Security at scale: Web application security in a continuous deployment environment


OWASP AppSec DC – 4/4/2012 Zane Lackey

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About this talk

Web application security techniques that are simple and effective



<- What it (hopefully) isn't



Pushing to production **30 times a day** on average



(dogs push too)

What it boils down to (spoiler alert)

Make things safe by default

Detect risky functionality / Focus your efforts

Automate the easy stuff

Know when the house is burning down

- Traditional defenses for XSS
 - Input validation
 - Output encoding
- Let's illustrate this approach...



- Problems?
 - Often done on a per-input basis
 - Easy to miss an input or output
 - May use defenses in wrong context
 - Input validation pattern may blocks full HTML injection, but not injecting inside JS
 - May put defenses on the client side in JS
 - Etc, ...

These problems miss the point

 The real problem is that finding these issues across a codebase is hard

• How can we make it simpler?

Input validation
Output encoding

Input validationOutput encoding

Input encoding? Input encoding.


 Encode dangerous HTML characters to HTML entities at the very start of your framework

Before input reaches main application code

On the surface this doesn't seem like much of a change

Except, we've just made lots of XSS problems grep-able

Th yeah!




- Now we look for two things:
 - Code that opts out of platform protections
 - HTML entity decoding functions or string replacements on certain characters

- Obviously not a panacea
 - Javascript: URLs
 - DOM based XSS
 - Is a pain during internationalization efforts

Focus your efforts

Focus your efforts



Focus your efforts

Continuous deployment means code ships fast

 Things will go out the door before security team knows about them

How can we detect high risk functionality?

 Know when sensitive portions of the codebase have been modified

- Build automatic change alerting on the codebase
 - Identify sensitive portions of the codebase
 - Create automatic alerting on modifications

Doesn't have to be complex to be effective

Approach:

- sha1sum sensitive platform level files
- Hourly/daily unit tests alert if hash of the file changes
- Notifies security team on changes, drives code review

 Watched items typically entire files at the platform level, specific methods at the feature level

 Identifying sensitive methods is part of initial code review/pen test of new features

Watch for dangerous functions

- Usual candidates:
 - File system operations
 - Process execution/control
 - HTML decoding (if you're input encoding)

- Grep codebase for dangerous functions as hourly/daily unit tests
 - Split into separate high risk/low risk lists

 Alerts are emailed to the appsec team, drive code reviews

Monitor application traffic

- Purpose is twofold:
 - Detecting risky functionality that was missed by earlier processes
 - Groundwork for attack detection and verification

- Regex incoming requests at the framework
 - Sounds like performance nightmare, shockingly isn't

- Look for HTML/JS in request
 - This creates a huge number of false positives
 - That's by design, we refine the search later

 We deliberately want to cast a wide net to see where HTML is entering the application

- From there, build a baseline of
 - The amount of traffic containing HTML
 - The features in the application that receive HTML

- What to watch for:
 - Did a new endpoint suddenly show up?
 - A new risky feature might've just shipped

- Did the amount of traffic containing HTML just significantly go up?
 - Something worth looking at is likely happening

Automate the easy stuff

Automate the easy stuff



Automate the easy stuff

 Automate finding simple issues to free up resources for more complex tasks

Use attacker traffic to automatically drive testing

We call it Attacker Driven Testing

- Some cases where this is useful:
 - Application faults
 - Reflected XSS
 - SQLi

Application faults (HTTP 5xx errors)

- As a pentester, these are one of the first signs of weakness in an app
 - As a defender, pay attention to them!

 Just watching for 5xx errors results in a lot of ephemeral issues that don't reproduce

Instead:

- Grab last X hours worth of 5xx errors from access logs
- Replay the original request
- Alert on any requests which still return a 5xx

Cron this script to run every few hours

 If a request still triggers an application fault hours later, it's worth investigating

Similar methodology for reflected XSS

- For reflected XSS we:
 - Identify requests containing basic XSS payloads
 - Replay the request
 - Alert if the XSS payload executed


- Basic payloads commonly used in testing for XSS:
 - alert()
 - document.write()
 - unescape()
 - eval()
 - etc

 We created a tool to use NodeJS as a headless browser with full JavaScript

- Methodology:
 - Replay the request (but don't interpret it yet)
 - Prepend instrumented JS that flags if a method has been executed
 - Interpret response with our instrumented JS
 - Check if execution flags have been set
 - Alert

Doesn't have to be NodeJS

 Can also use a browser driven via Watir/Selenium



Graph early, graph often

Which of these is a quicker way to spot a problem?

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```



- Methodology:
 - Instrument application to collect data points
 - Fire them off to an aggregation backend
 - Build data visualization dashboards

- We've open sourced our instrumentation library
 - https://github.com/etsy/statsd

Now we can visually spot attacks

But who's watching at 4AM?

 In addition to data visualizations, we need automatic alerting

 Look at the raw data to see if it exceeds certain thresholds


Works well for graphs like this...





But not like this...









We need to smooth out graphs that follow usage patterns

 Use exponential smoothing formulas like Holt-Winters

Math is hard, let's look at screenshots!







Now that we've smoothed out the graphs...

- Use the same approach as before:
 - Grab the raw data
 - Look for values above/below a set threshold
 - Alert



Don't turn the Internet switch off

Make things safe by default

Focus your efforts / Detect risky functionality

Automate the easy stuff

If you haven't heckled yet, now is your last chance

Thanks!



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