Microsoft® Developers | 2008

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Top Ten Strategies To Secure Your Code

Michael Howard mikehow@microsoft.com Principal Security Program Manager Microsoft Corp.



Take these strategies to heart, and you'll do just fine!

All these strategies are based on real-world experience!



A Secure System does what it's supposed to do, and no more.

Strategy #1

Remember: You will never get your code right!




Remember: You Will Never Get Your Code Right!

- Why?
 - "Attacks only get better, not worse"
 - You are not perfect (even if you think you are)
- Your code might be secure today, but that could all change tomorrow


Example: "Attacks Only Get Better"

MS03-047 XSS in Exchange 5.5 OWA Oct 15, 2003

Example: "Attacks Only Get Better"



Example: "Attacks Only Get Better"





Action

- Reduce your attack surface
 - Least privilege
 - Require authenticated connections by default
 - Disable less-used functionality
 - Apply the 80/20 rule
 - Use as many defenses as possible...
 - ... which leads me into...

Strategy #2

Use all possible defenses



Use All Possible Defenses

- A large portion of the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) focuses on defenses
- Extra defenses help protect customers in the event they are attacked
- Defenses either
 - Utterly stop an attack (they offer a security guarantee)
 - E.g., Firewall
 - Make life harder for an attacker
 - E.g., randomization

Example: Protected Customers

- Blaster took advantage of a buffer overflow in RPCSS
- In Windows Server 2003, RPCSS is compiled with /GS
 - A defense that detects stack-based buffer overruns at runtime
- On Windows Server 2003 the attack was detected by the /GS code
 - RPCSS was killed rather than running the Blaster exploit code
 - A remote elevation was turned into a DoS

Action

- Add XSS Defenses (ASP.NET, ASP, Gadgets)
 - Always HTMLEncode output
 - ... or better, use the <u>Microsoft Anti-Cross Site Scripting Library</u>
- Add SQL injection Defenses (any language)
 - Grant access to sprocs
 - Deny access to all underlying tables
- Add Buffer Overrun Defenses (C and C++)
 - Use VC++ 2005 SP1 or later
 - Compile with/GS
 - Link with /NXCOMPAT /DYNAMICBASE /SAFESEH

Strategy #3


Leverage Threat Models



Leverage Threat Models

- Threat models not only benefit design
- Understand your code more
 - Where does the data come from (local, remote, local subnet)
 - What trust level is required to communicate with your code (anonymous, user, admin)
 - Pay special attention to external dependencies and assumptions
 - Make sure the correct defenses are in place
- What data are you storing?
 - Privacy concerns: Is the data personally identifiable or confidential?

Leverage Threat Models



Action

- Build effective threat models
- Identify all entry points into the system, and rank their accessibility
 - Increasing attack surface
 - Local versus local subnet versus remote
 - Admin versus user versus anonymous
- Higher attack surface == better be good code!
- Consider reducing attack surface (see strategy #1)
- Review code along the anonymous data paths

Strategy #4

Never Trust Data



Never Trust Data

- "All data is evil, until proven otherwise"
- The most heinous bugs are because of too much trust in data
 - Buffer overruns
 - Cross-site scripting (XSS)
 - SQL injection
 - Command injection
 - Etc.

Evidence

- ~49% of security bugs tracked by CVE between 2001-2007 were due to too much trust in data
- Stragglers include
 - Breaking a sandbox, poor crypto, information disclosure etc

Action

- Don't solely use "blocklists"
- Constrain
 - Only allow what you know to be good
 - E.g., constrain to only a valid email address
- Reject
 - Reject that which you know is bad
 - E.g., reject bad characters, often environment specific (Web etc) such as <>& etc
- Sanitize
 - Encode if possible
 - E.g., HTML encode

Crystal Reports MS04-017

```
public class CrystallmageHandler : WebControl {
 private string tmpdir = null;
protected override void Render(HtmlTextWriter writer) {
  string filepath;
                                                               (1) Get filename from querystring
  string dynamicImage =
   (string)Context.Request.QueryString.Get("dynamicimage");
  if (tmpdir == null) {
    tmpdir = ViewerGlobal.GetImageDirectory();
                                       (2) Concat temp dir and filename
  filePath = tmpdir + dynamicImage;
  FileStream imagestream =
  new FileStream (filePath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read);
                                                         (3) Open the file
  // stream file to user^h^h^h bad guy
 File.Delete (filePath);
                   (4) Delete the file!
```

MS04-017 The Lesson & The Fix

- Trusting an untrusted filename not good!
- Fix was:
 - Constrain
 - Extension must be ".jpg" or ".png"
 - Filename must be a GUID
 - Reject
 - Path must be devoid of ':', '/' and '\'
- On failure (ANY FAILURE!) simply return 404

Strategy #5

Fuzz!



Fuzz

- Fuzzing was designed to find reliability bugs
 - It turns out many reliability bugs are actually security bugs
- A buffer overrun defect might crash an app
- The right payload could execute malicious code
- This strategy is to prove that your messed up on Strategy #4!

Why Fuzz?

- XLS (MS06-012)
- BMP (MS06-005, MS05-002)
- ▼ TNEF (MS06-003)
- **EOT** (MS06-002)
- WMF (MS06-001, MS05-053)
- EMF (MS06-053)
- PNG (MS05-009)

- GIF (MS05-052, MS04-025)
- JPG (MS04-028)
- **№** ICC (MS05-036)
- ▶ ICO (MS05-002)
- CUR (MS05-002)
- ANI (MS05-002)
- **DOC** (MS05-035)
- ZIP (MS04-034)
- ASN.1 (MS04-007)
- Etc...

