

OpenCore

Reference Manual (0.6.3.4)

[2020.11.30]

loaded by the firmware by default according to UEFI specification, and Bootstrap.efi can be registered as a custom option to let OpenCore coexist with operating systems using BOOTx64.efi as their own loaders (e.g. Windows), see BootProtect for more details.

• boot

Duet bootstrap loader, which initialises UEFI environment on legacy BIOS firmware and loads OpenCore.efi similarly to other bootstrap loaders. Modern Duet bootstrap loader will default to OpenCore.efi on the same partition when present.

• ACPI

Directory used for storing supplemental ACPI information for ACPI section.

Drivers

Directory used for storing supplemental UEFI drivers for UEFI section.

Kexts

Directory used for storing supplemental kernel information for Kernel section.

• Resources

Directory used for storing media resources, such as audio files for screen reader support. See UEFI Audio Properties section for more details. This directory also contains image files for graphical user interface. See OpenCanopy section for more details.

• Tools

Directory used for storing supplemental tools.

• OpenCore.efi

Main booter driver responsible for operating system loading. The directory OpenCore.efi resides is called the root directory. By default root directory is set to EFI\OC, however, when launching OpenCore.efi directly or through Bootstrap.efi, other directories containing OpenCore.efi can also be supported.

• config.plist

OC Config.

• vault.plist

Hashes for all files potentially loadable by OC Config.

• vault.sig

Signature for vault.plist.

• SysReport

Directory containing system reports generated by SysReport option.

• nvram.plist

OpenCore variable import file.

• opencore-YYYY-MM-DD-HHMMSS.txt

OpenCore log file.

• panic-YYYY-MM-DD-HHMMSS.txt

Kernel panic log file.

Note: It is not guaranteed that paths longer than OC_STORAGE_SAFE_PATH_MAX (128 characters including 0-terminator) will be accessible within OpenCore.

3.2 Installation and Upgrade

To install OpenCore reflect the Configuration Structure described in the previous section on a EFI volume of a GPT partition. While corresponding sections of this document do provide some information regarding external resources such as ACPI tables, UEFI drivers, or kernel extensions (kexts), completeness of the matter is out of the scope of this document. Information about kernel extensions may be found in a separate Kext List document available in OpenCore repository. Vaulting information is provided in Security Properties section of this document.

OC config, just like any property lists can be edited with any stock textual editor (e.g. nano, vim), but specialised software may provide better experience. On macOS the preferred GUI application is Xcode. For a lightweight cross-platform and open-source alternative ProperTree editor can be utilised.

For BIOS booting a third-party UEFI environment provider will have to be used. OpenDuetPkg is one of the known UEFI environment providers for legacy systems. To run OpenCore on such a legacy system, OpenDuetPkg can be installed with a dedicated tool — BootInstall (bundled with OpenCore). Third-party utilities can be used to perform this on systems other than macOS.

For upgrade purposes refer to Differences.pdf document, providing the information about the changes affecting the configuration compared to the previous release, and Changelog.md document, containing the list of modifications

DevirtualiseMmio. This means that the firmware will be able to directly communicate with this memory region during operating system functioning, because the region this value is in will be assigned a virtual address.

The addresses written here must be part of the memory map, have EfiMemoryMappedIO type and EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute (highest bit) set. To find the list of the candidates the debug log can be used.

2. Comment

Type: plist string Failsafe: Empty string

Description: Arbitrary ASCII string used to provide human readable reference for the entry. It is implementation defined whether this value is used.

3. Enabled

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false

Description: This address will be devirtualised unless set to true.

5.4 Quirks Properties

1. AllowRelocationBlock

Type: plist boolean

Failsafe: false

Description: Allows booting macOS through a relocation block.

