# Visualizing ATT&CK data in Maltego

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Windows Management Instrumentation

Windows Remote Management

Logon Scripts

LSASS Driver

Modify Existing Service

Sudo

Sudo Caching

Valid Accounts

Indicator Blocking

Indicator Removal from Tools

Indicator Removal on Host

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Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command And Control	Exfiltration	Impa no color
11 items	34 items	62 items	32 items	69 items	21 items	23 items	18 items	13 items	22 items	9 items	16 ite
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	Acco
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Compressed	Data Data
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Connection Proxy	Data Encrypted	Data pact
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	Applnit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	and Distributed COM	Data from Information Repositories	Custom Command and	Data Transfer Size Limits	Defa
Replication Through	Component Object Model and Distributed COM	Applnit DLLs	Application Shimming	Clear Command History	Credentials from Web Browsers	File and Directory Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data from Local System	Control Protocol	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Disk
Removable Media	Control Panel Items	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	Network Service Scanning	Internal Spearphishing	Data from Network Shared	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Exfiltration Over Command	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Authentication Package	Control	Code Signing	Credentials in Registry	Network Share Discovery	Logon Scripts	Drive	Data Encoding	and Control Channel	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	BITS Jobs	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Exploitation for Credential	Network Sniffing	Pass the Hash	Data from Removable Media	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module	Bootkit	Dylib Hijacking	Compiled HTML File	Access	Password Policy Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data Staged	Domain Fronting	Exfiltration Over Physical	Inhibit System Recovery
Supply Chain Compromise	Load	Browser Extensions	Elevated Execution with	Component Firmware	Forced Authentication	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Email Collection	Domain Generation	Medium	Network Denial of Service
Trusted Relationship	Exploitation for Client Execution	Change Default File Association	Prompt	Component Object Model Hijacking	Hooking	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote File Copy	Input Capture	Algorithms	Scheduled Transfer	Resource Hijacking
Valid Accounts	Graphical User Interface	Component Firmware	Emond	Connection Proxy	Input Capture	Process Discovery	Remote Services	Man in the Browser	Fallback Channels		Runtime Data Manipulation
	InstallUtil	Component Object Model	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Control Panel Items	Input Prompt	Query Registry	Replication Through	Screen Capture	Multi-hop Proxy		Service Stop
	Launchetl	Hijacking	Extra Window Memory	DCShadow	Kerberoasting	Remote System Discovery	Removable Media	Video Capture	Multi-Stage Channels		Stored Data Manipulation
	Local Job Scheduling	Create Account	Injection	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Keychain	Security Software Discovery	Shared Webroot		Multiband Communication		System Shutdown/Reboot
	LSASS Driver	DLL Search Order Hijacking	File System Permissions Weakness	Disabling Security Tools	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Software Discovery	SSH Hijacking		Multilayer Encryption		Transmitted Data Manipulation
	Mshta	Dylib Hijacking Emond	Hooking	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Network Sniffing	System Information Discovery	Taint Shared Content		Port Knocking		
	PowerShell	External Remote Services	Image File Execution	DLL Side-Loading	Password Filter DLL	System Network Configuration Discovery	Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares		Remote Access Tools  Remote File Copy		
	Regsvcs/Regasm	File System Permissions	Options Injection  Launch Daemon	Execution Guardrails	Private Keys	System Network Connections Discovery	Windows Remote		Standard Application Layer		
	Regsvr32	Weakness	New Service	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Securityd Memory	System Owner/User Discovery	Management		Protocol		
	Rundll32	Hidden Files and Directories	Parent PID Spoofing	Extra Window Memory Injection	Steal Web Session Cookie	System Service Discovery			Standard Cryptographic Protocol		
	Scheduled Task	Hooking	Path Interception	File and Directory Permissions Modification	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	System Time Discovery			Standard Non-Application		
	Scripting	Hypervisor	Plist Modification	File Deletion		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion			Layer Protocol		
	Service Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Port Monitors	File System Logical Offsets					Uncommonly Used Port		
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Kernel Modules and	PowerShell Profile	Gatekeeper Bypass					Web Service		
	Signed Script Proxy Execution	Extensions	Process Injection	Group Policy Modification							
	Source	Launch Agent	Scheduled Task	Hidden Files and Directories							
	Space after Filename	Launch Daemon	Service Registry	Hidden Users							
	Third-party Software	Launchetl	Permissions Weakness	Hidden Window							
	Trap	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Setuid and Setgid	HISTCONTROL							
	Trusted Developer Utilities	Local Job Scheduling	SID-History Injection	Image File Execution Options						S	
	User Execution	Login Item	Startup Items	Injection						M	

