CHIPSEC

version 1.2.1



Platform Security Assesment Framework

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Contents

CHIPSEC	1
Description	1
Installation	1
Windows Installation	1
Linux Installation	3
Installing CHIPSEC	3
UEFI Shell Installation	2
Building bootable USB thumb drive with UEFI Shell	4
Installing CHIPSEC on bootable thumb drive with UEFI shell	4
Extending CHIPSEC functionality for UEFI	5
Using CHIPSEC	6
Options	6
Advanced Options	6
Exit Code	7
Using CHIPSEC as a Python Package	7
Using CHIPSEC in a Python Shell	7
Compiling CHIPSEC Executables on Windows	3
Writing Your Own Modules (security modules)	3
CHIPSEC Components and Structure	9
Core components	10
Security modules (tests, tools)	10
Platform Configuration	23
OS/Environment Helpers	24
HW Abstraction Layer (HAL)	24
Utility command-line scripts	29
Auxiliary components	35
Executable build scripts	35



CHIPSEC

Welcome to the CHIPSEC documentation!

Questions about CHIPSEC can be directed to chipsec@intel.com

Warning

Chipsec should only be used on test systems!

It should not be installed/deployed on production end-user systems.

There are multiple reasons for that:

- 1. Chipsec kernel drivers provide direct access to hardware resources to user-mode applications (for example, access to physical memory). When installed on production systems this could allow malware to access privileged hardware resources.
- 2. The driver is distributed as source code. In order to load it on Operating System which requires kernel drivers to be signed (for example, 64 bit versions of Microsoft Windows 7 and higher), it is necessary to enable TestSigning (or equivalent) mode and sign the driver executable with test signature. Enabling TestSigning (or equivalent) mode turns off an important OS kernel protection and should not be done on production systems.
- 3. Due to the nature of access to hardware, if any chipsec module issues incorrect access to hardware resources, Operating System can hang or panic.

Description

CHIPSEC is a framework for analyzing the security of PC platforms including hardware, system firmware (BIOS/UEFI), and the configuration of platform components. It includes a security test suite, security assessment tools for various low level components/interfaces, and basic forensic capabilities for firmware.

CHIPSEC can run from Windows, Linux, and UEFI Shell.

Installation

CHIPSEC supports Windows, Linux, and UEFI shell. Circumstances surrounding the target platform may change which of these environments is most appropriate. When running CHIPSEC on client PC systems, Windows may be preferred. However, sometimes it may be preferable to assess platform security without interfering with the normal operating system. In these instances, CHIPSEC may be run from a bootable USB thumb drive - either a Live Linux image or a UEFI shell.

Windows Installation

Supports the following client versions:

- Windows 8/8.1 x86 and AMD64
- Windows 7 x86 and AMD64
- Windows XP (support discontinued)

Supports the following server versions:



- Windows Server 2012 x86 and AMD64
- Windows Server 2008 x86 and AMD64

Steps for installation:

1. Install Python

Note

Tested on 2.7.x and Python 2.6.x (E.g. Python 2.7.6)

- 2. Install additional packages for installed Python release (in any order)
 - (REQUIRED) pywin32: for Windows API support
 - (OPTIONAL) WConio: if you need colored console output
 - (OPTIONAL) py2exe: if you need to build chipsec executables

Note

Packages have to match Python platform (e.g. AMD64 package on Python AMD64)

3. Turn off kernel driver signature checks

Windows 8 64-bit (with Secure Boot enabled) / Windows Server 2012 64-bit (with Secure Boot enabled):

- In CMD shell: shutdown /r /t 0 /o
- Navigate: Troubleshooting > Advanced Settings > Startup Options > Reboot
- After reset choose F7 "Disable driver signature checks"

OR

 Disable Secure Boot in the BIOS setup screen then disable driver signature checks as in Windows 8 with Secure Boot disabled

Windows 7 64-bit (AMD64) / Windows Server 2008 64-bit (AMD64) / Windows 8 (with Secure Boot disabled) / Windows Server 2012 (with Secure Boot disabled):

- Boot in Test mode (allows self-signed certificates)
 - 1. Start CMD.EXE as Adminstrator
 - 2. BcdEdit /set TESTSIGNING ON
 - 3. Reboot
- If that doesn't work, run these additional commands:
 - 1. BcdEdit /set noIntegrityChecks ON
 - 2. BcdEdit /set loadoptions DISABLE_INTEGRITY_CHECKS

OR

- Press F8 when booting Windows and choose "No driver signatures enforcement" option to turn off driver signature checks at all
- 4. Notes on loading chipsec kernel driver:
 - On Windows 7, launch CMD.EXE as Administrator



- CHIPSEC will attempt to automatically register and start its service (load driver) or call existing if it's already started.
- (OPTIONAL) You can manually register and start the service/driver. Follow below instructions before running CHIPSEC, then run it with "--exists" command-line option. CHIPSEC will not attempt to start the driver but will call already running driver.

To start the service (in cmd.exe)

- 1. sc create chipsec binpath=<PATH_TO_CHIPSEC_SYS> type= kernel DisplayName="Chipsec driver"
- 2. sc start chipsec

Then to stop/delete service:

- 1. sc stop chipsec
- 2. sc delete chipsec

Linux Installation

Tested on:

- Fedora LXDE 64bit
- Ubuntu 64bit
- Debian 64bit and 32bit
- Linux UEFI Validation (LUV)

Installing CHIPSEC

- 1. You can use CHIPSEC on a desired Linux distribution or create a live Linux image on a USB flash drive and boot to it
 - For example, you can use liveusb-creator to create live Fedora image on a USB drive
- 2. Update and install necessary packages

```
#> yum install kernel kernel-devel-$(uname -r) python python-devel gcc nasm
or
#> apt-get install build-essential python-dev python gcc ``
``linux-headers-$(uname -r) nasm
```

Note

You can install the kernel headers for the currently installed version. That is why the above commands install kernel-devel-\$(uname -r) or linux-headers-\$(uname -r).

- 3. Clone CHIPSEC Git repository
 - git clone https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec
- 4. Build Linux driver for CHIPSEC
 - cd source/drivers/linux



- make
- 5. Load CHIPSEC driver in running system
 - (Optional) chmod 755 run.sh
 - sudo ./run.sh or sudo make install

or

- cd source/scripts
- chmod 755 compile_linux_driver.sh
- sudo ./compile_linux_driver.sh
- 6. Run CHIPSEC

cd source/tool sudo python chipsec_main.py Of sudo python chipsec_util.py

7. Remove CHIPSEC driver after using

sudo make uninstall

UEFI Shell Installation

Building bootable USB thumb drive with UEFI Shell

If you don't have bootable USB thumb drive with UEFI Shell yet, you need to build it:

- 1. Download UDK from Tianocore (Tested with UDK2010.SR1)
- 2. Follow instructions in DuetPkg/ReadMe.txt to create a bootable USB thumb drive with UEFI Shell (DUET)

Installing CHIPSEC on bootable thumb drive with UEFI shell

- 1. Extract contents of __install__/UEFI/chipsec_uefi_x64.zip to the DUET USB drive
 - This will create /efi/Tools directory with Python.efi and /efi/StdLib with subdirectories
- Copy contents of CHIPSEC (source/tool) to the DUET USB drive. The contents of your thumb drive should look like follows:



```
Boot\
Boot64.efi
StdLib\
Python.27\
[lots of python files and directories]
Tools\
Python.efi
Chipsec\
Source\
```

Note

The USB drive should already include a UEFI Shell binary in /efi/boot. On 64-bit platforms this should be named bootx64.efi.