Relocation block is a scratch buffer allocated in lower 4 GB to be used for loading the kernel and related structures by EfiBoot on firmwares where lower memory is otherwise occupied by the (assumed to be) non-runtime data. Right before kernel startup the relocation block is copied back to lower addresses. Similarly all the other addresses pointing to relocation block are also carefully adjusted. Relocation block can be used when:

- No better slide exists (all the memory is used)
- slide=0 is forced (by an argument or safe mode)
- KASLR (slide) is unsupported (this is macOS 10.7 or older)

This quirk requires ProvideCustomSlide to also be enabled and generally needs AvoidRuntimeDefrag to work correctly. Hibernation is not supported when booting with a relocation block (but relocation block is not always used when the quirk is enabled).

Note: While this quirk is required to run older macOS versions on platforms with used lower memory it is not compatible with some hardware and macOS 11. In this case you may try to use EnableSafeModeSlide instead.

2. AvoidRuntimeDefrag

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false

Description: Protect from boot.efi runtime memory defragmentation.

This option fixes UEFI runtime services (date, time, NVRAM, power control, etc.) support on firmware that uses SMM backing for select services such as variable storage. SMM may try to access physical addresses, but they get moved by boot.efi.

Note: Most types of firmware, apart from Apple and VMware, need this quirk.

3. DevirtualiseMmio

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false

Description: Remove runtime attribute from select MMIO regions.

This option reduces stolen memory footprint from the memory map by removing runtime bit for known memory regions. This quirk may result in the increase of KASLR slides available, but is not necessarily compatible with the target board without additional measures. In general this frees from 64 to 256 megabytes of memory (present in the debug log), and on some platforms it is the only way to boot macOS, which otherwise fails with allocation error at bootloader stage.

6. DisableIoMapper

Type: plist boolean

Failsafe: false

Requirement: 10.8 (not required for older)

Description: Disables IOMapper support in XNU (VT-d), which may conflict with the firmware implementation.

Note: This option is a preferred alternative to deleting DMAR ACPI table and disabling VT-d in firmware preferences, which does not break VT-d support in other systems in case they need it.

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$7. \ {\tt DisableLinkeditJettison}$

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false Requirement: 11.011

Description: Disables __LINKEDIT jettison code.

This option lets Lilu.kext and possibly some others function in macOS Big Sur with best performance without keepsyms=1 boot argument.

8. DisableRtcChecksum

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false Requirement: 10.4

 ${\bf Description:}\ {\bf Disables}\ {\bf primary}\ {\bf checksum}\ (0x58-0x59)\ {\bf writing}\ {\bf in}\ {\bf AppleRTC}.$

Note 1: This option will not protect other areas from being overwritten, see RTCMemoryFixup kernel extension if this is desired.

Note 2: This option will not protect areas from being overwritten at firmware stage (e.g. macOS bootloader), see AppleRtcRam protocol description if this is desired.

9. ExtendBTFeatureFlags

Type: plist boolean

Failsafe: false Requirement: 10.8

Description: Set FeatureFlags to 0x0F for full functionality of Bluetooth, including Continuity.

Note: This option is a substitution for BT4LEContinuityFixup.kext, which does not function properly due to late patching progress.

10. ExternalDiskIcons

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false Requirement: 10.4

Description: Apply icon type patches to AppleAHCIPort.kext to force internal disk icons for all AHCI disks.

Note: This option should be avoided whenever possible. Modern firmware usually have compatible AHCI controllers.

11. ForceSecureBootScheme

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false Requirement: 11.011

Description: Force x86 scheme for IMG4 verification.

Note: This option is required on virtual machines when using SecureBootModel different from x86legacy.

12. IncreasePciBarSize

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false Requirement: 10.10

Description: Increases 32-bit PCI bar size in IOPCIFamily from 1 to 4 GBs.

Note: This option should be avoided whenever possible. In general the necessity of this option means misconfigured or broken firmware.

