ROP

Return Oriented Programming




whoami

- briansp8210
- 交通大學資工系大二
- 喜歡學習 pwn 題的相關技巧 XD



Review

- When a program use some dangerous input method like gets()
 or scanf("%s", buf) ..., buffer overflow may happen!
- By x86 calling convention, return address is stored at EBP+4, padding proper length then we can control the program!



Function Epilogue:


```
mov esp, ebp
pop ebp
ret
```

← ESP EBP-8 → AAAA EBP-4 \rightarrow AAAA **EBP** AAAA EBP+4 → Target_Address EBP+8 →

這份投影片裡用<mark>黃字</mark>標示的指令代表剛跑 完這條指令,準備去跑下一條了。

Function Epilogue:

```
mov esp, ebp
pop ebp
ret
```



Function Epilogue:

```
mov esp, ebp
pop ebp
ret
```

0x41414141 ← EBP

AAAA AAAA AAAA ← ESP Target_Address

Function Epilogue:

```
mov esp, ebp
pop ebp
ret
```

0x41414141 ← EBP

Target_Address ← EIP

AAAA AAAA AAAA Target_Address **ESP** \leftarrow

What is the next step?

ret2text

Return to shellcode

Return to libc

ROP

What is the next step?

ret2text

Return to shellcode

ret2libc

ROP

ret2text

 When PIE (Position Independent Executable) is enable, program will be loaded to random address, we can't predict where to return.

```
080485fd <secure>:
80485fd:
                                                                                >>> print ELF('ret2text').checksec()
80485fe:
               89 e5
                                              ebp,esp
                                       mov
                                                                                              Partial RELRO
               83 ec 28
                                                                                RELRO:
                                              esp,0x28
8048600:
                                              DWORD PTR [esp],0x0
8048603:
               c7 04 24 00 00 00 00
                                                                                Stack:
               e8 61 fe ff ff
                                              8048470 <time@plt>
804860a:
                                       call
                                                                                              NX enabled
                                                                                NX:
804860f:
               89 04 24
                                              DWORD PTR [esp],eax
                                       mov
8048612:
               e8 99 fe ff ff
                                              80484b0 <srand@plt>
                                                                                PIE:
                                       call
8048617:
               e8 c4 fe ff ff
                                       call
                                              80484e0 <rand@plt>
804861c:
               89 45 f4
                                              DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],eax
000007eb <secure>:
7eb:
       55
                              push
7ec:
       89 e5
                              mov
                                    ebp,esp
       53
7ee:
                              push
                                    ebx
                                                                            >>> print ELF('ret2text with PIE').checksec()
7ef:
       83 ec 24
                                    esp,0x24
                                                                            RELRO:
                                                                                         Partial RELRO
7f2:
       e8 c9 fe ff ff
                                    6c0 < _x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
                                                                            Stack:
7f7:
       81 c3 09 18 00 00
                                    ebx,0x1809
7fd:
      c7 04 24 00 00 00 00
                                    DWORD PTR [esp],0x0
                                                                            NX:
                                                                                         NX enabled
804:
       e8 d7 fd ff ff
                              call
                                    5e0 <time@plt>
                                                                            PIE:
                                                                                         PIE enabled
       89 04 24
                                    DWORD PTR [esp],eax
809:
       e8 1f fe ff ff
                              call
                                    630 <srand@plt>
       e8 4a fe ff ff
                              call
                                    660 <rand@plt>
811:
                                    DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],eax
816:
       89 45 f4
```

If not, we can use desirable program code to do exploit!

ret2text

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
void secure(void)
   int secretcode, input;
   srand(time(NULL));
   secretcode = rand();
   scanf("%d", &input);
   if(input == secretcode)
       system("/bin/sh");
   main(void)
   setvbuf(stdout, OLL, 2, OLL);
   setvbuf(stdin, OLL, 1, OLL);
   char buf[100];
   printf("There is something amazing here, do you know anything?\n");
   gets(buf);
   printf("Maybe I will tell you next time !");
   return 0;
```

What is the next step?

ret2text

Return to shellcode

ret2libc

ROP

 When memory address isn't marked as non-executable, we can send shellcode to it and return to its address to run our

shellcode.

