# RSAConference2020

San Francisco | February 24 – 28 | Moscone Center



SESSION ID: CSV-R01

# Clearing the Clouds: Incident Response in AWS (Isn't as Bad as You Thought)



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### **Disclaimer**

- The views, opinions, and material presented by Kristy Westphal at this conference are solely based on her experience and opinions related to incident response.
- The content of this presentation does not reflect the views or opinions of MUFG Union Bank.

## Agenda

- Why am I Here?
- AWS Architecture 101
- Incident Response Use Cases
- Acquiring Amazon Web Services (AWS) Skills
- 90 Day Plan for AWS Incident Response

## Why am I here?

- Information security leader specializing in security assessments, operational risk, and program development
- Security is painful all around; hopefully I can help
- Let's share knowledge and make it less painful for all of us!
- Props to Pete Ehlke for helping make this preso really come to life



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# Why AWS incident response is important...



### What this session is...and isn't...

- Think about cloud incident response differently
  - But not as the impossible mountain to climb
- Yes, this is only Amazon Web Services
  - But the approach can be applied to other providers
- We won't be doing in-depth AWS training
  - But you will have resources to do this yourself

### **Poll the Audience**

- CSV-R01
- Are you doing security incident response in AWS now?
- A. Yes
- B. No
- c. I Don't Know

https://rsa1-

<u>live.eventbase.com/polls?event=rsa2020&session=1454108104</u>

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### A Peek Into AWS Architecture

### Pizza as a Service

Traditional **On-Premises** (Legacy) **Dining Table** Drinks Electric / Gas Oven Fire Pizza Dough **Tomato Sauce** Toppings Cheese Made at Home Infrastructure as a service (laaS) Dining Table Drinks Electric / Gas Oven Fire Pizza Dough **Tomato Sauce Toppings** Cheese

Platform as a service (Paas) **Dining Table** Drinks Electric / Gas Oven Fire Pizza Dough Tomato Sauce Toppings Cheese

Software as a service (Saas) **Dining Table** Drinks Electric / Gas Oven Fire Pizza Dough **Tomato Sauce** Toppings Cheese

\*Thank you Albert Barron for this example.

Take and Bake


Pizza Delivery

**Dining Out** 


You Manage

Vendor Manages

### Pizza as a Service



### In reality....



## The five pillars of the AWS framework

- Operational Excellence
- Security
- Reliability
- Performance Efficiency
- Cost Optimization

https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/architecture/AWS Well-Architected Framework.pdf?did=wp\_card&trk=wp\_card

