

Ongoing Security Automation Standardization Efforts

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Goals

- ▶ Define standard protocols and data formats for architectural components
- ▶ Provide ongoing awareness over the constantly changing state of endpoints
- ▶ Detect endpoint changes in cyber-relevant time
- ▶ Enable information sharing within organizations:
 - ▶ Support multiple operational and security processes
 - ▶ Inform courses of action - Patch, Configure, Block
 - ▶ Identify indicators of compromise - Find and prevent malicious software from executing
- ▶ Leverage existing standards where possible

Key Questions to Address

- ▶ What endpoints are connected to the network?
- ▶ What software and patches are deployed on a given endpoint?
- ▶ How is this software configured?
- ▶ Has an important change in the software load or configuration occurred?
- ▶ What implication does this have for the observed behavior of the endpoint?

Working in the IETF

The Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring
(SACM) Working Group

Current Focus: Enterprise Vulnerability Assessment


- ▶ Mechanisms to support online collection of endpoint software inventory
- ▶ Supports management of software patches and updates

Needed capabilities:


- ▶ Endpoint Identification
- ▶ Ongoing exchange of software inventory, open ports, enabled services
- ▶ Use of vulnerability alerts to determine vulnerable endpoints based on software load

Future focus on Configuration Management and automating Courses of Action (CoA).

Building on Existing Standards: The IETF NEA Architecture




NEA Standards




The Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA) stack includes:

- ▶ The Posture Broker (PB) protocol
 - ▶ A generalized client/server protocol to communicate endpoint posture
 - ▶ Leverages TLS for the underlying transport (PT-TLS)
- ▶ The Posture Attribute (PA) protocol
 - ▶ Supports information exchanges between collectors and validators
 - ▶ Allows extensible message types

Additional Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specifications



Use of IF-IMC & IF-IMV



IF-IMC: Standardizes how collectors are registered and communicated with

- ▶ PB Client can find and load new collectors
- ▶ PB Client can provide information to collectors so they can change their behavior


IF-IMV: Standardizes how verifiers are registered and communicated with

- ▶ PB Server can find and load new verifiers
- ▶ PB Server can provide information to verifiers so they can change their behavior

Use of SWID Tags

SWID tags enable:

- ▶ High-fidelity software metadata provided by vendors
- ▶ Platform-neutral, standardized software inventory
- ▶ Integration of data and process verticals
- ▶ Automation and innovation supporting risk-based management of software




Development of NISTIR 8060

Identification Tags

NISTIR 8060: *Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable Software Identification Tags*


- Provides guidelines for creating SWID tags that support cybersecurity use cases
- Use case driven:
 - ✓ Continuously monitoring software inventory
 - ✓ Identifying vulnerable endpoints
 - ✓ Ensuring products are properly patched
 - ✓ Integrity measurement of installation packages and installed software
 - ✓ Preventing execution of tampered software

TCGs SWID Messages & Attributes for IF-M




- ▶ Supports the maintenance of an enterprise repository of software inventory data
- ▶ Allows reporting full and delta software inventories using SWID tags
- ▶ Allows establishing subscriptions to monitor aspects of endpoints software inventory
- ▶ Detects updates to SWID tag repository on client machine, and update server
- ▶ Allows the server to query about SWID tag state

The TCG Endpoint Compliance Profile



The need for a Message Fabric



Questions and Discussion

- ▶ Counting endpoints and having basic knowledge of their state is common theme of compliance and control frameworks (e.g., FISMA, SOX, HIPPA). Do your customers see this the same way?
- ▶ How do you see a message fabric fitting in with this architecture?
- ▶ Do you envision other uses of endpoint software inventory and configuration information? How could a message fabric support these uses?

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