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Sécurité des Web Services (SOAP vs REST)

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Agenda

- Qu'est-ce qu'un Web Service ?
- SOAP
- REST
- Threat Modeling / ACME SA
- Réduction des risques
- Conclusion
- Questions









- 18 years of experience in ICT Security
- Principal Consultant at MARET Consulting
- Expert & Lecturer at University of Applied Sciences (Yverdon)
- Swiss French Area delegate at OpenID Switzerlan OpenID



- Co-founder Application Security Forum #ASFWS
- **OWASP Member**
- Author of the blog: la Citadelle Electronique
- http://ch.linkedin.com/in/smaret or @smaret
- http://www.slideshare.net/smaret
- Chosen field
 - AppSec / Digital Identity Security / Cyber Defense











Agenda




- Qu'est-ce qu'un Web Service ?
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Web Service?





Un **service web** (ou **service de la toile** ¹) est un programme informatique permettant la communication et l'échange de données entre applications et systèmes hétérogènes dans des environnements distribués. Il s'agit donc d'un ensemble de fonctionnalités exposées sur internet ou sur un intranet, par et pour des applications ou machines, sans intervention humaine, et de manière synchrone.



Un peu d'histoire



- 1990 : DCE/RPC Distributed Computing Environment
- 1992 : CORBA Common Object Request Broker Architecture
- 1990-1993 : Microsoft's DCOM -- Distributed Component Object Model
- 1995: RMI Monde Java
- Pour arriver à une standardisation (toujours en cours) des protocoles, outils, langages et interfaces
 - SOAP
 - REST
 - Etc.



Web Service





Typical Web Services environment




Figure 1.1 Typical Web Services environment.



Source: Mastering Web Services Security / www.wiley.com



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SOAP: Démystification des technologies

- Langages
 - XML
 - WSDL: Descripteur du service
 - UDDI: Annuaire des services
 - Xpath
- Protocoles
 - Transport: HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, FTP, SMS, TFTP, SSH, etc. (TCP or UDP)
 - Message: Enveloppe SOAP
- Sécurité
 - WS-Security (Signature & Chiffrement)
- Autres éléments
 - AuthN: SAML, X509, Username & Password, Kerberos, HTTP Digest, etc.





Enveloppe SOAP

SOAP-ENV: Envelope

SOAP-ENV: Header


SOAP-ENV: Body

- SOAP : Simple Object Access Protocol
- Permet l'envoi de messages XML





SOAP request







UDDI



 Universal Description Discovery and Integration, connu aussi sous l'acronyme UDDI, est un annuaire de services fondé sur XML et plus particulièrement destiné aux services Web.








WSDL

 WSDL est une grammaire XML permettant de décrire un Service Web.




- Le WSDL sert à décrire :
 - le format de messages requis pour communiquer avec ce service
 - les méthodes que le client peut invoquer
 - la localisation du service
 - le protocole de communication (SOAP RPC ou SOAP orienté message)





WSDL





WSDL: exemple

```
- <wsdl:definitions targetNamespace="http://thomas-bayer.com/blz/">
  <wsdl:documentation>BLZService</wsdl:documentation>
 -<wsdl:types>
   -<xsd:schema targetNamespace="http://thomas-bayer.com/blz/" attributeFormDefault="unqualified" elementFormDefault="qualified">
      <xsd:element name="getBank" type="tns:getBankType"/>
       <xsd:element name="getBankResponse" type="tns:getBankResponseType"/>
     - <xsd:complexType name="getBankType">
       -<xsd:sequence>
           <xsd:element name="blz" type="xsd:string"/>
         </xsd:sequence>
       </xsd:complexType>
     -<xsd:complexType name="getBankResponseType">
       -<xsd:sequence>
           <xsd:element name="details" type="tns:detailsType"/>
         </xsd:sequence>
       </xsd:complexType>
     - <xsd:complexType name="detailsType">
       -<xsd:sequence>
           <xsd:element name="bezeichnung" type="xsd:string" minOccurs="0"/>
           <xsd:element name="bic" type="xsd:string" minOccurs="0"/>
           <xsd:element name="ort" type="xsd:string" minOccurs="0"/>
           <xsd:element name="plz" type="xsd:string" minOccurs="0"/>
         </xsd:sequence>
       </xsd:complexType>
    </xsd:schema>
  </wsdl:types>
 - <wsdl:message name="getBank">
    <wsdl:part element="tns:getBank" name="parameters"/>
  </wsdl:message>
 - <wsdl:message name="getBankResponse">
     <wsdl:part element="tns:getBankResponse" name="parameters"/>
  </wsdl:message>
 -<wsdl:portType name="BLZServicePortType">
  -<wsdl:operation name="getBank">
       <wsdl:input message="tns:getBank"/>
       <wsdl:output message="tns:getBankResponse" wsaw:Action="http://thomas-bayer.com/blz/BLZService/getBankResponse"/>
    </wsdl:operation>
  </wsdl:portType>
```