```
08048000-08049000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 928493
08049000-0804a000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 928493
0804a000-0804b000 rwxp 00001000 08:01 928493
09df9000-09e1a000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
f7599000-f759a000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
f759a000-f7746000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 3014705
f7746000-f7747000 ---p 001ac000 08:01 3014705
f7747000-f7749000 r-xp 001ac000 08:01 3014705
f7749000-f774a000 rwxp 001ae000 08:01 3014705
f774a000-f774e000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
f776d000-f776f000 r--p 00000000 00:00 0
f776f000-f7770000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0
f7770000-f7792000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 3014701
f7792000-f7793000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
f7793000-f7794000 r-xp 00022000 08:01 3014701
f7794000-f7795000 rwxp 00023000 08:01 3014701
ffd96000-ffdb7000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
```

```
We can both write and execute here!
```

```
CSC/ROP/return_to_shellcode/return_to_shellcode
oot/CSC/ROP/return_to_shellcode/return_to_shellcode
/root/CSC/ROP/return_to_shellcode/return_to_shellcode
[heap]
```

```
/lib32/libc-2.23.so
/lib32/libc-2.23.so
/lib32/libc-2.23.so
/lib32/libc-2.23.so
[vvar]
[vdso]
/lib32/ld-2.23.so
/lib32/ld-2.23.so
/lib32/ld-2.23.so
[stack]
```

>>> print ELF('return_to_shellcode').checksec()

RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: No canary foun
NX: NX disabled

PIE: No PIE

```
finclude <stdio.h>
finclude <string.h>
char buf2[100];
int main(void)
   setvbuf(stdout, OLL, 2, OLL);
   setvbuf(stdin, OLL, 1, OLL);
   char buf[100];
   printf("No system for you this time !!!\n");
   gets(buf);
   strncpy(buf2, buf, 100);
   printf("bye bye ~");
   return 0;
```

buf2 →

0x2f68686a

•••••

.....

0x4141cd80

0x41414141

•••••

data buffer

0x80485a8 <main+123> DWORD PTR [esp],0x804a080 mov call 0x8048420 <strncpy@plt> DWORD PTR [esp],0x8048680 0x80485af <main+130> 0x80485b4 <main+135> mov call 0x80483c0 <printf@plt> 0x80485bb <main+142> 0x80485c0 <main+147> eax,0x0 mov 0x80485c5 <main+152> leave 0x80485c6 <main+153> ret

....

AAAA

AAAA


AAAA

buf2

•••••

system stack





← EIP

Begin to run our shellcode!!

0x804a080		push	0x68
0x804a082	<buf2+2></buf2+2>	push	0x732f2f2f
0x804a087	<buf2+7></buf2+7>	push	0x6e69622f
0x804a08c	<buf2+12></buf2+12>	push	0xb
0x804a08e	<buf2+14></buf2+14>	рор	eax
0x804a08f	<buf2+15></buf2+15>	mov	ebx,esp
0x804a091	<buf2+17></buf2+17>	xor	ecx,ecx
0x804a093	<buf2+19></buf2+19>	cdq	
0x804a094	<buf2+20></buf2+20>	int	0x80
0x804a096	<buf2+22></buf2+22>	inc	ecx
0x804a097	<buf2+23></buf2+23>	inc	ecx

•••••

AAAA

AAAA

AAAA

buf2

.....

← ESP

data buffer

system stack

What is the next step?

ret2text

Return to shellcode

ret2libc

ROP

 Observe normal function call strcpy (Destination, Source);

```
mov DWORD PTR [esp+0x4],0x804a020
mov DWORD PTR [esp],0x804a035
call 80482f0 <strcpy@plt>
```

Source address: 0x804a020

Destination address: 0x804a035



 Observe normal function call strcpy (Destination, Source);

Source address: 0x804a020

Destination address: 0x804a035



• Observe normal function call strcpy (Destination, Source);

```
mov DWORD PTR [esp+0x4],0x804a020
mov DWORD PTR [esp],0x804a035
call 80482f0 <strcpy@plt>
.....
```

Source address: 0x804a020

Destination address: 0x804a035

destination address

source address
.....

 Observe normal function call strcpy (Destination, Source);

```
mov    DWORD PTR [esp+0x4],0x804a020
mov    DWORD PTR [esp],0x804a035
call    80482f0 <strcpy@plt>
.....
```

Source address: 0x804a020


Destination address: 0x804a035

return address

destination address

source address
.....


- When calling a function, there will be some needed information on stack.
- If we know a function's address, we can fake a function call by return to the function with proper value on stack.



- Put needed value on stack when buffer overflow .
- After returning to the function, it can fetch right data from right position, just like a normal function call!




- Put needed value on stack when buffer overflow .
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
leave
ret
system()


return address
after system() return


address of "/bin/sh"


