



27<sup>th</sup> ANNUAL  
**FIRST** **BERLIN**  
CONFERENCE

---

14 - 19 JUNE 2015

**UNIFIED SECURITY:  
IMPROVING THE FUTURE**



# I'm Sorry to Inform You...

Dr. Marie Moe

[@MarieGMoe](#)



Éireann Leverett


[@blackswanburst](#)



UNIVERSITY OF  
CAMBRIDGE  
Judge Business School

Centre for  
**Risk Studies**

# How we met...



# Trust. Why do I trust him?



# How did I come trust her?

Face to Face contact

Willingness to use strong cryptography in emails

She provided feedback (where others didn't)

Independent verification of facts

Yearly communication


Working further incidents

Core question:

- How do I know this info doesn't flow straight to the offensive national team?



# 2010-2011



# In retrospect

I should have included vulnerabilities

- I was uncomfortable sending both IPs and vulnerabilities to one country for distribution
- So I just sent IPs to ICS-CERT
- That mean Marie couldn't have much traction
- Since she didn't have evidence of vulnerability
- She had to redo that work

In the future I'd trust more



# Informing by proxy.

I used ICS-CERT/DHS in 2011

- They shared with 52 certs

I worked with 12 certs in 2012

- Codesys Vulnerabilities (detailed later)


Basic Process

- Send them an email about what you have
- Attach GPG key and sign email
- Offer them data
- When they respond, send it to them encrypted







# How do you approach companies?



# Who in the organisation should you be speaking to?



# How do you explain vulnerabilities and exposure?



# One time during an incident: ‘assisted scope discovery’

Client thought only email  
had been compromised

Turned out  
to be  
wrong, but  
useful

Forensics on a disk  
suggested exfiltration of  
data

I suggested it  
might be box that  
contained email

Client then  
thought single  
windows box was  
infected


Knowledge of  
IODINE allowed  
me to suggest  
DNS traffic  
examination in  
openflow

Got a handle on  
volume of  
exfiltrated data


Suggested looking  
at where profile  
had roamed



# How do you tell them they're owned/infected?



# How do you tell them they're causing someone else harm?



# The CodeSys Story

**Table 1.** Ten Autonomous Systems containing the largest number of vulnerable PLCs


PLCs Found	ASN	CC	Registrar	AS Name
9	6327	CA	arin	Shaw Communications Inc.
9	6830	AT	ripence	Liberty Global Operations B.V.
12	5610	CZ	ripence	Telefonica Czech Republic, a.s.
21	28929	IT	ripence	ASDASD-AS ASDASD srl
25	12605	AT	ripence	LIWEST Kabelmedien GmbH
28	3269	IT	ripence	Telecom Italia S.p.a.
28	3303	CH	ripence	Swisscom (Switzerland) Ltd
43	1136	EU	ripence	KPN Internet Solutions <sup>2</sup>
43	286	EU	ripence	KPN Internet Backbone
44	3320	DE	ripence	Deutsche Telekom AG

**Table 2.** Ten Countries containing the largest number of vulnerable PLCs

PLCs Found	Country Code
21	CA
21	ES
29	CZ
33	AT
33	US
38	CH
60	PL
64	NL
80	DE
81	IT




# How not to do it.






# The shock effect 1



# The Null CTRL article series




## Journalists warned system owners and Norwegian NSA of 2500 critical data flaws

How two journalists set out on a mission to test the data security in the whole of Norway.

Source: [http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/01/06/nyheter/nullctrl/shodan/english/english\\_versions/30861347/](http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/01/06/nyheter/nullctrl/shodan/english/english_versions/30861347/)



# The shock effect 2



Source: <http://www.dagbladet.no/2013/10/14/nyheter/innenriks/nullctrl/datasikkerhet/29071043/>



# Havex/Dragonfly/Energetic Bear

August 28, 2014

## Hundreds of Norwegian energy companies hit by cyber-attacks

Share this article:



*Approximately 300 oil and energy companies in Norway have been hit by one of the biggest cyber-attacks ever to have happened in the country, a government official is reported to have claimed.*

As first reported by The Local and Dagens Næringsliv, the National Security Authority Norway (Nasjonal Sikkerhetsmyndighet – NSM) detailed how 50 companies in the oil sector were hacked and how another 250 have been warned that they may have been hit too.

NSM is Norway's prevention unit for serious cyber-attacks and, like CERT-UK in Great Britain, warns companies about the newest threats. It took part of the CyberEurope2014 exercise in June.


The companies themselves haven't been named – although NSM is investigating whether the computer systems at Statoil, Norway's largest oil company, were targeted. Technical details are also few and far between at this moment in time.




Hundreds of Norwegian energy companies hit by cyber-attacks

Source: <http://www.scmagazineuk.com/hundreds-of-norwegian-energy-companies-hit-by-cyber-attacks/article/368539/>









# Ideas and solutions for remote maintenance.

**mbNET™**   **mbCONNECT24**   **mymbCONNECT24**



**MB CONNECT LINE**  
remote maintenance solutions

[HOMEPAGE](#)   [APPLICATIONS](#)   [SOLUTIONS](#)   [PRODUCTS](#)   [SUPPORT](#)   [NEWS](#)   [CONTACT](#)

 search...

[Homepage](#) | [Support](#) | [Downloads](#) | [mbCONNECT24](#) | [Software](#)

## Software Downloads

### mbCHECK (EUROPE)



diagnostic program mbCHECK for mbCONNECT24 server location EUROPE

Version: V 1.1.2

MD5 Checksum: A61FCB0F09F99E57B10F663923ECD472

### mbCHECK (USA/CAN)



diagnostic program mbCHECK for mbCONNECT24 server location USA / CAN

Version: V 1.1.2

MD5 Checksum: BB977F03FEF48CE28DA48199EE8CFD6F

## NEWS

[all News »](#)

Career Opportunities:IT Specialist  
Customer Support and Training f / m

Career Opportunities:IT Security  
Specialist / IT Security Manager f / m

MB CONNECT LINE now part of the  
"Cluster Mechatronik und Automation"

Manipulationen an SPS sicher  
erkennen

LUA scripting workshop for  
mbNET.toolbox/mbSPIDER



```
Programm was started at 10:00:34
*****
10:00:34.0225: Start finging of LAN hosts...
10:00:34.0256: Was found 1 hosts in LAN:
01) [          44A89C]
*****
10:00:34.025 : Start finging of OPC Servers...
10:00:34.088 Was found 1 OPC Servers.
1) [          8544A89C\Matrikon.OPC.Simulation.1]
    CLSID: {F8582CF2-88FB-11D0-B850-00C0F0104305}
    UserType: MatrikonOPC Server for Simulation and Testing
    VerIndProgID: Matrikon.OPC.Simulation
    OPC version support: +++
*****
10:00:34.0897: Start finging of OPC Tags...
10:00:34.0897: Thread 01 running...
10:00:36.0725: Thread 01 finished.
1)[\\SVEIN-28544A89C\Matrikon Inc (780) 448-1010 http://www.matrikonopc.com]
Saved in 'OPCServer01.txt'
```






# In retrospect


- Sending out physical letters was not very useful
- The crisis management personell were not always the best contact points
- The media “got it wrong”, however the effect was good nonetheless
- With the KraftCERT establishment we should do better the next time




# Good Reactions



# Bad Reactions



# Conclusion Slide



# Questions



# Thank you