SOAP: Démystification des protocoles

Découverte **UDDI** Description **WSDL** SOAP / XML Message HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SFTP, SMS, SMTP Protocole (TCP or UDP) **Transport IP**





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REST: Démystification des technologies

- Langages
 - XML
 - JSON
 - XHTML, HTML, PDF... as data formats
- Protocoles
 - HTTP(s) → Utilisation d'une URL
 - Méthode de communication (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE)
- Sécurité
 - Sécurité du transport (SSL/TLS)
 - Sécurité des messages: HMAC / Doseta / JWS, etc. (Like XML Signature)
- Autres éléments
 - Oauth, API Keys, etc.



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Représentation REST (exemple JSON)

```
"results": [
     "profile image url": "http://a3.twimg.com/profile images/97541875/t
     "created at": "Fri, 28 May 2010 22:08:32 +0000",
     "from user": "tibcommunity",
     "metadata": {"result type": "recent"},
     "to user id": null,
     "text": "Automated tools for Integration Test?: I would go for soay
     "id": 14935096312,
     "from user id": 7363121,
     "geo": null,
     "iso language code": "en",
     "source": "<a href=&quot;http://twitterfeed.com&quot; rel=&quot,
  },
     "profile image url": "http://s.twimg.com/a/1274899949/images/defaul
     "created at": "Fri, 28 May 2010 15:50:10 +0000",
     "from_user": "onion_soup",
```



Méthodes REST

HTTP Method	Think	Description	/proc analogy
PUT	CREATE	Create a resource with the user specified id	Start a new process
GET	RETRIEVE	Retrieve a resource representation	Get the status of a process
POST	UPDATE	Update a resource/Append to a resource/Create a resource with a server assigned id	Amend a process
DELETE	DELETE	Delete a resource	Kill a process




REST: Démystification des protocoles

Découverte Description WADL, Swagger XML, JSON, etc. Message **Protocole** HTTP, HTTPS **Transport** TCP/IP





