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Connect to Protect

SESSION ID: PDAC-W05

The State of Modern Password Cracking

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#RSAC

Presentation Overview





Password Hashing 101

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

trustNo1 → Math! → 5979150da68d8b9d074751590c7896ed

trustNo2 → Math! → 0ab15acb4711103a7ffa24e485f4f03c

Adding Some Salt

No Salt

trustNo1	Hash	5979150da68d8b9d074751590c7896ed
trustNo1	Hash	5979150da68d8b9d074751590c7896ed

Salt

q89f236h	trustNo1	Hash	18af5d264d8dabd39498990fadf9ec34	q89f236h
ohfq3w84	trustNo1	Hash	a40e7ee72045e2b8d6b25673fda3b724	ohfq3w84



Getting Hashes

Stealing Hashes

Compromise a Host

- Local Caches
- Network Sniffing

Application Vulnerabilities

- SQL Injection
- File Inclusion

Leaked Code

- Hardcoded Client Passwords
- Backdoor Hashes

Indecent Exposure

Search GitHub for *'abc.com' password*

```
Warehouse.define do
  warehouse :User do
    login "admin@abc.com"
    name ""
    access  "super"
    email "admin@abc.com"
    password "$2a$08$Y.JcIVvVQMk4UiToFFlLSObWeHYIT2zHdJrhYsgjdZdW7ZzByioh6"
    reset_token nil
 end
end
```



Basic Password Cracking

Entropy (lack thereof)

Standard keyboard:	• 95 characters
“Reasonable” password length:	• 10 characters
Possible combinations:	• 60,510,648,114,517,000,000
Time to crack @ 200 million KPS:	• 9,587 years

Powers of 2

Time to crack @ 200 million keys per second

Length	Lowercase Letters	Lowercase Alphanumeric	Mixed Case Alphanumeric	All characters
6 character	**1.7 seconds**	11.2 seconds	4.9 minutes	1.1 hours
7 characters	41.8 seconds		hours	4.1 days
8 characters	18.1 minutes	4.1 hours	9 weeks	1.1 years
9 characters	7.9 hours	0.9 weeks		1.1 centuries
10 characters	1.3 weeks	31.1 weeks	1.4 centuries	**9.6 millennia**

secret

Secret123!

Entropy (lack thereof)

OED Entries:	• 291,500 entries • @200 million/sec = 0.0015 seconds
Our “English” file	• 394,748 entries • @200 million/sec = 0.0020 seconds
Our “Crack” file	• 148,903,320 entries • @200 million/sec = 0.75 seconds
CEWL	• Spiders web sites and adds unique terms it finds to the dictionary file





GPU Cracking

The Speed Problem



The Bottleneck Solution

aaaaaaaa
aaaaaaab
aaaaaaac
...

3072 cores

3dbe00a167653a1aaee01d93e77e730e

Hashcat

- CPU and GPU cracking
- Free/Open Source

Rules

Modify dictionary words

Masks

Selective brute force

More Power

VS



Model	• Intel Xeon E5-2620 v3; $400 ea.
Cores	• 6@2.4GHz x 2 CPUs = 12 cores
MD5	• 205 million/sec
Crack 10 characters	• 9,353 years

Model	• Nvidia GeForce GTX Titan X; $1,000 ea.
Cores	• 3,072@1GHz x 8 GPUs= 24,576 cores
MD5	• 132 billion/sec
Crack 10 characters	• 15 years



Statistical Analysis

PCI Compliance

PCI Security Standards Council™

Req 8.2.3:
- 7 characters
- Alphanumeric

Req 8.2.4:
- Change <90 days

Time to 7 characters alphanumeric	Time to 10 characters alphanumeric
MD5 5 mins	**MD5** 3 days
SHA512 6 mins	**SHA512** 9 days

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Analyzing leaked passwords

rockyou

Breached in 2009: 14.3 million plaintext passwords leaked

Password Length



Password Complexity



Smarter Analysis



"LD" Pattern:

- All lowercase or all numbers
- Lowercase with last 1-4 characters numeric

1-10 characters alphanumeric	1-10 characters using pattern
• Recovered: 71%	• Recovered: 61%
• MD5: 3 days	• MD5: 6h23m
• SHA512: 9 days	• SHA512: 17h41m

Breaking NTLM for fun and profit

- Old Windows domain authentication system
- Uses very weak hashes
- Hashes are everywhere
- Keys to the Kingdom
- Other security fails besides cracking

Crack and Analyze

8,930/15,902 “stolen” NTLM hashes (< 9 chars)

Password Length



Password Complexity



Recurring Themes

- Variations on Company name
- Variations on “P@5$w0rd”
- Likely IT defaults that never got changed
- A pattern emerges…



Live Fire - Patterns

15,902 NTLM hashes “stolen” in penetration tests

Fast

Method	Recovered	Time
All to 7 chars	15%	10 mins
ULSD 8 chars	12%	1 min
ULSD 9 chars	5%	12 mins
LD 10 chars	2%	44 mins
Total	**35%**	**~1 hour**

Thorough

Method	Recovered	Time
All to 8 chars	56%	17 hours
ULSD 9 chars	5%	12 mins
ULSD 10 chars	4%	6 hours
LD to 11 chars	1%	19 hours
Total	**67%**	**~41 hours**

Live Fire – Adding Dictionaries

15,902 NTLM hashes “stolen” in penetration tests

Method	Recovered	Time
149 million dictionary words with Best64 rule	24.6%	53s
149 million dictionary words with d3ad0ne rule	**44.1%**	**5m**

Fast (<1 hour)	Recovered
No dictionary	35.0%
With dictionary	**47.7%**

Thorough (<2 days)	Recovered
No dictionary	67%
With dictionary	**73.9%**



Advanced Hashing and Cracking

Rainbow Tables (Horribly Oversimplified)

Start	End
aaaaaa	abcabc
bbbbbb	kitten
cccccc	secret
dddddd	sesame
eeeeee	random
ffffff	archer
…	…



Better Hashing

Key Derivation Functions (KDFs)

Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs)





Making Trouble

Making Trouble

- Access or escalate privileges on a target network
- Impersonate a user for fraud
- Publicly post them to embarrass a target
- Add them to cracking dictionary



Recommendations

Keep Hashes Safe

- Strong SDLC for custom apps
- Lock down Windows security configuration
- Use admin credentials only when necessary
- Penetration test to find weaknesses

Strong Password Policy

Enforce password requirements				
Change <90 days	12+ characters	All character types	Prohibit re-use	Pattern checks?
Support				
Crack your own passwords		Awareness of phishing and re-use		

Use Appropriate Crypto

DON’T WRITE YOUR OWN!!! EVER!!!

Cryptographically sound random number generator

Long and cryptographically strong salt unique to each credential

Use a KDF or HMAC instead of a plain hash

KDFs:		HMACS:	
PBKDF2, scrypt, bcrypt	Update Work Factors as appropriate	Use a strong key	Protect the key

When it really needs to be secure

Something You Know

- PIN
- Password

Something You Have

- Token Card
- Certificate File

Don’t Muck It Up

- Broken authentication and session management
- Password reset procedures
- Leaking plaintext passwords
- Users with the same password on every site
- Users who fall for phishing
- Malware and keyloggers



Wrapping Up

Apply this knowledge

Next week you should:

- Change YOUR password to something long, complex, and unique to each service
- Do some Google searches for your own company's code and passwords (e.g. GitHub)

In the first three months following this presentation you should:

- Implement a better password policy and enforce it
- Look for incorrect salt usage, use of plain hashes, and weak crypto, and unnecessary backwards-compatibility settings

Within six months you should:

- Disable as much backwards compatibility and outdated crypto as possible
- Use salted KDF or HMACs for all password authentication
- Implement 2-factor or other password alternatives where appropriate

Contact Details

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