

# Emulating the Adversary in Post-Exploitation

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# \$whoami

- Founder and President of Rendition Infosec
- IANS Faculty
- Endorsed by the Shadow Brokers
- Former NSA hacker, Master CNE operator, recipient of the DoD Exception Civilian Service Medal
- **Dislikes:** those who call themselves “thought leaders,” “crypto bros,” and anyone who **needlessly adds blockchain** to a software solution

# Agenda

- What are adversaries doing that we aren't?
- Never go full cyber!
- Techniques for adversary emulation
- Conclusion





# What are adversaries doing that we aren't?

AKA: How do we get executives to pay attention to our reports?

The background of the lower half of the slide is a dark blue, abstract graphic. It features a grid of small, glowing squares. Overlaid on this grid are several glowing blue lines and circles, some of which form a network-like structure. The overall effect is a high-tech, digital aesthetic.

# The Process


- We all know the standard pentest/red team process
  - Note: we are not arguing over definitions here, because:
    1. It's not relevant to the talk
    2. I don't care



On further inspection, this actually IS missing a step:  
Arguing about the findings and severity...


# The Disconnect

- After an incident, there's rarely a case where the exploitation vectors aren't remediated
  - Yet this occurs routinely after a penetration test
- Why the disconnect?
  - Hint: it's about WAY more than just liability



# The Disconnect (2)


- As humans, we are inherently loss averse
  - We will spend more to avoid a loss than to gain the same
- Most humans are also better at understanding tangible things than their intangible counterparts
  - With an incident, there's a tangible loss
  - In an average pentest report, there's a technical summary of vulnerabilities, leaving decision makers to spot potential risks





# Stop Focusing On Domain Admin

- Stop focusing on domain admin in your penetration test reports
- That's it
- That's the whole slide






# Stop Focusing On Domain Admin (2)

- Even saying “keys to the kingdom” doesn’t help create a concrete image for stakeholders
- Do better – explain the impact of what you’ve found
- This doesn’t have to be done for every vuln you discover, but create impact scenarios for the vulnerabilities you know need to be addressed

# Never go full cyber!

Sure, the adversary did it...  
But should you?!



# Should We Completely Emulate The Adversary?

- Absolutely not – never go full cyber!
- Use common sense – just because an attacker is willing to take a risk with your client's infrastructure, should you?
  - Hint: of course not!
- Consider the impacts of reporting particularly sensitive data discovered in the course of the assessment

# Choose Wisely

- Things to avoid in practice:
  - Locking out accounts (duh)
  - Anything that might destroy data or impact systems (duh)
  - Anything involving switching (STP is a fickle beast)
  - Actually exfiltrating sensitive, and especially regulated data
  - Exploiting storage devices and controllers
  - Performing post-exploitation activities on hypervisors



# Techniques for adversary emulation

So what CAN I do then?



# Top Post-exploitation Techniques

- In this section, we'll discuss the following post-exploitation techniques for demonstrating impact after the compromise:
  - Pivot to data the user already has access to
  - Hunt for the most sensitive documents
  - Target backups
  - Compromise source code
  - Plant web shells
  - Dump WiFi and VPN configurations



# Pivot To User Accessible Data

- So you landed that first phishing email and have a shell
  - Should you immediately pivot?
- Consider examining what's in the user's mapped drives

```
PS C:\Users\IEUser> get-psdrive
```

| Name     | Used (GB) | Free (GB) | Provider    | Root                         |
|----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|------------------------------|
| Alias    |           |           | Alias       |                              |
| C        | 18.04     | 21.35     | FileSystem  | C:\                          |
| Cert     |           |           | Certificate | \                            |
| D        |           |           | FileSystem  | D:\                          |
| E        |           |           | FileSystem  | E:\                          |
| Env      |           |           | Environment |                              |
| Function |           |           | Function    |                              |
| HKCU     |           |           | Registry    | HKEY_CURRENT_USER            |
| HKLM     |           |           | Registry    | HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE           |
| S        | 24.18     | 35.48     | FileSystem  | \\192.168.13.142\secrets     |
| Variable |           |           | Variable    |                              |
| WSMan    |           |           | WSMan       |                              |
| Z        |           |           | FileSystem  | \\vmware-host\Shared Folders |

```
C:\Users\IEUser> net use
```

```
New connections will be remembered.
```

| Status | Local | Remote                       | Network                   |
|--------|-------|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| OK     | S:    | \\192.168.13.142\secrets     | Microsoft Windows Network |
|        | Z:    | \\vmware-host\Shared Folders | VMware Shared Folders     |

```
The command completed successfully.
```



# Pivot To User Accessible Data

- Think about the user's recently accessed documents

```
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.ppt
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.pptx
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.py
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.ssv
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.tlp
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.txt
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.vmx
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.vsdx
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.webp
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.xls
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.xlsx
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\.zip
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs\Folder
```

```
C:\Users\jake>reg query "hkcu\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\recentdocs" _
```