- 3. Reboot to the USB drive (this will load UEFI shell)
- 4. Run CHIPSEC in UEFI shell
 - 1.fs0:
 - 2. cd source/tool
 - 3. python chipsec_main.py or python chipsec_util.py

Extending CHIPSEC functionality for UEFI

You don't need to read this section if you don't plan on extending native UEFI functionality for CHIPSEC. Native functions accessing HW resources are built directly into Python UEFI port in built-in edk2 module. If you want to add more native functionality to Python UEFI port for chipsec, you'll need to re-build Python for UEFI:

- 1. Check out AppPkg with Python 2.7.2 port for UEFI from SVN
 - You'll also need to check out StdLib and StdLibPrivateInternalFiles packages from SVN
 - Alternatively download latest EADK (EDK II Application Development Kit). EADK includes AppPkg/StdLib/StdLibPrivateInternalFiles. Unfortunately, EADK Alpha 2 doesn't have Python 2.7.2 port so you'll need to check it out SVN.
- 2. Add functionality to Python port for UEFI
 - Python 2.7.2 port for UEFI is in <UDK>\AppPkg\Applications\Python
 - All chipsec related functions are in <UDK>\AppPkg\Applications\Python\Efi\edk2module.c (#ifdef CHIPSEC)
 - Asm functions are in <UDK>\AppPkg\Applications\Python\Efi\cpu.asm
 - e.g. <UDK> is C:UDK2010.SR1
 - Add cpu.asm under the Efi section in PythonCore.inf



- 3. Build <UDK>/AppPkg with Python
 - Read instructions in <UDK>\AppPkg\ReadMe.txt and
 <UDK>\AppPkg\Applications\Python\PythonReadMe.txt
 - Binaries of AppPkg and Python will be in <UDK>\Build\AppPkg\DEBUG_MYTOOLS\X64\
- 4. Create directories and copy Python files on DUET USB drive
 - Do not use Python binaries from python_uefi.7z, copy newly generated
 - Read instructions in <UDK>\AppPkg\Applications\Python\PythonReadMe.txt

Using CHIPSEC

CHIPSEC should be launched as Administrator/root.

- In command shell, run
 - # python chipsec_main.py
- For help, run
 - # python chipsec_main.py --help
- Command Line Usage
 - # chipsec_main.py [options]

Options

-mmodule	specify module to run (example: -m common.bios_wp)	
-amodule_args	additional module arguments, format is 'arg0,arg1'	
-vverbose	verbose mode	
-llog	output to log file	

Advanced Options

-pplatform	explicitly specify platform code. Should be among the supported platforms: [SNB IVB JKT BYT QRK BDW IVT AVN HSW HSX]
-nno_driver	chipsec won't need kernel mode functions so don't load chipsec driver
-iignore_platform	run chipsec even if the platform is not recognized
-eexists	chipsec service has already been manually installed and started (driver loaded).
-xxml	specify filename for xml output (JUnit style).
-tmoduletype	run tests of a specific type (tag).
list_tags	list all the available options for -t,moduletype
-linclude	specify additional path to load modules from
failfast	fail on any exception and exit (don't mask exceptions)



no_time don't log timestamps	no_time
--------------------------------	---------

Exit Code

CHIPSEC returns an integer exit code:

- Exit code is 0: all modules ran successfully and passed
- Exit code is not 0: each bit means the following:
 - Bit 0: SKIPPED at least one module was skipped
 - Bit 1: WARNING at least one module had a warning
 - Bit 2: DEPRECATED at least one module uses deprecated API
 - · Bit 3: FAIL at least one module failed
 - Bit 4: ERROR at least one module wasn't able to run
 - Bit 5: EXCEPTION at least one module thrown an unexpected exceptions

Use --no-driver command-line option if the module you are executing does not require loading kernel mode driver. Chipsec won't load/unload the driver and won't try to access existing driver

Use --exists command-line option if you manually installed and start chipsec driver (see "install_readme" file). Otherwise chipsec will automatically attempt to create and start its service (load driver) or open existing service if it's already started

Use -m --module to run a specific module (e.g. security check, a tool or a PoC test..):

- # python chipsec_main.py -m common.bios_wp
- # python chipsec_main.py -m common.spi_lock
- # python chipsec main.py -m common.smrr
- You can also use CHIPSEC to access various hardware resources:

```
# python chipsec util.py help
```

Using CHIPSEC as a Python Package

The directory should contain the file setup.py. Install CHIPSEC into your system's site-packages directory:

```
# python setup.py install
```

then to run use this command:

```
# python -m chipsec_main
```

Using CHIPSEC in a Python Shell

The chipsec.app component can also be run from a python interactive shell or used in other python scripts and contains application logic in the form of a set of python functions for this purpose:

run_module('module_path') Immediately calls module.check_all() and returns. Does not affect internal loaded modules list.



load_module('module_path') Loads a module into the internal module list for batch processing

unload_module('module_path') Unloads a module from the internal module list

load_my_modules() Loads all modules from "modulescommon" and (if the current chipset is recognized) modules<chipset_code> into an internal list for batch processing.

un_loaded_modules() Calls the check_all() function from every module in the internal loaded modules list clear_loaded_modules() Empties the internal loaded module list

run_all_checks() Calls load_my_modules() followed by run_loaded_modules(). This function executes all existing security checks for a given chipset/platform. Calling this function in Python shell is equivalent to executing standalone chipsec_main.py or chipsec_main.exe.

Example:

```
>>> import chipsec_main
>>> chipsec_main._cs.init(True) # if chipsec driver is not running
>>> chipsec_main.load_module('chipsec/modules/common/bios_wp.py')
>>> chipsec_main.run_loaded_modules()
```

Compiling CHIPSEC Executables on Windows

Directories "bin/<platform>" should already contain compiled CHIPSEC binaries: "chipsec_main.exe", "chipsec_util.exe"

• To run all security tests run "chipsec_main.exe" from "bin" directory:

```
# chipsec_main.exe
```

• To access hardware resources run "chipsec_util.exe" from "bin" directory:

```
# chipsec_util.exe
```

If directory "bin" doesn't exist, then you can compile CHIPSEC executables:

- Install "py2exe" package from http://www.py2exe.org
- From the build directory run "build_exe_<platform>.py" as follows:

```
# python build_exe_<platform>.py py2exe
```

chipsec_main.exe, chipsec_util.exe executables and required libraries will be created in "bin/<platform>"
directory

Writing Your Own Modules (security modules)

See chipsec/modules/module_template.py for an example. Your module class should subclass BaseModule and implement at least the methods named is_supported and run. When chipsec_main runs, it will first run is_supported and if that returns true, then it will call run.

As of CHIPSEC version 1.2.0, CHIPSEC implements an abstract name for platform *controls*. Module authors are encouraged to create controls in the XML configuration files for important platform configuration information and then use get_control and set_control within modules. This abstraction allows modules to test for the abstract control without knowning which register provides it. (This is especially important for test reuse across platform generations.)

Most modules read some platform configuration and then pass or fail based on the result. For example:

Define the control in the platform XML file (in chispec/cfg):

```
<control name="BiosLockEnable" register="BC" field="BLE" desc="BIOS Lock Enable"/>
```



Get the current status of the control:

```
ble = chipsec.chipset.get_control( self.cs, 'BiosLockEnable' )
```

React based on the status of the control:

```
if ble: self.logger.log_passed_check("BIOS Lock is set.")
else: self.logger.log_failed_check("BIOS Lock is not set.")
```

Return:

```
if ble: return ModuleResult.PASSED
else: return ModuleResult.FAILED
```

When a module calls <code>get_control</code> or <code>set_control</code>, CHIPSEC will look up the control in the platform XML file, look up the corresponding register/field, and call chipsec.chipset.read_register_field or chipsec_chipset.write_register_field. This allows modules to be written for abstract <code>controls</code> that could be in different registers on different platforms.

The CHIPSEC HAL and other APIs are also available within these modules. See the next sections for details about the available functionality.


