LTE PROTOCOL EXPLOITS: IMSI CATCHERS, BLOCKING DEVICES AND LOCATION LEAKS

Roger Piqueras Jover

rpiquerasjov@bloomberg.net



ABOUT ME

- Wireless Security Researcher (aka Security Architect) at Bloomberg LP
 - http://www.bloomberg.com/company/announcements/mobile-security-a-conversation-with-roger-piqueras-jover/
- Formerly (5 years) Principal Member of Technical Staff at AT&T Security Research
 - http://src.att.com/projects/index.html
- Mobile/wireless network security research
 - LTE security and protocol exploits
 - Advanced radio jamming
 - Control plane signaling scalability in mobile networks
 - 5G mobile networks and new mobile core architectures
- If it communicates wirelessly, I am interested in its security
 - Bluetooth and BLE
 - -802.11
 - Zigbee, Zigwave
 - LoRaWAN
- More details
 - http://www.ee.columbia.edu/~roger/



@rgoestotheshows

MOBILE NETWORK SECURITY

- Often thought at the "app" layer
 - Certificates
 - Encryption
 - SSL
 - Recent examples
 - iOS SSL bug
 - Android malware
 - XcodeGhost iOS infected apps
 - Long etc

- My areas of interest
 - PHY layer
 - "Layer 2" protocols (RRC, NAS, etc)
 - Circuit-switched mobile core architecture for packet-switched traffic → No bueno!
 - Recent examples
 - LTE jamming
 - Low-cost LTE IMSI catchers and protocol exploits
 - IM app causes huge mobile operators outage
 - Mobile operators trouble with "signaling storms"



MOBILE NETWORK SECURITY

The first mobile networks were not designed with a strong security focus (no support for encryption in 1G!!!)



Basic security principles

- Confidentiality
- Authentication
- Availability




Protecting user data

Mobile connectivity availability against security threats




LTE BASICS

LTE MOBILE NETWORK ARCHITECTURE






LTE CELL SELECTION AND CONNECTION





LTE FRAME




(c)

(b)

(a)




LTE NAS ATTACH PROCEDURE





MOBILE NETWORK USER/DEVICE IDENTIFIERS



IMEI – "Serial number" of the device



IMSI – secret id of the SIM that should never be disclosed TMSI – temporary id used by the network once it knows who you are



MSISDN – Your phone number.

LTE SECURITY AND PROTOCOL EXPLOITS

OVERVIEW OF TOPICS

- LTE (in)security rationale
- Toolset
- Sniffing base station configuration
- Building a low-cost LTE-based IMSI catcher (Stingray)
- Blocking smartphones and IoT devices
- LTE location leaks and following moving targets



