

Build Secure Smart Contracts:

A Deep Dive into Automated Tools

Trufflecon 2020

Who Am I?



Josselin Feist, josselin@trailofbits.com

- Trail of Bits: <u>trailofbits.com</u>
 - We help everyone build safer software
 - R&D focused: we use the latest program analysis techniques

Goals



- Basic introduction to program analysis
- Tools used to write secure code
- How to use these tools
- Hands-on with Slither, Echidna and Manticore

Before Starting



- git clone
 - https://github.com/crytic/building-secure-contracts
 - cd building-secure-contracts
 - git checkout trufflecon2020
- docker pull trailofbits/eth-security-toolbox

Program Analysis

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Problem: How to Find Bugs?



How to test for the presence of bugs in smart contracts?

```
/// @notice Allow users to buy token. 1 ether = 10 tokens
/// @param tokens The numbers of token to buy
/// @dev Users can send more ether than token to be bought, to give gifts to the team.
function buy(uint tokens) public payable{
    uint required_wei_sent = (tokens / 10) * decimals;
    require(msg.value >= required_wei_sent);
    balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(tokens);
    emit Mint(msg.sender, tokens);
}
```

Problem: How to Find Bugs?



Manual review

- Can detect any bug
- Time-consuming
- Difficult
- Does not track code changes



Contact security company

Unit tests

- Track code changes
- Only cover "good" behaviors (*)
- Covers only a small part



Program Analysis



- Automatic bug detection and code verification
 - We will cover 3 types
 - Static Analysis: <u>Slither</u>
 - Fuzzing: <u>Echidna</u>
 - Symbolic Execution: <u>Manticore</u>

Finding Bugs With Automated Analysis




- Static analysis (e.g. <u>Slither</u>)
 - All the program's paths are approximated and analyzed
 - Fast
 - Built-in detectors (>90 private, ~40 public)
 - <u>Today:</u> Custom API



crytic.io






Finding bugs with automated analysis



- Fuzzing (e.g. <u>Echidna</u>)
 - Random transactions to stress the contract: **testing**
 - Successful technique for 'classic software' (e.g. AFL, libfuzzer)



Finding bugs With automated analysis



- Symbolic Execution (e.g. <u>Manticore</u>)
 - Generate inputs through mathematical representation of the contract
 - Explores all the paths of the contract: verification



Finding Bugs With Automated Analysis



Technique	Tool	Speed	Complexity	Precision
Static Analysis	Slither	seconds	CLI: + API: ++	+
Fuzzing	Echidna	< hour	++	++
Symbolic Execution	Manticore	> hours	+++	+++ (Verification)

Secure Development Workflow

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Rules



- Rule 1: Follow coding best practices
 - Well-architectured code is simpler to verify
- Rule 2: Determine what you want to test
 - Many components can be tested
 - Each tool has situation where it is best suited
- Rule 3: Use the tools from the start

Rule 1: Follow coding best practice



- Strive for simplicity
- Write small and modular components

Rule 1: Follow coding best practices



buy does two things:

- 1. Check that the user sent enough ethers
- 2. Mint the tokens

```
function buy(uint tokens) public payable{
    uint required_wei_sent = (tokens / 10) * decimals;
    require(msg.value >= required_wei_sent);
    balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(tokens);
    emit Mint(msg.sender, tokens);
}
```

Rule 1: Follow coding best practices



Alternative version:

```
function buy(uint tokens) public payable{
   valid buy(tokens, msg.value);
   mint(msg.sender, tokens);
function mint(address addr, uint value) internal{
    balances[addr] = safeAdd(balances[addr], value);
    emit Mint(addr, value);
function _valid_buy(uint desired_tokens, uint wei sent) internal view{
    uint required wei sent = (desired tokens / 10) * decimals;
   require(wei sent >= required wei sent);
```

Rule 1: Follow coding best practices



The second version allows:

- Testing individual components separately
- Code reuse

Rule 2: Determine what you want to test



State machine

- Ex: Once the buying period ended, no tokens can be created
- o Tools: Echidna, Manticore

