

teaching your reverse proxy to “think” (◦◦?)

ADEL “0x4D31” KA.
DEF CON 33



whoami

- member of technical staff @ an “ai chatbot startup”!
- security engineer, detection & response



0x4D31

- [finch](#)
- [venator](#)
- [galah](#)
- ...

what if i could use...

fingerprint-based routing
to waste attackers' time
intelligently! 

why
fingerprint-aware
reverse proxy?

in threat detection, we prioritize signals that are harder for attackers to change.

“pyramid of pain”

ip addresses? easy to rotate.
user-agents? trivial to spoof.


IP addresses? easy to rotate.
user-agents? trivial to spoof.

tls handshakes,
http/2 settings,
header order, ...


once you have that data, you can
block smarter, deceive better,

& find patterns that would
otherwise be buried!

can your waf do this?



how about this?



most WAFs can't...

finch is a fingerprint-aware tls
reverse proxy that lets you



deny,



route,



tarpit,



deceive

-pre-upstream!

zap fingerprints

ja3 (tls): 795a08fe385896aee616d3b7236502da

ja4 (tls): t13i371100_db35923f8641_7c76daad20ec

ja4h (http): ge11nn040000_d5cb08ea9ac8

The screenshot shows the ZAP interface with the 'Network' tab selected. In the 'Connection' section, the 'Default User Agent' dropdown is open, displaying a list of browser versions and operating systems. The option 'Chrome 131.0 Win10' is highlighted with a blue selection bar. Below this, under 'Security Protocols', the 'SSLv2Hello' checkbox is unselected, while 'TLS' and 'TLS 1.3' checkboxes are selected. A checked checkbox for 'Enable unsafe SSL/TLS' is also visible.

Default User Agent:
Chrome 131.0 Win10
Chrome 129.0 macOS
Chrome 130.0 ChromeOS
Chrome 130.0 Linux
Chrome 130.0 Win10
Chrome 130.0 macOS
Chrome 131.0 Linux
Chrome 131.0 Win10
Chrome 131.0 macOS
Chrome 79.0 macOS
Chrome 99.0 Win10
Edge 130.0 Win10
Edge 131.0 Win10

here's an example rule for zap

```
# Tarpit ZAP active-scan traffic
rule "tarpit-zap" {
    action = "tarpit"

    when all {
        # TLS fingerprints
        tls_ja3    = ["795a08fe385896aee616d3b7236502da"]
        tls_ja4    = ["t13i371100_db35923f8641_7c76daad20ec"]

        # HTTP fingerprint
        http_ja4h = ["ge11nn040000_d5cb08ea9ac8_000000000000_000000000000"]
    }
}
```

INFO REQ: ⚡ GET request / from 127.0.0.1 matched tarpit-zap rule, action: tarpit
INFO EVT: {"eventTime": "2025-08-07T19:03:56.53233Z", "srcIP": "127.0.0.1", "srcPort": 510.1, "dstPort": 9443, "method": "GET", "request": "/", "headers": {"Cache-Control": "no-cache", "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/128.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 OPR/114.0.0.0"}, "body": "", "bodySha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8b934ca495991b7852b855", "protocolVersion": "HTTP/1.1", "userAgent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/128.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 OPR/114.0.0.0"896aee616d3b7236502da", "ja3Raw": "771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49195-52393-49200-52392-4919-162-49188-49192-49187-49191-107-106-103-64-49162-49172-49161-49171-57-56-51-50-157-15-10-11-17-23-35-13-43-45-50-51,29-23-24-25-30-256-257-258-259-260,0", "ja4": "t13i371100aad20ec", "ja4h": "ge11nn040000_d5cb08ea9ac8_000000000000_000000000000", "http2": "", "rulection": "tarpit", "upstream": "http://localhost:8081", "listenerAddr": "0.0.0.0:9443"}



nmap

```
# Tarpit Nmap TLS fingerprints (no-SNI and SNI variants)
rule "block-nmap" {
    action = "tarpit"

    when all {
        tls_ja3 = [
            "ee2b1d84fa1d67ced85c6284a724888e",
            # no-SNI probe
            "2fd66e5dee273eef288bf5efcc10a71a",
        ]
    }

    tls_ja4 = [
        "t13d801100_59a17bb9eabe_d41ae481755e",
        # no-SNI probe
        "t13i801000_59a17bb9eabe_d41ae481755e",
    ]
}
```

```
INFO REQ: 🐌 GET request /flumemaster.jsp from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 GET request /master.jsp from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 POST request /sdk from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 GET request / from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 GET request /status.jsp from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 GET request /rs-status from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 GET request /.git/HEAD from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 PROPFIND request / from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 POST request / from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 PROPFIND request / from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 GET request /browseDirectory.jsp from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 OPTIONS request / from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
INFO REQ: 🐌 GET request /robots.txt from 127.0.0.1 matched block-nmap rule, action: tarpit
```

