

# RSA<sup>®</sup>Conference2016

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## Understanding The “Why” In Enterprise Application Security Strategy



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# SAP Security – The New Reality



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13 MAY 2015 NEWS

**Report: Chinese Breach of USIS Started with SAP**

# SAP Security – The New Reality

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## The Escalation of SAP Security Breaches

2012



Anonymous claimed breach to Greek Ministry of Finance using SAP zero-day exploit.

2013



A malware targeting SAP systems discovered in the wild – A "Tsunami of SAP Attacks Coming?"

2014



A Chinese hacker exploited a vulnerability in a corporate SAP NetWeaver Portal.

May 2015



Report: A Chinese Breach of USIS targeted SAP. Went unnoticed for over six months and compromised over 48,000 employee records of DHS and OPM.

# 2012

## Evolution of SAP Security Breaches

May 2015



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May 2015



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
# Risk of SAP Insecurity



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- Risk = Loss ( Threat + Vulnerability)
  - Sensitive Information
    - Tangible Assets – Tech IP, Customer/Vendor Data, Financial Records, Personnel Records ( PII )
  - Loss is significant
    - 74% of world's financial transactions touch and SAP System
    - 86% of global fortune 500 run SAP software
    - SAP serves > 263,000 customers in 190 countries
    - “The impact of an SAP breach is serious to catastrophic in 92% of organizations” – Ponemon Institute
    - Average cost of breach involving SAP systems is \$4.5 Million Dollars

We identify SAP in the scope of our “crown jewels”




# Changes in SAP Environment




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SAP Security Notes by Year



SAP Security Talks





- SAP Security Team
  - Operations and Infrastructure ERP teams
  - Reactive/Tactical service oriented
  - Success defined by audit and compliance
  - Other risks were out of scope
- Information Security Team
  - Vulnerability Management/Malware Defense
  - Cyber Defense/Incident Response
  - Weak in SAP Knowledge
- Both groups identified the other as responsible making it difficult to pursue an SAP Security Strategy





# Are our SAP Systems Secure?



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## ■ Common Responses

- Patch Management/ System Recommendations
- Configuration Management/Configuration Validation
- Early Watch/ SOSS
- Service Market Place/SAP Security Guides
- RAL/UCON

## ■ End State

- SAP Security Team Solely Responsible
- The unknown?



## **Transition to Information Security**





# Speaking a common language

SAP Critical Controls	SANS Top 20
Reduce Attack Surface	3 - Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Servers
Gateway Security	10 - Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewall, Routers, and Switches
Protect Default Users	12- Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
Secure RFC Management	11 - Limitation and Control of Network Services
Secure Communications	3 - Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Servers
Password Management / SSO	16 - Account Monitoring and Control
Maintain Security Logs	18 - Incident Response and Mgmt
Patch Management / SDLC	14 - Maintenance, Monitoring and Analysis of Audit Logs
System Configurations	6 - Application Software Security
Access Management	3 - Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Servers
Secure Code	15 - Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know
Data Classification	6 - Application Software Security
Critical Access	1 - Device Inventory
	2 - Application / Software Inventory
	12- Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges

# SAP Security Framework



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## Vulnerability Management

- Secure communications
- Attack surface
- Gateway
- Default users
- Secure RFCs
- Password Management
- Security Logs
- Configuration
- Patch Management
- System Configuration

## Crown Jewels

- Identification
- Inventory
- Data/Asset Classification

## Application Security

- Code reviews
- Architecture

## GRC Access Control

- Administrative Privilege
- System administration
- Transport management
- SODs/Fraud Protection


## Control Enhancements Solution Development Architecture

- Network segmentation

## Investigate Issues

## Resolve Problems

## Incident Response



## Role Design

- Production
- Non-production

## GRC Access Control / IDM

- Automated workflows w/ integrated risk checks

## Governance

- Access attestation
- Role recertification
- Critical access reviews

## Control implementation

- Password management
- Default accounts
- Secure comms (SNC, https)
- Gateway security
- RFC security (UCON)
- Configuration standards
- Logging activities