Example




```
Mozilla Firefox
<u>Fichier Édition Affichage Historique Marque-pages Outils ?</u>

    ★ https://api.tw...n_name=smaret × +
Mike Jones: self-issued
                 witter.com https://api.twitter.com/1/statuses/user_timeline.xml?screen_name=smaret
🖻 Les plus visités 🗌 Débuter avec Firefox 🗟 À la une 🗌 Scoop.it! 📮 Cyberwarzone | Cyberw... 🗍 Security Affair
Aucune information de style ne semble associée à ce fichier XML. L'arbre du document est affiché ci-dessous.
 <statuses type="array">
  -<status>
      <created_at>Mon Dec 03 23:23:03 +0000 2012</created_at>
      <id>275741971111354368</id>
        Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency hit again by malware http://t.co/gEo5y7kx
    -<source>
        <a href="http://www.tweetdeck.com" rel="nofollow">TweetDeck</a>
      <truncated>false</truncated>
      <in reply to status id/>
      <in reply to user id/>
      <in reply to screen name/>
      consibly sensitive>false/possibly sensitive>
    -<user>
        <id>26370924</id>
        <name>S. Maret - F0rge</name>
        <screen name>smaret</screen name>
        <location>Geneva / Switzerland</location>
      --profile image url>
          http://a0.twimg.com/profile images/1021648075/smaret avatar graphique normal.jpg
        file image url>
      ---profile image url https>
          https://si0.twimg.com/profile images/1021648075/smaret avatar graphique normal.jpg
        file image url https>
        <url>http://www.citadelle-electronique.net/</url>
        <description>ICT Security / Digital Identity Security / AppSec</description>
        cted>false
        <followers_count>441</followers_count>
        cprofile_background_color>B8E3CF</profile_background_color>
        cprofile_text_color>3C3940/profile_text_color>
        color>0099B9file_link_color>
        cprofile_sidebar_fill_color>95E8EC</profile_sidebar_fill_color>
        cprofile_sidebar_border_color>509992/profile_sidebar_border_color>
        <friends_count>430</friends_count>
        <created at>Wed Mar 25 00:21:38 +0000 2009</created at>
```



Example Twitter (OAuth)







REST web service API's





























(P) ρίαχο




















SOAP vs REST





Web services in the Enterprise Enterprise integration Web background (EI) background

WS-*

service

(both styles matter)

- SOAP, WSDL, UDDI
- Sophisticated infrastructure available today
- Web API, SAAS, Cloud Lightweight **RESTful** orientation enablers







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Modèle STRIDE

STRIDE Threat List				
Туре	Examples	Security Control		
Spoofing	Threat action aimed to illegally access and use another user's credentials, such as username and password.	Authentication		
Tampering	Threat action aimed to maliciously change/modify persistent data, such as persistent data in a database, and the alteration of data in transit between two computers over an open network, such as the Internet.	Integrity		
Repudiation	Threat action aimed to perform illegal operations in a system that lacks the ability to trace the prohibited operations.	Non-Repudiation		
Information disclosure	Threat action to read a file that one was not granted access to, or to read data in transit.	Confidentiality		
Denial of service	Threat aimed to deny access to valid users, such as by making a web server temporarily unavailable or unusable.	Availability		
Elevation of privilege	Threat aimed to gain privileged access to resources for gaining unauthorized access to information or to compromise a system.	Authorization		

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Application Threat Modeling





Menaces - DFD Acme SA

- Threat 1
 - Interception des messages (Information disclosure)
 - Modification des messages (Tampering)
 - Usurpation d'identité (Spoofing)

Threat 2

- Attaque de l'application
 - BoF
 - Injection
 - DoS & DDoS
 - Etc







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ACME SA: Réduction des risques ?


- Chiffrement du transport
- AuthN
- SSL Mutual AuthN / X509
- WAF / XML Gateway
- Intégrité et confidentialité des messages
- Secure Coding





Chiffrement du transport


SOAP / XML	REST
HTTPS	HTTPS
SSL/TLS tunnel	
SSH	
IPSEC	
Etc.	



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AuthN

SOAP / XML	REST
HTTP Basic, Digest,	HTTP Basic, Digest,
HTTP Header	HTTP Header
Mutual SSL	Mutual SSL
IP trust	IP trust
WS Security user name password	Oauth
WS SAML Authentication token	API Keys
XML Signature	JSON Web Token (JWT)
Kerberos	
Etc.	







7

SSL Mutual AuthN / X509 / PKI

SOAP / XML	REST
SSL/TLS Mutual AuthN**	SSL/TLS Mutual AuthN**






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WAF / XML Gateway (Protection périmétrique)

SOAP / XML	REST
Reverse Proxy	Reverse Proxy
Contrôle requêtes HTTP	Contrôle requêtes HTTP
Rupture SSL/TLS	Rupture SSL/TLS
Black List	Black List
White List	White List
Validation WSDL	
Signature & Verification	
Encryption & Decryption	
SAML	







