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Unmasking Operation Shaheen

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About Us

Kevin Livelli


- Currently: Director of Threat Intelligence, Principal Intel Analyst
- Previously: 10 years, Emmy and Peabody Award-winning investigative journalist at 60 MINUTES
- Four years, Supervising Investigator at nation's largest police oversight agency (NYPD)

Tom Pace

- Currently: Senior Director, Worldwide Consulting
- Previously: 11 years of security experience (government, law enforcement, financial)
- Four years Marine Corps
 (infantry, intelligence, Afghanistan, Iraq)

Acknowledgements

- Authors: Kevin Livelli, Ryan Smith, Jon Gross
- Research Support: Cylance Applied Security Team



Summary

A New Campaign – Operation Shaheen


- Target: The nuclear-armed, Pakistani military and government
- Length: More than a year, in multiple phases
- Reason: Espionage

A new threat actor – The White Company

- Likely state-sponsored and Middle Eastern
- Access to zero-day developers
- Highly complex, automated exploit build set
- Capacity for advanced reconnaissance
- Concurrent management of multiple targets

New reasons to care


- Pakistan as "pivot of the world"
- A powerful new threat actor with an unknown target list
- Tools that allow the time-triggered evasion of eight antivirus products
- Tools that deliberately surrender to the target
- Explicit use of contradictory indicators to delay/degrade incident response
- Exploitation of vulnerabilities, not just in software, but in thinking and methodology



The Campaign

Targeting – Pakistan's Air Force in the Crosshairs

- Lures:
 - The Pakistani Air Force or military (10)
 - The Pakistani government or other government agencies (11)
 - Chinese military or foreign affairs in the region (4)
 - Subjects of topical or general regional interest (5)



The Campaign

Evolves Over Multiple Phases

- Phase 1
 - Picking the locksmith
 - Pakistan's critical infrastructure as infrastructure for the attack
 - Open-source exploit of older vulnerability
 - Download and run delivery of malware
 - Russian doll RATs



The Campaign

- Phase 2 Custom Job
 - Highly complex and customized exploit and newer vulnerability
 - Self-extracting of malware from exploit
 - Deliberate evasion of eight antivirus products:
 - 1. Sophos
 - 2. ESET
 - 3. Kasperksy
 - 4. BitDefender
 - 5. Avira
 - 6. Avast!
 - 7. AVG
 - 8. Quick Heal
 - Time-triggered surrender to those products



The Campaign Disappearing Tricks

Within the exploit:

- Four different ways to check whether the malware was on an analyst's or investigator's system
- The capacity to clean up Word and launch a decoy document to reduce suspicion
- The ability to delete itself entirely from the target system

Within the malware:

- Five different obfuscation (packing) techniques that placed the ultimate payload within a series of nesting-doll layers
- Additional ways to check whether the malware was on an analyst's or investigator's system
- Anonymous, open-source payloads and obfuscation techniques
- Use of compromised or otherwise unattributable network infrastructure for command and control

The Threat Actor

The White Company – Whitewashing as a Calling Card

• Attributes:

- Access to zero-day exploit developers and, potentially, zero-day exploits
- Complex, automated exploit build system
- Ability to modify, refine, and evolve exploits to meet mission-specific needs
- Capacity for advanced reconnaissance of targets
- Concurrent management of multiple targets
- Resources, know-how, and personnel for all of the above



The Threat Actor

The White Company – Whitewashing as a Calling Card


- Comparison to Other APTs
 - Profile does not resemble public descriptions of the known Russian, Chinese, North Korean, Iranian, Israeli, Indian, or Five Eyes groups
 - Style evoking contradictions sets them apart
 - Some deliberate: stealth vs. surrender
 - Some not: exploits reflect both craftsmanship and sloppiness
 - Possibility of alignment with one of the states above, but in a way that has not yet been seen and written about publicly



The White Company


- A Different Approach To Attribution
 - The White Company's awareness of traditional methods
 - The futility of tracking malware and infrastructure
- Genetic Tagging and Tracking of Exploit Shellcode
 - 42 unique functions
 - Multiple variants of each function
 - Result = Establish chronology / version development
 - Result = YARA Ruleset on unique combination of function and variant nets larger sample set





Impact

- Lessons for Enterprise
 - Hacking the methodology / common approach
 - A series of contradictions:
 - Evasion vs. surrender
 - Public tools vs. custom tools
 - Complex exploit vs. simple payload
 - Craftsmanship vs. sloppiness
 - Reliance on antivirus products to alert
 - Reliance on traditional EDR approaches to incident response




Impact

- Geopolitical Implications
 - "Pakistan is the pivot of the world"
 - Influence of the Pakistani military on domestic and foreign affairs
 - Nuclear weapons and terrorists: a volatile mix
 - Strategic rivals
 - The war in Afghanistan
 - China's One Belt, One Road Initiative
 - The Port of Gwadar
 - Ties to the Gulf religious and financial
 - Self-Defense: the new National Centre for Cyber Security



- The White Company's unknown identity, interests, and target list changes the risk calculus for both public and private sector leaders
 - Who's next?
 - What are they after?
- A newly recognized, likely state-sponsored threat actor's appearance challenges policy makers and the strategic decision making of governments
- Reliance upon security solutions to identify, stop, track and properly alert to threats from the White Company is significantly undermined



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Questions and Answers

Thank You