aws

Services A Resource Groups v



#### History

Console Home

Group

A-Z



EC2

Lightsail 🗷

**ECR** 

ECS

EKS

Lambda

Storage

S3 Glacier

AWS Backup

Storage Gateway

S3

**EFS** 

FSx

Batch

Elastic Beanstalk

Serverless Application Repository



AWS IQ 🗷

Support

Managed Services



Amazon Managed Blockchain



#### Satellite

Ground Station



Athena

**EMR** 

CloudSearch

Elasticsearch Service

Kinesis

QuickSight ☑\*

Data Pipeline

AWS Data Exchange

AWS Glue

AWS Lake Formation

MSK



#### **Business Applications**

Alexa for Business

Amazon Chime Г₹

WorkMail



#### **End User Computing**

WorkSpaces

AppStream 2.0

WorkDocs

WorkLink

#### Internet Of Things

IoT Core

Amazon FreeRTOS

IoT 1-Click

IoT Analytics

IoT Device Defender

IoT Device Management

IoT Events

IoT Greengrass

IoT SiteWise

IoT Things Graph



Database

RDS

DynamoDB

ElastiCache

Neptune

Amazon Redshift

Amazon QLDB

Amazon DocumentDB



Management & Governance

AWS Organizations

CloudWatch

AWS Auto Scaling

CloudFormation

CloudTrail

Config

OpsWorks

Service Catalog

Systems Manager

Trusted Advisor

Control Tower

AWS License Manager

AWS Well-Architected Tool

Personal Health Dashboard <a>C</a>



#### Security, Identity, & Compliance

IAM

Resource Access Manager

Cognito

Secrets Manager

GuardDuty

Inspector

Amazon Macie <a>C</a>

AWS Single Sign-On

Certificate Manager

Key Management Service

CloudHSM

Directory Service

WAF & Shield

Artifact



**Game Development** 

Amazon GameLift

### Where to focus IR efforts?

- Host
- IAM (a.k.a. role-based access)
- Data storage (e.g., S3)
- Persistence (e.g., when odd things change)
  - S3 bucket permissions
  - Security groups
  - Network gateways
  - EC2 instance ownership
  - Authorization failures



# **Breaking it down**

Bad guy

Leverages

EC2

CloudWatch

IAM

S3

CloudTrail

### Poll the Audience

- CSV-R01
- What of the following do you see as roadblock to AWS Incident Response?
- A. Not enough authority
- B. Knowledge of landscape
- c. Lack of skills

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<u>live.eventbase.com/polls?event=rsa2020&session=1454108104</u>


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# **AWS Incident Response Use Cases**

## Use Case 1: What really happened at Capital One?

- An old vulnerability called Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
  - On the Web Application Firewall (WAF) ModSecurity
- The WAF was misconfigured
  - Able to make a metadata service request
  - Which is how the attacker gained access to credentials
  - Credentials had access to whatever resource requested them
  - WAF assigned too much privilege
  - Could list information contained within S3 storage buckets
- AWS has since added additional authentication to the service

### A visual



# Why should you care?

- Cloud misconfigurations can have greater impact if exploited
  - Versus on premises misconfigurations
- A bad actor much more likely to access if internet-facing

### Use Case 2: Oh no, not more!

- Ever heard of Code Spaces?
  - Maybe not since it's been dead since 2014
  - It was a site that hosted source code repositories and offered project management services
  - Mostly hosted on AWS
- An attacker gained access to their AWS console
  - Held it for ransom
  - When no payment, started deleting...everything
  - Elastic Block Storage (EBS) Snapshots, S3 data, some server instances


## All eggs in one basket

- All the data that was deleted included backups
- Effectively put Code Spaces out of business



## So how do I respond to that?

- Follow the breadcrumbs
  - Read the logs (Cloud Trail, Cloud Watch)
  - Understand the flow
  - Understand what your scope of response is
    - An internal shared responsibility model?
  - Understand how things are configured
    - And did they behave as expected?



← AWS CLI Commai



### **Table Of Contents**

#### aws

- Description
- Synopsis
- Options
- Available Services
- See Also

### Quick search



### Feedback

Did you find this page useful? Do you have a suggestion? Give us feedback or send us a pull request on GitHub.

### User Guide

### aws

### **Description**

The AWS Command Line Interface is a unified tool to manage your AWS

### **Synopsis**

aws [options] <command> <subcommand> [parameters]

Use *aws command help* for information on a specific command. Use *aws* available help topics. The synopsis for each command shows its parameters are shown in square brackets.

### **Options**

--debug (boolean)

Turn on debug logging.

### **Available Services**





- acm-pca
- alexaforbusiness
- amplify
- apigateway
- apigatewaymanagementapi
- apigatewayv2
- appconfig
- application-autoscaling
- application-insights
- appmesh
- appstream
- appsync
- athena
- autoscaling
- · autoscaling-plans
- backup
- batch
- budgets
- ce
- chime
- cloud9
- clouddirectory
- cloudformation
- cloudfront

## **Command line interface tips**

- You'll have to install the environment
  - Looks like DOS! (seriously!)
- Run aws-configure
  - Consider debug to get all the interactive detail
  - Do you have a proxy? May need to pass through/tunnel.
  - If you do tunnel, may need to import certs
    - set REQUESTS\_CA\_BUNDLE=full-path-to\[name of].pem
- Potential for automation

## Some examples

- Want to copy a snapshot?aws ec2 copy-snapshot \
  - region us-east-1 \
  - source-region us-west-2 \
- source-snapshot-id snap-066877671789bd71b \
- description "This is my copied snapshot."



