RSA*Conference2016

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Bridging the Gap Between
Threat Intelligence and Risk
Management



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Underlying assumption



Good intelligence makes smarter models;
Smarter models inform decisions;
Informed decisions drive better practice;
Better practice improves risk posture;
which, done efficiently,
Makes a successful security program.

Does your security program look like this?





Threat Intelligence





Risk Management





They have some issues dividing them...





Threat Intelligence

- "There's way too much uncertainty around her. I live & die in binary world."
- "I beat adversaries with STIX & detonate their remains. She plays with numbers."
- "People say she's "stochastic." That explains a lot; she needs serious help."
- "She doesn't even cyber, bro! Need I say anything more?"



Risk Management



- "He's intolerable. I assess he needs to be treated & transferred to a 3rd party."
- "One look at his laptop makes me panic. It's a giant audit finding with a keyboard."
- "He never shares with coworkers. I swear, if he TLP-Red's us one more time..."
- "What's his deal with China, anyway? It's an HR liability if you ask me."





...but they'd make such a great team.





Agenda



- Bridging Risk & IR in Verizon's DBIR.
- Building Understanding
- Finding Common Ground
- Bridging the Gap
- Crossing the Divide (Apply)

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Bridging Risk and IR in Verizon's DBIR



Bridging Risk and IR in the DBIR

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Frequency of incident classification patterns per victim industry

INDUSTRY	POS INTRUS- ION	WEB APP ATTACK	INSIDER MISUSE	THEFT/ LOSS	MISC. ERROR	CRIME- WARE	PAYMENT CARD SKIMMER	DENIAL OF SERVICE	CYBER ESPION- AGE	EVERY- THING ELSE
Accommodation [72]	75%	1%	8%	1%	1%	1%	<1%	10%		4%
Administrative [56]		8%	27%	12%	43%	1%		1%	1%	7%
Construction [23]	7%		13%	13%	7%	33%			13%	13%
Education [61]	<1%	19%	8%	15%	20%	6%	<1%	6%	2%	22%
Entertainment [71]	7%	22%	10%	7%	12%	2%	2%	32%		5%
Finance [52]	<1%	27%	7%	3%	5%	4%	22%	26%	<1%	6%
Healthcare [62]	9%	3%	15%	46%	12%	3%	<1%	2%	<1%	10%
Information [51]	<1%	41%	1%	1%	1%	31%	<1%	9%	1%	16%
Management [55]		11%	6%	6%	6%		11%	44%	11%	6%
Manufacturing [31,32,33]		14%	8%	4%	2%	9%		24%	30%	9%
Mining [21]			25%	10%	5%	5%	5%	5%	40%	5%
Professional [54]	<1%	9%	6%	4%	3%	3%		37%	29%	8%
Public [<u>92</u>]		<1%	24%	19%	34%	21%		<1%	<1%	2%
Real Estate [53]		10%	37%	13%	20%	7%			3%	10%
Retail [44,45]	31%	10%	4%	2%	2%	2%	6%	33%	<1%	10%




Bridging Risk and IR in the DBIR

The Intelligence Gap




**All figures from Verizon DBIR





Breach discovery methods over time





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Building Understanding



What is threat intelligence?



"Evidence-based knowledge, including context, mechanisms, indicators, implications and actionable advice about an existing or emerging menace or hazard to assets that can be used to inform decisions regarding the subject's response to that menace or hazard."

Gartner.


"The details of the motivations, intent, and capabilities of internal and external threat actors. Threat intelligence includes specifics on the tactics, techniques, and procedures of these adversaries. Threat intelligence's primary purpose is to inform business decisions regarding the risks and implications associated with threats."





Classic intelligence cycle









Threat intelligence process

The Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis






VICTIM



Threat intelligence process






What is risk?



"The probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss"


- Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR)





Risk management process (NIST 800-39)








Risk management process (ISO 27005)






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Finding Common Ground



Risky questions needing intelligent answers




- What types of threats exist?
- Which threats have occurred?
- How often do they occur?
- How is this changing over time?
- What threats affect my peers?
- Which threats could affect us?
- Are we already a victim?
- Who's behind these attacks?
- Would/could they attack us?
- Why would they attack us?
- Are we a target of choice?
- How would they attack us?

- Could we detect those attacks?
- Are we vulnerable to those attacks?
- Do our controls mitigate that vulnerability?
- Are we sure controls are properly configured?
- What happens if controls do fail?
- Would we know if controls failed?
- How would those failures impact the business?
- Are we prepared to mitigate those impacts?
- What's the best course of action?
- Were these actions effective?
- Will these actions remain effective?



