

MITRE ATT&CK™ Update

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What is ATT&CK?

**A knowledge base of
adversary behavior**

- ***Based on real-world observations***
- ***Free, open, and globally accessible***
- ***A common language***
- ***Community-driven***

What's Next for ATT&CK: “One ATT&CK”

- **Consistency and integration between matrices**
 - Refactor PRE-ATT&CK as part of this

Mobile ATT&CK
Enterprise ATT&CK
PRE-ATT&CK

} It's just
ATT&CK™

October 2019 Update

Release notes available at:

<https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/>

PRE-ATT&CK

Pre-ATT&CK Today

15 Tactics & ~144 Techniques

Priority Definition Planning	Priority Definition Direction	Target Selection	Technical Information Gathering	People Information Gathering	Organizational Information Gathering	Technical Weakness Identification	People Weakness Identification	Organizational Weakness Identification	Adversary Opsec	Establish & Maintain Infrastructure	Persona Development	Build Capabilities	Test Capabilities	Stage Capabilities
13 items	4 items	5 items	20 items	11 items	11 items	9 items	3 items	6 items	22 items	16 items	6 items	11 items	7 items	6 items
Assess current holdings, needs, and wants	Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements	Determine approach/attack vector	Acquire OSINT data sets and information	Acquire OSINT data sets and information	Acquire OSINT data sets and information	Analyze application security posture	Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies	Analyze business processes	Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services	Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services	Build social network persona	Build and configure delivery systems	Review logs and residual traces	Disseminate remote media
Assess KITs/KIQs benefits	Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements	Determine highest level tactical element	Conduct active scanning	Aggregate individual's digital footprint	Conduct social engineering	Analyze architecture and configuration posture	Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations	Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies	Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services	Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services	Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys	Build or acquire exploits	Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores	Distribute malicious software development tools
Assess leadership areas of interest	Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements	Determine operational element	Conduct passive scanning	Conduct social engineering	Determine 3rd party infrastructure services	Analyze data collected	Assess targeting options	Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities	Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates	Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates	Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts	Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information	Test application security analysis performed by app stores	Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest
Assign KITs/KIQs into categories	Task requirements	Determine secondary level tactical element	Conduct social engineering	Identify business relationships	Determine physical locations	Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities		Assess opportunities created by business deals	Common, high volume protocols and software	Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery	Develop social network persona digital footprint	Create custom payloads	Test callback functionality	Hardware or software supply chain implementation
Conduct cost/benefit analysis		Determine strategic target	Determine domain and IP address space	Identify job postings and needs/gaps	Dumpster dive	Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies		Assess security posture of physical locations	Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery	Domain registration hijacking	Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate	Create infected removable media	Test malware in various execution environments	Port redirector
Create implementation plan			Determine external network trust dependencies	Identify people of interest	Identify business relationships	Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries		Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors				Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums	Test malware to evade detection	Upload, install, and configure software/tools
Create strategic plan			Determine firmware version	Identify personnel with an authority/privilege	Identify job postings and needs/gaps	Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs						Identify resources required to build capabilities	Test physical access	
Derive intelligence requirements				Identify sensitive personnel information	Identify supply chains	Research visibility gap of security vendors			Data Hiding	Dynamic DNS		Obtain/re-use	Test signature	

Pre-ATT&CK Changes

- **New tactics**
- **Significant reduction in number of techniques**
- **Aiming to cover the scope of all current techniques that are**
 - a) technical
 - b) visible to some kind of defender
 - c) real

Mobile

Total Refresh

- New techniques
- Updating existing techniques
- New software entries to account for new threat reporting that we've identified,
- External contributions (and always looking for more!)
- Align more closely with Enterprise ATT&CK

Sub-Techniques

What are Sub-Techniques

- **Address differing levels of abstraction**
 - Consider example Execution techniques: **Scripting** vs. **Rundll32**
- **Major change for all ATT&CK users**

Credential Dumping Today

- In the description there **9** ways to perform the action
 - SAM (Security Accounts Manager)
 - Cached Credentials
 - Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets
 - NTDS from Domain Controller
 - Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files
 - Service Principal Names (SPNs)
 - Plaintext Credentials
 - DCSync
 - Proc filesystem (Linux)

- **That's a lot of different behaviors lumped into one technique even though the end result is similar each time**

Credential Dumping With Sub-techniques

Credential Access

Account Manipulation

Bash History

Brute Force

Credential Dumping

Credentials in Files

...

Credential Dumping Sub-Techniques (draft)

SAM (Security Accounts Manager)

Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets

NTDS from Domain Controller

Cached Credentials

Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files


Service Principal Names (SPNs)

Plaintext Credentials

...

How This Affects ATT&CK

- **New techniques** — We added a few new techniques to help us better organize sub-techniques. (Example: “Pre-OS Boot”)
- **Technique-to-sub-technique demotion** — We moved many techniques into sub-techniques. (Example: “Bootkit”)



How This Affects ATT&CK

- **New ID numbering**

- T[technique].[sub-technique].
- For example, [Access Token Manipulation](#) will still be T1134, but “Token Manipulation/Theft” will be T1134.001, “Create Process with Token” T1134.002, etc.

