# Supercharging Network Security w/ SIGMA

Nate Guagenti (@neu5ron), SOC Prime

# > (^W^h^Oa^mi /^A^L^I)

- @neu5ron (New-Tron)
- Father
- Employee at SOC Prime
- Author of None, Contributor of Some
  - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma
  - https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/HELK
  - https://github.com/hunters-forge/OSSEM
- Lego Builder



## Agenda

to Gaugeria
Maria

- SIGMA Quick Recap
- Why Zeek or network for that matter
- Use Cases
- Screen sharing

to Gaugest
sudgers
special control of the Care of the

Common language. **Both for detections and search** 



**Detection and rule logic.** One can cover many techniques





Infinite log possibilities





**Infinite community** 

MISP, HELK, SecurityOnion, ATT&CK...



### **NSM** Is Dead....

Near Gu Barrell Anna Caragent description of the Caragent

## Endpoint is unable to cover:

Routers, Switches, Firewalls..

Virtualization (ie: ESXi) servers.

Bios/chip level.

SCADA/ICS. etc...

Nate Guagest females (and the state of the s

## The Goldilogs

Nation Clarge
(Institute Clarg

- conn.log
- dce\_rpc.log
- dhcp.log
- dnp3.log
- dns.log
- dpd.log
- files.log
- ftp.log
- http.log
- irc.log
- kerberos.log
- known\_certs.log
- known\_devices.log
- known\_hosts.log
- known\_modbus.log
- known\_services.log
- modbus\_register\_change.log
- modbus.log
- mysql.log
- notice.log

- ntlm.log
- pe.log
- radius.log
- rdp.log
- rfb.log
- sip.log
- smb\_cmd.log
- smb\_files.log
- smb\_mapping.log
- smtp.log
- snmp.log
- socks.log
- software.log
- ssh.log
- ssl.log
- syslog.log
- traceroute.log
- tunnel.log
- weird.log
- x509.log


- ntp.log
- Lots of community ones
- Scada/ICS from
- MQTT
- Lots of community ones

Mate Gargers

Water Gargers

Water Gargers

# **Zeek Syslog: Logs in Logs**



#### SIGMA: Cisco AAA Crypto to Zeek syslog.log

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco\_cli\_crypto\_actions.yml

# CLI command to try yourself in splunk:

python3 tools/sigmac -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-zeek.yml rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco\_cli\_crypto\_actions.yml # CLI command to try yourself in es-qs (lucene):

python3 tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/logstash-zeek-default-json.yml rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco\_cli\_crypto\_actions.yml

title: Cisco Crypto Commands	1	
id: 1f978c6a-4415-47fb-aca5-736a44d7ca3d	2	
status: experimental		
description: Show when private keys are being exported from the device, or when new cer	t 3	
references:	4	
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145/	5	## Splunk
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130/	6	(sourcetype="bro:syslog:json" ("crypto pki export" OR "crypto pki import" OR "crypto pki
author: Austin Clark	ľ	
date: 2019/08/12		trustpoint"))
	7	
- attack.credential_access	8	
- attack.defense_evasion	1	
- attack.t1130	9	## Elasticsearch Lucene (would work in Kibana search bar too)
- attack.t1145	10	(@stream:"syslog" AND \*.keyword:(*crypto\ pki\ export* OR *crypto\ pki\ import* OR *crypto\
		pki\ trustpoint*))
product: cisco	11	
service: aaa		
category: accounting	12	
efields:	13	
- src	14	
- CmdSet		
- User		
- Privilege_Level		
A - Remote_Address		
detection:		
- 'crypto pki export'		
- 'crypto pki import'		
- 'crypto pki trustpoint'		
condition: keywords	I _	
falsepositives:		
<ul> <li>Not commonly run by administrators. Also whitelist your known good certificates.</li> </ul>	I	
level: high		