Access control

- Ex: Only the owner can call **mint**
- Tools: Slither (simple setup), Echidna, Manticore (complex setup)

Arithmetic operations

- No integer overflows exist
- Tools: Manticore, Echidna

Rule 2: Determine what you want to test



Inheritance correctness

- Ex: the function mint must never be overridden
- Tools: Slither

External interactions

- Ex: what happen if your external dependency is compromised?
- Tools: Manticore, Echidna

Standard conformance

- Ex: you rely on an ERC that requires functions to return a boolean
- Tools: Slither





Component	Tools	
State machine	Echidna, Manticore	
External interactions	Echidna, Manticore	
Arithmetic operations	Echidna, Manticore	
Access controls	Slither, Manticore, Echidna	
Inheritance correctness	Slither	
Standard conformance	Slither	

Rule 3: Use the tools from the start



Crytic / Slither CLI

From the first line written to catch early issues

Echidna and Slither API

As soon as you can determine a property of your contract

Manticore

Once you want to reach an in-depth level of confidence in your code

Slither: Static Analysis


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Static analysis



Static analysis

- From pattern matching (linter) to formal verification
- Code representations
 - Ex: control flow graph



Slither



Static analysis framework for Solidity

- Vulnerability detection
- Optimization detection
- Code understanding
- Assisted code review
- "LLVM for smart contracts"

Detectors



- ~40 public vulnerability detectors
- From critical issues:
 - Reentrancy
 - Shadowing
 - Uninitialized variables
 - 0 ...
- To optimization issues:
 - Variables that should be constant
 - Functions that should be external
 - 0 ...
- Private detectors with more complex patterns

Slither CLI



```
tob: $ catc uninitialized.sol
pragma solidity ^0.5.5;
contract Uninitialized{
    address payable destination;
    function buggy() external{
        destination.transfer(address(this).balance);
tob: $ slither uninitialized.sol
INFO: Detectors:
Uninitialized.destination (uninitialized.sol#4) is never initialized. It is used in:
        - buggy (uninitialized.sol#6-8)
Reference: https://github.com/trailofbits/slither/wiki/Detectors-Documentation#uninitialized-state-varia
bles
INFO:Slither:uninitialized.sol analyzed (1 contracts), 1 result(s) found
tob:$
```

https://asciinema.org/a/eYrdWBvasHXelpDob4BsNi6Qg

Slither API



- Python API
- Allows exploring every aspect of the contracts
- Gives access to powerful semantic information
 - Built-in taint and data-flow analyses
 - "SlithIR"
 - Out of scope for today

Print contract information



```
from slither import Slither

# Init slither
slither = Slither('coin.sol')
Load project
```

Print contract information



```
from slither import Slither

# Init slither
slither = Slither('coin.sol')

for contract in slither.contracts:
    # Print the contract's name
    print(f'Contract: {contract.name}')
    # Print the name of the contract inherited
    print(f'\tInherits from{[c.name for c in contract.inheritance]}')

Iterate over the contracts
```

Print contract information



```
from slither import Slither
# Init slither
slither = Slither('coin.sol')
for contract in slither.contracts:
  # Print the contract's name
   print(f'Contract: {contract.name}')
   # Print the name of the contract inherited
   print(f'\tInherits from{[c.name for c in contract.inheritance]}')
   for function in contract.functions:
      # For each function, print basic information
      print(f'\t{function.full name}:')
      print(f'\t\tVisibility: {function.visibility}')
                                                                                 Print functions information
      print(f'\t\tContract: {function.contract}')
      print(f'\t\tModifier: {[m.name for m in function.modifiers]}')
      print(f'\t\tIs constructor? {function.is constructor}')
```

Slither: Exercises

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Exercise 1



- https://github.com/crytic/building-secure-contracts/tree/ trufflecon2020/program-analysis/slither
- exercise1.md
- Goal: Function override protection in Solidity 0.5

Exercise 2



- https://github.com/crytic/building-secure-contracts/tree/ trufflecon2020/program-analysis/slither
- exercise2.md
- Goal: Conservative access control

