

Supercharging Network Security w/ SIGMA

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> (^W^h^Oa^mi / ^A^L^I)

- @neu5ron (New-Tron)
- Father
- Employee at SOC Prime
- Author of None, Contributor of Some
 - <https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma>
 - <https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/HELK>
 - <https://github.com/hunters-forge/OSSEM>
- Lego Builder



Agenda

- SIGMA Quick Recap
- Why Zeek or network for that matter
- Use Cases
- Screen sharing

SIGMA

1

Common language.
Both for detections and search



600+

Detection and rule logic.
One can cover many techniques



∞

Infinite log possibilities



∞

Infinite community

MISP, HELK, SecurityOnion, ATT&CK...



NSM Is Dead....

Endpoint is unable to cover:

Routers, Switches, Firewalls..

Virtualization (ie: ESXi) servers.

Bios/chip level.

SCADA/ICS. etc...

The Goldilogs

- conn.log
- **dce_rpc.log**
- dhcp.log
- dnp3.log
- dns.log
- dpd.log
- files.log
- ftp.log
- http.log
- irc.log
- kerberos.log
- known_certs.log
- known_devices.log
- known_hosts.log
- known_modbus.log
- known_services.log
- modbus_register_change.log
- modbus.log
- mysql.log
- notice.log

- ntlm.log
- pe.log
- radius.log
- rdp.log
- rfb.log
- sip.log
- smb_cmd.log
- **smb_files.log**
- **smb_mapping.log**
- smtp.log
- snmp.log
- socks.log
- software.log
- ssh.log
- ssl.log
- **syslog.log**
- traceroute.log
- tunnel.log
- weird.log
- x509.log

- ntp.log
- Lots of community ones
- Scada/ICS from
- MQTT
- Lots of community ones

National

SIGMA: Cisco AAA Crypto to Zeek syslog.log

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_crypto_actions.yml

CLI command to try yourself in splunk:

```
python3 tools/sigmac -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-zeek.yml rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_crypto_actions.yml
```

CLI command to try yourself in es-qs (lucene):

```
python3 tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/logstash-zeek-default-json.yml rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_crypto_actions.yml
```

```
title: Cisco Crypto Commands
id: 1f978c6a-4415-47fb-aca5-736a44d7ca3d
status: experimental
description: Show when private keys are being exported from the device, or when new certificates are being imported.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1130
  - attack.t1145
logsource:
  product: cisco
  service: aaa
  category: accounting
fields:
  - src
  - CmdSet
  - User
  - Privilege_Level
  - Remote_Address
detection:
  keywords:
    - 'crypto pki export'
    - 'crypto pki import'
    - 'crypto pki trustpoint'
  condition: keywords
falsepositives:
  - Not commonly run by administrators. Also whitelist your known good certificates.
level: high
```

```
## Splunk
```

```
(sourcetype="bro:syslog:json" ("crypto pki export" OR "crypto pki import" OR "crypto pki trustpoint"))
```

```
## Elasticsearch Lucene (would work in Kibana search bar too)
```

```
(@stream:"syslog" AND *.keyword:(*crypto\ pki\ export* OR *crypto\ pki\ import* OR *crypto\ pki\ trustpoint*))
```


MITRE BZAR Execution SIGMA Rule View

```
title: MITRE BZAR Indicators for ATT&CK Execution
id: b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aeef8-95a24261dd1d
description: 'Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an ATT&
CK-like Execution techniques on the remote system. All credit for
the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to
MITRE.'
author: '@neu5ron, @SOC_Prime'
date: 2020/03/19
references:
  - https://github.com/mitre-attack/
    bzar#indicators-for-attck-execution
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1035
  - attack.t1047
  - attack.t1053
logsource:
  product: zeek
  service: dce_rpc
detection:
  op1:
    endpoint: 'JobAdd'
    operation: 'atsvc'
  op2:
    endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
    operation: 'SchRpcEnableTask'
  op3:
    endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
    operation: 'SchRpcRegisterTask'
```

```
op4:
  endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
  operation: 'SchRpcRun'
op5:
  endpoint: 'IWbemServices'
  operation: 'ExecMethod'
op6:
  endpoint: 'IWbemServices'
  operation: 'ExecMethodAsync'
op7:
  endpoint: 'svcsctl'
  operation: 'CreateServiceA'
op8:
  endpoint: 'svcsctl'
  operation: 'CreateServiceW'
op9:
  endpoint: 'svcsctl'
  operation: 'StartServiceA'
op10:
  endpoint: 'svcsctl'
  operation: 'StartServiceW'
  condition: 1 of them
falsepositives:
  - 'Windows administrator tasks or troubleshooting'
  - 'Windows management scripts or software'
level: medium
```

Uncoder: MITRE BZAR Execution to Splunk

Sigma

ArcSight Rule

Azure Sentinel Query



Elasticsearch

QRadar

Splunk

Zeek



Translate



```
1 title: MITRE BZAR Indicators for ATT&CK Execution
2 id: b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aef8-95a24261dd1d
3 description: 'Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an ATT&CK-like
  Execution techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek
  mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE.'
4 author: '@neu5ron, @SOC_Prime'
5 date: 2020/03/19
6 references:
7 | - https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar#indicators-for-attck
  -execution
```

