

# RSA<sup>®</sup>Conference2019

San Francisco | March 4–8 | Moscone Center



**BETTER.**

SESSION ID: ASD-T09

# Release Your Inner DevSecOp

**Shannon Lietz**

Director, Intuit

**James Wickett**

Head of Research, Signal Sciences

#RSAC

A vertical stack of several books is shown on the left side of the image. The books have various colored spines, including blue, red, and white. The pages are aged and yellowed. In the background, there is a faint, stylized network diagram with blue lines and dots, resembling a web or a data structure.

## Got a good story? We're writing a book

I'm are writing a book along with  
James Wickett, Ernest Mueller and  
John Willis on DevSecOps.

We are looking for stories of  
DevSecOps transformations,  
journeys, successes and failures.

[book@devsecops.org](mailto:book@devsecops.org)

shannon lietz <@devsecops />

### MY pseudo JOURNEY LINE...



### WHAT MAKES ME HUMAN...



*Sugar plum  
fairies*



### HOW I SPEND MY DAYS...



intuit®

IANIS

HACKERGIRL

# James Wickett (@wickett)

Head of Research  **Signal Sciences**

Instructor, LinkedIn Learning

- Six courses on DevOps, DevSecOps, CI/CD, Security Automation

DevOps Days Austin Organizer

- Come to Texas y'all!



**Get the slides now:  
james@signalsciences.com**

*Paying \$1,500 to browse Twitter and hang out on Slack*



# Half-listening to Conference Talks

*In Depth*

O RLY?

@ThePracticalDev



# DevSecOp

*[divh-sek-op]*

Maybe in order to understand devsecops, we have to look at the word itself. Basically, it's made up of three separate words: de, vseco, and ps. What do these words mean? It's a mystery, and that's why so is devsecops.

- DevSecOps Deep Thoughts



**An inclusive person  
participating in the  
movement of security  
into devops.**

**...not a tool**  
**...not a security CI/CD pipeline**  
**...not a CI/CD pipeline with security in it**  
**...can't be bought on expo floor**

# It can be you.

# The 10-fold Path of DevSecOps

# The Journey

1. See the new world
2. Recognize place in value chain
3. Know Agile and DevOps
4. Live out Bi-directional Empathy
5. Do Security for Developers' Benefit
6. Operationalize DevSecOps
7. Make Security as Normal
8. Track Adversary Interest
9. Create Security Observability
10. Build the Future





*Essential*

# Hoping This Works

O RLY?

@ThePracticalDev

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# 1. See the New World

**Justin Garrison**

@rothgar

Following

The new OSI model is much easier to understand



11:22 AM - 18 Jul 2017

2,754 Retweets 3,895 Likes



93

2.8K

3.9K



@devsecops @wickett

## 3 Major Movements

1. Waterfall -> *Agile* -> **DevOps**
2. *Monolith* -> **Microservices**
3. *Datacenter* -> **Cloud**

# The Developer Revolt is Real



**While engineering teams are busy deploying leading-edge technologies, security teams are still focused on fighting yesterday's battles.**

- SANS 2018 DevSecOps Survey**

# Thinking Security

Stopping Next Year's Hackers



Steven M. Bellovin



ADDISON-WESLEY PROFESSIONAL COMPUTING SERIES

Companies are spending a great deal on security, but we read of massive computer-related attacks. Clearly something is wrong. The root of the problem is twofold: we're protecting the wrong things, and we're hurting productivity in the process.

@devsecops @wickett

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# the Tangled Web

*A Guide to Securing Modern  
Web Applications*



Michał Zalewski



**[Security by risk assessment] introduces a dangerous fallacy: that structured inadequacy is almost as good as adequacy and that underfunded security efforts plus risk management are about as good as properly funded security work**

@devsecops @wickett

# Meanwhile, Devs be like...

*Putting off critical tasks until everyone forgets about them*



Getting Around to  
Security Next Month

*If there's time*



 **Signal Sciences**

@devsecops @wickett

O RLY?


