OSINT Investigation Report

TryHackMe - OhSINT (practice)

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 $\textbf{Engagement type: } \ \mathrm{OSINT} \ / \ \mathrm{Cyber \ Investigation} \ (\mathrm{CTF\text{-}style})$

Scope: Identify target information from provided artefacts (image, pages).

Tester: Freelance beginner pentester

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Executive Summary

This document reports the open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigation performed for the TryHackMe *OhSINT* challenge. The objective was to extract and correlate publicly-available information from the provided artefact (an image) and related web resources to identify the target's digital footprint.

Key results (derived from the provided image and subsequent investigation):

- EXIF metadata in the image revealed a copyright owner: **OWoodflint**.
- Wireless BSSID discovered in the image metadata: **B4:5D:50:AA:86:41**; SSID correlated via Wigle.net: **UnileverWifi**.
- Public GitHub profile located under the name **OWoodflint**; personal email found: **OWoodflint**@gmail.com.
- Personal blog/WordPress page located at https://oliverwoodflint.wordpress.com/author/owoodflint/indicating the subject was on holiday in New York.
- A hidden (white-on-white) string in the WordPress page source was discovered and used as a password: **pennYDr0pper.!**

The lab goal (to find the target-related data) was completed using these OSINT techniques.

1 Scope and Rules of Engagement

Scope

- Target: OhSINT challenge artefacts provided by TryHackMe (image file and linked resources).
- Objective: Extract identifying information using OSINT techniques and public resources.
- Engagement type: Educational / CTF-style.

Rules of Engagement

- Only publicly-available data and resources were used.
- No brute-force or intrusive actions were performed against third-party services.
- Findings are for training/educational purposes only.

2 Methodology

The investigation followed a straightforward OSINT workflow:

- 1. **Artifact analysis:** Extract metadata from the provided image.
- 2. **Lookup and correlation:** Use discovered identifiers (BSSID, names) on public directories (e.g., Wigle, search engines).
- 3. **Profile discovery:** Locate public profiles and pages (GitHub, WordPress).
- 4. Source analysis: Inspect page source for hidden strings or additional information.
- 5. Consolidation: Correlate discoveries into a concise target profile.

Primary tools used:

- $\bullet~$ Wigle.net correlate BSSID to observed SSID
- $\bullet~$ Web browser and ${\tt view-source}$ inspect pages and hidden content
- Public search engines and GitHub for profile discovery

3 Findings

Finding #1 — Image metadata (EXIF) reveals copyright owner and BSSID

Summary:

The provided image (Windows XP background) contained EXIF metadata revealing an owner-ship string and a wireless BSSID — useful starting points for OSINT correlation.

Command / Evidence:

exiftool XP.jpg

Relevant metadata extracted (as observed):

• Copyright: **OWoodflint**

• Wireless BSSID: **B4:5D:50:AA:86:41**

Impact: Metadata embedded in images can leak personally-identifying information (PII) or infrastructure identifiers that allow further linkage to online profiles and network infrastructure.

Remediation:

- Strip EXIF and other metadata from images before sharing publicly (e.g., exiftool -all=image.jpg).
- Educate users about metadata leakage and implement sanitization in publishing pipelines.

Finding #2 — BSSID correlated to SSID via Wigle.net

Summary:

The wireless BSSID found in the image metadata was looked up on Wigle.net to identify an associated SSID.

Evidence / Result:

- BSSID: **B4:5D:50:AA:86:41**
- Correlated SSID (via Wigle.net): UnileverWifi

Impact: Publicly-exposed network identifiers can reveal infrastructure ownership or physical site information which aids in profiling a subject's location or employer.

Remediation:

- Avoid publishing images that contain network identifiers.
- Use generic SSIDs where appropriate and avoid embedding infrastructure details in public content.

Finding #3 — Public profile (GitHub) and contact email

Summary:

A public GitHub profile matching the extracted name/handle was located, and a personal email address was discovered on that profile.

Evidence / Result:

- GitHub handle / profile owner: **OWoodflint**
- Email address located on GitHub: OWoodflint@gmail.com

Impact: Email addresses and profile links enable direct correlation to other platforms and facilitate targeted social engineering if misused.

Remediation:

- Use contact forms or project-specific addresses rather than personal emails on public profiles.
- Consider using a privacy-focused email or separate work email for public profiles.

Finding #4 — Personal blog (WordPress) and location hint

Summary:

The target's WordPress author page was located and contained a mention that the subject was on holiday in New York — a useful contextual detail for profiling.

Evidence / URL:

- Author page: https://oliverwoodflint.wordpress.com/author/owoodflint/
- Observed note: Subject stated they were on holiday in New York (as presented on that page).

Impact: Public posts about travel or location can reveal real-world whereabouts which may be sensitive.

Remediation:

- Avoid posting real-time location information publicly.
- Post travel updates selectively or after returning.

Finding #5 — Hidden password string in page source

Summary:

The HTML source of the WordPress page contained a string styled (white-on-white) so it was invisible in the rendered page. This string functioned as a password discovered during the investigation.

Evidence / Command:

- Inspect page source via browser (View \rightarrow Page Source) or developer tools.
- Hidden string (password) discovered: **pennYDr0pper.!**

Impact: Embedding passwords or sensitive tokens in page source (even hidden) is a major information exposure and can enable unauthorized access if used as credentials elsewhere.

Remediation:

- Never embed passwords, API keys, or secrets in HTML, CSS or client-side scripts.
- Use server-side authentication and secure secret management for credentials.
- Perform code reviews to identify inadvertently published secrets.

4 Conclusion

The OhSINT lab effectively demonstrates how small artefacts (image metadata, network identifiers, or hidden strings in page source) can be correlated to build a clear profile of a subject. Using only publicly-available information and simple tools (exiftool, Wigle lookup, browser source inspection), the investigation uncovered:

Owner/handle: OWoodflintBSSID: B4:5D:50:AA:86:41

• SSID: UnileverWifi

• Email: OWoodflint@gmail.com

• Location hint: Holiday in New York (from WordPress author page)

• Hidden password in page source: pennYDr0pper.!

These results complete the OhSINT challenge scope. The recommendations above (strip metadata, avoid embedding secrets in client-side content, and limit public exposure of contact/location details) will reduce the risk of similar information leakage in real-world scenarios.

Appendix — Commands and Notes

• Image metadata extraction:

exiftool XP.jpg

- BSSID lookup (example service used): Wigle.net
- Page source inspection: browser View Source or developer tools
- Profiles visited: GitHub (handle: OWoodflint), WordPress author page at https://oliverwoodflint.wordpress.com/author/owoodflint/

Contact and Notes

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This report documents an OSINT training exercise executed in the TryHackMe OhSINT lab. All findings are derived from the provided artefacts and publicly-available resources.