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Intel ME: Flash File System Explained

POSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES



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- Introduction
 - What is Intel ME
 - Notes about Flash File System design
- MFS Internals
 - MFS partition structure
 - File extraction
- MFS Usage
 - Special files
 - Integrity, Encryption, Anti-Replay
- Additional Info
 - VFS implementation in ME 11.x




Introduction




blackhat ME Position in Computer System



Intel AMT Release 2.0/2.1/2.2 Architecture








blackhat MFS Partition Layout







ckhat Flash Memory Characteristics



Any byte can be written independently

Need to erase (make all bits=1) before re-writing

• Erasing with precision of block (e.g., 8K) only

- Limited number of guaranteed erase cycles
 - Usually between 10,000 and 1,000,000
 - Inerasable block should be marked as "bad"



ackhat Flash File System Design Goals



- Erase count minimization
 Use incremental modification to avoid redundant erases
- Wear leveling
 Distribute erases between blocks as evenly as possible


Popular Linux Flash File Systems:

- JFFS, JFFS2, and YAFFS
- UBIFS
- LogFS
- F2FS



Recommended Materials







Patents / White Papers / Documentation

Intel ME Secrets

Hidden code in your chipset and how to discover what exactly it does

Igor Skochinsky Hex-Rays

RECON 2014 Montreal





ptresearch / unME11



MFS Internals



blackhat MFS Pagination



MFS is set of fixed-size pages (8192 == 0x2000 bytes each)

System pages

1/12 of total
number of pages

the only page without signature




```
#define MFS_PAGE_SIZE 0x2000
cbMFS = sizeof(MFS); // Size of MFS partition
nPages = cbMFS / MFS_PAGE_SIZE; // Total number of pages

nSysPages = nPages / 12; // Number of System pages
nDataPages = nPages - nSysPages - 1; // Number of Data pages
```



blackhat MFS Page Header




```
typedef struct {
  unsigned __int32 signature; // Page signature == 0xAA557887
  unsigned __int32 USN; // Update Sequence Number
  unsigned __int32 nErase; // How many times page has been erased
  unsigned __int16 iNextErase; // Index of next-to-be-erased page
  unsigned __int16 firstChunk; // Index of first chunk (for Data page)
  unsigned __int8 csum; // Page Header checksum (for first 16 bytes)
  unsigned __int8 b0; // Always 0
} T_MFS_Page_Hdr; // 18 bytes
```



blackhat Page Chunks



Single Chunk (66 bytes)



Chunk# Ox1201

Chunk# Ox1201

Chunk# Ox1201

Chunk# Ox1201

Chunk# Ox1202

Chunk# Ox1203

Chunk# Ox1203

*CCITT CRC-16 calculated from Chunk data + 16-bit (2-byte) Chunk Index

Chunk Index can be derived from (data + crc16) by reversing CRC-16


```
#define MFS_CHUNK_SIZE 0x40
typedef struct {
  unsigned __int8 data[MFS_CHUNK_SIZE]; // Payload
  unsigned __int16 crc16; // Checksum
} T_MFS_Chunk; // 66 bytes
```



blackhat System Pages

Chunk indices stored in axIdx (in obfuscated form)

```
axIdx[i+1] == 0xFFFF for unused slots axIdx[i+1] == 0x7FFF for last used slot
```




hdr	Page header
axIdx[121]	Obfuscated chunk indices
chunks[120]	System chunks

```
#define SYS_PAGE_CHUNKS 120

typedef struct {
   T_MFS_Page_Hdr hdr; // Page header
   unsigned __int16 axIdx[SYS_PAGE_CHUNKS+1]; // Obfuscated indices
   T_MFS_Chunk chunks[SYS_PAGE_CHUNKS]; // System chunks
} T_MFS_System_Page;
```





aFree[i] == 0xFF for unused chunks

starting at hdr.firstChunk

Stores chunks with sequential indices

```
Free chunks map
aFree[122]
              Data chunks
chunks[122]
```

```
#define DATA PAGE CHUNKS 122
typedef struct {
 T MFS Page Hdr hdr; // Page header
 unsigned int8 aFree[DATA PAGE CHUNKS]; // Free chunks map
  T MFS Chunk chunks[DATA PAGE CHUNKS]; // Data chunks
 T MFS Data Page;
```



ackhat Data Area Reconstruction



Each Data chunk is stored exactly once

nDataChunks = nDataPages * 122

Enumerate Data pages

nSysChunks = min(nSysPages, pg.hdr.firstChunk)

