# Insights and Experiences from Monitoring Multiple P2P Botnets

Leon Böck, Shankar Karuppayah, Valentin Sundermann, Max Mühlhäuser, Dave Levin










### Monitoring multiple botnets

- Blind men and the elephant
- How (dis-)similar are botnets?
  - Affected devices
  - Behavior over time
  - Affected regions
  - Dynamics
- P2Pwned Rossow et. al[1]
- Long Term Tracking and Characterization of P2P Botnet [2]
- What has changed with new IoT botnets?

[1] Christian Rossow, Dennis Andriesse, Tillmann Werner, Brett Stone-Gross, Daniel Plohmann, Christian J. Dietrich, Herbert Bos: SoK: P2PWNED - Modeling and Evaluating the Resilience of Peer-to-Peer Botnets. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2013: 97-111

[2] Jia Yan, Lingyun Ying, Yi Yang, Purui Su, Dengguo Feng: Long Term Tracking and Characterization of P2P Botnet. TrustCom 2014: 244-251



### Challenges and Motivation

#### Human Effort

- Reverse Engineering
- Implementing Crawlers
- Data analysis

Resource constraints and requirements

- Size and number of botnets
- Anti-monitoring mechanisms
- (Local) network limitations

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
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
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### **P2P Botnets**


#### Unstructured




#### Structured




#### Parasitic




### Crawlers and Sensors






# **Botnet Monitoring System**




#### Live Preview - Overview




# Live Preview - Single Botnet




### Live Preview - Geolocations



#### Live Preview - ASes




### Live Preview - Counting Comparison




### Live Preview - Botnet Comparison




## Anomalies in Mozi - Diurnals or Throttling?





<sup>\*</sup> Pengxiong Zhu, Keyu Man, Zhongjie Wang, Zhiyun Qian, Roya Ensafi, J. Alex Halderman, Hai-Xin Duan: Characterizing Transnational Internet Performance and the Great Bottleneck of China. Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst. 4(1): 13:1-13:23 (2020)

# **Botnet Monitoring System**



#### Backend - Database Format

#### Replies:

- Any kind of interaction with a bot at the specified time
- Crawlers, Sensors, Honeypots, etc.

#### Edges:

- P2P-specific
- Enables graph analysis
- Crawlers

timestamp	Src_ip	Src_port	Dst_ip	Dst_port	Src_id	Dst_id
2022-04	1.1.1.1	1000	2.2.2.2	2000	null	null
2022-04	2.2.2.2	2000	3.3.3.3	3000	null	null

timestamp	ip	port	id	json
2022-04	1.2.3.4	1337	null	null
2022-04	4.3.2.1	42	383838	V389

#### **Backend - Communication**

#### Simple solution:

Distributed crawlers with centralized DB

#### Drawbacks:

- No validation / authentication
- "one way" communication
- No coordination possible
  - Circumvent countermeasures
  - Dynamic resource allocation


=> Using a custom API

#### BaseCrawler

#### Features:

- Backend and API connection
- Queuing and parallelized crawling
  - 20k+ simultaneous connections
- Removal of unresponsive peers
- TCP and UDP
  - Implements custom retry mechanism for UDP
- 2-Queue system to minimize slow down by unresponsive peers

# BaseCrawler - Double Queue



### BaseCrawler - Example HnS

#### Most simple case:

- 2 Functions
- SendPeerRequest
- ReadReply

BaseCrawler calls methods and processes the output

```
func (ci *HnSProtocol) SendPeerRequest(conn *net.UDPConn, addr *net.UDPAddr, logger *logrus.Logger) {
        msq := []byte("~")
        logger.Debug("Sending to ", addr)
        _, _ = conn.WriteTo(msg, addr) //@Todo verify that readfrom after writeto does not lose packets...
func (ci *HnSProtocol) ReadReply(msg []byte, msgLen int, srcAddr *net.UDPAddr, logger *logrus.Logger) (bcrawler.CrawlResult, []string, []bmsclient.DatedEdge, [][
       newPeers := []string{}
        edges := []bmsclient.DatedEdge{}
       datedBotReplies := []bmsclient.DatedBotReply{}
       if msg[0] == 94 {
               datedBotReplies = []bmsclient.DatedBotReply{{
                       Timestamp: time.Now(),
                       BotID: "",
                       IP: srcAddr.IP.
                       Port: uint16(srcAddr.Port),
               }}
               var ip uint32
               var port uint16
               portRead := bytes.NewReader(msg[2:4])
               ipRead := bytes.NewReader(msg[4:8])
               binary.Read(ipRead, binary.BigEndian, &ip)
               binary.Read(portRead, binary.BigEndian, &port)
               hostStr := net.JoinHostPort(int2ip(ip).String(), strconv.Itoa(int(port)))
               logger.Debug("Received reply: ", srcAddr, " ", hostStr)
               edge := bmsclient.DatedEdge{
                        Timestamp: time.Now(),
                       SrcBotID: "",
                       SrcIP: srcAddr.IP,
                       SrcPort: uint16(srcAddr.Port),
                       DstBotID: "",
                       DstIP: net.ParseIP(int2ip(ip).String()),
                       DstPort: uint16(port),
               edges = append(edges, edge)
               newPeer := hostStr
               newPeers = append(newPeers, newPeer)
               return bcrawler.BOT REPLY, newPeers, edges, datedBotReplies
               return bcrawler.NO_REPLY, newPeers, edges, datedBotReplies
```

### Ongoing and Future Work

- Automated measurement of Churn and lifetimes
  - How long do bots remain active?
- Sensor / Crawler detection
  - Analyze if we can detect ourselves
  - Filter out activities of other researchers
- Coordination
  - Dynamic load allocation
  - Circumventing anti-monitoring mechanisms

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### Availability

- We are happy to collaborate directly
- Access to source code upon request
- Selected dashboards will be made public soon
- Contact us at: botnets@tk.tu-darmstadt.de

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### Summary

- Measuring multiple botnets provies unique insights
  - Geographic differences
  - Diurnal patterns
  - IP / ID counts may not be comparable
- BMS enables resource efficient monitoring
- Availability: botnets@tk.tu-darmstadt.de

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