Copy your module into the chipsec/modules/ directory structure

- Modules specific to a certain platform should be in chipsec/modules/<chipset_code> directory
- Modules common to all supported chipsets should be in chipsec/modules/common directory

If a new platform needs to be added:

- Create directory for the new platform in chipsec/modules
- Create empty __init__.py in the new directory
- Modify chipsec/chipset.py to include the Device ID for the platform you are adding
- Review the platform datasheet and include appropriate information in an XML configuration file for the platform. Place this file in chipsec/cfg. Registers that are correctly defined in common.xml will be inherited and do not need to be added. Use common.xml as an example. It is based on the 4th Generation Intel Core platform (Haswell).

CHIPSEC Components and Structure





Core components

chipsec_main.py	main application logic and automation functions
chipsec_util.py	utility functions (access to various hardware resources)
chipsec/chipset.py	chipset detection
chipsec/logger.py	logging functions
chipsec/file.py	reading from/writing to files
chipsec/module_common.py	common include file for modules
chipsec/helper/oshelper.py	OS helper: wrapper around platform specific code that invokes kernel driver
chipsec/helper/xmlout.py	support for JUnit compatible XML output (-x command-line option)

Security modules (tests, tools)

chipsec/modules/	modules including tests or tools (that's where most of the chipsec functionality is)
chipsec/modules/common/	modules common to all platforms
chipsec/modules/ <platform< td=""><td>> modules specific to <platform></platform></td></platform<>	> modules specific to <platform></platform>
chipsec/modules/tools/	security tools based on CHIPSEC framework (fuzzers, etc.)

A CHIPSEC module is just a python class that inherits from BaseModule and implements is_supported and run. Modules are stored under the chipsec installation directory in a subdirectory "modules". The "modules" directory contains one subdirectory for each chipset that chipsec supports. There is also a directory for common modules that should apply to every platform.

Internally the chipsec application uses the concept of a module name, which is a string of the form: common.bios_wp. This means module common.bios_wp is a python script called bios_wp.py that is stored at <ROOT_DIR>\chipsec\modules\common\.

Each published module can be mapped to a publication that details the issue being checked (consult the documentation for an individual module for more information).

chipsec.modules.common.secureboot.variables module

UEFI 2.4 spec Section 28

Verify that all Secure Boot key/whitelist/blacklist UEFI variables are authenticated (BS+RT+AT) and protected from unauthorized modification.

Use '-a modify' option for the module to also try to write/corrupt the variables.



```
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
           VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
[CHIPSEC]
           DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.common.secureboot.variables
[*] running loaded modules ...
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.common.secureboot.variables
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/common/secureboot/variables.py
[x][ Module: Attributes of Secure Boot EFI Variables
[*] Checking protections of UEFI variable 8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c:SecureBoot
[*] Checking protections of UEFI variable 8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c:SetupMode
[!] Secure Boot variable PK is not found
[!] Secure Boot variable KEK is not found
[!] Secure Boot variable db is not found
[!] Secure Boot variable dbx is not found
[-] Some required Secure Boot variables are missing
[-] FAILED: Not all Secure Boot UEFI variables are protected
[CHIPSEC] Modules total
                         1
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
                         0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed
                         1:
[-] FAILED: chipsec.modules.common.secureboot.variables
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules skipped 0:
```

chipsec.modules.common.uefi.access_uefispec module

Checks protection of UEFI variables defined in the UEFI spec to have certain permissions.

Returns failure if variable attributes are not as defined in table 11 "Global Variables" of the UEFI spec.

```
CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework
##
                                                 ##
##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m common.uefi.access_uefispec
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
[CHIPSEC] OS
              : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precisel-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
           VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
[CHIPSEC]
           DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.common.uefi.access_uefispec
[*] running loaded modules ...
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.common.uefi.access_uefispec
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/common/uefi/access_uefispec.py
[x][ Module: Access Control of EFI Variables
[*] Testing UEFI variables ..
[*] Variable VarTest1 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable VarTest0 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PlatformLangCodes (BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0F03_0_VV (BS+RT)
[*] Variable SetupCpuFeatures (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable CpuS3Resume (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable ConOut (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable StdDefaults (NV+BS+RT)
```



```
[*] Variable FWVERSIONDATA (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable SdrEraseTimeStamp (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable AMITSESetup (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0400_0_NV (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable BootOrder (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable DriverHealthCount (BS+RT)
[*] Variable Setup (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable NetworkStackVar (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable WheaSetupData (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable SdrVersion (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable UsbMassDevNum (BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0F03_0_NV (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable ColdReset (BS+RT)
[*] Variable WdtPersistentData (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar8 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar9 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar2 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar3 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar0 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar1 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar6 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar7 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar4 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar5 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable DefaultBootOrder (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable MfgDefaults (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zzTestVar0
                                      Testing!!!
                                                                /// - - - - - ///
 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable ConErrDev (BS+RT)
[*] Variable PciSerialPortsLocationVar (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable LDP (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable SetupMode (BS+RT+AWS)
[!] Extra attributes:AWS
[*] Variable JktSaPamVar (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PhysicalPresence (NV+BS+RT)
                                                                /// - - - - - ///
[*] Variable zzTestVar2
                                      Testing!!!
 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable HiiDB (BS+RT)
[*] Variable SerialPortsEnabledVar (BS+RT)
[*] Variable BootOptionSupport (BS+RT)
[*] Variable ConInDev (BS+RT)
[*] Variable zzTestVar1
                                      Testing!!!
                                                                /// - - - - - ///
 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable MfgModeAfterFirstBoot (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0303_0_NV (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0501_3_VV (BS+RT)
[*] Variable MemoryRuntimeConfig (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable EFIDebug (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0501_2_VV (BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0604_0_NV (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable UsbSupport (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0501_3_NV (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable CurrentBbsInfo (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PchInit (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable OsIndicationsSupported (BS+RT)
[*] Variable BootCurrent (BS+RT)
[*] Variable Timeout (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable SignatureSupport (BS+RT+AWS)
[!] Extra attributes:AWS
[*] Variable MemoryTypeInformation (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable SetupVolatileData (BS+RT)
                                                                /// - - - - - ///
[*] Variable zzTestVar
                                     Testing!!!
 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable MonotonicCounter (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable Lang (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable Boot0004 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0501_1_VV (BS+RT)
[*] Variable MemoryOverwriteRequestControl (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable SecureBoot (BS+RT+AWS)
[!]
     Extra attributes:AWS
[*] Variable ExitBSEvent (BS+RT)
[*] Variable TimeZone (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable DriverHlthEnable (BS+RT)
```



```
[*] Variable ConOutDev (BS+RT)
[*] Variable ConIn (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0501_0_VV (BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0303_0_VV (BS+RT)
[*] Variable ExtdAcpiGlobalVariable (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0501_2_NV (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0501_1_NV (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PNP0501_0_NV (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable zTestVar10 (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable AcpiGlobalVariable (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable LangCodes (BS+RT)
[*] Variable MemoryConfig (NV+BS+RT)
[*] Variable PlatformLang (NV+BS+RT)
[-] Variables with attributes that differ from UEFI spec:
   SetupMode
   SignatureSupport
   SecureBoot
[CHIPSEC] Modules total 1
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
                             0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 1:
[!] WARNING: chipsec.modules.common.uefi.access_uefispec
[CHIPSEC] Modules skipped 0:
[CHIPSEC] *********
```

chipsec.modules.common.bios kbrd buffer module

DEFCON 16: Bypassing Pre-boot Authentication Passwords by Instrumenting the BIOS Keyboard Buffer by Jonathan Brossard

Checks for BIOS/HDD password exposure through BIOS keyboard buffer.