@ThePracticalDev








# Security Hierarchy of Needs



## 2. Recognize Place in the Value Chain



# The Inequitable Distribution of Labor

# 10:1 Dev:Ops



# 100:10:1 Dev:Ops:Sec

# Value Stream Mapping

**DevOpsCon**

**Session**

„DevOps Kaizen: Empowering Teams to find and fix their own Problems“

Damon Edwards (SimplifyOps)

**Silos: the natural force pulling any org out of alignment**

Planning → Dev/Test → Release → Operate

Handoff

Handoff

Handoff

7:53 / 1:04:21


1,117 views

DevOpsCon 2016: DevOps Kaizen: Empowering Teams to find and fix their own Problems

23 0 SHARE SAVE ...

@DamonEdwards

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gutKcKjdwRQ>



# 3. Know Agile and DevOps

*The Addison-Wesley Signature Series*

A MARTIN FOWLER SIGNATURE  
BOOK  
*Martin*

# CONTINUOUS DELIVERY

RELIABLE SOFTWARE RELEASES THROUGH BUILD,  
TEST, AND DEPLOYMENT AUTOMATION

JEZ HUMBLE,  
DAVID FARLEY




**Continuous  
Delivery is how  
little you can  
deploy at a time**



**We optimized for cycle  
time—the time from  
code commit to  
production**



# Roughly 15,000 deploys in the last 3.5 yrs



## You might be, if...

- Security is writing code and identify with developers
- You have completed value stream mapping and/or wardley map
- You have started logging for security feedback within your CI/CD Pipeline
- Read The Phoenix Project

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**Are you ready  
to advance?**

An abstract graphic in the bottom right corner of the slide. It consists of numerous thin, white, curved lines that sweep across the blue background. Small white dots are scattered along these lines, creating a sense of motion and connectivity, reminiscent of a network or data flow.

# 4. Live out Bi-directional Empathy

# Culture is the most important aspect to devops succeeding in the enterprise

- Patrick DeBois


**A security team who embraces  
openness about what it does  
and why, spreads  
understanding.**


**- Rich Smith**



## 4 Keys to Culture

- Mutual Understanding
- Shared Language
- Shared Views
- Collaborative Tooling





# 5. Do Security Testing for Developers' Benefit

# You cannot train developers to write secure code.

# A bug is a bug is a bug

*Now with user-generated content!*

#RSAC

*Essential*

`); DROP TABLE  
animals;--`



# Defect Density studies range from 0.5 to 10 per KLOC

# No matter what, it isn't zero

**But my app is only  
a few lines of code**

# Is it?

**222 Lines of Code**  
**5 direct dependencies**  
**54 total deps (incl. indirect)**

**(example thanks to snyk.io)**

# 460,046

## Lines of Code



# Agile Application Security

ENABLING SECURITY IN A CONTINUOUS DELIVERY PIPELINE

Laura Bell, Michael Brunton-Spall,  
Rich Smith & Jim Bird

The goal should be to come up with a set of automated tests that probe and check security configurations and runtime system behavior for security features that will execute every time the system is built and every time it is deployed.

@devsecops @wickett









# 6. Operationalize DevSecOps

# Balance the \*ilities





## Cavano and McCall's 11 Quality Factors (1978)



# “Securability”





# Simplify the security domain into problem spaces

## DESIGN


- Requirement not considered
- Excluded for purpose or balanced out
- Misunderstood
- Ideal state unknown
- New attack strategies

## DEVELOP

- Bad component parts
- Poor coding skills
- Significant complexity
- Iterative misses
- Priorities not clear
- Existing debt
- Poor dependencies

## OPERATE

- Leftover manual tasks
- Missing capabilities
- Unclear security design or strategy
- Poor visibility/feedback
- Lack of accountability
- Not enough rigor



# # of exploits

---

# *n* tests run

# 7. Make Security as Normal

# Realign on Separation of Duties


## PCI DSS Requirements

**6.4.2** Separation of duties between development/test and production environments

## Guidance

Reducing the number of personnel with access to the production environment and cardholder data minimizes risk and helps ensure that access is limited to those individuals with a business need to know.

The intent of this requirement is to separate development and test functions from production functions. For example, a developer may use an administrator-level account with elevated privileges in the development environment, and have a separate account with user-level access to the production environment.