Model	10.6 (minimal)	10.6 (client)	10.6 (server)	10.7 (any)
Macmini	4,x (Mid 2010)	5,x (Mid 2011)	4,x (Mid 2010)	3,x (Early 2009)
MacBook	Unsupported	Unsupported	Unsupported	5,x (2009/09)
MacBookAir	Unsupported	Unsupported	Unsupported	2,x (Late 2008)
MacBookPro	4,x (Early 2008)	8,x (Early 2011)	8,x (Early 2011)	3,x (Mid 2007)
iMac	8,x (Early 2008)	12,x (Mid 2011)	12,x (Mid 2011)	7,x (Mid 2007)
MacPro	3,x (Early 2008)	5,x (Mid 2010)	3,x (Early 2008)	3,x (Early 2008)
Xserve	2,x (Early 2008)	2,x (Early 2008)	2,x (Early 2008)	2,x (Early 2008)

Note: 3+2 and 6+4 hotkeys to choose the preferred architecture are unsupported due to being handled by EfiBoot and thus being hard to properly detect.

3. KernelCache

Type: plist string

Failsafe: Auto

Description: Prefer specified kernel cache type (Auto, Cacheless, Mkext, Prelinked) when available.

Different variants of macOS support different kernel caching variants designed to improve boot performance. This setting prevents the use of faster kernel caching variants if slower variants are available for debugging and stability reasons. I.e., by specifying Mkext, Prelinked will be disabled for e.g. 10.6 but not for 10.7.

The list of available kernel caching types and its current support in OpenCore is listed below.

macOS	i386 NC	i386 MK	i386 PK	x86_64 NC	x86_64 MK	x86_64 PK	x86_64 KC
10.4	YES	YES (V1)	NO (V1)	_	_	_	_
10.5	YES	YES (V1)	NO (V1)	_	_	_	
10.6	YES	YES (V2)	YES (V2)	YES	YES (V2)	YES (V2)	
10.7	YES		YES (V3)	YES	_	YES (V3)	
10.8-10.9			_	YES	_	YES (V3)	_
10.10-10.15			_	_	_	YES (V3)	_
11.0 11+	_	_	_			YES (V3)	YES

Note: First version (V1) of 32-bit prelinkedkernel is unsupported due to kext symbol tables being corrupted by the tools. On these versions Auto will block prelinkedkernel booting. This also makes keepsyms=1 for kext frames broken on these systems.

Note 1: It is known that some Lenovo laptops have a firmware bug, which makes them unbootable after performing NVRAM reset. See acidanthera/bugtracker#995 for more details.

Note 2: Resetting NVRAM will also erase all the boot options otherwise not backed up with bless (e.g. Linux).

2. AllowSetDefault

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false

Description: Allow CTRL+Enter and CTRL+Index handling to set the default boot option in boot picker.

3. ApECID

Type: plist integer, 64 bit

Failsafe: 0

Description: Apple Enclave Identifier.

Setting this value to any non-zero 64-bit integer will allow using personalised Apple Secure Boot identifiers. To use this setting, make sure to generate a random 64-bit number with a cryptographically secure random number generator. As an alternative, first 8 bytes of SystemUUID can be used for ApECID, this is found in macOS 11.0-11 for Macs without the T2 chip.

With this value set and SecureBootModel valid and not Disabled it is possible to achieve Full Security of Apple Secure Boot.

To start using personalised Apple Secure Boot, the operating system will have to be reinstalled or personalised. Unless the operating system is personalised, macOS DMG recovery cannot be loaded. If DMG recovery is missing, it can be downloaded with macrecovery utility and put to com.apple.recovery.boot as explained in Tips and Tricks section. Note that DMG loading needs to be set to Signed to use any DMG with Apple Secure Boot.

