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### About <del>Us</del> Me



### Colin Watson

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Founder of Watson Hall Ltd, based in London, where his work involves the management of application risk, designing defensive measures, building security & privacy in to systems development and keeping abreast of relevant international legislation and standards. He holds a BSc in Chemical Engineering from Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh, and an MSc in Computation from the University of Oxford.

### Dennis Groves

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Co-founder of OWASP and a well known thought leader in application security who's work focuses on multidisciplinary approaches to information security risk management. He holds an MSc in Information Security from Royal Holloway, University of London.

# Universal Security Strategy



- If you can try to prevent bad guys getting to you
- If you cannot
  - try to detect and react before it succeeds
  - try to detect whether you've been compromised
- If you've been compromised
  - do incident response and clean up

### Risk Treatments



Tolerate: Do nothing

Transfer: Outsource the risk

Terminate: Eliminate the asset

• Treat: Reduce the risk

### Risk Reduction Methods



- Reducing the risk (treatment) is the most common strategy used today
  - Reduce the probability of a threat
  - Reduce the probability of a vulnerability
- Risk optimisation is rarely practiced, but is a highly effective method
  - Reduce the impact of an event

# Conventional Defensive Measures



- Perimeter defence
  - Packet Filters
  - Firewalls
  - Application layer (WAFs, filters, guards)
- Cryptographic communications
- Anti-Virus (AV)
- Network and host Intrusion
   Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS)

# Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems



## IDS/IPS

- Host based OSSEC, Tripwire, etc
- Network based Snort, etc
- Application based OWASP AppSensor.

# OWASP AppSensor



Moving detection & reaction into the application

# Application Defensive Measures



- Attack-aware detection
- Normal and malicious behavior
- Real-time response
- Evasion
- Unknown attacks

### Resilient Software



"Software Assurance goals promote the security and resilience of software across the development, acquisition, and operational lifecycle; as such, SwA is scoped to address trustworthiness, dependability (correct and predictable execution), conformance, and survivability."

"The resilient software of the future will require cyber defenses that are proactive, not reactive. Moreover, these defenses, as appropriate, need to marshal automated collective action to protect, detect, respond, and recover our cyber assets. They will categorize cyber attacks and provide a set of future cyber ecosystem capabilities to mitigate those attacks."

## AppSensor Guide v2



### In numbers

- 150 pages
- 41 tables
- 27 figures
- 24 chapters
- 7 case studies
- 6 demonstration implementations



#### **AppSensor Guide**

Application-Specific Real-Time Attack Detection & Response

Version 1.35 (Draft)

The OWASP AppSensor concept was originally created by Michael Coates and is an OWASP Labs Project producing releases ready for mainstream usage

Version 2 Authors and Editors

Dennis Groves, John Melton, 2?? 2??, ??? 2??, Colin Watson

Version 2 Reviewers

222, 222, 222

Version 1 Author Michael Coates

The AppSensor Guide is primarily written for those with software architecture responsibilities, but can also be read by developers and others with an interest in secure software; implementation requires a collaborative effort by development, operational and information security disciplines

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# Practical Deployment 1



#### Illustrative case studies

- Rapidly deployed web application
- Magazine's mobile app
- Smart grid consumer meter
- Financial market trading system
- B2B E-commerce website
- B2B web services
- Document management system

Gas and electricity smart meters are beginning to replace traditional meters and allow remote usage monitoring, configuration and can offer some benefits to both the supplier and consumer. Remote connectivity may use an embedded SIM card to connect with a mobile network provider, or in the case of broadband-connected home, utilize the existing WiFi connection. Customers often have concerns about privacy, confidentiality of data, difficulties in changing their supplier and health due to the use of mobile phone and WiFi technology.

Mobile technicians connect to smart meters using an infrared optical port which is more reliable in the many different locations that the meters can be installed in. The technicians use security codes to authenticate and then may alter the configuration or collect information. The long highly-random security codes could be identified by brute force and dictionary attacks.

