The Ultimate Windows 10 Hardening Guide: What to Do to Make Hackers Pick Someone Else



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John Craddock



Mark Russinovich

Blocking the SBP-2 driver and



Paula Januszkiewicz



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We are proud to announce that Paula Januszkiewicz

was rated as

No 1 Speaker at Microsoft Ignite!!!

> May 4-8, 2015 Chicago, IL



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


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Agenda




Tools!

- Oheck out the following links:
 - Our tools: http://cqure.pl → Tools

- Knowledge:
 - http://channel9.msdn.com/Shows/Defrag-Tools



Agenda



Step 1: Monitor DNS Queries

- Solution DNS role in security:
 - 'Who has DNS has power'
 - Spoofing is easy (WPAD etc.)
 - DNS is a text based protocol
- Monitoring and securing DNS strategy:
 - PTR communication is pretty rare and it depends on the owner of IP
 - Sorrelate queries and responses
 - DNSSEC is an option



For example: What if RevDNS of Hackers.cn IP says it is Microsoft.com? Nothing if we remember that <u>our DNS</u> has resolved the hackers.cn name!

DNS to Rely On

The DNS protocol perspective

Step 2. Sanitize Network Data

Shellshock

Nothing but an inappropriate data sanitization

Data sanitization – know who processes data

Black list approach: deny eg. <script>, --, ;, ../ White list approach: define what you accept Regular expressions

Second Examples:

SQL Injection, Directory Traversal, escape sequences, XSS



As simple as this: verify data **before** processing...

Shell is shocked

The operating system perspective

Step 3: Actively Monitor Your Servers

Applocker and Sysmon are great combo

Applocker blocks unwanted software


Sysmon will inform you when someone starts a process or connection or changes the file date

Mow to discover malicious software when Applocker cannot be enabled?

System logs (Process creation details)
Sysmon enhances built in functionalities

Sysmon stores a hash base

It can be used for malware or unwanted activity discovery



Sysmon Demonstration

The administrator's perspective

Step 4: Web Server Check

Naturally unpleasant environment

Patch and upgrade the Web server application

Remove/disable unnecessary services, apps, and sample content

Install Web content on a dedicated hard drive or logical partition

Limit uploads to filesystem and disable directory browsing

Define a single directory for all external scripts or programs executed as part of Web content

Disable the use of hard or symbolic links

Use service accounts with strictly defined privileges

Define a complete Web content access matrix that identifies which folders and files are restricted and which are accessible by whom

Use host-based IDS/IPS and/or file integrity checkers

Protect backend server (e.g., database server) from command injection attacks at both the Web server and the backend server



How much web could a web-check check?

The web perspective

Step 5: Centralize your logs

It's quite obvious that losing logs after attack is not in our dreams

Logs for critical systems should be stored outside the server

Sometime in the second seco

Can help us to correlate different logs and events Helps to maintain the legal proof after attack

Available solutions

Operating system built in: subscriptions, scripts Other products: SCOM, Splunk, SolarWinds, WhatsUpGold, TripWire & other (see: Gartner)



Sysmon Demonstration

The bad guys perspective


Step 6A: EMET - Protection From Injection

- Second Experience Toolkit
- Second Helps prevent vulnerabilities in software from being successfully exploited
- Protection mechanisms:
 - Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
 - Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)
 - Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
 - Sertificate Trust (Pinning)



Step6B: Code Integrity

- Secure Boot
 - Includes Secure Firmware Updates and Platform Secure Boot
- Kernel Mode Code Integrity (KMCI)
- User Mode Code Integrity (UMCI)
- AppLocker



Code.Stopper

The workstation perspective

Step 7: Malicious File Review

- Security awareness: Ideally users should recognize malicious .exe, .docx, .pdf etc.
- Malicious files are not digitally signed, but many files are not...
- PDF File is comprised of header, objects, cross-reference table (to locate objects), and trailer

"/OpenAction" and "/AA" defines the script or action to run automatically

"/Names", "/AcroForm", "/Action" can also specify and launch scripts or actions

"/JavaScript" specifies JavaScript to run

"/GoTo*" changes the view to a destination within the PDF or in another PDF file

"/Launch" launches a program or opens a document

"/URI" accesses a resource by its URL

"/RichMedia" can be used to embed Flash in PDF

"/ObjStm" can hide objects inside an Object Stream



DOCX, DOC – Macro Extracting Techniques

Perfectly Designed File?

The file perspective

Step 8: Data Caching

Solution
Idea is simple: no caching

Hashes, Passwords from browsers and applications Temporary files, RDP cache Search, browsing history

- Pay attention to the edge servers
- Settings in policies

Profile and folder redirection Set cached logon policy



Cache the hash

The good practice perspective

Step 9: Use Host-Based Firewall

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- Second the second se
- Ser logging purposes
- Second to the second of the

Edge firewall does not provide that function


Second travelling users



It... is not obvious. It isn't...

The remote connection perspective

Agenda



Summary

- Act proactively: Applocker, EMET
- Solution
 Isolate infrastructure components so that in case of attack they prevent spreading
- Review servers' and workstations' configuration periodically
- Implement log centralization solution
- Implement security awareness campaign



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