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Singapore | 22-24 July | Marina Bay Sands

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
Threat Forecasting (Leveraging Big Data for Predictive Analysis)

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CHANGE

Challenge today's security thinking



Agenda


- ◆ Identifying The Problem
- ◆ Threat Forecasting
- ◆ Threat Intelligence Feeds
- ◆ Community Sharing
- ◆ Connecting The Dots



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Identifying The Problem



Identifying The Problem

- ◆ Reviewing only historical threat reporting
 - ◆ Discusses what happened in the past
 - ◆ May have predictions about expected trends however these are expectations
 - ◆ A snapshot in time, not what is happening right now
- ◆ This doesn't mean to NOT look at these reports as they contain valuable trend data
 - ◆ Verizon DBIR (highly quoted)
 - ◆ Many vendors also produce reports (examples include Cisco, Mandiant)



Identifying The Problem

◆ Security product limitations / effectiveness

	All Programs	Anti-Virus	Network Firewall	Web App Firewall	Network IPS	IPSec VPN	SSL VPN	Custom Testing
Percentage of products that attain certification in the first cycle of testing	4%	27%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Percentage of products that eventually attain certification	82%	92%	86%	100%	29%	90%	91%	87%
Number of testing cycles typically required before products attain certification	Typically 2-4 cycles							

96% of product fail their first time to meet all testing requirements

Certification Testing Passing Rate

Source – ICSA Labs Product Assurance Report



Identifying The Problem

- ◆ Security product limitations / effectiveness

	All Programs	Anti-Virus	Network Firewall	Web App Firewall	Network IPS	IPSec VPN	SSL VPN	Custom Testing
Percentage of products that exhibit violations during post-certification testing	36%	30%	18%	50%	93%	24%	27%	11%
Percentage of products that lose certification	13%	13%	3%	20%	43%	6%	9%	0%

Over 60% of products fail to meet all testing requirements when retested

Results For Post-Certification Testing


Source – ICSA Labs Product Assurance Report



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Threat Forecasting



Threat Forecasting

- ◆ Apply real-world threat intelligence with data collected within your organization to identify patterns or trends “in-the-wild” that may impact your organization
- ◆ How does it work?
 - ◆ Identify knowledge elements within your data and collect for tracking / reporting
 - ◆ Subscribe to threat intelligence feeds to get a holistic view of the greater threat landscape
 - ◆ Combine all datasets together and use identified trends to determine high risk elements and provide protection to needed areas prior to attack / breach



Threat Forecasting

Threat Forecasting

- ◆ Leverages your data for better accuracy to your organization
- ◆ Leverages third party intelligence to provide a holistic view of the entire threat landscape
- ◆ Shows what is happening today in the real-world (even within your industry vertical)
- ◆ Can help you improve your security posture prior to an attack or a data breach

Historical Threat Reporting

- ◆ Overview of what happened within the period of time the report covers
- ◆ Sometimes provides predictions based on the upcoming year based on previous year trends
- ◆ Static report generated on a fixed schedule (usually once a year)
- ◆ No ongoing updates about how your organization maps to the threats occurring “in-the-wild”

Threat Forecasting

Knowledge Elements

◆ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

- ◆ IP address
- ◆ URL (potentially FQDN + path)
- ◆ MD5 Hash of a file
- ◆ File
- ◆ Win Registry Key
- ◆ Win Driver

◆ Indicators of Interest (IOIs)


- ◆ HTTP session
- ◆ DNS Query
- ◆ X509 Certificate
- ◆ User account
- ◆ Country of operation
- ◆ Packet capture



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Threat Intelligence Feeds



Threat Intelligence Feeds

- ◆ Community Driven and Commercial Offerings Available
- ◆ Most use industry accepted content formats
 - ◆ Data driven frameworks in XML, JSON, etc.
- ◆ Items to consider when choosing intelligence feeds
 - ◆ Update Frequency
 - ◆ Source of feed is within industry vertical
 - ◆ Quality of the intelligence feed
 - ◆ Popularity within the Information Security community
 - ◆ Ease of integration into tools already in use by IT / Ops Team




Threat Intelligence Feeds

The Open Indicators Of Compromise Framework (OpenIOC)

- ◆ Open source framework developed by Mandiant (now FireEye)
- ◆ Started as internal project to help Mandiant rapidly search through security intelligence
- ◆ Goals of framework were to express
 - ◆ Components of an attack
 - ◆ Attack methodology
 - ◆ Evidence of a compromise
- ◆ Built as an extensible XML schema
- ◆ To provide a way to share/digest threat intelligence as quickly as possible.
- ◆ Easily machine-digestible for faster dissemination into the community.
- ◆ Resources
 - ◆ OpenIOC Framework – <http://www.openioc.org>



Threat Intelligence Feeds



OpenIOC - Create and Refine IOCs

Source – White Paper: An Introduction to OpenIOC, OpenIOC Framework (Mandiant, Inc.)

