

Introduction to and survey of TLS Security

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Information Security and Cryptography

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TLS is something we deal with on a daily basis, so this is an obvious topic for education.

Keep in mind that these attacks are not only possible for nation-state actors, some of them I can mount on this very laptop.

Summary


Published Date: **November 05, 2014**

Comparisons are made against the previous month's data.

◀ Previous

▶ Next

SSL Security Summary



Total sites surveyed

151,089

- 0.3 %

Insecure sites

114,989

+ 8.9 %


Secure sites

■ A+ ■ A ■ A-

36,100

- 8.9 %


SSL Labs Grade Distribution




<https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse>

Key Findings

Certificate Chain




Cipher Strength




Heartbleed




Strict Transport Security




Protocol Support



<https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse>



<https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse>



<https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse>

Unfortunately this is not a talk about InfoSec nor cryptography, so I will only cover the very basics needed to understand the topic properly. Background information on Information Security and Cryptography herein is fitted to TLS only.

I will recommend appropriate resources for those who want to gain a deeper understanding at the end of my talk.

Information Security mandates at minimum the following three properties in a secure protocol:

- ▶ Confidentiality
- ▶ Integrity
- ▶ Availability (discussed later)

..this is commonly known as the “CIA triad” (seriously). You will see later on why these are paramount. The triad is usually extended by:

- ▶ Authenticity & Non-repudiation

- ▶ Prevent unauthorized disclosure of information
- ▶ *Encryption* and *Decryption* of confidential data

Example: Rijndael cipher. Later renamed AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) after winning a NIST challenge by the same name.

- ▶ Symmetric 128, 192 or 256 bit **block cipher**
- ▶ Stick figure guide to AES: <http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html>

Background

Confidentiality: Block cipher modes

Block ciphers operate on fixed size *blocks of data*.

Online communication is defined by *streams of data*.


Block cipher modes repeatedly apply a given cipher to a stream of data. Examples include:

- ▶ Cipher-Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
- ▶ Counter Mode (CTR)
- ▶ Galois-Counter Mode (GCM) [authenticated]
- ▶ Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) [authenticated]
- ▶ Offset Codebook Mode (OCB) [authenticated]


Background

Confidentiality: Block cipher modes

► CBC Mode (sequential):



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption




Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption


Background

Confidentiality: Block cipher modes

► CTR Mode (parallel):



Counter (CTR) mode encryption



Counter (CTR) mode decryption

Background

Integrity

- ▶ Assures consistency of data
- ▶ e.g. tampered data will be detected (and may be discarded)
- ▶ Cryptographic hash functions like SHA can provide integrity by acting as a Hash based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) on the message to be sent and recieved
- ▶ Hash-functions need to be collision-resistant: Two different inputs should never produce the same hash!
- ▶ Ideally messages should be encrypted first then MACed (encrypt-then-mac, ETM) to prevent against attacks (CCA, CPA) and to provide for integrity of ciphertexts and plaintexts. See: <http://bit.ly/1kZA6WR>
- ▶ Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) can be used instead (e.g. GCM, CCM, OCB)

Background

Authenticity & Non-repudiation

- ▶ Assures that the involved parties are genuine
- ▶ i.e. are who they say they are
 - ▶ Injection attacks
 - ▶ Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks
 - ▶ Various cryptographic attack vectors

Examples:

- ▶ RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
- ▶ DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm)
- ▶ ECDSA (Elliptic Curve DSA)
- ▶ Ed25519 (<http://ed25519.cr.yp.to>)
- ▶ ElGamal Signature System

Background

Authenticity & Non-repudiation: RSA

RSA

- ▶ Used for:
 - ▶ Signatures
 - ▶ Certificates
 - ▶ Authenticated Key-Exchanges (don't)
 - ▶ Encryption
- ▶ Security based on the difficulty of factoring integers:
 - ▶ p, q are large prime numbers (e.g. ≈ 1024 bits)
 - ▶ $N = p \times q$
 - ▶ find factors of N
- ▶ Best known algorithm (~ 1994): General Number Field Sieve
- ▶ Computational complexity for n -bits: $O\left(\exp\left(\left(\frac{64}{9}n\right)^{\frac{1}{3}}(\log n)^{\frac{2}{3}}\right)\right)$

