

RSA®Conference2015

Singapore | 22-24 July | Marina Bay Sands

SESSION ID: MBS-R03


ShadowOS: Modifying the Android OS for Mobile Application Testing

Ray Kelly

Research and Innovation
HP Fortify On Demand
@vbisbest

CHANGE

Challenge today's security thinking



About Me

- ◆ Ray Kelly
- ◆ Innovation and Research, HP Fortify on Demand
- ◆ SPI guy, lead developer of WebInspect
- ◆ FoD Mobile pen test team
- ◆ Twitter: @vbisbest



Agenda

- ◆ Why is mobile testing important
- ◆ Challenges of mobile testing
- ◆ Example mobile vulnerabilities
- ◆ How do we make this easier, ShadowOS
- ◆ The Android build process
- ◆ Identify key Android source code files for modification
- ◆ Demonstrate a custom Android OS with intercepting code




MITF?



Why is Mobile Testing Important

- ◆ Mobile development is the hottest type of development right now. New surface area equals dangerous surface area
- ◆ If anyone's going to put features over security to get the product out the door, it's likely to be a mobile team
- ◆ Many enterprise mobile developers haven't had the security training that other types of developers have had – Anyone can make apps, its easy!
- ◆ Many assume that because mobile back ends aren't visited directly they are more secure (obscurity assumption)

Challenges of Mobile Testing



Full Mobile App Coverage

Client



- Credentials in memory
- Credentials on file system
- Data stored on file system
- Poor cert management



Network



- Clear text credentials
- Clear text data
- Backdoor data
- Data leakage



Server



- Injection flaws
- Authentication
- Session management
- Access control
- Logic flaws



Server

- ◆ Mobile API's are vulnerable to most of the same vulnerabilities as standard websites e.g. SQL Injection, XSS, path traversal etc.
- ◆ Testing JSON/XML based API's should be tested with valid structures as well as invalid structures.
- ◆ Difficult to test when app is using SSL and pinning certificates.



```
{
  "username" : "my_username",
  "password" : "my_password",
  "validation" : {
    "validationData" : [
      {
        "param1" : "remote_address",
        "param2" : "location"
      }
    ]
  }
}
```


Server

- ◆ Backend API allowed WebDAV



Network

- ◆ Privacy/data leakage, clear text data
- ◆ 3rd party data leakage
- ◆ Need to MITM, same challenges as server side
- ◆ Difficult to test when app is using SSL and certificate pinning

Network

- ◆ Transmission of private information
- ◆ Used SSL but did not pin certificate



```

Request to https://devices.c[redacted]
Forward Drop Intercept is on Action
Comment this item
Raw Params Headers Hex
POST /v3/devices/51f6c45000d4afe31d00235a/locations.json HTTP/1.1
Host: [redacted].sh.com
Authorization: Basic IDVhOEc2ZWU[redacted]JRuZndreGZMaTc3EjE5MTkxMjQ=
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 499
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept: application/json
Connection: keep-alive
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: [redacted] CFNetwork/609 Darwin/13.0.0

{"location":{"data":[{"FormattedAddressLines":["[redacted]","[redacted]","[redacted]","United States"],"Street":"[redacted]","SubAdministrativeArea":"London","Thoroughfare":"Le","PostCodeExtension":"4235","Country":"United States","State":"Virginia","SubLocality":"Sugarland Run","SubThoroughfare":"10909","CountryCode":"US","longitude":77.35[redacted]88,"latitude":39.03[redacted],"date":"2013-07-31T02:38:14-0400"}]}}
```

Client

- ◆ The big unknown especially without source code. Even with source code its not always easy (what is sensitive input?)
- ◆ What is being written to the file system?
 - ◆ Credentials
 - ◆ Private information
 - ◆ Sensitive photos outside of sandbox
- ◆ SQL Lite
 - ◆ Application storage
 - ◆ iOS WebKit cache (includes query string)




Client

- ◆ Promiscuous client-side storage
 - ◆ Storage of credentials in plist files, SQLite databases
 - ◆ Failure to use Key Chain to store credentials
 - ◆ Storage of sensitive application data on file system
 - ◆ Apps storing their images in the public folder rather than in their sandbox
 - ◆ Applications logging to the system log, but sending sensitive app data along with it (e.g. logcat output)



