DINING CRYPTOGRAPHERS NETWORK IMPLEMENTATION IN GO

ISA 763 – Security Protocol Analysis

Project Report
Date: 04/11/2018

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1. Introduction

The dining cryptographer's problem was proposed by David Chaum in 1988 [1]. It involves three cryptographers sitting down for dinner where their waiter informs them that the bill for their meal must be paid anonymously. The payer could be any one of the three cryptographers or the NSA (U.S. National Security Agency).

The cryptographers use a protocol to resolve the uncertainty if one of the cryptographers is paying or the NSA. Per the protocol, each cryptographer begins by flipping a coin. The outcome of this coin can only be seen by that cryptographer and the one sitting to the right-hand side of him. After each coin flip, the cryptographer says out loud whether the outcome of his coin flip and that of the cryptographer sitting to his left is same or different. If one of the cryptographers is the payer, he states the opposite of what he sees. In the end, a count is done for differences uttered at the table. An odd count indicates that a cryptographer is paying whereas an even count indicates that NSA is paying. The protocol preserves anonymity as even if any of the cryptographer is paying, it is not possible with the disclosures done to find out which cryptographer paid [1].




Figure 1: Dining Cryptographers protocol run

2. Protocol Specifications

The following implementation of the dining cryptographer's problem in GO has been simplified to allow easy verification of results. Following are the specifications:

- 1. There are four Cryptographers (A, B, C, 0), one Observer, one Restaurant owner, and the NSA participating in the protocol.
- 2. The outcome of each coin flip is either true or false (Boolean)
- 3. The outcome of each comparison done by every cryptographer is either same (true) or different (false) (Boolean)

- 4. Cryptographer 0 acts essentially as the verifier. Cryptographer 0 can watch all the coin flip outcomes after the communication between the cryptographers has occurred. Cryptographer 0 can also view the assertions made by the other cryptographers.
- 5. The Observer can only view the assertions made by the three cryptographers and not the outcomes for each coin flip.
- 6. The Restaurant owner computes the outcome of all assertions to determine who is paying the bill, the NSA or one of the cryptographers.

3. Code Design

1) Every coin is its own process

a) Uses flip function to toss a coin

2) Every cryptographer is its own process

a) Uses compare function to determine outcome: Same or different

3) The restaurant owner is its own process

a) Uses assertions/outcomes by cryptographers to compute the payer

4) Channels used to communicate between processes

- a) Channels allow synchronization without explicit locks
- b) Channels exists between the coin and cryptographer processes
- c) Channels also used between cryptographer and restaurant owner process
- d) Cryptographer 0 has channels with both coins and cryptographer processes.

5) Used WaitGroups to coordinate between the different actors.

a) Example: The restaurant owner can only compute result after all cryptographers declare their assertion.

4. GO Program Modules

4.1. Cryptographer and NSA Objects

Figure 2: Crytographers and NSA structures

To implement the various properties concerning the cryptographers like the coin toss value, payer status, identity etc. we used structures. Similarly, for NSA actor we defined a structure to track payer status and its identity.

4.2. WaitGroup

```
//Waitgroup to sync processes
var wg[4] sync.WaitGroup
```

Figure 3: WaitGroup Array

To synchronize the separate processes corresponding to coins, cryptographers, restaurant owner as well as the cryptographer0 we used WaitGroups. Each actor or entity group was added to a WaitGroup. For example, the process for cryptographers that compared the coin values was initiated only after the process group for coin processes finished.

4.3. Flip Function

Figure 4: Flip function for coin processes

The flip function essentially selects a random integer and then takes a modulus 2 to get 0 or 1 (true or false). Once the coin value is generated, it is shared to the Cryptographer process using the channel "channel". This channel is later closed as no additional values need to be written to it ensuring integrity. Moreover, the value is also shared with Cryptographer0 using channel "channel 0".

4.4. Compare Function

Figure 5: Compare function for cryptographer processes

The cryptographer process receives the coin flip values using the channels established. If the concerned cryptographer is the payer, the compare function computes a xor of the two-coin values of the cryptographer himself and the cryptographer on the left and then returns the opposite of that. Whereas, if the cryptographer is not paying he publishes the outcome as it is. The outcome is then shared with Restaurant owner using the channel "channel_out". The outcome is also shared with cryptographer0 using the channel "channel 0".

4.5. Restaurant Owner Function

Figure 6: Restaurant owner function for Restaurant Process

The restaurant function is implementing a three input XOR to find out if the NSA paid or if a cryptographer paid. The input is the three outcomes from the compare function.

