.CONT18 splunk>

An Introduction to Fraud Detection with Splunk

How Sony Interactive Entertainment uses Splunk for Fraud Prevention

Grant Walthall – Security Engineer @ SIE

Beau Morgan - Staff SE @ Splunk

August 2018 | Version 1.0

Draft Outline:

- Why Splunk for Fraud (3 min) Beau
- What is an Account (7 min) Beau
- Real World SIE Use Cases (25 min) Grant
- SIE Value / Metrics (5 min) Grant
- Call to Action (5 min) Beau


Forward-Looking Statements

During the course of this presentation, we may make forward-looking statements regarding future events or the expected performance of the company. We caution you that such statements reflect our current expectations and estimates based on factors currently known to us and that actual events or results could differ materially. For important factors that may cause actual results to differ from those contained in our forward-looking statements, please review our filings with the SEC.


The forward-looking statements made in this presentation are being made as of the time and date of its live presentation. If reviewed after its live presentation, this presentation may not contain current or accurate information. We do not assume any obligation to update any forward-looking statements we may make. In addition, any information about our roadmap outlines our general product direction and is subject to change at any time without notice. It is for informational purposes only and shall not be incorporated into any contract or other commitment. Splunk undertakes no obligation either to develop the features or functionality described or to include any such feature or functionality in a future release.

Splunk, Splunk>, Listen to Your Data, The Engine for Machine Data, Splunk Cloud, Splunk Light and SPL are trademarks and registered trademarks of Splunk Inc. in the United States and other countries. All other brand names, product names, or trademarks belong to their respective owners. © 2018 Splunk Inc. All rights reserved.





Existing Fraud Tools Too Limiting



RIGID AND INFLEXIBLE



SCALE AND SPEED ISSUES




NARROW VIEW OF FRAUD



DIFFICULT TO DEPLOY; LIMITED ROI



Splunk: Leading Solution for Fraud Detection



FLEXIBLE



SCALE AND SPEED

splunk>




BROAD VIEW




FAST VALUE
COMPELLING ROI





What is an Account?

Accounts Are Customers



(%) 10:57:1531 "GET / Category.screen?category_id=GIFTS&15E5510NID=SD15L4FF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 720 "http://buttercup-shoppine F107/jan 18:10:157:1231 "GET / GET / GE



Account Activities


- Transactional (Single Event Type)
 - Credit Card Transactions
 - Inventory Sales
 - Money Movements
 - Loyalty Card
 - Coupons
 - Financial Services

- Behavioral (Multiple Event Types)
 - Online Banking
 - Online Sales
 - Online Insurance
 - Clickstreams
 - Web Logins

Account Takeover (ATO) Detection Example

Monitor Application Successful Logins from Unusual IPs/Locations to Uncover Successful Phishing

	_time 0	incoming_login 0	logged_in_before 0	times_ip_used 0	times_ua_used 0	possible_ato 0	username_logged_in 0	src_ip 0	Country 0	Region 0	City 0
1	2017-10-29 02:52:42.282	yes	yes	0	0	yes	Darryl	63.249.52.123	United States	California	Los Angeles
2	2017-10-28 05:22:02.867	yes	yes	3	1	no	Anne-Marie	68.56.193.84	United States	Michigan	Macomb
3	2017-10-28 23:45:30.394	yes	yes	1	1	no	Jonathan	68.147.22.29	Canada	Alberta	Calgary
4	2017-10-28 20:16:05.213	yes	yes	2	1	no	billmarschall61	71.10.85.28	United States	Minnesota	Big Lake
5	2017-10-28 20:42:20.656	yes	yes	1	1	no	chud575	82.215.182.179	Italy	Provincia di Savona	Ortovero
6	2017-10-28 06:21:36.319	yes	yes	1	1	no	mmathews	68.97.128.168	United States	Oklahoma	Edmond
7	2017-10-28 19:53:27.603	yes	yes	2	1	no	nmaganlal	96.40.182.98	United States	California	Riverside