#### MITRE BZAR Execution SIGMA Rule View

```
title: MITRE BZAR Indicators for ATT&CK Execution
                                                                       op4:
id: b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aef8-95a24261dd1d
                                                                         endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
description: 'Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an ATT&
                                                                         operation: 'SchRpcRun'
CK-like Execution techniques on the remote system. All credit for
the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to
                                                                         endpoint: 'IWbemServices'
MITRE.'
                                                                         operation: 'ExecMethod'
author: '@neu5ron, @SOC Prime'
                                                                       op6:
date: 2020/03/19
                                                                         endpoint: 'IWbemServices'
references:
                                                                         operation: 'ExecMethodAsync'
    - https://github.com/mitre-attack/
    bzar#indicators-for-attck-execution
                                                                       op7:
tags:
                                                                         endpoint: 'svcctl'
  - attack.execution
                                                                         operation: 'CreateServiceA'
  - attack.t1035
                                                                       op8:
  - attack.t1047
                                                                         endpoint: 'svcctl'
  - attack.t1053
                                                                         operation: 'CreateServiceW'
logsource:
                                                                       op9:
  product: zeek
  service: dce rpc
                                                                         endpoint: 'svcctl'
detection:
                                                                         operation: 'StartServiceA'
  op1:
                                                                       op10:
    endpoint: 'JobAdd'
                                                                         endpoint: 'svcctl'
    operation: 'atsvc'
                                                                         operation: 'StartServiceW'
                                                                       condition: 1 of them
    endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
                                                                     falsepositives:
    operation: 'SchRpcEnableTask'


    - 'Windows administrator tasks or troubleshooting'

  op3:
                                                                         - 'Windows management scripts or software'
    endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
    operation: 'SchRpcRegisterTask'
                                                                     level: medium
```

#### **Uncoder: MITRE BZAR Execution to Splunk**



#### **Uncoder: MITRE BZAR Execution to Elastic Query (Lucene)**



#### **Uncoder: Web Server Multiple Error Caused by Single IP**

Zeek http.log covers all same scenarios as existing Proxy and Web Server rules \o/

```
1 title: Multiple Suspicious Resp Codes Caused by Single Client
2 id: 6fdfc796-06b3-46e8-af08-58f3505318af
 description: Detects possible exploitation activity or bugs in a web
     application
4 author: Thomas Patzke
5 date: 2017/02/19
6 modified: 2020/03/14
7 logsource:
      category: webserver
             - 400
            - 500
       timeframe: 10m
       condition: selection | count() by src_ip > 10
       - Unstable application
       - Application that misuses the response codes
```

```
curl -s -XPUT -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @- localhos
t:9200/ watcher/watch/6fdfc796-06b3-46e8-af08-58f3505318af <<EOF
  "metadata": {
    "title": "Multiple Suspicious Resp Codes Caused by Single Client",
    "description": "Detects possible exploitation activity or bugs in a web
application",
    "tags": "",
    "query": "(@stream:\"http\" AND status code:(\"400\" OR \"401\" OR \"403
\" OR \"500\"))"
  },
  "trigger": {
    "schedule": {
      "interval": "10m"
  },
  <u>"i</u>nput": {
    "search": {
      "request": {
        "body": {
          "size": 0,
          "query": {
            "bool": {
              "must": [
                  "query string": {
                     "query": "(@stream:\"http\" AND status_code:(\"400\" OR
```

#### SIGMA: DCE RPC Enumeration (Elastalert)

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek-dce\_rpc\_domain\_user\_enumeration.yml

