

# **RSA**Conference2016

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SESSION ID: HTA-R05

## **Combatting Spoofed GPS in Forensics**

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# GPS becomes critical...



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By David  
Earl  
BIO »

## Police have GPS evidence that puts teen murder suspects at crime scene

*15-year-old Courvoisier Sims was wearing a juvenile probation tracking device, police say*

UPDATED 5:31 PM CST Dec 30, 2015

## UT Austin Researchers Spoof Superyacht at Sea

MONDAY, JUL 29, 2013

This summer, a radio navigation research team from The University of Texas at Austin set out to discover whether they could subtly coerce a 213-foot yacht off its course, using a custom-made GPS device.

## TECHNOLOGY

# TEXAS STUDENTS HIJACK A U.S. GOVERNMENT DRONE IN MIDAIR

By Colin Lecher   Posted June 28, 2012

# GPS becomes critical...



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THE  
NATIONAL  
INTEREST

MAGAZINE

BLOGS

TOPICS

REGIONS

## The Pentagon Is Worried About Hacked GPS



WORLD | PASSCODE | PASSCODE VOICES | CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

## Opinion: Were US sailors 'spoofed' into Iranian waters?

In 2011, Iran spoofed – or faked – Global Positioning System signals to send a CIA drone off course. Did it do the same to trick Navy vessels into Iranian waters?

By Dana A. Goward, Contributor | JANUARY 15, 2016



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# GPS becomes critical...



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WORLD | MIDDLE EAST

## Exclusive: Iran hijacked US drone, says Iranian engineer (Video)

In an exclusive interview, an engineer working to unlock the secrets of the captured RQ-170 Sentinel says they exploited a known vulnerability and tricked the US drone into landing in Iran.

By Scott Peterson, Staff writer Payam Faramarzi\*, Correspondent  
DECEMBER 15, 2011

Save for later




Sepahnews/AP | View Caption

# GPS spoofing evolves from this...



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# GPS spoofing old style




- Complex
- Difficult to acquire
- Expensive

# Into this...



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# GPS spoofing new style



- Not Quite as Complex
- Easy to acquire
- Inexpensive

# What we'll be talking about



- How GPS (and BeiDou, Galileo, GLONASS, and IRNSS) works
- Avenues for spoofing attacks
- How GPS can be spoofed
- Methodologies for detecting spoofed tracks

# Let's start with why!



- This has potential real world impact
- New technologies are fun
- I get bored very easily

# But first, a demo...




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- What: I'll be broadcasting a spoofed GPS signal to the equipment onstage.
- Why: So we have something to analyze later
- Also: This takes a few minutes, and is boring to watch.
- WARNING: If you don't want to participate, disable GPS on your phones NOW.

# How GNSS systems work




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# How GNSS systems work



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# How GNSS systems work



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$$P^1 = ( (x^1 - x)^2 + (y^1 - y)^2 + (z^1 - z)^2 )^{1/2} + c\tau - c\tau^1$$

$$P^2 = ( (x^2 - x)^2 + (y^2 - y)^2 + (z^2 - z)^2 )^{1/2} + c\tau - c\tau^2$$

$$P^3 = ( (x^3 - x)^2 + (y^3 - y)^2 + (z^3 - z)^2 )^{1/2} + c\tau - c\tau^3$$

$$P^4 = ( (x^4 - x)^2 + (y^4 - y)^2 + (z^4 - z)^2 )^{1/2} + c\tau - c\tau^4$$

# GNSS gives us



- Spatial positioning in three dimensions
- Temporal positioning in a single dimension.

# Attacks abound



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- GPS is vulnerable to attacks impacting both positioning and timing.

# Attacks on location



- Navigation systems
- Location systems (like monitoring systems for probation)
- False location histories
- Security interlocks (drones, etc)

# Attacks on time



- Industrial controls
- Time lock safes
- Authoritative Time Attacks

# What do you need to spoof GPS




- Ephemeris Data for the time you're spoofing
- A track to lay down
- Lots of math
- Relativity matters!

# Take GPS track data



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# Now, about that demo



- I'll capture the track that we've been laying down



# My thought process



- The real world is full of random... stuff
- We could resort to complex math... but I'm bad at math
- So we look at simple techniques...
- And some of them work!

# Noise and spatial “jitter”



- Straight lines... aren't
- Calculate the average distance from the line.

# Noise and spatial “jitter”



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- Errors caused by multipath, ephemeris data errors, weather, interference, solar conditions add up.
- Testing shows lower amounts of “jitter” when spoofed GPS tracks are reviewed
- This is due to the reduction of outside factors impacting the signal.


# Velocity profiling



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- Tracks give you a relatively low resolution sampling of position.
- Unusually regular velocities are an indicator of spoofing

- Radically different velocity profiles yield similar track results



# Secondary data



- Some devices support wifi
- Check for artifacts of seen wifi networks
- Compare to Wifi Geolocation Databases like Mozilla Location Service and WiGLE

# The State of Things



- Only “civilian” GPS systems are susceptible (right now)
- No commercial solutions using spoofing detection!
- Lots of academic work on detecting spoofing in real-time...
  - “GPS Spoofing Detection via Dual-Receiver Correlation of Military Signals”, Psiaki Et Al (2011)
- This is new ground... plenty of opportunities for research

# Next steps and further research



- Profile position jitter on more devices
- Integrate with GIS and traffic datasources to identify discrepancies
- Look into Jitter-detection from Optics
- Test additional spoofing methods



# ANALYSIS SCRIPT DEMO



# “Apply”



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- Review your protocols for processing GPS track evidence
- Build a workflow for automatically calculating key parameters
- Seek corroborative evidence, always!

# Any Questions?



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