

RSA®Conference2018

San Francisco | April 16–20 | Moscone Center



#RSAC

SESSION ID: TV-W04

THE RISE OF SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS


Craig Williams

Director Outreach
Cisco Talos
[@security_craig](https://twitter.com/security_craig)

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It started with a phone call...



TALOS

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Nyetya Impact



More than half of major malware attack's victims are industrial targets

Posted Jun 29, 2017 by [Taylor Hatmaker \(@tayhatmaker\)](#)



Lasting Damage and a Search for Clues in Cyberattacks

By NICOLE PERLROTH JULY 6, 2017

Ransomware 'Nyetya' behind new global cyber attack: Cisco

BY IANS | UPDATED: JUN 28, 2017, 12.00 PM IST

Post a Comment


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Key researchers reclassify N
suspect destruction was true



The Detonation



The Backdoor



Contacts upd.me-doc.com.ua every 2 mins

If finds a proxy:

- Retrieve email data from local me-doc
- Wait for & execute commands

These commands almost certainly used to distribute Nyetya.

COMMAND 0 will read in parameters and a timeout in minutes and will then execute "cmd.exe" with those parameters. It will return the result of this command back to the web server.



COMMAND 1 will write data to a file, potentially using environment variables to write to the correct path (e.g., %SystemRoot%\filename).



COMMAND 2 will return the information that it retrieved earlier (Proxy and SMTP information, including usernames and passwords) as well as information on the OS version and architecture, whether the user is admin, what token level the process is running as and whether UAC is enabled.



COMMAND 3 will read any file from the file system and upload it to the server.



COMMAND 4 is similar to Command 1 in that it will write a file to the filesystem, but it will also immediately execute that file as a new process. When it is done, the file will be overwritten by random data and then deleted.



COMMAND 5 handled by the function AutoPayload, is similar to command 4, but will start the downloaded file with "rundll32.exe"

Propagation



Scans IP subnet





Oops, your important files are encrypted.

If you see this text, then your files are no longer accessible, because they have been encrypted. Perhaps you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but don't waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.

We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. All you need to do is submit the payment and purchase the decryption key.

Please follow the instructions:

1. Send \$300 worth of Bitcoin to following address:

1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBWx

2. Send your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-mail wowsmith123456@posteo.net. Your personal installation key:

J3mE9S-8XNTZd-ZgjYXb-fUFj8m-gMYdyv-6rEiYa-KevGjA-q8Y2f4-5LP82d-ew5GVU

If you already purchased your key, please enter it below.

Key: _

Genuine Ransomware?



- Single bitcoin wallet means difficult to follow who has paid.
- Single contact email address, now blocked
 - you can't contact the criminals even if you want to.
- If admin, MBR is overwritten.
- If not admin, wipes first 10 disk sectors.
- If have software "avp.exe" running, wipes first 10 disk sectors.

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CCleaner Command and Control Causes Concern

Supply Chain Attacks



NEWS

New Havex malware variants target industrial control system and SCADA users



By Lucian Constantin

Security Correspondent, IBC News Service | JUN 24, 2014 8:05 AM EDT



TECHNICA



BIZ & IT

TECH

SCIENCE

POLICY

CARS

UPDATE WITH THE DEVIL —

Avast! There's malware in that CCleaner software update

Avast's recent acquisition spreads a backdoor signed with its own certificate.

SEAN GALLAGHER - 9/18/2017, 10:08 AM


BRIEF

Maersk says Nyetya cyberattack cost it \$300M in revenue loss



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Digital Signature of CCleaner 5.33

- presence of a valid digital may be indicative of a larger issue that resulted in portions of the development or signing process being compromised
- this certificate should be revoked and untrusted moving forward

Compilation Artifact

- likely an attacker compromised a portion of development or build environment
- Leveraged access to insert malware into the CCleaner build that was released and hosted by the organization

S:\workspace\ccleaner\branches\v5.33\bin\CCleaner\Release\CCleaner.pdb


```
System
C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe
C:\Windows\System32\wininit.exe
C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe
C:\Windows\System32\services.exe
C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
C:\Windows\System32\lsm.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\invsvcs.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\audiodg.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\SLsvc.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\invsvcs.exe
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Adobe\ARM\1.0\armsvc.exe
C:\Program Files\Agilent\IO Libraries Suite\Agilent\IO LibrariesService.exe
C:\Program Files\Agilent\IO Libraries Suite\LxiMdnsResponder.exe
C:\Program Files\ESET\ESET Endpoint Antivirus\ekrn.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
```

