

Code Assessment of the EndGame Toolkit Smart Contracts

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Produced for



by



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1 Executive Summary

Dear all,

Thank you for trusting us to help Maker with this security audit. Our executive summary provides an overview of subjects covered in our audit of the latest reviewed contracts of EndGame Toolkit according to [Scope](#) to support you in forming an opinion on their security risks.

Maker offers a new governance token for SubDAO-level governance and a SubProxy for executing governance delegatecalls.

The most critical subjects covered in our audit are security, functional correctness and seamless integration with the existing system. Security regarding all the aforementioned subjects is high.

In summary, we find that the codebase provides a high level of security.

It is important to note that security audits are time-boxed and cannot uncover all vulnerabilities. They complement but don't replace other vital measures to secure a project.

The following sections will give an overview of the system, our methodology, the issues uncovered and how they have been addressed. We are happy to receive questions and feedback to improve our service.

Sincerely yours,

ChainSecurity

1.1 Overview of the Findings

Below we provide a brief numerical overview of the findings and how they have been addressed.

Critical -Severity Findings	0
High -Severity Findings	0
Medium -Severity Findings	0
Low -Severity Findings	0

2 Assessment Overview

In this section, we briefly describe the overall structure and scope of the engagement, including the code commit which is referenced throughout this report.

2.1 Scope

The assessment was performed on the source code files inside the EndGame Toolkit repository based on the documentation files.

The scope consists of the two solidity smart contracts:

1. ./src/SDAO.sol
2. ./src/SubProxy.sol

The table below indicates the code versions relevant to this report and when they were received.

V	Date	Commit Hash	Note
1	2 May 2023	da937582c5b8ca444fd31627f91a6fa5ede35d92	Initial Version

For the solidity smart contracts, the compiler version 0.8.19 was chosen.

2.1.1 Excluded from scope

Any other file not explicitly mentioned in the scope section. In particular tests, scripts, external dependencies, and configuration files are not part of the audit scope.

2.2 System Overview

This system overview describes the initially received version (**Version 1**) of the contracts as defined in the [Assessment Overview](#).

Maker implements a toolkit for SubDAO-level governance with:

- A mintable ERC-20 SDAO token for SubDAO governance, which supports EOA and smart contract signature validation for approvals.
- A SubProxy for executing governance delegatecalls, which isolates the context of execution for spells from the main governance contract to avoid potential exploits messing with the original contract storage.

2.2.1 SDAO

SDAO is an ERC-20 token for governance with 18 decimals. The contract is controlled by privileged roles `wards`, which is initialized with `msg.sender` in the constructor. Any address in `wards` has owner access to:

- Add a new ward by `rely()`.
- Remove a ward by `deny()`.
- Mint any amount of SDAO tokens to an address by `mint()`.

Token transfers work the same way as a normal ERC-20 token but with a few restrictions. Specifically, transfers to the zero address (`address(0)`) or the contract itself are not allowed. A user can also burn its own tokens by calling `burn()` with its own address. In case the address specified is different to the `msg.sender`, the user will burn on behalf of others if its allowance is sufficient.

SDAO supports the unlimited allowance pattern. In addition, `permit()` is provided for setting allowance with signatures either from an EOA or a contract (EIP-1271). A contract can give permission to a spender by implementing `isValidSignature()` with customized verification logic. If the signature length does not equal to 65 bytes, it is assumed the allowance owner is a contract, which will be queried for signature validation.

2.2.2 SubProxy

`SubProxy` is the SubDAO-level *PauseProxy*. This proxy uses *delegatecall* to execute calls from context isolated from the main governance contract. All the contracts controlled by the SubDAO must authorize this proxy instead of the governance contract itself. The proxy itself is controlled by the wards initialized with `msg.sender` in the constructor. Different from Maker's `DSPauseProxy` where there is only one owner (the `DSPause` contract), any address in `SubProxy`'s `wards` has owner access to:

- Add a new ward by `rely()`.
- Remove a ward by `deny()`.
- Trigger a `delegatecall` execution on the target address by `exec()`.

2.2.3 Roles and Trust Model

The wards of SDAO token are trusted to not misbehave, otherwise any amount of tokens can be minted at its discretion. The `SubProxy` contract would be authorized by contracts under SubDAO's control for privileged operations, hence the wards of the proxy are assumed to behave honestly and correctly at all times and never act against the interest of the system users. (e.g. selfdestruct the proxy, abuse authorization, etc.).

3 Limitations and use of report

Security assessments cannot uncover all existing vulnerabilities; even an assessment in which no vulnerabilities are found is not a guarantee of a secure system. However, code assessments enable the discovery of vulnerabilities that were overlooked during development and areas where additional security measures are necessary. In most cases, applications are either fully protected against a certain type of attack, or they are completely unprotected against it. Some of the issues may affect the entire application, while some lack protection only in certain areas. This is why we carry out a source code assessment aimed at determining all locations that need to be fixed. Within the customer-determined time frame, ChainSecurity has performed an assessment in order to discover as many vulnerabilities as possible.

The focus of our assessment was limited to the code parts defined in the engagement letter. We assessed whether the project follows the provided specifications. These assessments are based on the provided threat model and trust assumptions. We draw attention to the fact that due to inherent limitations in any software development process and software product, an inherent risk exists that even major failures or malfunctions can remain undetected. Further uncertainties exist in any software product or application used during the development, which itself cannot be free from any error or failures. These preconditions can have an impact on the system's code and/or functions and/or operation. We did not assess the underlying third-party infrastructure which adds further inherent risks as we rely on the correct execution of the included third-party technology stack itself. Report readers should also take into account that over the life cycle of any software, changes to the product itself or to the environment in which it is operated can have an impact leading to operational behaviors other than those initially determined in the business specification.

4 Terminology

For the purpose of this assessment, we adopt the following terminology. To classify the severity of our findings, we determine the likelihood and impact (according to the CVSS risk rating methodology).

- *Likelihood* represents the likelihood of a finding to be triggered or exploited in practice
- *Impact* specifies the technical and business-related consequences of a finding
- *Severity* is derived based on the likelihood and the impact

We categorize the findings into four distinct categories, depending on their severity. These severities are derived from the likelihood and the impact using the following table, following a standard risk assessment procedure.

Likelihood	Impact		
	High	Medium	Low
High	Critical	High	Medium
Medium	High	Medium	Low
Low	Medium	Low	Low

As seen in the table above, findings that have both a high likelihood and a high impact are classified as critical. Intuitively, such findings are likely to be triggered and cause significant disruption. Overall, the severity correlates with the associated risk. However, every finding's risk should always be closely checked, regardless of severity.

5 Findings

In this section, we describe our findings. The findings are split into these different categories:

Below we provide a numerical overview of the identified findings, split up by their severity.

Critical -Severity Findings	0
High -Severity Findings	0
Medium -Severity Findings	0
Low -Severity Findings	0