Enumerate used chunks within current page

dataChunks[pg.hdr.firstChunk + i] = pg.chunks[i].data



blackhat System Area Reconstruction



Enumerate System pages in USN order

Enumerate all chunks used in the current page


```
Calculate chunk Index (iChunk) from pg.axIdx[i]
sysArea[iChunk*64 : (iChunk+1)*64] = pg.chunks[i].data
```

```
typedef struct {
 unsigned int32 sign; // Volume signature == 0x724F6201
 unsigned int32 ver; // Volume version? == 1
 unsigned int32 cbTotal; // Total volume capacity (System area + Data area)
 unsigned int16 nFiles; // Number of file records
 T MFS Volume Hdr; // 14 bytes
typedef struct {
 T MFS Volume Hdr vol; // Volume header
 unsigned int16 aFAT[vol.nFiles + nDataChunks]; // File Allocation Table
 T MFS System Area;
```



Data Extraction from Files







blackhat MFS Templates from fit.exe



	AFS_region_256K.bin	AFS_region_400K.bin	AFS_region_1272K.bin	
Total pages in MFS	32	50	159	
Number of System pages	2	4	13	
Number of Data pages	29	45	145	
Number of System chunks	119	188	586	
Number of Data chunks	3538	5490	17690	
Number of file slots	256	512	1024	
System area capacity (bytes)	7616	12032	37504	
Data area capacity (bytes)	226432	351360	1132160	



MFS Usage







File #	Description
2, 3	AR (Anti-Replay) table
4	Used for migration after SVN (Secure Version Number) upgrade
5	File System Quota storage (related to $\underline{\text{User Info metadata extension}}$ for vfs module)
6	/intel.cfg file (default state of FS configured by Intel). SHA256 of intel.cfg is stored in System Info manifest extension.
7	/fitc.cfg file (vendor-specific FS configuration). Can be created by platform vendor using Intel's Flash Image Tool (fit.exe).
8	/home/ directory (starting directory for ME files stored in MFS)



blackhat intel.cfg (fitc.cfg) Structure



```
typedef struct
 char name[12]; // File name
 unsigned int16 unused; // Always 0
 unsigned int16 mode; // Access mode
 unsigned int16 opt; // Deploy options
 unsigned int16 cb; // File data length
 unsigned int16 uid; // Owner User ID
 unsigned int16 gid; // Owner Group ID
 unsigned int32 offs; // File data offset
 T CFG Record; // 28 bytes
typedef struct {
 unsigned int32 nRec; // Number of records
 T CFG Record rec[nRec]; // Records
 unsigned int8 data[]; // File data
 T CFG;
```

Bits	Description of mode fields
80	rwxrwxrwx Unix-like rights
9	I Enable integrity protection
10	E Enable encryption
11	A Enable anti-replay protection
1312	d Record type (0: file, 1: directory)
Bits	Description of opt fields
0	F Use data from fitc.cfg
1	M Updatable by mca process
23	?! Unknown [for now]

