

RSA®Conference2020

San Francisco | February 24 – 28 | Moscone Center

HUMAN
ELEMENT

SESSION ID: TECH-T11

DEEP DIVE ANALYSIS OF ENTERPRISE NETWORK SECURITY MECHANISMS



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#RSAC



**The question
that
triggered this
presentation**

Why This Presentation Matters



- Common Enterprise Issues
 - Ambiguous network security protocols in use
 - Diversity of solutions
 - Across business units
 - Network line
 - User / equipment
 - Hardware and software variances
 - Monitoring
 - Feature complexity

Session Outline and Learning Objectives

Network security protocols

- SSH
- TLS
- IPsec
- 802.1X

Looking for commonalty to
improve understanding

Evolutionary improvements


- Functionality
- Cryptographic algorithms
- Forward secrecy

Gain insights into where things
are going

Today's Presentation is Mostly Demonstrations


Wireshark

- Open source tool for packet analysis



PCAPs

- <https://tinyurl.com/qohs6lk>



<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/inxjtpt96lfxng/AABT2Z2gnHMOD4m-ngaLpy5nla?dl=0>

Things to Observe

- Business goals drive the message flows
 - Multiple protocols or layers required to deliver network security
 - Same underlying security mechanisms
 - PSK, public/private cryptography
 - Sharing of keying material
 - Generate shared secret
 - Encryption, message integrity
- Techniques that as security experts
you are aware of

802.1X / EAP

Business Usage



Multiple Layers

TLS	TTLS	...	PEAP
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)			
802.1X EAPOL			
Logical Link Control (LLC)			
802.11 / 802.3			

Evolution

Wired


- MACsec
- MACsec Key Agreement (MKA)

Wireless


WPA3	
Personal	Enterprise
128 AES	192 AES
SAE	802.1X
PMF Mandatory	PMF Mandatory

802.1X EAPOL


WPA3-Personal



WPA3-Enterprise



802.1X Demonstration



The image shows a Wireshark capture of an 802.1X authentication process. The main window displays a list of packets, with packet 21 selected. A detailed view of packet 21 is shown in the bottom pane, revealing the IEEE 802.1X authentication structure.

Packet List:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
13	0.0492180...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
14	0.0631098...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
16	0.0706480...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
17	0.0839389...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
19	0.0984574...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
20	0.0995263...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
21	0.1036534...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
23	0.1841711...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
24	0.1882992...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
26	0.1946245...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
27	0.2134849...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
29	0.2243521...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
30	0.2272188...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
32	0.2339596...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
33	0.2366750...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
35	0.2573872...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
36	0.2600024...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
38	0.3089228...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
39	0.3118290...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
41	0.3409180...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
42	0.3438003...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
44	0.3709407...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
45	0.3719828...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
46	0.3729328...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)
48	0.3754914...	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	Apple_7d:aa:de	EAPOL	Key (Message 3 of 4)
49	0.3769004...	Apple_7d:aa:de	ea:cb:ac:b4:47:86	EAPOL	Key (Message 4 of 4)

Packet 21 Details:


- Frame 5: 150 bytes on wire (1200 bits), 150 bytes captured (1200 bits) on interface 0
- Radiotap Header v0, Length 22
- 802.11 radio information
- IEEE 802.11 Authentication, Flags:
- IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN
 - Fixed parameters (104 bytes)
 - Authentication Algorithm: Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) (3)

IPsec

Business Usage



Multiple Layers



Evolution of IKE


IKEv1

- Phase 1 Main mode
 - IKE SA Negotiation
 - 6 Messages
- Phase 2 Quick Mode
 - IPSec SA Negotiation
 - 3 messages
- Validate peers
 - Pre-Shared Keys
 - Certificates


IKEv2

- Phase 1
 - 4 messages
 - Encrypts after 2 messages
- Phase 2 Creates first CHILD SA
- New DH values, encryption & hashing algorithms
- Adds EAP
- Possible future changes
 - Labeled IPsec