LTE (IN)SECURITY RATIONALE

Name	Start time	DI/	UI Cell Cell ID Frame	Subf	RCE			Errs	Retrans	Decr	Valid	Sf RSSI	SINR	٦	RACH handshake
ACH	01:32:03.954999	U	440	1	-16.64	-57.98							16.64	 	between UE and eNB
MAC Random Access Response	01:32:03.958999	D	440	5	-16.41	-45.73		OK				-39.20	16.41	4	between 6 2 and enb
RRCConnectionRequest	01:32:03.964999	U	440 441	1	-23.85	-51.14		OK					23.85		RRC handshake between
RRCConnectionSetup	01:32:03.979999	D	442	6	-15.11	-42.21	26	OK				-38.72	15.11	1	UE and eNB
RRCConnectionSetupComplete 💎	01:32:04.013999	U	446	0			56	OK						Ţ	OE allu einb
Attach Request	01:32:04.013999	U	446	0	-25.25	-49.36	53	OK					25.25		
PDN Connectivity Request	01:32:04.013999	U	446	0	-25.25	-49.36	36	OK					25.25		
DLInformationTransfer	01:32:04.088999	D	453	5			39	OK							
Authentication Request	01:32:04.088999	D	453	5	-15.00	-41.33	36	OK				-38.44	15.00		
ULInformation Transfer	01:32:04.225999	U	467	2			22	OK							
Authentication Response	01:32:04.225999	U	467	2	-20.80	-53.66	19	OK					20.80		
OLInformationTransfer	01:32:04.267999	D	471	4			17	OK							Connection setup
Security Protected NAS Message	01:32:04.267999	D	471	4	-15.52	-44.04	14	OK		Not	No	-39.22	15.52		Connection setup
Security Mode Command	01:32:04.267999	D	471 473	4	-15.52	-44.04	8	OK				-39.22	15.52	L	(authentication, set-up of
JLInformation Transfer	01:32:04.285999	U	473	2			22	OK							encryption, tunnel set-up,
Security Protected NAS Message	01:32:04.285999	U	473	2	-22.49	-52.16	19	OK		No	No		22.49		etc)
Jnknown NAS	01:32:04.285999	U	477	2	-22.49	-52.16	13	OK					22.49		
OLInformation Transfer	01:32:04.327999	D	477	4			12	OK							
Security Protected NAS Message	01:32:04.327999	D	477	4	-14.73	-45.68	9	OK		No	No	-39.27	14.73		
Unknown NAS	01:32:04.327999	D	477	4	-14.73	-45.68	3	OK				-39.27	14.73		
ULInformationTransfer	01:32:04.345999	U	479	2			24	OK							
Security Protected NAS Message	01:32:04.345999	U	479 479 479	2	-21.36	-53.39	21	OK		No	No		21.36		
Jnknown NAS	01:32:04.345999	U	479	2	-21.36	-53.39	15	OK					21.36	J	
SecurityModeCommand	01:32:04.472999	D	491	9			3	OK						٦	
Ciphered RRC	01:32:04.495999	U	494	2			2	OK		No	No				
Ciphered RRC	01:32:04.501999	D	494	8			3	OK		No	No				
Ciphered RRC	01:32:04.515999	U	496	2			18	OK		No	No				
Ciphered RRC	01:32:04.536999	D	498	3			165	OK		No	No				
Ciphered RRC	01:32:04.575999	U	502	2			2	OK		No	No			-	Encrypted traffic
Ciphered RRC	01:32:04.575999	U	502 502	2			16	OK		No	No				71
Ciphered RRC	01:32:04.604999	D	505 463	1			30	ОК			No				
Ciphered data	01:32:14.426997	U	463	3			96	OK		No			_	_	
Ciphered data	01:32:14.475997	U	468 472	2			40	OK		No					© Portions Copyright 2016 Bloombe
Ciphered data	01:32:14.513997	Ш	472	0			96	ОК		No					© 1 51 tions copyright 2010 bloomber

LTE (IN)SECURITY RATIONALE

IntelliJudg	e							Θ	
Count	Name	Start time	DI/UI	Cell ID	Frame	RNTI	RCE	Power	Errs
1	RACH	00:04:42.942818	U		651		-6.42	-64.65	
2	MAC Random Access Response	00:04:42.946818	D		651	####	-8.50	-45.23	OK
3	RRCConnectionRequest	00:04:42.952818	U		652		-19.19	-56.46	OK
4	RRCConnectionSetup	00:04:42.967818	D		653		-9.07	-43.18	OK
5	RRCConnectionSetupComplete	00:04:43.001818	U		657				OK
6	Attach Request	00:04:43.001818	U		657	####			OK
7	PDN Connectivity Request	00:04:43.001818	U		657	###	-17.59	-60.11	OK
8	DLInformationTransfer	00:04:43.080818	D		664				OK
9	Authentication Request	00:04:43.080818	D		664		-8.86	-42.27	OK
10	ULInformationTransfer	00:04:43.213818	U		678				OK
11	Authentication Response	00:04:43.213818	U		678		-12.51	-65.43	OK
12	DLInformationTransfer	00:04:43.258818	D		682				ОК
13	Security Protected NAS Message	00:04:43.258818	D		682		-8.90	-44.51	ОΚ
14	Security Mode Command	00:04:43.258818	D		682		-8.90	-44.51	OK
15	ULInformationTransfer	00:04:43.273818	U		684	###			OK
16	Security Protected NAS Message	00:04:43.273818	U		684	#####	-11.14	-64.93	OK
17	Unknown NAS	00:04:43.273818	U		684		-11.14	-64.93	OK
18	DLInformationTransfer	00:04:43.318818	D		688				OK
19	Security Protected NAS Message	00:04:43.318818	D		688		-8.88	-45.69	OK
20	Unknown NAS	00:04:43.318818	D		688		-8.88	-45.69	OK
21	ULInformationTransfer	00:04:43.333818	U		690				OK
22	Security Protected NAS Message	00:04:43.333818	U		690		-11.82	-63.66	OK
23	Unknown NAS	00:04:43.333818	U		690		-11.82	-63.66	OK
24	SecurityModeCommand	00:04:43.451818	D		702				OK
25	Ciphered RRC	00:04:43.479818	D		704				OK
26	Ciphered RRC	00:04:43.503818	U		707				OK
27	Ciphered RRC	00:04:43.524818	D		709				ОК
28	Ciphered RRC	00:04:43.563818	U		713				OK
29	Ciphered RRC	00:04:43.563818	U		713				OK
30	Ciphered RRC	00:04:43.594818	D		716				ОК
31	Ciphered data	00:04:52.021817	D		535				ОК
32	Ciphered data	00:04:52.021817	D		535				ОК
33	Ciphered data	00:04:52.113817	U		544				OK
34	Ciphered data	00:04:52.153817	Ū		548				ОК

