

# Cloud encryption – Encrypt all the things!

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German Owasp Day 2014

#### About me

 Security researcher at SAP SE walter.tighzert@sap.com

Focus on search over encrypted data



- Randomized encryption
- Deterministic encryption
- Order preserving encryption
- Homomorphic encryption

Animal cat dog cat

encryption

Animal

09122014...

080012...

0171633...

SQL operators: SELECT, COUNT

AES - CBC



- Randomized encryption
- Deterministic encryption
- Order preserving encryption
- Homomorphic encryption

Animal cat dog cat

encryption

Animal

09122014...

080012...

09122014...

SQL operators: =, DISTINCT, GROUP BY, JOIN

**AES-ECB** 



- Randomized encryption
- Deterministic encryption
- Order preserving encryption
- Homomorphic encryption

Animal
cat
cat
dog

encryption

Animal

0171633...

0171633...

080012...

SQL operators: <, ORDER BY

**BOLDYREVA** 



- Randomized encryption
- Deterministic encryption
- Order preserving encryption
- Homomorphic encryption

ENC(f(x,y)) = g(ENC(x),ENC(y))

SQL operators: SUM

**PAILLIER** 



SELECT animal, SUM(food)
 FROM animals
 WHERE quantity > 1
 GROUP BY animal



SELECT animal\_RND, SUM(food\_HOM)
 FROM animals
 WHERE quantity\_OPE > 05ef
 GROUP BY animal\_DET



# Agenda

- Motivation
- State of the art
- Demo
- Challenges



## **Motivation - Cloud**

 From personal finance (<u>Mint</u>) to company finance (<u>Workday</u>)


What happens with my data?

Encryption?






## Cloud scenario






## Solution 1: between DaaS and SaaS





## Solution 1: between DaaS and SaaS

- Attacker model: DaaS honest but curious
- CryptDB






## Solution 1: between DaaS and SaaS

	Advantages	Disadvantages
١	Complex queries supported	Encryption keys in the cloud
	Transparent for the application	Plaintext on the SaaS



#### Solution 2: between End User and SaaS





#### Solution 2: between End User and SaaS

- Attacker model: SaaS honest but curious
- Commercial solutions from 3<sup>rd</sup> parties (<u>CipherCloud</u>, <u>Vaultive</u>...)
- HTTP Encryption Proxy for specific applications
- No application changes possible




#### Solution 2: between End User and SaaS

Advantages	Disadvantages
Keys stay at the customer	Only a few applications are supported
	Proxy at the customer
	Simple queries (only textual values)



#### Solution 3: between Browser and End User





#### Solution 3: between Browser and End User

- New attacker model: SaaS malicious/ compromised
- Research prototypes: <u>ShadowCrypt</u>, <u>Mylar</u>...
- Plaintext is encapsulated in a sandbox




#### Solution 3: between Browser and End User

CONNECT. LEARN. GROW.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Sandbox	Browser-specific
Lightweight client	Key management
	Simple queries (only textual values)



## Healthcare Application






## Healthcare Application

Only JOIN and simple WHERE conditions





## Sales Dashboard





### Sales Dashboard

 Complex queries with SUM and ORDER BY SUM (not supported on encrypted data)





## Sales Dashboard

 Complex queries with SUM and ORDER BY SUM (not supported on encrypted data)







## Challenges


- Not supported functions:
  - ORDER BY SUM
  - LIKE/FUZZY search queries
- Business logic on the server:

```
TOTAL = SUM(PRICE);
IF TOTAL > 200 THEN TOTAL *= 0.9;
```

-> move it to the client?



## Final Words – Trade-off





# Thanks for your attention

CONNECT

LEARN

GROW

Questions/remarks?

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#### Sources

- Mint: <a href="https://www.mint.com/images/rd/features/overview\_hero.png">https://www.mint.com/images/rd/features/overview\_hero.png</a>
- CryptDB: <a href="http://css.csail.mit.edu/cryptdb/cryptdbdiag.jpg">http://css.csail.mit.edu/cryptdb/cryptdbdiag.jpg</a>
- Cloud scenario: <u>benny@fuhry.de</u>

