MITRE ATT&CK™ Update

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What is ATT&CK?

A knowledge base of adversary behavior

- Based on real-world observations
- > Free, open, and globally accessible
- > A common language
- > Community-driven



Impact

Data Destruction

Data Encrypted for Impact

Defacement

Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe

Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption

Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service

Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation

Service Stop

Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation

ATT&CK Today

Tactics: the adversary's technical goals

<u></u>	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	
O	Drive-by Compromise		Scheduled Task		Binary Padding	Netwo	rk Sniffing	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	
	Exploit Public-Facing	Lau	inchetl	Access Toke	en Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	Application Deployment	Automated Collection	Communication Through	Data Compressed	
ו נא	Application	Local Job	Scheduling	Bypass User	Account Control	Bash History	Application Window	Software	Clipboard Data	Removable Media	Data Encrypted	
	External Remote Services	LSAS	S Driver	Extra Window	Memory Injection	Brute Force	Discovery	Distributed Component	Data from Information	Connection Proxy	Data Transfer Size Limits	
A	Hardware Additions	Т	rap	Proces	ss Injection	Credential Dumping	Browser Bookmark	Object Model	Repositories	Custom Command and	Exfiltration Over Other	
Q	Replication Through	AppleScript		DLL Search Order Hijacking		Credentials in Files	Discovery	Exploitation of	Data from Local System	Control Protocol	Network Medium	
	Removable Media	CMSTP		Image File Execution Options Inject	tion	Credentials in Registry	Domain Trust Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Network	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Alternative	
	Spearphishing Attachment	Command Line Interface		Plist Modification		Exploitation for	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Shared Drive			
	Spearphishing Link	Compiled HTML File		Valid Accounts		Credential Access	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Removable Media	Data Encoding		
	Spearphishing via Service	Control Panel Items	Accessib	illty Features	BITS Jobs	Forced Authentication	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data Staged	Data Obfuscation	Protocol	
45	Supply Chain Compromise	Trested Relationship Execution through API		Cert DLLs	Clear Command History	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Email Collection	Domain Fronting	Exfiltration Over	
a				Applnit DLLs		Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote File Copy	Input Capture	Domain Generation	Physical Medium	
	Valid Accounts	Execution through		on Shimming	Code Signing	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote Services	Man in the Browser	Algorithms	Scheduled Transfer	
		Module Load Exploitation for	· ·	Hijacking	Compiled HTML File	Kerberoasting	Process Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Screen Capture	Fallback Channels		
4			File System Per	missions Weakness	Component Firmware	Keychain	Query Registry		Video Capture	Multiband Communication		
	`,	Client Execution		ooking	Component Object Model	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning	Remote System Discovery	Shared Webroot		Multi-hop Proxy		
2	`,	Graphical User Interface		h Daemon	Hijecking	and Relay	Security Software Discovery	SSH Hijacking		Multilayer Encryption		
	`,	InstallUtil	New	Service	Control Panel Items	Password Filter DLL	System Information	Taint Shared Content		Multi-Stage Channels		
0	Mshta Discovery											
	·	Procedures: Specific technique implementation										
		Regsvcs/Regasm	Serv	ocedu	11es. 31	Jechic	цесппп	aue III	pieme	ntation		
		Regsvr32			and the second s							
		Rundll32	Spearphishing Attachment									
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U)		Service Execution	.basn_profile a	PCGIPI	9	/ ((())	11110110					
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			BITS J	ocedure	Example	lS						
	70	Signed Script Proxy Execution	Bootk	000000								
		Source	Browser Ext									
O	Ф	Space after Filename	Na	me Descr	ription							
		Third-party Software	Change D File Assoc									
		Timbolary Solitone										
	(1)	User Execution	AP'	T12 APT1:	2 has sent emails v	vith malicious Micr	osoft Office docum	ents and PDFs atta	ached. ^{[88] [89]}			
			Component Model Hija									
4.5		Windows Management Instrumentation	Create Ac									
			External Remo	T19 APT1	19 sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments in RTF and XLSM formats to deliver initial exploits. ^[62]							
1	()	Windows retinue Management Hidden Files an										
I.W	\succeq	XSL Script Processing	Hypervisor		from Tools							
	$\boldsymbol{\sigma}$		Kernel Modules		Indicator Removal on Host							
•			and Extensions Indirect Command Execution									
			-	→	-	-						



What's Next for ATT&CK: "One ATT&CK"

- Consistency and integration between matrices
 - Refactor PRE-ATT&CK as part of this

