



OWASP Jakarta Tech Day Meetup 2017

Client Side Security And Testing Tools





David Cervigni @ Minded Security

Agenda

- Short Intro
- Client side threats: Why important/difficult
- Examples: Dom XSS, HTTP Param Pollution
- Taint Analysis techniques
- BlueClosure
- Demo
- Questions...



Who am I



- □ 10+ yeas of development
- Software Security Enthusiast
- Securing SDLC
- Secure coding trainer
- [...]
- Tango Dancing

Contacts:

- david.cervigni@mindedsecurity.com
- https://www.linkedin.com/in/david-cervigni-229569a/

Experience



Senior Information Security Consultant

Minded Security

Apr 2017 - Present • 2 mos



DevSecOps consultant

HSBC

Aug 2016 – Nov 2016 • 4 mos London, United Kingdom

See description ~



CISO advisor

Aviva

May 2016 – Aug 2016 • 4 mos London, United Kingdom

See description ~



IT Security Consultant: PCI-DSS review, Quality Assurance

Visa Europe

Dec 2013 – Sep 2015 • 1 yr 10 mos London, United Kingdom

See description ~



Minded Security Services & Solutions



- Secure Software Engineering Services: helping mission critical businesses in the development of secure web and mobile applications and products from the inception to production cycle
 - JavaScript Vulnerability Detection Solutions: innovative technology for automated detection of vulnerabilities in company owned client JavaScript that run on user's browsers







Minded Security Global Customers











































Client Side Security Risks

Client-Side Security is concerned with the execution of code on the client, typically natively within a web browser or browser plugin. The execution of code on the client-side is distinct from executing on the server and returning the subsequent content.

The OWASP Testing Guide describes 12 major vulnerabilities that is possible to find analyzing th JavaScrip and HTML code of an application: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Client_Side_Testing

DOM based Cross Site Scripting (OTG-CLIENT-001)

JavaScript Execution (OTG-CLIENT-002)

HTML Injection (OTG-CLIENT-003)

Client Side URL Redirect (OTG-CLIENT-004)

CSS Injection (OTG-CLIENT-005)

Client Side Resource Manipulation (OTG-CLIENT-006)

Cross Origin Resource Sharing (OTG-CLIENT-007)

Cross Site Flashing (OTG-CLIENT-008)

Clickjacking (OTG-CLIENT-009)

WebSockets (OTG-CLIENT-010)

Web Messaging (OTG-CLIENT-011)

Local Storage (OTG-CLIENT-012)



Why is always more important?

- SPA: Single Page Applications
- Mainly HTML & JavaScript (not anymore flash)
- Frameworks: Angular, React
- Third party libraries (JQuery and others)
- High degree of integration: portals



Why is always more difficult?

- Big codebases
- JavaScript is not easy to read: manual review
- Developing and Quality Assure for JavaScript and client components is DIFFICULT, time consuming and error prone.
- Classic approach with SCA (Static Code Analysis) leads to:
- Too many false positives
- 2. Too many false negatives
- 3. Usually this is performed by QA, or periodically, distant in time from the developers writing the code...not the best practice: long time of detection and remediation, and high cost.



HTML Injection

```
<script>
  var userposition = location.href.indexOf("user=");
  var user = location.href.substring(userposition+5);
  document.getElementById("Welcome").innerHTML = " Hello, "+user;
  </script>
```

http://vulnerable.site/page.html?user=<img%20src="aaa"%20onerror=alert(1)>



Hello,



JavaScript Execution and DOM XSS

These functionalities will interpret a string as JavaScript :

Arguments to eval, execScript, Function, setTimeout, setInterval

Assignments to src attribute of iframe or script tags.

Insecure usage of location.replace/assign.

Insecure assignments to location.

Those functions can lead to:

JavaScript execution



HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)

- The term Query String is commonly used to refer to the part between the "?" and the end of the URI
- As defined in the RFC 3986, it is a series of fieldvalue pairs
- Pairs are separated by "&" or ";"
- The usage of semicolon is a W3C recommendation in order to avoid escaping
- RFC 2396 defines two classes of characters:

```
—Unreserved: a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and _ . ! ~ * ' ( )
```

```
-Reserved: ; / ? : @ & = + $ ,
```



HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)

GET /foo?par1=val1&par2=val2 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Host: Host Accept: */*

POST /foo HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Host: Host Accept: */*

Content-Length: 19

par1=val1&par2=val2c

POST /index.aspx?par=1&par=2 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Host: Host

