

Android / iPhone Risks and Solutions



Part of the Reverse Engineering and Code Modification
Prevention OWASP Project

Agenda

- Prevalence of App Cracking
- Current Threats / Risks
- Where to Go For Guidance?



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Just How Prevalent is Code Modification?

A RECENT STUDY OF APPS



Changes to the Threat Landscape

- Most web application vulnerabilities stem from malicious input provided by a user;
- To mitigate these risks, we:
 - Consider anything coming from the user's browser to be unsafe
 - Apply various secure-coding techniques to sanitize incoming data from any untrustworthy source (e.g., user browser);
- Threats posed by other sources are generally considered less likely to occur



Changes to the Threat Landscape

- We still need to worry about traditional sources of untrustworthy input (user browsers);
- However, we're introducing new sources of untrustworthiness...

Examples of distributed or untrusted environments

Mobile Applications



Packaged Software



Embedded Software



Software in other at-risk / untrusted environments





Application Integrity Problem



- Software in untrusted environments is exposed to reverse-engineering, analysis, modification, and exploitation by attackers
- 2. Attackers can directly access the binary and compromise its integrity with various tools and techniques
- 3. Attackers may cause brand, revenue, or IP loss through reverse-engineering



What Do Binary Attacks Result In?



Compromise (disable, circumvent) of security controls, e.g., authentication, encryption, license management / checking, DRM, root / jailbreak detection



Exposure of sensitive application information, e.g., keys, certificates, credentials, metadata



Tampering with critical business logic, control flows, and program operations



What Do Binary Attacks Result In?



Insertion of malware or exploits in the application and repackaging



Exposure of application internals (logic, vulnerabilities) via reverse-engineering



IP theft (e.g., proprietary algorithms) via reverse-engineering

Piracy and unauthorized distribution




Independent Surveys of the Wild...

- 86% of Android malware are repackaged versions of legitimate apps (IEEE Security & Privacy 2012)
- 90% of ethical hacking engagements were successful in gaining access to highly sensitive information (PwC mobile app report, 2012)
- Info Sec professionals say App Security and Mobile Security are #1 and #2 threat areas to their organizations (Frost & Sullivan, 2011)



2013 Arxan Study



- Analyzed Top 100 Apps for Android / iPhone for serious flaws
- Binary / HTML Modification extremely common




Analysis

- What were the hackers interested in doing with these cracked apps?
 - Security Control Bypass
 - Adware / Spyware Code Injection
 - Repackaging (IP Theft)
 - Stealing Information About Users



2012 Study – Android Banking Vulnerabilities






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Things Organizations Should Think About

CURRENT RISKS& CODING FLAWS



Android / iPhone Technical Risks





Top Mobile Risks to Mitigate

- Code Modification Technical Risks
 - Repackaging
 - Method Swizzle With Behavioral Change
 - Security Control Bypass
 - Automated Jailbreak / Root Detection Disable
 - Presentation Layer Modification
 - Cryptographic Key Replacement



Swizzling w/Behavioral Change

This method will likely be swizzled and modified by an attacker

```
// Transaction-request delegate
 (IBAction)performTransaction:(id)sender
    if([self loginUserWithUsername:username
incomingPassword:password] != true)
        UIAlertView *alert = [[UIAlertView
alloc] initWithTitle:@"Invalid User"
message:@"Authentication Failure" delegate:self
cancelButtonTitle:@"OK" otherButtonTitles:nil];
        [alert show];
        return;
    // Perform sensitive operation here
```

Automated Jailbreak Bypass

```
-(BOOL) isJailbrokenEnvironment {
    NSFileManager *filemgr = [NSFileManager defaultManager];

BOOL jailbrokenEnvironment =
    [filemgr fileExistsAtPath:@"/Applications/Cydia.app"];
    return jailbrokenEnvironment;
}
```

NOTE: Methods that appear to return a simple yes/no response and appear to be doing something sensitive are excellent candidates for simple code modification.



Top Mobile Risks to Mitigate

- Reverse Engineering Risks
 - Exposed Method Signatures
 - API Monitoring
 - Exposed Data Symbols
 - Exposed String Tables
 - Algorithm Decompilation and Analysis
 - Application Decryption



Cryptographic Key Theft

```
NSString* const szDecryptionKey =
    @"32402394u2wewer90we90we09";

NSString* const szEncryptionKey =
    @"eroieuroiweruowieriw254234";
```



Flag hardcoded keys that could be easily found by an attacker through static or dynamic analysis.



AntiDebugger Checks

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Common app entrypoints should check for the unauthorized presence of a debugger.

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```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    @autoreleasepool {
       return UIApplicationMain(
    }
}
```



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Useful OWASP Projects

SOLUTIONS




Practical Solutions

- Define and Implement Particular Security Controls In Your Mobile Apps:
 - Prevent Static / Dynamic Analysis
 - Detect Code Modification at Runtime
 - React to Modification at Runtime
 - Alert Intelligently

These controls must be written correctly and protected from reverse engineering / binary signatures!



Defense-In-Depth Approach





Practical Solutions

 Check out OWASP Project for more specific guidance / recommendations:



Reverse Engineering and Code Modification Prevention

OWASP Project

Subproject "<u>Technical Risks of Reverse Engingeering and Unauthorized Code Modification</u>" for coding examples / solutions



Conclusions

- Unauthorized modification of Android / iPhone apps at the binary level is extremely common and overlooked by most security professionals
- There are lots of things you can do to mitigate this class of mobile vulnerabilities. You must code a correct solution and keep it correct via integrity controls.
- Check out the OWASP "Reverse Engineering" project for technical guidance
- Jonathan Carter jcarter@owasp.org