4.6. Cryptographer 0 Function

```
<mark>func</mark> crypt0(aCoin bool, bCoin bool, cCoin bool, axor bool, bxor bool, cxor bool ) {
          fmt.Println(
          fmt.Println(
                                   ==> Cryptographer A <==
          fmt.Println("-
          fmt.Println("Computed Result: A xor C =>",xor(aCoin, cCoin))
fmt.Println("Declared Result by A =>",axor)
          fmt.Println("\n-----
          fmt.Println('
fmt.Println('
                                Cryptographer B
          fmt.Println("Computed Result: B xor A =>",xor(bCoin, aCoin))
fmt.Println("Declared Result by B =>",bxor)
          fmt.Println("\n-----
          fmt.Println(
                                     Cryptographer C
          fmt.Println("-
          fmt.Println("Computed Result: C xor B =>",xor(cCoin, bCoin))
fmt.Println("Declared Result by C =>",cxor)
fmt.Println("-----\n")
          if reverse_xor(aCoin, cCoin) == axor {
                     fmt.Println("*** Cryptographer A said opposite --> Cryptographer A Paid! ***")
         } else if reverse_xor(bCoin, aCoin) == bxor {
    fmt.Println("*** Cryptographer B said opposite --> Cryptographer B Paid!")
} else if reverse_xor(cCoin, bCoin) == cxor {
    fmt.Println("*** Cryptographer C said opposite --> Cryptographer C Paid!")
          } else {
                     fmt.Println("*** Nobody said opposite so The NSA paid! ***\n\n")
          wg[3].Done() // Signal to waitgroup of completion
```

Figure 7: Cryptographer0 function for Cryptographer0 process

The CryptographerO function is basically reverse engineering the protocol since it has access to all the diners coin results, as well as XOR results. Based upon the reverse engineering, the function can deduct who paid accurately.

4.7. XOR Functions

```
// XOR operation
func xor(a bool, b bool) bool {
         return a != b
}

// Reverse XOR operation
func reverse_xor(a bool, b bool) bool {
         return !(a != b)
}
```

Figure 8: XOR Function implementation

The XOR and reverse XOR are common basic implementations.

4.8. Main Function

```
func main() {

    // Channels for communication between cryptographers
    channel_a := make(chan bool, 1) // Channel for Crytographer A's coin shared to B
    channel_B := make(chan bool, 1) // Channel for Crytographer B's coin shared to C
    channel_C := make(chan bool, 1) // Channel for Crytographer B's coin shared to A
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 1) // Channel for Crytographer O's coin shared to A
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers O's
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers O's
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers O's
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers O's
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers O's
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers O's
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers O's
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    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers O's
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    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers O's
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographer O's
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers O's
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographer O's
    channel_O := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by
```

Figure 9: Initialization of objects and channels in main function

Figure 10: Running coin, cryptographer, restaurant owner and cryptographer0 process

5. Results

```
osboxes@osboxes:~/project3$ go run dining.go
    Randomly Selecting Payer
 Selected Payer: Cryptographer A
Flip results visible to Crytographer0
Cryptographer C coin value: true
Cryptographer A coin value: false
Cryptographer B coin value: true
   Cryptographers declare outcomes
** Visible to: Observer, Restaurant Owner, Cryptographer 0,A,B,C **
Cryptographer C declares outcome: Same
Cryptographer A declares outcome: Same
Cryptographer B declares outcome: Different
   Restaurant Owner computes payer
Result Count -> ||Same: 2 ||  ||Different: 1 ||
*** Odd count of "Different" Uttered. So.. ***
=> Restaurant Owner declares a cryptographer paid !!
   Cryptographer0 verifies payer
  Cryptographer A
Computed Result: A xor C => true
Declared Result by A => false
                 Cryptographer B
Computed Result: B xor A => true
Declared Result by B => true
```

Figure 11: Result Window 1

```
Cryptographer0 verifies payer

Cryptographer A

Computed Result: A xor C => true
Declared Result by A => false

Cryptographer B

Computed Result: B xor A => true
Declared Result by B => true

Cryptographer C

Computed Result: C xor B => false
Declared Result by C => false

*** Cryptographer A said opposite --> Cryptographer A Paid! ***
```

Figure 12: Result Window 2

6. Conclusion

The results prove that Dining cryptographers protocol satisfies the anonymity requirement with respect to the Observer and restaurant owner. Even without knowing the value of each cryptographer's coin (secret), the restaurant owner can compute who among the NSA or the cryptographers paid the bill.