Targeted to Tech Companies



```
$DomainList = array(  
    "singtel.corp.root",  
    "htcgroup.corp",  
    "samsung-breda",  
    "Samsung",  
    "SAMSUNG.SEPM",  
    "samsung.sk",  
    "jp.sony.com",  
    "am.sony.com",  
    "gg.gauselmann.com",  
    "vmware.com",  
    "ger.corp.intel.com",  
    "amr.corp.intel.com",  
    "ntdev.corp.microsoft.com",  
    "cisco.com",  
    "uk.pri.o2.com",  
    "vf-es.internal.vodafone.com",  
    "linksys",  
    "apo.epson.net",  
    "msi.com.tw",  
    "infoview2u.dvrdns.org",  
    "dfw01.corp.akamai.com",  
    "hq.gmail.com",  
    "dlink.com",  
    "test.com");
```

2nd Stage only delivered to 23 specific domains

- Database Tracked 2nd Stage Delivery
- No Cisco Devices Delivered 2nd Stage

Code Reuse with Group 72



CCleaner
Malware

```
.text:10001210 ; Attributes: bp-based frame
.text:10001210 CustomBase4 proc near
.text:10001210
.text:10001210 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:10001210 var_8 = dword ptr -8
.text:10001210 arg_4 = dword ptr 4
.text:10001210 arg_8 = dword ptr 8
.text:10001210 arg_C = dword ptr 12h
.text:10001210
.text:10001210 push ebp
.text:10001210 mov ebp, esp
.text:10001210 push ecx
.text:10001210 push esi
.text:10001210 push edi
.text:10001210 mov edi, [ebp+arg_8]
.text:10001210 test edi, edi
.text:10001210 jf loc_10001260
.text:10001210 cmp [ebp+arg_4], 0
.text:10001210 jf loc_10001260
.text:10001210 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:10001210 push 3
.text:10001210 xor edx, edx
.text:10001210 pop ecx
.text:10001210 div ecx
.text:10001210 push 3
.text:10001210 xor edx, edx
.text:10001210 pop esi
.text:10001210 mov ecx, eax
.text:10001210 mov [ebp+arg_4], ecx
.text:10001210 div ecx
.text:10001210 mov eax, ecx
.text:10001210 shl eax, 2
.text:10001210 mov [ebp+arg_4], eax
.text:10001210 mov [ebp+var_4], edx
.text:10001210 jr short loc_10001263
.text:10001210 add eax, 4
.text:10001210 mov [ebp+arg_4], eax
.text:10001210
.text:10001210 loc_10001263:
.text:10001210 mov esi, [ebp+arg_8]
.text:10001210 test esi, esi
.text:10001210 jnz short loc_10001278
.text:10001210 cmp [ebp+arg_4], esi
.text:10001210 jnz loc_1000126D
.text:10001210 jmp loc_1000126F
.text:10001210
.text:10001210 loc_10001278:
.text:10001210 cmp [ebp+arg_4], eax
.text:10001210 jb loc_10001278
.text:10001210 test ecx, ecx
.text:10001210 push ebx
.text:10001210 jbe short loc_1000128E
.text:10001210 mov [ebp+arg_4], ecx
.text:10001210
.text:10001210 loc_1000128E:
.text:10001210 mov bl, [edi]
.text:10001210 mov al, [edi+1]
.text:10001210 inc edi
.text:10001210 mov byte ptr [ebp+arg_4], al
.text:10001210 mov al, bl
.text:10001210 inc edi
.text:10001210 sar al, 2
.text:10001210 and al, 3fh
.text:10001210 push eax
.text:10001210 call sub_10001206
.text:10001210 mov [edi], al
.text:10001210 mov al, byte ptr [ebp+arg_4]
.text:10001210 sar al, 4
.text:10001210 and bl, 3
.text:10001210 and al, 0fh
```

