

ATT&CK FOR TELCO NETWORKS

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ABOUT ME: SID RAO

Security Researcher, Bell-labs Nokia, Finland

- Threat modeling, network security

Doctoral candidate, Aalto University, Finland

- “Broken authentication problems”
 - Telco networks
 - Password managers
 - Virtual Private Networks
 - Cryptocurrency wallets
 - Browser extensions
 - Google Suite Add-ons


Public Interest Technologist, various NGOs

Previously: BlackHat, DefCon, hack.lu, Troopers, Disobey




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TELCO NETWORK TOPOLOGY



POTENTIAL ATTACKERS



THE STORY SO FAR (1)

What we wanted:

- Build a telco-specific framework:
 - to quickly model a new attack with familiar taxonomy
 - to compare multiple known attacks similarity in root causes

What we gathered:

- Publications and presentations (from infosec venues)
- Threat landscape studies and best practice guidelines (from standardization and governance bodies)

THE STORY SO FAR (2)

What we did:

- **Understand** attack flow
 - Deduce **commonalities**
 - **Cross-reference** with defensive solutions
 - **Tactics X techniques** matrix

What we currently have:

- 47 techniques span across 8 tactics
- Concrete examples of using the framework

THE MATRIX

Initial Access	Persistence	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Protocol Misuse	Defense Evasion	Collection	Impact
Attacks from UE	Infect UE hardware or software	Port scanning or sweeping	Exploit roaming agreements	SS7-based attacks	Security audit camouflage	Admin credentials	Location tracking
SIM-based attacks		Perimeter mapping		Diameter based attacks		User specific identifiers	Call eavesdropping
Attacks from Radio Access network	Infecting SIM cards	Threat intelligence	Abuse interworking functions	GTP-based attacks	Blacklist evasion	User specific data	SMS interception
Attacks from other mobile networks		CN-specific scanning		DNS-based attacks	Middlebox misconfig exploits		Data interception
Attacks with access to transport network	Spoofed radio network	Internal resource search	Exploit platform & service specific vulnerability	Pre-AKA attacks	Bypass firewalls	Network specific identifiers	Billing frauds
Attacks from IP-based networks	Infect network nodes				Bypass homerouting		DoS - network
Insider attacks and human errors	Covert channels	UE knocking			Downgrading	Network specific data	DoS- user
					Redirection		Identity-based attacks
					UE protection evasion		

#1 : ATTACK MOUNTING

Initial Access	Persistence	Discovery
Attacks from UE	Infect UE hardware or software	Port scanning or sweeping
SIM-based attacks		Perimeter mapping
Attacks from Radio Access network	Infecting SIM cards	Threat intelligence
Attacks from other mobile networks	Spoofed radio network	CN-specific scanning
Attacks with access to transport network	Infect network nodes	Internal resource search
Attacks from IP-based networks	Covert channels	UE knocking
Insider attacks and human errors		

Initial access

- SIM-based attacks
 - SIM swapping, cloning, jacking
- Attacks from radio network
 - IMSI catchers

Persistence

- Infecting network nodes, with malware

Discovery

- The usual ones → port scanning, network mapping, threat intel.
- CN-specific scanning

#2 : ATTACK EXECUTION

Lateral Movement	Protocol Misuse	Defense Evasion
Exploit roaming agreements	SS7-based attacks	Security audit camouflage
Abuse interworking functions	Diameter based attacks	Blacklist evasion
Exploit platform & service specific vulnerability	GTP-based attacks	Middlebox misconfig exploits
	DNS-based attacks	Bypass firewalls
	Pre-AKA attacks	Bypass homerouting
		Downgrading
		Redirection
		UE protection evasion

Lateral Movement

- Abuse interworking functionalities
 - 2G \leftrightarrow 3G \leftrightarrow 4G communication
- Exploit “Linux” platform-specific vulnerabilities.

Protocol misuse

- Unauthenticated signaling protocols
- Pre-authentication over radio channels

Defense evasion

- Bypass blacklist, firewall or audits
- Downgrade to legacy systems

#3 : RESULT GATHERING

Collection	Impact
Admin credentials	Location tracking
User specific identifiers	Call eavesdropping
User specific data	SMS interception
Network specific identifiers	Data interception
Network specific data	Billing frauds
	DoS - network
	DoS- user
	Identity-based attacks

Collection


- User-specific
 - Identifiers: e.g. IMSI, IMEI
 - Data: e.g. contents of communication
- Network-specific
 - Identifiers: e.g. IP, Global Titles
 - Data: e.g. Topology, routing data

Impact

- Location tracking
- Call, SMS, Data interception
- Billing frauds
- Signaling DoS and Radio jamming

SIMJACKER

- Large scale espionage campaign on mobile users in multiple countries
- Exploits vulnerable **S@T browser** in UICC cards
- **binary SMS payload** through mobile devices, VAS provider, or SS7
- Mainly used for **location tracking** + **IMEI disclosure**



Source: Adaptive Mobile

<https://simjacker.com/>

MODELING SIMJACKER

Initial Access	Persistence	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Protocol Misuse	Defense Evasion	Collection	Impact
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Insider attacks and human errors		UE knocking			Redirection	Network specific data	DoS- user
					UE protection evasion		Identity-based attacks

WHAT NEXT?

- **To build an “Open” community for more collaboration**
 - As of now, Nokia Bell-Labs, Ericsson, and a few more
 - To make the current proposal more concrete
 - To build knowledge base and tools
- **Call for participation and contribution:**
 - ANYONE WHO IS INTERESTED
 - E.g. mobile network operators, equipment vendors, researchers from industry, academia or governance bodies
 - Comments, critics, feedbacks are most welcome.

SOUNDS INTERESTING?

1. Read the full paper



<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.05110.pdf>

2. Take part in the survey



<https://www.netigate.se/a/s.aspx?s=884150X225761371X45363>

THANKS

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