#### Register to stream ATT&CKcon 2.0 October 29-30

**ENTERPRISE** ▼

#### **TECHNIQUES**

ILCIINIQ

Initial Access

Execution
Persistence

Privilege Escalation

Defense Evasion

Credential Access

Discovery

Lateral Movement

AppleScript

Application Access Token

**Application Deployment Software** 

Component Object Model and Distributed COM

**Exploitation of Remote Services** 

Internal Spearphishing

Logon Scripts

Pass the Hash

#### Pass the Ticket

Remote Desktop Protocol

Remote File Copy

Remote Services

Replication Through Removable Media

**Shared Webroot** 

SSH Hijacking

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Pass the Ticket

#### Pass the Ticket

Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.

In this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. [1] [2]

Silver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). [1]

Golden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. [3]

ID: T1097

Tactic: Lateral Movement

Platform: Windows

System Requirements: Requires Microsoft Windows as a target

system and Kerberos authentication enabled.

Data Sources: Authentication logs

CAPEC ID: CAPEC-645

Contributors: Ryan Becwar; Vincent Le Toux

Version: 1.0

#### Procedure Examples

Name	Description
APT29	APT29 used Kerberos ticket attacks for lateral movement. [11]
APT32	APT32 successfully gained remote access by using pass the ticket. [13]
BRONZE BUTLER	BRONZE BUTLER has created forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets to maintain administrative access. [12]
Empire	Empire can leverage its implementation of Mimikatz to obtain and use Silver and Golden Tickets. [8]
Ke3chang	Ke3chang has used Mimikatz to generate Kerberos golden tickets. [10]
Mimikatz	Mimikatz's LSADUMP::DCSync, KERBEROS::Golden, and KERBEROS::PTT modules implement the three steps required to extract the krbtgt account hash and create/use Kerberos tickets. [4] [5] [6] [7]
SeaDuke	Some SeaDuke samples have a module to use pass the ticket with Kerberos for authentication. [9]

#### Mitigations

Mitigation	Description
Active Directory	For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos

#### Search site

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#### GROUPS

Overview

admin@338

APT1

APT12

APT16

APT17 APT18

APT19

#### APT28

APT29

APT3 APT30

APT32

APT33

APT37

APT38 APT39

APT41

Axiom

BlackOasis
BRONZE BUTLER

Carbanak

Charming Kitten

Cleaver

Cobalt Group

CopyKittens

Dark Caracal

Home > Groups > APT28

#### APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice indictment. This group reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. APT28 has been active since at least 2004. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]

ID: G0007

Associated Groups: SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group 74, Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat Group-4127, TG-4127

Contributors: Drew Church, Splunk, Emily Ratliff, IBM, Richard Gold, Digital Shadows


Version: 2.2

#### **Associated Group Descriptions**

Name	Description
SNAKEMACKEREL	[15]
Swallowtail	[10]
Group 74	[18]
Sednit	This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT. [6] [5] [36] [2]
Sofacy	This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware. [4] [5] [3] [26] [2][18]
Pawn Storm	[5] [26]
Fancy Bear	[3] [36] [26] [2][18][10][23]
STRONTIUM	[36] [26] [29]
Tsar Team	[26][18][18]
Threat Group-4127	[5]
TG-4127	[5]

Techniques Used

ATT&CK™ Navigator Layers ▼



Z

+ ♦ Valid Accounts - T1078 Q \

+ ♦ Accessibility Features - T1015 Q \

+ ♦ Process Discovery - T1057 Q \( \exists

next »

**2** 

« previous

+ 3 Query Registry - T1012 Q \

+ ♦ Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1060 Q \

+ 3 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - T1140 Q

+ ♦ Application Window Discovery - T1010 Q \= + ♦ File and Directory Discovery - T1083 Q \=