Slither: Exercises Solutions

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Exercise 1: override protection



```
from slither.slither import Slither
slither = Slither('coin.sol')
coin = slither.get contract from name('Coin')
# Iterate over all the contracts
for contract in slither.contracts:
 # If the contract is derived from MyContract
  if coin in contract.inheritance:
     # Get the function definition
     mint = contract.get function from signature(' mint(address, uint256)')
     # If the function was not declarer by coin, there is a bug!
     if mint.contract != coin:
          print(f'Error, {contract} overrides {mint}')
```

Exercise 2: conservative access controls



```
from slither import Slither
slither = Slither('coin.sol')
whitelist = ['balanceOf(address)']
for function in slither functions:
   if function.full name in whitelist:
       continue
   if function.is constructor:
       continue
   if function.visibility in ['public', 'external']:
       if not 'onlyOwner()' in [m.full name for m in function.modifiers]:
           print(f'{function.full name} is unprotected!')
```

Slither: Summary



- Slither automatically detects most of common bugs
- Its API can be used to test complex properties
- Try https://crytic.io for integration with GitHub

Echidna: Property Based Testing

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Echidna



Fuzzing

Echidna explores the contract with random inputs

Echidna




Property-based fuzzing

You write a property, Echidna tries to break it

Echidna





Echidna: Example



```
// Anyone can have at maximum 1000 tokens
// The tokens cannot be transferred (not ERC20)
mapping(address => uint) public balances;
function airdrop() public {
    balances[msg.sender] = 1000;
function consume() public {
    require(balances[msg.sender] > 0);
    balances[msg.sender] -= 1;
    other functions
```

Echidna: Example



```
// Anyone can have at maximum 1000 tokens
// The tokens cannot be transferred (not ERC20)
mapping(address => uint) public balances;
function airdrop() public {
    balances[msg.sender] = 1000;
function consume() public {
    require(balances[msg.sender] > 0);
    balances[msg.sender] -= 1;
   other functions
```

Property: balances(msg.sender) <= 1000

Echidna: How To Use it



Write the property in Solidity:

```
function echidna_balance_under_1000() public view returns(bool) {
    return balances[msg.sender] <= 1000;
}</pre>
```

Echidna: How To Use it



Let Echidna check the property

Echidna: Example



```
$ echidna-test token.sol
...
echidna_balance_under_1000: failed!

Call sequence:
    airdrop()
    backdoor()
```

Echidna: Example



Discover a hidden function:

```
// ...
function backdoor() public {
    balances[msg.sender] += 1;
}
// ...
```

Echidna: Exercises

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Exercise 1



- https://github.com/crytic/building-secure-contracts/tree/ trufflecon2020/program-analysis/echidna
- Exercise-1.md
- Goal: check for correct arithmetic

First: try without the template!

Exercise 2



- https://github.com/crytic/building-secure-contracts/tree/ trufflecon2020/program-analysis/echidna
- Exercise-2.md
- Goal: check for correct access control of the token

First: try without the template!

Echidna: Exercises Solutions

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Exercise 1: Test arithmetic



```
contract TestToken is Token {
   address echidna_caller = 0x00a329c0648769a73afac7f9381e08fb43dbea70;

   constructor() public {
      balances[echidna_caller] = 10000;
   }

   // add the property
}
```

Exercise 1: test arithmetic



```
contract TestToken is Token {
  address echidna_caller = 0x00a329c0648769a73afac7f9381e08fb43dbea70;
   constructor() public {
       balances[echidna caller] = 10000;
  function echidna_test_balance() view public returns(bool) {
       return balances[echidna_caller] <= 10000;</pre>
```

Exercise 1: test arithmetic



```
$ echidna-test exercise2_solution.sol TestToken
...
echidna_test_balance: failed!
Call sequence:
    transfer(e7646f3fc82caf8a5e409b9c370f9610c5c19515,16384)
```

Exercise 2: test access controls



```
contract TestToken is Token {
   address echidna_caller = 0x00a329c0648769a73afac7f9381e08fb43dbea70;

   constructor() {
      paused();
      owner = 0x0; // lose ownership
   }

   // add the property
}
```





```
contract TestToken is Token {
   address echidna_caller = 0x00a329c0648769a73afac7f9381e08fb43dbea70;

constructor() {
   paused();
   owner = 0x0; // lose ownership
}

function echidna_no_transfer() view returns(bool) {
   return is_paused == true;
}
}
```

Exercise 2: test access controls



```
$ echidna-test solution.sol TestToken
...
echidna_no_transfer: failed!
    Call sequence:
        Owner()
        resume()
```

Echidna: Summary



- Echidna will automatically test your code
- No complex setup, properties written in Solidity
- Integrate Echidna tightly with your development process!

