

# RSA<sup>®</sup>Conference2016

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## Automation and Virtualization Simplify Life: Can They Simplify Security?



#RSAC



Connect **to**  
Protect

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Vmware  
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**What can we do today?**






- Policy - What do I allow or don't allow?
- Triggers - Event, activity, baseline differentials, etc.
- Actions - Block, log, accept, etc..
- Timer - How long should the change last?
- Reset - What is post incident normal?

- Policy - No SSH within the Data center
- Triggers - SSH process started on a server
- Actions - Block traffic via firewall
- Timer - Check for alerts in near real time
- Reset - 5 minutes before firewall rule is removed

# Demo



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
**And now some history**



# Background on Virtualization



Server



Virtual datacenter




Virtual private  
cloud

# Laydown the Network



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




# Add Compute



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# Now For The Complex Part




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# Mixing of Workloads



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



- Deploy from gold image
- PowerShell
- Scripts
- Puppet Chef
- Package deployments

# Security and Virtualizing



- Gen 1 virtual security
  - Virtual appliances – Functional, but limited
- Agentless AV
- Most enforcement still outside the virtual environment






**“We cannot solve our problems  
with the same way of thinking that created  
them.”**

- Albert Einstein

# Modern Attack: Targeted, Interactive, Stealthy



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# Modern Attack: Targeted, Interactive, Stealthy



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## Intrusion

Attack Vector / Malware

Delivery Mechanism

Entry Point Compromise

## Stop Infiltration

**80% of the investment is focused  
on preventing intrusion**


*The attack surface is simply too  
wide*



# Modern Attack: Targeted, Interactive, Stealthy



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**Stop Exfiltration**


**20% of the investment is focused on  
addressing propagation, extraction and exfiltration.**

*Organizations lack the visibility and control inside their data center*

# Modern Attack: Targeted, Interactive, Stealthy



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## Stop Exfiltration


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# Modern Attack: Targeted, Interactive, Stealthy



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**Stop Exfiltration**

**20% of the investment is focused on  
addressing propagation, extraction and exfiltration.**

*Organizations lack the visibility and control inside their data center*

## Security Infrastructure

### IDENTITY CONTROLS

Advanced Authentication, SSO, Authorization, User Provisioning

### APP/DATABASE CONTROLS

Vulnerability Management, Storage Security, Web Services Security, Secure OS

### GOVERNANCE/COMPLIANCE

Vul Management, Log Management, GRC, Posture Management, DLP

### SECURITY SERVICES MANAGEMENT

Visibility, Provisioning, and Orchestration

### SOC

SIEM, Security Analytics, Forensics

### COMPUTE

AV, HIPS, AMP, Encryption, Exec/Device Control

### NETWORK

FW, IDS/IPS, NGFW, WAF, AMP, UTM, DDoS

### STORAGE

Encryption, Key Management, Tokenization

# Impact of Architecture



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Distributed  
application  
architectures



Comingled on a  
common  
infrastructure



**Massive  
misalignment**

- 
1. Hyper-connected compute base
  2. Distributed policy problem

**How do we fix this?**



# Security and Virtualizing Gen 2



- Virtualization security is a reality
- NextGen Firewalls and IPS systems are integrating into the fabric
- Endpoint and network monitoring leverage virtualization

# Automating and Security



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- New levels of information and visibility
- RestAPI is common
- Why not leverage this?





# Leveraging Virtualization



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1



2



3



## Traditional Data Center

Static service chain



## Virtualized Data Center

Dynamic service chain

# Design and Leverage



- Enhanced security and service insertions
- Automatic remediation & automatic response
- Network isolation on demand
  - DMZ anywhere



# Adaptable Security Response



- All this based on changing meta data of your systems....
- What it was is not what it is today...
- Adaptable security for an ever adapting world






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# The Automation Security Workflow



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# Automation Risk Reduction



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- How long does it take to respond?
- What is the size of team?
- Can you reduce remediation time and time to investigate ?



# How to get started



- Things to consider?
  - Is your organization ready for this?
  - What is your hypervisor?
  - How much are your virtualized?
  - Is IT silo or integrated
  - What is your automation platform, if you have one?
  - Are there low hanging fruit we can attack with this?

# Apply What You Have Learned Today



- Next Step:
  - Talk to your virtualization team and find out what you have deployed
- Build a plan:
  - Understand the integration points with your security products and your hypervisor
  - Define remediation workflows (PTATR)
- Put it into action:
  - Deploy a initial security remediation workflow to help with non-business critical systems security alerts
  - Increase integration points and develop playbooks for security remediation automation



# Why Not Now



- Stateless built fashion
  - Wipe at random (just in case) – temporary systems
  - Containers and read only systems
  - Why write?
- Change control paradigm change
  - Auto updates/changes based on automation....



- Automate based on dynamic variables
  - Encryption on the fly
  - Enhanced trusted context from the endpoint
  - Look at app memory via hypervisor
  - Honeypot on demand
  - Integrate into development



## Q&A

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