



2018 西湖论剑·网络安全大会
West Lake Cybersecurity Conference

OLYMPIC DESTROYER

Deception of Cybersecurity Industry

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KASPERSKY®

1

WHO AM I

VITALY KAMLUK

Director of APAC Research Team, KASPERSKY LAB

Experience:

- 13 years with Kaspersky Lab
- 2 years with INTERPOL in Singapore
- Reverse Engineering
- Digital Forensics
- Computer Investigations



KASPERSKY Global Research & Analysis Team




- APT Discovery
- Investigations
- Threat Intelligence Service

2

OLYMPIC DESTROYER

What Is Olympic Destroyer

- Self-replicating network worm
- Collects user credentials
- Carries a wiper to destroy data
- Disables local system from boot




Why Is It Special?

- Destructive cyber-sabotage attack
- No motive for cybercriminals => Nation-state?
- Olympic Games infrastructure was a target
- Compromise of supply chains

9th February 2018
Pyeongchang, South Korea



Chain of Events



Our Position

- What is the infection vector?
- How large was the operation?
- Why cybersecurity industry was confused?
- What is the true motivation of the attacker?




This is just a sample picture. This is not a picture of the attacked resort.

The Infection Vector

November-December 2017

Email




Enterprise




Government



Hospitals



Energy
Companies




Semiconductor
Vendor



Hotels and
Resorts




Media and
Advertising



Weaponized Macro Document

Tracing The Infection

- The worm collects credentials and hostnames
- Every new generation includes appended new hosts
- It is possible to reconstruct the chain of infection



OlympicDestroyer propagation chart

Attribution Hell

- No financial motivation
- Similarities to different actors
- False signatures to trigger detections

```
Buffer = 0;
memset(&v17, 0, 0xFFCu);
v18 = 0;
v19 = 0;
v1 = CreateFileA(lpFileName, 0x40000000u, 0, 0, 3u, 0x80u);
v2 = v1;
if ( v1 == (HANDLE)-1 )
    return GetLastError();
SetFilePointer(v1, -1, 0, 2u);
WriteFile(v2, &Buffer, 1u, &NumberOfBytesWritten, 0);
FlushFileBuffers(v2);
FileSize.QuadPart = 0x164;
GetFileSizeEx(v2, &FileSize);
SetFilePointer(v2, 0, 0, 0);
v4 = FileSize.HighPart;
v5 = FileSize.LowPart;
v6 = 0;
v7 = 0;
if ( FileSize.HighPart >= 0 && (FileSize.HighPart > 0 ||
{
    while ( 1 )
    {
        v8 = __OFSUB__( __PAIR__(v4, v5), __PAIR__(v7, v6));
        v11 = v5 - v6;
        v9 = ( __PAIR__(v4, v5) - __PAIR__((unsigned int)v7, v
        v10 = v5 - v6;
        if ( v9 < 0 || (unsigned __int8)((v9 < 0) ^ v8) | (v9
        {
            v15 = v9;
        }
        else
        {
            v10 = 0x1000;
            v15 = 0;
        }
    }
    if ( !WriteFile(v2, &Buffer, v10, &NumberOfBytesWritt
        break;
    v4 = FileSize.HighPart;
    v12 = NumberOfBytesWritten + v6;
    if ( v10
```



Costin Raiu
@craiu

The Olympic Destroyer is also an
amazing example of false flags and
attribution nightmare.

13/2/18, 23:16

5 Retweets 18 Likes

NotPetya?

Eternal Romance?

Chinese Hackers?

Lazarus?

Lazarus

Olympic Destroyer

Petr

Rich Header Overlap

- Unusual attribute connected OlympicDestroyer to Lazarus
- This attribute, known as Rich Header has never been used for attribution before

0	9000	3c0d740347b0362331c882c2dee96dbf
0	4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00	MZ.....
10	b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00@.....
20	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
30	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e8 00 00 00
40	0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68!...L.!Th
50	69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f	is program canno
60	74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20	t be run in DOS
70	6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	mode....\$.....
80	d3 1e 27 79 97 7f 49 2a 97 7f 49 2a 97 7f 49 2a	..'y..I*..I*..I*
90	ec 63 45 2a 96 7f 49 2a f8 60 43 2a 9c 7f 49 2a	.cE*..I*..C*..I*
A0	14 63 47 2a 92 7f 49 2a f8 60 4d 2a 93 7f 49 2a	.cG*..I*..M*..I*
B0	54 70 14 2a 90 7f 49 2a 97 7f 48 2a da 7f 49 2a	Tp*..I*..H*..I*
C0	a1 59 42 2a 94 7f 49 2a 52 69 63 68 97 7f 49 2a	.YB*..I*Rich..I*
D0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
E0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4c 01 05 00PE..L...