Background

Authenticity & Non-repudiation: RSA

RSA Key Generation

- ▶ integer N is the product of two large primes p and q
- ▶ $\phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$
- ▶ choose an integer e (usually 65537), such that
 - ▶ $1 < e < \phi(N)$
 - ▶ $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$
- ▶ Public Key: N (*modulus*), e (*public exponent*)
- ▶ Private Key: $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(N)}$

\gcd and ϕ denote the *Greatest Common Divisor (Euclidian algorithm)* and *Euler totient function*, respectively.

Math background: *Modular arithmetic*.

Proof: *Euler's theorem* and *Fermat's little theorem*.

Authenticity & Non-repudiation: RSA

Alice sends her public key (modulus N and exponent e) to Bob
Bob sends his public key (modulus N and exponent e) to Alice

RSA Encryption:

- ▶ Bob wants to send a message M to Alice, turns M into an integer m ($0 \leq m < N$) using a common padding-scheme
- ▶ ..computes ciphertext $c \equiv m^e \pmod{N}$

RSA Decryption:

- ▶ Bob sends ciphertext to Alice
- ▶ Alice computes $m \equiv c^d \pmod{N}$
- ▶ ..recovers Bob's message M by reversing the common padding-scheme

Authenticity & Non-repudiation: RSA padding

..a secure padding scheme is really important.

Example: Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1

<http://tinyurl.com/bleichenbacher> (real world SSLv3 attack)

Not going into that here has been explained in detail in a 31c3 talk yesterday, see also: <http://tinyurl.com/rsa-padding>

A key exchange algorithm exchanges cryptographic keys (i.e. shared secrets) among parties which want to communicate confidentially.

Key Agreement: Diffie-Hellman

The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm (1976) was the first scheme devised to exchange cryptographic keys among multiple parties. It is the most widely used key exchange algorithm to this date.

Background

Key Agreement: Diffie-Hellman

Alice and Bob want to communicate with each other and thus agree on a large prime number p and a generator g ($0 < g < p$)

- ▶ Alice choses a secret integer x (private key)
..and calculates $g^x \pmod{p}$ as her public key
- ▶ Bob choses a secret integer y (private key)
..and calculates $g^y \pmod{p}$ as his public key

Math Background: *Multiplicative group of integers modulo p*

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiplicative_group_of_integers_modulo_n

<http://tinyurl.com/multiplicativegroupmodp>

Background

Key Agreement: Diffie-Hellman

Alice and Bob exchange their public keys

- ▶ Alice doesn't know Bob's y
- ▶ Bob doesn't know Alice's x

But,...

- ▶ Alice however knows x and g^y
..therefore calculates $(g^y)^x \pmod p = g^{yx} \pmod p$
- ▶ Bob however knows y and g^x
..therefore calculates $(g^x)^y \pmod p = g^{xy} \pmod p$

They now have established a *shared secret*: $g^{xy} \pmod p$

Key Agreement: Forward secrecy

Forward secrecy (aka Perfect Forward Secrecy – PFS) ensures that only ephemeral session keys are used.

Even if a key is compromised in the future, not all communication that may have been recorded is compromised.

Simple, at the end of a session:

- ▶ Alice discards her public-key x
- ▶ Bob discards his public-key y

Hence: *Ephemeral* Diffie–Hellman (DHE and ECDHE).

In SSL/TLS terminology; a *ciphersuite* combines the previously mentioned cryptographic techniques to work together and forms part of a secure (online) communication protocol

Example:

- ▶ Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (Ephemeral – PFS)
- ▶ RSA
- ▶ AES128
- ▶ in Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
- ▶ SHA256

IANA standardized TLS parameters:

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

OpenSSL:

ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256

PolarSSL:

TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256

GnuTLS:

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

Apple Crypto Framework:

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

Microsoft SChannel:

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256_P256

(No ECDHE with RSA and GCM for Microsoft users, you get crappy ECDSA instead.)


