得函数.
求偏导得0
画图,
看顶点

1. A monopolist can produce at a constant average (and marginal) cost *AC = MC = 5*. The market demand curve is *Q = 53-P*.
(1) Calculate the monopolist's profit-maximizing price and output, and calculate its profit.
(2) Assume that a second vendor joins the market. The output of the first manufacturer is Q_1, and the output of the second manufacturer is Q_2. Market demand function is now $Q_1 + Q_2 = 53 - P$. The second manufacturer has the same cost as the first manufacturer. Calculate the profit of each manufacturer (as a function of Q_1 and Q_2).
(3) Find the "response curve" of each manufacturer. (Assume that each firm chooses its profit-maximizing production level, when its competitor's output is given).
(4) Calculate Cournot equilibrium. What is the market price? What is the profit of each manufacturer? (That is, calculate the value of Q_1, Q_2, P, and the profit of each manufacturer based on question (2) and (3))
(5) Now there are N manufacturers in this industry, each has the same cost *AC = MC = 5*. Find Cournot equilibrium. How many products each manufacturer will produce? What will the market price be? And how much profits each manufacturer will make? Also, prove that when N becomes larger, the market price is close to the price under perfect competition.

2. Consider the Bertrand duopoly model with homogeneous products. Suppose that the quantity that consumers demand from i is $a-p_i$ when $p_i < p_j$, 0 when $p_i > p_j$, and $(a - p_i)/2$ when $p_i = p_j$. Suppose also that there are no fixed costs and that marginal costs are constant at c, where $c < a$. Show that if the firms choose prices simultaneously, then the unique Nash equilibrium is that both firms charge the price c.

3. The game being played is the one shown below; call this the “true” game

		2: L	2: R
1	T	6, 3	0, 9
	B	3, 3	3, 0

Player 1 knows that she is playing this game, while Player 2 is uncertain as to whether she is playing this game or a different game, shown below, where the payoffs of Player 1 are different:

		2: L	2: R
1	T	0, 3	3, 9
	B	3, 3	0, 0

画格子.
划线

	TaTb	TaBb	BaTb	BaBb
L	3 6 0	3 3 0	3 6 3	3 3 3
R	9 0 3	6 3 3	3 0 0	0 3 0

一 纯策略的纳什均衡

混合策略的纳什均衡不考虑

For convenience, refer to the "true game" as the game where Player 1 is of type *b* and the "different game" as the game where Player 1 is of type *a*.

Suppose that Player 2 assigns probability $\frac{2}{3}$ to Player 1 being of type *a* and probability $\frac{1}{3}$ to Player 1 being of type *b*. Find a Nash equilibrium.

古诺竞争

4. Consider a Cournot duopoly operating in a market with inverse demand $P(Q) = a - Q$, where $Q = q_1 + q_2$ is the aggregate quantity on the market. Both firms have total costs $c_i(q_i) = cq_i$, but demand is uncertain: it is high ($a = a_H$) with probability θ and low ($a = a_L$) with probability $1-\theta$. Furthermore, information is asymmetric: firm 1 knows whether demand is high or low, but firm 2 does not. All of this is common knowledge. The two firms simultaneously choose quantities. What are the strategy spaces for the two firms? Make assumptions concerning a_H, a_L, θ, and c such that all equilibrium quantities are positive. What is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game?

Q_1在High. Q_1在low Q_2求期望. 都求1阶导. 难点在化简

5. The following static game of complete information (Matching Pennies) has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium but has one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium: each player plays *H* with probability $\frac{1}{2}$.

		2: H	2: T
1	H	1, -1	-1, 1
	T	-1, 1	1, -1

Provide a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a corresponding game of incomplete information such that as incomplete information disappears, the players' behavior in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium approaches their behavior in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the original game of complete information.

Hint: Consider the following Bayesian game in which t_1 and t_2 are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, *x*].

分别设2者的临界值., 用x表达出二者临界值.

		2: H	2: T
1	H	$1+t_1$, -1	-1, $1-t_2$
	T	-1, 1	1, -1

补充.1.

$P=a-bQ$.　　C_1　C_2.

两家边际生产成本.

序贯博弈.

firm 1. 先确定

firm 2 后确定. 2知道1的产量.

1) 先求均衡.　　2) 求序贯博弈均衡.

答: (1). 均衡时　$Q总=Q_1+Q_2$.

$$P=a-b(Q_1+Q_2).$$

$$\pi_1=[a-b(Q_1+Q_2)-C_1]\cdot Q_1.$$

$$\pi_2=[a-b(Q_1+Q_2)-C_2]Q_2.$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial Q_1}=$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi_2}{\partial Q_2}=$$

2) 序贯博弈.

先考虑firm 2. 得 $Q_2=$ Q_1和abc

将Q_2作为常数代入原式 求确系 得Q_1

由于2知1的信息. 所以2可知1在选Q_1时的自己的最优决策

那也就是说对于给定的Q_1都有一个最优的Q_2. 那么1也可以把2的产量也知道了. 就能算了.

2. $\theta \in [0,1]$. θ是报价

$b_i(\theta_i) = \alpha_i \theta_i$. α是报价策略，是固定的值.