


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Who am I?

- CTI Strategist, CERT.be
- OASIS CTI Technical Committee co-chair (with Richard Struse, father of STIX/TAXII)
- @treyka on the Twitters (and pretty much everywhere else...)
- trey.darley@cert.be





CERT.be and our constituents

- Operators of vital interest (NIS list) are key constituents.
- EWS: Belgian Early Warning System
- Capturing our constituents' intelligence requirements is key.
- MITRE ATT&CK is not a threat model, but it provides a framework and building blocks for developing threat models.



EWS: what problems are we trying to solve?

- Prevent bad stuff from happening (left of boom)
- Decrease MTTD/MTTR when incidents occur
- Inform tactical and strategic decision-making by building a mature sightings ecosystem at the sectorial and national level

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How does ATT&CK help?





CSIRTs are at different levels

• Crawl, walk, run





Building feedback loops with our constituents

 It helps to know when things we do help and when they don't.

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TLP:WHITE

Building feedback loops with our peers

- Where is there room for improvement in how we tag CTI?
- Is there room for standardizing how we capture adversary behavior during IR?

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Capacity building between higher and lower maturity CSIRT teams



Harmonization of approaches

- Premature standardization is bad.
- Are we far enough along that it makes sense to begin harmonization yet?
- What would this (potentially) solve?

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• The future is not yet here, but it's coming...





Questions? Comments? Comments disguised as questions?