Elastic Query

Elastic Alert Rule

Elastic Saved Search

Splunk Query

More ▾

```
(sourcetype="bro:dce_rpc:json" ((endpoint="JobAdd" operation="atsvc") OR (endpoint="ITaskSchedulerService" operation="SchRpcEnableTask") OR (endpoint="ITaskSchedulerService" operation="SchRpcRegisterTask") OR (endpoint="ITaskSchedulerService" operation="SchRpcRun") OR (endpoint="IWbemServices" operation="ExecMethod") OR (endpoint="IWbemServices" operation="ExecMethodAsync") OR (endpoint="svcctl" operation="CreateServiceA") OR (endpoint="svcctl" operation="CreateServiceW") OR (endpoint="svcctl" operation="StartServiceA") OR (endpoint="svcctl" operation="StartServiceW"))))
```

Suggest translation ➕

Copy 📋

Uncoder: MITRE BZAR Execution to Elastic Query (Lucene)

Sigma ArcSight Rule Azure Sentinel Query ▼



Elasticsearch

QRadar

Splunk

Zeek ▼

Translate



```
1 title: MITRE BZAR Indicators for ATT&CK Execution
2 id: b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aef8-95a24261dd1d
3 description: 'Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an
  ATT&CK-like Execution techniques on the remote system. All
  credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint
  /operation field goes to MITRE.'
4 author: '@neu5ron, @SOC_Prime'
5 date: 2020/03/19
6 references:
7 | - https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar#indicators-for
  -attck-execution
```

Elastic Query

Elastic Alert Rule

Elastic Saved Search

More ▼

```
(@stream:"dce_rpc" AND ((endpoint:"JobAdd" AND operation:"atsvc") OR
(endpoint:"ITaskSchedulerService" AND operation:"SchRpcEnableTask") O
R (endpoint:"ITaskSchedulerService" AND operation:"SchRpcRegisterTas
k") OR (endpoint:"ITaskSchedulerService" AND operation:"SchRpcRun") O
R (endpoint:"IwbemServices" AND operation:"ExecMethod") OR (endpoin
t:"IwbemServices" AND operation:"ExecMethodAsync") OR (endpoint:"svcc
tl" AND operation:"CreateServiceA") OR (endpoint:"svcctl" AND operati
on:"CreateServiceW") OR (endpoint:"svcctl" AND operation:"StartServic
eA") OR (endpoint:"svcctl" AND operation:"StartServiceW"))))
```

Suggest translation

Copy

Translating to: Zeek / Elastic Query

Uncoder: Web Server Multiple Error Caused by Single IP

Zeek http.log covers all same scenarios as existing Proxy and Web Server rules \o/

```
1 title: Multiple Suspicious Resp Codes Caused by Single Client
2 id: 6fd9c796-06b3-46e8-af08-58f3505318af
3 description: Detects possible exploitation activity or bugs in a web
  application
4 author: Thomas Patzke
5 date: 2017/02/19
6 modified: 2020/03/14
7 logsource:
8   | category: webservers
9 detection:
10  | selection:
11  | | | sc-status:
12  | | | | - 400
13  | | | | - 401
14  | | | | - 403
15  | | | | - 500
16  | timeframe: 10m
17  | condition: selection | count() by src_ip > 10
18 falsepositives:
19  | - Unstable application
20  | - Application that misuses the response codes
```

```
curl -s -XPUT -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @- localhost:9200/_watcher/watch/6fd9c796-06b3-46e8-af08-58f3505318af <<EOF
{
  "metadata": {
    "title": "Multiple Suspicious Resp Codes Caused by Single Client",
    "description": "Detects possible exploitation activity or bugs in a web
application",
    "tags": "",
    "query": "(@stream:\\"http\\" AND status_code:(\\"400\\" OR \\"401\\" OR \\"403\\" OR \\"500\\"))"
  },
  "trigger": {
    "schedule": {
      "interval": "10m"
    }
  },
  "input": {
    "search": {
      "request": {
        "body": {
          "size": 0,
          "query": {
            "bool": {
              "must": [
                {
                  "query_string": {
                    "query": "(@stream:\\"http\\" AND status_code:(\\"400\\" OR
```


SIGMA: DCE RPC Enumeration (Elastalert)

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek-dce_rpc_domain_user_enumeration.yml