Evolution of IKE



IKE v2 Demonstration



The image shows a Wireshark packet capture window titled 'IKEv2.pcapng'. The interface includes a menu bar (File, Edit, View, Go, Capture, Analyze, Statistics, Telephony, Wireless, Tools, Help) and a toolbar with various analysis tools. A packet list pane on the left shows a filtered view of 'isakmp' packets. The main packet details pane displays the selected packet (No. 43) with its protocol stack: Ethernet II, Internet Protocol Version 4, User Datagram Protocol, and Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
34	20.055273	172.16.0.40	172.16.0.10	ISAKMP	1186	IKE_SA_INIT MID=00 Initiator Request
35	20.074799	172.16.0.10	172.16.0.40	ISAKMP	402	IKE_SA_INIT MID=00 Responder Response
36	20.091490	172.16.0.40	172.16.0.10	ISAKMP	794	IKE_AUTH MID=01 Initiator Request
38	20.138967	172.16.0.10	172.16.0.40	ISAKMP	394	IKE_AUTH MID=01 Responder Response
39	20.322133	172.16.0.40	172.16.0.10	ISAKMP	130	IKE_AUTH MID=02 Initiator Request
40	20.421684	172.16.0.10	172.16.0.40	ISAKMP	138	IKE_AUTH MID=02 Responder Response
41	20.442481	172.16.0.40	172.16.0.10	ISAKMP	186	IKE_AUTH MID=03 Initiator Request
42	20.452782	172.16.0.10	172.16.0.40	ISAKMP	162	IKE_AUTH MID=03 Responder Response
43	20.474817	172.16.0.40	172.16.0.10	ISAKMP	114	IKE_AUTH MID=04 Initiator Request
44	20.477048	172.16.0.10	172.16.0.40	ISAKMP	114	IKE_AUTH MID=04 Responder Response
45	20.499069	172.16.0.40	172.16.0.10	ISAKMP	130	IKE_AUTH MID=05 Initiator Request
60	21.007744	172.16.0.10	172.16.0.40	ISAKMP	346	IKE_AUTH MID=05 Responder Response
61	21.076162	172.16.0.10	172.16.0.40	ISAKMP	186	INFORMATIONAL MID=00 Responder Request
179	22.026187	172.16.0.40	172.16.0.10	ISAKMP	178	INFORMATIONAL MID=00 Initiator Response
287	30.188108	172.16.0.40	172.16.0.10	ISAKMP	114	INFORMATIONAL MID=06 Initiator Request
288	30.190697	172.16.0.10	172.16.0.40	ISAKMP	114	INFORMATIONAL MID=06 Responder Response

> Frame 43: 114 bytes on wire (912 bits), 114 bytes captured (912 bits) on interface \Device\NPF...

> Ethernet II, Src: Microsof_0a:73:1b (00:15:5d:0a:73:1b), Dst: Microsof_0a:73:1a (00:15:5d:0a:73:1a)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.40, Dst: 172.16.0.10

> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 4500, Dst Port: 4500

> UDP Encapsulation of IPsec Packets


> Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol

TLS

Business Usage



Multiple Layers



Evolution of TLS

TLS1.2


- IETF RFC 5246
- Incrementally modified and enhanced
- Recommended version since 2008
- Increasing number of attacks
- Performance concerns

TLS 1.3


- IETF RFC 8446
- Finalized March 2018
- Major redesign
- Cryptographic changes
 - Supported encryption algorithms
 - Messages to negotiate a session
 - PSK with DHE