Mobile ATT&CK
Enterprise ATT&CK
PRE-ATT&CK





October 2019 Update

Release notes available at:

https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/



PRE-ATT&CK



Pre-ATT&CK Today

15 Tactics & ~144 Techniques

Definition Planning	Definition Direction	Target Selection 5 items	Technical Information Gathering 20 items	People Information Gathering 11 items	Organizational Information Gathering 11 items	Technical Weakness Identification 9 items	People Weakness Identification 3 items	Organizational Weakness Identification 6 items	Adversary Opsec 22 items	Establish & Maintain Infrastructure 16 items	Persona Development 6 items	Build Capabilities 11 items	Test Capabilities 7 items	Stage Capabilitie 6 items
holdings, needs, and wants Assess KITs/KIQs benefits Assess leadership areas of interest Assign KITs/KIQs into categories	intelligence requirements Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements Task requirements	Determine approach/attack vector Determine highest level tactical element Determine operational element Determine secondary level tactical element Determine strategic target	Acquire OSINT data sets and information Conduct active scanning Conduct passive scanning Conduct social engineering Determine 3rd party infrastructure services Determine domain and IP address space Determine external network trust dependencies Determine firmware	Acquire OSINT data sets and information Aggregate individual's digital footprint Conduct social engineering Identify business relationships Identify groups/roles Identify job postings and needs/gaps Identify people of interest Identify personnel with an authority/privilege Identify sensitive personnel information	Acquire OSINT data sets and information Conduct social engineering Determine 3rd party infrastructure services Determine centralization of IT management Determine physical locations Dumpster dive Identify business processes/tempo Identify business relationships Identify job postings and needs/gaps Identify supply chains Obtain		Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations Assess targeting options	Analyze business processes Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities Assess opportunities created by business deals Assess security posture of physical locations Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors	Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates Anonymity services Common, high volume protocols and software Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery Data Hiding	Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates Buy domain name Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery Create backup infrastructure Domain registration hijacking	Choose pre- compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys Choose pre- compromised persona and affiliated accounts Develop social network persona digital footprint Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate	Build and configure delivery systems Build or acquire exploits C2 protocol development Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information Create custom payloads Create infected removable media Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums Identify resources required to build capabilities Obtain/re-use	traces	Disseminate remo media Distribute malicious oftware developmedia Friend/Follow/Conto targets of interedirector Hardware or software port redirector Upload, install, anconfigure software/tools



Pre-ATT&CK Changes

- New tactics
- Significant reduction in number of techniques
- Aiming to cover the scope of all current techniques that are
 - a) technical
 - b) visible to some kind of defender
 - c) real



Mobile

Total Refresh

- New techniques
- Updating existing techniques
- New software entries to account for new threat reporting that we've identified,
- External contributions (and always looking for more!)
- Align more closely with Enterprise ATT&CK



Sub-Techniques



What are Sub-Techniques

- Address differing levels of abstraction
 - Consider example Execution techniques: Scripting vs. Rundll32
- Major change for all ATT&CK users



Credential Dumping Today

- In the description there 9 ways to perform the action
 - SAM (Security Accounts Manager)
 - Cached Credentials
 - Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets
 - NTDS from Domain Controller
 - Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files
 - Service Principal Names (SPNs)
 - Plaintext Credentials
 - DCSync
 - Proc filesystem (Linux)
- That's a lot of different behaviors lumped into one technique even though the end result is similar each time



Credential Dumping With Sub-techniques

Credential Access

Account Manipulation

Bash History

Brute Force

Credential Dumping

Credentials in Files

. . .



SAM (Security Accounts Manager)

Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets

NTDS from Domain Controller

Cached Credentials

Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files


Service Principal Names (SPNs)

Plaintext Credentials

. . .



- New techniques We added a few new techniques to help us better organize sub-techniques. (Example: "Pre-OS Boot")
- Technique-to-sub-technique demotion We moved many techniques into sub-techniques. (Example: "Bootkit")





New ID numbering

- T[technique].[sub-technique].
- For example, <u>Access Token Manipulation</u> will still be T1134, but "Token Manipulation/Theft" will be T1134.001, "Create Process with Token" T1134.002, etc.



- Technique decomposition Some techniques like <u>Account</u> <u>Manipulation</u> and <u>Process Injection</u> had several sub-techniques created from content in their previous definition.
- In other cases the techniques will get decomposed and sub-techniques will be assigned under other applicable techniques.
 - For example, <u>Local Job Scheduling</u> was decomposed into sub-techniques that fall under "Scheduled Task/Job" and "Scheduled Task/Job (Escalation Possible)".