Checks for exposure of pre-boot passwords (BIOS/HDD/pre-bot authentication SW) in the BIOS keyboard buffer.

```
##
##
  CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework
                                             ##
##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m common.bios_kbrd_buffer
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
[CHIPSEC] OS
             : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precisel-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
          VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
[CHIPSEC]
          DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.common.bios_kbrd_buffer
[*] running loaded modules ...
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.common.bios_kbrd_buffer
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/common/bios_kbrd_buffer.py
[x][ Module: Pre-boot Passwords in the BIOS Keyboard Buffer
[*] Keyboard buffer head pointer = 0x0 (at 0x41A), tail pointer = 0x0 (at 0x41C)
[*] Keyboard buffer contents (at 0x41E):
[*] Checking contents of the keyboard buffer..
[+] PASSED: Keyboard buffer looks empty. Pre-boot passwords don't seem to be exposed
```



```
[CHIPSEC] ******************** SUMMARY ********************
[CHIPSEC] Modules total
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
                          1:
[+] PASSED: chipsec.modules.common.bios_kbrd_buffer
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules skipped 0:
                           **********
[CHIPSEC] *********
```

chipsec.modules.common.bios smi module

Setup for Failure: Defeating SecureBoot by Corey Kallenberg, Xeno Kovah, John Butterworth, Sam Cornwell

Checks for SMI events configuration

```
##
   CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework
##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m common.bios_smi
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
              : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precisel-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
[CHIPSEC]
            VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
            DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.common.bios_smi
[*] running loaded modules ...
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.common.bios smi
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/common/bios_smi.py
[x][ Module: SMI Events Configuration
[x][------
[*] BC = 0x2A << BIOS Control (b:d.f 00:31.0 + 0xDC)
   [00] BIOSWE
                    = 0 << BIOS Write Enable
   [01] BLE
                     = 1 << BIOS Lock Enable
   [02] SRC
                     = 2 << SPI Read Configuration
   [04] TSS = 0 << Top Swap Status
[05] SMM_BWP = 1 << SMM BIOS Write Protection
[+] SMM BIOS region write protection is enabled (SMM_BWP is used)
[*] Checking SMI enables..
   Global SMI enable: 1
   TCO SMI enable : 1
[+] All required SMI events are enabled
[*] Checking SMI configuration locks..
[*] TCO1\_CNT = 0x0800 << TCO1 Control (I/O ABASE + 0x68)
   [12] TCO_LOCK
                     = 0
[-] TCO SMI event configuration is not locked. TCO SMI events can be disabled
[*] GEN_PMCON_1 = 0x0E18 << General PM Configuration 1 (b:d.f 00:31.0 + 0xA0)
   [04] SMI LOCK
                   = 1
[+] SMI events global configuration is locked
[!] WARNING: Not all required SMI sources are enabled and locked, but SPI flash writes are still restricted to SMM
[CHIPSEC] Modules total
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
                           0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed
                           0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 1:
[!] WARNING: chipsec.modules.common.bios_smi
```



chipsec.modules.common.bios_ts module

BIOS Boot Hijacking and VMware Vulnerabilities Digging - Sun Bing

Checks for BIOS Top Swap Mode

```
##
  CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework ##
##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m common.bios_ts
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
             : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precisel-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
[CHIPSEC]
           VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
           DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.common.bios_ts
[*] running loaded modules ..
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.common.bios ts
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/common/bios_ts.py
[x][ Module: BIOS Interface Lock and Top Swap Mode
[*] BC = 0x2A << BIOS Control (b:d.f 00:31.0 + 0xDC)
                  = 0 << BIOS Write Enable
   [00] BIOSWE
   [01] BLE
                    = 1 << BIOS Lock Enable
   [02] SRC
                    = 2 << SPI Read Configuration
   [04] TSS
                   = 0 << Top Swap Status
                = 1 << SMM BIOS Write Protection
   [05] SMM_BWP
[*] BIOS Top Swap mode is disabled
[*] BUC = 0x000000000 << Backed Up Control (RCBA + 0x3414)
   [00] TS
                    = 0 << Top Swap
[*] RTC version of TS = 0
[*] GCS = 0x00000C21 << General Control and Status (RCBA + 0x3410)
   [00] BILD
                    = 1 << BIOS Interface Lock Down
   [10] BBS
                    = 3 << Boot BIOS Straps
[+] PASSED: BIOS Interface is locked (including Top Swap Mode)
[CHIPSEC] Modules total
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
                     1:
[+] PASSED: chipsec.modules.common.bios_ts
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules skipped 0:
[CHIPSEC] ************
```

chipsec.modules.common.bios_wp module

The BIOS region in flash can be protected either using SMM-based protection or using configuration in the SPI controller. However, the SPI controller configuration is set once and locked, which would prevent writes later.

This module does check both mechanisms. In order to pass this test using SPI controller configuration, the SPI Protected Range registers (PR0-4) will need to cover the entire BIOS region. Often, if this configuration is used at



all, it is used only to protect part of the BIOS region (usually the boot block). If other important data (eg. NVRAM) is not protected, however, some vulnerabilities may be possible.

A Tale of One Software Bypass of Windows 8 Secure Boot described just such an attack. In a system where certain BIOS data was not protected, malware may be able to write to the Platform Key stored on the flash, thereby disabling secure boot.

SMM based write protection is controlled from the BIOS Control Register. When the BIOS Write Protect Disable bit is set (sometimes called BIOSWE or BIOS Write Enable), then writes are allowed. When cleared, it can also be locked with the BIOS Lock Enable (BLE) bit. When locked, attempts to change the WPD bit will result in generation of an SMI. This way, the SMI handler can decide whether to perform the write.

As demonstrated in the Speed Racer issue, a race condition may exist between the outstanding write and processing of the SMI that is generated. For this reason, the EISS bit (sometimes called SMM_BWP or SMM BIOS Write Protection) must be set to ensure that only SMM can write to the SPI flash.

This module common.bios_wp will fail if SMM-based protection is not correctly configured and SPI protected ranges (PR registers) do not protect the entire BIOS region.

```
CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework
##
##
                                                 ##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m common.bios_wp
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
[CHIPSEC] OS
             : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precise1-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
[CHIPSEC] VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC] DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.common.bios_wp
[*] running loaded modules ...
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.common.bios_wp
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/common/bios_wp.py
[x][ Module: BIOS Region Write Protection
[*] BC = 0x2A << BIOS Control (b:d.f 00:31.0 + 0xDC)
   [00] BIOSWE = 0 << BIOS Write Enable
   [01] BLE
                    = 1 << BIOS Lock Enable
   [02] SRC
                    = 2 << SPI Read Configuration
   [04] TSS
                   = 0 << Top Swap Status
   [05] SMM_BWP = 1 << SMM BIOS Write Protection
[+] BIOS region write protection is enabled (writes restricted to SMM)
[*] BIOS Region: Base = 0x00400000, Limit = 0x007FFFFF
SPI Protected Ranges
PRx (offset) | Value | Base | Limit | WP? | RP?
______
       | 00000000 | 00000000 | 00000000 | 0
PR0 (74)
         00000000 | 00000000 | 00000000 | 0
PR1 (78)
                                         0
PR2 (7C)
         00000000 | 00000000 | 00000000 | 0 | 0
          PR3 (80)
                                         0
PR4 (84)
[!] None of the SPI protected ranges write-protect BIOS region
[+] PASSED: BIOS is write protected
[CHIPSEC] Modules total 1
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
                        1:
[+] PASSED: chipsec.modules.common.bios wp
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed
                        0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 0:
```



chipsec.modules.common.smm module

In 2006, Security Issues Related to Pentium System Management Mode outlined a configuration issue where compatibility SMRAM was not locked on some platforms. This means that ring 0 software was able to modify System Management Mode (SMM) code and data that should have been protected.

In Compatability SMRAM (CSEG), access to memory is defined by the SMRAMC register. When SMRAMC[D_LCK] is not set by the BIOS, SMRAM can be accessed even when the CPU is not in SMM. Such attacks were also described in Using CPU SMM to Circumvent OS Security Functions and Using SMM for Other Purposes.