# Pivot To User Accessible Data

- Decoding Data

[illegible]

```
>>> fname = ''
>>> for i in range(0, len(x), 2):
...     print(x[i:i+2] + " = " + chr(int(x[i:i+2], 16)))
...     fname += chr(int(x[i:i+2], 16))
... 
```

# Hunt For The Most Sensitive Documents

- Sometimes you're presented with hundreds (or even thousands) of documents
  - You can't (and shouldn't) exfiltrate them all
  - Saying "we were able to access these thousands of documents" doesn't communicate impact
  - Be real, in many cases the client forgot those files existed or has no idea what's in them
  - And you really don't have time to open lots of documents and performing analysis individually

# Tika To The Rescue!

- While we can't natively read office documents, we can extract data from them using Tika
  - The worst part about Tika is that it requires Java
  - And it's HUGE (70MB+)

```
C:\Users\IEUser>type "Desktop\20200604- Hackfest Emulating the Adversary.pptx" |findstr /i exfil

C:\Users\IEUser>java -jar Downloads\tika-app-1.24.1.jar "Desktop\20200604- Hackfest Emulating the Adversary.pptx" |findstr /i exfil
Jun 03, 2020 5:38:20 PM org.apache.tika.config.InitializableProblemHandler$3 handleInitializableProblem
WARNING: J2KImageReader not loaded. JPEG2000 files will not be processed.
See https://pdfbox.apache.org/2.0/dependencies.html#jai-image-io
for optional dependencies.

Jun 03, 2020 5:38:20 PM org.apache.tika.config.InitializableProblemHandler$3 handleInitializableProblem
WARNING: org.xerial's sqlite-jdbc is not loaded.
Please provide the jar on your classpath to parse sqlite files.
See tika-parsers/pom.xml for the correct version.
<p>Actually exfiltrating sensitive, and especially regulated data</p>
<p>You can't (and shouldn't) exfiltrate them all</p>
```



# Use Tika To Find Your “Keys To The Kingdom”

- To demonstrate maximum impact, we ask what specific data would hurt the business the most if it were targeted
- Once we get Tika into the environment, we can use it to parse text from documents
  - If in scope, the extracted text can be zipped and exfiltrated en-masse
- This prevents the client from wondering “does this matter”





# Target Backups

- Targeting backup servers is a great way to find sensitive data
- We've found backups on open iSCSI endpoints
  - Made me laugh extra hard when this happened to Hacking Team
- When you find a backup, don't make it about the data you have
  - Instead, report that you can run the server you have the backup of
  - For some reason, the idea of attackers duplicating their infrastructure really eats at stakeholders

# Compromise Source Code


- If you can compromise a developer or a source code repository, you can do (at least) two things:
  - Exfil source code (this IS a serious business impact for most orgs)
  - Add a backdoor to the source code
- Rendition has demonstrated changing source code on multiple occasions - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rc-eEArQV4Q>
- Don't forget to look in source code for passwords and API keys

# Plant Web Shells

- In most environments, web shells are difficult to detect
- Post-breach, the effort to hunt for web shells (beyond a cursory examination) is a significant expense if the organization doesn't know what "good" looks like in their code base
  - Hint: few do
- Stakeholders detest uncertainty – highlight how web shells were planted as long term backdoors but were undetected

# Plant Web Shells (2)

- Even in cases where a refined build and deploy system exists, redeploying an entire web application infrastructure is not easy
  - Or cheap
  - Usually the shops that can do this effectively use a DevOps model
- Even when infrastructure can be rebuilt, it's not easy
  - Work with infosec stakeholders to obtain information about costs of previous outages in web application infrastructure
  - This helps highlight the impact





# Plant Web Shells (3)

- In most cases where you'd have access to plant a web shell, you also have access to change existing files
- It's easy to demonstrate a modification that logs plaintext usernames and passwords to a text file (don't ACTUALLY do this)
- In an e-commerce application, the same modification can be used to store credit card numbers or exfiltrate session IDs

# Dump WiFi and VPN Configurations

- Hunting VPN configurations is fun, but dumping Wifi configurations makes things personal
- Most workers have connected their laptops to home Wifi
  - Demonstrating that you can dump their Wifi configurations (including passwords) for their home networks is something that gets attention

```
C:\Users\jake>netsh wlan export profile
```

```
Interface profile "eternallyblue_5G_2" is saved in file ".\Wi-Fi-eternallyblue_5G_2.xml" successfully.
```

```
Interface profile "eternallyblue_guest_5G" is saved in file ".\Wi-Fi-eternallyblue_guest_5G.xml" successfully.
```

# Closing Thoughts

Let's wrap this up...



# Conclusion

Emulating an adversary in post-exploitation helps stakeholders understand impact

Unlike traditional adversary emulation, this doesn't require substantial CTI resources

Choose your actions carefully in order to avoid negatively impacting security

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