How This Affects ATT&CK

- **Technique decomposition** — Some techniques like [Account Manipulation](#) and [Process Injection](#) had several sub-techniques created from content in their previous definition.
- In other cases the techniques will get decomposed and sub-techniques will be assigned under other applicable techniques.
 - For example, [Local Job Scheduling](#) was decomposed into sub-techniques that fall under “Scheduled Task/Job” and “Scheduled Task/Job (Escalation Possible)”.

How This Affects ATT&CK

- **Technique realignment and deprecation** — The analysis of techniques necessary to do sub-techniques led to some technique realignment between tactics and deprecation of techniques.
 - We pruned back several techniques that didn't fit the core definition of the tactic, like [Hidden Files and Directories](#) not fitting under Persistence,
 - and a small number that needed to be deprecated, like [Hypervisor](#) where we've found no documented use cases beyond proof of concepts.

Benefits

- Top-level techniques will change less frequently
- Coverage assessment
 - understand that there's several ways a technique can be performed.
- Lead to more refined data sources that apply to techniques and sub-techniques on specific platforms.
- Provide a structure for others to add their own local sub-techniques under existing techniques to meet their specific requirements.
- Make it easier to fit the ATT&CK Matrix with techniques on a single slide. (Look, we make a lot of PowerPoints, and we know you do too!)

When is this happening?

- End of 2019
- Update will be in the form of a separate website to give people time to adjust and give us feedback before it becomes the "official" version of ATT&CK (3ish months post release).
- We want feedback from ATT&CK users to make sure we aren't doing this in vain.
 - Please reach out to us at attack@mitre.org (Use a subject line that starts with "Sub-technique feedback" so it's easy to spot.)

How Will This Affect Me?

- **Detections and Tooling**

- review and refine

- Many sub-techniques will map directly to “old” techniques, so in those cases you should only have to update IDs.
 - You will have some level of effort with mapping new techniques and sub-techniques as well as determining how to assign things like detection analytics to those sub-techniques that have been decomposed.

How Will This Affect Me?

■ Mapping Intel

- Significant change and level of effort
- We plan to keep the historical site and STIX objects available as a reference for older intel that is mapped to the prior, pre-sub-technique version of ATT&CK.
- Historic repositories
 - consider how you may want to approach that (e.g. only map new intel to the new ATT&CK version).
- We are working on a tool to help with this but still expect this to be time consuming

Controls

ATT&CK to NIST 800-53

- The task is extremely labor intensive due to the scope (314 ATT&CK techniques by 256 controls)
- Releasing a template mapping at ATT&CKcon 2019
- MITRE will crowd source the mapping so that it can be maintained collaboratively by the people who use it

Template Example

Mapping shows NIST 800-53 controls that protect and/or detect ATT&CK techniques

← NIST CONTROLS →

← ATT&CK →

		AC Access Control			
		AC-1 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY AND PROCEDURES		AC-2 ACCOUNT MANAGE	
Initial Access	Drive-by Compromise	Protect	Detect	NA	
	Exploit Public-Facing Application				
	External Remote Services				
	Hardware Additions				
	Replication Through Removable Media				
	Spearphishing Attachment				
	Spearphishing Link				
	Spearphishing via Service				
	Supply Chain Compromise				
	Trusted Relationship				
	Valid Accounts				

Cloud

Cloud

- First version of techniques going out in October with another big release happening next year.
- Cloud will be part of enterprise and will be represented by new platforms in addition to Windows/macOS/Linux
- We've added three infrastructure as a service (IaaS) platforms:
 - Amazon Web Services (AWS),
 - Microsoft Azure (Azure), and
 - Google Cloud Platform (GCP).

Cloud (continued)

- The Software as a service (SaaS) platform will cover techniques against general cloud-based software platforms.
- Separately from IaaS and SaaS, we've also added two cloud software platforms to cover techniques against those specific platforms:
 - Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) and
 - Office 365
- 36 techniques have been added or updated to cover adversary behavior against cloud-based platforms.

ATT&CK Sightings

- **Sighting:** A detection of a specific adversary behavior as defined within ATT&CK
 - **Example:** On 6/12/19, T1193 (Spearphishing Attachment) was detected in the US Financial Sector

- **Empower the community with real, anonymized data about adversary behavior from many sources**
 - To enable analysis of what adversaries are doing:
 - What techniques are being detected in the wild?
 - Are there differences in detections across different sectors?
 - How do behaviors change over time?



Cyber Analytics Repository

Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR) Relaunch

- Knowledge base of analytics developed by MITRE *based on* ATT&CK
- Relaunch goal was to address barriers
 - Make it easy to contribute and use
- Other updates
 - Additions to process data model
 - New analytics
 - Native Splunk queries



ATT&CKcon 2.0

ATT&CKcon 2.0 October 29-30



Entire conference will be live-streamed!

Register at: <https://www.mitre.org/attackcon-streamed-live>

“Getting Started with ATT&CK™”

New eBook available at:

<https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/mitr-e-getting-started-with-attack-october-2019.pdf>

ATT&CK

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