This CHIPSEC module simply reads SMRAMC and checks that D_LCK is set.

```
##
                                                ##
   CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework
##
                                               ##
##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m common.smm
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
[CHIPSEC] OS
             : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precisel-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
           VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
[CHIPSEC]
           DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.common.smm
[*] running loaded modules ...
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.common.smm
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/common/smm.py
Skipping module chipsec.modules.common.smm since it is not supported in this platform
[CHIPSEC] Modules total
                       1
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
                        0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed
                        0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules skipped 1:
[*] SKIPPED: chipsec.modules.common.smm
```

chipsec.modules.common.smrr module

Researchers demonstrated a way to use CPU cache to effectively change values in SMRAM in Attacking SMM Memory via Intel CPU Cache Poisoning and Getting into the SMRAM: SMM Reloaded . If ring 0 software can make SMRAM cacheable and then populate cache lines at SMBASE with exploit code, then when an SMI is triggered, the CPU could execute the exploit code from cache. System Management Mode Range Registers (SMRRs) force non-cachable behavior and block access to SMRAM when the CPU is not in SMM. These registers need to be enabled/configured by the BIOS.

This module checks to see that SMRRs are enabled and configured.



```
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
               : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precisel-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] OS
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
          VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
[CHIPSEC]
            DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.common.smrr
[*] running loaded modules ..
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.common.smrr
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/common/smrr.py
[x][ Module: CPU SMM Cache Poisoning / System Management Range Registers
[x][ -----
[+] OK. SMRR range protection is supported
[*] Checking SMRR range base programming..
[*] IA32 SMRR PHYSBASE = 0xBE000006 << SMRR Base Address MSR (MSR 0x1F2)
                       = 6 << SMRR memory type
                       = BE000 << SMRR physical base address
   [12] PhysBase
[*] SMRR range base: 0x0000000BE000000
[*] SMRR range memory type is Writeback (WB)
[+] OK so far. SMRR range base is programmed
[*] Checking SMRR range mask programming..
[*] IA32\_SMRR\_PHYSMASK = 0xFE000800 << SMRR Range Mask MSR (MSR <math>0x1F3)
   [11] Valid = 1 << SMRR valid
   [12] PhysMask
                       = FE000 << SMRR address range mask
[*] SMRR range mask: 0x0000000FE000000
[+] OK so far. SMRR range is enabled
[*] Verifying that SMRR range base & mask are the same on all logical CPUs..
[CPU0] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU1] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 000000000BE0000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE0000800
[CPU2] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU3] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU4] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU5] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU6] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU7] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU8] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU9] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU10] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU11] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU12] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU13] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU14] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[CPU15] SMRR_PHYSBASE = 00000000BE000006, SMRR_PHYSMASK = 00000000FE000800
[+] OK so far. SMRR range base/mask match on all logical CPUs
[*] Trying to read memory at SMRR base 0xBE000000..
[+] PASSED: SMRR reads are blocked in non-SMM mode
[+] PASSED: SMRR protection against cache attack is properly configured
1
[CHIPSEC] Modules total
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
[+] PASSED: chipsec.modules.common.smrr
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules skipped 0:
[CHIPSEC] ********
```

chipsec.modules.common.spi_desc module

The SPI Flash Descriptor indicates read/write permissions for devices to access regions of the flash memory. This module simply reads the Flash Descriptor and checks that software cannot modify the Flash Descriptor itself. If



software can write to the Flash Descriptor, then software could bypass any protection defined by it. While often used for debugging, this should not be the case on production systems.

This module checks that software cannot write to the flash descriptor.

```
##
##
  CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework
                                                 ##
##
                                                 ##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m common.spi_desc
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
[CHIPSEC] OS
            : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precise1-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
[CHIPSEC]
           VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
           DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.common.spi_desc
[*] running loaded modules ...
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.common.spi_desc
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/common/spi_desc.py
[x][ Module: SPI Flash Region Access Control
[*] FRAP = 0x00001B1B << SPI Flash Regions Access Permissions Register (SPIBAR + 0x50)
   [00] BRRA
                    = 1B << BIOS Region Read Access
   [08] BRWA
                   = 1B << BIOS Region Write Access
                   = 0 << BIOS Master Read Access Grant
   [16] BMRAG
   [24] BMWAG
                    = 0 << BIOS Master Write Access Grant
[*] Software access to SPI flash regions: read = 0x1B, write = 0x1B
[-] Software has write access to SPI flash descriptor
[-] FAILED: SPI flash permissions allow SW to write flash descriptor
[CHIPSEC] Modules total 1
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
                         0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed
                         1:
[-] FAILED: chipsec.modules.common.spi_desc
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules skipped 0:
[CHIPSEC] *********
```

chipsec.modules.common.spi_lock module

The configuration of the SPI controller, including protected ranges (PR0-PR4), is locked by HSFS[FLOCKDN] until reset. If not locked, the controller configuration may be bypassed by reprogramming these registers.

This vulnerability (not setting FLOCKDN) is also checked by other tools, including flashrom and MITRE's Copernicus

This module checks that the SPI Flash Controller configuration is locked.

```
##
                                                ##
##
  CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework
                                                ##
##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m common.spi lock
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
[CHIPSEC] OS
             : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precisel-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
[CHIPSEC]
        VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
           DID: 3C00
```



```
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.common.spi_lock
[*] running loaded modules ..
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.common.spi_lock
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/common/spi_lock.py
[x][ Module: SPI Flash Controller Configuration Lock
[*] HSFS = 0x6008 << Hardware Sequencing Flash Status Register (SPIBAR + 0x4)
                 = 0 << Flash Cycle Done
   [00] FDONE
   [01] FCERR
                       = 0 << Flash Cycle Error
   [02] AEL
                       = 0 << Access Error Log
                      = 1 << Block/Sector Erase Size
   [03] BERASE
   [05] SCIP
                       = 0 << SPI cycle in progress
   [13] FDOPSS
                       = 1 << Flash Descriptor Override Pin-Strap Status
   [14] FDV = 1 << Flash Descriptor Valid
[15] FLOCKDN = 0 << Flash Configuration Lock-Down
[-] FAILED: SPI Flash Controller configuration is not locked
[CHIPSEC] Modules total
                             1
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed
                             1:
[-] FAILED: chipsec.modules.common.spi_lock
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules skipped 0:
[CHIPSEC] *******
```

chipsec.modules.tools.secureboot.te module

Tool to test for 'TE Header' vulnerability in Secure Boot implementations as described in All Your Boot Are Belong To Us

Usage:

chipsec_main.py -m tools.secureboot.te [-a <mode>,<cfg_file>,<efi_file>] <mode>

generate_te - (default) convert PE EFI binary <efi_file> to TE binary replace_bootloader - replace bootloader files listed in <cfg_file> on ESP with modified <efi_file> restore_bootloader - restore original bootloader files from .bak files

<cfg_file> - path to config file listing paths to bootloader files to replace <efi_file> - path to EFI binary to convert to TE binary

If no file path is provided, the tool will look for Shell.efi

Examples:

Convert Shell.efi PE/COFF EFI executable to TE executable:

chipsec_main.py -m tools.secureboot.te -a generate_te,Shell.efi

Replace bootloaders listed in te.cfg file with TE version of Shell.efi executable:

chipsec_main.py -m tools.secureboot.te -a replace_bootloader,te.cfg,Shell.efi

Restore bootloaders listed in te.cfg file:

chipsec_main.py -m tools.secureboot.te -a restore_bootloader,te.cfg

chipsec.modules.tools.smm.smm_ptr module

As described in A New Class of Vulnerability in SMI Handlers of BIOS/UEFI Firmware at CanSecWest 2015, the interface to SMI handlers may be used to pass pointer inputs to the SMI handler. If an SMI handler does not



carefully check the value of this pointer input, it may read or write arbitrary memory. This module provides a tool to test SMI handlers for pointer such vulnerabilities.

