

# An Introduction to Dynamic Analysis for R.E.

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#### Objectives

- Program Analysis Review
- Tools of the Trade: Debuggers
- Fuzzing
- Symbolic Execution
- Demonstrations
- Other Resources
- Concluding Thoughts / Questions

#### Program Analysis Review

program/binary analysis

"How does this program behave under the hood?"

- Analyzing and reasoning with properties and behaviors of a computer program, in order to gain a deeper intrinsic understanding
  - Often times with compiled programs, we are stuck without source!

- Static vs dynamic analysis; Can someone explain the difference?
  - Static recovering properties and extrapolating information from a program
  - **Dynamic** gaining an understanding of how a program behaves during its runtime





- Limitations of static analysis Can someone name a few?
  - Does not account and anticipate for behaviors occurring during execution
  - Optimal for more manual reverse engineering
- Dynamic Analysis Tools
  - Hook onto a program, observe their behavior when run with an input, and reason about their functionality during execution
- Limitations of dynamic analysis
  - Can be slower than static analysis
  - Won't provide most insight for environmental side effects (program interacting with operating system facilities)
  - \*Need program coverage!
    - We can therefore explore how program behaves *under every single path*

## Tools of the Trade: Debuggers

- Debuggers allow you to introspectively trace through the execution of a program
  - Understand program crashes
  - Reason about functionality at a machine-level
  - Help write exploits
- Important functionality include:
  - Inspecting memory regions and offsets
  - Pause during runtime by setting breakpoints
  - Read register values
  - Trace child processes
  - Provide an interface to build analysis plugins to gain automate meaningful debugging
- Let's take a look at gdb / pwndbg!

```
RCX 0x7fffffffeca8 → 0x7fffffffeeaf ← 0x4f494e4f48545950 ('PYTHONIO'
RDI 0x7ffff7ffe168 - 0x0
    0x7ffffffffe6f8 - 0x0
    0x4006b0 ← xor ebp, ebp
R13 0x7ffffffffec90 - 0x1
R14 0x0
R15 0x0
                0x7fffffffec98 -> 0x7fffffffee7b -
0x2f6465726168532f ('/Shared/')
                0x7fffffffeca8 → 0x7ffffffffeeaf ← 0x4f494e4f48545950 ('PYTHONIO')
4:0020
                0x7fffffffecb0 → 0x7ffffffffeec6 ← 0x79786f72705f6f6e ('no_proxy')
                0x7fffffffecb8 → 0x7fffffffeee3 ← 0x454d414e54534f48 ('HOSTNAME'
                0x7fffffffecc0 → 0x7fffffffeef9 ← 0x313d4c564c4853 /* 'SHLVL=1' *,
                0x7ffffffffecc8 → 0x7ffffffffef01 ← 'HOME=/root'
         7ffffffffee7b
```

Pwndbg (http://pwndbg.re/)

## Using pwndbg

- Let's define our workflow:
  - 1. Do an initial **static analysis** and recover basic information.
  - 2. **Trace** through the execution of the program from the entry point.
  - 3. **Find** our memory offsets of interest.
  - 4. **Analyze** behavior when EIP is at points of interest
  - 5. Craft an appropriate payload and/or build up your exploit
  - 6. **PWN**!

Functionality	Command	Usage Example
Examine Memory	x <addr></addr>	x/i 0xdeadbeef
Set Breakpoint	b <symbol> or b <addr></addr></symbol>	b my_function
Look at memory offsets	vmmap or info proc map	vmmap
Step Through Program	si or ni or c	si
Attack process	attach <pid></pid>	attach 5431
Set register values	set <reg> = value</reg>	set \$rip = 0x1000

#### Demo

Let's examine how a license validator works under the hood!

https://github.com/osirislab/Hack-Night/blob/master/Rev/dynamic/license\_validator/

# Other Notable Debugging Tools

- strace / ltrace
  - Run a program, get every system call (strace) and library call (ltrace)
     made during its execution
- Valgrind
  - Run a program and check for memory violations
- exploitable
  - GDB plugin that can determine possible exploit primitives during runtime
- rr (record-replay)
  - Tool with GDB extensions that allow one to record and replay snapshots of a program being run