Photo Storage



Logging

◆ Using Logcat

```

W/System.err( 3318): at java.security.KeyStore.getInstance(KeyStore.java:116)
W/System.err( 3318): ... 5 more
I/SSLTrusKiller( 3318): init() override in javax.net.ssl.SSLContext
V/BestVulnerableApp( 3318): Using bbaggins242@gmail.com and password : password1234
V/BestVulnerableApp( 3318): Failed to connect/login to xmpp.l.google.com Did you enter right user?
W/System.err( 3318): SASL authentication failed using mechanism PLAIN:
W/System.err( 3318): at org.jivesoftware.smack.SASLAuthentication.authenticate(SASLAuthentication.java:116)
W/System.err( 3318): at org.jivesoftware.smack.XMPPConnection.login(XMPPConnection.java:230)
W/System.err( 3318): at org.jivesoftware.smack.Connection.login(Connection.java:353)
W/System.err( 3318): at mz.vulnerability.com.WeAreVulnerableActivity$1.run(WeAreVulnerableActivity.java:11)
W/System.err( 3318): at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:841)

```


Security Through Obscurity?



RSA[®]Conference2015


Singapore | 22-24 July | Marina Bay Sands

How Do We Make This Easier, ShadowOS



There Must Be A Better Way


- ◆ There must be a better way to test mobile apps
- ◆ Needs to get around certificate pinning
- ◆ Watch files being created or modified real time
- ◆ Watch SQL queries being executed real time
- ◆ Android is open source, so how about we get inside the OS



Source: Wikipedia

Android OS

WebKit
SQLite



HTTPClient
File Access


Source: Wikipedia

Android OS

RSA®Conference2015

Singapore | 22-24 July | Marina Bay Sands


Android Build Process



 #RSAC

The Host And Environment

- ◆ Ubuntu 12.04 64bit
- ◆ Sounds crazy, but follow the instructions!
- ◆ <http://source.android.com/source/downloading.html>



Hidden Targets

- ◆ Run “lunch sdk-eng” to select the sdk target and images
- ◆ Don’t bother with the lunch menu

```
shadowlabs@ubuntu:~/WORKING_DIRECTORY$ lunch
You're building on Linux
Lunch menu... pick a combo:
1. full-eng
2. full_x86
3. vbox_x86
4. full_grouped-userdebug
5. mini_armv7-userdebug
6. mini_armv7-userdebug
7. full_wing-userdebug
8. full_crespo-userdebug
9. full_maguro-userdebug
10. full_panda-userdebug
Which would you like? [full-eng] 0
```

```
shadowlabs@ubuntu:~/WORKING_DIRECTORY$ lunch sdk-eng
=====
PLATFORM_VERSION_CODENAME=REL
PLATFORM_VERSION=4.1.2
TARGET_PRODUCT=sdk
TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT=eng
TARGET_BUILD_TYPE=release
TARGET_BUILD_APPS=
TARGET_ARCH=arm
TARGET_ARCH_VARIANT=armv7-a
HOST_ARCH=x86
HOST_OS=linux
HOST_OS_EXTRA=Linux-3.8.0-29-generic-x86_64-with-Ubuntu-12.04-precise
HOST_BUILD_TYPE=release
BUILD_ID=JZ054L
OUT_DIR=out
=====
shadowlabs@ubuntu:~/WORKING_DIRECTORY$
```


Successful Build

◆ Success!

```

===== [Windows SDK] Build android-sdk_eng.shadowlabs_windows =====

MAIN_SDK_NAME: android-sdk_eng.shadowlabs_linux-x86
WIN_SDK_NAME  : android-sdk_eng.shadowlabs_windows
WIN_SDK_DIR   : out/host/windows/sdk
WIN_SDK_ZIP   : out/host/windows/sdk/android-sdk_eng.shadowlabs_windows.zip
Windows SDK generated at out/host/windows/sdk/android-sdk_eng.shadowlabs_windows.zip


===== [Windows SDK] Done =====

shadowlabs@ubuntu:~/WORKING_DIRECTORY$

