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Upwardly Mobile: Looking at Evolving Cybercrime Tactics in Mobile Malware



Connect **to**
Protect

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Agenda



- Introduction
- Evolution of mobile credential theft malware
- Evolution of mobile ransomware
- Outlook and implications
- Application

- Cyber crime: abuses of computer systems for profit
- Our focus: cyber criminal mobile malware



Introduction | Mobile Threat Taxonomy



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GENERAL THREAT

- Call Fraud
- Phishing Email

MOBILE- TAILORED

- Phishing Sites
- Exploit Kits

MOBILE ONLY

- Malicious Apps
- SMS-Based Threats

Introduction | Mobile Malware Taxonomy



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DATA THEFT

Credential Theft

SMS Interception

Spyware / RAT



SERVICE MANIPULATION

SMS & USSD Interaction

Click Fraud

Premium Number Fraud

Appstore Purchases



FINANCIAL EXACTION

Ransomware

Fake AV



TRAFFIC GENERATION

DDoS

TDoS



ENABLING

Self-Spreading

Loader

Privilege Escalation



DISTRIBUTION

Illicit App Hosting


Disguised App

Malicious Update

Supply Chain

Mobile Credential Theft Malware

- Compromises user accounts with online banking and other services



A screenshot of a mobile banking login interface. At the top, it says "Mobile Banking". Below that are input fields for "Card/Access Number", "Security Number", and "Issue Number". There is a "Remember me" checkbox and an "Internet Password" field. At the bottom is a red "LOGON" button.

Mobile Ransomware

- Blocks access or functionality, demands ransom to restore



Introduction | Focus



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Mobile Credential Theft Malware

Consumer Service Fraud



Mobile Ransomware

Operational Disruption



Corporate Account Fraud



Data Loss



Poor Device User Experience



- Why this focus?
 - Recent emergence
 - Rapid maturation
 - Significant threats


Mobile Credential Theft Malware



Credential Theft | History



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- **Campaigns affecting 100s – 1,000s of victims likely regular**
- Market leaders observable; competitors regularly emerge
- Target increasingly numerous banks & other organizations in multiple regions
- Compromises multiple authentication factors simultaneously
- Infects Android devices



Windows malware “injects”

- Modify victim’s experience of online service or interact with service
- Emerged following online banking security enhancements
- Diverse implementations created: circumvent MFA, record or modify displayed data, automate transfers...

Android malware “injects”


- Modify victims’ experience of device in general or specific app
- Emerged following mobile banking and payment apps
- Current implementation is primarily credential solicitation w/ other features used for MFA circumvention

Credential Theft | Case Study



Mazar: Latest Tool from Established Developer

- Credential theft / “injects”
 - Overlay legitimate app or standalone window
 - Multiple triggers



Credential Theft | Case Study



- Identified targets
 - **Services:** Online banking, payment cards, eCommerce, social media, communications
 - **Regions:** North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific
- Additional targets likely resulting from on-demand development efforts

Credential Theft | Case Study




- Data gathered
 - **Online Banking:** Username, Password, MFA information
 - **Payment Card:** Number, Expiration, CVV, Name, PIN, 3-D Secure
 - **eCommerce:** Username, Password

A screenshot of a mobile application interface showing a billing address form. The form is titled "Please enter your billing address to be stored in your Google account." and contains several input fields: "Cardholder name", "Date of birth", "Postal code", "Street address", and "Phone number" (with a "+" icon for the country code). A green "Continue" button is located at the bottom right of the form. The background is a dark grey, and the bottom of the screen shows a standard Android navigation bar with back, home, and recent apps icons.


Credential Theft | Case Study



■ Additional compromise vectors



Credential Theft | Monetization






Mobile Ransomware



Ransomware | History



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
- **Accounts for large share of recent mobile infections**
- Primarily block device functionality; some encryption
- Linked to affiliate programs in eCrime marketplace
- Victims selected by country; increasingly global problem
- Primarily infects Android devices
 - Similar tactics applied to iOS through non-malware tools

Ransomware | Case Study



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- **Simplocker:** First identified mobile ransomware to encrypt victims' files
- Distribution
 - Disguised as legitimate applications, often adult-themed
 - Hosted on fake Google Play sites



Ransomware | Case Study



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- Extortive Behavior
 - Displays locked-device warning
 - Encrypts files on SD card: images, videos, documents
- Other Features
 - Collects device information, likely for campaign management
 - Jabber/XMPP-based C&C





- Estimated average ransom amounts: \$300 to \$500 per victim device
- Commercial ransomware kits and services enable campaign operators to customize ransom amounts
- Victims forced to contribute to laundering process via payment in easily-handled currency

Outlook





- Geographic and sector scope of targeted services to expand
- Likely development focus: manipulating legitimate apps
 - **Interact** with specific apps
 - **Steal credentials** users enter legitimately
 - **Modify** app behavior



CREDENTIALS



RANSOMWARE

- Effects likely to remain focused on blocking functionality
 - Encryption of uncertain value
- Tools moving into commoditization stage → potentially rapid growth in distribution and use



- Capabilities increasingly mirror conventional computer malware
- Increasing specialization leading to growing incidents
- Effective distribution tactics to be a focus
- Device targeting to expand slowly
- Conflict over maximizing malware functions and utility
 - **Pros:** Greatest benefit from overcoming installation challenges
 - **Cons:** Increased support difficulty and likelihood of remediation

Application





- **Maintain mobile device replacement capability or workaround** to avoid productivity and accessibility disruptions
- **Ensure regular OS updates** to maintain security posture
- **Develop mobile device investigation capability** to assess incidents
- **Avoid isolated data on mobile devices** to limit impact of functionality loss
- **Achieve standalone, service-side fraud detection measures** to address account compromise without discernable client-side anomalies



Questions?