Cookie: par=5; par=6 Content-Length: 19

par=3&par=4

ASP creates a vector: 1,2,3,4,5,6



Parameter Pollution – Server enumeration

Technology/HTTP back-end	Overall Parsing Result	Example
ASP.NET/IIS	All occurrences of the specific parameter	par1=val1,val2
ASP/IIS	All occurrences of the specific parameter	par1=val1,val2
PHP/Apache	Last occurrence	par1=val2
PHP/Zeus	Last occurrence	par1=val2
JSP,Servlet/Apache Tomcat	First occurrence	par1=val1
JSP,Servlet/Oracle Application Server 10g	First occurrence	par1=val1
JSP,Servlet/Jetty	First occurrence	par1=val1
IBM Lotus Domino	Last occurrence	par1=val2
IBM HTTP Server	First occurrence	par1=val1
mod_perl,libapreq2/Apache	First occurrence	par1=val1
Perl CGI/Apache	First occurrence	par1=val1
mod_perl,lib???/Apache	Becomes an array	ARRAY(0x8b9059c)
mod_wsgi (Python)/Apache	First occurrence	par1=val1
Python/Zope	Becomes an array	['val1', 'val2']
IceWarp	Last occurrence	par1=val2
AXIS 2400	All occurrences of the specific parameter	par1=val1,val2
Linksys Wireless-G PTZ Internet Camera	Last occurrence	par1=val2
Ricoh Aficio 1022 Printer	First occurrence	par1=val1
webcamXP PRO	First occurrence	par1=val1
DBMan	All occurrences of the specific parameter	par1=val1~~val2



HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)

Exploiting HPP vulnerabilities, it may be possible to:

- Override existing hardcoded HTTP parameters
- Modify the application behaviors
- Access and, potentially exploit, uncontrollable variables
- Bypass input validation checkpoints and WAFs rules



HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)

http://frontendHost.com/page?amount=1000&recipient=Mat%26action%3dwithdraw




action=transfer&amount=1000&recipient=Mat&action=withdraw



Code Flow and Taint analysis

- Sources: the input data that can be directly or indirectly controlled by an attacker.
- ☐ **Filters**: operations on Sources which change the content or check for specific structures/values.
- **Sinks**: potentially dangerous functions the can be abused to take advantage of some kind of exploitation.





Taint analysis

```
<script>
  var I = location.href;
  var user = l.substring(l.indexOf("user"));
  document.write("Hello, " + user);
  </script>

Sink
```

The process of following the tainted value from source to sink is known as **Taint Propagation**.



Direct Input Sources: Location

Attacker controls all parts of a location except the victim hostname.

http://hostname/ path/to/page.ext/ PathInfo ?Query=String #Hash=value



He can force a user to visit a forged url address.

DOM XSS Wiki:

http://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/wiki/LocationSources



Indirect Input Sources: Cookies

Cookie value could have been instantiated somewhere else and retrieved on another page. Its value can be accessed/modified with:

document.cookie:

```
<script>
  var cvalue = document.cookie;
  var cstart = cvalue.indexOf("username=");
  cvalue = unescape(cvalue.substring(cstart+9, cstart+9+length));
  alert("Welcome " + cvalue);
</script>
```



The attacker could force a malicious cookie value



JavaScript Security



The leading platform for JavaScript Security:


BlueClosure represents a JavaScript Security Platform for Developers, Auditors and Testers to identify and block Javascript flaws in your code.



BlueClosure can analyse any codebase written with JavaScript frameworks like Angular.js, jQuery, Meteor.js, React.js and many more.



BlueClosure Detect uses an advanced Javascript Instrumentation engine to understand the code. By leveraging our proprietary technology the BC engine can inspect any code, no matter how obfuscated it is.







BlueClosure Detect




BC detect discovers JavaScript Flaws
Before Anyone Else Does: BC Detect helps
Companies to analyse and automatically
discover Client Side Vulnerabilities thanks to its
Hybrid IAST Engine together with the Smart
Fuzzer module.

BC detect finds Client Side Vulnerabilities Easily: Dynamic execution flows, browser quirks, different interpreters: few of the many factors that add up to the inherent difficulty to pinpoint JavaScript security flaws. Conventional tools cannot find them.





Let's test it!





Questions?

Minded Security Srl

Via Duca D'Aosta, 20 50129 Firenze - Italy

Mail: info@mindedsecurity.com

Minded Security UK Limited

One Canada Square Canary Wharf, E14 5AB London - UK

Site: http://www.mindedsecurity.com Blog: http://blog.mindedsecurity.com

Twitter: http://twitter.com/mindedsecurity BlueClosure: http://www.blueclosure.com



Thanks!