Threat Intelligence Feeds

Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII)



- ◆ Initially launched in 2013
- ◆ Current Specifications v1.1
- ◆ XML structured framework
- ◆ Designed to run over HTTP (HTTPS)
- ◆ Design to deliver threat intelligence
 - ◆ Leveraged by other threat intelligence feeds and included within TAXII as a “payload”

◆ Resources

- ◆ TAXII website – <https://taxii.mitre.org>
- ◆ TAXII Community – <http://taxii.mitre.org/community/>
- ◆ TAXII GitHub Repository – <http://taxiiproject.github.io>



Threat Intelligence Feeds

Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX)



- ◆ Initially launched in 2012
- ◆ Current Specifications v1.1.1
- ◆ XML structured framework
- ◆ Leverages TAXII for delivery
- ◆ Founded with six guiding principles
 - ◆ Provide coverage across the entire cyber security domain
 - ◆ Integrate, either directly or loosely, with other threat intelligence expression languages
 - ◆ Provide as much flexibility as possible in reporting knowledge elements
 - ◆ Supporting automation through maximizing structure and consistency
 - ◆ Needs to be human-readable as well



Threat Intelligence Feeds

Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX)



- ◆ Other threat intelligence expression languages supported
 - ◆ Cyber Observable eXpression (CybOX)
 - ◆ Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
 - ◆ Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC)
- ◆ Resources
 - ◆ STIX website – <http://stix.mitre.org>
 - ◆ STIX Community – <http://stix.mitre.org/community/>
 - ◆ STIX GitHub Repository – <https://github.com/STIXProject/>



Threat Intelligence Feeds

Cyber Observable eXpression (CybOX)

- ◆ Observable set of characteristics that express the observation of an event
- ◆ Initially launched in 2011
- ◆ Current Specifications v2.1
- ◆ XML structured framework
 - ◆ Includes pre-defined object representations
- ◆ Leveraged by STIX for cyber indicators



- ◆ Resources
 - ◆ CybOX website – <http://cybox.mitre.org>
 - ◆ CybOX Community – <http://cybox.mitre.org/community/>
 - ◆ CybOX GitHub Repository – <https://github.com/CybOXProject/>



Threat Intelligence Feeds


- ◆ Commercial Offerings
 - ◆ Different types available today
 - ◆ Before choosing a commercial offering, ask yourself
 - ◆ Is industry specific threat intelligence important?
 - ◆ What is provided within the commercial offering? Will it be easy to automate processing of?
 - ◆ Do you want an end-to-end solution that may not integrate with other solutions easily?
 - ◆ This may be the right choice for your organization depending on the size of your team



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
Community Sharing



Community Sharing

Typical Sharing Model

- ◆ Producers
 - ◆ Generate knowledge elements
 - ◆ Publish them onto the threat intelligence feed
- ◆ Consumers
 - ◆ Subscribe to the threat intelligence feed
 - ◆ Consume new knowledge elements as they are published



**Community members need to be both
for Community Sharing to be successful**

Community Sharing



- ◆ Disadvantages (Misconceptions)
 - ◆ Exposing attack data to potential threat actors
 - ◆ Someone with nefarious goals may be subscribed and now has access to data they didn't have before
 - ◆ Needing to sanitize data to protect yourself
 - ◆ Don't want to publish data about enterprise network infrastructure or application versioning
 - ◆ Time to publish new content to the community
 - ◆ Need to delay publishing the content until I have resolved all of my issues so I don't get re-hacked

Community Sharing

- ◆ Advantages
 - ◆ Sharing data means getting data
 - ◆ Some community driven feeds require participation to receive content
 - ◆ Expanding your knowledge base to include a larger dataset
 - ◆ Telemetry data outside your immediate dataset will help improve your overall threat modeling
 - ◆ Assisting others within your same industry vertical
 - ◆ Threat actors can (and sometimes do) stay within the same industry vertical
 - ◆ Learn about an attack before it reaches you!




Knowledge is power!

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Connecting The Dots...



Connecting The Dots...

Use Case: Anthem BC/BS Data Breach (2014)



- ◆ Insurance company that serves over forty million customers
 - ◆ 1 in 9 Americans according to Anthem's website
- ◆ Discovered breach January 29, 2014
 - ◆ Breach believed to have started weeks prior
- ◆ Expected costs over their \$100M insurance Policy
- ◆ Data accessed / stolen included:
 - ◆ Names
 - ◆ Dates of birth
 - ◆ Social Security numbers
 - ◆ Health care ID numbers
 - ◆ Home addresses
 - ◆ Email addresses
 - ◆ Work information like income data



Connecting The Dots...

Use Case: Anthem BC/BS Data Breach (2014)

- ◆ National Healthcare Information Sharing and Analysis Center (NH-ISAC)
 - ◆ Anthem, along with other major healthcare organizations, are members
 - ◆ Built the National Health Cybersecurity Intelligence System
 - ◆ Provides automated access, via STIX AND TAXII, to security intelligence and alert advisories




NH-ISAC

- ◆ Using community sharing, NH-ISAC was able to determine within 60 minutes the impact to its remaining members
- ◆ NH-ISAC also provided the IOCs to other ISACs within other verticals to measure larger cross-industry impact



Connecting The Dots...

- ◆ Leverage existing tools within your organization



Splice App for Splunk

Apply What You Learned Today

- ◆ Next week
 - ◆ Identify weaknesses in your organization's security practices
 - ◆ Research included threat intelligence feeds or check within your organization's vertical
 - ◆ Look at internal software tools used today (i.e., SIEM) and see if any will incorporate threat intelligence feeds
- ◆ Within the next four weeks
 - ◆ Begin working with your own data to make it sharable knowledge elements
 - ◆ Incorporate at least one community driven threat intelligence feed into your threat modeling
- ◆ Over the next three months
 - ◆ Begin to contribute knowledge elements into the threat intelligence community
 - ◆ Build threat modeling for your organization off of proactive data driven by big data analysis

Begin Threat Forecasting!

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Thank You!



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 #RSAC