Before talking about the history and attacks of TLS it just makes sense to point out how TLS actually works (TLS 1.2).

Background

Transport Layer Security: TLS records

TLS deals in “records”. Different types of records exist: Handshake, ChangeCipherSpec, Application data and Alert.

In general TLS record looks like this:



Transport Layer Security: TLS records

- ▶ Handshake records do have a different message structure
- ▶ Alert records basically just send an error code (1 byte) and description (1 byte) instead of a full message.

Besides Handshake and ChangeCipherSpec records – any records may optionally contain a MAC and padding (up to 4 bytes each) at the end, depending on the previously negotiated ciphersuite.

For reference, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_record

Transport Layer Security: Handshake


[Client]

[Server]

ClientHello




Transport Layer Security: Handshake




Background


Transport Layer Security: Handshake



Transport Layer Security: Handshake



Transport Layer Security: Handshake



Background

Session Resumption and False-start

Session-resumption and False-start are TLS extensions minimizing round-trip time and CPU cost.

Session-resumption:

- ▶ An “abbreviated handshake” is used
- ▶ Previously negotiated Handshake parameters are reused

False-start (somewhat deprecated):

- ▶ Optional extension to send data before the Handshake is completed
- ▶ After ChangeCipherSpec and Finished messages Client or Server data may be sent
- ▶ Even if the other side has not acknowledged yet

For a good description see: <http://chimera.labs.oreilly.com/books/12300000000545/ch04.html>
<http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/04/so-long-false-start-we-hardly-knew-ya.html>

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is a mechanism to check for the validity and revocation of certificates.

OCSP has recieved a lot of critique:

- ▶ MITM attackers may also interfere with OCSP requests
- ▶ OCSP stapling can be used to mitigate this problem
- ▶ OCSP latency for large CAs is usually in the hundreds of milliseconds
- ▶ OCSP infrastructure completely broke down during Heartbleed

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) is a security policy that enforces HTTPS connections on following requests (e.g. upgrade every HTTP requests to HTTPS).

A small downside: the first HSTS header must be sent over HTTPS to ensure it cannot be tampered with.

Effectively disables ssl-stripping attacks.

TLS Renegotiation Indication Extension

RFC5746 defines a TLS extension that prevents for TLS Handshake renegotiation attacks by sending a special Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) in the ClientHello which ties a renegotiation request to a TLS connection.

Called “Secure Renegotiation”.

Background

SPDY, NPN, ALPN and so forth

Google drafted specifications for protocol upgrade to SPDY including NPN and ALPN which SPDY effectively relies on. SPDY is the basis for the work in the IETF HTTPBIS-WG that will standardize HTTP2.

X.509, and Web-of-(mis)trust and ASN.1 would require a two hour talk on their own.

Certificate Authorities should and can not be trusted, they are known to behave maliciously at times, give away sub-CAs for DPI to large companies and nations and regularly fuck up their own security processes.

Read for example:

<http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct>

Now that you have an idea of the necessary background, let's take a look at the history of TLS (in)security.

- ▶ SSLv1 engineered at Netscape, never released to the public
- ▶ Kipp Hickman of Netscape introduces SSLv2 as an IETF draft back in 1995:

The SSL Protocol is designed to provide privacy between two communicating applications (a client and a server). Second, the protocol is designed to authenticate the server, and optionally the client. [...]