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 835.28 seconds



before the fun stuff...

let's go over how these
fingerprints actually work!

where's the signal?

tls handshakes

http headers

http/2 settings

TLS starts with a clientHello

version

cipher suites

extensions

TLS handshake

```
struct {
    ProtocolVersion client_vers
    Random random;
    SessionID session_id;
    CipherSuite cipher_suites<2
    Compression Method_compress
    select (extensions_present)
        case false:
            struct {};
        case true:
            Extension extension
    };
} ClientHello;
```

▼ Transport Layer Security

▼ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

 Content Type: Handshake (22)

 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

 Length: 512

▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

 Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)

 Length: 508

 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)

 Random: 3b6ef74c373ac3d85d4087fa3cf5f4b1ecf128eba4822a8

 Session ID Length: 32

 Session ID: 0c90f77f3b044e135d44fa5191eb87a966fa5cc5bb2

 Cipher Suites Length: 34

 ► Cipher Suites (17 suites)

 Compression Methods Length: 1

 ► Compression Methods (1 method)

 Extensions Length: 401

 ► Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)

 ► Extension: server_name (len=21)

 ► Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0)

 ► Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)

 ► Extension: supported_groups (len=10)

 ► Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2)

 ► Extension: session_ticket (len=0)

 ► Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=

TLS handshake

```
struct {
    ProtocolVersion client_version;
    Random random;
    SessionID session_id;
    CipherSuite cipher_suites<2>;
    Compression Method compression;
    select (extensions_present) {
        case false:
            struct {};
        case true:
            Extension extensions<0...2>;
    };
} ClientHello;
```

▼ Transport Layer Security

▼ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Content Type: Handshake (22)

Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

Length: 512

▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)

Length: 508

Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)

Session ID: 0c90f77f3b044e135d44fa5191eb87a966fa5cc5bb2

Cipher Suites Length: 34

- Cipher Suites (17 suites)
- Compression Methods Length: 1
- Compression Methods (1 method)
- Extensions Length: 401
- Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)
- Extension: server_name (len=21)
- Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0)
- Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)
- Extension: supported_groups (len=10)
- Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2)
- Extension: session_ticket (len=0)
- Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=

TLS handshake

```
struct {
    ProtocolVersion client_version;
    Random random;
    SessionID session_id;
    CipherSuite cipher_suites<2>;
    Compression Method compression;
    select (extensions_present)
        case false:
            struct {};
        case true:
            Extension extensions<0...218>;
    };
} ClientHello;
```

▼ Transport Layer Security

▼ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Content Type: Handshake (22)

Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

Length: 512

▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)

Length: 508

Cipher Suites Length: 34

Cipher Suites (17 suites)

- Cipher Suites (17 suites)
- Compression Methods Length: 1
- Compression Methods (1 method)
- Extensions Length: 401
- Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)
- Extension: server_name (len=21)
- Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0)
- Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)
- Extension: supported_groups (len=10)
- Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2)
- Extension: session_ticket (len=0)
- Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>

TLS handshake

```
struct {
    ProtocolVersion client_version;
    Random random;
    SessionID session_id;
    CipherSuite cipher_suites<2>;
    Compression Method compression;
    select (extensions_present)
        case false:
            struct {};
        case true:
            Extension extensions;
    };
} ClientHello;
```

▼ Transport Layer Security

▼ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

 Content Type: Handshake (22)

 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

 Length: 512

▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

 Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)

 Length: 508

Extensions Length: 401

Extension: Reserved (GREASE)

Extension: server_name (len=2)

Extension: extended_master_se

Extension: renegotiation_info

Extension: supported_groups (

Extension: ec_point_formats (


► Extension: SESSION_TICKET (len=0)

► Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=

ja3 = hash(version, ciphers,
extensions, curves, ec formats)

md5


```
771,4867-4866-4865-52393-52392-52394-49200-49196-491  
92-49188-49172-49162-159-107-57-65413-196-136-129-15  
7-61-53-192-132-49199-49195-49191-49187-49171-49161-  
158-103-51-190-69-156-60-47-186-65-49169-49159-5-4-4  
9170-49160-22-10-255,43-51-11-10-13-16,29-23-24-25,0
```



ja3

4f2655722e37c542ebeaf1eed48cbbb

curl/8.7.1



ja3

4f2655722e37c542ebeaf1eed48cbbb

ja4

- readable • resilient • rule-friendly
- ja3 → opaque hash
- ja4 → structured & sortable

