

Why AppSec Matters?

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Agenda

- Intro.
- Current status of AppSec in the industry.
- Case study.
- Why OWASP matters.



About me

- 10+ years of experience in AppSec.
- Currently working for Fortune 500 Company.
- Independent researcher in free time (bug bounty).
- Chapter Leader for Aguascalientes.
- Favorite vulnerability: SQL Injection.
- Proud U.A.A. alumnus.



I'm not here to scare you...

Or maybeI am





Another week, another hack

Data breach


- 3,000 Tidewater Community College workers victimized in W-2 scam
- Attacker compromises information of 250K in Bailey's data breach
- Karmanos Cancer Center patient info at risk from lost flash drive
- Stolen laptop exposes PII of over 200K Premier Healthcare patients
- Crooks Steal, Sell Verizon Enterprise Customer Data
- Thieves Phish Moneytree Employee Tax Data
- Seagate Phish Exposes All Employee W-2's
- Hacker breaches USA Cycling, personal information at risk
- 1-800 FLOWERS warns that hacker may have stolen customers' personal info
- · Data breach puts southern expats' personal details online
- Hackers reportedly access OpSec employee data
- 18 million stolen IDs discovered on server / Criminals in China got illegal access
- JASACare notifies 1,154 patients of breach

And the list goes on:

http://www.itgovernance.co.uk/blog/list-of-data-breaches-and-cyber-attacks-in-march-2016/



We are not doing a great job





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Real-life case study



Background

- Third party used to collect festivals and new-hires information.
- The following email was sent to artists/managers/assistants:

review and make sure all of the information is up to date:

public key=27deeb3af140

37784098d02a

/402672/edit?

 First thought on "public_key": Maybe it's an authentication token, not ideal but still provides some level of authentication.




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
Phase 1: Discovery



Public key parameter:




Removing public_key = Unauthenticated Access To Data





Analyzing URL:





Analyzing page:

Please upload official materials for festival use. Uploaded files should be in rastor format only ipg, jpeg, gif or png.

Artist Hi Res Photo


≛ Upload File

Artist Hi Res Photo Q

Artist Prod. Rider

♣ Upload File

Riders Q





Analyzing page:

```
ne='0' />
id]' value='' />
<a href="https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/ uploads_files/000/781/957/original.exe"
```

- Files are stored in AWS S3
- File is always renamed to original.ext
- Unauthenticated access to uploaded files as well.
- Bruteforcing of files is possible but not really needed.



Summary so far:


- Unauthenticated access to artist profile.
- Access to ANY profile is possible using Insecure Direct Object References.
- Unrestricted File Upload is possible.
- Unauthenticated Access to uploaded files is possible.



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Reminder: this is a single page.





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Phase 2: Automation



Automating data retrieval to demonstrate risk

- Initial Results:
 - More than 80 thousand records found.
- Notes:
 - More than 170 thousand requests were sent.
 - More than 6GBs were downloaded.
 - I was never stopped nor even detected.



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Phase 3: Parsing data



Parsing data:

Number Of Direct URLs To Download Files obtained:

```
data - bash - 80×24
2016 pdf
570 docx
311 doc
217 rtf
189 jpg
 85 txt
  55 png
  39 odt
 22 JPG
 21 xlsx
  18 xls
  17 zip
   8 pages
   8
   3 mp3
   3 lsd
   3 jpeg
   3 PNG
   2 htm
   2 gif
   2 PDF
   1 xml
   1 wav
   1 tiff
```



Parsing data:

Artists PII including emails and phones

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Parsing data:

• And much, much more:

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Possible outcomes if exploited by attackers:

- Headlines in the news:
 - "HUNDRES OF THOUSANDS ARTISTS DETAILS LEAKED BY COMPANY"
 - "WANT TAYLOR SWIFT'S NUMBER? WE'VE GOT IT"
- Attackers selling or leaking artists information (stalkers, curious people, etc.)
- Fraud and potential legal consequences (SSNs involved).
- Phishing campaigns against retrieved emails.
- Etc., etc., etc.



What could've been done better:

- Prevent unauthenticated access to the page.
- Once authentication has been implemented, perform authorization checks.
- Validate at server-side the uploaded files.
- Also add authentication checks to the files.
- Logging and IPS/IDS configuration to detect unusual activity.



Tools used for discovery and exploit:

 Python programming language to code small download script.

 Standard Unix tools to parse data (find, cat, cut, grep, sort, sed, ls, wget).



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Questions?



Why OWASP Matters?

 All the vulnerabilities shown in this presentation could've been avoided by following OWASP recommendations.





OWASP TOP 10 misses:

- A1 Injection
- A2 Broken Authentication and Session Management
- A4 Insecure Direct Object References

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project



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Questions?



Thanks!
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