- ▶ SSLv2 was fundamentally broken and badly designed. Basically full loss of Confidentiality and integrity of on-wire data thus susceptible to MITM attacks, see:
<http://osvdb.org/56387>
- ▶ CipherSpec is sent in the clear
- ▶ Size of Block-cipher padding is sent in the clear

- ▶ SSLv3 was introduced in 1996 by Paul Kocher, Phil Karlton and Alan Freier, utilizing an algorithm by Taher ElGamal, a known cryptographer and Chief Scientist at Netscape at the time: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6101>

On a side note; back then the choice algorithms was limited and export ciphers (low security) common as recommended by NSA and mandated by US law. Google: “Bernstein vs. United States”

- ▶ encryption algorithms (Confidentiality): NULL, FORTEZZA-CBC (NSA), IDEA-CBC, RC2-CBC-40 (40bit security), RC4-128, DES40-CBC (40bit security), DES-CBC (56bit security), Triple-DES-EDE-CBC
- ▶ hash functions (integrity): NULL, MD5 and SHA

David Wagner and Bruce Schneier publish a paper entitled “Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol”:

- ▶ Keyexchange algorithm rollback
- ▶ Protocol fallback to SSLv2
- ▶ Protocol leaks known plaintexts – may be used in cryptanalysis
- ▶ Replay attacks on Anonymous DH (don’t use it anyway!)

<https://www.schneier.com/paper-ssl.pdf>

TLS appears

1999. The SSL protocol is renamed to TLS (version 1) with little improvements over SSLv3. The spec. is almost identical.

- ▶ Diffie-Hellman, DSS and Triple-DES are now required by implementors
- ▶ most SSLv3 security issues are still present in TLS 1.0

(RFC2246)

History & Attacks

TLS gets padding attacks

2002. Vaudenay publishes a paper entitled “Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS...”

- ▶ Side-channel attack on CBC mode padding
- ▶ valid/invalid padding causes different reactions
- ▶ can be used to influence decryption operations
- ▶ introduces “padding oracle attacks” in SSL

<http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2002/EUROCRYPT/2850/2850.pdf>

TLS gets extended

2003. TLS extensions get specified in RFC3546.

- ▶ General: Extended Handshake, ClientHello and ServerHello
- ▶ Server Name Indication (SNI) for virtual hosting (SNI leaks metadata!)
- ▶ Certificate Status Request (CSR) support via OCSP
- ▶ (...)

History & Attacks

TLS gets timing attacks

2003. Brumley and Boneh publish a paper entitled “Remote timing attacks are practical”.

Timing attack on RSA in SSL/TLS implementations (OpenSSL):

- ▶ Send specially crafted ClientKeyExchange message
- ▶ Measure time between ClientKeyExchange and Alert response
- ▶ do a bit of statistics
- ▶ retrieve Private Key

<http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1251354>

TLS gets padding oracle password retrieval

2003. Canvel, Hiltgen, Vaudenay, Vuagnoux publish “Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel”.

Extend earlier work of Vaudenay and successfully intercept IMAP passwords in TLS channels.

<http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2003/CRYPTO/1069/1069.pdf>

TLS gets chosen plaintext attacks

2004 & 2006. Bard demonstrates Chosen-Plaintext Attacks against SSL and TLS1.0

Attack on CBC:

- ▶ CBC exchanges an Initialization Vector (IV) during Handshake
- ▶ these IVs turn out to be predictable
- ▶ PINs and Passwords can be decrypted
- ▶ VPNs/Proxies can also be used to accomplish this task

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/111>

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/136>

TLS gets updated

2006. A new TLS protocol version is standardized: TLS 1.1

- ▶ EXPORT ciphers removed
- ▶ Session resumption
- ▶ Protection against the CBC attacks by Bard
- ▶ IANA TLS parameters standardized
- ▶ (...)

(RFC4346)

TLS gets modern crypto

2008. A new TLS protocol version is standardized: TLS 1.2

- ▶ MD5/SHA1 removed as pseudorandom function (PRF)
- ▶ configurable PRFs in ciphersuites (e.g. SHA256)
- ▶ Authenticated encryption: CCM, GCM
- ▶ AES ciphersuites
- ▶ (...)

