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#### **Dan Regalado**

Security Researcher Zingbox Inc @danuxx





#### WHEN YOU HEAR ABOUT ROBOTIC TELEPRESENCE

WHAT IS THE FIRST THING THAT COMES TO YOUR MIND?

# Expectation






# Reality








How it works?



VGoNet Cloud Network





#### **Use Cases**





Zingbox

Conference2018



THE BENEFITS ARE GREAT, NO DOUBT

**DO YOU SEE ANY SECURITY CONCERNS?** 

# What if someone else is watching you?









#### **BREAKING INTO THE ROBOT**

#### Responsible Disclosure



- All the vulnerabilities identified were reported to vendor via ICS-CERT
- A total of three CVEs were issued
  - ✓ CVE-2018-8858: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
  - ✓ CVE-2018-8860: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
  - ✓ CVE-2018-8866: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements (RCE)
- At this moment, the patch has not been released



# **Intercepting Firmware Update**



192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	356 GET ,	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.
75.101.136.21	192.168.10.131	HTTP	126 HTTP,	ation/octet-stream)	
192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	364 GET ,	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.
75.101.136.21	192.168.10.131	HTTP	831 HTTP	ation/octet-stream)	
192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	358 GET ,	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.
75.101.136.21	192.168.10.131	HTTP	629 HTTP,	ation/octet-stream)	
192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	356 GET	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.
75.101.136.21	192.168.10.131	HTTP	351 HTTP	ation/octet-stream)	CARDO PROCESO DE SARAN LACAL BROSANO
192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	360 GET ,	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.
75.101.136.21	192.168.10.131	HTTP	1207 HTTP,	ation/octet-stream)	
192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	352 GET ,	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.
75.101.136.21	192.168.10.131	HTTP	324 HTTP,	(lain)	
192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	360 GET	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.
75.101.136.21	192.168.10.131	HTTP	647 HTTP,	ation/octet-stream)	3973
192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	340 GET ,	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.
75.101.136.21	192.168.10.131	HTTP	288 HTTP,	(lain)	STANDARD SACRO COLOR STANDARD COLOR
192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	350 GET ,	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.
192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	349 GET ,	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.
192.168.10.131	75.101.136.21	HTTP	373 GET ,	v1/vgo/release/build-	.releases_3.0.1.



#### Accessing the Firmware



```
danux@XpL@iT:~/_UBIFS_rootfs.img.extracted/ubifs-root$ ls
appfs bin BUILDTIME config dev etc home include lib linuxrc mnt opt proc root
danux@Xpl@iT:~/_UBIFS_rootfs.img.extracted/ubifs-root$ ls var/www/cgi-bin/
LTITE_configure configure conf
```




#### Accessing Developer's Interface



ence2018



North End Technologies, Inc.





i 192.168.10.191/cgi-bii

#### Running processes:

```
PID
    Uid
                 VSZ Stat Command
                3076 SW
                         init
   root
  2 root
                         [kthreadd]
   root
                         [ksoftirgd/0]
  4 root
                         [watchdog/0]
  5 root
                          [events/0]
  6 root
                          [khelper]
   root
                          [async/mgr]
 34 root
                          [events/0]
35 root
                          [events long/0]
36 root
                          [events nrt]
132 root
                          [sync supers]
134 root
                         [bdi-default]
136 root
                         [kblockd/0]
146 root
                          [khubd]
   root
                          [kseriod]
   root
                          [cfg80211]
173 root
                         [rpciod/0]
182 root
                          [khungtaskd]
183 root
                          [kswapd0]
184 root
                          [aio/0]
185 root.
                          [nfsiod]
186 root
                         [crypto/0]
334 root
                          [mtdblock0]
339 root
                          [mtdblock1]
   root
                         [mtdblock2]
349 root
                         [mtdblock3]
354 root
                          [mtdblock4]
359 root
                          [mtdblock5]
364 root
                         [mtdblock6]
369
   root
                         [mtdblock7]
374 root
                          [mtdblock8]
                         [ubi bgt0d]
   root
384 root
                          [ubiblk6]
387 root
                          [ubiblk6]
432 root
                          [hwevent]
433 root
                          [vgo security]
```

#### Shell Injection and Root Access



```
/tmp$ id
    -70e5691d00000056@vgocom.com root@d
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
    -70e5691d00000056@vgocom.com root@
                                          /tmp$ uname -a
inux
           2.6.35.3 #1 PREEMPT Fri Oct 27 16:49:12 EDT 2017 armv5tejl
     70e5691d00000056@vgocom.com root@d
                                          /tmp$
     70e5691d00000056@vgocom.com root@d
                                           /tmp$
     70e5691d00000056@vgocom.com root@d
                                          /tmp$ df -h
Filesystem
                        Size

    Used Available Use% Mounted on

ubi0:rootfs
                       34.8M 24.4M
                                          10.5M
                                                 70% /
ubi0:appfs
                                          16.1M 63% /appfs
                       43.3M 27.2M
ubil:config
                                996.0k
                                           1.1M
                                                 47% /config
                     2.2M
ubi2:scratch
                      118.6M
                                         106.6M
                                                  6% /scratch
                                  7.3M
```






# GOT ROOT, SO... GAME OVER?

# Stealing WiFi Credentials



```
ctrl_interface=/var/run/wpa_supplicant
update_config=1
network={
        ssid="ZingMi
        psk="
        proto=RSN
        key mgmt=WPA-PSK
        pairwise=CCMP
        group=CCMP
        disabled=1
network={
        ssid="IPhone OSX 7.0"
        psk="
        proto=RSN
        key mgmt=WPA-PSK
        pairwise=CCMP
        group=CCMP
        disabled=1
```








### Stealing Pictures taken







#### **DEMO**

#### **Sniffing Chat Conversations**






hi jianhong feel dirty pwned 18:59:48.941 2018 Info: [Embedded] Chats are ignored: hi ;; jianhong rt[rtp:stun:Ne 18:59:59.891 2018 Info: [LibJingle:client] Jingle:Port[rtp:stun:Ne 19:00:04.510 2018 Info: [Embedded] Chats are ignored: feel dirty 19:00:10.555 2018 Info: [Embedded] Chats are ignored: pwned 19:00:37.964 2018 Info: [LibJingle:phone] Voice channel paused



### **Monitoring Doctor Calls**










## First ever Robot Social Engineering







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#### **Takeaways**



- Manufacturers: Add security code review/PenTest into Software Dev Cycle
- Manufacturers: Secure Firmware Updates
- Manufacturers: Remove Developer interfaces in Production
- Customers: Ask manufacturers to show evidence of security assessments

### Summary



- Robotic Telepresence is great technology making life easier
- We just need to invite security to the party
- We cannot do background check on the Robot
  - > Better to make sure it is trustworthy by hacking it proactively ©
- IoT is the door to new technologies
  - > But we do not want it to be the door into our Privacy



# Thanks! Any questions?

@danuxx

