





NEW TOOLS OF THREAT HUNTING


Benny Ketelslegers

Industry-leading threat intelligence. The largest threat detection network in the world.

2018 ISC 互联网安全大会 中国·北京

Internet Security Conference 2018 Beijing - China

(原中国互联网安全大会)







Talos Intel Background

THREAT INTEL



INTEL SHARING





250+ Full Time Threat Intel Researchers



MILLIONS

Of Telemetry Agents



4

Global Data Centers



100+

Threat Intelligence
Partners



1100+ Threat Traps

Intelligence Lifecycle

and the threat environment





"Threat intelligence is evidence-based knowledge, including context, mechanisms, indicators, implications and actionable advice, about an existing or emerging menace or hazard to assets that can be used to inform decisions regarding the subject's response to that menace or hazard"

- Gartner



What are the bad guys up to that we don't already know about?

- Understand the threat environment
- Follow trends
- Detect new things first!





MIROX -Carding,lobby,vente-

@MiroxGhostSquadHacke







WELCOME TO DARKODE

"The best malware marketplace on the net"



\$5

Ask Yourself

What might be happening? What evidence might exist?

How would I find out?





Threat Intelligence in Action


Exfiltration by DNS







EXFILTRATING DATA BY DNS



Compromised System



EXFILTRATING DATA BY DNS

DNS lookup problems: Punctuation forbidden Case insensitive

Base32 Encoding

"top secret data" → ORXXAIDTMVRXEZLUEBSGC5DB
"Top Secret !!!!" → KRXXAICTMVRXEZLUEAQSCIJB

DNS Requests


www.domain1.com
mail.domain2.com
server.xyz.domain3.com
ORXXAIDTMVRXEZLUEBSGC5DB.malicious.com



LETS GO HUNTING!

Lets look for 'long' domain names.


Oh great there are 100 million!



OpenDNS DNS Lookup Data




MODEL DATA





IDENTIFY ANOMALIES





ACTIVE EXFILTRATION

Known Multigrain POS malware domain log.nu6timjqgq4dimbuhe.3ikfsb---redacted---cg3.7s3bnxqmavqy7sec.dojfgj.com lll.nu6toobygq3dsnjrgm.snksjg---redacted---dth.ejitjtk4g4lwvbos.amouc.com ooo.nu6tgnzvgm2tmmbzgq4a.rkgo---redacted---tw5.5z5i6fjnugmxfowy.beevish.com domains

Base32 encoded machine identifier *m*=3753560948

Base32 encoded & RSA 1024 encrypted credit card information





Background

- For several months Talos researchers have been collaborating with public- and private-sector threat intelligence partners and law enforcement to research a threat named "VPNFilter"
- VPNFilter is a campaign that deploys a multi-stage malware system to SOHO router and network devices around the world.
- More than 500,000 infections
- VPNFilter stage 2 has a kill command that potentially would disable infected devices.

Targeted Devices

















NETGEAR

Infection Process







- EXIF data containing GPS coordinates used to identify Stage 2 server.
- If this process fails, the malware reaches out to toknowall[.]com to obtain IP address.
- If the backup fails, the malware opens a listener for the attacker to directly connect to the device.

```
0804AA50
0804AA50 loc_804AA50:
                                  : Creates RC4-like SBOX 0-0xFF
0804AA50 S = ebx
0804AA50 mov
                  [eax+S], al
0804AA53 inc
0804AA54 cmp
                  eax. 100h
                  short loc 804AA50 ; Creates RC4-like SBOX 0-0xFF
0804AA59 jnz
              4 44
            0804AA5B i = ecx
            0804AA5B kev = edi
            0804AA5B keylength = esi
            0804AA5B keyidx = edx
            0804AA5B xor
                              keyidx, keyidx
            0804AA5D mov
            0804AA62 lea
                             keylength, [keylength+0]
            0804AA69 lea
                              key_, [key_+0]
0804AA70
0804AA70 loc 804AA70:
                                 ; XOR with key but do not swap
0804AA70 movzx
                 eax, byte ptr [keyidx+key_] ; eax = next key byte
0804AA74 inc
                 kevidx
0804AA75 xor
                 [i+S-1], al
                                 ; S[i] ^= keybyte
0804AA79 xor
                 eax. eax
0804AA7B cmp
                 keyidx, keylength
0804AA7D set1
0804AA80 inc
                 1
0804AA81 neg
0804AA83 and
                 keyidx, eax
                                 ; keyidx %= keylength
0804AA85 cmp
                 i, 101h
0804AA8B jnz
                 short loc 804AA70 : XOR with key but do not swap
0804AA8B
                                   eax = next key byte
```

Leverages crontab for persistence.

 C2 leverages Tor or SSLencrypted communications.

 Same RC4 implementation that was used by BlackEnergy.

Blackenergy

- First discovered 2007 with DDoS capability
- Version 3 actively used in 2014-15
 - known for having SCADA-related plugins
 - Heavily targeted Ukraine
- Blackenergy targets:
 - ICS, energy, government and media in Ukraine
 - ICS/SCADA companies worldwide
 - Energy companies worldwide

Not persistent across device reboots.

 Reaches out to C2 infrastructure to obtain commands to execute on infected devices.

 Provides all the functionality an attacker would need to deploy additional malware stages to infected devices.

Stage 2 - Functionality

- The x86 version of Stage 2 can perform the following functions:
 - kill: Overwrites first 5,000 bytes of /dev/mtdblock0 with zeros and reboots the device.
 - Exec: Executes shell command or plugin.
 - Tor: Sets the tor configuration flag (0 or 1).
 - Copy: Copies a file from the client to the server.
 - Seturl: Sets the URL of the current configuration panel.
 - Proxy: Sets the current proxy URL.
 - Port: Sets the current proxy port.
 - Delay: Sets the delay between main loop executions.
 - Reboot: Reboots the device.
 - Download: Downloads a URL to a file.
- The MIPS version of Stage 2 has these additional operations:
 - Stop: Terminates the malware process
 - Relay: A misspelled version of the "delay" command described above.


Not persistent across device reboots

- Includes modules to:
 - Enable C2 communications using the Tor network.

Capture and save traffic transferred through infected devices.

 The malware specifically tracks Modbus packets transmitted over IP.

Infections over Time



Findings

Have identified data exfiltration from affected systems.

 Have identified additional scanning from devices on TCP/23, TCP/80, TCP/2000, TCP/8080.

- Code overlap with BlackEnergy V2 and V3.
- Published Snort signatures targeting known vulnerabilities in devices targeted by VPNFilter


Conclusions

 VPNFilter is an expansive, robust, highly capable, and dangerous threat that targets devices that are challenging to defend.

 Device wiping functionality could be leveraged to impact internet connectivity for hundreds of thousands of victims.

 IOT and embedded devices are increasingly attractive to attackers hoping to collect information and stay under the radar.

The Backbone of Cisco Security




Cisco Security products, providing customers with comprehensive solutions from cloud to core.



Enabling the Good Guys

Spreading security news, updates, and other information to the public









Open Source

Public Facing Tools

- Threat detection and prevention: Snort, ClamAV, Razorback, Daemonlogger & MBRFilter
- Threat Research: LockyDump, **FIRST**
- Vulnerability detection and mitigation: Moflow, FreeSentry





Local Contacts



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