

1. In the following normal-form game, what strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria?

C列和B行被剔除

	L	C	R
T	2,0	1,1	4,2
M	<u>3,4</u>	1,2	2,3
B	1,3	0,2	3,0

[M, L]和 [T, R] 是纯策略均衡.

混合策略就对了.

2. Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the following normal-form game.

没.

	L	R
T	2,1	0,2
B	1,2	3,0

3. Each of two firms has one job opening. Suppose that the firms offer different wages: firm i offers the wage W_i , where $(1/2)W_1 < W_2 < 2W_1$. Imagine that there are two workers, each of whom can apply to only one firm. The workers simultaneously decide whether to apply to firm 1 or to firm 2. If only one worker applies to a given firm, that worker gets the job; if both workers apply to one firm, the firm hires one worker at random and the other worker is unemployed (which has a payoff of zero). Solve for the Nash equilibria of the workers' normal-form game.

		Worker 2	
		Apply to Firm 1	Apply to Firm 2
Worker 1	Apply to Firm 1	$(1/2)W_1, (1/2)W_1$	W_1, W_2
	Apply to Firm 2	W_2, W_1	$(1/2)W_2, (1/2)W_2$

纯 / 混