The Friends We Made Along the Way

The MITRE ATT&CK Edition

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whoami











This talk represents the speaker's personal views and not the views of Google or Alphabet

MITRE ATT&CK™ is a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.





The purpose of intelligence is to drive a decision advantage




Source: ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2018

The side that learns the fastest, wins

Developed for fighter pilots

Useful framework for thinking about decision making

Leveraging intelligence well shrinks your OODA loop



How do we know if it's working?

Measure of Performance

Am I doing things right?

What are we analyzing? Finding?

Largely within the intel team's control

Measure of Effectiveness

Am I doing the right things?

Is intel actually changing my org's decisions or behavior?

Requires strong partnership with who intel enables (ops? IR? execs?)

This makes intel people uncomfortable



What holds us back from being more effective?

Intel drawn to novel, unique, next

Ops needs stability of signal

Lives in the details

Works on a different, longer

Often retrospective


timeline than intel

Stronger on the diagnostic side


Needs intel to be more prognostic

Enter ATT&CK

ATT&CK growing in popularity



Value: Moving up from the tactical



Source: Pyramid of Pain by David Bianco

APT-28

nitial Access 11 items	Execution 34 items	Persistence 62 items	Privilege Escalation 32 items	Defense Evasion 69 items	Credential A 21 items
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash profile and .bashrc	Access loken Manipulation	Access loken Manipulation	Account Manip
XPIGIT Public-Facing	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Bash History
xternal Remote Services		Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force
ardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	Applnit DLLs	Bypass User Account	Credential Dum
eplication Through emovable Media	Component Object Model and Distributed COM	Applnit DLLs	Application Shimming	Clear Command History	Credentials from Browsers
pearphishing Attachment		Application Shimming	Expass User Account	CMSTP	Credentials in F
pearphishing Link	Dynamic Data Exchange	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order	Code Signing	Credentials in F
pearphishing via Service	Execution through API Execution through Module	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking Elevated Execution with Promof	Compile After Delivery	Exploitation for
ipply Chain	Exploration for Chart	Bootkit	Promot	Compiled HTML File	Forced Authent
usted Relationship	Exploitation for Client	Browser Extensions	Emond Exploitation for Privilege	Component Chart Model	Hooking
alid Accounts	Graphical User Interface InstallUtil	Change Default File Association Component Firmware	Exploitation for Privilege	Component Object Model	Input Capture Input Prompt
	Launchetl	Component Cirmware	Lie System Permissions	Connection Proxy Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting
	Local Job Scheduling	Create Account	Hooking	DCShadow DCShadow	Kerberoasting
	LSASS Driver	DLL Search Order	Image File Execution	Deobtuscate/Decode Files	LLMNR/NBT-N:
	Mshta	Dylib Hijacking	Launch Daemon	Disabling Security Tools	Network Sniffin
	PowerShell	Emond	New Service	DL Search Order	Password Filter
	Regsvcs/Regasm	Eutomal Damata Candana	Parent PID Spoofing	DLL Side-Loading	Private Keys
	Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32	External Remote Services Elle System Permissions	Parent PID Spooring Path Interception	Execution Guardrails	Securityd Mem
	Rundll32	Hidden Files and Directories	Plist Modification	Exploitation for Defense	Steal Web Ses
	Scheduled Task	Hooking	Port Monitors	Extra Window Memory	Jwo-Factor Aut
	Scripting	Hypervisor	PowerShell Profile	File and Directory	Interception
	Service Execution	Image File Execution	Process Injection	File Deletion	1
	Signed Binary Proxy	Kernel Modules and	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets	1
	Signed Script Proxy	Launch Agent	Service Registry	Gatekeeper Bypass	1
	Source	Launch Daemon	Setuid and Setgid	Group Policy Modification	1
	Space after Filename	Launchetl	SID-History Injection	Hidden Files and	i
	Third-party Software	LC LOAD DYLIB Addition	Startup Items	Hidden Users	1
	Trap	Local Job Scheduling	Sudo	Hidden Window	i
	Trusted Developer Utilities	Login Item	Sudo Caching	HISTCONTROL	1
	User Execution	Logon Scripts	Valid Accounts	Image File Execution	1
	Windows Management	LSASS Driver	Web Shell	Indicator Blocking	1
	Windows Remote	Modify Existing Service		Indicator Removal from	1
	XSL Script Processing	Netsh Helper DLL	1	Indicator Removal on Host	1
		New Service	1	Indirect Command	1
		Office Application Startup	1	Install Root Certificate	1
		Path Interception	1	InstallUtil	1
		Plist Modification	1	Launchetl	1
		Port Knocking	1	LC_MAIN Hijacking	1
		Port Monitors]	Masquerading	1
		PowerShell Profile]	Modify Registry]
		Rc.common]	Mshta	1
		Re-opened Applications]	Network Share moval]
		Redundant Access]	NTFS File Attributes]
		Registry Run Keys /]	Obtuscated Files or	
		Scheduled Task]	Parent PID Spoofing]
		Screensaver]	Plist Modification]
		Security Support Provider]	Port Knocking]
		Security Support Provider Server Software]	Process Doppelgänging]
		Permissions Weakness]	Process Hollowing]
		Setuid and Setgid]	Process Injection]
		Shortcut Modification]	Redundant Access]
		SIP and Trust Provider]	Regsvcs/Regasm]
		Startup Items]	Regsvr32]
		System Firmware]	Rootkit	
		Systemd Service]	Rundli32	
		Time Providers	1	Scripting	1
		Trap]	Signed Binary Proxy]
		Valid Accounts		Signed Script Proxy]
		Web Shell]	SIP and Trust Provider]
		京治にはいませんのもものできま]	Software Packing]
			1	Carres - No. Filesons	1
		Winlogon Helper DLL]	Space after Filename	J
		Winlogon Helper DLL	J	Template Injection	
		Winlogon Helper DLL	J		
		Winlogon Helper DLL	J	Template Injection	

