





A Doorman for Your Home – Control-Flow Integrity Means in Web Frameworks

Bastian Braun
bb@sec.uni-passau.de
joint work with Christian v. Pollak
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
Background


- A web application is a reactive system
 - reacts on incoming requests
 - reaction includes response + possibly change of data
 - a sequence of (action, reaction) pairs is a control flow
- Examples
 - booking & payment
 - eCommerce (ebay, amazon), banking, flights, railway tickets
 - configuration
 - registering, (re)set password
 - several domains involved
 - payments via Paypal

Background

- Web applications require step-by-step operation
 - Assumption: users start only at entry page & only click on hyperlinks and buttons
- Steps happen by processing HTTP requests
 - http://www.example.de/users.php?action=add &name=doe&firstname=john
- Factors: method, HTTP parameters, <u>past steps</u>
- Control flow = sequence of requests (i.e., steps) in the same user context









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🥙 Mozilla Firefox Startseite - Mozilla Firefox

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Choose a shipping speed:

- Standard International Shipping (averages 18-32 business days)
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- AmazonGlobal Priority Shipping (averages 2-4 days)

Item: Need to Change quantities or delete?

Shipping to: Bastian Braun, Universitaet Passau, Innstr. 43, Passau, Bayern, 94032 Germany

\$12.99 - Quantity: 1


Condition: New


Sold by: Amazon.com LLC

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


Real-World Examples

- Race Conditions [Paleari et al., 2008]
- HTTP Parameter Manipulation [Citigroup, 2011; UNESCO, 2011]
- Unsolicited Request Sequences [Wang et al., 2011]
- Compromising Use of the 'Back' Button [Hallé et al., 2010]
- Session Puzzling [Chen, 2011]
- Facebook OAuth Access Token Leak [Goldshlager, 2013]

Root Causes


- In all cases
 - no explicit control-flow definition
 - no central enforcement
 - user behavior differs from expectations
 - i.e. user did not only click on provided links
 - access control fails or can not help
 - e.g. by guessable URLs or permitted actions
 - Needed: central policy enforcement point



Survey

"A framework is a set of classes that embodies an abstract design for solutions to a family of related problems, and supports reuses at a larger granularity than classes."

[src:Johnson, R.E., Foote, B.: Designing Reusable Classes. In: Journal of Object-Oriented Programming. Volume 1. (1988)]



Survey

- Top 10 web application frameworks according to BuiltWith
 - Apache Tapestry
 - Google Web Toolkit
 - Spring
 - CodeIgniter
 - CakePHP
 - Kohana
 - ASP.NET
 - Web Forms, MVC, Web Pages
 - Ruby on Rails
 - Django*

Survey

- 3 security features inspected for each framework
 - message sequence enforcement
 - race condition protection
 - request integrity / parameter data type enforcement
- Methodology: check
 - manuals
 - config options
 - flow of request processing through framework components


- Message sequence enforcement
 - only 1 out of 11 provides support
 - Spring + Web module + Web Flow extension
 - inserts controller into MVC
 - accepts policy as XML or Java
 - implements flow graph with states & transitions
 - adds new request parameters
 - flowExecutionKey & eventID
 - allows multi-tabbing
 - "Back" button protection

- Message sequence enforcement: problem
 - cross-workflow parameter exchange
 - Example:
 - start workflows A & B
 - obtain "payment successful" token in A for cheap purchase
 - append this token to request in B to forge payment of expensive goods
 - application-specific parameter binding necessary, no framework support
 - can happen across tabs (same session) and across browsers (different sessions)

Survey: Race Condition Exploits

- Different attack levels exist
- message submission confirmation

- in-tab / in-workflow
 - same user account
 - same session ID
 - same workflow ID
- multi-tab
 - same user account
 - same session ID
 - different workflow IDs
- multi-browser
 - same user account
 - different session IDs
 - different workflow IDs



message

submission

message

form



message submission confirmation

confirmation

- Race condition protection
 - again only Spring offers protection
 - probably a side effect of message sequence enforcement
 - only 'in-tab' protection, i.e. within one workflow
 - no framework protects against race condition attacks from parallelized workflows
 - ... nor against attacks from parallelized sessions

