

RSACConference2020

San Francisco | February 24 – 28 | Moscone Center

HUMAN
ELEMENT

SESSION ID: CRYPT-T12


Extending NIST's CAVP Testing of Cryptographic Hash Function Implementations



Nicky Mouha and Christopher Celi

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

#RSAC



About the security content of iOS 13

This document describes the security content of iOS 13.

iOS 13

CoreCrypto

Available for: iPhone 6s and later

Impact: Processing a large input may lead to a denial of service

Description: A denial of service issue was addressed with improved input validation.

CVE-2019-8741: Nicky Mouha of NIST

Entry added October 29, 2019

Apple About the security content of macOS Catalina

support.apple.com/en-us/HT210634

Mac iPad iPhone Watch TV Music

About the security content of macOS Catalina 10.15

This document describes the security content of macOS Catalina 10.15.

macOS Catalina 10.15

CoreCrypto

Available for: MacBook (Early 2015 and later), MacBook Air (Mid 2012 and later), MacBook Pro (Mid 2012 and later), Mac mini (Late 2012 and later), iMac (Late 2012 and later), iMac Pro (all models), Mac Pro (Late 2013 and later)

Impact: Processing a large input may lead to a denial of service

Description: A denial of service issue was addressed with improved input validation.

CVE-2019-8741: Nicky Mouha of NIST

Entry added October 29, 2019

About the security content of watchOS 6

This document describes the security content of watchOS 6.

watchOS 6

CoreCrypto

Available for: Apple Watch Series 3 and later


Impact: Processing a large input may lead to a denial of service

Description: A denial of service issue was addressed with improved input validation.

CVE-2019-8741: Nicky Mouha of NIST

Entry added October 29, 2019

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About the security content of iTunes 12.10.1 for Windows

This document describes the security content of iTunes 12.10.1 for Windows.

iTunes 12.10.1 for Windows

CoreCrypto


Available for: Windows 7 and later


Impact: Processing a large input may lead to a denial of service

Description: A denial of service issue was addressed with improved input validation.

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Entry added October 29, 2019





A decorative graphic consisting of twelve question marks arranged in a circular pattern around the central text. The question marks are in three colors: teal, yellow, and pink. There are four teal question marks, four yellow question marks, and four pink question marks.

CRYPTANALYSIS

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A Little Bit of History...

The LANE hash function

[home](#) | [more information](#) | [submission package](#) | [dutch version](#)

What is LANE?


LANE is a cryptographic hash function that has been entered as a candidate in the [NIST SHA-3 competition](#) by the [COSIC research group](#) of the [Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium](#). The aims of LANE are to be secure, easy to understand, elegant and flexible in implementation. It reuses components from the AES block cipher. LANE can take advantage of the parallelism offered by modern high-performance CPUs, but also scales down to embedded systems. Another advantages of LANE is the fact that its design is supported by a clear design rationale and a comprehensive security analysis.

LANE was designed by Sebastiaan Indesteege. Important contributions to the design and the security analysis were made by Elena Andreeva, Christophe De Cannière, Orr Dunkelman, Emilia Käsper, Svetla Nikova, Bart Preneel and Elmar Tischhauser, all from the COSIC research group of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.

More information on LANE is available [here](#).


The SHA-3 competition

The American [National Institute of Standards and Technology \(NIST\)](#) has initiated a public competition, the [SHA-3 competition](#), to develop a new cryptographic hash algorithm. This is an algorithm that maps a message of variable length into a short, fixed-length digest, such that certain security properties, like collision resistance and preimage resistance, are achieved.




The LANE compression function

SHA-3 Competition Bugs




Two Common Hash Function Interfaces



Q: Where/when are they used?


BLAKE Bug

BLAKE-256: processes message in blocks of 64 bytes




BLAKE Bug

BLAKE-256: processes message in blocks of 64 bytes



BLAKE Bug

BLAKE-256: processes message in blocks of 64 bytes



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Real-World Impact?

Apple CoreCrypto: Hash Functions

- CoreCrypto
 - Cryptographic module in all Apple devices
- Vulnerability
 - Incorrect handling of long (≥ 4 GiB) messages
 - Affects 11/12 hash functions
 - Infinite loop

Algorithm	Block size (in bytes)	Vulnerable
MD2	16	X
MD4	64	✓
MD5	64	✓
RIPEMD-128	64	✓
RIPEMD-160	64	✓
RIPEMD-256	64	✓
RIPEMD-320	64	✓
SHA-1	64	✓
SHA-224	64	✓
SHA-256	64	✓
SHA-384	128	✓
SHA-512	128	✓

Apple CoreCrypto: Vulnerable Code

Lines 75-87 of `ccdigest_update()` in `ccdigest/src/ccdigest_update.c`:

```
// low-end processors are slow on division
if (di->block_size == 1<<6) { // sha256
    nblocks = len >> 6;
    nbytes = len & 0xFFFFffc0;
} else if (di->block_size == 1<<7) { // sha512
    nblocks = len >> 7;
    nbytes = len & 0xFFFFff80;
} else {
    nblocks = len / di->block_size;
    nbytes = nblocks * di->block_size;
}
```

Apple CoreCrypto: Updated (January 2020)

Lines 27-36 of `ccdigest_update()` in `ccdigest/src/ccdigest_update.c`:

```
if (di->block_size == 1<<6) { // md5 & sha1 & sha256
    nblocks = len >> 6;
    nbytes = nblocks << 6;
} else if (di->block_size == 1<<7) { // sha384 & sha512
    nblocks = len >> 7;
    nbytes = nblocks << 7;
} else {
    nblocks = len / di->block_size;
    nbytes = nblocks * di->block_size;
}
```


Apple CoreCrypto: Other Vulnerable Algorithms

- HMAC
- Ed25519
- SRP
 - strlen() on null-terminated string
- ~~ANSI X9.63 KDF~~
 - Not vulnerable due to range check
 - Source code comment: “ccdigest_update only supports 32-bit length”
- ...?

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NIST to the Rescue...


Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)



CAVP: prerequisite for CMVP

ACVP: protocol used by CAVP

Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)



CAVP: prerequisite for CMVP

ACVP: protocol used by CAVP

ACVP JSON Format

Algorithm Functional Test (AFT) request:

```
{  
  "msg": "BCE7",  
  "len": 16  
}
```

AFT response (for SHA-224):

```
{  
  "md": "1FA29E9B23060562F9370453EF817E18C56AE844E5B85F2ED34B4B38"  
}
```

NIST SHAVS Document

- *“While the specification for SHA specifies that messages up to at least $2^{64} - 1$ bits are possible, these tests only test messages up to a limited size of approximately 100,000 bits. This is adequate for detecting algorithmic and implementation errors.”*
 - The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS), NIST

Large Data Test (LDT)

LDT request:

```
{  
  "largeMsg": {  
    "content": "D6F7",  
    "contentLength": 16,  
    "fullLength": 34359738368,  
    "expansionTechnique": "repeating" }  
}
```

LDT response (for SHA-224):

```
{  
  "md": "BA94D02FBE63F0B858AFABF3F98AAED1CD9DE45A2D1120D661214EF1"  
}
```

Apply What You Have Learned Today

- CVE: not end, but beginning
 - Usually: patch and forget
 - Better: avoid systematically
- Discuss bugs in cryptography
 - Dive into your own experience
 - Talk to your colleagues
- Reach out to us!