+ System Information Discovery - T1082 Q \ ≡


+ ♦ Standard Cryptographic Protocol - T1032 Q \

+ Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel -

+ System Service Discovery - T1007 Q \

view all

Name and Address of the Owner, when the Owner, which t										1 ☑ ▼Show al	
Initial access (11 items)	Execution (33 items)	Persistence (59 items)	Privilege escalation (28 items)	Defense evasion (67 items)	Credential access (20 items)	Discovery (22 items)	Lateral movement (17 items)	Collection (13 items)	Command and control (22 items)	Exfiltration (9 items)	Impact (14 items)
Valid Accounts	Rundll32	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	DLL Side-Loading	Account Manipulation	Application Window Discovery	Remote File Copy	Audio Capture	Remote File Copy	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Destruction
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	Valid Accounts	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Bash History	File and Directory Discovery	AppleScript	Automated Collection	Standard Cryptographic Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Valid Accounts	Web Shell	Rundll32	Brute Force	Process Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Clipboard Data	Commonly Used Port	Data Compressed	Defacement
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Web Shell	Access Token Manipulation	Valid Accounts	Credential Dumping	Query Registry	Distributed Component Object Model	Data Staged	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Encrypted	Disk Content Wipe
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	.bash_profile and .bashrc	AppCert DLLs	Access Token Manipulation	Credentials in Files	System Information Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data from Information Repositories	Connection Proxy	Data Transfer Size Limits	Disk Structure Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	Account Manipulation	Applnit DLLs	BITS Jobs	Credentials in Registry	System Service Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Local System	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	AppCert DLLs	Application Shimming	Binary Padding	Exploitation for Credential Access	Account Discovery	Pass the Hash	Data from Network Shared Drive	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	Applnit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Bypass User Account Control	Forced Authentication	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Removable Media	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Inhibit System Recovery
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module Load	Application Shimming	DLL Search Order Hijacking	CMSTP	Hooking	Domain Trust Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Email Collection	Data Obfuscation	Scheduled Transfer	Network Denial of Service
Supply Chain Compromise	Exploitation for Client Execution	Authentication Package	Dylib Hijacking	Clear Command History	Input Capture	Network Service Scanning	Remote Services	Input Capture	Domain Fronting		Resource Hijacking
Trusted Relationship	Graphical User Interface	BITS Jobs	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Code Signing	Input Prompt	Network Share Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser	Domain Generation Algorithms		Runtime Data Manipulation
	InstallUtil	Bootkit	Extra Window Memory Injection	Compile After Delivery	Kerberoasting	Network Sniffing	SSH Hijacking	Screen Capture	Fallback Channels		Service Stop
	LSASS Driver	Browser Extensions	File System Permissions Weakness	Compiled HTML File	Keychain	Password Policy Discovery	Shared Webroot	Video Capture	Multi-Stage Channels		Stored Data Manipulation
	Launchctl	Change Default File	Hooking	Component Firmware	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning	Peripheral Device	Taint Shared Content		Multi-hop Proxy		Transmitted Data



Galaxy Event graph + Correlation graph + ATT&CK matrix - Attributes - Discussion Pivots Attribute: 1407821 Name: 2017-03-03T07:34:23+00:00 Toggle physics Type: attribute attribute: 20191041207999999248 2013 1722013830 22-101-36:56:03 attribute: 2018-10-3 13:03:50 attribute: oscere and attribute: 19809-18102:30:32+00:00

attribute: oscere and attribute: 19809-18102:30:32+00:00

attribute: oscere and attribute: oscere Actions attribute: 2018-05-21T03:46:10+00:00 attribute: 2018-10-02T11:38:31 attribute: 2018-05-21T03:46:10+00:00 attribute: 2018-03-21T09:03:44-00:00 attribute: 2018-11-20T15:03:324tribute: ris2.ititch.com object: whois object whois object: whois galaxy: XTunalexy Sto Agent B B attributed Registrant hidden beider mingrayers whois attribute: 2018-05-17T12:49@3 atmitribute conschae 2P 3:00:00+00:00 attribute Web4Africa Inc. attribute Web4Africa Inc. attribute 11.12 Web4Africa Inc. object: domandipartition tipe this echnical-reports attribute: Registated Numbers behind privace thribute: 2018-05-1711 00:18 100:188:10:11