Symbolic Execution


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Symbolic Execution in a Nutshell




- Program exploration technique
- Execute the program "symbolically"
 - Represent executions as logical formulas
 - Fork on each condition
- Use an SMT solver to check the feasibility of a path and generate inputs that reach it
























Symbolic Execution in a Nutshell



- Explore the program automatically
- Allows finding unexpected paths
- Optional: Add arbitrary conditions to path exploration

Manticore

Manticore



- A symbolic execution engine supporting EVM
- Built-in detectors for classic issues
 - Selfdestruct, External Call, Reentrancy, Delegatecall, ...
- Python API for generic instrumentation
 - Today's goal

Manticore: Command Line



```
contract Suicidal {
    function backdoor() {
        selfdestruct(msg.sender);
    }
}
```

Manticore: Command Line



\$ manticore examples/suicidal.sol

```
m.main:INFO: Beginning analysis
m.ethereum:INFO: Starting symbolic create contract
m.ethereum:INFO: Starting symbolic transaction: 0
m.ethereum:WARNING: Reachable SELFDESTRUCT
m.ethereum:INFO: 0 alive states, 4 terminated states
m.ethereum:INFO: Starting symbolic transaction: 1
m.ethereum:INFO: Generated testcase No. 0 - RETURN
m.ethereum:INFO: Generated testcase No. 1 - REVERT
m.ethereum:INFO: Generated testcase No. 2 - SELFDESTRUCT
m.ethereum:INFO: Generated testcase No. 3 - REVERT
m.ethereum:INFO: Results in /home/manticore/mcore 9pqdsgtc
```

Manticore: Command Line




```
$ cat mcore_9pqdsgtc/test_00000002.tx
Transactions Nr. 0
Function call:
Constructor() -> RETURN
Transactions Nr. 1
Function call:
backdoor() -> SELFDESTRUCT (*)
```



- Python API to express arbitrary properties
- Scenario = 3 steps:
 - a. Initialization: what contracts, how many users?
 - b. Exploration: what functions to explore, what is symbolic
 - c. Properties to check: what should happen/what should not happen







Find if someone can steal tokens

```
function transfer(address to, uint val){
    if(balances[msg.sender] >= balances[to]){
        balances[msg.sender] -= val;
        balances[to] += val;
    }
}
```



Steps:

- 1. Initialization: Deploy contract
- 2. Exploration: Call transfer with symbolic values
- 3. Property: sender's balance does not increase





```
from manticore.ethereum import ManticoreEVM, ABI
from manticore.core.smtlib import Operators

m = ManticoreEVM()
with open('my_token.sol') as f:
    source_code = f.read()

user_account = m.create_account(balance=1*10**18)
contract_account = m.solidity_create_contract(source_code, owner=user_account, balance=0)
```



```
# Explore all the forks
                                       Bug found if:
for state in m.ready states:
                                       balance after(sender) > balance before(sender)
   balance before = state.platform.transactions[1].return data
   balance before = ABI.deserialize("uint", balance before)
   balance after = state.platform.transactions[-1].return data
   balance after = ABI.deserialize("uint", balance after)
   # Check if it is possible to have balance after > balance before
   condition = Operators.UGT(balance after, balance before)
   if m.generate testcase(state, name="BugFound", only if=condition):
       print("Bug found! see {}".format(m.workspace))
```

Bug found!



```
$ cat mcore_.../Bug_00000000.tx

balances(..) -> 100

transfer(...,20430840703553386272388160528996790065041473555354846411818661786570194
945)
balances(..)
->115771658396612642037298596848158911063204943192085209193045765346126559445091
```

Bug found!



```
function transfer(address to, uint val){
    if(balances[msg.sender] >= balances[to]){
        balances[msg.sender] -= val;
        balances[to] += val;
    }
}
```

Manticore: Exercise

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Exercise 1



- https://github.com/crytic/building-secure-contracts/tree/ trufflecon2020/program-analysis/manticore
- exercises/exercise1.md
- Goal: check the correctness of the valid_buy function

First: try without the template!