This essentially protects the anonymity of an individual cryptographer.

The verifier Cryptographer 0 reaches the same conclusion as the protocol result.

References

- [1] D. Chaum. The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability. In Journal of Cryptology, 1(1), pp. 65-75, 1988.
- [2] Online GO Documentation: http://golang.org
- [3] TutorialsPoint GO Language: https://www.tutorialspoint.com/go/index.htm
- [4] Dining Cryptographers GO implementation: http://cpansearch.perl.org/src/SHEVEK/Crypt-Dining-1.01/lib/Crypt/Dining.pm
- [5] Dining Philosophers GO implementation: http://f.souza.cc/2011/10/go-solution-for-dining-philosophers.html
- [6] Dining Cryptographers Problem Wikipedia:
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining_cryptographers_problem

Appendix

I. Code:

```
package main
import (
   "fmt"
   "math/rand"
   "time"
   "sync"
// Define Cryptographer Actor
type Crypto struct {
   coin bool // Result of coin flip
   paid bool // Is the cryptographer payer?
   xorval bool // Outcome of comparision
               string // Identity of cryptographer
   identity
//Define NSA Actor
type NSA struct {
   //Waitgroup to sync processes
var wg[4] sync.WaitGroup
//Simulates flipping a coin
func (c *Crypto) Flip(channel chan bool, channel 0 chan bool) {
   random := rand.Int()
```

```
if random%2 == 0 {
          c.coin = true
   } else {
          c.coin = false
   }
   fmt.Println(c.identity, " coin value: ",c.coin)
   channel <- c.coin // Use this channel to share coin value with cryptographer on right
   channel 0 <- c.coin // Use this channel to share coin value with cryptographer0
   close(channel)
   wg[0].Done() // Signal to waitgroup of completion
}
// Compare function
func (c *Crypto) compare(left coin bool, channel out chan bool, channel 0 chan bool) {
   if c.paid {
          c.xorval = reverse xor(c.coin, left coin)
   } else {
          c.xorval = xor(c.coin, left coin)
   if c.xorval {
          fmt.Println(c.identity," declares outcome: Different")
   } else {
           fmt.Println(c.identity," declares outcome: Same")
   channel out <- c.xorval // Use this channel to share outcome with Restaurant Owner or
   channel 0 <- c.xorval // Use this channel to share outcome with Cryptographer0
   wg[1].Done() // Signal to waitgroup of completion
// Restaurant Owner Function
func restaurant owner(a bool, b bool, c bool) {
   var same, diff int
   var outcome[3] bool
   outcome[0]=a // Assign A's outcome
   outcome[1]=b // Assign B's outcome
   outcome[2]=c // Assign C's outcome
   same = 0
   diff = 0
   // Count the number of Different and Same utterances
   for i :=0; i<3; i++ {
           if outcome[i] {
                  diff = diff + 1
           } else {
                  same = same + 1
   }
   fmt.Println("Result Count -> ||Same:",same,"|| ||Different:",diff,"||\n")
   // If "different" utterance is even --> NSA Paid, if odd --> cryptographer paid
   if (diff % 2 != 0) {
           fmt.Println("*** Odd count of \"Different\" Uttered. So.. ***")
           fmt.Println("=> Restaurant Owner declares a cryptographer paid !!")
   } else {
           fmt.Println("*** Even count of \"Different\" Uttered. So.. ***")
           fmt.Println("=> Restaurant Owner declares the NSA Paid !!")
   wg[2].Done() // Signal to waitgroup of completion
//Cryptographer 0 Function
func crypt0(aCoin bool, bCoin bool, cCoin bool, axor bool, bxor bool, cxor bool) {
   fmt.Println("----")
```

```
fmt.Println(" ==> Cryptographer A <== ")</pre>
   fmt.Println("----")
   fmt.Println("Computed Result: A xor C =>", xor(aCoin, cCoin))
   fmt.Println("Declared Result by A =>",axor)
   fmt.Println("\n----")
   fmt.Println(" Cryptographer B ")
   fmt.Println("----")
   fmt.Println("Computed Result: B xor A =>", xor(bCoin, aCoin))
   fmt.Println("Declared Result by B =>",bxor)
   fmt.Println("\n----")
   fmt.Println(" Cryptographer C ")
   fmt.Println("----")
   fmt.Println("Computed Result: C xor B =>",xor(cCoin, bCoin))
   fmt.Println("Declared Result by C =>",cxor)