(RFC5246)

History & Attacks

Rouge CA Certificates

2008. Sotirov, Stevens, Appelbaum, Lenstra, Molnar, Osvik and de Weger present a paper based on earlier work by Lenstra et al. at 25c3 entitled “MD5 considered harmful today”

- ▶ MD5 Hash-collision of a CA Certificate
- ▶ Create colliding (rouge) CA Certificates
- ▶ Generate any Certificate for MITM you want

<http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQcWyDgGUVg>

2009. Moxie Marlinspike releases *sslstrip* at BlackHat DC 2009.

- ▶ Client connects to server
- ▶ Attacker intercepts session via MITM
- ▶ Attacker sends HTTP 301 (moved permanently)
- ▶ Attacker forwards requests to/from server via SSL/TLS
- ▶ Client receives data via unencrypted channel
- ▶ Attacker reads plaintext

<http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip>
<http://vimeo.com/50018478>

History & Attacks

Null-prefix attacks against Certificates

2009. Moxie Marlinspike publishes “Null prefix Attacks against SSL/TLS Certificates”.

- ▶ Specially crafted domain strings trick CA checking
- ▶ null-terminate stuff in a domain name
- ▶ ex.: `www.paypal.com\0.thoughtcrime.org` is valid
- ▶ ex.: `*\0.thoughtcrime.org` is valid
- ▶ CA ignores prefix
- ▶ Client does not → Certificate valid for prefix

Moxie updated his *sslsniff* project to carry out this attack.

<http://www.thoughtcrime.org/papers/null-prefix-attacks.pdf>
<http://thoughtcrime.org/software/sslsniff>

2011. IETF publishes and standardized a RFC to prohibit negotiation and thus compatibility of SSLv2 in TLS1.0-1.2 entirely.

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6176>

2011. Comodo CA: Attacker issues 9 certificates via reseller account for popular domains (google.com, yahoo.com, live.com, skype.com [...])

<https://www.comodo.com/Comodo-Fraud-Incident-2011-03-23.html>

2011. Doung and Rizzo publish the BEAST attack at ekoparty and demo a live attack on PayPal. Based on Bards earlier work on predictable IVs in CBC:

- ▶ Phishing gets victim to visit a certain website
- ▶ Script on said website makes request to genuine site
- ▶ Attacker records encrypted cookie information
- ▶ Tries to guess session-cookie with known CBC attack

Same Origin Policy (SOP) forbids this attack in client software. If SOP can be bypassed (as shown by the authors with Java's SOP) this attack is still practical.

<http://vnhacker.blogspot.co.at/2011/09/beast.html>

2012. Trustwave CA: Trustwave sells subordinate CAs to big corporations to be used for Deep Packet Inspection.

A sub-CA can issue and fake any certificate for MITM attacks.

<http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/02/clarifying-the-trustwave-ca-policy-update.html>
<http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/02/critics-slam-ssl-authority-for-minting-cert-used-to-impersonate-sites/>

2012. DigiNotar CA: Attackers compromise DigiNotar in it's entirety.

- ▶ attackers generate tons of certificates
- ▶ Google Chromes certificate store detects mismatches
- ▶ DigiNotar acknowledges breach
- ▶ DigiNotar files for bankruptcy
- ▶ FOX-IT never gets paid for the investigation

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar>
<http://cryptome.org/0005/diginotar-insec.pdf>
[http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/09/05/
operation-black-tulip-fox-its-report-on-the-diginotar-breach](http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/09/05/operation-black-tulip-fox-its-report-on-the-diginotar-breach)

Certificate validation in non-browser software

2012. Georgiev, Iyengar, Jana, Anubhai, Boneh and Shmatikov publish a paper entitled “The most dangerous code in the world: validating SSL certificates in non-browser software”

Certificate validation vulnerabilities in:

- ▶ OpenSSL
- ▶ GnuTLS
- ▶ JSSE
- ▶ EC2 Java libraries & Amazon SDKs
- ▶ PayPal SDKs
- ▶ eCommerce/WebShop software
- ▶ ..cURL, PHP, Python, tons of Java middleware

<https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/abstracts/ssl-client-bugs.html>

2012. Doung and Rizzo publish an attack against TLS Compression and SPDY titled CRIME.

- ▶ MITM attacker sees length of compressed ciphertext
- ▶ compression has direct affect on the length
- ▶ attacker makes client compress/encrypt data (or uses known data) with secret data
- ▶ attacker compares
- ▶ correct guesses yield shorter messages due to compression
- ▶ repeat until done

This is only feasible for small amounts of data, e.g. session strings, cookies and so forth.