- Parameter data type enforcement
 - mainly depends on underlying programming language
 - e.g. Java-based frameworks raise exceptions depending on type cast
 - all frameworks offer regular expression filtering
 - spoofed requests never reach controller if value does not match
 - this feature must be explicitly used by developer
 - no enforcement by default

Dispatchers + Filters: single points of enforcement

Framework	Dispatcher	Filters
Apache Tapestry	Master Dipatcher	
Google Web Toolkit	Web.xml	
CodeIgniter	routes.php	pre_controller,
		post_controller
CakePHP	routes.php	beforeFilter, afterFilter
Kohana	Bootstrap.php	before, after
ASP.NET Web Forms	Global.asax	_
ASP.NET MVC	Global.asax	OnActionExecuting, OnAc-
		tionExecuted
ASP.NET Web Pages	Global.asax	_
Ruby on Rails	ActionDispatch	beforeFilter, afterFilter
Django	URLconf	Middleware

Framework	Version	CFI	RC	Param.	Lang
Apache Tapestry	5	S=3:	777	+	Java
Google Web Toolkit	2.5	-	===	+	Java
Spring/Web Flow	3.2.2/2.3.0	-/+	-/≈	+	Java
CodeIgniter	2.1.3	-	-	+	PHP
CakePHP	2.3.0		-	+	PHP
Kohana	3.3.0		-	+	PHP
ASP.NET Web Forms	4.5	-	-	+	C#, VB.NET
ASP.NET MVC	4	144	525	+	C#, VB.NET
ASP.NET Web Pages	2	-		+	C#, VB.NET
Ruby on Rails	1.9.3	-	<u>125</u> 7	+	Ruby
Django	1.5.1			+	Python

Conclusion

- No framework offers security by design
 - all have at least single points of enforcement
 - 7 out of 11 even have customizable filters
 - implementation effort necessary
- Spring Web Flow provides basic protection
 - request sequence within workflow
 - race condition within workflow
- No framework has cross-workflow protection
 - neither concerning request sequence nor race conditions
- No framework has by design parameter data type integrity

but all have regex support

Are We Lost?

• Maybe WAFs can help...

Plus: WAF Survey

- Inspected 28 Web Application Firewalls
 - based on public documentation
 - all claim protecting against OWASP Top 10
 - 1 seems to be extensible for CFI protection
 - Ironbee
 - 1 provides only vague description of feaures
 - and no answer to email request

A1	Injection		
A2	Broken Authentication and Session Management		
A3	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)		
A4	Insecure Direct Object References		
A5	Security Misconfiguration		
A6	Sensitive Data Exposure		
A7	Missing Function Level Access Control		
A8	Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)		
A9	Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities		
A10	Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards		

Survey: WAF

OWASP Stinger 2.2.2	Radware AppWall
NAXSI 0.49	Armorlogic – Profense
AQTronix – WebKnight 3.0	Barracuda Networks - Application Firewall
Trustwave SpiderLabs – ModSecurity 2.7	Bee Ware – i-Suite
Qualys – Ironbee 0.7	BinarySec - Application Firewall
Riverbed – Stingray	BugSec – WebSniper
Trustwave - WebDefend Web Application Firewall 6.1	Cisco - ACE Web Application Firewall
Imperva – SecureSphere	Citrix - Application Firewall
Penta Security – WAPPLES	eEye Digital Security – SecureIIS
Bayshore Networks – Application Protection Platform 2.0	F5 - Application Security Manager 11.4 (?)
DenyAll - Web Application Firewall 4.1	Forum Systems – Sentry 11.4
Applicure – DotDefender 4.2	webScurity - webApp.secure
Port80 Software - ServerDefender VP 2.2.2	Ergon – Airlock 4.2.6
Privacyware - ThreatSentry IIS Web Application Firewall	Xtradyne - Application Firewalls

Questions?