Evolution of TLS

TLS 1.2



TLS 1.3



TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 Demonstration

The image displays two Wireshark windows. The top window, titled 'TLS 1.2.pcapng', shows a packet list with 14 packets. The bottom window, titled 'TLS 1.3.pcapng', shows a packet list with 10 packets. The bottom window's packet list is expanded, showing details for each packet.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	10.0.0.2	157.240.22.25	TCP	51351 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0
2	0.018070	157.240.22.25	10.0.0.2	TCP	443 → 51351 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0
3	0.018129	10.0.0.2	157.240.22.25	TCP	51351 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=66080 Len=0
4	0.018495	10.0.0.2	157.240.22.25	TLSv1.3	Client Hello
5	0.037662	157.240.22.25	10.0.0.2	TLSv1.3	Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec, Application Data
6	0.038658	157.240.22.25	10.0.0.2	TLSv1.3	Application Data [TCP segment of a retransmission]
7	0.038659	157.240.22.25	10.0.0.2	TLSv1.3	Application Data
8	0.039741	10.0.0.2	157.240.22.25	TLSv1.3	Change Cipher Spec, Application Data
9	0.054351	157.240.22.25	10.0.0.2	TLSv1.3	Application Data
10	0.054685	157.240.22.25	10.0.0.2	TLSv1.3	Application Data

Secure Shell (SSH)

Business Usage



Three layers

Connection Protocol

Multiplexes encrypted tunnel into logical channels

Authentication Protocol

Client (user) authentication

Transport Layer Protocol

Server (host) authentication, confidentiality, integrity, forward secrecy

TCP/IP

SSH

Evolution of SSH


SSHv2

- Different protocol to SSHv1
- Only host keys
- Stronger encryption ciphers
- Message integrity checking
- Support for public keys certificates
- OpenSSH

Extensions

- Stronger cryptography
 - Elliptic curve
 - SHA-256, SHA-512
- Negotiation mechanism RFC 8308

SSH



SSH2 Demonstration

PCAP SSH 2.pcapng

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/> Expression...

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000000	10.111.1.208	10.111.1.16	TCP	41628 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=3773256609 TSecr=0 WS=1024
2	0.000507565	10.111.1.16	10.111.1.208	TCP	22 → 41628 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=28960 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=3108898593 TSecr=3773256609 WS=128
3	0.000563896	10.111.1.208	10.111.1.16	TCP	41628 → 22 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=29696 Len=0 TSval=3773256610 TSecr=3108898593
4	0.001009427	10.111.1.208	10.111.1.16	SSHv2	Client: Protocol (SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.8p1 Debian-1)
5	0.055687465	10.111.1.16	10.111.1.208	SSHv2	Server: Protocol (SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.4p1 Raspbian-10+deb9u3)
6	0.056740800	10.111.1.208	10.111.1.16	SSHv2	Client: Key Exchange Init
7	0.060592330	10.111.1.16	10.111.1.208	SSHv2	Server: Key Exchange Init
8	0.066441699	10.111.1.208	10.111.1.16	SSHv2	Client: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Init
9	0.125890879	10.111.1.16	10.111.1.208	SSHv2	Server: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Reply, New Keys, Encrypted packet (len=140)
10	0.133301837	10.111.1.208	10.111.1.16	SSHv2	Client: New Keys
11	0.134249724	10.111.1.208	10.111.1.16	SSHv2	Client: Encrypted packet (len=44)
12	0.134608146	10.111.1.16	10.111.1.208	SSHv2	Server: Encrypted packet (len=44)
13	0.134687894	10.111.1.208	10.111.1.16	SSHv2	Client: Encrypted packet (len=60)
14	0.135621078	10.111.1.16	10.111.1.208	SSHv2	Server: Encrypted packet (len=52)

> Frame 1: 74 bytes on wire (592 bits), 74 bytes captured (592 bits) on interface 0

> Ethernet II, Src: WistronI_53:0e:a8 (3c:97:0e:53:0e:a8), Dst: Raspberr_89:b1:c5 (b8:27:eb:89:b1:c5)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.111.1.208, Dst: 10.111.1.16

> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 41628, Dst Port: 22, Seq: 0, Len: 0

The Best Reference is the Specification

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Request for Comments: 8446
Obsoletes: [5077](#), [5246](#), [6961](#)
Updates: [5705](#), [6066](#)
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721

E. Rescorla
Mozilla
August 2018

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3

Abstract

This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

Next Steps

7 DAYS

Find

What protocols are you using?

- Get permission
- Capture traffic

30 DAYS

Explore

What fields attributes are important?

- Download technical specifications
- Look up definitions


90 DAYS

Discover

What future access needs are essential?

- IoT
- 5G

Thank you for listening 😊



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