

#### 淺談Android APP之攻防思維



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Attack Vector



## Outline

Vulnerability数 V.S 防

Android N

C P NOW OANS LOD



# App 營收排行

#	By Downloads	Company			By Revenue	Company			
1	□ LINE (ライン)	<b>&amp;</b> 1	LINE (ライン)	•	1	© LINE(ライン)	-	LINE (ライン)	
2	§ snow	<b>A</b> 38	NAVER		2	Clash of Kings	-	Elex Technology (智明星通)	7
_	SHOW	#70	15PSF MAIS					37Wam	7
3	Facebook	▲2	Facebook [		3	Loong Craft (六龙争霸)	-	EFUN (易幻) Tencent (監讯)	12
4	Facebook Messenger	<b>A</b> 3	Facebook [		4	🌇 Seven Knights (세본나이츠)	-	Netmarble (넛마블)	(0)
5	(意) Shopee (鰕皮拍賣)	<b>▲</b> 4	Garena Online	-	5	MARVEL Future Fight	<b>▲</b> 32	Netmarble (넷마블)	36
6	(国 Lucky KoKo (五元奪寶)	<b>A</b> 21	5 Dollars Trading		6	▼ The King of Fighters' 98 Ultimate Match (拳皇98冬极之战)	<b>A</b> 1	Tencent (類讯) Smart Alec (阿達馬數位) OurPalm (掌趣)	9
7	(第三国)	<b>±</b>	Digital Sky Entertainment (成都数字天空科技)	,	7	(ash Royale	▼2	Supercell	4
8	高 LINE Manga (LINE マンガ)	*	LINE (ライン)	•	8	(記) Tower of Saviors (神麗之塔)	<b>45</b>	Mad Head	
9	(艾尔战记)	New Release	Kunlun (昆仑万维)	2	9	蠽 Everybody's Marble (모두의마불)	<b>\$</b> 2	Netmarble (気마를) LINE (ライン) Tencent (勝讯)	.00 .00
10	📥 Clean Master (借約清理大师)	<b>4</b> 3	Cheetah Mobile (借約移动)	2	10	Clash of Clans	▼2	Supercell	+

App Annie: http://cn.blog.appannie.com/taiwan-next-billion-dollar-market/

Related Report:

App Annie Index Reports

App Annie Rank: https://www.appannie.com/indexes/all-stores/rank/overall/?month=2016-05-01&country=TW



