

# How I started chasing speculative type confusion bugs in the kernel and ended up with 'real' ones

Jakob Koschel

PhD student @ Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam









We'll start with some **Spectre** background

followed by an interesting case study

revealing more 'real' bugs in the **list iterators** 



```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

$$i = 0$$

```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

$$i = 0$$

```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

$$i = 0$$

```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

$$i = 1$$

```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

$$i = 2$$

```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

$$i = 3$$

```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

$$i = 4$$

```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

$$i = 5$$

```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```


$$i = 6$$

```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

$$i = 63$$

```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

?



```
char msg[128] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 128; i ++) {
                                         count += 1;
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

?



But what if the CPU is not right?

Can we fool the **Branch** Predictor?



## Misprediction

```
char msg[129] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 129; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

#### Cache

## Misprediction

```
char msg[129] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 129; i ++) {
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```

?

$$i = 129$$

#### Cache

#### Misprediction

```
char msg[129] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 129; i ++) {
                                         count += 1;
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
```




#### Cache

### Misprediction

```
char msg[129] = "LPCLPCLPCLPCLPC...\0";
int count = 0;
// calculate length of string
for (int i = 0; i < 129; i ++) {
                                        cour
    if (msg[i] != '\0') {
        count += 1;
    } else {
        break;
                                           i = 129
```

```
x = get user(ptr);
if (x < size) {
  y = arr1[x];
  z = arr2[y];
```



```
x = get user(ptr);
if (x < size) {
  y = arr1[x];
  z = arr2[y];
```

```
= get user(ptr);
if (x < size) {
  y = arr1[x];
  z = arr2[y];
```

```
get_user(ptr);
if ( size) {
  y = arr1[x];
  z = arr2[y];
```

A Spectre V1 gadget

```
get_user(ptr);
if ( size) {
  y = arr1[x];
  z = arr2[y];
```







arr1
























































```
lfence on copy-from-user:
 static bool user_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len)
    if (unlikely(!access_ok(ptr,len)))
        return 0;
    __uaccess_begin_nospec();
    return 1;
LINUX
```


Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022




# What defenses are deployed in the kernel?








```
static __always_inline bool do_syscall_x64(struct pt_regs *regs, int nr)
     unsigned int unr = nr;
     if (likely(unr < NR_syscalls)) {</pre>
         unr = array_index_nospec(unr, NR_syscalls);
         regs->ax = sys_call_table[unr](regs);
         return true;
     return false;
LINUX
Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022
```








# What defenses are deployed in the kernel?




For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets.






# What defenses are deployed in the kernel?



For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.






We can do better.

So Brian Johannesmeyer and I started with a **dynamic analysis approach** in 2019.





```
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
   char *prog = malloc(100);
   strcpy(prog, argv[1]);
   execve(prog,
          (char *[]){prog, 0},
          environ);
```

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
   char *prog = malloc(100);
   strcpy(prog, argv[1]);
   execve(prog,
          (char *[]){prog, 0},
          environ);
```

Taint Source

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
   dfsan_add_label(user, argv[1],
     strlen(argv[1]));
   char *prog = malloc(100);
   strcpy(prog, argv[1]);
   execve(prog,
          (char *[]){prog, 0},
          environ);
```

Taint Source


```
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
   dfsan_add_label(user, argv[1],
     strlen(argv[1]));
   char *prog = malloc(100);
   strcpy(prog, argv[1]);
   execve(prog,
          (char *[]){prog, 0},
          environ);
```

Taint Propagation

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                      dfsan_add_label(user, argv[1],
                         strlen(argv[1]));
Taint Source
                      char *prog = malloc(100);
                      strcpy(prog, argv[1]);
                      execve(prog,
                              (char *[]){prog, 0},
                              environ);
Taint Sink
```

Taint Propagation

Violation detected!







Compiler-based dynamic taint analysis in the kernel?

We've built **KDFSAN** for this project!

https://github.com/vusec/kdfsan-linux/tree/kdfsan-linux-v5.13.7



Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022

```
void syscall_handler(int x) {
    ...
    if (x < size) {
        y = arr1[x];
        z = arr2[y];
    }
}</pre>
```

1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

```
void syscall_handler(int x) {
    ...
    if (x < size) {
        y = arr1[x];
        z = arr2[y];
    }
}</pre>
```


1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

```
x = 3 \qquad x = 100000
void syscall handler(int x) {
  if (x < size) {
    y = arr1[x];
    z = arr2[y];
```


1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

```
x = 3 \qquad x = 100000
void syscall handler(int x) {
  if (x < size) {
    y = arr1[x];
    z = arr2[y];
```


1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface



1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface




1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface



1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation



1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation

```
x = 3 \qquad x = 100000
void syscall handler(int x) {
  if (x < size) {
    y = arr1[x];
    z = arr2[y];
```


1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation

```
x = 3 x = 100000
void syscall handler(int x) {
  if (x < size) {
    y = arr1[x];
    z = arr2[y];
```


1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation




1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation



1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation



2. Add an attacker label

```
void syscall_handler(int x) {
    ...
    if (x < size) {
        z = arr1[x];
        z = arr2[y];
    }
}</pre>
```

4. Memory error detector identifies unsafe access

1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation

5. Add a secret label

```
x = 3 x = 100000
                                      2. Add an attacker
                                      label
void syscall handler(int x) {
  if (x < size)
                                    4. Memory error
  y = arr1[x];
                                    detector identifies unsafe
    z = arr2[y];
                                    access
```

1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation

5. Add a secret label

```
x = 3 x = 100000
                                      2. Add an attacker
                                      label
void syscall handler(int x) {
  if (x < size)
                                    4. Memory error
  y = arr1[x];
                                    detector identifies unsafe
    z = arr2[y];
                                    access
```

1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation


5. Add a secret label

```
x = 3 \qquad x = 100000
                                        2. Add an attacker
                                        label
void syscall handler(int x) {
  if (x < size)
                                     4. Memory error
  y = arr1[x];
                                     detector identifies unsafe
    z = arr2[y];
                                     access
```

1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation

5. Add a secret label




6. Cache interference detector identifies gadget

1. **Fuzz** the syscall interface

3. Start speculative emulation

5. Add a secret label



6. Cache interference detector identifies gadget

 $x = 3 \qquad x = 100000$ 1. Fuzz the syscall interface 2. Add an attacker label 3. Start void syscall handler(int x) { speculative emulation if (x < size) 4. Memory error y = arr1[x];detector identifies unsafe z = arr2[y];access 5. Add a secret label 6. Cache interference detector identifies gadget 7. Revert speculative operations


#### Our approach:


 $x = 3 \qquad x = 100000$ 1. Fuzz the syscall interface 2. Add an attacker label 3. Start void syscall handler(int x) { speculative emulation (x < size)4. Memory error = arr1[x];detector identifies unsafe z = arr2[y];access 5. Add a secret label 6. Cache interference detector identifies gadget 7. Revert speculative operations






Kasper runtime libraries








Kasper runtime libraries




Build the kernel with Kasper's LLVM passes


Kasper-instrumented kernel



Fuzz the kernel so that Kasper reports gadgets at runtime







#### Background: the list iterator


```
#define list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member)
for (pos = list_first_entry(head, typeof(*pos), member);
   !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member);
   pos = list_next_entry(pos, member))
```

#### Background: the list iterator

```
#define list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member)
   for (pos = list_first_entry(head, typeof(*pos),
                                                    member);
        !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member);
                                                       pos
        pos = list_next_entry(pos, member))
                                                             Data*
```


Next


Prev





Data\*


Prev Next















Iteration 1





List head














Iteration 3 (termination)

```
!list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member);
                                                             pos = list_next_entry(pos, member))
pos
                                         Data*
                                                                          Data*
   Prev
            Next
                                              Next
                                                                               Next
                                     Prev
                                                                       Prev
```


List head

#define list\_for\_each\_entry(pos, head, member)

typeof(\*pos), member);

for (pos = list\_first\_entry(head,

Iteration 3 (misprediction)



#define list\_for\_each\_entry(pos, head, member)

typeof(\*pos), member);


for (pos = list\_first\_entry(head,


Next

Iteration 3 (misprediction)




Prev






List head

Iteration 3 (misprediction)



#define list\_for\_each\_entry(pos, head, member)


Iteration 3 (misprediction)



List head

#define list\_for\_each\_entry(pos, head, member)


Iteration 3 (misprediction)



List head


#define list\_for\_each\_entry(pos, head, member)

Iteration 3 (misprediction)




List head


Iteration 3 (misprediction)




Iteration 3 (misprediction)



List head




List head



Finally, we implemented a **proof-of-concept exploit** of an instance of this gadget.

But that's just the **beginning of the story**...






#### How can we fix this?








# The iterator variable is invalidated at the end of the loop.

But 450+ locations use it after the loop.



Linux

Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022




# But 450+ locations use it after the loop.

\$ make coccicheck COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/iterators/use\_after\_iter.cocci

./arch/arm/mach-mmp/sram.c:54:6-10: ERROR: invalid reference to the index variable of the iterator on line 48 ./arch/arm/plat-pxa/ssp.c:54:6-9: ERROR: invalid reference to the index variable of the iterator on line 44 ./arch/arm/plat-pxa/ssp.c:78:6-9: ERROR: invalid reference to the index variable of the iterator on line 68 ./block/blk-mq.c:4481:11-13: ERROR: invalid reference to the index variable of the iterator on line 4472 ./drivers/block/rbd.c:776:16-27: ERROR: invalid reference to the index variable of the iterator on line 766 ./drivers/dma/at\_xdmac.c:1583:13-17: ERROR: invalid reference to the index variable of the iterator on line 1571



Linux
Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022






Let's look at **architectural** bugs now.

No speculation beyond this point...




asm("lfence");






### It looks safe, right?