Unencrypted and unprotected. I can sniff these messages and I can transmit them pretending to be a legitimate base station.

Other things sent in the clear:

- Base station config (broadcast messages)
- Measurement reports
- Measurement report requests
- (Sometimes) GPS coordinates
- HO related messages
- Paging messages
- Etc



LTE (IN)SECURITY RATIONALE

Regardless of mutual authentication and strong encryption, a mobile device engages in a substantial exchange of unprotected messages with *any* LTE base station (malicious or not) that advertises itself with the right broadcast information.



TOOLSET

- Fully/partially functional LTE open source implementations
 - OpenLTE End to end implementation: RAN and "EPC".
 - http://sourceforge.net/projects/openIte/
 - gr-LTE Based on gnuradio-companion. Great for starters.
 - https://github.com/kit-cel/gr-lte
 - OpenAirInterface Industry/Academia consortium.
 - http://www.openairinterface.org/
 - srsLTE Almost complete implementation. Includes srsUE.
 - https://github.com/srsLTE
- Hardware setup
 - USRP B210 for active rogue base station
 - BUDGET: USRP B210 (\$1100) + GPSDO (\$625) + LTE Antenna (2x\$30) = \$1785
 - Machine running Ubunutu
 - US dongles (hackRF, etc) for passive sniffing.







All LTE active radio experiments MUST be performed inside a faraday cage.

TOOLSET

- Traffic capture analysis
 - Sanjole WaveJudge
 - Reception and sniffing from multiple eNBs simultaneously
 - Decoding of messages at very low SNR regime
 - Retransmission of captures
 - Thanks to Sanjole for helping out and providing many of the captures shown in this presentation!
 - Other options
 - openLTE pcap traffic dump
 - WireShark LTE libraries
 - hackRF captures