Usage

chipsec_main -m tools.smm.smm_ptr [-a <mode>,<config_file>|<smic_start:smic_end>,<si ze>,<ac

- mode: SMI fuzzing mode
 - config = use SMI configuration file <config_file>
- size: size of the memory buffer (in Hex)
- address: physical address of memory buffer to pass in GP regs to SMI handlers (in Hex)
 - smram = option passes address of SMRAM base (system may hang in this mode!)

In 'config' mode, SMI configuration file should have the following format

```
SMI_code=<SMI code> or *
SMI_data=<SMI data> or *
RAX=<value of RAX> or * or PTR or VAL
RBX=<value of RBX> or * or PTR or VAL
RCX=<value of RCX> or * or PTR or VAL
RDX=<value of RDX> or * or PTR or VAL
RDX=<value of RDX> or * or PTR or VAL
RDI=<value of RDI> or * or PTR or VAL
RDI=<value of RDI> or * or PTR or VAL
[PTR_OFFSET=<offset to pointer in the buffer>]
[SIG=<signature>]
[SIG_OFFSET=<offset to signature in the buffer>]
[Name=<SMI name>]
[Desc=<SMI description>]
```

Where

- []: optional line
- *: Don't Care (the module will replace * with 0x0)
- PTR: Physical address SMI handler will write to (the module will replace PTR with physical address provided as a command-line argument)
- VAL: Value SMI handler will write to PTR address (the module will replace VAL with hardcoded _FILL_VALUE_xx)

chipsec.modules.module_template module

Template for a new module

```
##
                                                     ##
   CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework
                                                     ##
##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m module_template
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
[CHIPSEC] OS
               : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precisel-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
[CHIPSEC]
            VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
            DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.module_template
[*] running loaded modules ...
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.module_template
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/module_template.py
Skipping module chipsec.modules.module_template since it is not supported in this platform
```



chipsec.modules.remap module

Preventing & Detecting Xen Hypervisor Subversions by Joanna Rutkowska & Rafal Wojtczuk

Check Memory Remapping Configuration

```
##
  CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework
                                                  ##
##
                                                   ##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m remap
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
              : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precise1-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] OS
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
[CHIPSEC]
           VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
           DID: 3C00
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.remap
[*] running loaded modules ...
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.remap
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/remap.py
Skipping module chipsec.modules.remap since it is not supported in this platform
[CHIPSEC] Modules total
                         1
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
                          0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules skipped 1:
[*] SKIPPED: chipsec.modules.remap
[CHIPSEC] *************
```

chipsec.modules.smm dma module

Just like SMRAM needs to be protected from software executing on the CPU, it also needs to be protected from devices that have direct access to DRAM (DMA). Protection from DMA is configured through proper programming of SMRAM memory range. If BIOS does not correctly configure and lock the configuration, then malware could reprogram configuration and open SMRAM area to DMA access, allowing manipulation of memory that should have been protected.

DMA attacks were discussed in Programmed I/O accesses: a threat to Virtual Machine Monitors? and System Management Mode Design and Security Issues. This is also discussed in Summary of Attack against BIOS and Secure Boot.

This module examines the configuration and locking of SMRAM range configuration protecting from DMA attacks. If it fails, then DMA protection may not be securely configured to protect SMRAM.



```
##
   CHIPSEC: Platform Hardware Security Assessment Framework
##
##
                                                  ##
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.2.1
[CHIPSEC] Arguments: --failfast -m smm_dma
***** Chipsec Linux Kernel module is licensed under GPL 2.0
             : Linux 3.13.0-37-generic #64~precisel-Ubuntu SMP Wed Sep 24 21:37:11 UTC 2014 x86_64
[CHIPSEC] OS
[CHIPSEC] Platform: Server 2nd Generation Core Processor (Jaketown CPU / Patsburg PCH)
         VID: 8086
[CHIPSEC]
           DID: 3C00
[CHIPSEC]
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.smm_dma
[*] running loaded modules ...
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.smm_dma
[*] Module path: <chipsec_path>/source/tool/chipsec/modules/smm_dma.py
Skipping module chipsec.modules.smm_dma since it is not supported in this platform
[CHIPSEC] Modules total
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed to run 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules passed
[CHIPSEC] Modules failed
[CHIPSEC] Modules with warnings 0:
[CHIPSEC] Modules skipped 1:
[*] SKIPPED: chipsec.modules.smm_dma
[CHIPSEC] *******************
```

Platform Configuration

chipsec/cfg/	platform specific configuration xml files
chipsec/cfg/common.xml	common configuration
chipsec/cfg/ <platform>.xml</platform>	configuration for a specific <platform></platform>

chipsec.cfg.avn.xml module

Reference: Intel(R) Atom(TM) Processor C2000 Product Family for Microserver, September 2014

URL: http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/processors/atom/atom-c2000-microserver-datasheet.html

chipsec.cfg.byt.xml module

XML configuration for Baytrail

Reference: Intel(R) Atom(TM) Processor E3800 Product Family Datasheet September 2014, Revision 3.5

chipsec.cfg.chipsec_cfg.xsd module

PCI



chipsec.cfg.common.xml module

Common xml configuration file

chipsec.cfg.hsw.xml module

XML configuration file for Haswell

chipsec.cfg.template.xml module

Template for XML configuration file, this first comment will show in the documentation

OS/Environment Helpers

chipsec.helper.efi.efihelper module

On UEFI use the efi package functions

chipsec.helper.linux.helper module

Linux helper

chipsec.helper.win.win32helper module

Management and communication with Windows kernel mode driver which provides access to hardware resources

Note

On Windows you need to install pywin32 Python extension corresponding to your Python version: http://sourceforge.net/projects/pywin32/

chipsec.helper.oshelper module

Abstracts support for various OS/environments, wrapper around platform specific code that invokes kernel driver

HW Abstraction Layer (HAL)



Components responsible for access to hardware (Hardware Abstraction Layer)

chipsec.hal.acpi module

HAL component providing access to and decoding of ACPI tables

chipsec.hal.acpi_tables module

HAL component decoding various ACPI tables

chipsec.hal.cmos module

CMOS memory specific functions (dump, read/write)

usage:

```
>>> dump()
>>> read_byte( offset )
>>> write_byte( offset, value )
```

chipsec.hal.cpuid module

CPUID information

usage:

```
>>> cpuid(0)
```

chipsec.hal.cr module

Access to CR registers

usage:

```
>>> read_cr( 0 )
>>> write_cr( 4, 0 )
```

chipsec.hal.hal_base module

Base for HAL Components

chipsec.hal.interrupts module

Functionality encapsulating interrupt generation CPU Interrupts specific functions (SMI, NMI)

usage:



```
>>> send_SMI_APMC( 0xDE )
>>> send_NMI()
```

chipsec.hal.io module

Access to Port I/O

usage:

```
>>> read_port_byte( 0x61 )
>>> read_port_word( 0x61 )
>>> read_port_dword( 0x61 )
>>> write_port_byte( 0x71, 0 )
>>> write_port_word( 0x71, 0 )
>>> write_port_dword( 0x71, 0 )
```

chipsec.hal.iobar module

I/O BAR access (dump, read/write)

usage:

```
>>> get_IO_BAR_base_address( bar_name )
>>> read_IO_BAR_reg( bar_name, offset, size )
>>> write_IO_BAR_reg( bar_name, offset, size, value )
>>> dump_IO_BAR( bar_name )
```

chipsec.hal.mmio module

Access to MMIO (Memory Mapped IO) BARs and Memory-Mapped PCI Configuration Space (MMCFG)

usage:

```
>>> read_MMIO_reg(cs, bar_base, 0x0, 4 )
>>> write_MMIO_reg(cs, bar_base, 0x0, 0xFFFFFFFF, 4 )
>>> read_MMIO( cs, bar_base, 0x1000 )
>>> dump_MMIO( cs, bar_base, 0x1000 )
```

