Hercules project






Using COTS multicore for real-time embedded systems



Provide predictable timing guarantees when multiple cores may contend for shared resources, like memory and L2 cache.

Hercules project: architecture









Jetson TX1

GPU: NVIDIA Maxwell ™, 256 CUDA cores Quad ARM® A57 16-way set associative 2MB L2 cache Pseudo-random replacement policy No lockdown mechanism

Erika Enterprise

First open-source RTOS certified for automotive (OSEK/VDX)


Implements the AUTOSAR OS SC1 API

Open-source GPL and commercial licenses http://www.erika-enterprise.com
https://github.com/evidence/erika3

Hercules project: architecture







- Porting of the RTOS open-source ERIKA Enterprise on TX1/TX2/Ultrascale
- Porting the Jailhouse hypervisor on Nvidia Jetson TX1/TX2
- Implementing GRUB-PA in Linux kernel


Jailhouse partitioning Hypervisor based on Linux (https://github.com/siemens/jailhouse)

Our goal: Extend Jailhouse to schedule memory accesses and divide shared L2 cache

Hercules project: PREM model









Tasks divided into chunks of execution Each chunk has two phases:

- A memory phase (M-phase)
 needed instruction and data are
 pre-fetched into local memory (e.g. cache)
- An execution phase (C-phase) tasks execute with no conflicts

PREM Compiler support needed

Rodolfo Pellizzoni, Emiliano Betti, Stanley Bak, Gang Yao, John Criswell, Marco Caccamo, Russell Kegley: A Predictable Execution Model for COTS-Based Embedded Systems.

Björn Forsberg, Andrea Marongiu, Luca Benini: GPUguard: Towards supporting a predictable execution model for heterogeneous SoC


Goals





PREM: During memory phase data must be prefetched into L2 cache

I How to divide set-associative cache among different cores => cache coloring
II How to use pseudo-random replacement policy in deterministic way => preventive invalidation



Jetson TX1

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Cache coloring in Jailhouse

Cache coloring




The cache is physically indexed.

The cache set index is assigned based on the memory address.

Physical memory pages are "colored" so that pages with different "colors" have different positions in CPU cache memory.


ARM A-57 2MB L2 cache 16 ways

Index = Address % 128KB 2MB/16=128KB



ARM Virtualization Extension





John Goodacre: Hardware Accelerated Virtualization in the ARM Cortex Processors

Cache coloring in Jailhouse




- memory region structure for memory locations of a given color
- image loading mechanism for non continuous memory regions
- automatic color generation as a function of cache parameters.

Paolo Modica, Alessandro Biondi, Giorgio Buttazzo, Anup Patel: Supporting Temporal and Spatial Isolation in a Hypervisor for ARM Multicore Platforms

Cache coloring in Jailhouse: LMbench



Memory Latency Benchmark - Coloured Hypervisor




Memory Depth (MB)



Preventive Invalidation


Pseudo-random cache





Pseudo-random cache: self-eviction





8-way set associative cache

4 Data in use (green), 4 stall data (grey)

Prefetching new data: 50% chances to evict data that is in use


Pseudo-random cache: measure self-eviction



```
map Data_1, Data_2, ..., Data_16 to the different memory regions with the same index
```


Pseud-random cache: measure self-eviction





Pseudo-random cache: preventive invalidation





8-way set associative cache

4 Data in use (green), 4 empty ways (blue)

Prefetching new data: 100% chances to avoid eviction of data in use


Pseudo-random cache: preventive invalidation



```
map Data_1, Data_2, ..., Data_16 to the different memory regions with the same index
for(way=0; way<16; way++) {
        DC CISW, ((way << 28) + (index << 6) + 0x02);
PRFM PLDL2KEEP, Data_1;
PRFM PLDL2KEEP, Data 2;
PRFM PLDL2KEEP, Data 3;
PRFM PLDL2KEEP, Data 16;
DSB ISH;
for(way=0; way<16; way++) {
        RAMINDEX = (0x10 << 24) + (way << 18) + (index << 6);
        SYS #0, c15, c4, #0, RAMINDEX;
```


Pseudo-random cache: preventive invalidation






Benchmark – Heapsort (from Linux kernel)








Benchmark: two iterations of linked list





16

Pseudo-random cache: worst-case behavior



- Clean and Invalidate: every next access hit
- No Clean and Invalidate: every next access miss probability of 15 self-evictions in row (16 prefetches, each next evicting previous data) is very low: (1/16)¹⁵
- Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis probability of the worst-case behaviors can be upper bounded at extremely low levels which are below the maximum permissible failure rate (e.g. 10⁻⁹ per hour)

Benjamin Lesage, David Griffin, Sebastian Altmeyer, Liliana Cucu-Grosjean, Robert I. Davis: On the analysis of random replacement caches using static probabilistic timing methods for multi-path programs.

Sebastian Altmeyer, Robert I. Davis: On the correctness, optimality and precision of Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis.

Sebastian Altmeyer, Liliana Cucu-Grosjean, Robert I. Davis: Static probabilistic timing analysis for real-time systems using random replacement caches.

Conclusions





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- 1. Erika Enterprise ported on TX1/TX2/Ultrascale
- 2. Jailhouse ported on TX1/TX2
- 3. PREM compiler support
- 4. Cache coloring in Jailhouse
- 5. Preventive invalidation for pseudo-random caches
- 6. Automotive and avionic use cases















Conclusions





Thank you

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