<https://isecpartners.com/blog/2012/september/details-on-the-crime-attack.aspx>

History & Attacks

TIME

2013. Be'ery and Shulman present TIME at BlackHat Europe.
Extend on the CRIME Attack:

- ▶ Attacker generates HTTP requests (XSS, injection,...)
- ▶ Attacker exploits SOP design flaw and measures RTT differences
- ▶ determines correct or failed guesses by SOP timing leak

<https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Beery/bh-eu-13-a-perfect-crime-beery-wp.pdf>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTIpFfTp3-w>

2013. AlFardan and Paterson present a novel attack against CBC for TLS and DTLS based on timing analysis.

- ▶ Attacker intercepts and modifies a message including padding
- ▶ Attacker tempers with the padding of the message
- ▶ MAC computation takes longer during decryption process
- ▶ Attacker repeats and measures
- ▶ Attacker performs padding oracle attack described earlier
- ▶ (Extremely latency sensitive attack)

<http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html>
<http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf>

2013. AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt publish a generic attack on the RC4 cipher for TLS and WPA.

- ▶ Statistical biases in the first 257 bytes of ciphertext
- ▶ Recovery of the first 200 bytes after 2^{28} to 2^{32} encryption operations of the same plaintext
- ▶ A broadcast attack: mounted on unique keys
- ▶ May also be mounted with a single key with repeating target plaintexts
- ▶ Only feasible for large amounts of data and very time consuming

<http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls>

<http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/RC4biases.pdf>

2013 & 2014. Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange voice concern about the NIST Elliptic Curves that are widely implemented and used in TLS for ECDH and ECDSA

- ▶ NIST curves defined on recommendations by NSA's Jerry Solinas
- ▶ Unclear why these curves and their parameters were chosen
- ▶ NIST cites efficiency: more efficient and secure curves available
- ▶ Possible mathematical backdoor through previous analysis and carefully chosen and unexplained parameters
- ▶ Start SafeCurves project (ongoing)

<http://www.hyperelliptic.org/tanja/vortraege/20130531.pdf>

<http://cr.yp.to/talks/2013.09.16/slides-djb-20130916-a4.pdf>

<http://safecurves.cr.yp.to>

https://archive.org/details/ShmooCon2014_SafeCurves

2013. Gluck, Harris and Prado demonstrate yet another attack based on CRIME at BlackHat USA.

Very similar to CRIME but the attack works based on information leaks from HTTP compression instead of TLS compression.

<http://breachattack.com>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CoNKarq1IYA>

Unused Certificates in Truststores

2014. Perl, Fahl, Smith publish a paper entitled “You Won’t Be Needing These Any More: On Removing Unused Certificates From Trust Stores”

- ▶ Compared 48 mio. HTTP certificates
- ▶ 140 CA Certificates are unused in all major trust stores
- ▶ Of 426 trusted root certificates only 66% are even used

http://fc14.ifca.ai/papers/fc14_submission_100.pdf

Triple Handshakes Considered Harmful

2014. Bhargavan, Delignat-Lavaud, Pironti, Langley and Ray present an attack one day before the IETF'89 meeting in London.