Access MMIO by BAR name:

```
>>> read_MMIO_BAR_reg( cs, 'MCHBAR', 0x0, 4 )
>>> write_MMIO_BAR_reg( cs, 'MCHBAR', 0x0, 0xFFFFFFFF, 4 )
>>> get_MMIO_BAR_base_address( cs, 'MCHBAR' )
>>> is_MMIO_BAR_enabled( cs, 'MCHBAR' )
>>> is_MMIO_BAR_programmed( cs, 'MCHBAR' )
>>> dump_MMIO_BAR( cs, 'MCHBAR' )
>>> list_MMIO_BARs( cs )
```

Access Memory Mapped Config Space:

```
>>> get_MMCFG_base_address(cs)
>>> read_mmcfg_reg( cs, 0, 0, 0x10, 4 )
>>> read_mmcfg_reg( cs, 0, 0, 0x10, 4, 0xffffffff )
```

DEPRECATED: Access MMIO by BAR id:

```
>>> read_MMIOBAR_reg( cs, mmio.MMIO_BAR_MCHBAR, 0x0 )
>>> write_MMIOBAR_reg( cs, mmio.MMIO_BAR_MCHBAR, 0xFFFFFFFF )
>>> get_MMIO_base_address( cs, mmio.MMIO_BAR_MCHBAR )
```



chipsec.hal.msr module

Access to CPU resources (for each CPU thread): Model Specific Registers (MSR), IDT/GDT

usage:

```
>>> read_msr( 0x8B )
>>> write_msr( 0x79, 0x12345678 )
>>> get_IDTR( 0 )
>>> get_GDTR( 0 )
>>> dump_Descriptor_Table( 0, DESCRIPTOR_TABLE_CODE_IDTR )
>>> IDT( 0 )
>>> GDT( 0 )
>>> IDT_all()
>>> GDT_all()
```

chipsec.hal.pci module

Access to PCIe configuration spaces of I/O devices

usage:

```
>>> read_pci_dword( 0, 0, 0, 0x88 )
>>> write_pci_dword( 0, 0, 0, 0x88, 0x1A )
```

chipsec.hal.pcidb module

Note

THIS FILE WAS GENERATED

Auto generated from:

http://www.pcidatabase.com/vendors.php?sort=id http://www.pcidatabase.com/reports.php?type=csv

chipsec.hal.physmem module

Access to physical memory

usage:

```
>>> read_physical_mem( 0xf0000, 0x100 )
>>> write_physical_mem( 0xf0000, 0x100, buffer )
>>> write_physical_mem_dowrd( 0xf0000, 0xdeadbeef )
>>> read_physical_mem_dowrd( 0xfed40000 )
```

DEPRECATED

```
>>> read_phys_mem( 0xf0000, 0x100 )
>>> write_phys_mem_dword( 0xf0000, 0xdeadbeef )
>>> read_phys_mem_dword( 0xfed40000 )
```

chipsec.hal.smbus module

Access to SMBus Controller



chipsec.hal.spd module

Access to Memory (DRAM) Serial Presence Detect (SPD) EEPROM

References:

http://www.jedec.org/sites/default/files/docs/4_01_02R19.pdf http://www.jedec.org/sites/default/files/docs/4_01_02_10R17.pdf http://www.jedec.org/sites/default/files/docs/4_01_02_11R24.pdf http://www.jedec.org/sites/default/files/docs/4_01_02_12R23A.pdf http://www.simmtester.com/page/news/showpubnews.asp?num=184 http://www.simmtester.com/page/news/showpubnews.asp?num=153 http://www.simmtester.com/page/news/showpubnews.asp?num=101 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serial_presence_detect

chipsec.hal.spi module

Access to SPI Flash parts

usage:

```
>>> read_spi( spi_fla, length )
>>> write_spi( spi_fla, buf )
>>> erase_spi_block( spi_fla )
```

Note

!! IMPORTANT: Size of the data chunk used in SPI read cycle (in bytes) default = maximum 64 bytes (remainder is read in 4 byte chunks)

If you want to change logic to read SPI Flash in 4 byte chunks: SPI_READ_WRITE_MAX_DBC = 4

SPI write cycles operate on 4 byte chunks (not optimized yet)

Approximate performance (on 2 core HT Sandy Bridge CPU 2.6GHz): SPI read: ~25 sec per 1MB (DBC=64) SPI write: ~140 sec per 1MB (DBC=4)

chipsec.hal.spi_descriptor module

SPI Flash Descriptor binary parsing functionality

usage:

```
>>> fd = read_file( fd_file )
>>> parse_spi_flash_descriptor( fd )
```

chipsec.hal.spi_uefi module

SPI UEFI Region parsing

usage:

```
>>> parse_uefi_region_from_file( filename )
```



chipsec.hal.ucode module

Microcode update specific functionality (for each CPU thread)

usage:

```
>>> ucode_update_id( 0 )
>>> load_ucode_update( 0, ucode_buf )
>>> update_ucode_all_cpus( 'ucode.pdb' )
>>> dump_ucode_update_header( 'ucode.pdb' )
```

chipsec.hal.uefi module

Main UEFI component using platform specific and common UEFI functionality

chipsec.hal.uefi_common module

Common UEFI/EFI functionality including UEFI variables, Firmware Volumes, Secure Boot variables, S3 boot-script, UEFI tables, etc.

chipsec.hal.uefi_platform module

Platform specific UEFI functionality (parsing platform specific EFI NVRAM, capsules, etc.)

Utility command-line scripts

CHIPSEC utilities provide the capability for manual testing and direct hardware access.

Warning

DIRECT HARDWARE ACCESS PROVIDED BY THESE UTILITIES COULD MAKE YOUR SYSTEM UNBOOTABLE. MAKE SURE YOU KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING!

Note

All numeric values in the instructions are in hex.

chipsec.utilcmd.acpi_cmd module

Command-line utility providing access to ACPI tables

```
acpi (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util acpi list
>>> chipsec_util acpi table <name> | <file_path>
```



Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util acpi list
>>> chipsec_util acpi table XSDT
>>> chipsec_util acpi table acpi_table.bin
```

chipsec.utilcmd.chipset_cmd module

usage as a standalone utility:

```
>>> chipsec_util platform
```

```
platform (argv)
  chipsec_util platform
```

chipsec.utilcmd.cmos_cmd module

```
cmos (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util cmos dump
>>> chipsec_util cmos readl|writel|readh|writeh <byte_offset> [byte_val]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util cmos dump
>>> chipsec_util cmos rl 0x0
>>> chipsec_util cmos wh 0x0 0xCC
```

chipsec.utilcmd.cpuid_cmd module

```
cpuid (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util cpuid <eax> [ecx]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util cpuid 40000000
```

chipsec.utilcmd.cr_cmd module

```
crx (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util cr <cpu_id> <cr_number> [value]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util cr 0 0
>>> chipsec_util cr 0 4 0x0
```

chipsec.utilcmd.decode_cmd module

CHIPSEC can parse an image file containing data from the SPI flash (such as the result of chipsec_util spi dump). This can be critical in forensic analysis.



Examples:

chipsec_util decode spi.bin vss

This will create multiple log files, binaries, and directories that correspond to the sections, firmware volumes, files, variables, etc. stored in the SPI flash.

```
decode (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util decode <rom> [fw_type]
```

For a list of fw types run:

```
>>> chipsec_util decode types
```

Examples:

>>> chipsec_util decode spi.bin vss

chipsec.utilcmd.desc_cmd module

The idt and gdt commands print the IDT and GDT, respectively.