Olympic Destroyer

0	4000	5d0ffbc8389f27b0649696f0ef5b3cfe
0	4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00	MZ.....
10	b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00@.....
20	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
30	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e8 00 00 00
40	0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68!...L.!Th
50	69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f	is program canno
60	74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20	t be run in DOS
70	6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	mode....\$.....
80	d3 1e 27 79 97 7f 49 2a 97 7f 49 2a 97 7f 49 2a	..'y..I*..I*..I*
90	ec 63 45 2a 96 7f 49 2a f8 60 43 2a 9c 7f 49 2a	.cE*..I*..C*..I*
A0	14 63 47 2a 92 7f 49 2a f8 60 4d 2a 93 7f 49 2a	.cG*..I*..M*..I*
B0	54 70 14 2a 90 7f 49 2a 97 7f 48 2a da 7f 49 2a	Tp*..I*..H*..I*
C0	a1 59 42 2a 94 7f 49 2a 52 69 63 68 97 7f 49 2a	.YB*..I*Rich..I*
D0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
E0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4c 01 03 00PE..L...

Lazarus

Rich Header

- Contains encrypted data
- Includes references and counters to used object files
- May uniquely identify the project and author
- We discovered that it was **FORGED** in OlympicDestroyer samples.

Offset	First value	Second value	Description
00	44 61 6E 53 (“DanS”)	00 00 00 00	Beginning of the header
08	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	Empty record
10	Tool id, build version	Number of items	Bill of materials record #1
...			
...	52 69 63 68 “Rich”	Checksum / XOR key	End of the header

Raw data	Type	Count	Produced by
=====	=====	=====	=====
000C 1C7B 00000001	oldnames	1	12 build 7291
000A 1F6F 0000000B	cobj	11	VC 6 (build 8047)
000E 1C83 00000005	masm613	5	MASM 6 (build 7299)
0004 1F6F 00000004	stdlibd11	4	VC 6 (build 8047)
005D 0FC3 00000007	sdk/imp	7	VC 2003 (build 4035)
0001 0000 0000004D	imports	77	imports (build 0)
000B 2636 00000003	c++obj	3	VC 6 (build 9782)

Proof of Rich Header Forgery

Raw data	Type	Count	Produced by
000C 1C7B 00000001	oldnames	1	12 build 7291
000A 1F6F 0000000B	cobj	11	VC 6 (build 8047)
000E 1C83 00000005	masm613	5	MASM 6 (build 7299)
0004 1F6F 00000004	stdlibdll	4	VC 6 (build 8047)
005D 0FC3 00000007	sdk/imp	7	VC 2003 (build 4035)
0001 0000 0000004D	imports	77	imports (build 0)
000B 2636 00000003	c++obj	3	VC 6 (build 9782)

Forged Rich Header in Olympic Destroyer


Raw data	Type	Count	Produced by
009E 9D1B 00000008	masm10	8	VC 2010 (build 40219)
0093 7809 0000000B	sdk/imp	11	VC 2008 (build 30729)
0001 0000 00000063	imports	99	imports (build 0)
00AA 9D1B 0000003A	cobj	58	VC 2010 (build 40219)
00AB 9D1B 0000000E	c++obj	14	VC 2010 (build 40219)
009D 9D1B 00000001	linker	1	157 build 40219

Original Rich Header in Olympic Destroyer

3

ATTRIBUTION

Who Might Be Behind It?



National Security

Russian spies hacked the Olympics and tried to make it look like North Korea did it, U.S. officials say




The PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics opened with a dazzling ceremony Feb. 9. (Pawel Kopczynski/Reuters)

By Ellen Nakashima February 24 Email the author



Chris Bing @Bing_Chris · Apr 17

A lot of people appear to be interested in this NSA talk... the line wraps around the hallway and there's now overflow seating



6 3 19



Chris Bing @Bing_Chris

Follow

NSA confirms Olympicdestroyer was Russia false flagging North Korea

2:25 PM - 17 Apr 2018

4

CONCLUSIONS

So What Was Olympic Destroyer?

- A. Demonstration of power
- B. Controlled-impact cyberweapon checking
- C. Attempt to master the art of false-flags





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THANKS!
谢谢观看

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