To personalise an existing operating system use **bless** command after loading to macOS DMG recovery. Mount the system volume partition, unless it has already been mounted, and execute the following command:

```
bless bless --folder "/Volumes/Macintosh HD/System/Library/CoreServices" \
   --bootefi --personalize
```

Before macOS 11.011, which introduced a dedicated x861egacy model for models without the T2 chip, personalised Apple Secure Boot may not work as expected. When reinstalling the operating system, macOS Installer from macOS 10.15 and older, will usually run out of free memory on the /var/tmp partition when trying to install macOS with the personalised Apple Secure Boot. Soon after downloading the macOS installer image an Unable to verify macOS error message will appear. To workaround this issue allocate a dedicated RAM disk of 2 MBs for macOS personalisation by entering the following commands in macOS recovery terminal before starting the installation:

```
disk=$(hdiutil attach -nomount ram://4096)
diskutil erasevolume HFS+ SecureBoot $disk
diskutil unmount $disk
mkdir /var/tmp/OSPersonalizationTemp
diskutil mount -mountpoint /var/tmp/OSPersonalizationTemp $disk
```

4. AuthRestart

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false

Description: Enable VirtualSMC-compatible authenticated restart.

Authenticated restart is a way to reboot FileVault 2 enabled macOS without entering the password. A dedicated terminal command can be used to perform authenticated restarts: sudo fdesetup authrestart. It is also used when installing operating system updates.

VirtualSMC performs authenticated restart by saving disk encryption key split in NVRAM and RTC, which despite being removed as soon as OpenCore starts, may be considered a security risk and thus is optional.

5. BlacklistAppleUpdate Type: plist boolean

Failsafe: false

Description: Ignore boot options trying to update Apple peripheral firmware (e.g. MultiUpdater.efi).

Note: This option exists due to some operating systems, namely macOS Big Sur, being incapable of disabling firmware updates with the NVRAM variable (run-efi-updater).

6. BootProtect

Type: plist string

Failsafe: None

Description: Attempt to provide bootloader persistence.

Valid values:

• None — do nothing.

- Bootstrap create or update top-priority \EFI\OC\Bootstrap\Bootstrap.efi boot option (Boot9696) in UEFI variable storage at bootloader startup. For this option to work RequestBootVarRouting is required to be enabled.
- BootstrapShort create a short boot option instead of a complete one, otherwise equivalent to Bootstrap. This variant is useful for some Insyde firmwares, which cannot handle full device paths.

This option provides integration with third-party operating system installation and upgrade at the times they overwrite \EFI\B00T\B00Tx64.efi file. By creating a custom option in Bootstrap mode this file path becomes no longer used for bootstrapping OpenCore.

Note 1: Some types of firmware may have faulty NVRAM, no boot option support, or other incompatibilities. While unlikely, the use of this option may even cause boot failures. This option should be used without any warranty exclusively on the boards known to be compatible. Check acidanthera/bugtracker#1222 for some known issues with Haswell and other boards.

Note 2: Be aware that while NVRAM reset executed from OpenCore should not erase the boot option created in Bootstrap, executing NVRAM reset prior to loading OpenCore will remove it.

7. DmgLoading

Type: plist string Failsafe: Signed

Description: Define Disk Image (DMG) loading policy used for macOS Recovery.

Valid values:

- Disabled loading DMG images will fail. Disabled policy will still let macOS Recovery to load in most cases as there usually are boot.efi files compatible with Apple Secure Boot. Manually downloaded DMG images stored in com.apple.recovery.boot directories will not load, however.
- Signed only Apple-signed DMG images will load. Due to Apple Secure Boot design Signed policy will let any Apple-signed macOS Recovery to load regardless of Apple Secure Boot state, which may not always be desired.
- Any any DMG images will mount as normal filesystems. Any policy is strongly not recommended and will cause a boot failure when Apple Secure Boot is activated.

8. EnablePassword

Type: plist boolean

Failsafe: false

Description: Enable password protection to allow sensitive operations.

Password protection ensures that sensitive operations such as booting a non-default operating system (e.g. macOS recovery or a tool), resetting NVRAM storage, trying to boot into a non-default mode (e.g. verbose mode or safe mode) are not allowed without explicit user authentication by a custom password. Currently password and salt are hashed with 5000000 iterations of SHA-512.

Note: This functionality is currently in development and is not ready for daily usage.

9. ExposeSensitiveData

Type: plist integer

Failsafe: 0x6

Description: Sensitive data exposure bitmask (sum) to operating system.

