



HASSH

SSH Client/Server Profiling

Ben Reardon and Adel Karimi
Detection Cloud
Security Operations

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About us

Ben Reardon

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


Engineer

Detection Team

BrisVegas

Data Visualization, ML

Robotics / Electronics




<https://dataviz.com.au/>
Robot Guitar

About us



Adel “0x4D31” Karimi

- Lead Detection Engineer
- Honeynet Project
- Developer of honeyλ, and a couple more open-source projects
- github.com/0x4D31



A

Summary



What is it ?

How it works

What problems it helps solve

Show some use cases

Supporting tools that we've open sourced

Standing on the shoulders of giants



Move the needle, you should



Credit: EVR !

<next>
bro-symon
bro-OSQUERY
HASSH
JA3
bro-TLS client fingerprinting
FingerprinTLS
....
nmap -A
p0f
“Silence on the Wire”: Chapter 9
Footprints, in the dawn of time..

What is HASSH



Encrypted protocols need to negotiate many parameters

This negotiation is necessarily done in clear text

Certain Compositions of these parameters tend to be app unique

Build this composition to fingerprint client and server apps



HASSH does this with SSH

FingerprinTLS, JA3 do this with TLS

HASSH - how it works




#####



HASSH - how it works


#####



HASSH - how it works




#####



HASSH - how it works




#####



HASSH - how it works




#####



HASSH - how it works




#####



HASSH - how it works



#####



HASSH - how it works



#####

The screenshot shows an SSH session in Wireshark. The session details pane highlights the following key exchange parameters:

- SSH Version 2 (encryption:chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com mac:<implicit> compression:none)**
- key_algorithms string [truncated]:** curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp512
- server_host_key_algorithms length:** 290
- server_host_key_algorithms string [truncated]:** ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,ecdsa-sha2-
- encryption_algorithms_client_to_server length:** 108
- encryption_algorithms_client_to_server string:** chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- encryption_algorithms_server_to_client length:** 108
- encryption_algorithms_server_to_client string:** chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- mac_algorithms_client_to_server length:** 213
- mac_algorithms_client_to_server string [truncated]:** umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-gcm@openssh.com
- mac_algorithms_server_to_client length:** 213
- mac_algorithms_server_to_client string [truncated]:** umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-gcm@openssh.com
- compression_algorithms_client_to_server length:** 26
- compression_algorithms_client_to_server string:** none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib
- compression_algorithms_server_to_client length:** 26
- compression_algorithms_server_to_client string:** none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib
- languages_client_to_server length:** 0
- languages_client_to_server string:** [Empty]
- languages_server_to_client length:** 0
- languages_server_to_client string:** [Empty]

Key exchange algos

Encryption algos

Message auth algos

Compression algos

HASSH - how it works



Key Exchange methods

```
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group15-sha512,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group17-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256@ssh.com,diffie-hellman-group15-sha256,diffie-hellman-group15-sha256@ssh.com,diffie-hellman-group15-sha384@ssh.com,diffie-hellman-group16-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha384@ssh.com,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512@ssh.com,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512@ssh.com
```

Encryption

```
aes128-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes192-cbc,aes192-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes256-ctr,blowfish-cbc,blowfish-ctr,cast128-cbc,cast128-ctr,idea-cbc,idea-ctr,serpent128-cbc,serpent128-ctr,serpent192-cbc,serpent192-ctr,serpent256-cbc,serpent256-ctr,3des-cbc,3des-ctr,twofish128-cbc,twofish128-ctr,twofish192-cbc,twofish192-ctr,twofish256-cbc,twofish256-ctr,twofish-cbc,arcfour,arcfour128,arcfour256
```

Message Auth

```
hmac-sha1,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5,hmac-md5-96,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512
```

Compression

```
zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none
```



CyberDuck Version 6.7.1

hasshAlgorithms (all the things, concatenated with a ; delim)

```
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group15-sha512,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group17-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256@ssh.com,diffie-hellman-group15-sha256,diffie-hellman-group15-sha256@ssh.com,diffie-hellman-group15-sha384@ssh.com,diffie-hellman-group16-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha384@ssh.com,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512@ssh.com,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512@ssh.com;aes128-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes192-cbc,aes192-ctr,aes256-cbc,aes256-ctr,blowfish-cbc,blowfish-ctr,cast128-cbc,cast128-ctr,idea-cbc,idea-ctr,serpent128-cbc,serpent128-ctr,serpent192-cbc,serpent192-ctr,serpent256-cbc,serpent256-ctr,3des-cbc,3des-ctr,twofish128-cbc,twofish128-ctr,twofish192-cbc,twofish192-ctr,twofish256-cbc,twofish256-ctr,twofish-cbc,arcfour,arcfour128,arcfour256;hmac-sha1,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5,hmac-md5-96,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512;zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none
```

hassh = 8a8ae540028bf433cd68356c1b9e8d5b



HASSH - how it works

#####

Key Exchange methods

curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1

Encryption

chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se

Message Auth

umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1,hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96;none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib

Compression

none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib



hasshAlgorithms

curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1;chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se;umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1,hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96;none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib

hassh = 55a77ae9728654f1d4240a29287dc296



HASSH - how it works



```
#####
```

ncrack

```
##include "main.h"
152
153 #define SSH_TIMEOUT 20000
154 #define CLIENT_VERSION "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.1\n"
155
156
157 extern NcrackOps o;
158
159 extern void ncrack_read_handler(nsock_pool nsp, nsock_event nse, void *mydata);
160 extern void ncrack_write_handler(nsock_pool nsp, nsock_event nse, void *mydata);
161 extern void ncrack_module_end(nsock_pool nsp, void *mydata);
162
163 enum states { SSH_INIT, SSH_ID_EX, SSH_KEY, SSH_KEY2, SSH_KEY3, SSH_KEY4,
164   SSH_AUTH, SSH_AUTH2, SSH_AUTH3, SSH_AUTH4, SSH_FINI };
165
166 static void ssh_free(Connection *con);
167
168
169
170 static inline int
171 ssh_loop_read(nsock_pool nsp, Connection *con, ncrack_ssh_state *info)
```

ncrack poses as OpenSSH 7.1.., but
hassh(ncrack)=55a77ae9728654f1d4240a29287dc296



HASSH - Notes during Development



#####

MD5 vs SHA256

	MD5	SHA-256
Collisions?	Not for our use case	No
Short	Yes, 32 chars	No, 64 chars
Tweetable	Yes	Not friendly at all
Swamps surrounding text	No	Yes
Supported	By everything	Probably by everything
Provides Nett Benefit	Yes	No

HASSH - Notes during Development



Language Field



Ylonen & Lonvick

Standards Track

[Page 18]

[RFC 4253](#)

SSH Transport Layer Protocol

January 2006

`compression_algorithms`

A name-list of acceptable compression algorithms in order of preference. The chosen compression algorithm MUST be the first algorithm on the client's name-list that is also on the server's name-list. If there is no such algorithm, both sides MUST disconnect.

Note that "none" must be explicitly listed if it is to be acceptable. The compression algorithm names are listed in [Section 6.2](#).

`languages`

This is a name-list of `language` tags in order of preference [[RFC3066](#)]. Both parties MAY ignore this name-list. If there are no `language` preferences, this name-list SHOULD be empty as defined in Section 5 of [[SSH-ARCH](#)]. `Language` tags SHOULD NOT be present unless they are known to be needed by the sending party.

`first_kex_packet_follows`

Indicates whether a guessed key exchange packet follows. If a

HASSH - how it works



#####

hassh examples

8a8ae540028bf433cd68356c1b9e8d5b **CyberDuck** Version 6.7.1 (28683)

b5752e36ba6c5979a575e43178908adf SSH-2.0-**paramiko**_2.4.1 (E.g. used by Metasploit exploit kit modules)

16f898dd8ed8279e1055350b4e20666c SSH-2.0-**dropbear**_2012.55 (popular embedded/IOT library)

06046964c022c6407d15a27b12a6a4fb SSH-2.0-**OpenSSH_7.6**

de30354b88bae4c2810426614e1b6976 SSH-2.0-**Renci.SshNet.SshClient.0.0.1** (Powershell, E.g Empire)

fafc45381bfde997b6305c4e1600f1bf SSH-2.0-**Ruby/Net::SSH_5.0.2** x86_64-linux (Ruby, E.g. used by Metasploit)