^{*}Red letters are used on the next slide





name	mode	opt	cb	uid	gid	offset	mode opt path
home	11FF	0000	0000	0000	0000	00003388	drwxrwxrwx /home/
RTFD	13C0	0009	0000	0046	0000	00003388	dIrwx ?F /home/RTFD/
	13C0	0000	0000	0046	0000	00003388	/home/
alert_imm	136D	0001	0000	01F9	01FA	00003388	dIr-xr-xr-xF /home/alert_imm/
AlertImm	03F8	0001	0003	01F9	01FA	00003388	IrwxrwxF /home/alert_imm/AlertImm
	136D	0000	0000	01F9	01FA	00003388	/home/
bup	13F9	0009	0000	0003	0115	00003388	dIrwxrwxx ?F /home/bup/
bup_sku	13C0	0009	0000	0003	0000	00003388	dIrwx ?F /home/bup/bup_sku/
emu_fuse_map	01A0	0009	0000	0003	OOEE	0000338B	rw-r ?F /home/bup/bup_sku/emu_fuse_map
fuse_ip_base	01A0	0009	0000	0003	OOEE	0000338B	rw-r ?F /home/bup/bup_sku/fuse_ip_base
plat_n_sku	01A0	0009	0000	0003	OOEE	0000338B	rw-r ?F /home/bup/bup_sku/plat_n_sku
	13C0	0000	0000	0003	0000	00003388	/home/
ct	01E0	0009	0000	0003	015F	0000338B	rwxr ?F /home/bup/ct
df_cpu_info	01FF	0009	0004	0003	00CE	0000338B	rwxrwxrwx ?F /home/bup/df_cpu_info
invokemebx	01B0	0009	0004	0003	0115	0000338F	rw-rw ?F /home/bup/invokemebx
mbp	01A0	0009	0004	0003	00CE	00003393	rw-r ?F /home/bup/mbp
si_features	01A0	0009	0014	0003	015F	00003397	rw-r ?F /home/bup/si_features
	13F9	0000	0000	0003	0115	00003388	/home/
gpio	13F8	0009	0000	0003	0190	00003388	dIrwxrwx ?F /home/gpio/
csme_pins	01B0	0009	0028	0003	0190	000033AB	rw-rw ?F /home/gpio/csme_pins
	13F8	0000	0000	0003	0190	00003388	/home/
h_res_w	13FF	0001	0000	01FF	01FF	00003388	dIrwxrwxrwxF /home/h_res_w/
hrw_conf	03FF	0001	0000	01F8	01F8	000033D3	IrwxrwxrwxF /home/h_res_w/hrw_conf
	13FF	0000	0000	01FF	01FF	00003388	/home/
hm	136D					00003388	dIr-xr-xr-xF /home/hm/
exceptions	13ED	0001	0000	0205	0208	00003388	dIrwxr-xr-xF /home/hm/exceptions/



blackhat MFS Directory

```
typedef struct {
  unsigned __int32 fileno; // iFS,salt,iFile
  unsigned __int16 mode; // Access mode
  unsigned __int16 uid; // Owner User ID
  unsigned __int16 gid; // Owner Group ID
  unsigned __int16 salt; // Another salt
  char name[12]; // File name
} T_MFS_Folder_Record; // 24 bytes
```

Dum	Dump of home/policy/pwdmgr/directory						
iFile	e fileno	mode	uid	gid	salt	name	size
105:	1 F5BC105	dNIrwxrwx	0055	OOEE	A84D	•	<dir></dir>
0F6:	1 4EBD0F6	dNIrwxrwxx	0055	0115	410C	• •	<dir></dir>
107:	1 0000107	rw	0055	0000	0000	maxattempts	o
108:	1 0000108	rw-r	0055	OOEE	0000	pwdpolicy	0
109:	1 DE0C109	NEIrw-rw	0055	OOEE	C098	segreto	11
10A:	1 000010A	rw	0055	0000	0000	sendpwd	0

Bits	Description of fileno fields
110	iFile (04095)
2712	16 bits of salt
3128	FileSystem ID (always 1)

Bits	Description of mode fields		
80	rwxrwx Unix-like rights		
9	Enable integrity protection		
10	E Enable encryption		
11	A Enable anti-replay protection		
13	N Use non-Intel keys		
1514	d Record type (0: file, 1:		
	directory)		



blackhat Integrity, Encryption, Anti-Replay



If I bit is set, raw file contains additional security blob at the end (52 bytes in length)

Integrity protection also enabled and mandatory for:

- AR tables (iFile == 2, 3)
- /home/ directory (iFile == 8)

```
typedef struct
 unsigned int8 hmac[32]; // HMAC value
 unsigned int32 antiReplay:2; // Anti-Replay
 unsigned int32 encryption:1; // Encryption
 unsigned int32 unk7:7;
 unsigned int32 iAR:10; // Index in AR table
 unsigned int32 unk12:12;
 union {
   struct ar { // Anti-Replay data
     unsigned int32 rnd; // AR Random value
     unsigned int32 ctr; // AR Counter value
   unsigned int8 nonce[16]; // AES-CTR nonce
 T FileSecurity; // 52 bytes
```

HMAC covers file data, security blob (with hmac zeroed), fileno and salt (from directory)



Additional Info



FS Security Keys



There are up to 10 keys involved in FS Security

Intel	Non-Intel
Integrity	Integrity
Curre	nt keys
(for cur	rent SVN)
,	,
Intel	Non-Intel
Confidentiality	Confidentiality

RPMC RPMC HMAC #0 HMAC #1

Replay-Protected Monotonic Counter (RPMC) is optional feature of SPI Flash chip

Intel Integrity	Non-Intel Integrity
	us* keys
(opti	onal)
Intel	Non-Intel
Confidentiality	Confidentiality

*Previous keys are calculated if current SVN > 1 and PSVN partition contains valid data. These keys are used for migrating files created before the SVN was updated.



Crypto Engine / Usage Practices



Features

- HW Engines for AES, RSA, Hash/HMAC
- Secure Key Storage (SKS)
 - Keys 1..11 are 128 bits long
 - Keys 12..21 are 256 bits long
 - Keys can be used by AES/HMAC
 - Keys cannot be extracted
- Direct access to HW Engines/SKS allowed for ROM, bup, and crypto only

Usage

HMAC Key and Wrapping Key are loaded into SKS

To prepare the necessary key:

- Derive it with HMAC*
- Wrap it with AES and store in mem
- Wipe plaintext key

To use wrapped key:

- Unwrap it with AES into SKS
- Use AES/HMAC with SKS linkage

^{*} This is the only moment when the Plaintext Key is available in memory (until wiped)



blackhat Key Derivation and Usage



VFS Confidentiality/Integrity key	Intel	Non-Intel
Never stored on Flash in any form	Yes	Yes
Persists in memory in wrapped form only (SKS key #21)	Yes	Yes
Cannot be unwrapped to memory (SKS only)	Yes	Yes
Depends on SVN value (1-byte)	Yes	Yes
Depends on secret obtained from GEN device	Yes	Yes
Copy of GEN secret wiped in ROM (before passing control to rbe)		Yes
GEN device reading disabled by ROM (before passing control to rbe)	Yes	Yes
GEN secret unavailable under JTAG	Yes	No

Note: Rare module protects files with Intel keys:

sigma, ptt, dal ivm, mca





blackhat File System Types in VFS



iFS	Name	Description
0	root	Defined in vfs. Can hold up to 1024 entries. Initially contains /, /dev/, /etc/, /etc/rc, /temp/
1	home	Handles files from MFS, supports security features.
2	bin	Maps modules from Code Partition Directory (\$CPD).
3	susram	Defined in bup and vfs. Uses 3072 bytes of NV Suspend RAM.
4	fpf	Defined if fpf. Not available in Server Platform Services firmware.
5	dev	Maps devices from Special File Producer metadata extension.
6	umafs	Never seen any references to this



Black Hat Sound Bytes



 Physical access (to SPI chip) allows R/W access to ME Flash File System content (as raw files). fitc.cfg can also be modified in an arbitrary way.

2. Intel has developed a sophisticated and flexible security model to protect against various types of attacks on data-at-rest.

3. Knowing the GEN secret for non-Intel keys (just 16 bytes) permits R/W access to most data stored in MFS (for any SVN). Code execution in bup permits access to everything (for current SVN) by re-calculating keys.



ckhat Thanks! Questions?



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