*[transport][version][sni][cipher_count][ext_count][alpn]
_hash(sorted_ciphers)
_hash(sorted_extensions + signature_algs)*

ja4

ja3: 4f2655722e37c542ebeaf1eed48cbbbb

ja4: t13i4906h2_0d8feac7bc37_7395dae3b2f3

*[transport][version][sni][cipher_count][ext_count][alpn]
_hash(sorted_ciphers)
_hash(sorted_extensions + signature_algs)*

quic = tls 1.3 over udp

clientHello is encrypted,
but decryptable

<https://quic.xargs.org>

quic-chdump

decrypt quic initial → extract clientHello → ja4

2607:2ac0:120:2114:a950:9317:4e15:e1d7 -> 2607:f8b0:4007:80a::200e [JA3: 1ce1fa993
[JA4: q13d0313h3_55b375c5d22e_226f3f127bbe] SNI: ogs.google.com

ClientHello Hex Dump																
00000000	16	03	01	08	a6	01	00	08	a2	03	03	64	61	7f	56	ab
00000010	46	b0	bc	df	4a	6a	1f	81	1e	2a	bd	64	51	4a	c8	2f
00000020	b5	ec	da	2d	9d	9b	4b	94	41	ce	17	00	00	06	13	01
00000030	13	02	13	03	01	00	08	73	00	1b	00	03	02	00	02	00
00000040	2b	00	03	02	03	04	00	33	04	ea	04	e8	11	ec	04	c0
00000050	76	76	31	3a	2c	b1	ab	85	cc	5e	78	8f	dc	e3	4f	11
00000060	2a	19	e3	dc	03	47	e5	8d	e4	c4	94	fe	00	8a	84	64
00000070	78	da	7a	aa	46	29	26	7d	eb	bf	4b	37	4a	3f	b9	84
00000080	2d	eb	7e	ed	8c	0e	3f	05	99	7a	c2	0a	02	12	6a	7f

**http header set + order =
strong client signal**

ja4h = a_b_c_d

a: method+ver+cookie+referrer+count+lang

b: header-order hash

c: sorted cookie names hash

d: sorted cookie values hash

ja4h = a_b_c_d

a: method+ver+cookie+referrer+count+lang

b: header-order hash

c: sorted cookie names hash

d: sorted cookie values hash

chrome: ge20nn15engb_74941313fa48

zap: ge11nn040000_d5cb08ea9ac8


curl: ge20nn020000_5594a17e7e7e

akamai http2


SETTINGS + WINDOW_UPDATE + PRIORITY

evasion tactics


uTLS • curl-impersonate •
cycleTLS • custom libs •
burp-awesome-tls



src ip → ja3




src ip → ja3





src ip → ja3

src ip → ja3




src ip → ja3





src ip → ja3

src ip → ja3



src ip -> ja3

src ip -> ja3





src ip → ja3



src ip -> ja3

randomization became the
fingerprint!

one ip → hundreds of ja3s in minutes

> high-confidence detection:
fingerprint rotation +
cross-layer mismatch

finch

fingerprint-aware tls reverse proxy

collect → *decide* → *act*



listener → parsers → fingerprints →
rule engine → action → upstream

```
./finch serve --config finch.hcl
INFO starting finch 650da5a-dirty
INFO loaded config from finch.hcl
INFO loaded 426 rules from /Users/adelka/Projects/suricata-rules
INFO listening on 0.0.0.0:8443 (primary)

INFO REQ: ✓ GET request /index.html from 127.0.0.1 matched allow-chrome rule, action: allow
INFO REQ: 🧑 GET request /yo from 127.0.0.1 matched tarpit-curl-sus rule, action: deceive
INFO REQ: ⏪ GET request /hey from 127.0.0.1 matched route-safari rule, action: route
INFO REQ: 🔴 GET request /admin from 127.0.0.1 matched default rule, action: deny

INFO GALAH: generated HTTP response: {"Headers":{"Content-Type":"text/plain","Server":"Apache/2.4.41 (ength":"123"},"Body":"root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\n/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\n"}
INFO REQ: 🧑 GET request /etc/passwd from 127.0.0.1 matched deceive-suri-match rule, action: deceive
```