hasshServer examples

c1c596caaeb93c566b8ecf3cae9b5a9e SSH-2.0-**dropbear_2016.74**

d93f46d063c4382b6232a4d77db532b2 SSH-2.0-**dropbear_2016.72**

2dd9a9b3dbebfæec8b8aab689e75d2 SSH-2.0-**AWSCodeCommit**

a0fd4bcb0e72b4b21232a486825b6742 **Cowrie** SSH Honeypot

HASSH - implementation



```
#####
```

Bro/Zeek

```
# bro-pkg install hassh
```

hasshVersion	string	1.0
hassh	string	d43d91bc39d5aaed819ad9f6b57b7348
hasshServer	string	a7a87fbe86774c2e40cc4a7ea2ab1b3c
cshka	string	ssh-rsa,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ssh-ed25519
hasshAlgorithms	string	curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1;chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com;umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1;none,zlib@openssh.com
sshka	string	ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
hasshServerAlgorithms	string	diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1;aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se,aes192-cbc,aes128-cbc,blowfish-cbc,arcfour128,arcfour,cast128-cbc,3des-cbc;hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5,hmac-md5-96,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com;none

HASSH - implementation



#####

Python

Mode 1: Reads PCAP files

Mode 2: Live traffic capture

JSON Output:

```
{  
    "timestamp": "2018-09-04T18:57:03.644663",  
    "sourceIp": "10.1.2.3",  
    "destinationIp": "192.1.2.3",  
    "sourcePort": "52068",  
    "destinationPort": "22",  
    "client": "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.6",  
    "hassh": "06046964c022c6407d15a27b12a6a4fb",  
    "hasshAlgorithms": "curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org",  
    "hasshVersion": "1.0",  
    "ckex": "curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org",  
    "ceacts": "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes128-gcm@openssh.com",  
    "cmacts": "umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com",  
    "ccacts": "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib",  
    "clcts": "[Empty]",  
    "clstc": "[Empty]",  
    "ceastc": "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes128-gcm@openssh.com",  
    "cmastc": "umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com",  
    "ccastc": "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib",  
    "cshka": "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,ecdsa-sha2-nistp512-cert-v01@openssh.com",  
}
```

Usage

- Live network traffic capture:

```
$ python3 hassh.py -i eth0 -l json -o hassh.json --print
```

Output:

```
[+] Server SSH_MSG_KEXINIT detected  
[ 192.1.2.3:22 -> 10.1.2.3:52068 ]  
    [-] Identification String: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.2p2 Ubuntu-4ubuntu2.4  
    [-] hasshServer: d43d91bc39d5aaed819ad9f6b57b7348  
    [-] hasshServer Algorithms: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256  
[+] Client SSH_MSG_KEXINIT detected  
[ 10.1.2.3:52068 -> 192.1.2.3:22 ]  
    [-] Identification String: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.6  
    [-] hassh: 06046964c022c6407d15a27b12a6a4fb  
    [-] hassh Algorithms: curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
```

HASSH - implementation

```
#####
```

Dockerized hassh.py



A dockerized version of hassh.py can be used to extract HASSH fingerprints from input PCAP files and live network traffic.

Build the docker image using Dockerfile:

```
$ docker build -t hassh:latest .
```



0x4d31/hassh ☆

By [0x4d31](#) • Updated 5 months ago

A dockerized hassh.py to extract HASSH fingerprints from input PCAP files and live network traffic.

Container

Pulls 30

Docker Pull Command

```
docker pull 0x4d31/hassh
```



HASSH - implementation



hasshGen.py

License BSD 3-Clause

Sample python script and Dockerfiles to automate building docker images with different SSH clients/versions for generating HASSH fingerprints. As a demonstration we created a list (`sshClient_list`) containing 49 different version of OpenSSH, Python's paramiko and Dropbear SSH clients and generated a database of HASSH fingerprints in [JSON](#) and [CSV](#) formats.

Getting Started

1. Install Docker CE:

[Download Docker Engine](#)

2. Install the Docker's Python library:

`pipenv install docker`

3. Test:

`pipenv run python3 hasshgen.py -h`


Output:

```
usage: hasshgen.py [-h] [-i IMAGE] [-iV IMAGE_VER] [-c SSHCLIENT]
                   [-cv SSHCLIENT_VER] [-d DOCKER_FILE] -s SERVER
                   [-if INPUT_FILE] [-f] [--cmd CMD]
```

A python script to automate building docker images with different SSH clients/versions.

optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-i IMAGE, --image IMAGE Docker image name. e.g. alpine, ubuntu
-iV IMAGE_VER, --image_ver IMAGE_VER Docker image version. e.g. 18.04, latest
-c SSHCLIENT, --sshclient SSHCLIENT SSH client name
-cv SSHCLIENT_VER, --sshclient_ver SSHCLIENT_VER SSH client version
-d DOCKER_FILE, --docker_file DOCKER_FILE Specify the Dockerfile
-s SERVER, --server SERVER Specify the server address to test the SSH connection
-if INPUT_FILE, --input_file INPUT_FILE Bulk mode; Specify an input file containing a list of docker image, image version, sshclient and sshclient version
-f, --fingerprint Set this option to automatically run hassh.py for capturing SSH client fingerprints (HASSH). Specify the command for running hassh.py using --cmd arg.
--cmd CMD Enter the command for running hassh.py. Use with -f/--fingerprint arg

<https://github.com/salesforce/hassh>



Branch: master | [hassh / python / hasshGen / hassh_fingerprints.csv](#) | Find file | Copy path | 44f1d6f on 26 Sep | 2 contributors

51 lines (50 sloc) | 28.6 KB | Raw | Blame | History |

Q Search this file...

1	image	imageVersion	sshClient	sshClientVersion	clientIdentificationString	hassh
2	debian	sid-slim	dropbear	2018.76-4	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2018.76	e22efe3cde8b396b874c3f13fdb6c61a
3	debian	buster-slim	dropbear	2018.76-4	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2018.76	e22efe3cde8b396b874c3f13fdb6c61a
4	debian	stretch-slim	dropbear	2016.74-5	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2016.74	7742887e2a57712bdb91a772093f54ce
5	debian	jessie-slim	dropbear	2014.65-1+deb8u2	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2014.65	ad00edb0c2a031d9884826ba7b7ba41e
6	debian	jessie-slim	dropbear	2014.65-1+deb8u3	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2014.65	ad00edb0c2a031d9884826ba7b7ba41e
7	debian	wheezy-slim	dropbear	2012.55-1.3	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2012.55	16f898dd8ed8279e1055350b4e20666c
8	debian	wheezy-slim	dropbear	2012.55-1.3+deb7u2	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2012.55	16f898dd8ed8279e1055350b4e20666c
9	ubuntu	18.04	dropbear	2017.75-3build1	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2017.75	7742887e2a57712bdb91a772093f54ce
10	ubuntu	16.04	dropbear	2016.72-1	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2016.72	7742887e2a57712bdb91a772093f54ce
11	ubuntu	14.04	dropbear	2013.60-1ubuntu2	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2013.60	22865d7159a8dedcb091cd4fc5fd2841
12	alpine	3.8	dropbear-dbclient	2018.76-r2	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2018.76	e22efe3cde8b396b874c3f13fdb6c61a
13	alpine	3.7	dropbear-dbclient	2017.75-r1	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2017.75	7742887e2a57712bdb91a772093f54ce
14	alpine	3.5	dropbear-dbclient	2017.75-r0	SSH-2.0-dropbear_2017.75	7742887e2a57712bdb91a772093f54ce
15	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	1.13.0	SSH-2.0-paramiko_1.13.0	b05dfbbf26090c7792d4aa6b76cd1f1a
16	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	1.14.0	SSH-2.0-paramiko_1.14.0	b05dfbbf26090c7792d4aa6b76cd1f1a
17	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	1.15.0	SSH-2.0-paramiko_1.15.0	d72f74b08466652d162ca02ad197b9ad
18	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	1.16.0	SSH-2.0-paramiko_1.16.0	c6f5e6d54285a11b9f02fef7fc77bd6f
19	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	1.17.0	SSH-2.0-paramiko_1.17.0	c6f5e6d54285a11b9f02fef7fc77bd6f
20	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	1.18.0	SSH-2.0-paramiko_1.18.0	c6f5e6d54285a11b9f02fef7fc77bd6f
21	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	2.0.0	SSH-2.0-paramiko_2.0.0	c6f5e6d54285a11b9f02fef7fc77bd6f
22	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	2.1.0	SSH-2.0-paramiko_2.1.0	c6f5e6d54285a11b9f02fef7fc77bd6f
23	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	2.2.0	SSH-2.0-paramiko_2.2.0	b5752e36ba6c5979a575e43178908adf
24	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	2.3.0	SSH-2.0-paramiko_2.3.0	b5752e36ba6c5979a575e43178908adf
25	python	3.6-alpine	paramiko	2.4.1	SSH-2.0-paramiko_2.4.1	b5752e36ba6c5979a575e43178908adf
26	centos	7	openssh-clients	7.4p1-16.el7	SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.4	ec9ea89c70f5c71c61061bf5e4740
27	centos	6	openssh-clients	5.3p1-123.el6_9	SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.3	3646f4d62498cd92721bd242ce988a42
28	fedora	rawhide	openssh-clients	7.8p1-2.fc30	SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.8	4eea4239dc591cbf6e661a656ae9d58c
29	fedora	29	openssh-clients	7.8p1-1.fc29	SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.8	4eea4239dc591cbf6e661a656ae9d58c
30	fedora	28	openssh-clients	7.7p1-2.fc28	SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.7	4eea4239dc591cbf6e661a656ae9d58c
31	fedora	27	openssh-clients	7.5p1-5.fc27	SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.5	82a9e17b13a816a3b8cbfe1b5cf030
32	fedora	26	openssh-clients	7.5p1-2.fc26	SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.5	254470d00576202014-53b80-75e

