

RSA[®]Conference2019

San Francisco | March 4–8 | Moscone Center



BETTER.

SESSION ID: HT-F03

The Etiology of Vulnerability Exploitation

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Today's Journey...

- Describing the Vulnerability Landscape
- Measuring the Effectiveness of Vulnerability Remediation
- What contributes to exploitation?


Data Sources





Data Sources


**REVERSING
LABS**


**EXPLOIT
DATABASE**




















4

NVD


CSS

**CPA**
common platform enumeration


CWE

7.3 billion exploitation attempts (12 mos.)
2.8 billion scanned vulnerabilities
13 million assets


Simplified View of Vulnerabilities



Simplified View of Vulnerabilities




Simplified View of Vulnerabilities




The World of CVEs

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
Source: Kenna / Cyentia

Things Happen Quick




Source: Kenna / Cyentia

Simplified View of Vulnerabilities




The World of CVEs (counting by CVEs)



Source: Keena / Cyentia


Published CVEs

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


Published CVEs

There are 108k published CVEs...



Of those, 37k CVEs are observed in real environments...




Of those, only 5k CVEs have exploits




■ = 100 CVEs (rounded)

...you care about these


What about Volume of Open Vulns?




Simplified View of Vulnerabilities



Is CVSS used to prioritize IRL?




The Vendor Role in Remediation?





Top 3 Vendors


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Top 3 Vendors



Top Products going unpatched




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
**A Quick aside on remediation
times...**

An abstract graphic in the bottom right corner of the slide. It consists of numerous thin, light blue lines that form a complex web of overlapping circles and arcs. These lines are scattered across the lower right portion of the slide, creating a sense of dynamic movement and interconnectedness. The lines vary in length and curvature, some forming complete circles while others are partial arcs.

Probability of Patching



The Case for Auto-Patching




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How effective is your remediation strategy?

An abstract graphic in the bottom right corner of the slide. It consists of numerous thin, light blue lines that form overlapping circles and arcs. Small blue dots are scattered along these lines, creating a sense of motion or a network. The overall effect is a complex, organic pattern that contrasts with the solid purple background.

Measuring Remediation Decisions



Efficiency and Coverage (Precision and Recall)


How many remediated CVEs have published exploits?

$$\text{Efficiency} = \frac{\text{true positives}}{\text{true positives} + \text{false positives}}$$


How many CVEs with published exploits have been remediated?

$$\text{Coverage} = \frac{\text{true positives}}{\text{true positives} + \text{false negatives}}$$

Measuring Decisions: CVSS 10




How many remediated CVEs have published exploits?

Efficiency = 

$$= \frac{1,510}{1,510 + 5,025}$$

23.1% Efficiency


How many CVEs with published exploits have been remediated?

Coverage = 

$$= \frac{1,510}{1,510 + 20,207}$$


7% Coverage

Measuring Decisions: CVSS 10



Remediating CVSS 10+ results
in:
6,535 CVEs prioritized,
23.1% Efficiency, 7% Coverage
Is this good?

Measuring Decisions: CVSS 10




Remediating CVSS 10+ results
in:

6,535 CVEs prioritized,
23.1% Efficiency, 7% Coverage

Is this good?

What if we randomly selected
6,535 CVEs to remediate?

Measuring Decisions: CVSS 10



Remediating CVSS 10+ results
in:

6,535 CVEs prioritized,
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Is this good?

What if we randomly selected
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23% Efficiency, 7.1% Coverage


Measuring Decisions: CVSS

Results for prioritization strategies based on CVSS Base Scores

Remediate above CVSS Base Score		Remediated correctly (True Pos.)	Delayed incorrectly (False Neg.)	Remediated too soon (False Pos.)	Delayed correctly (True Neg.)	Efficiency (Precision)	Coverage (Recall)	Efficiency by Chance	Coverage by Chance
	10	1,510	20,207	5,025	67,855	23.1%	7%	23%	7.1%
	9	3,148	18,569	10,405	62,475	23.2%	14.5%	23%	14.7%
	8	3,228	18,489	10,736	62,144	23.1%	14.9%	23%	15.1%
	7	11,562	10,155	25,180	47,700	31.5%	53.2%	23%	39.8%
	6	14,320	7,397	34,715	38,165	29.2%	65.9%	23%	53.2%
	5	17,547	4,170	49,753	23,127	26.1%	80.8%	23%	73%

Source: Kenna / Cyentia

Vendor-based Strategy




Vendor-based Strategy

Results for prioritization strategies based on vendors with the highest numbers of CVEs

Remediate Vendors		Remediated correctly (True Pos.)	Delayed incorrectly (False Neg.)	Remediated too soon (False Pos.)	Delayed correctly (True Neg.)	Efficiency (Precision)	Coverage (Recall)	Efficiency by Chance	Coverage by Chance
	Top5	2,598	19,119	18,500	54,380	12.3%	12%	23%	22.9%
	Top10	3,588	18,129	27,705	45,175	11.5%	16.5%	23%	33.9%
	Top20	4,726	16,991	34,471	38,409	12.1%	21.8%	23%	42.5%

Source: Kenna / Cyentia

Simplified View of Vulnerabilities




Predictive Model

Results for prioritization strategies based on varying thresholds for prediction model⁶


Remediation Model		Remediated correctly (True Pos.)	Delayed incorrectly (False Neg.)	Remediated too soon (False Pos.)	Delayed correctly (True Neg.)	Efficiency (Precision)	Coverage (Recall)	Efficiency by Chance	Coverage by Chance
	Highly Efficient	5,546	13,518	1,450	74,083	79.3%	29.1%	23%	16.7%
	Balanced	11,755	7,309	7,399	68,134	61.4%	61.7%	23%	45.8%
	Broad Coverage	15,550	3,514	16,917	58,616	47.9%	81.6%	23%	77.6%

Source: Kenna / Cyentia

Predictive Model



Predictive Model



Source: Kenna / Cyentia

CVSS 7+ to
“Balanced”


- Twice the efficiency
- Improved Coverage (53% to 62%)
- A Third of FP
- Half the effort

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
The Etiology of Vulnerability Exploitation




What contributes to exploitation in the wild?




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
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
What contributes to exploitation in the wild?



What contributes to exploitation in the wild?



What contributes to exploitation in the wild?




If nothing else is present, 0.1% chance of exploitation

If there is a published exploit, in metasploit: 40% chance

What contributes to exploitation in the wild?

...AND has a CVE
reference from MS:
81% chance

If there is a published
exploit, in metasploit:
40% chance




What contributes to exploitation in the wild?


...AND has a CVE
reference from MS:
81% chance

If there is a published
exploit, in metasploit:
40% chance

...AND exploitDB
published the exploit:
16%




What contributes to exploitation in the wild?



Predicting Probability: “well calibrated”

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Apply What You Have Learned Today

- Next week you should:
 - Look at your own vulnerability efforts, what are you using beyond CVSS?
 - Investigate how you are tracking open and closed vulnerabilities.
- In the next month:
 - Start collecting exploit(ed) vulnerabilities from your own sensors.
- Within six months you should:
 - Calculate and track your own Coverage, Efficiency and Capacity
 - Compare your strategy to other prioritization strategies
 - Look for more research coming soon!

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