- Base station configuration broadcasted in the clear in MIB and SIB messages.
- Open source tools available to scan for LTE base stations
 - My setup: USRP B210 + Ubuntu machine + modified openLTE
 - New setup: European USB LTE dongle (GT-B3740) + modified Kalmia driver
 - Working on small form-factor scanner running on
 - RaspberryPi 3 + RTL-SDR
 - Android phone + RTL-SDR

```
info channel_not_found freq=738800000 dl_earfcn=5778
info channel_not_found freq=738900000 dl_earfcn=5779
info channel_found_begin freq=739000000 dl_earfcn=5780 freq_offset=911.7427
98 phys_cell_id=405 sfn=354 n_ant=2 phich_dur=Normal phich_res=1 bandwidth=
10
info sib1_decoded freq=739000000 dl_earfcn=5780 freq_offset=911.742798 phys
_cell_id=405 sfn=354 mcc[0]=310 mnc[0]=410 network[0]=AT&T resv_for_oper[0]
=false tac=2341 cell_id=28503311 cell_barred=false intra_freq_resel=allowed
    q_rx_lev_min=-122 q_rx_lev_min_offset=0 p_max=23 band=17 si_win_len=20 si_
    periodicity[0]=16 sib_mapping_info[0]=2,3 si_periodicity[1]=64 sib_mapping_
info[1]=5,6 duplex_mode=fdd si_value_tag=8
info channel_found_end freq=739000000 dl_earfcn=5780 freq_offset=911.742798
    phys_cell_id=405
info channel_not_found freq=739100000 dl_earfcn=5781
info channel_not_found freq=7392000000 dl_earfcn=5782
```

```
Tunning receiver to 739.000 MHz
Searching for cell...
Using Volk machine: avx_64_mmx_orc
*Found Cell id: 405 CP: Normal , DetectRatio=100% PSR=25.58, Power=36.7 dB
 Found Cell_id: 10 CP: Extended, DetectRatio=25% PSR=11.46, Power=3.1 dBm
 Found Cell_id: 0 CP: Normal , DetectRatio= 0% PSR=0.00, Power=-inf dBm
Decoding PBCH for cell 405 (N id 2=0)
  Asking for clock rate 11.520000 MHz...
  Actually got clock rate 11.520000 MHz.
  Performing timer loopback test... pass
-- Performing timer loopback test... pass
Setting sampling rate 11.52 MHz
 - Cell ID:
                   405 2.3, FrameCnt: 0, State: 1000
 - Nof ports:
 - CP:
                   Normal
- PRB:
 - PHICH Length:
                   Normal
 - PHICH Resources: 1
- SFN:
                   424
Decoded MIB. SFN: 424, offset: 3
CFO: +0.92 KHz, SNR: 27.7 dB, PDCCH-Miss: 50.00%, PDSCH-BLER: 1.15%%
CFO: +0.90 KHz, SNR: 26.7 dB, PDCCH-Miss: 55.61%, PDSCH-BLER: 1.15%
CFO: +0.89 KHz, SNR: 29.6 dB, PDCCH-Miss: 57.56%, PDSCH-BLER: 1.15%
CFO: +0.93 KHz, SNR: 26.4 dB, PDCCH-Miss: 66.86%, PDSCH-BLER: 0.88%%
```




```
Subframe: 0
  BCCH-BCH-Message
    message
      dl-Bandwidth: n50
      phich-Config
        phich-Duration: normal
        phich-Resource: one
      systemFrameNumber: {8
bits |0x17|
      spare: {10 bits|0x0000|Right
Aligned}
```

LTE PBCH MIB packet



```
BCCH-DL-SCH-Message
 message
     systemInformationBlockType1
       cellAccessRelatedInfo
         plmn-IdentityList
           PLMN-IdentityInfo
             plmn-Identity
                MCC-MNC-Digit: 3
                MCC-MNC-Digit: 1
                                            Mobile operator
                MCC-MNC-Digit: 0
                 MCC-MNC-Digit:
                MCC-MNC-Digit:
                 MCC-MNC-Digit:
             cellReservedForOperatorUse: reserved
         trackingAreaCode: {16 bits|
         cellIdentity: {28 bits| Right Aligned}
         cellBarred: notBarred
         intraFreqReselection: allowed
         csg-Indication: false
       cellSelectionInfo
         q-RxLevMin:
                                      RX power to select
       freqBandIndicator:
                                            that cell
       schedulingInfoList
         SchedulingInfo
           si-Periodicity: rf8
           sib-MappingInfo
             SIB-Type: sibType3
       si-WindowLength: ms10
       systemInfoValueTag: 11
  Padding
```

LTE PDSCH SIB1 packet



LTE PDSCH SIB2/3 packet

- MIB/SIB messages are necessary for the operation of the network
 - Some things must be sent in the clear (i.e. a device connecting for the first time)
 - But perhaps not everything
- Things an attacker can learn from MIB and SIB messages
 - Optimal tx power for a rogue base station (no need to set up your USRP to its max tx power)
 - High priority frequencies to force priority cell reselection
 - Mobile operator who owns that tower
 - Tracking Area of the legitimate cell (use a different one in your rogue eNodeB to force TAU update messages)
 - Mapping of signaling channels
 - Paging channel mapping and paging configuration
 - Etc


LTE/LTE-A Jamming, Spoofing and Sniffing: Threat Assessment and Mitigation. Marc Lichtman, Roger Piqueras Jover, Mina Labib, Raghunandan Rao, Vuk Marojevic, Jeffrey H. Reed. IEEE Communications Magazine. Special issue on Critical Communications and Public Safety Networks. April 2016.




