reviewer finds his summation of Tibetan national aspiration and their deep fear and hatred of the Chinese are well-founded and most if not all he tells is true or at least credible.

The book, however, is marred by numerous errors and misstatements, none of which are very grave, yet they give rise to a certain degree of reserve about accepting all that is written. Apparently nothing was ever cross-checked. Ma Pu-fang is difficult to recognise as Ma Bao Feng. Aba Alo, often called Huang Si-ling, is equally difficult to identify when called Abu Abolok or Hou Wan Seiling. He is said to have had access to unlimited supplies of modern weapons during the war years, but at that time, as I knew both from him and his chief of staff, he was getting only a trickle of practically useless rejects. Chinghai is mentioned as a province in connection with the Simla Conference of 1914, whereas the province of Chinghai only came into existence in 1928. The Tibetans are ethnically classified as Tartar in race but speaking a Burmese language and the Lhasa dialect is said to have become corrupted "by restricted in-breeding", whatever that means. The tribe of Dzachuka is credited with one hundred thousand families. But my very painstaking cross check with traders and the Golok chiefs only gave the figure of six thousand—which is a very large tribe for the nomads. Taktser, the eldest brother of the Dalai Lama, is said to have gone, in 1950, from the Communist Chinese headquarters in Chamdo to Lhasa. He has recorded a tape, however, in which he describes in some detail his itinerary from Kumbum to Nagchuka to Lhasa.

The book would be a much stronger presentation of a case, which this reviewer accepts in the main, if these and similar errors had been kept out; but nevertheless his portrayal of the Tibetans is essentially correct.

These three books focus on the Tibetan revolt, but that revolt and its causes raise, inferentially at least, the basic problem as to what

constitutes the theory and practice of the Communist Chinese policy toward racial minorities. Communist doctrine imposes the necessity of giving lip service at least to the idea that minority peoples and their cultures should be fostered and preserved, and given a considerable degree of autonomy or freedom of self-determination. From the very beginning the Chinese Communists have preached such ideas, but when policy had to be put into practice they have found themselves on the horns of a very real dilemma. They were the Chinese who, throughout the course of a long history, with self-assured chauvinism, have absorbed and assimilated many peoples—for their own good: also they were communists who preach cultural self-determination for all good communists.

Great Han chauvinism was an unknown, or unexpressed, concept prior to the rise of the communists, although some Chinese leaders such as Chang Chih-chung were aware of its implications, as shown by the policies he sought to initiate in Sinkiang in 1946–48. The frequency of its use as a self-indictment or preachment by the communist Chinese, even when they were engaged in taking over Tibet, shows that they are aware of the dilemma caused by the difference between what they preach as communists, and what the historical habits of absorption, they have acquired as Chinese, impel them to do. Many of the vacillations discernible in the policy of the Chinese in Tibet from 1950–59 are not necessarily tactical in nature but may derive from a consciousness of this dilemma. The Tibetans were restive under, and finally rebellious against, both communism as such and chauvinistic Chinese imperialism. For the communist Chinese Tibet could have been, either an example of their success in reconciling these two irreconcilables, or the gigantic warning signal of failure. They now hold a crushed, sullen, resentful Tibet; but the problem of how to resolve the contradictions between what they preach as communists and what they practice as Chinese is more acute than ever before. Small peoples both within and without the borders of China can only take warning.

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