# RSA Conference 2015 San Francisco | April 20-24 | Moscone Center

SESSION ID: STR-F03

# **Supply Chain as an Attack Chain: Key Lessons to Secure Your Business**



### **MODERATOR:**

### **Tony Gaidhane**

Senior Associate Booz | Allen | Hamilton @Tony\_Gaidhane

### **PANELISTS:**

### **Scott Stephens**

Director, EG Global Supply Chain HP

### Benjamin Jun

CTO Chosen Plaintext @BenjaminJun

### Sam Phillips

VP, GM, CISO Samsung Business Services @Sam\_Phillips\_se



# **Agenda**

### Motivations and Drivers

- Adversarial Supply Chain Operations (ASCO)
- Maturing Customer Requirements (Public vs. Private Sector) and Regulations
- Threat Actors

### ◆ Capabilities of a mature Supply Chain Cyber Risk Management (SCCRM) Program

- Tools and Techniques
  - Counterfeit Resistant Chips (crypto key pairs)
  - Security by Design
- Visibility and Traceability
  - Component Tracking
- Cyber Security Testing and Options
- Product Security Incident Response
- The future of SCCRM
- Wrap-up and Q&A

# Adversarial Supply Chain Operations (ASCO) To vs. ASCO Through



### **Adversaries**

- Nation State Actors
- Competitors (esp. Nation Stateowned)
- Criminals
- Hacktivists

### **Lifecycle Process**

Design

Sourcing

Build

Fulfillment

Distribution

Sustainment & Operations

Disposal

ASCO To

#### Methods:

- Interdiction/ Compromise
- Theft/ Re-Route
- Break/Fix Subversion

#### Effects:

- Halt or slow production
- Prevent sustainment operations
- Loss of Intellectual Property

ASCO Through



#### Methods:

- Malware Shotgun Infection
- Malicious Component Insertion
- · Repair part compromise
- Trojan Insertion/Design to Fail

#### Effects:

- National security risk
- Customer compromise
- Impaired customer operations
- · Brand/ Legal/ Market Impact
- · Loss of customer intellectual property




# **Public Sector Requirements**

- Cyber Hygiene Practices of Third Parties
  - Executive Order 13636 PD 21
  - NIST Cyber Risk Management Framework
  - Voluntary Implementation for Critical Infrastructure
- Product Integrity/ Software Assurance And Hardware Assurance (Anti-Counterfeit)
  - GSA/DOD Improving Cybersecurity Through Acquisition Recommendation V
  - Using Commercially Acceptable Global Sourcing Standards And Evaluation Of Context And Fit For Use
- Malicious Insertion During Development
  - DODI 5200.44 Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN)
  - NIST SP 800-161 Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

# **Understand your adversary**







# Agenda


- Motivations and Drivers
  - Adversarial Supply Chain Operations (ASCO)
  - Maturing Customer Requirements (Public vs. Private Sector) and Regulations
  - Threat Actors
- ◆ Capabilities of a mature Supply Chain Cyber Risk Management (SCCRM) Program
  - Tools and Techniques
    - Counterfeit Resistant Chips (crypto key pairs)
    - Security by Design
  - Visibility and Traceability
    - Component Tracking
  - Cyber Security Testing and Options
  - Product Security Incident Response
  - The future of SCCRM
- Wrap-up and Q&A

## Trust meets in the Middle



Identity + key provisioning
Authentication service
Secure session management
Security updates

Identity + key management
Sandboxed secrets
Partitioning of critical state
Reliability & integrity





## **Characterize Your Threats**

#### Benefit / Payoff Factors

#### **Risk Factors**

#### Cost / Resource Factors



### Threat Payoff

Value placed on the rewards



#### Adversary Confidence

Assessed likelihood the supply chain attack accomplishes its goal



Likelihood of detection



### Risk of Attribution

Likelihood of suspect being identified



#### Scope of Retribution

Likely accessed scope of client's response



### Tools

sophistication of the cyber and other tools being used




#### **Techniques**

Sophistication of the tactics, techniques, and procedures

### Characterization Factors

### **Test This?**







# **Apply What You Have Learned Today**

- Next week you should:
  - Conduct a Supply Chain Decomposition and Identify High-Priority Components
- In the first three months following this presentation you should:
  - Conduct a Threat Assessment (Outside-in, Open Source, Threat Vectors)
  - Characterize your Risks (Business Impact Analysis, Inherent Risks)
  - Understand your Baseline Capabilities (including Compliance Posture)
- Within six months you should:
  - Conduct a Gap Analysis, and define Target State Maturity
  - Identify Key Priorities for Visibility, Control and Governance

# **Comprehensive SCCRM Program Maturity**



### Control

Implementation of technical capabilities

- Supplier Assessments
- Supplier Contractual Amendments
- R&D Engagement across Supply Chain
- Collaboration with Threat Intelligence

- Segmentation of Proprietary Data
- Automatic Security Checks
- Standardized Software Security Testing
- High Assurance Product Maturity Model

#### Governance

Oversight, monitoring, and collaboration with supplier cyber operations

- Database of Cybersecurity Requirements
- Organizational Structure & Design
- Cybersecurity Engagement Tool
- Strategy Development


- Legal Requirements for Suppliers
- Formalized Cyber Organizational Functions
- Procedures for Vulnerability ID
- Risk Management Framework
   & Function

### **Ongoing Visibility**

Comprehensive, timely, and dynamic vision over key cyber components

- Supply Chain Cybersecurity Assessment
- Component Sourcing
- Integration of Incident Response
- Repair/Replace Parts Management
- Counterfeiting Detection

- Consolidation of BOM Tools
- Cybersecurity Performance Management
- Monitoring of Emerging Risks
- Awareness of Cybersecurity



# RSA\*Conference2015

San Francisco | April 20-24 | Moscone Center

**QUESTIONS?** 