`./demo`
finch serve & echo

hcl rules

```
rule "name" {
    action = "allow" | "deny" | "route" | "tarpit" | "deceive"

    when all|any {
        tls_ja3      = [...]
        tls_ja4      = [...]
        http_ja4h    = [...]
        http_http2   = [...]
        http_method  = ["GET", "POST"]
        http_path    = ["^/api/"]
        http_header  = {
            "user-agent" = ["^EvilBot/"]
        }
        client_ip    = ["203.0.113.0/24"]
        suricata_msg = ["~Exploit"]
    }
    upstream = "http://honeypot:9000"    # for route
}
```

```
# Allow Chrome (by JA4H)
rule "allow-chrome" {
    action = "allow"
    when {
        http_ja4h = ["ge20nn15engb_74941313fa48_000000000000_000000000000"]
    }
}
```

```
# Route Safari (by JA4)
rule "route-safari" {
    action    = "route"
    upstream = "https://example.com/"
    when {
        tls_ja4 = ["t13i2013h2_a09f3c656075_e42f34c56612"]
    }
}
```

```
# Deceive admin probes or Suricata hits
rule "deceive-admin" {
    action = "deceive"
    when any {
        http_path      = ["^ /admin"]
        suricata_msg  = ["~ .+"]
    }
}
```

galah = llm-based web honeypot

```
> finch `deceive` → galah → http response  
> optional cache to avoid repeat llm calls
```

← → C ⓘ 127.0.0.1:8080/global-protect/login.esp ⭐

Index of /

Name	Last modified	Size	Description
..	12-Feb-2023 14:45	-	
passwd	27-Feb-2023 15:44	1023	
shadow	27-Feb-2023 15:44	1023	
group	27-Feb-2023 15:44	1023	
gpasswd	27-Feb-2023 15:44	1023	
shadow	27-Feb-2023 15:44	1023	
gshadow	27-Feb-2023 15:44	1023	

GlobalProtect Login

Username:

>Password:

>Login

Error

The requested file could not be found. Please check the URL.

Elements Console Sources Network

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8">
    <title>GlobalProtect Login</title> == $0
  </head>
  <style>
    body {
      font-family: sans-serif;
      display: flex;
```

Styles Computed Layout Event Listener

Filter :hover .cls +

```
element.style {
}
title {
  display: none;
}
```

← → C ⓘ 127.0.0.1:8888/login.php?u

Login Page

Invalid username or password

Username:

Password:

Submit

57

```
curl -i galah:8888/are-you-a-honeypot
```

```
curl -i galah:8888/are-you-a-honeypot
```

Connection: close

Content-Length: 20

Content-Type: text/plain

Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)

No, I am a server.



./demo

galah

rules can also...
block known scanners & tools

```
# Block Nmap (SNI & no-SNI)
rule "block-nmap" {
    action = "deny"
    when all {
        tls_ja3 = [
            "ee2b1d84fa1d67ced85c6284a724888e",
            "2fd66e5dee273eef288bf5efcc10a71a", # no-SNI
        ]
        tls_ja4 = [
            "t13d801100_59a17bb9eabe_d41ae481755e",
            "t13i801000_59a17bb9eabe_d41ae481755e", # no-SNI
        ]
    }
}
```

```
# Block ZAP active-scan
rule "block-zap" {
    action = "deny"
    when all {
        tls_ja3 = [
            "795a08fe385896aee616d3b7236502da",
            "20ee858fb3bcdda802d5f5caaa5e1122",
        ]
        tls_ja4 = [
            "t13i371100_db35923f8641_7c76daad20ec",
            "t13i371200_db35923f8641_867a32efce91",
        ]
        http_ja4h = ["ge11nn040000_d5cb08ea9ac8_000000000000_000000000000"]
    }
}
```

```
# Block Burp Repeater
rule "block-burp" {
    action = "deny"
    when all {
        tls_ja3 = [
            "62f6a6727fda5a1104d5b147cd82e520",
            "c53a2c34afdebeea3d08e9b86e555e7a", # no-SNI
        ]
        tls_ja4 = [
            "t13d4913h2_bd868743f55c_aac333855136",
            "t13i4912h2_bd868743f55c_aac333855136", # no-SNI
        ]
        http_http2 = ["3:1000;2:0;4:6291456;1:4096|15663105|0|s,m,p,a"]
    }
}
```

connecting finch to your tooling

access logs

/events SSE → live feed of Finch events
JSONL logs → easy ingest & replay

Finch SSE Events

t13i4906h2

127.0.0.1 → :8443/etc/passwd

JA3: 4f2655722e37c542ebeaf1eed48cbbbb

JA4: t13i4906h2_0d8feac7bc37_7395dae3b2f3

JA4H: ge20nn020000_5594a17e7e7e_000000000000_000000000000

HTTP2:3:100;4:10485760;2:0|1048510465|0|m,s,a,p

UA: curl/8.7.1