CLI command to try yourself:

python3 tools/sigmact -t elastaalert -c tools/config/ecs-zeek-corelight.yml rules/network/zeek/zeek-dce_rpc_domain_user_enumeration.yml

```
title: Domain User Enumeration Network Recon 01
description: Domain user and group enumeration via network reconnaissance. Seen in APT 29 and other
id: 66a0bdc6-ee04-441a-9125-99d2eb547942
references:
  - "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29"
  - "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/37"
author: 'Nate Guagenti (@neu5ron), Open Threat Research (OTR)'
date: 2020/05/03
modified: 2020/05/03
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1087
  - attack.t1082
logsource:
  product: zeek
  service: dce_rpc
detection:
  selection:
    operation:
      #- LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains #potentially too many FPs, removing. caused by netlogon
      #- SamrEnumerateDomainsInSamServer #potentially too many FPs, removing. #method obtains
      - LsarLookupNames3 #method translates a batch of security principal names to their SIDs
      - LsarLookupSids3 #translates a batch of security principal SIDs to their name forms
      - SamrGetGroupsForUser #obtains a listing of groups that a user is a member of
      - SamrLookupIdsInDomain #method translates a set of RIDs into account names
      - SamrLookupNamesInDomain #method translates a set of account names into a set of RIDs
      - SamrQuerySecurityObject #method queries the access control on a server, domain, user, or group
      - SamrQueryInformationGroup #obtains attributes from a group object
  timeframe: 30s
  condition: selection | count(operation) by src_ip > 4
falsepositives:
  - Devices that may do authentication like a VPN or a firewall that lookup IPs to username
  - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: medium
status: experimental

alert:
  - debug
  buffer_time:
    seconds: 30
  description: Domain user and group enumeration via network reconnaissance
    . Seen in APT 29 and other common tactics and actors. Detects a set of
    RPC (remote procedure calls) used to enumerate a domain controller. The
    rule was created based off the datasets and hackathon from
    https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29
  doc_type: doc
  filter:
    - query:
        query_string:
          query: (event.dataset:"dce_rpc" AND dce_rpc.operation:
            ("LsarLookupNames3" OR "LsarLookupSids3" OR "SamrGetGroupsForUser" OR
            "SamrLookupIdsInDomain" OR "SamrLookupNamesInDomain" OR
            "SamrQuerySecurityObject" OR "SamrQueryInformationGroup"))
  index: '*ecs-*'
  max_threshold: 4
  metric_agg_key: dce_rpc.operation.keyword
  metric_agg_type: cardinality
  name: 66a0bdc6-ee04-441a-9125-99d2eb547942_0
  priority: 3
  query_key: source.ip.keyword
  realert:
    minutes: 0
  type: metric_aggregation
```

SIGMA: Windows Event ID 5145 Rule Converted to Zeek SMB (Elastalert)

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek-dce_rpc_domain_user_enumeration.yml

CLI command to try yourself:

python3 tools/sigmac -t elastalert -c tools/config/ecs-zeek-corelight.yml rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb Converted_win_lm_namedpipe.yml

```
title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe - Zeek
id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral
  movement and remote exec
  using named pipes
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
date: 2020/04/02
references:
  - https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_lm_namedpipe.yml
tags:
  - attack.lateral_movement
  - attack.t1077
logsource:
  product: zeek
  service: smb_files
detection:
  selection1:
    path: \\*\IPC$
  selection2:
    path: \\*\IPC$
    name:
      - 'atsvc'
      - 'samr'
      - 'lsarpc'
      - 'winreg'
      - 'netlogon'
      - 'srvsvc'
      - 'protected_storage'
      - 'wkssvc'
      - 'browser'
      - 'netdfs'
      - 'svccctl'
      - 'spoolss'
      - 'ntsvcs'
      - 'LSM_API_service'
      - 'HydraLsPipe'
      - 'TermSrv_API_service'
      - 'MsFteWds'
  condition: selection1 and not selection2
falsepositives:
  - update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
```

```
1 alert:
2 - debug
3 description: This detection excludes known namped pipes
  accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones,
  may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using
  named pipes
4 filter:
5 - query:
6   query_string:
7     query: (event.dataset:"smb_files" AND file.path
      .keyword:\\*\IPC$ AND (NOT (file.path.keyword:\\*\IPC$
      AND file.name:(atsvc" OR "samr" OR "lsarpc" OR "winreg"
      OR "netlogon" OR "srvsvc" OR "protected_storage" OR
      "wkssvc" OR "browser" OR "netdfs" OR "svccctl" OR
      "spoolss" OR "ntsvcs" OR "LSM_API_service" OR
      "HydraLsPipe" OR "TermSrv_API_service" OR "MsFteWds"))))
8 index: '*ecs-*'
9 name: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad_0
10 priority: 2
11 realert:
12 - minutes: 0
13 type: any
14
15
16
```

SIGMAC (SIGMA Config aka Field Mapping)

<https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/tree/master/tools/config>

Arcsight

tools/config/arcsight-zeek.yml

Elasticsearch: Lucene, Kibana, Elastalert, Watcher

tools/config/logstash-zeek-default-json.yml (No field rename ECS)

tools/config/ecs-zeek-corelight.yml (Corelight ECS)

tools/config/ecs-zeek-elastic-beats-implementation.yml (Filebeat ECS)

Splunk

tools/config/splunk-zeek.yml

If your database does not rename fields, it will work as is

Thus no need to write a SIGMAC

More on the way

Coming soon for test/use APT 29 Hackathon dataset:

<https://zeek.neu5ron.com>

Github, Twitter, & Interwebs:

@neu5ron

Linkedin

<https://linkedin.com/in/NathanGuagenti>