```
struct goku_request
                     *req;
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
   if (&req->req == _req)
       break;
if (&req->req != _req) {
   ret = -EINVAL;
   goto out;
```



Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022






#### Does it still look safe?



```
struct goku_request
                     *req;
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
   if (&req->req == _req)
       break;
if (&req->req != _req) {
   ret = -EINVAL;
   goto out;
```




Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022




List head

118


```
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
    if (&req->req == _req)
        break;
}
if (&req->req != _req) {
    ...
}
```




```
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
    if (&req->req == _req)
        break;
}
if (&req->req != _req) {
    ...
}
```




```
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
    if (&req->req == _req)
        break;
}
if (&req->req != _req) {
    ...
}
```



```
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
    if (&req->req == _req)
        break;
}
if (&req->req != _req) {
    ...
}
```




```
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
    if (&req->req == _req)
        break;
}
if (&req->req != _req) {
    ...
}
```



After loop

```
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
    if (&req->req == _req)
        break;
}
if (&req->req != _req) {
    ...
}
```




After loop



```
req
```


queue

```
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
    if (&req->req == _req)
        break;
}
if (&req->req != _req) {
    ...
}
```




#### After loop


List head




```
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
    if (&req->req == _req)
        break;
}
if (&req->req != _req) {
    ...
}
```



#### After loop




```
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
    if (&req->req == _req)
        break;
}
if (&req->req != _req) {
    ...
}
```





#### After loop

List head




```
list_for_each_entry(req, &ep->queue, queue) {
    if (&req->req == _req)
        break;
}
if (&req->req != _req) {
    ...
}
```







## Type Confusion in C




• container\_of() is performed on the list\_head which is not
contained in a struct






#### Type Confusion in C




• container\_of() is performed on the list\_head which is not
contained in a struct

• it resembles an **invalid downcast** in object oriented programming






#### Type Confusion in C



- container\_of() is performed on the list\_head which is not contained in a struct
- it resembles an **invalid downcast** in object oriented programming
- that's why we call it a type confusion












### Quotes from Linus




Make the rule be "you never use the iterator outside the loop".







#### Quotes from Linus



Make the rule be "you never use the iterator outside the loop".

The whole reason this [...] bug can happen is that we [...] didn't have C99-style "declare variables in loops".





#### Quotes from Linus




Make the rule be "you never use the iterator outside the loop".

The whole reason this [...] bug can happen is that we [...] didn't have C99-style "declare variables in loops".

"we could finally start using variable declarations in for-statements"




Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022










```
struct goku_request  *req = NULL, *iter;
list_for_each_entry(iter, &ep->queue, queue) {
   if (&iter->req == _req) {
       req = iter;
       break;
if (!req) {
   ret = -EINVAL;
   goto out;
 Linux
 Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022
```





#### Moving the kernel to modern C

By Jonathan Corbet February 24, 2022 Despite its generally fast-moving nature, the kernel project relies on a number of old tools. While critics like to focus on the community's extensive use of email, a possibly more significant anachronism is the use of the 1989 version of the C language standard

for kernel code — a standard that was codified before the kernel project even began over 30 years ago. It is looking like that longstanding practice could be coming to an end as soon as the 5.18 kernel, which can be expected in May of this year.


#### Linked-list concerns

The discussion started with this patch series from Jakob Koschel, who is trying to prevent speculative-execution



Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022

https://lwn.net/Articles/885941/




Submitting patches is **fun but very time intensive**.

Around 80 patches have been merged so far.








~300 locations still use the list iterator after the loop!

Patching has to be done one by one.



Linux

Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022






Treewide changesets is **a tricky entry** to submitting patches.

Same bugs will need different fixes depending on the maintainer.







Knowing how to split them into pieces is **difficult**.


Different subsystems have **different rules**.



Linux
Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022








There might be more type confusions in the kernel.

Maybe it's time for a new scanner...



Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022





Any use of container\_of() can potentially result in a type confusion...

Detecting those is ongoing work.





... ended up with real type confusion bugs

and caused the kernel to move to a **more modern version of C**.

Thank you!



Plumbers Conference | Dublin, Ireland Sept. 12-14, 2022



Jakob-Koschel



@JakobKoschel



j.koschel AT vu DOT nl