00000010: 30001210: CustomBase4 (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

```
.text:00401016 ; Attributes: bp-based frame
.text:00401016 CustomBase4 proc near
.text:00401016
.text:00401016 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:00401016 var_8 = dword ptr -8
.text:00401016 arg_4 = dword ptr 4
.text:00401016 arg_8 = dword ptr 8
.text:00401016 arg_C = dword ptr 12h
.text:00401016
.text:00401016 push ebp
.text:00401016 mov ebp, esp
.text:00401016 push ecx
.text:00401016 push esi
.text:00401016 push edi
.text:00401016 mov edi, [ebp+arg_8]
.text:00401016 test edi, edi
.text:00401016 jf loc_40101060
.text:00401016 cmp [ebp+arg_4], 0
.text:00401016 jf loc_40101060
.text:00401016 mov [ebp+arg_4], eax
.text:00401016 push 3
.text:00401016 xor edx, edx
.text:00401016 pop ecx
.text:00401016 div ecx
.text:00401016 push 3
.text:00401016 xor edx, edx
.text:00401016 pop esi
.text:00401016 mov ecx, eax
.text:00401016 mov [ebp+arg_4], ecx
.text:00401016 div ecx
.text:00401016 mov eax, ecx
.text:00401016 shl eax, 2
.text:00401016 mov [ebp+arg_4], eax
.text:00401016 mov [ebp+var_4], edx
.text:00401016 jr short loc_40101063
.text:00401016 add eax, 4
.text:00401016 mov [ebp+arg_4], eax
.text:00401016
.text:00401016 loc_40101063:
.text:00401016 mov esi, [ebp+arg_8]
.text:00401016 test esi, esi
.text:00401016 jnz short loc_40101071
.text:00401016 cmp [ebp+arg_4], esi
.text:00401016 jnz loc_4010106D
.text:00401016 jmp loc_4010106F
.text:00401016
.text:00401016 loc_40101071:
.text:00401016 cmp [ebp+arg_4], eax
.text:00401016 jb loc_40101071
.text:00401016 test ecx, ecx
.text:00401016 push ebx
.text:00401016 jbe short loc_4010107D
.text:00401016 mov [ebp+arg_4], ecx
.text:00401016
.text:00401016 loc_4010107D:
.text:00401016 mov bl, [edi]
.text:00401016 mov al, [edi+1]
.text:00401016 inc edi
.text:00401016 mov byte ptr [ebp+arg_4], al
.text:00401016 mov al, bl
.text:00401016 inc edi
.text:00401016 sar al, 2
.text:00401016 and al, 3fh
.text:00401016 push eax
.text:00401016 call sub_40101006
.text:00401016 mov [edi], al
.text:00401016 mov al, byte ptr [ebp+arg_4]
.text:00401016 sar al, 4
.text:00401016 and bl, 3
.text:00401016 and al, 0fh
```

00000016: 00401016: CustomBase4 (Synchronized with Hex View-2)



Group 72
Malware

Who is Group 72



[CENTRAL ASIA](#) [EAST ASIA](#) [OCEANIA](#) [SOUTH ASIA](#) [SOUTHEAST ASIA](#) [ECONOMY](#) [DIPLOMACY](#) [ENVIRONMENT](#)

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CHINA POWER

Report: 'Highly Sophisticated Cyber Espionage' Group Linked to Chinese Intelligence

A new report claims to have uncovered a Chinese hacking group more sophisticated than Unit 61398.

By Shannon Tiezzi
October 29, 2014

[f](#) [t](#) [g+](#) [in](#) [r](#)

A report issued by private cyber-security firms claims to have unveiled a sophisticated hacking outfit sponsored by the Chinese government. "Axiom" in the report, is said to have targeted everything from government offices in a global campaign over the past six years. A PDF of the full report, titled "Operator Group Report" can be [accessed here](#).

Image Credit: Image via SI

New Chinese Intelligence Unit Linked to Massive Cyber Spying Program

Axiom likely a Ministry of State Security spy unit

BY: Bill Gertz [Follow @BillGertz](#)
October 31, 2014 5:00 am

A Chinese intelligence unit carried out a massive cyber espionage program that stole vast quantities of data from governments, businesses and other organizations, security analysts who uncovered the operation said Thursday.

The activities of the Chinese unit called the Axiom group began at least six years ago and were uncovered by a coalition of security firms this month.

October 15, 2014

Global security firms cooperate against Chinese hackers

Ten cyber-security companies have cooperated to pool intelligence and combat Chinese APT actors.

For the first time, a group of 10 leading cyber-security companies have joined forces to hit back against an advanced persistent threat (APT) hacker

Global security firms cooperate against Chinese hackers

ninals, but the security ymantec and FireEye – have ers and the malware tools

fensive are detailed in a rm Novetta, which led the group.

TALOS

<https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/threat-spotlight-group-72>

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