Proposed Capability-Based Reference Architecture for Real-Time Network Defense

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Problem Statement

- **Current asymmetric advantage to the attackers**
  - **Tools support automation of the attack process vs. manual cyber defense operations**
  - **Attackers able to re-use tools and techniques across multiple targets vs. ad hoc information sharing by defenders**
- **Cyber-attack response times are too slow**
  - **Human in the loop, limited analyst time**
  - **Large numbers of cyber events never analyzed**

Pillars of A Cyber Ecosystem



Integrated Adaptive Cyber Defense (IACD)

An active cyber defense ecosystem enabling near real-time network defense at the enterprise level.

Trusted information sharing and cyber services across enterprises.

Goals

- **Use human capital for cyber operations more effectively within the community through automation.**
  - **Respond to cyber events as they occur through automated sensing, sense making, decision making, and response**
  - **Increase the number of cyber events in an enterprise that can be analyzed, thereby detecting intrusions earlier in the kill chain.**

- **Degrade the attacker's ability to re-use their wares across the community through enhanced information sharing.**
  - **Rapidly share and ingest threat information, analytics, and effective cyber event responses within the defender community.**
  - **Force attackers to develop new tools and techniques for each new target.**

- **Remove barriers to adoption for the community through interoperability.**
  - **Create a market for security tools that emphasize machine-to-machine information exchange and interoperability.**
  - **Enable diverse but interoperable implementations of IACD, supporting a "bring your own enterprise" approach to integration.**

IACD Constituent Capabilities



- **Trusted Cyber Services**
  - Trust Services
  - Information/Data Management Services
  - Analytics, Reputation, and Enrichment Services
  - Shared Situational Awareness Services
  - Integrated Operational Action Services
- **Trusted Information Services**
  - Indicators
  - Analytics
  - Courses of Action
- **Enterprise Automated Security Environment (EASE)**
  - Enterprise Automation
  - Interoperability
  - Information Sharing

Reference Architecture Objectives

1. Encourage and provide guidelines for implementing security automation and information sharing in enterprises with diverse legacy architectures
2. Promote commercial adoption of standardized machine-to-machine interfaces by communicating IACD needs and requirements to vendors

Approach to the Reference Architecture

- **Capability-based approach**
  - Focus on the required capabilities and interactions between them
  - Support many different vendor solutions
- **Acknowledge and support a "bring your own enterprise" model**
  - Product-agnostic, plug-and-play architecture
- **Allow vendors to innovate**
  - For each capability, specify the minimum functionality necessary to ensure the capability meets the functional objectives, including interoperability
  - Only specify the essential functions
- **Avoid tight coupling between components**
  - Support multi-vendor solutions and simplify integration
- **Be as stateless as possible within a capability**
  - Increase robustness of the solution and prevent resource exhaustion

Enterprise Automated Security Environment (*EASE*)

IACD Constituent Capabilities



Focus of briefing

EASE Architectural Views



Conceptual View
Functionality Inside the Enterprise



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Conceptual View
Across/Among Enterprises



Messaging View
Centralized Control of Service Orchestration Approach



Messaging View
Decentralized Control of Service Orchestration Approach



Centralized vs. Decentralized (Hypotheses)

Centralized

- **Advantages**
  - Control logic easily managed in one component
  - Existing Orchestrator products satisfy functionality
  - Central point of management
- **Disadvantages**
  - Potential bottleneck or resource exhaustion at centralized coordinator
  - New services require additional logic in centralized coordinator

Decentralized

- **Advantages**
  - Scalability – replicate stateless components to increase capacity
  - Extensibility – add new components as data producers or consumers
- **Disadvantage**
  - Management, debugging challenges
  - Control Message Infrastructure must be high performance – all logic at the data consumers

Functional View
Information Sharing



Functional View
Sensor Actuator Interface

Sensors and actuators have translators and managers that bridge the proprietary interfaces (***Raw Sensor Data***) to the standard Control Message Infrastructure format (***Sensor Data***)



Functional View
Sense Making Analytic Framework

Evaluators use analytics to assess ***Sensor Data*** against ***Intel Data***, determine if a ***Cyber Event*** has occurred



Functional View
Decision-Making Engine

Given a ***Cyber Event***, DM-Engine determines a course of action (***COA***) to minimize risk while considering mission impact of the alternative COAs



Functional View
Response Action Controller

Selected COAs ***(COA Selection Notice*)*,*** with parameters for targets and other options, converted to specific ***Workflow***s containing ***Sensor/Actuator Control Info*** for execution



* Incoming status includes Tip/Event/COA sharing notice

Functional View
Sharing Interface

COAs, ***Analytics***, and ***Indicators*** may be received from the community or shared with the community



Recommended Actions may be received as part of a coordinated response

Work To Date

- Partially completed the architecture views presented in this briefing
- Completed detailed Functional Decomposition
- Assessed the architecture against representative use cases
- Executed four spirals to demonstrate the concept feasibility by integrating commercial products:
  - Spiral 0: Auto-enrichment of troubleshooting and analyst activity; detection and mitigation of malware
  - Spiral 1: Generation of indicators and tips for sharing, and direction to other enterprises; indicators and tips received from external source and initiation of IACD response
  - Spiral 2: Indicators and tips received from external source and initiation of IACD response
  - Spiral 3: Sharing COAs between enterprises

Next Steps

- **Product Vendors:**
  - **We need your feedback on the reference architecture!**
  - **We need your help to develop the open interface and interoperability specifications**
- **Potential Adopters:**
  - **We need your feedback on the reference architecture!**
  - **Use cases for your environment, including mobility, managed service consumers, industrial control systems, and geographically distributed networks**
- **The IACD Challenge:**
  - **We are looking for vendors and integrators to instantiate some or all of the architecture and demonstrate the capabilities**
  - **Opportunity to demonstrate the results at a future Community Day event:**
- **https://secwww.jhuapl.edu/iacdcommunityday/**

Conclusions

- IACD focuses on cyber defense information sharing, automation, and interoperability
- Reference Architecture serves as a framework for vendors and adopters to complete the interface definitions required for interoperable solutions
- Prior spiral demonstrations have shown the feasibility and benefits of security automation
- The next steps require support from industry to define the interfaces and messages that will enable interoperability


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