Intel in the risk management process








Finding some common ground

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
Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR)






Finding some common ground











RelatedIncident[*]

Source: https://stixproject.github.io/

RelatedCOA[*]

RelatedThreatActor[*]

Finding some common ground


A FAIR-ly intelligence approach



Threat Intel (STIX)

RelatedIndicator[*] Observable[*] IndicatedTTP[*] RelatedTTP[*] Campaign Observable HistoricalCampaign[*] Attribution[*] RelatedObservable[*] RelatedIncident[*] LeveragedTTP[*] COATaken[*] AssociatedActo. 11 ExploitTarget SuggestedCOA[*] Re. edExploitTarget[*] Poten ICOA[*] ParameterObservable(*) RelatedCOAI* RelatedT eatActor(*) RelatedIncident[*]

Risk Analysis (FAIR)



- Bepervior
- **Repaintiea**tion
- Ribin@inainAPIblasespport
- Extrelocite & a Effect t
- Observed TTPs

*Initial map: https://threatconnect.com/threat-intelligence-driven-risk-analysis/



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Bridging the Gap





"During a recent audit, it was discovered that there were active accounts in a customer service application with inappropriate access privileges. These accounts were for employees who still worked in the organization, but whose job responsibilities no longer required access to this information. Internal audit labeled this a high risk finding."

From: *Measuring and Managing Information Risk* by Jack Freund and Jack Jones (p 123)



FAIR analysis process flow







Scenarios associated with inappropriate access privileges

Asset at Risk	Threat Community	Threat Type	Effect	
Customer PII	Privileged insiders	Malicious	Confidentiality	
Customer PII	Privileged insiders	Snooping	Confidentiality	
Customer PII	Privileged insiders	Malicious	Integrity	
Customer PII	Cyber criminals	Malicious	Confidentiality	

FAIR estimations relevant to the cyber criminal scenario

TEF Min	TEF M/L	TEF Max	TCap Min	TCap M/L	TCap Max
0.5 / year	2 / year	12 / year	70	85	95





Standard cyber criminal threat profile

Factor	Description
Motive	Financial, Intermediary
Primary intent	Engage in activities legal or illegal to maximize their profit.
Sponsorship	Non-state sponsored or recognized organizations (illegal organizations or gangs).
Targets	Financial services and retail organizations
Capability	Professional hackers. Well-funded, trained, and skilled.
Risk Tolerance	Relatively high; however, willing to abandon efforts that might expose them. Prefer to keep their identities hidden.
Methods	Malware, stealth attacks, and Botnet networks.

Example intelligence-driven adversary profile



SOCIO-POLITICAL AXIS

- Intent: High
- Target Geo: US, RU
- Target Sector: FinSrv
- Timeline: 2014 to present

TECHNICAL AXIS (TTPS)

- Spear phishing, CSRF, SQLi, DNS hijack, Paremeter tampering
- ATM withdrawals


CAPABILITIES

Files

6FF3AE5BA4E9A312602CBD44A398A02AB04 37378 58318739±970bbfs3±445673447b09ba 3fe3f20b.833a8d88be11807bae966d56b28af 7b3cc34dbcd.fb434ba4f1eaf9f7f20fe6f49c43 75e90fa98069.af7564ee7959142c3b0d9eb81 29505c2ae582cb7.dcc932b878b374d47540d 43a2dee97f37d58267f.32aa4911bc5ab8098e 495cd88790ff7147ed5ac3.3d1cd365ffe90e25 c36c849d720ba6c7329dde7b

- VIRLOCK
- Exploits
 - CVE-2012-2539,CVE- 1 2012-0158
- Tools
 - Mimikatz, MBR Eraser, Network Scanner, Cain & Abel, SSHD backdoor, Ammy Admin, Team Viewer

ADVERSARY



- Group: Anunak/Carbanak
- Type: eCrime
- Motive: Financial or economic
- Origin: Russia

INFRASTRUCTURE

- IPs
 - 78.128.92[.]117
 - 176.31.157[.]62
- Hosts
 - login.collegefan[.]org
 - login.loginto[.]me
 - img.in-travelusa[.]com
- Known to rent adversary infr


VICTIM

- Organizations: Acme Corp (that's us), 50 Russian banks, British bank
- Assets: Endpoints, servers, ATMs, SWIFT network






Example intelligence-driven threat community profile...OVER TIME



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Crossing the Divide



Making it work in your organization



- 1. Initiate communication between intel & risk teams
- 2. Orient intel processes & products around desired risk factors
- 3. Identify threat communities of interest and create profiles
- 4. Establish guidelines & procedures for risk assessment projects
- 5. Encourage ongoing coordination & collaboration
 - Create centralized tools/repositories

Underlying assumptionMotivating conviction



Good intelligence makes smarter models;
Smarter models inform decisions;
Informed decisions drive better practice;
Better practice improves risk posture;
which, done efficiently,
Makes a successful security program.



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THANK YOU!!



Connect **to** Protect

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