   fmt.Println("-----\n")
   if reverse xor(aCoin, cCoin) == axor {
          fmt.Println("*** Cryptographer A said opposite --> Cryptographer A Paid! ***")
   } else if reverse xor(bCoin, aCoin) == bxor {
          fmt.Println("*** Cryptographer B said opposite --> Cryptographer B Paid!")
   } else if reverse xor(cCoin, bCoin) == cxor {
          fmt.Println("*** Cryptographer C said opposite --> Cryptographer C Paid!")
   } else {
          fmt.Println("*** Nobody said opposite so The NSA paid! ***\n\n")
   wg[3].Done() // Signal to waitgroup of completion
// XOR operation
func xor(a bool, b bool) bool {
  return a != b
// Reverse XOR operation
func reverse xor(a bool, b bool) bool {
  return ! (a != b)
func main() {
   // Channels for communication between cryptographers
   channel A := make(chan bool, 1) // Channel for Crytographer A's coin shared to B
   channel B := make(chan bool, 1) // Channel for Crytographer B's coin shared to C
   channel C := make(chan bool, 1) // Channel for Crytographer C's coin shared to A
   channel O := make(chan bool, 3) // Channel for Crytographers Outcome shared with
Restaurant Owner
   \label{eq:channel_0A} \mbox{channel\_0A} := \mbox{make(chan bool, 2)} \ // \ \mbox{Channel shared by Crytographers 0,A}
   channel_0B := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers 0,B
   channel_OC := make(chan bool, 2) // Channel shared by Crytographers 0,A
   //Get random seed as current time
   rand.Seed(time.Now().UTC().UnixNano())
   // Set Defaults
   a := Crypto{paid: false, identity: "Cryptographer A"}
   b := Crypto{paid: false, identity: "Cryptographer B"}
   c := Crypto{paid: false, identity: "Cryptographer C"}
   n := NSA{paid: false, identity: "NSA"}
   //determine payer randomly
   payer := rand.Int() % 4
```

```
fmt.Println("----")
   fmt.Println(" ==> Randomly Selecting Payer <==</pre>
                                                ")
   fmt.Println("----")
  if payer == 0 {
        n.paid = true
        fmt.Println(" Selected Payer:", n.identity)
   if payer == 1 {
        a.paid = true
        fmt.Println(" Selected Payer:", a.identity)
  if payer == 2 {
        b.paid = true
        fmt.Println(" Selected Payer:", b.identity)
  if payer == 3 {
        c.paid = true
         fmt.Println(" Selected Payer:", c.identity)
   fmt.Println("----\n")
   // All crytographers flip coins simultaneously
   fmt.Println("-----")
   fmt.Println(" ==> Flip results visible to Crytographer0 <== ")</pre>
   fmt.Println("-----\n")
  wg[0].Add(3) // Add the three coin processes to WaitGroup
  go a.Flip(channel A, channel OA)
  go b.Flip(channel_B, channel_0B)
  go c.Flip(channel_C, channel_OC)
  wg[0].Wait() // Wait for the coin processes to complete
   fmt.Println("----\n")
   // All crytographers compare coins and broadcast
   fmt.Println("-----")
   fmt.Println(" ==> Cryptographers declare outcomes <== ")</pre>
   fmt.Println("----")
   fmt.Println("** Visible to: Observer, Restaurant Owner, Cryptographer 0,A,B,C **\n")
  wg[1].Add(3) // Add the three cryptographer processes to WaitGroup
  go a.compare(<-channel C, channel O, channel OA)
  go b.compare(<-channel A, channel O, channel OB)
  go c.compare(<-channel B, channel O, channel OC)
  wg[1].Wait() // Wait for the cryptographer processes to complete
   fmt.Println("----\n")
  fmt.Println("----")
   fmt.Println(" ==> Restaurant Owner computes payer <==</pre>
  fmt.Println("----")
  //Restaurant Owner Process
  wg[2].Add(1) // Add the restaurant owner process to WaitGroup
  go restaurant owner(<-channel 0,<-channel 0,<-channel 0)</pre>
  wg[2].Wait() // Wait for the restaurant processes to complete
  fmt.Println("----\n")
  fmt.Println("-----")
  fmt.Println(" ==> Cryptographer0 verifies payer <== ")</pre>
  fmt.Println("----")
  // Cryptographer0 Process
  wg[3].Add(1) // Add the cryptographer 0 process to WaitGroup
  go crypt0(<-channel 0A , <-channel 0B, <-channel 0C, <-channel 0A , <-channel 0B, <-
channel OC)
  wg[3].Wait() // Add the cryptographer 0 process to complete
```