Intégrité et confidentialité des messages

SOAP / XML	REST
XML Signature XML Encryption	 (p.ex: HMAC, Doseta) JSON Web Signature (JWS) – Draft v7 JSON Web Encryption

```
01. POST /resources/rest/geo/comment HTTP/1.1[\r][\n]
02. hmac: jos:+9tn0CLfxXFbzPmbYwq/KYuUSUI=[\r][\n]
03. Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2012 21:34:33 CEST[\r][\n]
04. Content-Md5: r52FDQv6V2GHN4neZBvXLQ==[\r][\n]
05. Content-Length: 69[\r][\n]
06. Content-Type: application/vnd.geo.comment+json; charset=UTF-8[\r][\n]
07. Host: localhost:9000[\r][\n]
08. Connection: Keep-Alive[\r][\n]
09. User-Agent: Apache-HttpClient/4.1.3 (java 1.5)[\r][\n]
10. [\r][\n]
11. {"comment": {"message":"blaat", "from":"blaat", "commentFor":123}}
```

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-07





Example XML Signature (SOAP)

```
Demande
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
G<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soap</pre>
   <wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-2"</pre>
      <dsig:Signature xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" Id="Id-</pre>
 tBBsJX0YlMS81fXsuPEAXR3Grq9F8VvNLpRpVmN+CRTH/ffPof5zSMsrmLwMq9rX
 5rZI66D6WG3ngVaZAYX8f33hri46i4wESkPVCWLXwmfid+W84ycwKJ00CLhC7Kvg
 UgagXeVWDAbvJEab/NEP9ZSr/c7eB6axLWcd0QbZD9FSn2Y7CBQWNxO9bP7ovYyb
 oYrcqY1czNHuZNU88NhClBHqIcXQtmW5Yzcwj0rRKfrw/LGzcM0JlfR4SaaHIi4y
 PxRJuIFC6mbzHgoBvUX+zQ==</dsig:SignatureValue><dsig:KeyInfo Id="Id-00013547"
    </wsse:Security>
    </soap:Header>
G<soap:Body xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-w</pre>
G<ns:echo xmlns:ns="http://ws.apache.org/axis2">
 <!-- Zero or one occurrences -->
 <ns:args0>a</ns:args0>
 </ns:echo>
 </soap:Body>
 </soap:Envelope>
```



Example JSON "Signature"

A.1. JWS using HMAC SHA-256

A.1.1. Encoding

The following example JWS Header declares that the data structure is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Secured Input is see

```
{"typ":"JWT",
"alg":"HS256"}
```

The following byte array contains the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header:

[123, 34, 116, 121, 112, 34, 58, 34, 74, 87, 84, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 72, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]

Base64url encoding these bytes yields this Encoded JWS Header value:

```
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
```

The JWS Payload used in this example is the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the JSON object below. (Note that the payload can be base64url encoded JSON object.)

```
{"iss":"joe",
  "exp":1300819380,
  "http://example.com/is root":true}
```

The following byte array, which is the UTF-8 representation of the JSON object above, is the JWS Payload:

[123, 34, 105, 115, 115, 34, 58, 34, 106, 111, 101, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 101, 120, 112, 34, 58, 49, 51, 48, 48, 56, 49, 57, 51, 56, 4 109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 99, 111, 109, 47, 105, 115, 95, 114, 111, 111, 116, 34, 58, 116, 114, 117, 101, 125]

Base64url encoding the above yields the Encoded JWS Payload value (with line breaks for display purposes only):

eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLAOKICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt



Code security

SOAP / XML	REST
- Data input validation	- Data input validation
- Data output encoding	- Data output encoding
- Pseudorandom data generation, high	- Pseudorandom data generation, high
entropy	entropy
- Strong / reliable data encryption algorithms	- Strong / reliable data encryption algorithms
- Data leakage prevention	- Data leakage prevention
- Robust error & exception handling	- Robust error & exception handling
- Anti-automation and expiration measures	- Anti-automation and expiration measures

OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS):

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ASVS

WASC web application weaknesses:

http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246978/Threat%20Classification