# CLI command to try yourself:

python3 tools/sigmac -t elastalert -c tools/config/ecs-zeek-corelight.yml rules/network/zeek/zeek-dce\_rpc\_domain\_user\_enumeration.yml

```
title: Domain User Enumeration Network Recon 01
description: Domain user and group enumeration via network reconnaissance. Seen in APT 29 and oth
                                                                                                   - debug
id: 66a0bdc6-ee04-441a-9125-99d2eb547942
                                                                                                     seconds: 30
   - "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29"
   - "https://qithub.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/37"
                                                                                                   description: Domain user and group enumeration via network reconnaissance
author: 'Nate Guagenti (@neu5ron), Open Threat Research (OTR)'
                                                                                                     . Seen in APT 29 and other common tactics and actors. Detects a set of
date: 2020/05/03
                                                                                                     RPC (remote procedure calls) used to enumerate a domain controller. The
modified: 2020/05/03
                                                                                                      rule was created based off the datasets and hackathon from
   - attack.discovery
                                                                                                     https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29
   - attack.t1087
                                                                                                   doc_type: doc
   - attack.t1082
   product: zeek
   service: dce rpc
                                                                                                          query: (event.dataset:"dce_rpc" AND dce_rpc.operation:
                                                                                                     ("LsarLookupNames3" OR "LsarLookupSids3" OR "SamrGetGroupsForUser" OR
                                                                                                     "SamrLookupIdsInDomain" OR "SamrLookupNamesInDomain" OR
                                                                                                     "SamrQuerySecurityObject" OR "SamrQueryInformationGroup"))
           - LsarLookupNames3 #method translates a batch of security principal names to their $
          - LsarLookupSids3 #translates a batch of security principal SIDs to their name forms
           - SamrGetGroupsForUser #obtains a listing of groups that a user is a member of
                                                                                                   metric_agg_key: dce_rpc.operation.keyword
           - SamrLookupIdsInDomain #method translates a set of RIDs into account names
                                                                                                   metric_agg_type: cardinality
           - SamrLookupNamesInDomain #method translates a set of account names into a set of RID 14
          - SamrQuerySecurityObject #method queries the access control on a server, domain, use 15
                                                                                                   name: 66a0bdc6-ee04-441a-9125-99d2eb547942 0
           - SamrQueryInformationGroup #obtains attributes from a group object
   timeframe: 30s
                                                                                                   query_key: source.ip.keyword
   condition: selection | count(operation) by src_ip > 4
                                                                                                     minutes: 0
   - Devices that may do authentication like a VPN or a firewall that looksup IPs to username
   - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
                                                                                                   type: metric_aggregation
level: medium
status: experimental
```

#### SIGMA: Windows Event ID 5145 Rule Converted to Zeek SMB (Elastalert)

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek-dce\_rpc\_domain\_user\_enumeration.yml

# CLI command to try yourself:

python3 tools/sigmac -t elastalert -c tools/config/ecs-zeek-corelight.yml rules/network/zeek/zeek\_smb\_converted\_win\_lm\_namedpipe.yml

```
title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe - Zeek
1d: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
                                                                                                                        - debug
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral
 movement and remote exec
                                                                                                                        description: This detection excludes known namped pipes
  using named pipes
                                                                                                                         accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones,
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
date: 2020/04/02
                                                                                                                         may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using
   - https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_lm_namedpipe.yml
                                                                                                                           named pipes
   - attack.lateral_movement
   - attack.t1077
                                                                                                                        - query:
   service: smb files
                                                                                                                                query: (event.dataset:"smb_files" AND file.path
                                                                                                                          .keyword:\\*\\IPC$ AND (NOT (file.path.keyword:\\*\\IPC$
                                                                                                                         AND file.name:("atsvc" OR "samr" OR "lsarpc" OR "winreg"
                                                                                                                         OR "netlogon" OR "srvsvc" OR "protected_storage" OR
                                                                                                                          "wkssvc" OR "browser" OR "netdfs" OR "svcctl" OR
                                                                                                                          "spoolss" OR "ntsvcs" OR "LSM_API_service" OR
                                                                                                                          "HydraLsPipe" OR "TermSrv_API_service" OR "MsFteWds"))))
                                                                                                                        index: '*ecs-*'
      - 'protected_storage'
                                                                                                                        name: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad 0
      - 'browser'
                                                                                                                        priority: 2
                                                                                                                          minutes: 0
      - 'ntsvcs'
      - 'LSM_API_service'
                                                                                                                        type: any
      - 'HydraLsPipe'
      - 'TermSrv_API_service'
      - 'MsFteWds'
   condition: selection1 and not selection2
   - update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
```

## SIGMAC (SIGMA Config aka Field Mapping)

https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/tree/master/tools/config

#### # Arcsight

tools/config/arcsight-zeek.yml

#### # Elasticsearch: Lucene, Kibana, Elastalert, Watcher

tools/config/logstash-zeek-default-json.yml (No field rename ECS) tools/config/ecs-zeek-corelight.yml (Corelight ECS) tools/config/ecs-zeek-elastic-beats-implementation.yml (Filebeat ECS)

#### # Splunk

tools/config/splunk-zeek.yml

#### # If your database does not rename fields, it will work as is

Thus no need to write a SIGMAC

#### # More on the way

Nate Guagenti nate@neu5ron. Coming soon for test/use APT 29 Hackathon dataset: <a href="https://zeek.neu5ron.com">https://zeek.neu5ron.com</a>

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