AWS CLI Topic Guide

Description \*\*\*\*\*\*

This is the AWS CLI Topic Guide. It gives access to a set of topics that provide a deeper understanding of the CLI. To access the list of topics from the command line, run "aws help topics". To access a specific topic from the command line, run "aws help [topicname]", where "topicname" is the name of the topic as it appears in the output from "aws help topics".

Available Topics

General

=====

- \* config-vars: Configuration Variables for the AWS CLI
- \* return-codes: Describes the various return codes of the AWS CLI

53


-- More --


## **Another example**

- Change a security group?
- aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress \\
  - group-name MySecurityGroup \
  - protocol tcp \
  - port 22 \
  - cidr 203.0.113.0/24

## **Other options**

- Crash cart
  - What tools might you want to have available?
    - Depends upon incident response scope
    - Remnux for malware analysis
    - Other gems?
- Breakglass
  - May be more palatable for Incident Response to have emergency only access
- Lambda
  - What can you automate through scripting?
- Who contacts Amazon in case of an incident?





# Use Case 3: Let's Run Through An Incident End To End

- Your Macie service has identified odd behavior via a key pair
  - Key pair is accessing an account it's never logged into before
  - Is this a security incident?
- Work through four stages of an Incident:
  - Prepare
  - Detect
  - Contain
  - Post-Incident

### Run It Down...

### Detect

- How would you determine what IAM User the access keys belonged to?
  - O How were the access keys used?
- Which log would access to keys show up in? (access, use)
  - What would the log tell you?
  - How do you sift through all those events?
- Would you have an alert any where when they were accessed?
  - Depends on the action
- What regions were the keys used in?
  - Were they limited to specific regions?

TS4 tmux

kmw@rsa-demo:~/src/rsa-demo (master.)\$

# A quick demo...

Ţ

### Wrapping Up....

### Contain

- What actions need to be taken to mitigate?
- Who has the permission to do it?
  - Incident Response Team?
  - IAM Team?
- Who needs to be notified?
  - Application Team?
  - End User?

### Post-Incident

- How did the credentials get posted?
  - Was it posted from within your network?
  - Code for the demo available here: <a href="https://github.com/kameenan/RSAC2020">https://github.com/kameenan/RSAC2020</a>


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
**Acquiring AWS Skills** 

### Start of available resources

- https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws security incident response.pdf
- https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/Security/AWS Security Best Practice s.pdf
- https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/AWS CAF Security Perspective.pdf
- https://www.aws.training/ (need to set up an account)
- https://aws.amazon.com/free (get your own hands on!)
- https://www.coursera.org/ (search for AWS [topic])
- https://github.com/jlevy/og-aws (awesome find)
- https://aws.amazon.com/

## **AWS training**





II FUNDAMENTAL @ 2 HOURS I ENGLISH

#### **ABOUT**

#### Description

In this self-paced course, you will learn fundamental AWS cloud security concepts, including AWS access control, data encryption methods, and how network access to your AWS infrastructure can be secured. We will address and your security responsibility in the AWS cloud and the different security-oriented services available.

#### **Intended Audience**


This course is intended for:

• IT business-level professionals interested in cloud security practices

### Youtube. OMG.

- Go there
- Search for Amazon Web Service
- Find the very latest from re:Invent
- Learn a ton of stuff!





## Apply – 90-day AWS incident response plan

### • 30 days:

- Identify gaps between existing plan and what we've discussed
- Begin acquiring needed skills

### • 60 days:

- Confirm architecture of AWS (or other cloud provider) environment
- Acquire sandbox environment
- Document processes to support

### • 90 days:

- Consider automation for certain tasks
- Test out processes
  - Table tops!

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# Thank you!

Keep the conversation going!

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