LOW-COST LTE IMSI CATCHER (STINGRAY)

- Despite common assumptions, in LTE the IMSI is always transmitted in the clear at least once
 - If the network has never seen that UE, it must use the IMSI to claim its identity
 - A UE will trust *any* eNodeB that claims it has never seen that device (pre-authentication messages)
 - IMSI can also be transmitted in the clear in error recovery situations (very rare)
- Implementation
 - USRP B210 + Ubuntu 14.10 + gnuradio 3.7.2
 - LTE base station OpenLTE's LTE_fdd_eNodeB (slightly modified)
 - Added feature to record IMSI from Attach Request messages
 - Send attach reject after IMSI collection
 - Tested with my phone and 2 LTE USB dongles
 - Experiments in controlled environment
- Stingrays also possible in LTE without need to downgrade connection to GSM






IMSI CATCHERS(STINGRAY)





IMSI CATCHERS(STINGRAY)



INTERMISSION – EXCELLENT RELATED WORK

- I was hoping to be the first to publish but...
- A team at TU Berlin, University of Helsinki and Aalto University doing excellent work in the same area
 - More results on SIM/device bricking with Attach/TAU reject messages
 - LTE location leaks
 - Detailed implementation and results
 - Paper presented at NDSS 2016: http://arxiv.org/abs/1510.07563
- Prof. Seifert's team at TU Berlin responsible for other previous VERY COOL projects




DEVICE AND SIM TEMPORARY LOCK

- Attach reject and TAU (Tracking Area Update) reject messages not encrypted/integrityprotected
- Spoofing this messages one can trick a device to
 - Believe it is not allowed to connect to the network (blocked)
 - Believe it is supposed to downgrade to or only allowed to connect to GSM
- Attack set-up
 - USRP + openLTE LTE_fdd_eNodeB (slightly modified)
 - Devices attempt to attach (Attach Request, TAU request, etc)
 - Always reply to Request with Reject message
 - Experiment with "EMM Reject causes" defined by 3GPP



These are not the droids we are looking for. I am not allowed to connect to my provider anymore, I won't try again.



REQUEST

REJECT

These are not the droids you are looking for... And you are not allowed to connect anymore to this network.



Rogue eNodeB

DEVICE AND SIM TEMPORARY LOCK


- Some results
 - Tested with my phone and 2 USB LTE dongles
 - The blocking of the device/SIM is only temporary
 - Device won't connect until rebooted
 - SIM won't connect until reboot
 - SIM/device bricked until timer T3245 expires (24 to 48 hours!)
 - I did not test this because I cannot go by without phone for 24h!
 - See related work for much more and better results on this...
 - Downgrade device to GSM and get it to connect to a rogue BS
- If the target is an M2M device, it could be a semi-persistent attack
 - Reboot M2M device remotely?
 - Send a technician to reset SIM?
 - Or just wait 48 hours for your M2M device to come back online...



SOFT DOWNGRADE TO GSM

- Use similar techniques to "instruct" the phone to downgrade to GSM
 - Only GSM services allowed OR LTE and 3G not allowed
 - Tested with my phone and 2 LTE USB dongles
- Once at GSM, the phone to connects to your rogue base station
 - Bruteforce the encryption
 - Listen to phone calls, read text messages
 - Man in the Middle
 - A long list of other bad things...


I will remove these restraints and leave this cell with the door open... and use only GSM from now on... and I'll drop my weapon.






RNTI

- PHY layer id sent in the clear in EVERY SINGLE packet, both UL and DL
- Identifies uniquely every UE within a cell
 - Changes infrequently
 - Based on several captures in the NYC and Honolulu areas
- No distinguishable behavior per operator or per base station manufacturer
- Assigned by the network in the MAC RAR response to the RACH preamble





