



TENCENT SECURITY CONFERENCE 2018  
2018腾讯安全国际技术峰会

# Secure Foundation for connected devices – Platform Security Architecture

Samuel Chiang

Sn BD Director, IoT Line of Business



# Agenda


- + IoT – What is an IoT device
- + IoT attack surfaces
- + Introducing Platform Security Architecture
- + Security counter-measures
- + Development platforms for PSA designs








# Anatomy of IoT devices






# IoT – Still the wild west?

- Unregulated, no common standards
- Inconsistent approach to security
- Immature and fragmented end markets with diverse requirements



**Jeep hack**



**Mirai Botnet  
DDoS attack**



**Owlet baby  
monitor**



**St Jude's  
pacemaker**




# What is Platform Security Architecture?






# Introducing Platform Security Architecture (PSA)

- A recipe for building more secure systems from analysis to implementation






# The PSA onion model of security by isolation





# PSA consists of three parts







TENCENT SECURITY CONFERENCE 2018  
2018腾讯安全国际技术峰会

# Threat Modelling



# Analyze: Analysis of security threats and risks

- *Understand application security requirements*
  - What do I need to protect against ?
  - What are the attack vectors?
  - What are the security objectives?
  - What are the security requirements?
  - What solutions can provide the requirements?
- **Security designed in from the start**

## Analyze




Threat models  
& security analyses








# Security is a balance...





# Threat modelling considers “How much security







# STRIDE threat model

## Spoofing identity

- illegally accessing and then using another user's authentication information

## Tampering with data

- malicious modification
- unauthorized changes

## Repudiation

- deny performing an malicious action
- non-repudiation refers to the ability of a system to counter repudiation threats



## Elevation of privilege

- unprivileged user gains privileged access to compromise the system
- effectively penetrated and become part of the trusted system

## Denial of service

- deny service to valid users
- threats to system availability

## Information disclosure

- exposure of information to individuals not supposed to access



# Analysis: Establishing the “right” level of security

- [www.arm.com/psa-resources](http://www.arm.com/psa-resources)

## Three example Threat Models and Security Analyses (TMSA) documents available now

Use case

### Asset tracker

Long range asset-tracking device used for tracking people, vehicles, containers or valuables

### Smart water meter

Smart water meters used in domestic and business locations

### Network camera

Network-connected cameras found in homes and offices. Can be used for high security use cases

Security considerations

Cellular communication, SIM-based network authentication, real-time tracking

Battery-powered, limited over-the-air maintenance, long lifecycles, large deployments

Provisions to automatically connect to network





# Security starts with analysis

Analysis leads to requirements



Arm will deliver representative IoT device  
security analyses & requirements

## • Example

Asset: metering data to be protected in integrity  
& confidentiality

Threat: Remote SW attacks

Security objective: Strong Crypto

Security requirement: Hardware based key store






# Mitigation methods





# Security by separation / isolation


- PSA protects sensitive assets (keys, credentials and firmware) by separating these from the application firmware and hardware
- PSA defines a Secure Processing Environment (SPE) for this data, the code that manages it and its trusted hardware resources
- The application firmware runs in the Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE)
- PSA defines a secure boot process so only authentic, trusted firmware runs in the SPE
- PSA depends on secure installation of the initial keys and firmware during manufacture






# Isolation techniques


## Memory protection unit



## Two Cortex-M processors



## TrustZone for Armv8-M







# TBSA-M

TBSA-M comprises a set of requirements aimed at providing a secure hardware foundation for M-Class MCUs.

Types of requirements :

- Enforce TrustZone system principles
- Supports baseline S/W secure services
- Prohibitions on bad practices
- Propagation of good practices

Builds on TBSA-Client (for A class)

- Authored Specification
- Requirements
- Recommendations

## Draft

- ☒ System view
- ☒ Infrastructure
- ☒ Fuses
- ☒ Cryptographic keys
- ☒ Trusted boot
- ☒ Trusted timers
- ☒ Version counters
- ☒ Entropy source
- ☒ Cryptographic acceleration
- ☒ Debug
- ☒ External interface peripherals
- ☒ DRAM protection
- ☒ Device lifecycle



TENCENT SECURITY CONFERENCE 2018  
2018腾讯安全国际技术峰会

# Trusted Firmware-M






# What is Trusted Firmware?

- It is a set of foundational software components which implement the services required for a secure platform:
- Reference software for partners to build on which creates a trusted execution environment
- Secure Function invocation (Software Interface to TrustZone)
- Secure Device Initialisation and Setup
- Trusted Boot (image verification derived from RoT)
- PSA Compliance



# Trusted Firmware-M Open Source Project

- Trusted Firmware-M
- Reference firmware for PSA architecture specification
- Targeting M-profile SoCs (Initially Armv8-M)
- Available on [www.trustedfirmware.org](http://www.trustedfirmware.org)
- Arm Mbed OS will include an implementation of PSA
- Based on TF-M for secure services
- Used by Mbed TLS, Pelion Device Mgmt & Mbed OS
- Components being introduced now to future Mbed releases




<https://connect.linaro.org/resources/hkg18/hkg18-212/>





# PSA Firmware Framework Concepts

- Secure Partition Manager (SPM)
  - provides the boot, isolation and IPC services to the SPE
- Partition
  - the unit of execution
- Secure function
  - a set of related APIs invoked through secure IPC
- Trusted function
  - a secure function that provides a Root of Trust service





# PSA firmware isolation levels

- **Level 2**
- Separate Root of Trust from Secure Partitions within



- **Level 1**
- Lower cost hardware – only isolate the



- **Level 3**
- More robustness – isolate all partitions from each other








# TF-M approach for ARMv8M based system


Constrained implementation with PSA alignment

- This figure represents the current view of TF-M architecture at PSA level 1 isolation.
- TF-M project will provide mechanisms to include existing APIs in the TF-M API handlers.
- Existing apps and secure libs will most likely need some updates.
- Extent of rework will depend upon the design of existing software.






# TF-M secure services today






# TF-M secure services 2019







# PSA In Action – TLS Session Setup





# Getting started with a secure system



# Get started now: Platform Security Architecture

Deliverables already available - [www.arm.com/psa-resources](http://www.arm.com/psa-resources)

- Download example threat models and assess your risks

## Analyze



Threat models  
& security analyses

- Specifications available under NDA


## Architect



Hardware & firmware  
architect specifications

- Download open-source firmware (TF-M) and contribute
- Request a Musca board

## Implement



Firmware  
source code






# Development platforms for PSA

## Musca-A1: the development board for PSA

Request your free board ([arm.com/musca](http://arm.com/musca))

- Arm Cortex-M33 based dev board
- Used for internal software development
- Test chip built on PSA recommendations
- Prototype your system




You could also choose to develop via MPS2/MPS3 FPGA boards with fixed virtual platforms



# Summary – Secure foundations

- + PSA provides a complete set of security deliverables reducing TTM and cost
- + PSA makes security easier to implement through a common architecture
- + Enabling success for the ecosystem, by providing confidence and trust



Security Manifesto





TENCENT SECURITY CONFERENCE 2018  
2018腾讯安全国际技术峰会

# THANKS





TENCENT SECURITY CONFERENCE 2018  
2018腾讯安全国际技术峰会

# THANKS



TENCENT SECURITY CONFERENCE 2018  
2018腾讯安全国际技术峰会

# THANKS



TENCENT SECURITY CONFERENCE 2018  
2018腾讯安全国际技术峰会

# THANKS