# **Dynamic Analysis Techniques**

- Fuzzing
  - Symbolic Execution

#### **Fuzzing** - The "Dumb" Method\*


- Throw garbage at a program, and see what crashes we can get
  - (Hopefully they are exploitable!)
- Mutational vs Generational fuzzing
- \*Dumb, but surprisingly effective.

```
int status = myFunctionality(input);
if (status < 1) {
    // Can we find an input that can
    // hit this condition?
    fail_and_panic();
}</pre>
```


```
american fuzzy lop 0.47b (readpng)
                                                            overall results
 process timina
       run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 4 min, 43 sec
                                                            cycles done : 0
 last new path: 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 26 sec
                                                            total paths: 195
last uniq crash : none seen yet
                                                           uniq crashes: 0
                  0 days, 0 hrs, 1 min, 51 sec
                                                             uniq hangs: 1
cycle progress
                                            map density : 1217 (7.43%)
now processing : 38 (19.49%)
paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)
                                         count coverage : 2.55 bits/tuple
                                         findings in depth
now trying : interest 32/8
                                         favored paths : 128 (65.64%)
stage execs : 0/9990 (0.00%)
                                         new edges on: 85 (43.59%)
                                                         0 (0 unique)
                                         total crashes :
exec speed: 2306/sec
                                           total hangs : 1 (1 unique)
fuzzing strategy yields
bit flips : 88/14.4k, 6/14.4k, 6/14.4k
byte flips: 0/1804, 0/1786, 1/1750
                                                           pending: 178
arithmetics: 31/126k, 3/45.6k, 1/17.8k
known ints: 1/15.8k, 4/65.8k, 6/78.2k
                                                          pend fav : 114
                                                          imported : 0
      havoc: 34/254k, 0/0
                                                          variable: 0
       trim : 2876 B/931 (61.45% gain)
                                                            latent : 0
```

American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) https://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/

# **Fuzzing**



# **Fuzzing**




- Reads and validates your input
- Parses your input
- Perform some functionality, and validate its execution


```
#include <my_json_impl.h>
  JSON file -> Object -> JSON dump 1
    Check if JSON file == JSON dump
 */
int main(int argc, char *argv□)
    /* `argv[1]` is a JSON input test we read from */
    char *input = readFromFile(argv[1]);
    size_t size = getFileInputSize(argv[1]);
    /* Parse our input, and an initial validation check */
    json_t *object = json_parse(input, size);
    object.validate();
    /* Dump back as a string */
    char *dump_output = object.dump();
    size_t dump_size = object.dump_size();
    /* Check against our original input! */
    CHECK(input, dump_output);
    exitSuccessfully();
```

#### JSON Example (https://github.com/osirislab/Hack-Nig ht/blob/master/Rev/dynamic/fuzz\_exa mple.c)

# **Fuzzing**



# **Fuzzing**



```
#include <my_json_impl.h>
  JSON file -> Object -> JSON dump 1
    Check if JSON file == JSON dump
 */
int main(int argc, char *argv□)
    /* `argv[1]` is a JSON input test we read from */
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    object.validate();
    /* Dump back as a string */
    char *dump_output = object.dump();
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    /* Check against our original input! */
    CHECK(input, dump_output);
    exitSuccessfully();
```

- What are testing? Serialization and deserialization for a parser library
  - We want to find inputs that make our library crash.
  - Crashes may mean edge cases that the library did not account for.
- How are we testing? We check to see if the library properly serializes an input back to the original
  - The code demonstrates good coverage of the functionality, especially as we validate along the way


#### Demo

Finding and Exploiting CVE-2014-0160

https://github.com/osirislab/Hack-Night/blob/master/Rev/dynamic/heartbleed\_fuzz/