Fuzzers


- Two major types, both can effective
 - Dumb
 - Effective in early fuzz testing
 - Randomly change data
 - Smart
 - Effective in early and advanced fuzz testing
 - Know of the data format

Action

- If you consume files or network data you MUST fuzz!
 - File
 - SDL mandates minimum 100,000 iterations per file format
 - Network end points
 - Especially anonymous and remote end points
- Buy or build fuzzers
- You have to automate
- Dedicate a computer or three
- Add a "layer of pain" to your app

Action: Layer of Pain





Strategy #6

Stop the Bleeding



Stop The Bleeding

- Attackers attack all code
- Don't add insecure code to your product
- "Friends don't let friends write insecure code"

Action

- Security training for all engineers
 - Instructor-led classes
 - "just in time" training
 - About to build a Web app? Read up on XSS issues
 - About to do database access? Read up on SQL injection
 - Using C or C++? Learn about buffer overruns and integer overflow bugs
 - Doing crypto? Read about common crypto failures.
- Create a "Security Quality Gate"
 - No banned APIs
 - No lousy crypto
 - All code analysis tools pass
- VSTS can have a check-in rule run

Strategy #7

Recognize the asymmetry



Recognize The Asymmetry

- "The Attacker's Advantage, the Defender's Dilemma"
- The odds are against you
 - You have to get 100% of the features right 100% of the time, with many constraints
- The odds are stacked in favor of the bad guy
 - They can spend as long as they want to find one bug



Action

- I already said, "Stop the bleeding"
 - But cure the patient too!
- Bad guys whack all code
- Review and fix legacy code too
- Deprecate old features

Strategy #8

Use the best tools at your disposal



Use The Best Tools At Your Disposal

- Tools are no panacea
- But they do help
- Tools do something humans cannot do
 - They scale
- Tools can give you a feel for how bad code might be
 - A lot of warnings may indicate poor quality code

Action:Use The Best Tools At Your Disposal

- Use static analysis tools on every build
 - FxCop
 - /analyze
 - lint
 - Etc.
- /W4
- Run the tools on all code

Strategy #9

Stay one Step Ahead



Stay One Step Ahead

- The security landscape constantly changes
- Not only might there be bugs in your code
- But patches required in systems you use

Action: Stay One Step Ahead

- Learn from past mistakes
- Read! Read! Read!
- Nominate a security champ
 - Distill and disseminate security intelligence
- Sign up for bugtraq
 - www.securityfocus.com
 - Create an inbox rule!!

Strategy #10

Security of the Software is up to (singular) you




Security Of The Software Is Up To (Singular) You

- It's totally up to you (yes, YOU!) to get security right
 - Secure products are made from secure code
 - Secure code is written by individuals
 - You cannot be replaced by a tool
 - Therefore, the security of the product is totally up to you. QED
- Remember, your code will be scrutinized and attacked
- But will it be compromised?
- The difference is totally up to you

Evidence

- Blaster was due to a bug in DCOM
 - Only one person wrote the function containing the flaw
- CodeRed was due to a bug in Index Server ISAPI
 - Only one person wrote the function containing the flaw
- Debian/Ubuntu rand number bug
 - Only one person made the error



Action

- Take pride in your code
- Use all the tools at your disposal
- Take advantage of every language construct that leads to greater safety and security
- Have it peer-reviewed
- Don't be scared or too vain to ask for help
- No passing the buck



Summary

- Remember: You will never get your code right!
- Use all possible defenses
- Leverage Threat Models
- Never Trust Data
- Fuzz!
- Stop the Bleeding
- Recognize the asymmetry
- Use the best tools at your disposal
- Stay one Step Ahead
- Security of the Software is up to (singular) you

Security Resources

- The SDL 3.2 documentation
 - http://go.microsoft.com/?linkid=8685076
- The SDL Book (Howard and Lipner)
- The SDL Blog
 - http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl

Resources for Developers



www.microsoft.com/teched


Tech·Talks
Live Simulcasts

Tech·Ed Bloggers
Virtual Labs



http://microsoft.com/msdn

Developer's Kit, Licenses, and MORE!




Development Practices Resources

Be sure to visit the ALM & Development Practices booth in the TLC (RED section)




- Visual Studio Team System Panel Meet the Team Tuesday at 3:00 PM
- Let's Talk Application Lifecycle Management Panel Wednesday at 9:00 AM
- Michael Howard Book Signing
 - Thursday from 4:15 5:15
 Developer Tools & Languages (Blue) section of the TLC



Email: mikehow@microsoft.com

Blog: http://blogs.msdn.com/michael-howard/

Response Splitting in Pictures



Response Splitting in Code (1 of 2)

```
get.aspx
<% Response.Redirect("/getitem.aspx?item="</pre>
                                                 Vulnerable code
       + Request.QueryString("item") \( \) %>
/get.aspx?item=TwasMidnightInTheSchool
                                                 'Normal' request
/getitem.aspx?item=TwasMidnightInTheSchool
                                                 Which redirects to
/get.aspx?item=
 foo%0d%0aContent-Length:%200%0d%0a
                                                 An attack, poisons
 HTTP/1.1%20200%200K%0d%0a
                                                 a user's cookie
 Content-Type: %20text/html%0d%0a
                                                 with xyzzy
 Set-Cookie: %20xyzzy%0d%0a
                                                 (or worse!)
 Content-Length: %2020%0d%0a
 <html>Gotcha!</html>
```

Response Splitting in Code (2 of 2)

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2004 15:00:11 GMT
Location: http://foo.com/getitem.aspx?item=foo
Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
                              Completes the first response
Content-Type: text/html
Set-Cookie: xyzzy
Content-Length: 20
                             The forged HTTP Response
<html>Gotcha!</html>
                             from the Response.Redirect
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Type: text/html
```