:10:57:123] "GET /Category.screen?category_id=GIFTS&JSESSIONID=SDJSL4FF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1 18:10:56:123] "GET /product.screen?product_id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SDSSL7F6ADFF0 HTTP 1.1" 200 1318 3432)] "GET /DJSLSSCREEN?product_id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SDSSL7F6ADFF3 HTTP 1.1" 200 1318







Real World Use Cases with Real Results

A look at how Sony Interactive Entertainment uses Splunk for Fraud Prevention and Analysis

Introduction

Grant Walthall

Senior Fraud Engineer Global Fraud Management (GFM) Sony Interactive Entertainment







Responsibilities of GFM

Financial Fraud

- Real time risk decision making
- Research and monitoring using Splunk and Oracle database


Password List Attack (Credential Stuffing)

Focus of Today

 Detection and password reset of compromised accounts

Account Takeover


- Protection of users accounts
- Recovery of affected accounts



Steps of a password list attack



Types of attacks



- Very simple attack
- Easy to detect

- Attack is not obvious
- Attack is likely continuous


- High volume attacks that are unlikely to stop
- usually there are many attacks
 splunk> .conf18

Uses of ATO Accounts

- Credit card fraud
- Use of account entitlements
- Use of accounts subscriptions

Depending on the activity hackers may not make any changes to the account.

Potentially using it at the same time as the owner.



Actions against PLA

Actions Against Password List Attacks

- Security enhancements
 - Prevent unauthorized access
- Rate limiting, IP blocking, and blocking bad requests (WAFs)
 - Limit the scale of the attack
- Password reset
 - Mitigation after the authentication
- Dormant account reset
 - Dormant accounts are at high risk of ATO. We reset the password so that only the account holder can recover the account.

Security Enhancements

Blocking bad authentications is the most desirable action.

- Hackers get an immediate response
- If it is something in their control they will change it


Well thought out enhancements are difficult to work around.

May cause some friction to users.

I'm not a robot

Enhancements at SIE:

- Captcha on all authentications
- Two factor authentication
- Machine Learning/biometric detection





IP Rate Limiting

Rate limiting is important to limit the scale of attacks.

- This may deter some casual hackers.
- Professional hackers will not be deterred.
 - They have a very large number of IP addresses at their disposal.
- Likely has more benefits with DDOS prevention.
- Aggressive rate limiting may make detection harder.

We have seen more than 10 million IP addresses attacking us in a given month





What can be done?

- You will likely never stop being attacked.
- Blocking attacks can be challenging and expensive.
 - Some will be missed.
- Detection of compromised accounts will always be needed.
 - Splunk has filled this need for us very well.

Useful Data Sources in PLA

Web logs

Show the behavior of a user or IP address

Authentication logs

- Allows us to know what accounts were actually compromised
- Useful for looking at high failure rates

Other account logs


- Need to know if they have made any other changes
- Email changes are very important to us


Looking for Potential Attacks


Monitor the following:

- Authentication endpoints
- Authentication results

<<your data>>
| timechart bins=1000 count by ...
user agent, IP country, auth result








Monitoring Authentications

SIE must support a wide range of devices for both current and legacy services.

- Requires greater effort to protect all endpoints from attacks
- Hackers will exploit your weakest endpoints
 - You need to have a good understanding of your network and how they are attacking you
 - Without this we can not make well informed decisions

Monitoring Account Events

- Time charts are helpful in visualizing anomalies
 - Gives us a general idea if there are abnormal activities occuring
- Monitored Events:
 - change password
 - change email
 - add payment instrument
 - sub account creation
 - purchasing events



Researching

Splunk is heavily used for researching the scale of new malicious trends and prototyping mitigation.

- We have many different data sources in Splunk
 - This allows us to better understand what is going on and what we can do, which can be very difficult to do in something such as a database.
- Splunk allows for rapid iteration and prototyping

Research steps:

- Notice anomaly (either through reporting or alerting)
- 2. Create additional queries looking at suspicious activity


Researching

Try to understand the activity on some data point like IP address, account ID, or session ID.

Useful to understand how both good users act and hackers act.


Find ways to explore your data that is useful to you.

This is likely to constantly change.



