

# RSA<sup>®</sup>Conference2019

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**BETTER.**

SESSION ID: SEM-M01


## Measuring the Rationality of Security Behavior

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
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# People must make a variety of security decisions



# The decisions they make may appear irrational



Why So Many People Make Their Password 'Dragon'

LOUISE MATSAKIS SECURITY 04.22.18 07:00 AM

## WHY SO MANY PEOPLE MAKE THEIR PASSWORD 'DRAGON'

COMMUNICATIONS  
OF THE  
ACM


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## The State of Phishing Attacks

By Jason Hong

Estimates of damage caused by phishing vary widely, ranging from \$61 million per year to \$3 billion per year of direct losses to victims in the U.S.

# Do users behave insecurely because they don't care, behave randomly, or because it's not worth it?



The user is going to pick **dancing pigs** over **security** every time.

-- McGraw and Felten / Schneier

The user is rationally ignoring security advice because **the costs outweigh the benefits.**

-- Herley, 2009



# Controlled experiments to measure degree of rationality



Online experimental system: simple bank account  
Account holds study compensation  
Account has explicit risk of being hacked

At the end of the study, you will be compensated with the amount of money left in your study bank account. You begin the study with \$5 in your bank account. You must login once a day, otherwise you will lose all of the money in your account. If you are hacked, you will also lose all of the money in your account.

Studies indicate that 20% of users will have their study accounts hacked over the course of the study.

$H = 1\%, 20\%, \text{ or } 50\%$



# Controlled experiments to measure degree of rationality



Online experimental system: simple bank account  
Account holds study compensation  
Account has explicit risk of being hacked



Users make a security choice: enable/don't enable 2FA  
2FA lowers risk of hacking  
Increases cost (time and effort) to complete study

## UMD Website Study

Login

Bank

Would you like to enable two factor authentication using your phone number?  
Two factor authentication will protect you from hacking 90% of the time.

$P = 50\%$  or 90%

Use Two Fac

Continue Without Two Fac

# Controlled experiments to measure degree of rationality




Online experimental system: simple bank account  
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Users make a security choice: enable 2FA lowers risk of hacking  
Increases cost (time and effort) to complete




Participants stand to lose money  
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Crowd Worker) participants  
Earn money from small time increments





# Observed 2FA behavior twice to account for learning



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## Only 52% of participants enabled 2FA

After being shown risk & protection information



# Rational behavior: benefit of behavior outweighs cost



Cost of 2FA

<



Protection  
offered by 2FA


**48%** strictly rational with no experience  
**61%** strictly rational once familiar with the system

*Significant ( $p < 0.001$ ), medium ( $V = 0.578$ ) learning effect*


# Users with more experience, skill & risk are more rational

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Higher internet skill 15% more likely to behave rationally



# People are not perfectly rational, but is their behavior random?



The user is going to pick  
**dancing pigs** over **security** every time.

-- McGraw and Felten / Schneier


The user is rationally ignoring security advice  
because **the costs outweigh the benefits.**

-- Herley, 2009






# Testing the bounded rationality hypothesis: is there a consistent pattern in security behavior?




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Costs  
(time)

+



Past 2FA  
Behavior

+



Demographics

Controls

# Experimental results suggest users are boundedly rational


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explains 9% behavior variance


# Security behavior is not random

## Differences in ability and account value alter behavior



### People behave in ways we can model well

We can model human behavior well ( $R^2=0.61$ ) as a function of variables measured or controlled in the simulation system





Differences in *ability* (differences in *cost*) alter behavior



Differences in *account valuation* alter behavior

# Behavioral security allows us to understand what initially looks irrational and unfixable.




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
**Easier idea: just require 2FA!**



# Requiring security can be costly: 2FA code fees + engagement losses



Login frequencies



Value of accounts to users

## Market Impact 500K MTurk Users

Approach	User Costs	2FA Benefit	Loss/Gain
2FA Required	\$275 per 1000 MTurkers	\$148 per 1000 MTurkers	(-) \$126 per 1000 MTurkers
Perfect Rationality	\$32 per 1000 MTurkers	\$128 per 1000 MTurkers	(+) \$96 per 1000 MTurkers
No 2FA Offered	\$266 per 1000 MTurkers	\$0 per 1000 MTurkers	(-) \$266 per 1000 MTurkers

(-) \$63,606

(+) \$47,865

(-) \$133,000



# Apply What You Have Learned Today



Instead of prompting on sign-up  
prompt after account use or value has increased



Consider nudging by communicating risk or using  
social influence calculated based on similar profiles



Consider providing resources that reduce  
security costs to low skill / high risk users

# Users are boundedly rational: they make burden-risk tradeoffs affected by human biases

## What We Learned About Security Behavior



**Boundedly Rational:** users take into account burden & risk



**Anchoring Effects:** tendency to stick with first decision



**Account Value Effects:** more protective of existing assets



## Driving Toward “Security Rationality”

**We’re starting beta tests for a system to optimize company cost & risk using dynamic automated security requirement setting. Email me!**

Elissa Redmiles [eredmiles@cs.umd.edu](mailto:eredmiles@cs.umd.edu)