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Conclusion

SOAP:

- Implémenter les standards WS-* liés à la sécurité?
- Mettre en place un filtrage applicatif (WAF, XML GW)
- Complexe à mettre en œuvre (PKI, Secure coding, Cryptography, etc.)
- Architecture à forte contrainte de sécurité

REST

- Mettre en place un filtrage applicatif (WAF, XML GW)
- Implémentation rapide et facile → tendance
- Architecture de type Cloud, Intranet, Social Login, etc.
- Emergence des standards (JSON Web Algorithms)
- On attend avec impatience les standards sécu pour REST ???
 - Pragmatique: protection périmétrique, chiffrement et Secure Coding ???







Approche périmétrique vs WS-Security?









Questions?







Merci / Thank you!



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@smaret

http://www.maret-consulting.ch

Slides:

http://slideshare.net/ASF-WS/





The OWASP Foundation

http://www.owasp.org

Backup Slides

By Sylvain Maret

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MIKE JONES: SELF-ISSUED

Musings on Digital Identity

HOME

ABOUT

SEARCH

Go

CATEGORIES

Bandit Project Claims Cryptography Documentation Events Federation Firefox Higgins Project I-names Information Cards Interoperability JanRain

JSON LiveID OAuth

OpenID Pamela Project

Specifications

People Phishing Resistance

Privacy Safety Shibboleth Software « Simple Web Discovery (SWD) Enabling Hosted Deployments

OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices »

NOVEMBER 8, 2012

JOSE and JWT specs updated for IETF 85 working group meetings

I've made a small set of updates to the JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and JSON Web Token (JWT) specs in preparation for the JOSE and OAuth working group meetings at IETF 85. These updates incorporate resolutions to issues that have been discussed by the working groups since publication of the previous drafts.



ations and to change the

Normative changes to the working group specs were to add length fields for PartyUlnfo and PartyVlnfo values for key derivation calculations and to change the JWK field identifiers for RSA keys from (mod, xpo) to (n, e). Fields for representing the RSA private key values needed for Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) calculations were added to the JSON Private Key specification.

The updated specs are available at:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-07

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-07

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-07

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-07

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-05

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bearer-03


http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-03

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-03


http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-json-private-key-01



SoapBox




Capture HTTP








Signer le message





Remarque : la clé privée associée au certificat sélectionné est utilisée pour signer.



Signer le message

?-? xml	version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"
soap:Envelope	
® xmlns:soap	http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/
■ soap:Header	
wsse:Security	
® xmlns:wsse	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd
dsig:Signature	
® xmlns:dsig	http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#
3 Id	Id-0001354375296344-2ce605b050ba208001050000-3
dsig:SignedInfo	
dsig:CanonicalizationMe	e
Algorithm	http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#
dsig:SignatureMethod	
Algorithm	http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1
dsig:Reference	
@ URI	#Id-0001354375296344-2ce605b050ba208001050000-2
dsig:Transforms	
dsig:Transform	
	http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#
dsig:DigestMethod	
Algorithm	http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1
dsig:DigestValue	FGocmKVuA8AXUurE4Gqh/qoLBK0=
dsig:SignatureValue	kR2y52mMeHL+ul9zgGfoh5Cd+X4+Jofz7Z2WTqr3WzPSu+/WfmNfY/RcTxlt1XEDwjDFmln2jtrRQbp6j+GKIrracketers and the property of the prop
dsig:KeyInfo	
Id	Id-0001354375296344-2ce605b050ba208001050000-4
e dsig:X509Data	
dsig:X509Certificate	MIICOTCCAbmgAwIBAgIGATDa3Nm5MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMBgxFjAUBgNVBAMTDVNPQVBCb3hDb
e soap:Body	
® xmlns:wsu	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd
® wsu:Id	Id-0001354375296344-2ce605b050ba208001050000-2
e ns:echo	
® xmlns:ns	http://ws.apache.org/axis2
!	Zero or one occurrences
e ns:args0	a

