warning Keidel gives: with their own agendas to pursue, external leaders are inclined to oversimplify the theories of market economy and overemphasize China's need to liberalize its economy. Nonetheless, readers may find it more convincing if Keidel discussed how this aspect of external influence brought harm to the Chinese economy in the 1980s.

This volume ultimately lacks a balanced discussion of the issues pertinent to China's development in 1996–2000. Readers interested in political reforms in China will find the collection disappointing in that the pieces by mainland Chinese scholars on the National People's Congress and village elections provide little more than pronouncements of official policies. And the issue of Sino–U.S. relations is not examined at all.

PAK K. LEE

The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. By MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN. [Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1997. xiii + 152 pp. $19.95. ISBN 0-520-21254-1.]

Ever since his doctoral dissertation in 1968 ("An Anthropological Study of the Tibetan Political System"), Melvyn C. Goldstein has been trying to understand and realistically portray Tibet as the complex culture it is. Whether writing about history, culture, language or politics, Goldstein – who is fluent in the language and has spent a total of two years in Tibet since 1985 – often finds himself a solitary voice against the Hollywoodization of Tibet.

Goldstein argues that Tibetan culture is currently at grave risk; ironically from Chinese democratization. The freedom to travel within China has led to an influx of ethnic Chinese into Tibet so large that soon Tibetans will be a minority in their own land. But Goldstein has a possible solution to, what he calls, the "Tibet Question;" here, sketched out in an unemotional, rational, "*realpolitik* framework" (p. x). Ultimately, Goldstein believes, "the Tibet Question is about control of territory – about who rules it, who lives there, and who decides what goes on there" (p. x).

There are four possible solutions. One, China disintegrates as the Soviet Union did and Tibetans declare independence; two, a democratically inclined government in Beijing gives Tibet independence; three, Tibetans achieve independence through armed insurrection; or four, Beijing and the Dalai Lama agree to a plan that permits the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa in an authentically autonomous Tibet, thereby preserving Tibetan culture and the current Chinese state.

Goldstein's contention, widely shared in the sinological community but not necessarily in the Tibetological one, is that the first three options are highly unlikely and the only hope of preserving Tibetan culture is the fourth. To that end he offers a possible scenario.

The first half of the book is a remarkably concise political history of Tibet. Key issues are highlighted, especially the difference between the political boundaries of Tibet (Tibet Autonomous Region) and the much larger area of ethnic Tibetan inhabitation which the exiles judge to be Tibet although "the goal of a Greater Tibet ... [is] not at all politically realistic" (p. 71).

The second, more important, section appraises the situation since 1979 when the Dalai Lama and Beijing began negotiations that have persisted, off and on, to the present. These talks have been hindered by mutual distrust, historical animosity and splits within the Tibetan exile community and within the Chinese and Tibetan leadership in the PRC.

Goldstein explains the political machinations of the two sides and laments the current stalemate. He mostly blames the Dalai Lama for this, for his unwillingness to make concessions and for not "placing the interest of the four million Tibetans in Tibet ahead of the interests of the 130,000 Tibetans in exile" (p. 115). "Right now the hard-liners on Tibet are in control [in China] and they will remain so unless something gives the more moderate elements in Beijing and Lhasa new leverage" (p. 111). This leverage should come from the Dalai Lama, Goldstein believes.

Goldstein is particularly critical of the U.S. government. Washington, he argues, openly supports opponents of a peaceful resolution hindering progress towards a realistic and quick solution. U.S. policy, he asserts, gives the Tibetan exiles "symbolic victories – more shiny stars for their already star-filled helmets" (pp. 125–26), while in the meantime the possibility of a solution to preserve Tibetan culture fades. There is too little trust between the Dalai Lama and Beijing according to Goldstein. He proposes that Washington act as a "catalyst-facilitator" (p. 129) through private diplomacy or through another country (Norway or Mongolia are suggested) to get the Beijing–Dalai Lama talks restarted.

This is a very important and powerfully argued book, more so for a time when historical fantasy and nationalistic and religious fervour so drastically distort discussion about the Roof of the World. It is a must-read for anyone who is seriously interested in Tibet – especially officials in Beijing, Dharamsala and Washington.

A. TOM GRUNFELD

Tears of the Lotus: Accounts of Tibetan Resistance to the Chinese Invasion, 1950–1962. By ROGER E. MCCARTHY. [Jefferson, North Carolina and London: McFarland & Company, 1997. vi + 290 pp. £43.65. ISBN 0-7864-0331-4.]

No aspect of modern Tibetan history has remained so mysterious as the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the guerrilla war of Tibetan resistance against Chinese rule. The CIA has refused to declassify any documents on this operation compelling the historian of the Department of State to comment bitterly that when it comes to Tibet, the