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The Psychology of Info Sec



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
Agenda

- Chapter 1: Info Sec the sell
- Chapter 2: Human decision making in risky situations
- Chapter 3: Persuasion
- Chapter 4: Towards an Info Sec safety culture
- Chapter 5: What next?

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Info Sec - the sell





The Info Sec Salesman

Who here today is an Info Sec salesman?







The Info Sec Salesman

- A conversation with your CFO
 - CISO: This year I need \$1 000 000 more for my security program
 - CFO: How much did you spend last year?
 - CISO: Just what was budgeted
 - CFO: Anything bad happen?
 - CISO: No, nothing
 - CFO: Great! Keep up the good work.





Chapter 1: The Info Sec Sell

- What do you do?
- How much does it cost?
- What value does it provide?






Chapter 1: The Info Sec Sell

- Risk
 - Rewarded
 - Unrewarded
- The flipside of risk is Opportunity

Revenue
Reputation
Resilience
Regulation



Source: www.sabsa.org




Chapter 1: The Info Sec Sell

- Selling business value through the realisation of rewarded risk and the mitigation of unrewarded risk
- The objective of the Info Sec function is to manage risks to an acceptable level
- The specific risks to be managed will differ between organisations as will the level of tolerable or acceptable risk

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Human decision making in risky situations






- Decisions involve risk
- Kahneman and Tversky





| | System 1 | System 2 |
|-----------------|---|--|
| Characteristics | Triggers emotions Looks for causation Effortless Unconscious Associative Looks for patterns Creates stories to explain events | Slow Effortful Conscious Logical Deliberative Can handle abstract concepts |
| Advantages | Speed of response in a crisis Easy completion of routine or repetitive tasks Creativity through associations, so good for expansive thinking | Allows reflection and consideration of the "bigger picture", options, pros and cons, consequences Can handle logic, Good for maths, statistics reductive thinking |
| Disadvantages | Jumps to Unhelpful emotional conclusions responses Can make errors that are not detected and corrected, such as wrong assumptions, poor judgements, false causal links | Slow, so requires time Requires effort and energy, which can lead to decision fatigue |



Source: http://electia.co.uk/tag/daniel-kahneman/



"If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how many minutes does it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?"

◆ The answer "100 minutes" leaps to mind (System 1 at work), but it is wrong. But a bit of reflective thought (by System 2) leads to "five minutes," the right answer.

#RSAC

An individual has been described as follows:

"Steve is very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful but with very little interest in people or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and structure, and a passion for detail."

Is Steve more likely to be a librarian, a pilot, surgeon or a farmer?



Heuristics





- Representativeness
- Availability
- Adjustment and anchoring




- Biases
 - Optimism bias
 - Hindsight bias
 - Confirmation bias





Prospect theory





- Scenario One The test subject was asked to pick between:
 - Option A: A 100% chance of losing \$3000 or
 - Option B: An 80% chance of losing \$4000, and a 20% chance of losing nothing.

- Scenario Two Next, choose between:
 - Option C: A 100% chance of receiving \$3000 or
 - Option D: An 80% chance of receiving \$4000, and a 20% chance of receiving nothing.



- Scenario One: An epidemic breaks out that is likely to kill 600 people if left untreated.
 - Treatment strategy A: will save 200 people.
 - Treatment strategy B: has 1/3 chance of saving 600 people and 2/3 chance of saving nobody.

- Scenario Two: An epidemic breaks out that is likely to kill 600 people if left untreated.
 - Treatment strategy C: 400 people will die.
 - Treatment strategy D: there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.



Mental models





Risk and decision making in groups





- Risk communications and the factors influencing the persuasiveness of a message
 - Order effects
 - One-sided vs two-sided presentations
 - Simplicity and repetition
 - Message medium






- Combating biases
 - Before finalising a decision, imagine that, a year after it has been made, it has turned out horribly, then write a history of how it went wrong and why
 - hbr.org/2011/06/the-big-idea-before-you-make-that-big-decision


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Persuasion







"Influence means change and moving people in a particular direction" – Robert Cialdini



- People repay in kind
- Free stuff
- Disabled American Veterans organisation improved response (donations) from 18% to 35% by enclosing a small gift – address labels
- 'Sure glad to help. I know how important it is for me to count on your help when I need it"





- People want more of what they can have less of
- People are motivated to act by the idea of losing something rather than gaining that very thing





- People like those that like them
- No 1 rule of sales is to like the other person
- Bargaining by email





- People follow the lead of similar others
- Restaurant menus, "These are our most popular dishes", increased sales from 13% to 20%





- People align with their public commitments
- UK Doctors surgery reduced no show appointments by 18%
- "What would you like to achieve?"
- "When you made that decision in the past, I have no doubt it was the right on, but circumstances have changed. Let me show you how."