**[Deploys] can be treated as standard or routine changes that have been pre-approved by management, and that don't require a heavyweight change review meeting.**



## Dear Auditor,



a love letter to auditors from devops,  
where we promise to make life better

[View My GitHub Profile](#)

Download  
**ZIP File**

Download  
**TAR Ball**

View On  
**GitHub**

Hosted on GitHub Pages — Theme by [orderedlist](#)

Dear Auditor,

We realize that we have been changing things in a rapid fashion from Agile and DevOps to Cloud and Containers. Yes, we have been busy, and are having great success delivering faster than ever, with better quality and supporting the business response to competitive pressures. This isn't just icing on the cake, the only sustainable advantage in our industries is the ability to meet customer demands faster, more reliably than our competitors.

With all this growth, we made a mistake, we forgot to bring you along for the ride. That is totally our bad, but we want to make it right. We want to make some new commitments.

- We will bring you along
- We will be fully transparent about our development process
- We do realize that we own the risks
- We will maintain an open channel of discussion to demonstrate to you how we manage risks with our modern development practices


For example, you have told us that you are concerned about "Separation of Duties" in agile and DevOps practices, and we heard you! We think we have a better way to manage this and risks now. Having everything in version control, enforcing peer review for every change, releasing via a secure pipeline, restricting production access, and monitoring unauthorized changes in production systems should address your concern.

The DevOps community has been experimenting quite a bit over the last number of years and common practice represents the collective wisdom across many companies, industries, and countries.



# Web App Attacks Are the #1 Source of Data Breaches

Attacks are Up 300% from 2014 – Incumbent Products Aren't Solving the Problem



**Less Than 5%** of  
data center security budgets  
are spent on AppSec

Sources: Gartner, Verizon

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# 8. Track Adversary Interest

# Security Facts

Original Lines of Code 300  
 Open Source Components 25  
 Type: **Embedded** Version 1.0

Intended Version Lifetime/Expiration 02/2020

Organization Security Trend at Release 3.2

Security Degradation Rating **A**

Required Monthly Customer Maintenance 2

## % Control Values

**Adversary Interest** 97%

**Residual Risk** 8%

**Preventative Measures** 93%

Access Control 100%

Encryption 95%

Tamper 91%

**Detective Measures** 99%


Remote 99%

Local 99%


NIST 99% ■ OPNGBK 91%

PCI DSS 92% ■

\* All values are based on modeled Abuse and FMEA cases for this class of device and applicable implementation patterns. Your results may fluctuate according to intended business risk profile and residual risk tolerances that allow for some controls to be less restrictive. Actual results may also vary with creative use or experimental implementation.



# OWASP vs. Real World



# 9. Create Security Observability







# DEVSECOPS COMMUNITY SURVEY 2019





Carnegie Mellon University  
Software Engineering Institute



## At what point in the development process does your organization perform automated application security analysis?

Mature DevOps practices are 350 % more likely to integrate automated security.








**Security Observability gives applications the ability to expose the attacks that are happening below the surface with feedback to devs, ops, and security.**

# Rank the top challenges with your application security processes.

#RSAC

Everyone sees value in getting security insight earlier.






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# 10. Build the Future

# How do we change the game?





Less Guessing...



	OWASP TOP 10 App Sec Risks	Real-World Top 10 Attacks
1	Injection	Direct Object Reference
2	Broken Authentication	Forceful Browsing
3	Sensitive Data Exposure	Null Byte Attack
4	XML External Exposures (XXE)	Command Injection
5	Broken Access Control	Feature Abuse
6	Security Misconfiguration	Evasion Techniques
7	Cross Site Scripting	Subdomain Takeover
8	Insecure Deserialization	Misconfiguration
9	Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	Cross Site Scripting
10	Insufficient Logging/Monitoring	SQL Injection

# No *Exploitable* Escapes

# Continuous

# Precision

# Community

# Books we recommended

Agile Application Security



Continuous Delivery

The Phoenix Project

DevOps Handbook

Accelerate

Thinking Security



# How to apply

## Next Week

- Determine where you are, understand value contribution

## Next Month

- Telemetry and testing for feedback on 1-2 projects

## Next 6 months

- Look for and share culture wins as they happen, get involved with DevSecOps

**Get the slides now:  
james@signalsciences.com**





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