Source: App Annie Intelligence

# 台灣為什麼特別?









## APP Attack Vector

Sensitive Data Storage

No Encryption / Weak Encryption

Improper SSL Validation


Config Manipulation

Dynamic Runtime Injection

**Unintended Permissions** 

**Escalated Privileges** 


Access to Device / User Info





## Android Vulnerability Scanner












## Apps in the Browser





## Woodpecker in Android







## Android-CVE



#	CVE ID	CWE ID	# of Exploits	Vulnerability Type(s)	Publish Date	Update Date	Score	Gained Access Level	Access	Complexity	Authentication	Conf.	Integ.	Avail.
1 CVE-	2016-4477	19		DoS +Priv	2016-05-09	2016-05-10	4.4	None	Local	Medium	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
				eject \n and \r characters i SET, (2) SET_CRED, or (3)			th allows lo	ocal users to trigg	ger arbitrar	y library loadin	g and consequently	gain priviles	ges, or cause	a denial o
2 CVE-	2016-2500	200		+Info	2016-06-12	2016-06-15	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Partial	None	None
	danager in An on, aka intern			.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and	6.x before 2016	5-06-01 does no	ot properly	terminate proces	ss groups,	which allows at	tackers to obtain s	ensitīve infor	mation via a	crafted
3 <u>CVE-</u>	2016-2499	200		+Info	2016-06-12	2016-06-14	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Partial	None	None
				rver in Android 4.x before n, aka internal bug 278551		ore 5.0.2, 5.1.x	before 5.	1.1, and 6.x befo	re 2016-06	-01 does not in	itialize certain data	, which allow	s attackers to	o obtain
4 CVE-	2016-2498	200		Bypass +Info	2016-06-12	2016-06-14	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Partial	None	None
ne Qual	lcomm Wi∹Fi d	friver in A	ndroid before	e 2016-06-01 on Nexus 7 (	2013) devices a	illows attackers	to bypass	intended data-ac	cess restri	ctions via a cra	fted application, ak	ca internal bu	g 27777162.	
5 <u>CVE-</u>	2016-2496	264			2016-06-12	2016-06-14	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complet
	nework UI per aka internal b			nentation in Android 6.x be	fore 2016-06-01	L allows attacke	rs to cond	udt tapjacking att	acks and a	ocess arbitrary	private-storage file	es by creatin	g a partially (	overlappin
6 <u>CVE-</u>	2016-2495	20		DoS	2016-06-12	2016-06-14	7.1	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	None	None	Complet
-	able.cpp in lib t) via a crafte			erver in Android 4.x before 1 28076789.	4.4.4, 5.0.x bei	fore 5.0.2, 5.1.x	before 5.	1.1, and 6.x befo	re 2016-06	5-01 allows rem	ote attackers to ca	use a denial	of service (d	evice han
7 <u>CVE-</u>	2016-2494	264		+Priv	2016-06-12	2016-06-14	9.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complet
				id 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x t ccess, aka internal bug 28		1.x before 5.1.1	, and 6.x l	pefore 2016-06-0	1 allows at	tackers to gain	privileges via a cra	afted applicat	ion, as demo	nstrated l
8 <u>CVE-</u>	2016-2493	264		+Priv	2016-06-12	2016-06-14	9.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complet
	dcom Wi-Fi d bug 26571522		idroid before	2016-06-01 on Nexus 5, 1	lexus 6, Nexus	6P, Nexus 7 (20	)13), Nexu	s Player, and Pix	el C device	s allows attack	ers to gain privileg	es via a craft	ed applicatio	n, aka
9 <u>CVE-</u>	2016-2492	264		+Priv	2016-06-12	2016-06-16	9.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complet
te Medi	iaTek power-r	manageme	ent driver in	Android before 2016-06-01	on Android On	e devices allow	s attackers	to gain privilege	es via a cra	fted application	, aka internal bug	28085410.		
0 <u>CVE-</u>	2016-2491	264		+Priv	2016-06-12	2016-06-14	9.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complet
ne NVII	DIA camera di	river in An	droid before	2016-06-01 on Nexus 9 d	evices allows at	tackers to gain	privileges	via a crafted app	lication, ak	a internal bug :	27556408.			
1 CVE-	2016-2490	264		+Priv	2016-06-12	2016-06-14	9.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complet
ne NVIE	DIA camera de	river in An	idroid before	2016-06-01 on Nexus 9 d	evices allows at	tackers to gain	privileges	via a crafted app	olication, ak	a internal bug :	27533373.			
2 CVE-	2016-2489	264		+Priv	2016-06-12	2016-06-14	9.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complet
ne Qual	comm video	driver in A	ndroid befor	e 2016-06-01 on Nexus 5,	5X, 6, and 6P d	levices allows a	ttackers to	gain privileges v	/ia a crafte	d application, a	ka internal bug 274	107629.		
3 CVE-	2016-2488	<u> 264</u>		+Priv	2016-06-12	2016-06-14	9.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complet
ne Qual	comm camer	a driver in	Android bet	ore 2016-06-01 on Nexus	5, 5X, 6, 6P, an	d 7 (2013) devi	ces allows	attackers to gain	privileges	via a crafted a	pplication, aka inte	rnal bug 276	00832.	
4 CVE-	2016-2487	20		+Priv	2016-06-12	2016-06-13	9.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complet
				before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before ! ccess, aka internal bug 27		ore 5.1.1, and 6	x before :	2016-06-01 allow	s attackers	to gain privileg	ges via a crafted ap	pplication, as	demonstrate	d by





## Android N Security

#### 網路安全設定

- 自訂信任錨點
- 僅偵錯覆寫
- 退出明碼流量
- 憑證關聯

#### APK 簽章配置第2版

• 全檔案簽章配置,改善驗證速度並增強完整性

#### 限定範圍目錄存取

• 存取特定外部儲存空間目錄



## 攻 V.S. 防





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## Code Analysis

#### 反編譯 apk 檔

- 主要的 Activity
- Application 類

Smali 檔 - baksmali產生

Dex 檔結構 – Dalvik字串碼

Jar檔 – dex2jar產生

#### Tools

Androguard \ IDA pro \ dex2jar \ jd-gui \ apktool





# 反編譯apk檔

# APP名稱

- META-INF
- res
- AndroidManifest.xml
- classes.dex
- resources.arsc
- smali





## 反編譯apk檔

Online apk檔: <a href="http://www.ludaima.cn/android.html">http://www.ludaima.cn/android.html</a>

Android apk decompiler: <a href="http://www.decompileandroid.com">http://www.decompileandroid.com</a>







## Smali檔格式

.field 權限 修飾關鍵字 字串名:字串類型

# instance fields

.field public final a:Landroid/content/Context;

.field public final b:Ljp/naver/line/android/util/b;