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object: \*\*\*
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object effect: domain-ip objects/ectrato-vain-ip tag: APT tribute: 385070 attribute: 6144 VBV SIF man GC 18gin 814 nsslSeVKSz3tBWa1ipbUCOgrZkohophica Blazzini 140MiZim: VBvod8gijeVF5fg/3017 object: domain oute: geneticibility dedicates a surface of the policy of attribute: picturecrawling.com attribute: ns4.web4afrtca.com attribute@pol.michael@post.com attribute: 2019-03-03-14-13-26-04-10T07:55:55

attribute: 2018-03-24-10708:65-05-24-10708:06:58 attribute: 2017-03-03 7:34:23+00:00 attribute: 1106432 attribute: 2048r624670048400914709:11:11 attribute: 2018-02-14T10:00:14 event: (13070) OSIN Tattibule: voil to the state of the s attribute: virteec.com object: whois galaxy: Sofacy attribute: narrowpass.netgalaxy: APT28 - G0007 attribute: a15a4e21fe3b0图70d52f7383ef45e4li6bute7<del>269301366ed334634311</del>1011 = attribute: attribute: assoutlook.dll attribute: 145.23 (b) 7.8 object decided in a ttribute: 961e79a33f432ea96d2 (c) 1969b0 (f) 48.83 124 object domain-ip attribute: 961e79a33f432ea96d2 (c) 1969b0 (f) 48.83 124 object domain-ip attribute: 414:Dl8vIVbfmb7FG5APHG9krjk7mP7DpzUXGw8Vm0ohRl7iHo.DGAVbfmb7FG5APHG9krjk7mP7DpzUXGw8Vm0ohRl7iHo.D attribute: hsysheduler.org

attribute: hs.uk.iii)dns.com

attribute: hs.uk.iii)dns.com

attribute: hs.uk.iii)dns.com

attribute: hs.uk.iii)dns.com event: (13026) OSINT: Zebrocy attratuteuteroBack@101449906-2014-12-2678-3-45.18+00:00 attribute: 94.177.12:238 event: (13099) OS Sofacy Continues Global ... event: (13095) OSINT Swinting 1100 OSINT Sednit: What's going o... attribute: 1c966f2f647kfe7f04f27f69ff9ff9ff68666fefc9f434ff456693be62ff59ff4a63f6f727ff6a29c37e5fffaa1d 

# Glue with \$favorite tool

- ATT&CK rocks
- MISP rocks

although they do not cover EVERYTHING

- Glue with favorite toolset
  - MISP Galaxies
  - PyMISP & REST API
  - Visualization tool => Maltego (commercial)

### Use-Cases

- Is my IOC in MISP?
- Exploring data from MISP
- Visualize relationships
  - Object / Attribute Relations
  - Event Relations
  - Tags, Galaxies, ATT&CK and more
- Start from Galaxies / Malware / Tools / ...

# ATT&CK

 Demo, see here: https://www.misp-project.org/2019/10/27/visualising\_common\_patterns\_attack.html

mitre-intrusion-set
Tropic Trooper - G0081





MISPGal... (11)

mitre-attack-patternAccessibilit...
mitre-attack-patternApplication ...
mitre-attack-patternExfiltration ...
mitre-attack-patternFile and Dir...
mitre-attack-patternQuery Regis...
mitre-attack-patternRegistry Ru...
mitre-attack-patternRemote File...
mitre-attack-patternRemote File...
mitre-attack-patternRemote Serv...
mitre-attack-patternSystem Serv...
mitre-attack-patternValid Accou...
mitre-attack-patternWeb Shell - ...

## Where?

- https://github.com/MISP/MISP-maltego
- https://github.com/MISP/misp-galaxy
- Code & documentation
- Installation:
  - pip3 install MISP-maltego
  - canari create-profile MISP\_maltego
  - Maltego > home button > Import > Import Configuration & select the MISP\_maltego.mtz file
  - SHOME/.canari/MISP\_maltego.conf set your misp\_url and misp\_key
- Feedback & Ideas <u>very</u> welcome!