- Technique realignment and deprecation The analysis of techniques necessary to do sub-techniques led to some technique realignment between tactics and deprecation of techniques.
 - We pruned back several techniques that didn't fit the core definition of the tactic, like <u>Hidden Files and Directories</u> not fitting under Persistence,
 - and a small number that needed to be deprecated, like <u>Hypervisor</u> where we've found no documented use cases beyond proof of concepts.



Benefits

- Top-level techniques will change less frequently
- Coverage assessment
 - understand that there's several ways a technique can be performed.
- Lead to more refined data sources that apply to techniques and sub-techniques on specific platforms.
- Provide a structure for others to add their own local sub-techniques under existing techniques to meet their specific requirements.
- Make it easier to fit the ATT&CK Matrix with techniques on a single slide. (Look, we make a lot of PowerPoints, and we know you do too!)



When is this happening?

- End of 2019
- Update will be in the form of a separate website to give people time to adjust and give us feedback before it becomes the "official" version of ATT&CK (3ish months post release).
- We want feedback from ATT&CK users to make sure we aren't doing this in vain.
 - Please reach out to us at attack@mitre.org (Use a subject line that starts with "Sub-technique feedback" so it's easy to spot.)



How Will This Affect Me?

Detections and Tooling

- review and refine
 - Many sub-techniques will map directly to "old" techniques, so in those cases you should only have to update IDs.
 - You will have some level of effort with mapping new techniques and subtechniques as well as determining how to assign things like detection analytics to those sub-techniques that have been decomposed.



How Will This Affect Me?

Mapping Intel

- Significant change and level of effort
- We plan to keep the historical site and STIX objects available as a reference for older intel that is mapped to the prior, pre-sub-technique version of ATT&CK.
- Historic repositories
 - consider how you may want to approach that (e.g. only map new intel to the new ATT&CK version).
- We are working on a tool to help with this but still expect this to be time consuming



Controls



ATT&CK to NIST 800-53

- The task is extremely labor intensive due to the scope (314 ATT&CK techniques by 256 controls)
- Releasing a template mapping at ATT&CKcon 2019
- MITRE will crowd source the mapping so that it can be maintained collaboratively by the people who use it



← ATT&CK →

Template Example

Mapping shows NIST 800-53 controls that protect and/or detect ATT&CK techniques

← NIST CONTROLS →

AC Access Control

te	ct ATT&CK techniques		NTROL POLICY AND EDURES	AC-2 ACCOUNT MANAGE		
	Drive-by Compromise	Protect	Detect	NA		
	Exploit Public-Facing Application					
2	External Remote Services					
Š	Hardware Additions					
	Replication Through Removable Media					
	Spearphishing Attachment					
	Spearphishing Link					
	Spearphishing via Service					
	Supply Chain Compromise					
	Trusted Relationship					
	Valid Accounts					



Cloud

Cloud

- First version of techniques going out in October with another big release happening next year.
- Cloud will be part of enterprise and will be represented by new platforms in addition to Windows/MacOS/Linux
- We've added three infrastructure as a service (laaS) platforms:
 - Amazon Web Services (AWS),
 - Microsoft Azure (Azure), and
 - Google Cloud Platform (GCP).



Cloud (continued)

- The Software as a service (SaaS) platform will cover techniques against general cloud-based software platforms.
- Separately from laaS and SaaS, we've also added two cloud software platforms to cover techniques against those specific platforms:
 - Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) and
 - Office 365
- 36 techniques have been added or updated to cover adversary behavior against cloud-based platforms.



ATT&CK Sightings




ATT&CK Sightings Ecosystem



- Sighting: A detection of a specific adversary behavior as defined within ATT&CK
 - Example: On 6/12/19, T1193 (Spearphishing Attachment) was detected in the US Financial Sector
- Empower the community with real, anonymized data about adversary behavior from many sources
 - To enable analysis of what adversaries are doing:
 - What techniques are being detected in the wild?
 - Are there differences in detections across different sectors?
 - How do behaviors change over time?



Vision of Desired End-State



Cyber Analytics Repository



Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR) Relaunch

- Knowledge base of analytics developed by MITRE based on ATT&CK
- Relaunch goal was to address barriers
 - Make it easy to contribute and use
- Other updates
 - Additions to process data model
 - New analytics
 - Native Splunk queries





ATT&CKcon 2.0



ATT&CKcon 2.0 October 29-30



Entire conference will be live-streamed!

Register at: https://www.mitre.org/attackcon-streamed-live



"Getting Started with ATT&CK™"

New eBook available at:

https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/mitre-getting-started-with-attack-october-2019.pdf



ATT&CK

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