- People defer to experts
- Trustworthiness
- "The credible communicator who has both expertise and trustworthiness is the single most powerful communicator that social science has ever uncovered"
- Mention a drawback



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Towards an Info Sec safety culture





People, people people





Figure 3 The 2015 Black Hat Attendee Survey

Which consume the greatest portion of your IT security spending or budget? Accidental data leaks by end users who fail to follow security policy Sophisticated attacks targeted directly at the organization Internal mistakes or external attacks that cause my organization to lose compliance with industry or regulatory requirements Security vulnerabilities introduced through the purchase of off-the-shelf applications or systems Phishing, social network exploits or other forms of social engineering Security vulnerabilities introduced by my own application development team Polymorphic malware that evades signature-based defenses Data theft or sabotage by malicious insiders in the organization Attacks or exploits on cloud services, applications, or storage systems used by my organization Attacks or exploits brought into the organization via mobile devices Espionage or surveillance by foreign governments or competitors Attacks on suppliers, contractors, or other partners that are connected to my organization's network Data theft, sabotage, or disclosure by "hacktivists" or politically-motivated attackers Digital attacks on non-computer devices and systems - the Internet of Things Surveillance by my own government

Note: Maximum of three responses allowed Data: UBM survey of 460 security professionals, June 2015

| Of the following threats and challenges, which are of the greatest concern to you? Sophisticated attacks targeted directly at the organization Phishing, social network exploits or other forms of social engineering 46% Accidental data leaks by end users who fail to follow security policy 21% Polymorphic malware that evades signature-based defenses 20% Espionage or surveillance by foreign governments or competitors 20% Security vulnerabilities introduced by my own application development team 20% Data theft or sabotage by malicious insiders in the organization 17% Attacks or exploits on cloud sexploites, applications, or storage systems used by my organization 16% Internal mistakes or external attacks that cause my organization to lose compliance with industry |
|--|
| Sophisticated attacks targeted directly at the organization Phishing, social network exploits or other forms of social engineering 46% Accidental data leaks by end users who fail to follow security policy 21% Polymorphic malware that evades signature-based defenses 20% Espionage or surveillance by foreign governments or competitors 20% Security vulnerabilities introduced by my own application development team 20% Data theft or sabotage by malicious insiders in the organization 17% Attacks or exploits on cloud services, applications, or storage systems used by my organization 16% |
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| 16% |
| Internal mistakes or external attacks that cause my organization to lose compliance with industry |
| or regulatory requirements |
| Security vulnerabilities introduced through the purchase of off-the-shelf applications or systems 13% |
| Attacks on suppliers, contractors, or other partners that are connected to my organization's network |
| Data theft, sabotage, or disclosure by "hacktivists" or politically-motivated attackers |
| Surveillance by my own government 9% |
| Attacks or exploits brought into the organization via mobile devices |
| Digital attacks on non-computer devices and systems – the Internet of Things 7% |

Note: Maximum of three responses allowed Data: UBM survey of 460 security professionals, June 2015



- What is a safety culture?
- Product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an organisations health and safety management (http://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/topics/common4.pdf)
- The way we do things around here
- A set of attitudes, beliefs or norms
- Change "health and safety" to information security






Figure 1 - A Three Aspect Approach to Safety Culture (based upon Cooper, 2000)




- Activating the human firewall
 - What is security awareness?
 - Are you just checking the box?
 - Security awareness is not easy!
 - Engage, engage, engage
 - Measure, measure, measure
 - Have reasonable expectations
 - Reinforce, reinforce, reinforce





FIGURE 1. Mental models risk communication framework






- Implementing a safety culture
 - Who's Info Sec safety culture consists of "broadcasting" facts?
- Framing risk communications
- Mental models differ between lay people and technical experts
- Determine the difference
- Tailor your Info Sec safety culture messages



- Simply communicating facts such as policies, does not work
- Focus on the needs of your audience






Resources

- Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
 - psiexp.ss.uci.edu/research/teaching/Tversky_Kahneman_1974.pdf
- Affect, risk and decision making
 - www.skidmore.edu/~hfoley/Exp.Labs/Lab%203.S06/Slovic_2005.pdf
- Prospect Theory
 - www.princeton.edu/~kahneman/docs/Publications/prospect_theory.pdf
- www.securingthehuman.org
- scf.roer.com
- www.restrictedintelligence.co.uk

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What next?





Chapter 5: What Next?

- Summary
 - Info sec is selling business value through rewarded and unrewarded risk
 - Heuristics and biases impact decision making when risk is involved
 - How to persuade effectively
 - How to activate the human firewall
 - Synergies between a safety culture and security awareness
 - Mental model approach to implementing a safety culture



Chapter 5: What Next?

- Next week you should:
 - Revisit your organisation's business strategy
 - Identify the business value your info sec function can provide
 - Review your security strategy
- In the first three months following this presentation you should:
 - Review and assess your info sec safety program (security awareness)
 - Start selling info sec more effectively through persuasion and understanding how risk based decisions are made (heuristics and bias)
 - Start framing risk communications more effectively
 - Start selling business value



Chapter 5: What Next?

- Within six months you should:
 - Determine your audience's mental model as it relates to your Info Sec safety and broader programs and respond accordingly









Contact me

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