#### **Symbolic Execution** - The "Smarter" Method

- Can we automatically generate all possible input test cases that can reach this point of program execution?
- Analyzing a program under a symbolic model / representation to logically reason about execution
  - We represent conditional forks as path constraints using a logical representation called SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theorem)
  - Find solutions and generating interesting inputs == solving path constraints



```
void foo(int z)
    fail("%d is less than 10! Bad!", z);
void bar(int z)
    doSomething(z);
    exitSuccessfully();
int main(int argc, char *argv□)
    int x = int(argv[0]);
    int y = int(argv[1]);
   int z = x + y
    if (x < 5 & y < 5)
        foo(z)
        bar(z)
```

```
void foo(int z)
    fail("%d is less than 10! Bad!", z);
void bar(int z)
    doSomething(z);
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int main(int argc, char *argv□)
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```

#### **Symbolic Representation**

$$π := T$$

$$x := α$$

$$y := β$$

```
void foo(int z)
    fail("%d is less than 10! Bad!", z);
void bar(int z)
    doSomething(z);
    exitSuccessfully();
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
    int x = int(argv[0]);
    int y = int(argv[1]);
    int z = x + y
    if (x < 5 & y < 5)
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#### **Symbolic Representation**

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void foo(int z)
    fail("%d is less than 10! Bad!", z);
void bar(int z)
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int main(int argc, char *argv□)
   int x = int(argv[0]);
    int y = int(argv[1]);
    int z = x + y
    if (x < 5 & y < 5)
        foo(z)
        bar(z)
```

#### <u>Symbolic Representation</u>

$$x := \alpha$$
  
 $y := \beta$ 

 $\pi := T$ 

$$z := \alpha + \beta$$

$$\pi := \alpha \ge 5 \land \beta \ge 5$$

Fail branch!

 $\pi := \alpha < 5 \land \beta <$ 

5

ch! Success branch!

```
void foo(int z)
    fail("%d is less than 10! Bad!", z);
void bar(int z)
    doSomething(z);
    exitSuccessfully();
int main(int argc, char *argv□)
    int x = int(argv[0]);
    int y = int(argv[1]);
    int z = x + y
    if (x < 5 & y < 5)
        foo(z)
        bar(z)
```

#### **Symbolic Representation**

$$z := x + y$$
  
 $z := \alpha + \beta$ 

$$\pi := \alpha < 5 \ \land \ \beta < \qquad \qquad \pi := \alpha \ge 5 \ \land \ \beta \ge 5$$
 
$$5$$
 Fail branch! Success branch!

#### **Symbolic Executor Outputs:**

5

- Success Branch: x = 6, y = 5
- Fail Branch: x = 0, y = 0

#### **Symbolic Execution**

- Current standard tooling:
  - Angr
  - Manticore
  - KLEE
- Still being heavily researched and developed
  - Slow
  - Path explosion problem!
- Why do we care if fuzzing can find a lot of bugs?
  - Extract fine-grained test cases from complexity
  - SE can help provide verification- useful for mission-critical systems



Manticore (https://github.com/trailofbits/manticore)



Angr (https://angr.io)

#### Demo

Let's go back and break our license key validator!

https://github.com/osirislab/Hack-Night/blob/master/Rev/dynamic/license\_validator

#### Other Cool Tools and Platforms

- radare2
- Microsoft Security Risk Detection (SAGE)
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security-risk-detection/
- BAP (CMU's Binary Analysis Platform)
  - https://github.com/BinaryAnalysisPlatform/bap
- PANDA (NYU/MIT/NU's whole-system malware analysis sandbox)
  - https://github.com/panda-re/panda
- Cyber Reasoning Systems (CRSes)
  - Mechanical Phish <a href="https://github.com/mechaphish">https://github.com/mechaphish</a>

#### Other Resources



- awesome-dynamic-analysis
  - https://github.com/analysis-tools-dev/dynamic-analysis
- /r/ReverseEngineering
  - https://www.reddit.com/r/ReverseEngineering/
- Google's work in fuzzing
  - https://qithub.com/qoogle/fuzzing
- Andriesse, Dennis. Practical Binary Analysis
  - https://nostarch.com/binaryanalysis
- Related Concentration: Malware Analysis

#### Closing Thoughts

- Other dynamic analysis techniques to explore:
  - Dynamic taint analysis (DTA)
  - Program slicing
  - Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI)
  - o ... and so on!
- Use in tandem with static analysis tools and plugins for effective analyses!
- Program analysis R&D is valuable to industry!



# Questions?