


Mobile Application Threat Analysis

Ari Kesäniemi



Threat Modeling





- 1. "What do we want to protect and why?"
 - 2. "Where could the attack happen?"
 - 3. "What could go wrong?"
 - 4. "Do we have appropriate protection?"
 - 5. "What is the risk we accept?"



1. "What do we want to protect and why?"

- What are the assets worth protecting?
- What would be the business impact if compromised?
- Data
- Money, privacy, credentials
- Transactions and processes
- IPR, innovations, algorithms
- Reputation, customer experience
- Resources



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2. "Where could the attack happen?"

- What is the *attack surface?*
- Local storage? (Including logs, caches etc)
- Connection to back end server?
- Connection to third party services?
- Malicious user?
- Web browsing and content handlers?
- Exposed API or RPC?
- Third party components part of the application?



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- What are the most feasible attack scenarios?
- How each of the assets (from step 1) could be compromised
 - Considering confidentiality, integrity, availability and nonrepudiation for information assets?
 - Considering STRIDE* for processes and data flows?
 - Considering attack surfaces (from step 2)?
 - Considering the system as a whole?

^{*} STRIDE = Spoofing / Tampering / Repudiation / Information disclosure / Denial of service / Elevation of privilege




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
4. "Do we have appropriate protection?"

- Consider each scenario individually
- Is there a best practice protection mechanism? Is it implemented in the system?
- Build an attack tree when necessary





Attack Tree





OWASP Top Ten Mobile Risks (DRAFT)

- 1. Insecure or unnecessary client-side data storage
- 2. Lack of data protection in transit
- 3. Personal data leakage
- 4. Failure to protect resources with strong authentication
- 5. Failure to implement least privilege authorization policy
- **6.** Client-side injection
- 7. Client-side DOS
- 8. Malicious third-party code
- 9. Client-side buffer overflow
- 10. Failure to apply server-side controls



... and:

- Abuse of client side paid resources
- Failure to properly handle inbound SMS messages
- Failure to properly handle outbound SMS messages
- Malicious / fake applications from app store
- Ability of one application to view data or communicate with other applications
- Switching networks during a transaction
- Failure to protect sensitive data at rest
- Failure to disable insecure platform features in application (caching of keystrokes, screen data)



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


5. "What is the risk we accept?"

- What are the residual risks that can be accepted?
- Not every scenario is worth protecting
- For scenarios not having good protection, consider DREAD:
 - Damage
 - Reproducibility
 - Exploitability
 - Affected users
 - Discoverability
- Is there a known threat agent motivated to perform an attack?




Attack Tree






Summary & Conclusion





4. "Do we have appropriate protection?"

5. "What is the risk we accept?"







Questions?

Resources:

- OWASP Mobile Security Project
- ENISA: Top Ten Smartphone Risks
- Microsoft: STRIDE, DREAD