Researching

Visuals are often very helpful in understanding your data







Some SIE Detections

SIE detection rules (typically on IP):

- High failure to success ratio
- Skipping endpoints
 - For example skipping login page and hitting authentication endpoint directly
- High counts of endpoints that are rarely used
 - Hackers evaluate what values an account has, such as what games it owns
 - Other account information may also be evaluated
- Accounts on many IP addresses
 - As well as other accounts on those IP addresses
- Many authentications occurring very quickly

Detection Process

Iteration is very important

Which Splunk is great at

Output any data that may be relevant for either detection or validation

 For example user agent is not great for detection, but can be very useful for validation when developing rules

iç	o_address 0	Country 0	1	user_agent 0	/	success_count 0	anf_count 0	InvPass_count =	cnt_login_do 0	cnt_login_jsp 0	pct_jsp 0
1 1	88.x.x.x	Kuwait		Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 11_4_1 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mobile/15G77		1	0	13	44	52	54.166666666666664
2 1	08.x.x.8	United States		Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 8.1.0; SM-N960U Build/M1AJQ; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/68.0.3440.91 Mobile Safari/537.36		0	0	4	29	34	53.96825396825397
3 7	2.x.x.x	United States		Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 8.0.0; SM-G960U Build/R16NW; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/68.0.3440.91 Mobile Safari/537.36		1	0	4	23	25	52.083333333333336
4 1	68.x.x.x	Argentina		Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/68.0.3440.106 Safari/537.36		0	0	2	22	27	55.10204081632652
5 5	x.x.x.	Saudi Arabia		Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/68.0.3440.106 Safari/537.36		0	0	4	21	23	52.27272727272727
6 1	59.x.x.x	Saudi Arabia		Mozilla/S.0 (Linux; Android 8.0.0; FIG-LA1 Build/HUAWEIFIG-LA1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/68.0.3440.91 Mobile Safari/S37.36 Mozilla/S.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/68.0.3440.106 Safari/S37.36		3	0	2	20	23	53.48837209302325
7 7	7.x.x.x	Saudi Arabia		Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:61.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/61.0		0	0	4	20	24	54.545454545454
8 8	7.x.x.x	France		Mozilla/5.0 (PlayStation 4 5.55) AppleWebKit/601.2 (KHTML, like Gecko)		-2	0	8	20	27	57.446808510638306
9 1	03.x.x.x	Australia		Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/S37.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.140 Safari/S37.36 Edge/17.17134 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/S37.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/68.0.3440.106 Safari/S37.36 Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 11_4_1 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mobile/15G77		6	0	1	19	21	52.5
10 2	00.x.x.x	Peru		Mozilla/S.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/S37.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.140 Safari/S37.36 Edge/17.17134 Mozilla/S.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/S37.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/68.0.3440.106 Safari/S37.36 Mozilla/S.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/S37.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/68.0.3440.106 Safari/S37.36 Mozilla/S.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/S37.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/68.0.3440.106 Safari/S37.36 Mozilla/S.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/S37.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/68.0.3440.106 Safari/S37.36		13	0	4	19	25	56.81818181818182



Detection Process

Detection Research

```
(<<web data>>) OR (<<authentication data>>)
 iplocation ip_address
 stats
 values(Country) as Country
 values(user agent) as user agent
 count(eval(result like "%SUCCESS")) as success_count
 count(eval(result like "%ACCOUNT_NOT_FOUND ")) as
anf_count
 count(eval(result like "%INVALID_PASSWORD")) as
invPass count
 count(eval(match(uri_path,"<<auth endpoint>>"))) as cnt_auth
 count(eval(match(uri_path,"<<login page>>))) as cnt_login_page
by ip address
where cnt_auth > 0 AND
(success_count+anf_count+invPass_count) > 0
eval
pct_login_page=(cnt_login_page/(cnt_auth+cnt_login_page))*100
sort - cnt auth
```

More data is returned in order to determine what is even relevant.