## Smali檔格式

#### .method 訪問權限 修飾子 方法名稱

```
# direct methods
.method protected onDestroy()V
  .locals 1
  .prologue
  .line 86
  invoke-super {p0},
Ljp/naver/line/android/common/CommonBaseActivity;>onDestroy()V
  invoke-virtual (v0), Ljp/naver/line/android/util/b;->a()V
  .line 89
  return-void
.end method
```



## Dex檔結構



## 對抗反編譯



#### 編譯失敗,使工具無法反編譯

- Ex: apktool \ baksmali \ dex2jar
- 查看來源碼,是否存在Bug?
- 壓力測試:測試大量的apk,尋找編譯器異常的錯誤訊息
- Anti dex2jar(0.0.7.8): <a href="https://github.com/jltxgcy/AntiCrack/tree/master/Antidex2jar">https://github.com/jltxgcy/AntiCrack/tree/master/Antidex2jar</a>

#### 編譯成功,使得到的代碼並不是正確的



## 靜態技術



#### 代碼混淆

- ProGuard (Android 2.3版起) [1] \ DexGuard [2] \ APKfuscator [3] \ DashO [4]
- DexProtector [5] \ Shield4J [6] \ Stringer [7] \ Allitori [8]

#### NDK保護

• 將邏輯寫在C / C++實現

#### 加殼保護

- 代碼加密, Ex: upx or sstriping
- loader: /system/bin/linker
- System.LoadLibrary

#### JNI佈密鑰







#### 優點

- 可讀性變差
- 全面掌控代碼的難度增加
- 壓縮代碼

#### 击共黑占

- 無法真正保護代碼不被反編譯
- 動態debug時失效
- 驗證本地簽名容易bypass



## 對抗混淆



#### Dex-oracle

 https://github.com/CalebFenton/dexoracle

## Simplify

https://github.com/CalebFenton/simplify


## Bytecode-viewer

 https://github.com/konloch/bytecodeviewer





## Android加殼的原理







## Android加殼步驟

#### Checksum

• 使用alder32 演算法再除去 magic 及 checksum

## Signature

使用 SHA-1 演算法再除去 magic, checksum 和 signature

### File\_size





## Android加殼步驟





## 重新編譯



#### 檢查簽名

- 在 JAVA 端檢測簽名 [9]
- PackageManager的 getPackageInfo()
- 可比對 hashCode()

#### 完整性檢驗

- 檢查 classes.dex 的 Hash [10]
- 檢查 META-INF 底下的 MANIFEST.MF



## 反動態分析



#### Debugger, Ex: GikDbg: <a href="http://gikir.com/product.php">http://gikir.com/product.php</a>

- 限制debugger連接,若偵測到連接則停止執行
- 加入android:debuggable="false"
- android.os.debug.isdebuggerconnected()

#### Trace檢查

- 父行程、行程狀態檢查
- 比較 ptrace 返回值
- 設置 app 執行最大的時間
- 檢查 filedescriptor
- 防止 dump
- 對read做hook

# # getprop getprop [ro.secure]: [0] [ro.allow.mock.location]: [1] [ro.debuggable]: [1] [persist.service.adb.enable]: [1] [ro.kernel.qemu]: [1] [ro.kernel.console]: [tty\$0] [ro.kernel.android.checkjni]: [1] [ro.kernel.android.gemud]: [tty\$1] [ro.kernel.ndns]: [2] [ro.factorytest]: [0] [ro.serialno]: [] [ro.botmode]: [unknown]


#### 模擬器

- adb shell getprop
- ro.product.model:sdk or google\_sdk
- ro.build.tags:test-keys
- ro.kernel.qemu:1
- 判斷IMEI



# JNI佈密鑰







## JNI佈密鑰



## Signature – JNI版

• JAVA版6行....

## Checksum - JNI版

- 程式邏輯和流程已知
- 散在判斷式
- Memory Point



# 經濟學問題





密鑰重要



付出時間



軟體成本



駭客關注





## Conclusion

設置障礙,阻礙通行

安全等級

Server端存簽名和CRC碼

SO檔加殼



## 附錄



- [1] http://proguard.sourceforge.net/index.html#manual/examples.html
- [2] https://www.guardsquare.com/dexguard
- [3] <a href="https://github.com/strazzere/APKfuscator">https://github.com/strazzere/APKfuscator</a>
- [4] https://www.preemptive.com/products/dasho/overview
- [5] https://dexprotector.com
- [6] https://java.net/projects/shield4j
- [7] https://jfxstore.com/stringer
- [8] http://www.allatori.com
- [9] https://github.com/jltxgcy/AntiCrack/tree/master/CheckSignature
- [10] https://github.com/jltxgcy/AntiCrack/tree/master/CheckCRC



## Q and A