filters

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	Credential Access 21 items	Discovery 23 items	Lateral Movement 18 items	Collection 13 items	Command And	Exfiltration 9 items	Impact 16 items
	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	Account Access Removal
	Bash History	Application Window	Application Deployment	Automated Collection	Semmynication Uhrough	Data Compressed	Data Destruction
	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark	Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Connection Proxy	Data Encrypted	Data Encrypted for Impact
	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote	Bata from Information	Custom Command and	Data Transfer Size Limits	Defacement
у	Credentials from Web Browsers	File and Directory	Internal Spearphishing	Data from Local System	Cryptographic Cryptographic	Atternative Protocol	Disk Content Wipe
	Credentials in Files	Network Service Scanning	Logon Scripts	Pata from Network Shared	Data Encoding	Extilization Over Command	Disk Structure Wipe
	Credentials in Registry	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Hash	Data from Removable	Data Obfuscation	Extiltration Over Other	Endpoint Denial of Service
	Exploitation for Credential	Network Sniffing	Pass the Ticket	Data Staged	Domain Fronting	Exhitration Over Physical	Firmware Corruption
	Forced Authentication	Bassword Policy	Remote Desktop Protocol	Email Collection	Domain Generation	Scheduled Transfer	Inhibit System Recovery
	Hooking	Remberal Device	Remote File Copy	Input Capture	Fallback Channels		Network Denial of Service
del	Input Capture	Rermission Groups	Remote Services	Man in the Browser	Multi-hop Proxy	l	Resource Hijacking
	Input Prompt	Process Discovery	Replication Through	Screen Capture	Multi-Stage Channels	l	Runtime Data Manipulation
	Kerberoasting	Query Registry	Shared Webroot	Video Capture	Multiband Communication	l	Service Stop
	Keychain	Remote System Discovery	SSH Hijacking		Multilayer Encryption		Stored Data Manipulation
iles	LIMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Security Software	Taint Shared Content		Port Knocking		System Shutdown/Reboot
s	Network Sniffing	Software Discovery	Third-party Software		Remote Access Tools	l	Transmitted Data
	Password Filter DLL	System Information	Windows Admin Shares		Remote File Copy		•
	Private Keys	System Network Contiguration Discovery	Windows Remote		Standard Application		
	Securityd Memory	System Network Connections Discovery	,		Standard Cryptographic		
6	Steal Web Session Cookie	System Owner/User Drscovery			Standard Non-Application		
	Lwo-Factor Authentication	System Service Discovery	l		Uncommonly Used Port	l	
on		System Time Discovery	l		Web Service		
		Virtualization/Sandbox					

Register to stream ATT&CKcon 2.0 October 29-30

GROUPS

Overview

admin@338

APT1

APT12

APT16

APT17

APT18

APT19

APT28

APT29

APT3

APT30

APT28

Home > Groups > APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Main Intelligence
Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice
indictment. This group reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the
Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.
APT28 has been active since at least 2004.^[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]

ID: G0007

Associated Groups: SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group 74, Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat Group-4127, TG-4127

Contributors: Drew Church, Splunk, Emily Ratliff, IBM, Richard Gold, Digital Shadows

Version: 2.2

A common nomenclature enables a common operational picture



ATT&CK's Jedi Mind Trick




Improving detection and visibility

Be careful....it probably looks worse before it gets better



Planning and Mapping Requirements

Take executive's top-level intel requirements and map those attack types and what key systems are involved against ATT&CK




Presented by Francesco Bigarella at FIRST CTI Symposium 2019

https://www.first.org/resources/papers/london2019/Metrics-and-attack-website.ndf

Supporting your product evals

What are the gaps I need to close?

Does this product do what it says it will?



Presented at ATT&CKcon 2018

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhsN5pBDrGY

"Plans are worthless, but planning is everything"

~ Dwight D. Eisenhower (maybe)

Sign me up!

I want to do all these amazing things with ATT&CK. Full steam ahead, right?



Complexity

266 Techniques in Enterprise ATT&CK

Many teams find themselves extending further



Time

Done right, ATT&CK changes your inputs, processes, and outputs

Expect a solid 6 months-1 year of sustained effort when getting started

Will wider vendor adoption bend this curve?

Buy in

Who needs to commit for this to be successful?

Focus on the why and the how - and then the what becomes easier

Manage expectations

Use the community!

Closing Thoughts

Thank you!