- 0x00100000 (bit 20) OC_SCAN_ALLOW_DEVICE_ATAPI, allow scanning CD/DVD devices and old SATA.
- 0x00200000 (bit 21) OC_SCAN_ALLOW_DEVICE_USB, allow scanning USB devices.
- 0x00400000 (bit 22) 0C_SCAN_ALLOW_DEVICE_FIREWIRE, allow scanning FireWire devices.
- 0x00800000 (bit 23) OC_SCAN_ALLOW_DEVICE_SDCARD, allow scanning card reader devices.
- 0x01000000 (bit 24) 0C_SCAN_ALLOW_DEVICE_PCI, allow scanning devices directly connected to PCI bus (e.g. VIRTIO).

Note: Given the above description, 0xF0103 value is expected to allow scanning of SATA, SAS, SCSI, and NVMe devices with APFS file system, and prevent scanning of any devices with HFS or FAT32 file systems in addition to not scanning APFS file systems on USB, CD, and FireWire drives. The combination reads as:

- OC SCAN FILE SYSTEM LOCK
- OC_SCAN_DEVICE_LOCK
- OC_SCAN_ALLOW_FS_APFS
- OC_SCAN_ALLOW_DEVICE_SATA
- OC_SCAN_ALLOW_DEVICE_SASEX
- OC_SCAN_ALLOW_DEVICE_SCSI
- OC_SCAN_ALLOW_DEVICE_NVME

15. SecureBootModel

Type: plist string Failsafe: Default

Description: Apple Secure Boot hardware model.

Sets Apple Secure Boot hardware model and policy. Specifying this value defines which operating systems will be bootable. Operating systems shipped before the specified model was released will not boot. Valid values:

- Default Recent available model, currently set to j137.
- Disabled No model, Secure Boot will be disabled.
- j137 iMacPro1,1 (December 2017) minimum macOS 10.13.2 (17C2111)
- j680 MacBookPro15,1 (July 2018) minimum macOS 10.13.6 (17G2112)
- j132 MacBookPro15,2 (July 2018) minimum macOS 10.13.6 (17G2112)
- j174 Macmini8,1 (October 2018) minimum macOS 10.14 (18A2063)
- j140k MacBookAir8,1 (October 2018) minimum macOS 10.14.1 (18B2084)
- j780 MacBookPro15,3 (May 2019) minimum macOS 10.14.5 (18F132)
- j213 MacBookPro15,4 (July 2019) minimum macOS 10.14.5 (18F2058)
- j140a MacBookAir8,2 (July 2019) minimum macOS 10.14.5 (18F2058)
- j152f MacBookPro16,1 (November 2019) minimum macOS 10.15.1 (19B2093)
- j160 MacPro7,1 (December 2019) minimum macOS 10.15.1 (19B88)
- j230k MacBookAir9,1 (March 2020) minimum macOS 10.15.3 (19D2064)
- j214k MacBookPro16,2 (May 2020) minimum macOS 10.15.4 (19E2269)
- j223 MacBookPro16,3 (May 2020) minimum macOS 10.15.4 (19E2265)
- j215 MacBookPro16,4 (June 2020) minimum macOS 10.15.5 (19F96)
- j185 iMac20,1 (August 2020) minimum macOS 10.15.6 (19G2005)
- j185f iMac20,2 (August 2020) minimum macOS 10.15.6 (19G2005)
- x86legacy Macs and VMs without T2 chip minimum macOS 11.0.1 (20B29)

Apple Secure Boot appeared in macOS 10.13 on models with T2 chips. Since PlatformInfo and SecureBootModel are independent, Apple Secure Boot can be used with any SMBIOS with and without T2. Setting SecureBootModel to any valid value but Disabled is equivalent to Medium Security of Apple Secure Boot. The ApECID value must also be specified to achieve Full Security. Check ForceSecureBootScheme when using Apple Secure Boot on a virtual machine.

Installing macOS with Apple Secure Boot enabled is not possible while using HFS+ target volume. This may include HFS+ formatted drives when no spare APFS drive is available.

