

# RSA<sup>®</sup>Conference2015

San Francisco | April 20-24 | Moscone Center

SESSION ID: MBS-T09

## Mobile Vulnerabilities From Data Breach to Complete Shutdown

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
# CHANGE

Challenge today's security thinking





# Mobile Security Landscape





1. Physical Security




## 2. Network Security



Malicious  
WiFi



3G/4G/LTE

Captive  
Portals



# 3. Malware Security








# Previous Disclosures by Skycure

- ◆ iOS Malicious Profiles
- ◆ Invisible Malicious Profiles
- ◆ WiFiGate
- ◆ HTTP Request Hijacking
- ◆ LinkedInOut



# This Year's Focus





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
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## Vulnerabilities



# SSL Stack

- ◆ Previous examples
  - ◆ goto fail;
  - ◆ Heartbleed
  - ◆ SSL decryption issues



# Example 1: GoToFail


```
static OSStatus
SSLVerifySignedServerKeyExchange(SSLContext *ctx, bool isRsa, SSLBuffer signedParams,
                                uint8_t *signature, UInt16 signatureLen) {
    ...
    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &clientRandom)) != 0)
        goto fail;
    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0)
        goto fail;
    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)
        goto fail;
    goto fail;
    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
        goto fail;
    err = sslRawVerify(ctx,
                      ctx->peerPubKey,
                      dataToSign,
                      dataToSignLen,
                      signature,
                      signatureLen);
    /* plaintext */
    /* plaintext length */
    ...
fail:
    SSLFreeBuffer(&signedHashes);
    SSLFreeBuffer(&hashCtx);
    return err;
}
```

Always goto  
“fail”, even if  
err==0

Code is skipped  
(even though err == 0)

Function returns 0 (i.e. verified),  
even though sslRawVerify was  
not called

Source: Apple’s published source code



## Example 2: SSL Decryption



**92% of users click on “Continue”  
compromising their Exchange  
identity**

(username and password)

**Cannot Verify Server Identity**  
Personal cannot verify the identity of  
“google.com”. Would you like to  
continue anyway?

Cancel

Details


Continue




# CVEs - The Numbers

## iOS CVE Stats


Vulnerabilities By Year



Vulnerabilities By Type




Source: cvedetails.com



# How to Identify These Bugs

Demo





# Actual Vulnerability Numbers are Higher

- ◆ **Awareness**


- ◆ What seems to be about quality might be about security

- ◆ **Motivation**

- ◆ Black market

- ◆ **Finding a bug in a haystack**

- ◆ 2014 reminded us that bugs can lie undetected for **A LOT** of years



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
## SSL Bugs



# Implications

- ◆ Data decryption
- ◆ Data leakage
- ◆ Remote control
- ◆ Denial of service


**What if the core functions were susceptible to such vulnerabilities?**



# SSL Certificate Parsing Bug

- ◆ Remote application crash (Movie)
- ◆ Technical Details


This issue is being  
Investigated by Apple



# What If You Never Connect to a WiFi?

- ◆ Are you safe?
  - ◆ NO
- ◆ The bug can be combined with WiFiGate
- ◆ 3G/LTE attacks can also be used

```
adish — vim — 56x21
<string>com.vodafone.uk.wifi.wifi</string>
<key>PayloadOrganization</key>
<string></string>
<key>PayloadType</key>
<string>com.apple.wifi.managed</string>
<key>PayloadUUID</key>
<string>CF33ED1E-AE96-4D49-BED5-B1A79A781D61</string>
<key>PayloadVersion</key>
<integer>1</integer>
<key>SSID_STR</key>
<string>1WifiVodafone1x</string>
</dict>
</array>
<key>PayloadDescription</key>
<string>Profile description.</string>
<key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
<string>Vodafone UK Wi-Fi</string>
<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
<string>com.vodafone.uk.wifi</string>
<key>PayloadOrganization</key>
```







# The iOS-Shield

- ◆ A nearby attacker (or dedicated hardware) can force the bug via a network interface.

**Attacker's device**




**Victim's device rendered useless**





## What's The Fix?


Pending Apple's patch release




# So Far...

- ◆ We have covered
  - ◆ Inception
  - ◆ Detection
  - ◆ Research
  - ◆ Vendor patch

**Does the vulnerability story end here?**



# What About?





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

## Vulnerability Lifecycle



# Vulnerability Lifecycle



# Vulnerability Lifecycle – Mobile






You can rest now ...  
After 18 months of exposure

# Summary


- ◆ Mobile security is here to stay
  - ◆ Physical
  - ◆ Network
  - ◆ Malware
  - ◆ Vulnerabilities
- ◆ System and app level vulnerabilities are on the rise
- ◆ OS vendors should employ a multi-platforms oriented vulnerability patching process
- ◆ The importance of enterprise mobile defense increases



# Apply What You Have Learned

## Researchers Perspective


- ◆ Any bug has the potential to transform into a security issue
  - ◆ Be persistent!
- ◆ Utilize the public tools offered by the industry to boost your efforts
  - ◆ Don't reinvent the wheel
- ◆ Follow responsible disclosure guidelines
  - ◆ It is the key for a better functioning world



# Apply What You Have Learned

## Security/Remediation Perspective

- ◆ Personal level
  - ◆ Maintain an up to date operating-system
  - ◆ Update the apps that you are using
  - ◆ Be alerted and aware of evolving threats
    - ◆ Network layer
    - ◆ Third-party app stores
    - ◆ OS misconfigurations and vulnerabilities
- ◆ Organizational level
  - ◆ (Same as above) ^ 2
  - ◆ Deploy a mobile threat defense solution for visibility and protection



# Next Steps



[contact@skycure.com](mailto:contact@skycure.com)



<https://www.skycure.com>



<https://blog.skycure.com>



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