The same functionality is also available remotely, but the optical port is much more exposed.

1. Identify attacks against authentication functions

# Practical Deployment 2



# Demonstration implementations

- Web services (AppSensor WS)
- Fully integrated (AppSensor Core)
- Light touch retrofit
- Invocation using Jni4Net
- Using an external log management system
- Leveraging a web application firewall

#### Format for each

- Introduction
- Description
- AppSensor scope
- Source code
- Implemenation
- Considerations
- Related implementations

# Example: Light Touch Retrofit



Windows Firewall
IIS Web Server
PHP Scripts
phpBB Application
PHP Application Server
MySQL Database Server
phpBB Database

# Detection and Event Analysis



Windows Firewall			
IIS Web Server			
PHP Scripts			
New custom code			
* Violation of Blacklist * Multiple Usernames * Large Number File Uploads * Force Browsing			
X Violation of Whitelist       X Multiple Passwords       X Honey Trap Data / Resource       X High Rate         Posts       ■ Event Manager       ■ Event Analysis Engine			
phpBB Application			
PHP Application Server			
MySQL Database Server			
phpBB Database	New custom tables  Event Store  Attack Store		

# Respond



Windows Firewall			
Disable Application for a Single U	lser		
IIS Web Server	3301		
iis web server			
PHP Scripts			
New custom code			
* Violation of Blacklist * Mult Browsing	ciple Usernames	* Large Number File Uploads	* Force
* Violation of Whitelist * Mult Posts	iple Passwords ger	★ Honey Trap Data / Resource □ Event Analysis Engine	
phpBB Application			
PHP Application Server			
MySQL Database Server			
phpBB Database	New custom table	es	
Disable Posts by a Single User	Event Store		
	Attack Store		

# Do More




Windows Firewall  Disable Application for a Single User				
IIS Web Server				
PHP Scripts				
New custom code				
* Violation of Blacklist * Multiple Usernames * Large Number File Uploads * Force Browsing				
* Violation of Whitelist * Multiple Passwords * Honey Trap Data / Resource * High Rate Posts Event Manager				
phpBB Application				
PHP Application Server				
MySQL Database Server				
phpBB Database New custom tables				
Disable Posts by a Single User				
☐ Attack Store				

# Currently Running



# A: With AppSensor



### B: Without

# **Project Contributors**



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### Forward Plan



### 2013

- Book finalisation and publication
  - DoHS design funding?
  - OWASP Reboot funding
- Completion on honeypot trial
- OWASP Cheat Sheet Series
  - Active Defense Cheat Sheet
- OWASP Code Review Guide
  - Review for active defense
- OWASP Testing Guide
  - Business logic tests?

# Beyond

- Standalone engine
- Reporting interface

## Project Resources



- Project home page https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ OWASP\_AppSensor\_Project
- Mailing lists
  - Project
     https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/ listinfo/owasp-appsensor-project
  - Development
     https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/ listinfo/owasp-appsensor-dev
- Resilient software https://buildsecurityin.uscert.gov/swa/topics/resilient-software
- CrossTalk Journal http://www.crosstalkonline.org/storag e/ issue-archives/2011/201109/201109-Watson.pdf

- Example detection points https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ AppSensor\_DetectionPoints
- Example responses
   https://www.owasp.org/index.php/
   AppSensor\_ResponseActions
- Book v1.1 (2008)
   http://www.lulu.com/shop/owasp-foundation/owasp-appsensor/paperback/product-4520003.html
- Book ₩2 v1.35 (2013)
   https://www.owasp.org/index.php/
   File:Owasp-appensor-guide-v2.doc
- High Interaction Honeypot Analysis Toolkit (HIHAT) http://hihat.sourceforge.net/s



- Comments
- Questions

- Feedback
  - What did you like most?
  - What did you like least?
  - What can be improved?
- Contribute to project

### Presentation



- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ File:Appseceu2013-appsensor.odp
- AppSecEU website