Enabling Apple Secure Boot is more demanding to incorrect configurations, buggy macOS installations, and unsupported setups. Things to consider:

(a) As with T2 Macs, unsigned kernel drivers and several signed kernel drivers, including NVIDIA Web Drivers, cannot be installed.

- (b) The list of cached drivers may be different, resulting in the need to change the list of Added or Forced kernel drivers. For example, I080211Family cannot be injected in this case.
- (c) System volume alterations on operating systems with sealing, such as macOS 11, may result in the operating system being unbootable. Do not try to disable system volume encryption unless Apple Secure Boot is disabled.
- (d) If the platform requires certain settings, but they were not enabled, because the obvious issues did not trigger before, boot failure might occur. Be extra careful with IgnoreInvalidFlexRatio or HashServices.
- (e) Operating systems released before Apple Secure Boot landed (e.g. macOS 10.12 or earlier) will still boot until UEFI Secure Boot is enabled. This is so, because from Apple Secure Boot point they are treated as incompatible and are assumed to be handled by the firmware as Microsoft Windows is.
- (f) On older CPUs (e.g. before Sandy Bridge) enabling Apple Secure Boot might cause slightly slower loading by up to 1 second.
- (g) Since Default value will increase with time to support the latest major release operating system, it is not recommended to use ApECID and Default value together.

Sometimes the already installed operating system may have outdated Apple Secure Boot manifests on the Preboot partition causing boot failure. If there is "OCB: Apple Secure Boot prohibits this boot entry, enforcing!" message, it is likely the case. When this happens, either reinstall the operating system or copy the manifests (files with .im4m extension, such as boot.efi.j137.im4m) from /usr/standalone/i386 to /Volumes/Preboot/<UUID>/System/Library/CoreServices. Here <UUID> is the system volume identifier. On HFS+ installations the manifests should be copied to /System/Library/CoreServices on the system volume.

For more details on how to configure Apple Secure Boot with UEFI Secure Boot refer to UEFI Secure Boot section.

8.6 Entry Properties

1. Arguments

Type: plist string Failsafe: Empty string

Description: Arbitrary ASCII string used as boot arguments (load options) of the specified entry.

2. Auxiliary

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false

Description: This entry will not be listed by default when HideAuxiliary is set to true.

3. Comment

Type: plist string Failsafe: Empty string

Description: Arbitrary ASCII string used to provide human readable reference for the entry. It is implementation defined whether this value is used.

4. Enabled

Type: plist boolean Failsafe: false

Description: This entry will not be listed unless set to true.

5. Name

Type: plist string Failsafe: Empty string

Description: Human readable entry name displayed in boot picker.

6. Path

Type: plist string Failsafe: Empty string

Description: Entry location depending on entry type.

- Entries specify external boot options, and therefore take device paths in Path key. These values are not checked, thus be extremely careful. Example: PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/.../\EFI\COOL.EFI
- Tools specify internal boot options, which are part of bootloader vault, and therefore take file paths relative to OC/Tools directory. Example: OpenShell.efi.

7. RealPath

Type: plist boolean

Failsafe: false

Description: Pass full path to the tool when launching.

Passing tool directory may be unsafe for tool accidentally trying to access files without checking their integrity and thus should generally be disabled. Reason to enable this property may include cases where tools cannot work without external files or may need them for better function (e.g. memtest86 for logging and configuration or Shell for automatic script execution).

Note: This property is only valid for Tools. For Entries this property cannot be specified and is always true.

8. TextMode

Type: plist boolean

Failsafe: false

Description: Run the entry in text mode instead of graphics mode.

This setting may be benefitial to some older tools that require text output. By default all the tools are launched in graphics mode. Read more about text modes in Output Properties section below.

