RSA*Conference2016

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Aspirin as a Service: Using the Cloud to Cure Security Headaches



Connect **to** Protect

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Little. Cloudy. Different.



- Cloud can be more secure than traditional datacenters.
 - The economics are in your favor.
 - Cloud architectures can wipe out some traditional security headaches.
- This isn't theory, it's being done today.
 - But only if you understand how to leverage the cloud.
- We will show you how.








Not the SaaS you're looking for





This session is all IaaS and PaaS





Cloud Security Economics



- For clients to use a cloud provider, they must trust the provider.
- This is especially true for anything with a sensitive data or process.
- Thus security has to be a top priority for a provider or you won't use them.
- A major breach for a provider that affects multiple customers is an existential event.

You get one chance







Cloud Provider Critical Security Capabilities

#F

- API/admin activity logging
- Elasticity and autoscaling
- APIs for all security features
- Granular entitlements
- Good SAML support
- Multiple accounts per customer

- Software defined networking
- Region/location control

Nice to have: infrastructure templating/automation






Evolving the Practice of Security Architecture



Security architecture as a silo'd function can no longer exist.



- Static position papers, architecture diagrams & documents
- UI-dependent consoles and "pane of glass" technologies

 Auditing, assurance, and compliance are decoupled, separate processes






Evolving the Practice of Security Architecture



Security architecture as a silo'd function can no longer exist.



- Architecture artifacts
 (design choices, narrative, etc.) committed to
 common repositories
- Complete solutions account for automation

 Solution architectures are living audit/compliance artifacts and evidence in a closed loop






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Segregation is critical but hard





Segregating networks in a data center is hard, expensive, and often unwieldy.


- It's hard to isolate application services on physical machines.
 - Even using virtual machines has a lot of management overhead.
- Attackers drop in and move North/South in application stacks, and East/West on networks (or both).





Network segregation by default








Granularity of host firewall with ease of management of network firewall





Limiting blast radius










To a host or network...










To a host or network...












Or an entire "data center"
















Or an entire "data center"














Traditional blast radius









Application segregation




- Easier to deploy smaller services
- Easier to isolate
- Can integrate PaaS for "network air gaps"





Cloud "DMZ"









Template



```
"AWSTemplateFormatVersion": "2010-09-09",
  "Parameters" : {
    "KeyName" : {
     "Description": "The EC2 Key Pair to allow SSH access to the instance",
      "Type" : "String"
"Resources": {
  "LabVPC": {
   "Type": "AWS::EC2::VPC",
   "Properties": {
     "CidrBlock": "10.0.0.0/16",
     "InstanceTenancy": "default",
     "EnableDnsSupport": "true",
     "EnableDnsHostnames": "true",
      "Tags": [
          "Key": "Name",
          "Value": "CloudSec Lab"
          "Key": "Group",
          "Value": "Vpclab"
  "subnet667a7420": {
    "Type": "AWS::EC2::Subnet",
    "Properties": {
     "CidrBlock": "10.0.0.0/24",
     "AvailabilityZone": "us-west-2c",
      "VpcId": {
        "Ref": "LabVPC"
      "Tags": [
          "Key": "Name",
```





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Managing patches and change




- Nothing we deploy is consistent.
- Even when we become consistent, it's hard to patch live stuff without breaking things.
- Privileged users log into servers and make changes.
- Attackers love persistent servers they can compromise and camp inside.
- Plus, we need to keep the auditors happy.





Design to deploy is a mess









The power of immutable



- Instead of updating, you completely replace infrastructure through automation.
- Can apply to a single server, up to an entire application stack.
- Incredibly resilient and secure. Think "servers without logins".










Automate Creation of Master OS Images








Demo – Server Image Bakery/Factory




- Update the desired configuration of a new master OS image
- Build the master image
- Test the master image for security controls
- Make image available for use




































































































patched









Demo



■ Rolling update of 40 instances in 4 minutes with 0 downtime.