- ▶ Limited to client-certificate authentication with renegotiation
- ▶ MITM attack on renegotiation with a three-way handshake
- ▶ Variations of the attack also discussed on their website
- ▶ Can't possibly fit this into one slide, homework: understand the attack by reading their excellent description on the website

<https://secure-resumption.com>

<https://secure-resumption.com/IETF-triple-handshakes.pdf>

History & Attacks

Frankencerts

2014. Brubaker, Jana, Ray, Khurshid and Shmatikovy publish a paper entitled “Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations”

- ▶ Fuzzing of X.509 related code in all major implementations shows serious weaknesses in certificate validation and handling
- ▶ OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS, MatrixSSL, PolarSSL, CyaSSL, cyptlib [...]

https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak14.pdf

<https://github.com/sumanj/frankencert>

Heartbleed

2014. Heartbleed is independently discovered by Codenomicon and a Google Security engineer.

Faulty implementation in OpenSSL of the TLS Heartbleed extension leaks memory content over the wire. This has been all over the media and discussed in detail all over the internet. People have successfully extracted sensitive information (password files et cetera) from victim memory.

I wrote an nmap plugin to scan for Heartbleed:
<https://github.com/azet/nmap-heartbleed>

<http://heartbleed.com>

2014. At BlackHat Delignat-Lavaud presents an attack based on SSLv3 downgrade and sharing of session caches

- ▶ Attacker forces downgrade to SSLv3
- ▶ For SSLv3: larger deployments share session caches
- ▶ attacker exploits a server vulnerability where session caches are reused
- ▶ attacker requests different subdomain with SSLv3 using the same session
- ▶ vulnerable server will allow connection w/o authentication
- ▶ `www.company.com` vs `git.company.com`

<https://bh.ht.vc>

POODLE

2014. POODLE: Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption - OpenSSL/Google

- ▶ MITM attacker downgrades to SSLv3 (once again)
- ▶ attacker does block duplication
- ▶ takes on average 256 requests to decrypt 1 byte (!)
- ▶ disabling SSLv3 or using the FALLBACK_SCSV TLS extension (draft) mitigates this issue entirely

<https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/ssl-poodle.pdf>

Patch tuesday Nov. 2014: Remote Code Execution in Microsoft SChannel

Enables malicious attackers to initiate ClientCertificate exchange (even if unsupported) with payload in the signature

<http://blog.beyondtrust.com/triggering-ms14-066>

POODLE again

2014. POODLE on TLS 1.0-1.2

- ▶ turns out some implementations (e.g. F5 load balancers) are vulnerable to POODLE even for TLS 1.0 - TLS 1.2
- ▶ since TLS 1.1 this should have been mitigated entirely, but 3.6% of servers vulnerable

<https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html>

<https://vivaldi.net/blogs/entry/not-out-of-the-woods-yet-there-are-more-poodles>

There are tons of other issues with TLS stacks and software implementations that have not been discussed.


OpenSSL alone published 24 security advisories in 2014 until today.

- ▶ Apple's GOTO fail
- ▶ GnuTLS GOTO fail
- ▶ various GnuTLS vulnerabilities
- ▶ wrong use of OpenSSL API in server and client software

...

Clearly; a lot of people current have their eyes on this very topic.

For this crowd: It's up to you to find them and improve existing implementations, protocols and standards.



1 – Internet Engineering Task Force

2 – Internet Research Task Force

- ▶ After the Snowden Leaks appeared in press the IETF began discussion on how “pervasive monitoring” can be prevented
- ▶ In September 2013 the “PERPASS” (pervasive, passive monitoring) mailing list was started
- ▶ People started working on drafts to circumvent “pervasive monitoring”: <http://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/perpass.txt>

- ▶ IETF 89 was accompanied by a meeting on the topic (STRINT) with invited speakers on privacy, security and cryptography:
<https://www.w3.org/2014/strint/>
- ▶ "strengthening the internet against pervasive monitoring"
- ▶ a lot of good feedback and ideas
- ▶ main takeaways: threat modeling, CFRG was tasked with TLS-WG guidance on choices of ciphers and which curves/parameters (ECC) to use

