

## **Taming the Wild West:** Finding Evil with Cloud-Based Analytical Tools

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### **Outline**

- Understanding a research university
- Unique challenges
- Cloud-based analytics
- Results and lessons learned



## Understanding a research university



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Understanding a research university:

## The University of Arizona by the numbers

- More than 41,000 students
- More than 15,000 employees
- More than \$2 billion annual operating budget
- More than \$625 million in annual research expenditure
- Statewide job and economic impact <sup>(2011)</sup>
  - Combined from University, Health Network, and Tech Park
  - Contributes \$8.3 billion in annual economic impact
  - Creates more than 65,000 direct and indirect jobs

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Understanding a research university:

## UA “Real World” comparisons

- More than \$320 million in credit card sales annually
- Health Network serves 100,000 patients / Level 1 trauma center
- Campus Health serves more than 15,000 patients annually
- Arizona Poison and Drug Information Center
- Power plant generates 30% of electricity; university manages multiple substations including one supporting hospital
- CALEA accredited Police Department with 66 sworn officers and 46 civilian employees, 9-1-1 dispatch
- More than 7,000 residents living in campus housing

Understanding a research university:

## Information technology comparisons

- Highly decentralized: 37 IT departments with 900+ staff
- \$110 million annual IT expenditure (50/50 central and unit)
- 7,600+ wireless access points on main campus
- More than 100,000 BYOD devices during typical week
- Central IT: ERP, core network + Internet, datacenter colocation and hosting, research supercomputers
- Unit IT: manage thousands of servers with little oversight from central IT or security teams

## Understanding a research university: More like a small city!



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## Why are universities targeted?\*

### Sensitive Enterprise Data

- Employee data
- Student records
- Financial data
- Recruitment and marketing data

### Research with Potential Economic Value

- Energy technology
- Biotechnology, medical, and pharmaceuticals
- Engineering
- New materials, such as semi-conductors
- Information technology

### Politically or Commercially Sensitive Information

- Climate modelling
- Economic data and projections
- Live animal research
- Product development data
- Information used for expert testimony

\* Adapted from: Universities UK. "Cyber security and universities: managing the risk." November 2013.

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## Information security challenges

- Decentralized decision making
- Culture focused on idea creation and sharing
- Limited ability to require preventative controls
- High population turnover
- Limited budget and manpower
- And... remember those 37 IT departments?

## Why cloud-based analytical tools?

- Needed visibility without burden on local IT staff
- Limited security staff to deploy and maintain local solution
- Needed to ingest and act on variety of log sources
- Began using Threat Analytics Platform in June 2013
- Techniques here could be done with any SIEM and analytics tool

## Example 1: VPN sessions using compromised user credentials

Used subsearch function

- Search for all usernames with WiFi authentication events
- Search for matching usernames from VPN authentication events with non-US GeolP data
- Group by unique username

Results: Identified 10 – 20 compromised accounts/day




## Example 2: Open Recursive DNS servers participating in DDoS

### Step 1: Identify unusual domains in DNS logs

Search “metaclass” using pivot feature

- Metaclass:DNS combines BIND syslog and DNS grabbed off wire by BRO network sensors
- Group by domain and sort by highest frequency

Results: Visually identify unusual domains



## Example 2: Open Recursive DNS servers participating in DDoS

Step 2: Identify Open DNS Resolvers being queried

SEARCH

September 14, 2014 7:00:00 - September 20, 2014 7:00:00 ☐ QUICK MODE ☒ FAVORITE ☐ RULE SYNTAX HELP

CONTENT: **DSTIPV4 (29)** TIMELINE LOCAL: 2014-09-25T17:46:04-07:00 UTC: 2014-09-26T00:46:04+00:00

HIGHLIGHT:	128.400.00.47	150.110.04.183	150.110.03.97
GEO:	121 185 25,997	11 1 25,844	121 15 25,234
META:	115 142 25,045	11 7 24,041	121 1 19,586
Sort: NEWEST	121 8 19,415	11 1 6,574	121 110 6,385
Show: ALL	121 1 5,970	11 4 5,265	151 13 4,996
View: RAW+PARSED	121 9 4,893	11 12 3,918	121 1 2,034
Select: VISIBLE/NONE	121 10 1,819	11 27 1,711	121 180 1,370
	121 15 1,349	11 1 1,315	121 1 986
	128.199.15.1 954	128.199.96.8 915	128.199.215.94 831

Viewing 1-10 of 755.6k results in 3.8 seconds

1 2 3 4 5 NEXT LAST

## Example 3: Employee direct deposit modification from outside Arizona

Used alert rules

- Search Apache logs for POST method and unique URI string
- Group by username
- Rule runs once each minute

Tuning for false positives

- List of domains to exclude

Results: Investigate 3 – 5 accounts per week

**DIRECT DEPOSIT: MODIFIED FROM OUTSIDE ARIZONA**

**DESCRIPTION:**  
Looks for Employee Self Service web server logs for modifications made to an employee's direct deposit in University's IP range and outside the Arizona region.

**QUERY:**  
class=apache http\_server NOT srcdomain:Signum directdeposit NOT srcip:arizona NOT srcip:univ httpmethod="POST" AND uri="/SOLE\_EMPLOYEE.PY\_IC\_DEP\_GBL.Y"

**DISTINGUISHER:**  
username

**THRESHOLD:**  
1

**INTERVAL:**  
1 minutes

**RULE PACK:**  
Current Events

**CONFIDENCE:**  
Medium

**SEVERITY:**  
High

**RISK:**  
HIGH


## Example 4: Compromised accounts accessing Library resources

Needed to identify compromised accounts downloading material

Built off same technique as compromised VPN search

Leverage additional log sources

- WiFi authentication
- VPN authentication
- Web Single Sign On
- EZProxy authorization



## Example 4: Compromised accounts accessing Library resources

Built custom parsing for EZProxy logs

- Similar to Apache but slight nuances

Used multiple searches with subsearch function

- Identifies accounts logging in from multiple GeoIP regions
- Filters to highlight EZProxy users tagged in broader search

Results: Investigate 2 – 5 compromised accounts/day

```
username:(class:[cisco_vpn,jasig_cas,shibboleth_sso,oclc_ezproxy])
```

```
AND has:srcip4
```

```
AND has:srccountrycode
```

```
not srccountrycode:us
```

```
not srccountrycode:mx
```

```
not srccountrycode:ca
```

```
not action:"authentication_failed"
```

```
not action:"ticket_granting_ticket_not_created"
```

```
not msg:"authentication: rejected"
```

```
AND ((class:[jasig_cas,cisco_vpn,shibboleth_sso,oclc_ezproxy])
```

```
AND (srccountrycode:us OR srcip:"private ip address lan")
```

```
NOT (srcip4:10.138.* OR srcip4:150.135.114.* OR srcip4:150.135.115.*)
```

```
not action:"authentication_failed"
```

```
not action:"ticket_granting_ticket_not_created"
```

```
not msg:"authentication: rejected"
```

```
OR (class:[cisco_acs] AND callid:10.*)
```

```
AND class:oclc_ezproxy | groupby username 1000
```



## Questions?

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