```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
char *shell = "/bin/sh";
char buf2[100];
/oid secure(void)
   int secretcode, input;
   srand(time(NULL));
   secretcode = rand();
   scanf("%d", &input);
   if(input == secretcode)
       system("shell!?");
   main(void)
   setvbuf(stdout, OLL, 2, OLL);
   setvbuf(stdin, OLL, 1, OLL);
   char buf1[100];
   printf("RET2LIBC >_<\n");</pre>
   gets(buf1);
   return 0;
```

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
tinclude <time.h>
char buf2[100];
void secure(void)
   int secretcode, input;
   srand(time(NULL));
   secretcode = rand();
   scanf("%d", &input);
   if(input == secretcode)
       system("no_shell_QQ");
   main(void)
   setvbuf(stdout, OLL, 2, OLL);
   setvbuf(stdin, OLL, 1, OLL);
   char buf1[100];
   printf("Something surprise here, but I don't think it will work.\n");
   printf("What do you think ?");
   gets(buf1);
   return 0;
```









ASLR and libc address

- With ASLR, the base address of libc is randomized each time we execute a program.
- We can't predict the function's address we want to use and return to it, except those used by this program.

08048000-08049000 08049000-0804a000 0804a000-0804b000 08dc2000-08de3000 f75a6000-f75a7000	rp rw-p rw-p	00000000 00001000 00000000	08:01 08:01 00:00	928487 928487 0	/root/CSC/ROP/ret2tex /root/CSC/ROP/ret2tex /root/CSC/ROP/ret2tex [heap]
f75a7000-f7753000	r-xp	00000000	08:01	3014705	/lib32/libc-2.23.so
f7753000-f7754000	p	001ac000	08:01	3014705	/lib32/libc-2.23.so
f7754000-f7756000	rp	001ac000	08:01	3014705	/lib32/libc-2.23.so
f7756000-f7757000	rw-p	001ae000	08:01	3014705	/lib32/libc-2.23.so
f7757000-f775b000					
f777a000-f777c000					[vvar]
f777c000-f777d000	r-xp	00000000	00:00	0	[vdso]
f777d000-f779f000	r-xp	00000000	08:01	3014701	/lib32/ld-2.23.so
f779f000-f77a0000	rw-p	00000000	00:00	0	
f77a0000-f77a1000	rp	00022000	08:01	3014701	/lib32/ld-2.23.so
f77a1000-f77a2000	rw-p	00023000	08:01	3014701	/lib32/ld-2.23.so
ffa90000-ffab1000	rw-p	00000000	00:00	0	[stack]

How to find functions' offset

- The offset of a function in a libc will be fixed.
- Function's address will be libc base + function's offset.
- readelf or pwntools can help you find the offset!

```
192: 001288b0
                91 FUNC
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
                                           12 getnetbyname r@GLIBC 2.0
    0007a400
                82 IFUNC
                                           12 strncmp@@GLIBC 2.0
193:
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
                                                                               >>> from pwn import *
194:
    000fd0e0
               607 FUNC
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
                                           12 getnetbyname r@@GLIBC 2.1.2
                                                                               >>> libc = ELF('libc.so.6')
    000fd860
               211 FUNC
                                           12 getprotoent r@@GLIBC 2.1.2
195:
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
                                           12 svcfd create@@GLIBC 2.0
196:
    001175a0
                17 FUNC
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
                                                                                    '/root/CSC/ROP/libc.so.6'
197: 000e3d20
                                          12 ftruncate@@GLIBC 2.0
                58 FUNC
                                 DEFAULT
                           WEAK
                                                                                    Arch:
                                                                                                 i386-32-little
    00128970
                53 FUNC
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
                                           12 getprotoent r@GLIBC 2.0
198:
                                                                                    RELRO:
                                                                                                 Partial RELRO
    00081150
                44 FUNC
                                          12 strncpy gg@@GLIBC 2.1.1
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
199:
                                                                                                Canary found
    0010f4c0
               138 FUNC
                                           12 xdr unixcred@@GLIBC 2.1
                                                                                    Stack:
200:
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
    00029730
                                           12 dcngettext@@GLIBC 2.2
                72 FUNC
                          WEAK
201:
                                 DEFAULT
                                                                                    NX:
                                                                                                 NX enabled
    0010cd50
               125 FUNC
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
                                          12 xdr rmtcallres@@GLIBC 2.0
202:
                                                                                    PIE:
                                                                                                 PIE enabled
    00064da0
               421 FUNC
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
                                           12 IO puts@@GLIBC 2.0
203:
                                                                               >>> print hex(libc.symbols['strncmp'])
    001075d0
               242 FUNC
                                           12 inet nsap addr@@GLIBC 2.0
204:
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
    00106de0
               286 FUNC
                                           12 inet aton@GLIBC 2.0
205:
                           WEAK
                                 DEFAULT
                                                                               0x7a400
    000e4890
                                           12 ttyslot@@GLIBC 2.0
               217 FUNC
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
206:
                                                                               >>>
207: 001aa8dc
                                           32 rcmd errstr@@GLIBC 2.0
                 4 OBJECT
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
                                           12 wordfree@@GLIBC 2.1
208: 000d7dd0
                90 FUNC
                          GLOBAL DEFAULT
```

readelf -s file_name


How to find libc's base address

 For those dynamically linked program, when a function is called once, its address in libc will be written to its GOT entry.

file file_name

ret2text: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-linux.so.2, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[:

objdump -d file_name



<strcpy@got.plt> , this entry will store :

next instruction in <strcpy@plt>
if strcpy haven't been called yet .

strcpy()'s address in libc! if strcpy have been called.