```


Name	Date modified	Type	Size
add-ons	5/13/2014 9:15 AM	File folder	
docs	5/13/2014 9:15 AM	File folder	
extras	5/13/2014 9:15 AM	File folder	
platforms	5/15/2014 8:34 AM	File folder	
platform-tools	6/2/2014 4:51 PM	File folder	
samples	5/13/2014 9:15 AM	File folder	
system-images	5/15/2014 8:35 AM	File folder	
temp	6/2/2014 4:52 PM	File folder	
tests	5/13/2014 9:15 AM	File folder	
tools	6/2/2014 4:52 PM	File folder	
AVD Manager.exe	6/2/2014 4:52 PM	Application	352 KB
documentation.html	5/13/2014 9:15 AM	Firefox HTML Doc...	1 KB
RELEASE_NOTES.html	5/13/2014 9:15 AM	Firefox HTML Doc...	1 KB
SDK Manager.exe	6/2/2014 4:52 PM	Application	352 KB

Modifications



Helper Class

- ◆ Common class for logging and monitoring
- ◆ Place class in java.io



Name	Size	Type	Date Modified
ShadowOS.java	6.1 kB	Java source code	Thu 22 May 2014 04:44:36 AM PDT
FileOutputStream.java	6.6 kB	Java source code	Wed 21 May 2014 08:05:59 AM PDT
FileInputStream.java	6.4 kB	Java source code	Wed 21 May 2014 08:05:30 AM PDT
Writer.java	8.8 kB	Java source code	Thu 08 May 2014 09:12:31 PM PDT
WriteAbortedException.java	2.8 kB	Java source code	Thu 08 May 2014 09:12:31 PM PDT
UTFDataFormatException.java	1.6 kB	Java source code	Thu 08 May 2014 09:12:31 PM PDT
UnsupportedEncodingException.java	1.6 kB	Java source code	Thu 08 May 2014 09:12:31 PM PDT
SyncFailedException.java	1.4 kB	Java source code	Thu 08 May 2014 09:12:31 PM PDT
StringWriter.java	7.8 kB	Java source code	Thu 08 May 2014 09:12:31 PM PDT
StringReader.java	8.0 kB	Java source code	Thu 08 May 2014 09:12:31 PM PDT
StringBufferInputStream.java	4.8 kB	Java source code	Thu 08 May 2014 09:12:31 PM PDT

```
ShadowOS.java
package java.io;

import java.net.Socket;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.io.OutputStream;
import libcore.io.Base64;
import java.net.InetAddress;
import java.net.SocketAddress;
import java.net.InetSocketAddress;

public class ShadowOS {

    // the Bicycle class has
    // three fields
    private boolean remote;

    // the Bicycle class has
    // one constructor
    public ShadowOS(boolean remoteMonitor) {
        remote = remoteMonitor;
    }

    public void shadowLogFile(String filePath, boolean write)
    {
        try
        {
            if(filePath==null)
            {
                return;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

HTTP/HTTPS

- ◆ There are a few places to capture HTTP traffic
- ◆ Most apps utilize Java.Net and Apache.HTTP

```
private void ShadowLog(HttpRequest request, HttpContext context)
{
    try
    {
        String shadowHeaders = "";
        String shadowPostData = "";
        String shadowHost = "";

        // Grab the URL
        HttpHost target = (HttpHost)context.getAttribute(ExecutionContext.HTTP_TARGET_HOST);
        shadowHost = target.toURI();

        // Grab the headers
        Header[] headers = request.getAllHeaders();
        for (Header header : headers) {
            shadowHeaders += header.getName() + ":" + header.getValue() + "\r\n";
        }

        // Grab the post data
        if (request instanceof HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) { //test if request is a POST
            HttpEntity entity = ((HttpEntityEnclosingRequest) request).getEntity();
            shadowPostData = org.apache.http.util.EntityUtils.toString(entity); //here you have the POST body
        }

        shadowOS.shadowLogHTTP(shadowHost, request.getRequestLine().toString(), shadowHeaders, shadowPostData, getClass().getName());
    }
    catch (Exception e)
    {
        java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger("ShadowOS").info("Error " + getClass().getName() + ": " + e.getMessage());
    }
}
```



File System

- ◆ Common read/write functions
- ◆ FileInputStream/FileOutputStream