<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iab-strint-report-00>

IETF efforts

New WGs and documents being worked on

- ▶ UTA-WG (utilizing TLS in applications): working BCPs on how to properly use/implement TLS
- ▶ TLS-WG (transport layer security): TLS 1.3, chacha20-poly1305, DJB curves (ECC), FALLBACK_SCSV extension,..
- ▶ TCPINC (TCP increased security): working on standardization of opportunistic encryption on the TCP layer (similar to tcpcrypt)
- ▶ DPRIVE (DNS private exchange): working on DNS privacy features
- ▶ IAB (internet architecture board): threat model, see: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iab-privsec-confidentiality-threat>
- ▶ TRANS (Public Notary Transparency): fight malicious certificate authorities with certificate transparency, see: www.certificate-transparency.org

Curves Curves Curves

- ▶ CFRG (cryptography forum research group within IRTF) is working on a standardized set of curves and curve parameters for IETF WGs: expected by the end of 2014
- ▶ + Curve25519 (dan bernstein, et al.)
- ▶ + NUMS (microsoft)
- ▶ + ed448goldilocks (michael hamburg)

In comparison to NIST curves: most new proposals are pluggable into existing standards and can be reused within protocols and IETF documents.

Good summary (by the Brainpool authors, so a bit biased):
<http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/832.pdf>

- ▶ Certificate Transparency is now being worked on as an IETF standard: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/trans/charter/>
- ▶ discussion on mandatory encryption in HTTP2 (HTTPBIS-WG)

On Nov. 14, 2014 Internet Architecture Board issued a statement recommending deploying encryption by default throughout the protocol stack in further developments.

Commended by Internet Society a day later.

<https://www.iab.org/2014/11/14/iab-statement-on-internet-confidentiality/>
<http://www.internetsociety.org/news/internet-society-commends-internet-architecture-board-recommendation-encryption-default>

Get informed!

Luckily Mitigation does not require as much slides. Because it's rather simple:

- ▶ Use current software and update regularly:
Most of these attacks are fixed upstream
- ▶ Use peer-reviewed and solid configurations:
Check out <https://bettercrypto.org>
- ▶ Listen to recommendations by security experts
- ▶ Audit your infrastructure (possibly even pay external contractors to take a look)
- ▶ Keep track of TLS security and evolving security standards and recommendations

IETF TLS-WG is currently working on TLS 1.3 to mitigate some of the issues and concerns raised.

Drafts like new SCSVs would effectively prevent protocol downgrade attacks. (constant-time) ciphers and curves and DH parameter negotiation have been proposed along with protocol improvements for efficiency, security and privacy. It's still in the making and worth to keep track of.

Cryptography libraries seem to be more actively audited now, which has resulted in some of the disclosures in the paths months.

<http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-tls-5.pdf>

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv>

<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305>

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gillmor-tls-negotiated-dl-dhe/?include_text=1

..and in Dec. 2014 W3C has established a working group to “secure the web through encryption”:

<https://w3ctag.github.io/web-https>

Certificate Transparency and HPKP are only a few examples of proposed solutions to tackle the issue of malicious certificate authorities, certificate forgery and MITM attacks.

- ▶ Letsencrypt: Free, Secure, audited and distributed CA by Cisco, Akamai, UMichigan, EFF and others
- ▶ Cloudflare Keyless SSL: Have keys on central HSMs/servers instead on each frontend.
- ▶ Certificate Transparency: distributed consent, monitoring and auditability of certificates and CAs in the wild
- ▶ HPKP pins keys to certificates to prevent MITM and certificate based attacks

<https://letsencrypt.org/>

<https://www.cloudflare.com/keyless-ssl>

<http://www.certificate-transparency.org>

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/>

Philippe G. 2015 - Berlin, UMich

Aaron Zauner

- ▶ “Trust the Math” (Schneier)
- ▶ Implementation is still a big issue
- ▶ Software bugs are a big issue
- ▶ Protocol design is hard and longsome
- ▶ We’re going to see many more attacks on TLS
- ▶ TLS and Crypto improvements are being constantly worked on

THANKS FOR YOUR PATIENCE. ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

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<https://github.com/azet>

GPG Fingerprint:

7CB6 197E 385A 02DC 15D8 E223 E4DB 6492 FDB9 B5D5

[I have ECDSA (Brainpool) & EdDSA (Curve25519) subkeys as well.]