- 4D1EDE05-38C7-4A6A-9CC6-4BCCA8B38C14:HW_BID
 - Hardware BoardProduct (e.g. Mac-35C1E88140C3E6CF). Not present on real Macs, but used to avoid extra parsing of SMBIOS tables, especially in boot.efi.
- 4D1EDE05-38C7-4A6A-9CC6-4BCCA8B38C14:HW_MLB
 - Hardware BoardSerialNumber. Override for MLB. Present on newer Macs (2013+ at least).
- 4D1EDE05-38C7-4A6A-9CC6-4BCCA8B38C14:HW_ROM
 - Hardware ROM. Override for ROM. Present on newer Macs (2013+ at least).
- 7C436110-AB2A-4BBB-A880-FE41995C9F82:prev-lang:kbd
 - ASCII string defining default keyboard layout. Format is lang-COUNTRY:keyboard, e.g. ru-RU:252 for Russian locale and ABC keyboard. Also accepts short forms: ru:252 or ru:0 (U.S. keyboard, compatible with 10.9). Full decoded keyboard list from AppleKeyboardLayouts-L.dat can be found here. Using non-latin keyboard on 10.14 will not enable ABC keyboard, unlike previous and subsequent macOS versions, and is thus not recommended in case 10.14 is needed.
- 7C436110-AB2A-4BBB-A880-FE41995C9F82:security-mode
 - ASCII string defining FireWire security mode. Legacy, can be found in IOFireWireFamily source code in IOFireWireController.cpp. It is recommended not to set this variable, which may speedup system startup. Setting to full is equivalent to not setting the variable and none disables FireWire security.
- 4D1EDE05-38C7-4A6A-9CC6-4BCCA8B38C14:UIScale
 - One-byte data defining boot.efi user interface scaling. Should be $\mathbf{01}$ for normal screens and $\mathbf{02}$ for HiDPI screens.
- 4D1EDE05-38C7-4A6A-9CC6-4BCCA8B38C14:DefaultBackgroundColor Four-byte BGRA data defining boot.efi user interface background colour. Standard colours include **BF BF BF 00** (Light Gray) and **00 00 00 00** (Syrah Black). Other colours may be set at user's preference.

9.5 Other Variables

The following variables may be useful for certain configurations or troubleshooting:

- 7C436110-AB2A-4BBB-A880-FE41995C9F82:boot-args
 - Kernel arguments, used to pass configuration to Apple kernel and drivers. There are many arguments, which may be found by looking for the use of PE_parse_boot_argn function in the kernel or driver code. Some of the known boot arguments include:
 - acpi_layer=0xFFFFFFFF
 - acpi_level=0xFFFF5F (implies ACPI_ALL_COMPONENTS)
 - arch=i386 (force kernel architecture to i386, see KernelArch)
 - batman=VALUE (AppleSmartBatteryManager debug mask)
 - batman-nosmc=1 (disable AppleSmartBatteryManager SMC interface)
 - cpus=VALUE (maximum number of CPUs used)
 - debug=VALUE (debug mask)
 - io=VALUE (IOKit debug mask)
 - keepsyms=1 (show panic log debug symbols)
 - kextlog=VALUE (kernel extension loading debug mask)
 - nvram-log=1 (enables AppleEFINVRAM logs)
 - nv disable=1 (disables NVIDIA GPU acceleration)
 - nvda drv=1 (legacy way to enable NVIDIA web driver, removed in 10.12)
 - npci=0x2000 (legacy, disables kIOPCIConfiguratorPFM64)
 - lapic_dont_panic=1
 - slide=VALUE (manually set KASLR slide)
 - smcdebug=VALUE (AppleSMC debug mask)
 - -amd_no_dgpu_accel (alternative to WhateverGreen's -radvesa for new GPUs)
 - -nehalem_error_disable
 - -no_compat_check (disable model checking on 10.7+)
 - -s (single mode)
 - -v (verbose mode)
 - -x (safe mode)

There are multiple external places summarising macOS argument lists: example 1, example 2.

• 7C436110-AB2A-4BBB-A880-FE41995C9F82:bootercfg

Booter arguments, similar to boot-args but for boot.efi. Accepts a set of arguments, which are hexadecimal