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SESSION ID: PART2-T08

Magecart Attacks Require Rethinking Your Credit Card Security



Vice President of Products, Web Security Akamai Technologies

Magecart

- Hacker groups stealing sensitive data via thirdparty scripts
- Sites that use credit card processing are at constant risk
 - One infection can infect 1000s of sites in a single update
 - 20% are reinfected within a month of last attacks¹



¹ Source: **SANGUINE SECURITY**, 2018

https://sansec.io/labs/2018/11/12/merchants-struggle-with-magecart-reinfections/



Forbes

October 11, 2019

Over 18,000 Websites Infested With Magecart Card Skimming Malware



Lee Mathews Senior Contributor ①

Cybersecurity

Observing, pondering, and writing about tech, Generally in that order.

Magecart is one of the most widely-distributed pieces of malware in the world. It's been stealing credit cards for nearly a decade. Experts at RiskIQ they they've spotted Magecart skimmers in action more than 2 million times.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2019/10/11/over-18000-websites-infested-with-magecart-card-skimming-malware/#c78d66f7b1d9

Credit Card Stealing Malware Strikes Websites of Two International Hotel Chains

Baseball Hall of Fame Website Hacked With Credit Card Stealing Malware

This is How 380,000 British Airways Passengers Got Hacked

FBI Warns of Hidden Online Shopping Threats, Including E-Skimming, 'Magecart Attacks'

 $\frac{https://www.newsweek.com/fbi-warns-hidden-online-shopping-threats-including-e-skimming-magecart-attacks-1467311}{magecart-attacks-1467311}$



Agenda

- Why is Magecart a Big Deal?
- What is a Magecart Attack?
- Intrusion vs Detection
- A Comprehensive Security Strategy
- The Call to Action



Third-Party Script Use is Accelerating

Driven by Digital Transformation

- Enhances the Web Experience
- Easy to Add/Modify
- Promotes consistent experience
- Integrated with Third-Party Service
- Maintained by Third-Party

48

First
Party

62

Third
Party

Average Resources Per Page, 2017

Source: Security and Frontend Performance, Challenge of Today: Rise of Third Parties, Akamai Technologies and O'Reilly Media, 2017



706%
Increase in third-party script size 2011-2018


#RSAC

Script Requests and Sizes, 2018


Source: JavaScript growth and third parties, SpeedCurve, 2018




Analyzing Third-Party Application Activity



Complete www.akamai.com






68% Third-Party Scripts



Third-Party Scripts Can Introduce Vulnerabilities

Complex supply chains that can be compromised by attackers



R Picreel Alpaca



4,800

Websites compromised monthly



Delivered via supply chain PII Skimmed

Malicious code executes

hackers

- Outside of control and visibility
- Scripts added by other teams
- Come from trusted sources
- Re-infection is common

Sent back to



Source: Symantec 2019 Internet Security Threat ReportEvery month an average of 4,800 websites are compromised



Script Compromises and Examples



Data skimming



Major North American Retailer (4Q19)
Credit card info stolen from payment page



Accidental exfil



Major Online Search Service (4Q19)
Unsecure access to 250M customer records



Risky services



International Retailer (4Q19)
Unsecure access to 1.3TB of customer data



(CVEs) Known vulnerabilities



Travel Services (4Q19)
Exposed over 380,000 customer's personal and payment info



Third-Party Script Protection Approaches

Content Security Policy
Whitelisting

Synthetic Site Scanning

Access Control/ Sandboxing

In-App
Detection

- Supports rigorous CSP
- Prevention-focused
- Requires continuous manual analysis and testing
- Simple websites
- Useful for policy updates
- Requires continuous manual analysis and testing
- Simple websites, low PII
- Combines with CSP
- Requires continuous manual analysis and testing
- Monitors app script behaviors
- Detection-focused
- Quick mitigation, low business impact




Attributes of an Effective Magecart Protection Service


- In-App detection of suspicious behavior
- Easy-to-setup and administer
- Automated, Always on
- Filters out noise & targets problems
- Threat intelligence to stop known threats
- Feedback loop to access control policies



Third-Party Script Website Example

Films For All* – Subscription Signup








Films For All – Subscription Signup

Common site construction relies upon a constellation of service providers for analytics and site functionality.


- Might be dozens of hostnames
- An average of scripts 110 scripts
- Could be multiple tag managers
- A/B testing tool

This is an attack surface hackers could use to monitor or interact with Films For All users, or exfiltrate data they enter into the site.






Films For All – Account Creation







Analyzing the Current Script Composition





What to Remember

- Third-Party Scripts are essential to the modern websites
- Skimming threats are increasingly frequent & impactful
- Monitoring <u>Trusted</u> third-parties is the new requirement
- In-app script behavior detection is critical
- In-app script protection works with access control solutions



Next Steps

- Analyze your third-party script situation
- Think about which script security approach is right for you
- Test your ideas



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                Threats can come t: count); cc <- msg; fmt.Fprintf(w, "Controller of the count); 3); http://endleFunc("/status",
 ime.Second); select { case result := <- r from anywhere, se { fmt.Fprint(w, "] return; case <- timeout: fmt.Fprint(w, "] from anywhere, 37", nil)); }; package
                                                      protect sg := <-controlChannel: workerActive = workerActive = status; }}; func admin(min", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *htt
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eturn: ): msg := Control ControlMessage{Targ
nessage issued for Target %s, count %d", html.
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<code>farget string; Count int64; ]; func main() { co _ hannel := make(chan ControlMessage);workerComp</code>
select {    case respChan := <- statusPollChanne
true; go doStuff(msg, workerCompleteChan); cas
chan ControlMessage, statusPollChannel ch
quest) { /* Does anyone actually read t
                                                Intelligent Security Starts at the Edge
nttp.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {    reqChan := make(chan bool);    statusPollChanne
```

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