Finalized detection

```
(<<web data>>) OR (<<authentication data>>)
| iplocation ip_address
| stats
| count(result) as authentications
| count(eval(match(uri_path,"^<<auth endpoint>>"))) as cnt_auth
| count(eval(match(uri_path,"<<login page>>"))) as cnt_login_page
| by ip_address
| where cnt_auth > 0 AND authentications> 0
| eval
| pct_login_page=(cnt_login_page/(cnt_auth+cnt_login_page))*100
| where pct_jsp<20 AND cnt_auth>=5
```

Only data relevant to detection is returned.

Data sent to summary index.

Detection Process

Using detected bad IPs

```
(index=<<summary index>> source=<<search name of IP
detection>>) OR (<<auth data>> result=*SUCCESS)
eval account=_time.":".account_id.":".sign_in_id
stats
 values(account) as account
 count(eval(index="<<summary index>>")) as cnt_bad
by ip_address
where cnt_bad>0
mvexpand account
rex field=account
"^(?<_time>\d+(\.\d+)?):(?<account_id>\d+):(?<sign_in_id>.*)$"
stats
first(sign in id) as sign in id
 min(_time) as _time
 values(ip_address) as ip_address
 count as cnt auth
 dc(ip_address) as dc_ip
by account id
| eval ip_address=mvindex(ip_address,0,9)
```

Identifying accounts in same search

```
(<<web data>>)
OR (<<auth data>> result=*SUCCESS)
eval user=account_id."|".sign_in_id
stats
 count(eval(result like "%SUCCESS")) as success count
 values(user) as user
 count(eval(match(uri_path,"^<<auth endpoint>>"))) as cnt_auth
 count(eval(match(uri_path,"<<login page>>"))) as
cnt_login_page
by ip_address
l eval
pct_login_page=(cnt_login_page/(cnt_auth+cnt_login_page))*100
 where pct jsp<20 AND cnt auth>=5
fields ip_address user
 mvexpand user
 rex field=user "^(?<account_id>\d+)\|(?<sign_in_id>.*)$"
table account_id sign_in_id ip_address
```




Validation of Detection

Identify data useful for determining false positives and false negatives

- Not recommended to be data used in the rule
- User agent and IP location have been helpful

Graph the data using a timechart to see if the results look as you might expect






Monitor Detection

Useful in understanding if significant amounts of missed accounts Helpful in determining false positive events

Looking at the IP country is often helpful for this



PLA mitigation

Detecting Accounts

Direct detection

Identifying compromised account solely from logs for those accounts

Correlating detection

- Identifying IP addresses, devices, or other criteria
- Every account using that IP, device, etc. is identified as compromised
- If the time period is too long you will have a greater degree of false positives
 - Due to botnets being comprised of compromised devices, our users will sometimes have a compromised device on their IP address

Challenges in Splunk

A challenge we faced was the ability to perform some lookups in Splunk.

- For example our account table is massive and is constantly updated.
- We solved this problem by sending data from Splunk to a database to do these lookups.

Splunk Database Password Reset

Where to Start?

- Monitoring data
- Identifying bad/suspicious activities
- Identify what can and needs to be done to affected accounts

Call to Action

What's Next?





Splunk Security Essentials https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3435/

Learn to improve your security using Splunk's analytics-driven security:

- ✓ Common use cases and examples to get started
- ✓ Data onboarding guide for top data sources
- ✓ Understand how to improve your security
- ✓ Scales from small to massive companies
- ✓ Save searches, send results to ES/UBA




You can learn to solve use cases today for free, then use with Splunk solutions

GET /product.screen?roduct_id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SDSSL7FF6ADFF0 HTTP 1.1" 404 720 "NCCP."

GET /Oldlink?ten?product_id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SDSSL7FF6ADFF0 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322

12c to /Oldlink?ten?product_id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SDSSL7FF6ADFF0 HTTP 1.1" 200 1318 "NtTP://but








Splunk Essentials for Fraud Detection


https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3693/

Learn how Splunk Enterprise may be used to detect various forms of fraud using the example scenarios.





Free Workshops Deep-dive and grow your fraud detection skills





Thank You

opping.
//18 'nttp://o
afff 1.1' 280
(is Geria) Chr

Don't forget to rate this session in the .conf18 mobile app

.Conf18
splunk>