



The Friends We Made Along the Way

The MITRE ATT&CK Edition

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whoami




This talk represents the speaker's personal views and not the views of Google or Alphabet




MITRE ATT&CK™ is a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.

ATT&CK™



**The purpose of intelligence is
to drive a decision advantage**

Cyber Threat Intelligence Program




Source: ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2018

The side that learns the fastest, wins

Developed for fighter pilots

Useful framework for thinking about decision making

Leveraging intelligence well shrinks your OODA loop





How do we know if it's working?

Measure of Performance

Am I doing things right?

What are we analyzing? Finding?

Largely within the intel team's control

Measure of Effectiveness

Am I doing the right things?

Is intel actually changing my org's decisions or behavior?

Requires strong partnership with who intel enables (ops? IR? execs?)

This makes intel people uncomfortable





What holds us back from being more effective?

Intel drawn to novel, unique, next

Ops needs stability of signal

Lives in the details

Works on a different, longer timeline than intel


Often retrospective

Needs intel to be more prognostic

Stronger on the diagnostic side


Enter ATT&CK

ATT&CK growing in popularity



Interest in MITRE ATT&CK as a search term between May 2015 - October 2019. Source: Google Trends

Value: Moving up from the tactical



Source: Pyramid of Pain by David Bianco

filters

Discovery 23 items	Lateral Movement 18 items	Collection 13 items	Command And Control 20 items	Exfiltration 9 items	Impact 16 items
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Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	bash profile and bashrc	Accessability Features	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	Account Access Removal
Exploit Chain	CMSTP	Accessability Features	Accessability Features	Binary Padding	Bash History	Application Window	Application Deployment	Automated Collection	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Data Destruction
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark	Clipboard Data	Clipboard Data	Connection Proxy	Data Encrypted	Data Encrypted for Impact
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	Applet DLLs	Bypass User Account	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote	Data from Information	Custom Command and	Data Transfer Size Limits	Defacement
Hosts/Chroot through	Component Object Model	Applet DLLs	Application Shimming	Clear Command History	Credentials from Web	File and Directory	Exploitation of Remote	Data from Local System	Encryption Cryptographic	Exfiltration Over	Disk Content Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Control Panel Items	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	Network Service Scanning	Logon Scripts	Data from Network Shared	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Command	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Link	Dynamic Data Exchange	Authentication Package	BITS Jobs	Code Signing	Credentials in Registry	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Hash	Data from Network Shared	Data Enumeration	Exfiltration Over Other	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through API	Dylib Hijacking	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Exploitation for Credential	Network Sniffing	Pass the Ticket	Data Stored	Domain Fronting	Firmware Corruption	Firmware Corruption
Trusted Relationship	Execution through Module	Books	Delayed Execution with	Compiled HTML File	Forced Authentication	Network Sniffing	Remote Desktop Protocol	Email Collection	Domain Generation	Inhibit System Recovery	Inhibit System Recovery
Valid Accounts	EvilWinlogon for User	Browser Extensions	Emond	Component Firmware	Hooking	Network Device	Remote File Copy	Input Capture	Fallback Channels	Network Denial of Service	Network Denial of Service
	Graphical User Interface	Change Default File	Extra Window Memory	Component Object Model	Input Capture	Permission Groups	Remote Services	Man in the Browser	Multi-hop Proxy	Resource Hijacking	Resource Hijacking
	InstallUI	Component Firmware	Hooking	Control Panel Items	Input Prompt	Process Discovery	Screen Capture	Screen Capture	Multi-Stage Channels	Running Data	Running Data
	Launchctl	Component Object Model	Hooking	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting	Query Registry	Shared Webroot	Video Capture	Multiband Communication	Service Stop	Service Stop
	Local Job Scheduling	Create Account	Hooking	DCShadow	Keychain	Remote System Discovery	SSH Hijacking		Multilayer Encryption	Stored Data Manipulation	Stored Data Manipulation
	LSASS Driver	LSA Search Order	Image File Execution	Disabling Security Tools	Keychain	Security Software	Taint Shared Content		Port Knocking	System Shutdown/Reboot	System Shutdown/Reboot
	Mshta	Dylib Hijacking	Launch Daemon	New Service	Network Sniffing	Software Discovery	Third-party Software		Remote Access Tools	Transmitted Data	Transmitted Data
	PowerShell	Emond	New Service	DL Side-Loading	Password Filter DLL	System Information	Windows Admin Shares		Remote File Copy		
	Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote Services	Parent PID Spoofing	Execution Guardrails	Private Keys	System Information	Windows Remote		Shared Application		
	Regsvr32	Path Interception	Plist Modification	Extra Window Memory	Securely Memory	System Service Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Rundll32	PowerShell Profile	Process Injection	File and Directory	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Scheduled Task	Hypervisor	Process Injection	File and Directory	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Scripting	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Service Execution	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Signed Binary Proxy	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Signed Script Proxy	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Source	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Space after Filename	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Third-party Software	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Trap	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Trusted Developer Utilities	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	User Execution	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Windows Management	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	Windows Remote	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		
	XSL Script Processing	Process Injection	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery		Shared Application		

[Register to stream ATT&CKcon 2.0 October 29-30](#)

GROUPS

[Overview](#)[admin@338](#)[APT1](#)[APT12](#)[APT16](#)[APT17](#)[APT18](#)[APT19](#)[APT28](#)[APT29](#)[APT3](#)[APT30](#)[Home](#) > [Groups](#) > [APT28](#)

APT28

[APT28](#) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice indictment. This group reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.

[APT28](#) has been active since at least 2004. ^{[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]}

ID: G0007**Associated Groups:**

SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group 74, Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat Group-4127, TG-4127

Contributors: Drew Church, Splunk, Emily Ratliff, IBM, Richard Gold, Digital Shadows

Version: 2.2

**A common nomenclature
enables a common operational
picture**

—

BUT WAIT


THERE'S MORE!

ATT&CK's Jedi Mind Trick




Improving detection and visibility

Be careful....it probably looks
worse before it gets better



Planning and Mapping Requirements

Take executive's top-level intel requirements and map those attack types and what key systems are involved against ATT&CK




Presented by Francesco Bigarella at FIRST CTI Symposium 2019

<https://www.first.org/resources/papers/london2019/Metrics-and-attack-website.pdf>

Supporting your product evals

What are the gaps I need to close?

Does this product do what it says it will?



EMMA MacMULLAN
Staff Cyber
Intelligence Analyst
General Electric

JUSTIN SHERENCO
Senior Staff
Incident Responder
General Electric

**Summitting the
Pyramid of Pain:
Operationalizing
ATT&CK**
attack.mitre.org

Presented at ATT&CKcon 2018

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhsN5pBDrGY>

**“Plans are worthless, but
planning is everything”**

~ Dwight D. Eisenhower (maybe)

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Sign me up!

I want to do all these amazing things with ATT&CK. Full steam ahead, right?



Complexity

266 Techniques in Enterprise
ATT&CK

Many teams find themselves
extending further





Time

Done right, ATT&CK changes your inputs, processes, and outputs

Expect a solid 6 months-1 year of sustained effort when getting started

*Will wider vendor adoption
bend this curve?*



Buy in

Who needs to commit for this to be successful?

Focus on the why and the how -
and then the what becomes easier

Manage expectations

Use the community!

Closing Thoughts

Thank you!