			VIOL			
Name	Start time	DI/UI	Cell ID Frame	RNTI	UE Identity Lengt	th Erre
RACH	00:02:26.830866	U	988		0	
MAC Random Access Response	00:02:26.834868	D	989	8	7	OK
RRCConnectionRequest	00:02:26.840866	U	989	19841	6	OK
RRCConnectionSetup	00:02:26.853868	D	991	19841	24	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.855868	D	991	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.856868	D	991	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.857868	D	991	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.858868	D	991	19681	1280	OK
Unknown Data	00:02:26.871868	D	992	12381	52	1
Unknown Data	00:02:26.871868	D	992	12381	109	1
RRCConnectionSetupComplete	00:02:26.874866	U	993	19841	7	OK
Service Request	00:02:26.874866	U	993	19841	4	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.894868	D	995	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.895868	D	995	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.900868	D	995	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.901868	D	995	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.902868	D	995	19681	1280	OK
SecurityModeCommand	00:02:26.909868	D	996	19841	3	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.931868	D	998	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.932868	D	998	19681	1280	OK
SecurityModeComplete	00:02:26.932866	U	998	19841	2	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.933868	D	999	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.934868	D	999	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.952868	D	1000	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.953868	D	1001	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.954868	D	1001	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.955868	D	1001	19681	1280	OK
RRCConnectionReconfiguration	00:02:26.957868	D	1001	19841	84	OK
RRCConnectionReconfigurationC	00:02:26.972866	U	1002	19841	2	OK
IP Data (IPv4 UDP)	00:02:26.972866	U	1002	19841	70	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.974868	D	1003	19681	1280	OK
Ciphered data	00:02:26.975868	D	1003	19581	404	OK
MAC Random Access Response	00:02:26.984868	D	1004	4	7	OK
RRCConnectionSetup	00:02:27.003868	D	1006	1 3	24	OK
Unknown Data	00:02:27.020868	D	1007	1 1	1428	1
Ciphered RRC	00:02:27.021868	D	1007	1 5		OK
4 III						



- Potential RNTI tracking use cases
 - Know how long you stay at a given location
 - and meanwhile someone robs your house...
 - Estimate the UL and DL load of a given device
 - Signaling traffic on the air interface << Data traffic on the air interface
 - Potentially identify the hot-spot/access point in an LTE-based ad-hoc network
- Phone # TMSI RNTI mapping is trivial
 - If the passive sniffer is within the same cell/sector as the target



ee Ee

and

9

ee Ee

ee Ee

and

9

ee Ee

between

Handoff

ee Ee

and

9

<u>=</u>

ee Ee

and

9

ee

ee Ee

and

9

<u>=</u>

- According to 3GPP TS 36.300, 36.331, 36.211, 36.212, 36.213, 36.321
 - C-RNTI is a unique identification used for identifying RRC Connection and scheduling which is dedicated to a particular UE.
 - After connection establishment or re-establishment the Temporary C-RNTI (as explained above) is promoted to C-RNTI.
 - During Handovers within E-UTRA or from other RAT to E-UTRA, C-RNTI is explicitly provided by the eNB in MobilityControlInfo container with IE newUE-Identity.
- No specific guidelines on how often to refresh the RNTI and how to assign it
 - In my passive analysis I have seen RNTIs unchanged for long periods of time
 - Often RNTI_new_user = RNTI_assigned_last + 1



CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS

- Potential solutions
 - Refresh the RNTI each time the UE goes from idle to connected
 - Randomize RNTI
 - Analyze the necessity of explicitly indicating the RNTI in the handover message
- If RNTI is not refreshed rather frequently
 - MIT+Bell Labs work LTE Radio Analytics Made Easy and Accessible (SigComm'14)
 - Track a device and map measurements to it based on RNTI (paper's section 8.7)
 - When RNTI changes, PHY layer measurements still allow to map it to a given UE (SINR, RSSI, etc)
 - MIMO measurements and metrics
- Recent discussion with GSMA
 - The RRC Connection Reconfiguration message should be sent encrypted This would make tracking more difficult
 - But one could monitor traffic from adjacent cells and wait to see new RNTI with similar RF/traffic signature
 - Ongoing discussions to address these potential issues



WRAP UP

LTE SECURITY AND PROTOCOL EXPLOITS

- Mobile security research very active since ~2009
- Most cool mobile security research exclusively on GSM (until now)
 - GSM location leaks (NDSS'12)
 - Wideband GSM sniffing (Nohl and Munaut 27C3)
 - Hijacking mobile connections (Blackhat Europe'09)
 - Carmen Sandiego project (Blackhat'10)
 - GSM RACH flooding (Spaar DeepSec'09)
 - **—** ...
- Recent availability of open source LTE implementations
 - I expect a surge in LTE-focused security research
 - Very interesting PhD topic
 - I am open and interested in collaborations
- The more research in the area, the more secure networks will be
- Importance of advocating for specific protocol security focus in 5G and next-gen standards



Q&A

http://www.ee.columbia.edu/~roger/ ---- @rgoestotheshows