```
{"eventTime": "2025-07-27T17:39:00.182482Z", "srcIP": "127.0.0.1", "srcPort": 51095, "dstIP": "", "dstPort": 8443, "method": "GET", "request": "/etc/passwd", "headers": {"Accept": "*/*", "User-Agent": "curl/8.7.1"}, "body": "", "bodySha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afb4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855", "protocolVersion": "HTTP/2.0", "userAgent": "curl/8.7.1", "ja3": "4f2655722e37c542ebeaf1eed48cbbbb", "ja4": "t13i4906h2_0d8feac7bc37_7395dae3b2f3", "ja4h": "ge20nn020000_5594a17e7e7e_000000000000_000000000000", "http2": "3:100;4:10485760;2:0|1048510465|0|m,s,a,p", "ruleID": "", "action": "", "upstream": "", "suricataMatches": [{"msg": "ET WEB_SERVER /etc/passwd Detected in URI", "sid": "2049400"}]}
```

admin API

hot-load configs & rules safely

echo mode

debug & collect fingerprints
/, /fp/, /fp/detail

Your HTTP & TLS Fingerprints

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/138.0.0.0 Safari/537.36

JA3

c38429755404051d4d9e2c3d96aaec92

Copy

JA4

t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_d8a2da3f94cd

Copy

JA4H

ge20nn15engb_74941313fa48_0000000000
00_000000000000

Copy

HTTP/2

1:65536;2:0;4:6291456;6:262144|15663
105|0|m,a,s,p

Copy

[Download ClientHello \(hex\)](#)

use-cases

- > allow legitimate traffic
- > deny unwanted traffic
- > route clients to alternate upstreams
- > deceive attackers with on-the-fly
- > tarpit scanners with slow drip responses

api-key hijackers? skip the llm

markov-chain junk generator (fast, \$0).
seed = news-dataset + path → consistent nonsense

post /v1/chat/completions → finch (custom endpoint)

```
"method": "POST",
"request": "/v1/chat/completions",
"headers": {
  "Accept": "*/*",
  "Authorization": "Bearer sk-",
  "Content-Length": "250",
  "Content-Type": "application/json",
  "User-Agent": "curl/8.15.0"
},
"body": "{\n    \"model\": \"gpt-4o\",\n    \"messages\": [\n        {\\"role\\": \\"system\\\"\n        {\\"role\\": \\"user\\\", \\"content\\\": \"Explain the concept of quantum entanglement.\\"}\n    ],\n    \"bodySha256\": \"36573b65a44a6ce250930c217f77fa098da355e91e7b1c9de350e3b13c22cb70\", \n    \"protocolVersion\": \"HTTP/2.0\", \n    \"userAgent\": \"curl/8.15.0\", \n    \"ja3\": \"c0d0aa2585613528b3a18d77f6675913\", \n    \"ja3Raw\": \"771,4866-4867-4865-49196-49200-159-52393-52392-52394-49195-49199-158-49188-49187-57-156-61-60-53-47,65281-11-10-16-22-23-49-13-43-45-51,4588-29-23-30-24-25-256-257,0-1-2\", \n    \"ja4\": \"t13i3011h2_1d37bd780c83_882d495ac381\", \n    \"ja4h\": \"po20nn050000_caf4e6435328_000000000000_000000000000\", \n    \"http2\": \"3:100;4:65536;2:0|1048510465|0|m,s,a,p\" \n}
```

post /v1/chat/completions → finch (custom endpoint)

automate the boring parts
with ai agents!

observe → *decide* → *act*

agent = llm + tools + instructions

*tools • agent-as-tool • handoffs •
guardrails (input/output) • judge*

example workflow

1. cluster by JA4 / JA4H / H2
2. detect ip/ua/fp rotation
3. propose temp rules (expires=24h)
4. improve deception templates

`./demo`

agent, fingerprint rotation, finch log analysis.

future: central fingerprint sharing

future: ssh listener!

*fingerprint & redirect ssh connections
at key exchange*

thank you!
0×4D31



totally safe. ish.