Exercise 2



- https://github.com/crytic/building-secure-contracts/tree/ trufflecon2020/program-analysis/manticore
- exercises/exercise2.md
- Goal: arithmetic check with multiple transactions

First: try without the template!

Is an integer overflow possible?



```
contract Overflow {
   uint public sellerBalance = 0;

  function add(uint value) public returns (bool) {
     sellerBalance += value; // complicated math, possible overflow
  }
}
```

There are many ways to check it

• The one proposed is not the simplest, but it will allow you to get familiar with Manticore!

Manticore: Exercise Solution

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Exercise 1: correctness of valid_buy



```
ETHER = 10**18

m = ManticoreEVM() # initiate the blockchain
# Init
user_account = m.create_account()
with open('token.sol', 'r') as f:
    contract_account = m.solidity_create_contract(f, owner=user_account)
```





```
# Exploration
# Call two times f() with a different symbolic value
tokens_amount = m.make_symbolic_value()
wei_amount = m.make_symbolic_value()

contract_account.is_valid_buy(tokens_amount, wei_amount)

# Property
for state in m.ready_states:

condition = Operators.AND(wei_amount == 0, tokens_amount >= 1)

if m.generate_testcase(state, name="BugFound", only_if=condition):
    print(f'Bug found, results are in {m.workspace}')
```



```
$ cat mcore_.../BugFound_00000000.tx
...
Function call:
is_valid_buy(1,0) -> RETURN (*)
return: 1 (*)
```

Exercise 2: verify arithmetic



```
# First add won't overflow uint256 representation
value_0 = m.make_symbolic_value()
contract_account.add(value_0, caller=user_account)
# Potential overflow
value_1 = m.make_symbolic_value()
contract_account.add(value_1, caller=user_account)
contract_account.sellerBalance(caller=user_account)
```

Exercise 2: verify arithmetic



```
for state in m.ready states:
  # Check if input0 > sellerBalance
  # last return is the data returned
  sellerBalance tx = state.platform.transactions[-1]
  # retrieve last return and input0 in a similar format
  seller balance = ABI.deserialize("uint", sellerBalance tx.return data)
  condition = Operators.UGT(value 0, seller balance)
  if m.generate_testcase(state, name="BugFound", only_if=condition):
       print(f'Bug found, results are in {m.workspace}')
```



```
$ cat mcore .../OverflowFound 00000000.tx
add(60661326726858329439570428285975556647751607463109167504653840941059568861185)
-> RETURN (*)
add(69672080359326334380633291372539722228333936369746749109609793890948973854721)
-> RETURN (*)
sellerBalance() -> RETURN
return:
14541317848868468396632734649827371022815559167215352574806050824095413075970 (*)
```

Manticore: Summary



- Manticore will verify your code
- You can verify high-level and low-level properties

Bonus: Manticore-verifier

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manticore-verifier



- Verify Solidity properties with Manticore, without using the Python API!
- https://blog.trailofbits.com/2020/07/12/new-manticore-v erifier-for-smart-contracts/

Workshop Summary

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Workshop Summary



Our tools will help you building safer smart contracts

- Slither: https://github.com/trailofbits/slither/
- Echidna: https://github.com/trailofbits/echidna/
- Manticore: https://github.com/trailofbits/manticore/

Workshop Summary



- <u>crytic.io</u>: CI with access to private code analyzers
- github.com/crytic/building-secure-contracts
 - More exercises in master branch
- If you need help: https://empireslacking.herokuapp.com/
 - #ethereum, #manticore, #crytic
- Try writing an Echidna property for your contracts!