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objdump -d file_name



<strcpy@got.plt> , this entry will store :

next instruction in <strcpy@plt> if strcpy haven't been called yet .

strcpy()'s address in libc !
if strcpy have been called .

How to find libc's base address

- We can use puts to leak a function's address store in GOT entry.
- Subtract this function's offset in libc from the leaked address, we can get libc's base address!
- Then we can know each function's address:
 libc base + function's offsets

ret2libc

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
char buf2[100];
/oid secure(void)
   int secretcode, input;
   srand(time(NULL));
   secretcode = rand();
   scanf("%d", &input);
   if(input == secretcode)
       puts("no shell QQ");
   main(void)
   setvbuf(stdout, OLL, 2, OLL);
   setvbuf(stdin, OLL, 1, OLL);
   char buf1[100];
   printf("No surprise anymore, system disappeard QQ.\n");
   printf("Can you find it !?");
   gets(buf1);
   return 0;
```

What is the next step?

ret2text

Return to shellcode

ret2libc

 Try to use gadgets, some machine instruction sequences which end with ret, to achieve our goal.

8048729:	83 c4 1c	add	esp,0x1c
804872c:	5 b	pop	ebx
804872d:	5e	pop	esi
804872e:	5f	pop	edi
804872f:	5d	pop	ebp
8048730:	c 3	ret	

For example, this is a gadget comes from <__libc_csu_init>

..... return address ••••• ••••• •••••

AAAA

gadget1

gadget2

Oxdeadbeef


gadget3

.....





leave ret







leave ret









Find available gadgets

- ROPgadget can help you find gadgets.
- Usage:

```
ROPgadget --binary file_name
ROPgadget --binary file_name --opcode opcode
```

Gadgets information

```
0x080488a3 : adc al, 0x41 ; ret
0x08048560 : add al, 0x24 ; inc eax ; mov al, byte ptr [0xd0ff0804] ; leave ; ret
0x0804859d : add al, 0x24 ; inc eax ; mov al, byte ptr [0xd2ff0804] ; leave ; ret
0x080485c8 : add al, 8 ; add ecx, ecx ; ret
0x08048564 : add al, 8 ; call eax
0x080485a1 : add al, 8 ; call edx
0x08048548 : add al, 8 ; cmp eax, 6 ; ja 0x8048557 ; ret
0x080486c0 : add byte ptr [eax], al ; add byte ptr [eax], al ; leave ; ret
0x080486c1 : add byte ptr [eax], al ; add cl, cl ; ret
0x08048438 : add byte ptr [eax], al ; add esp, 8 ; pop ebx ; ret
0x080486c2 : add byte ptr [eax], al ; leave ; ret
0x080488a0 : add cl, byte ptr [eax + 0xe] ; adc al, 0x41 ; ret
0x080486c3 : add cl, cl ; ret
0x0804889c : add eax, 0x2300e4e ; dec eax ; push cs ; adc al, 0x41 ; ret
0x080485c5 : add eax, 0x804a064 ; add ecx, ecx ; ret
0x08048582 : add eax, edx ; sar eax, 1 ; jne 0x804858f ; ret
0x080485ca : add ecx, ecx ; ret
```

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
char *shell = "/bin/sh";
int main(void)
   setvbuf(stdout, OLL, 2, OLL);
   setvbuf(stdin, OLL, 1, OLL);
   char buf[100];
   printf("This time, no system() and NO SHELLCODE!!!\n");
   printf("What do you plan to do?\n");
   gets(buf);
   return 0;
```

Reference

- ROP
- Mechanisms preventing buffer overflow
- pwntools packing and unpacking of strings
- ROPgadget
- Linux syscall reference

Practice

- train.cs.nctu.edu.tw
 - ret2libc
 - > ROP
- secprog.cs.nctu.edu.tw
 - > 10/21 practice BOF1
 - ➤ 10/21 practice BOF2
 - > 10/21 practice BOF3
 - > 11/4 practice BOF4
 - > 11/4 practice BOF6