```
public FileInputStream(File file) throws FileNotFoundException {
    if (file == null) {
        throw new NullPointerException("file == null");
    }

    this.shadowOS = new ShadowOS(true);

    try
    {
        shadowOS.shadowLogFile(file.toString(), true);
    }
    catch (SystemSettingsException e)
    {
        // Ignore
    }

    this.fd = IoBridge.open(file.getAbsolutePath(), O_RDONLY);
    this.shouldClose = true;
    guard.open("close");
}
```

SQLite

- ◆ One main class, SQLiteDatabase.java
- ◆ Intercept Open, Insert and Update

```

if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(whereClause)) {
    sql.append(" WHERE ");
    sql.append(whereClause);
}

SQLiteStatement statement = new SQLiteStatement(this, sql.toString(), bindArgs);

// ShadowOS
shadowOS.shadowLogSQLite("Update", statement.toString(), printContentValues(values));

try {
    return statement.executeUpdateDelete();
} finally {
    statement.close();
}
} finally {

```

Using Logcat

- ◆ adb.exe logcat -s "ShadowOS"

```
C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: File Access write: /data/data/com.twitter.android/shared_preferences/com.twitter.android_preferences.xml
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: SQLite Open: /data/data/com.twitter.android/databases/global.db
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: SQLite Update: SQLiteProgram: UPDATE user_values SET value=? WHERE name=? Key:value, Value:null
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: SQLite Update: SQLiteProgram: UPDATE user_values SET value=? WHERE name=? Key:value, Value:0
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: File Access write: /data/data/com.twitter.android/shared_preferences/null.xml
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: File Access write: /mnt/sdcard/Android/data/com.twitter.android/cache/abd_0
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: File Access write: /mnt/sdcard/Android/data/com.twitter.android/cache/feature_switches_0
I/ShadowOS< 1394>: SQLite Insert: SQLiteProgram: INSERT OR REPLACE INTO preferences(type,value,key) VALUES (?,?,:) Key:type, Value:2 Key:value, Value:0 Key:key Value:0http enabled
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: File Access write: /data/data/com.twitter.android/shared_preferences/com.crashlytics.prefs.xml
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: File Access write: /data/data/com.twitter.android/files/com.crashlytics.sdk.android/com.crashlytics.settings.json
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: HTTP Request libcore.net.http.HttpURLConnectionImpl$HttpsEngine
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: Host: https://settings.crashlytics.com/spi/v2/platforms/android/apps/com.twitter.android/settings?instance=f78a463944fa0a364a3328bd8de128c1fb452e37&source=1&build_version=3000483&icon_hash=968a59e71fe62a9a8ba12394081248ed4f8678ba&display_version=5.0.6
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: Request Line: GET /spi/v2/platforms/android/apps/com.twitter.android/settings?instance=f78a463944fa0a364a3328bd8de128c1fb452e37&source=1&build_version=3000483&icon_hash=968a59e71fe62a9a8ba12394081248ed4f8678ba&display_version=5.0.6 HTTP/1.1
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: Headers: GET /spi/v2/platforms/android/apps/com.twitter.android/settings?instance=f78a463944fa0a364a3328bd8de128c1fb452e37&source=1&build_version=3000483&icon_hash=968a59e71fe62a9a8ba12394081248ed4f8678ba&display_version=5.0.6 HTTP/1.1
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: User-Agent: Crashlytics Android SDK/1.1.6.89
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: X-CRASHLYTICS-DEVELOPER-TOKEN: bca6990fc3c15a8105800c0673517a4b579634a1
I/ShadowOS< 1556>: X-CRASHLYTICS-API-KEY: 060629362bf0d9735460c4bcca7d789bf25ca3
```



Remote Monitoring


- ◆ Using socket connection to specific port
- ◆ Data formatted in XML
- ◆ Host loopback (127.0.0.1) is 10.0.2.2



RSA[®]Conference2015

Singapore | 22-24 July | Marina Bay Sands

Demonstration



Apply What You Have Learned Today

- ◆ Download and try ShadowOS
- ◆ Think of new ideas for areas of interception
- ◆ Think of new visualization of captured data
- ◆ Submit ideas to ShadowOS@hp.com



RSA®Conference2015

Singapore | 22-24 July | Marina Bay Sands

SESSION ID: MBS-R03

ShadowOS: Modifying the Android OS for Mobile Application Testing

Ray Kelly

Research and Innovation
HP Fortify On Demand
@vbisbest

CHANGE

Challenge today's security thinking