## Configuration validation

- Password management
- Default accounts
- Attack surface
- Gateway
- Configuration

## Log monitoring

- Network
- System
- Table
- Document
- Security

## Onapsis D&R

## **SAP VM Program Overview**



# SAP VM Program



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- POC in 2014 established context
- Leadership support based on business driver of differential protection of critical assets
- Founded program in February of 2015
- Core team members from SAP Security, Basis, and Information Security
- Meet on regular schedule to identify, prioritize, and remediate risk
- Communicate to management on monthly basis
- Founded on external intelligence by partnering with 3<sup>rd</sup> Party SAP Security Research and Vulnerability Management Company
  - Holistic, Complete, Scalable Intelligence



# SAP VM Program Impacts




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## ■ Operational Impacts

- Identification of previously unrecognized risk
- > 60% Reduction in 12 months

## ■ Strategic Impacts



- Holistically, completely, and accurately define **risk** posture
- **Risk** visualization and analysis can be used to communicate up, down, and across the organization
- Leadership interest and support put risk into business context





# Strategy of “Why”

- **“Why” people buy -**
  - The Four Horsemen:  
Amazon/Apple/Facebook & Google-  
-Who Wins/Loses
    - Scott Galloway – Clinical  
Professor of Marketing, NYU  
Stern
- **Start with “Why” – Simon Sinek**
  - Provide a platform for success and  
drive purpose





- Mitigation and reductions via SAP Vulnerability Management Program
  - Configuration Management
- Configuration Validation
  - 2 Target Systems
    - ZSEC - Alerting
    - ZSECGOLD – Gold client
- Patch Management
- System Recommendations
  - Used in combination with ConfVal for new system implementations
- New Standards for new system implementations
  - UCON, RAL, Network Segmentation



# Detection and Response



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- Configuration Validation
- Log Monitoring/Alerting
- Splunk
  - SAP Audit Logs
  - SAP ICM logs
  - SAP Gateway Logs
  - Enterprise Firewall Logs
- IDS Signatures
- SAP RAL
  - Read Access Logging
- Expanded partnership with 3<sup>rd</sup> party to provide scale

Splunk search results for 'Inbound SAP Network Firewall'. The table shows network traffic logs with columns for src, Source Hostname, service, dst, Destination Hostname, and count.

src	Source Hostname	service	dst	Destination Hostname	count
10 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	44336	10 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	242518
168.133 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	111	10 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	99697
		875			
10 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	3351	10 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	19458
10 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	3351	10 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	19455
168.133 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	13782	10 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	3350
		10			
168.133 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	3351	10 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	2648
		10			
		10			
		10			
168.133 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	1556	10 [redacted]	[redacted] hersheys.com	2596

Splunk search results for 'SAP Security GW denied'. The table shows denied events with columns for action, host, USER, USER\_HOST, TP, and log\_type.

action	host	USER	USER_HOST	TP	log_type
denied	localhost (127.0.0.1)		01 hersheys.com (10[redacted])	saplog	secinfo
denied	localhost (127.0.0.1)		01 hersheys.com (10[redacted])	rfexec	secinfo
denied server				onaps-reg	reginfo
denied client				IGS TRIP	reginfo
denied	localhost (127.0.0.1)		01 hersheys.com (10[redacted])	saptp	secinfo
denied	localhost (127.0.0.1)		01 hersheys.com (10[redacted])	saptp	secinfo
denied	localhost (127.0.0.1)		01 hersheys.com (10[redacted])	saplog	secinfo
denied	localhost (127.0.0.1)		01 hersheys.com (10[redacted])	rfexec	secinfo
denied	localhost (127.0.0.1)		01 hersheys.com (10[redacted])	saptp	secinfo

# “Apply” Slide



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- Identify your business critical applications and who is responsible for system security
- Bridge the gap between SAP Security and Information Security teams
- Review the maturity and efficiency of your SAP Control Framework and build/redesign your SAP control framework based on risk
- Don't attempt to scale to fix all issues but instead work to influence others around you but showing progress towards realistic goals
- Transfer the risk by deploying a holistic and complete assessment and communication capability



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