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






Automate with DevOps and Continuous Deployment
























Template A:





Template B:











Begin diverting traffic via DNS

Internet

Template A:





Template B:









Rollback or finish, depending on results

Template A:






Template B:





Internet














Template B:





Let your PaaS do the work



- We deploy many MANY core components to deliver applications.
 - Load balancers, databases, message queues, and more.
- It takes a lot of effort to keep these secure and up to date at scale.
- Each piece is yet more attack surface.





PaaS and "New" Cloud Architectures




- PaaS providers can't afford a preventable security failure.
 - Including letting things get out of date.
- Many types of PaaS can't rely on normal networking.
 - Instead you access them via API.
- This creates an opportunity to "air gap" parts of your application.
 - Kill off network attack paths (doesn't help with logic flaws)





Network attack path?










PaaS Air Gap









Software Defined Security



- Attackers are automated, we are mostly manual.
- Our tools have been poor.
- We lack trustable security automation and thus need to rely on a "Meat Cloud"
- In cloud, APIs are mandatory. We can write code to automate and orchestrate, even across products and services.







Code without Coding



- Work with your devs to build a library of building blocks
- Learn just enough to glue it together
- Build some core scripts
- Mix and match the blocks
- Pull in the dev when you have new requirements

```
when / clicked
 move 2 steps
      color is over ?
  turn 5 5 degrees
      color is over ?
  turn 🗣 5 degrees
```





Demo



- Meet SecuritySquirrel, the first warrior in the Rodent Army (apologies to Netflix).
- The following tools are written by an analyst with a Ruby-for-Dummies book.
- Automated security workflows spanning products and services.








Incident Response



Detect Compromise



Quarantine



Image



Analyze

Recover






Each step is manual, and uses a different set of disconnected tools











- 1. Pull metadata
- 2. Quarantine
- 3. Swap control to security team
- 4. Identify and image all storage
- 5. Launch and configure analysis server
- 6. Can re-launch clean server instantly





Stateless Security



- Security normally relies on scanning and checking databases.
- With cloud we are completely integrated into the infrastructure and platforms.
 - The cloud controllers have to see everything to manage everything, there is no Neo running around.
- Instead of scanning, we can directly pull state.
 - And then use it for security







Identify Unmanaged Servers (for the audit)



- Scan the network
 - Scan again and again for all the parts you missed
 - 3 Identify all the servers as best you can
 - Pull a config mgmt report
 - Manually compare results









```
\Theta \cap \Theta
                                 SecuritySquirrel - ruby - 83×26
Welcome to SecuritySquirrel. Please select an action:
Current region is us-west-2
  Pull and log metadata for an instance
  Assess an instance
  Change region
Select: 1
Instance
                                              managed?
ip-172-31-0-211.us-west-2.compute.internal false
ip-172-31-36-202.us-west-2.compute.internal true
ip-172-31-40-176.us-west-2.compute.internal false
ip-172-31-37-31.us-west-2.compute.internal false
ip-172-31-32-110.us-west-2.compute.internal false
ip-172-31-32-102.us-west-2.compute.internal true
ress Return to return to the main menu
```

- Get list of all servers from cloud controller (can filter on tags/OS/etc).
 - Single API call
- 2. Get list of all servers from Chef
 - Single API call
- 3. Compare in code





Event Driven Security




- Cloud providers are creating hooks to trigger actions based on events inside the cloud.
- We can use these for near-instant security reactions.





Self-Healing Infrastructure (yes, for real)









Demo



■ Watch a security group self heal in less than 10 seconds...





Aspirin Applied



- Next week you should:
 - Follow up this session by learning to use Git (or another source repo) and a build pipeline toolchain like Jenkins.
- In the first three months following this presentation you should:
 - Be collaborating with dev/engineering/operations/security on something anything! Even if you just keep basic "account governance" scripts in a repo that people can run, contribute to, track, build into pipelines, etc- have at least one key security capability wired up through a pipeline.
- Within six months you should:
 - Be running audits out of the toolchain for at least a few key controls as they are applied to the cloud.