```
gdt (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util idt|gdt|ldt [cpu_id]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util idt 0
>>> chipsec_util gdt
```

idt (argv)

```
>>> chipsec_util idt|gdt|ldt [cpu_id]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util idt 0
>>> chipsec_util gdt
```

ldt (argv)

```
>>> chipsec_util idt|gdt|ldt [cpu_id]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util idt 0
>>> chipsec_util gdt
```

chipsec.utilcmd.interrupts_cmd module

nmi (argv)

```
>>> chipsec_util nmi
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util nmi
```

smi (argv)

```
>>> chipsec_util smi <thread_id> <SMI_code> <SMI_data> [RAX] [RBX] [RCX] [RDX] [RSI] [RDI]
```

Examples:



```
>>> chipsec_util smi 0x0 0xDE 0x0
>>> chipsec_util smi 0x0 0xDE 0x0 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA...
```

chipsec.utilcmd.io_cmd module

The io command allows direct access to read and write I/O port space.

```
port_io (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util io <io_port> <width> [value]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util io 0x61 1
>>> chipsec_util io 0x430 byte 0x0
```

chipsec.utilcmd.mem_cmd module

The mem command provides direct access to read and write physical memory.

mem (argv)

```
>>> chipsec_util mem <op> <physical_address> <length> [value|buffer_file]
>>>
>>> <physical_address> : 64-bit physical address
>>> <op> : read|readval|write|writeval|allocate
>>> <length> : byte|word|dword or length of the buffer from <buffer_file>
>>> <value> : byte, word or dword value to be written to memory at <physical_address>
>>> <buffer_file> : file with the contents to be written to memory at <physical_address>
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util mem <op>
                        <physical_address> <length> [value|file]
>>> chipsec_util mem readval 0xFED40000 dword
>>> chipsec_util mem read 0x41E
                                       0x20
                                               buffer.bin
                                               0x9090CCCC
>>> chipsec_util mem writeval 0xA0000
                                       dword
0x1000
                                               buffer.bin
                                       0x10
                                               000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
                                       0x1000
>>> chipsec_util mem allocate
```

chipsec.utilcmd.mmcfg_cmd module

The mmcfg command allows direct access to memory mapped config space.

mmcfg (argv)

```
>>> chipsec_util mmcfg <bus> <device> <function> <offset> <width> [value]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util mmcfg 0 0 0 0x88 4
>>> chipsec_util mmcfg 0 0 0 0x88 byte 0x1A
>>> chipsec_util mmcfg 0 0x1F 0 0xDC 1 0x1
>>> chipsec_util mmcfg 0 0 0 0x98 dword 0x004E0040
```

chipsec.utilcmd.mmio cmd module

```
mmio (argv)
```



```
>>> chipsec_util mmio list
>>> chipsec_util mmio dump <MMIO_BAR_name>
>>> chipsec_util mmio read <MMIO_BAR_name> <offset> <width>
>>> chipsec_util mmio write <MMIO_BAR_name> <offset> <width> <>>> chipsec_util mmio write <MMIO_BAR_name> <offset> <width> <>>
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util mmio list
>>> chipsec_util mmio dump MCHBAR
>>> chipsec_util mmio read SPIBAR 0x74 0x4
>>> chipsec_util mmio write SPIBAR 0x74 0x4 0xFFFF0000
```

chipsec.utilcmd.msr_cmd module

The msr command allows direct access to read and write MSRs.

```
msr (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util msr <msr> [eax] [edx] [cpu_id]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util msr 0x3A
>>> chipsec_util msr 0x8B 0x0 0x0 0
```

chipsec.utilcmd.pci_cmd module

The pci command can enumerate PCI devices and allow direct access to them by bus/device/function.

pci (argv)

```
>>> chipsec_util pci enumerate
>>> chipsec_util pci <bus> <device> <function> <offset> <width> [value]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util pci enumerate
>>> chipsec_util pci 0 0 0 0 0x88 4
>>> chipsec_util pci 0 0 0 0x88 byte 0x1A
>>> chipsec_util pci 0 0x1F 0 0xDC 1 0x1
>>> chipsec_util pci 0 0 0x98 dword 0x004E0040
```

chipsec.utilcmd.smbus_cmd module

```
smbus (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util smbus read <device_addr> <start_offset> [size]
>>> chipsec_util smbus write <device_addr> <offset> <byte_val>
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util smbus read 0xA0 0x0 0x100
```

chipsec.utilcmd.spd_cmd module

```
spd (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util spd detect
>>> chipsec_util spd dump [device_addr]
```



```
>>> chipsec_util spd read <device_addr> <offset>
>>> chipsec_util spd write <device_addr> <offset> <byte_val>
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util spd detect
>>> chipsec_util spd dump DIMM0
>>> chipsec_util spd read 0xA0 0x0
>>> chipsec_util spd write 0xA0 0x0 0xAA
```

chipsec.utilcmd.spi_cmd module

CHIPSEC includes functionality for reading and writing the SPI flash. When an image file is created from reading the SPI flash, this image can be parsed to reveal sections, files, variables, etc.

Warning

Particular care must be taken when using the spi write and spi erase functions. These could make your system unbootable.

A basic forensic operation might be to dump the entire SPI flash to a file. This is accomplished as follows:

```
# python chipsec_util.py spi dump rom.bin
```

The file rom.bin will contain the full binary of the SPI flash. It can then be parsed using the decode util command.

spi (argv)

```
>>> chipsec_util spi info|dump|read|write|erase|disable-wp [flash_address] [length] [file]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util spi info
>>> chipsec_util spi dump rom.bin
>>> chipsec_util spi read 0x700000 0x100000 bios.bin
>>> chipsec_util spi write 0x0 flash_descriptor.bin
>>> chipsec_util spi disable-wp
```

chipsec.utilcmd.spidesc_cmd module

```
spidesc (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util spidesc [rom]
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util spidesc spi.bin
```

chipsec.utilcmd.ucode_cmd module

```
ucode (argv)
```

```
>>> chipsec_util ucode id|load|decode [ucode_update_file (in .PDB or .BIN format)] [cpu_id]
```

Examples:



```
>>> chipsec_util ucode id
>>> chipsec_util ucode load ucode.bin 0
>>> chipsec_util ucode decode ucode.pdb
```

chipsec.utilcmd.uefi cmd module

The uefi command provides access to UEFI variables, both on the live system and in a SPI flash image file.

uefi (argv)

```
>>> chipsec_util uefi var-list
>>> chipsec_util uefi var-find <name>|<GUID>
>>> chipsec_util uefi var-read|var-write|var-delete <name> <GUID> <efi_variable_file>
>>> chipsec_util uefi nvram[-auth] <fw_type> [rom_file]
>>> chipsec_util uefi tables
>>> chipsec_util uefi s3bootscript [script_address]
```

For a list of fw types run:

```
>>> chipsec_util uefi types
```

Examples:

```
>>> chipsec_util uefi var-list
>>> chipsec_util uefi var-read db D719B2CB-3D3A-4596-A3BC-DAD00E67656F db.bin
>>> chipsec_util uefi var-write db D719B2CB-3D3A-4596-A3BC-DAD00E67656F db.bin
>>> chipsec_util uefi var-delete db D719B2CB-3D3A-4596-A3BC-DAD00E67656F
>>> chipsec_util uefi nvram fwtype bios.rom
>>> chipsec_util uefi nvram-auth fwtype bios.rom
>>> chipsec_util uefi decode uefi.bin fwtype
>>> chipsec_util uefi keys db.bin
>>> chipsec_util uefi tables
>>> chipsec_util uefi s3bootscript
```

Auxiliary components

```
setup.py setup script to install CHIPSEC as a package
```

Executable build scripts

<CHIPSEC_ROOT>/build/build_exe_*.py make files to build Windows executables