A

HASSH - implementation



```
#####
```

Nmap script

[ssh-hassh](#) nse script reports hasshServer (i.e. SSH Server Fingerprint) and hasshServerAlgorithms for the target SSH server.

```
adel$ nmap -p 22 --script ssh-hassh github.com -oX hassh.xml



Starting Nmap 7.00 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-09-26 03:13 AEST
Nmap scan report for github.com (192.30.255.112)
Host is up (0.18s latency).
Other addresses for github.com (not scanned): 192.30.255.113
rDNS record for 192.30.255.112: lb-192-30-255-112-sea.github.com
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
| ssh-hassh:
|   Server Identification String: SSH-2.0-libssh_0.7.0
|   hasshServer: 85a34ecc072b7fee11a05e8208ffc2a2
|_  hasshServer Algorithms: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nis
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.47 seconds
```

HASSH - Use cases



CVE-2018-10933 libssh auth bypass bug

The vulnerability, which was introduced in libssh version 0.6, makes it possible to log in by presenting a server with a **SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS** message rather than **SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST** message the server was expecting





HASSH - Use cases






#####

libssh Auth bypass bug

Building a detection case



Exploit Attempt




Exploit Success

HASSH - Use cases



Control on whitelist/blacklist TO servers




HASSH - Use cases



#####


Control on whitelist/blacklist FROM systems



HASSH - Use cases



Highly defined environment - eg GCP control



```
> 21/12/2018 { [-]
  ccacts: none
  ceacts: aes128-ctr
  ckex: diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
  client: SSH-2.0-jsssh.0.1
  cmacts: hmac-sha2-256
  cshka: rsa-sha2-256
  direction: INBOUND
  hashs: 6f8725d34b5c2e6528d86a6f0ba211d4
  hashsAlgorithms: diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256;aes128-ctr;hmac-sha2-256;none
  hashsVersion: 1.0
  id.orig_h: .160
  id.orig_p: 64908
  id.resp_h: 10.1!
  id.resp_p: 22
  ts: 2018-12-21T01:13:06.845400Z
  uid: CVUA1z1BIJJerNF9re7
  version: 2
}
```



HASSH - Use cases



#####

Lateral Movement Detection

- Attackers use systems' default SSH client for lateral movement - **But not always!**
 - Empire's **Invoke-SSHCommand.ps1**
 - Renci SSH.NET Library
 - Specific Client ID and HASSH

```
# This is the base 64 encoded Renci.SshNet.dll You may find it at https://sshnet.codeplex.com/downloads/get/944156
$Base64 = 'TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA//8AALgAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAgAAAAA4fug4AtAnNIbgBTM0hVGh'
$content = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($Base64)
```

- How about Cobalt Strike?

HASSH - Use cases



Lateral Movement Detection - Cobalt Strike

- A popular adversary simulation and post-exploitation tool
- In 2016 an SSH client added to Cobalt Strike (version 3.5+) that allows you to conduct post-exploitation actions against UNIX targets!
- Built-in SSH client



```
beacon> ssh 172.16.20.159 root pfsense
[*] Tasked beacon to SSH to 172.16.20.159:22 as root
[+] host called home, sent: 848967 bytes
[+] host called home, sent: 45 bytes
[+] established link to child session: 172.16.20.159
[COPPER] SYSTEM */740
beacon>
```

HASSH - Use cases



Lateral Movement Detection - Cobalt Strike

- Windows → Linux



- Detection:
 - Internal SSH connections from a Windows host using the CS built-in SSH Client
 - Client ID String: **SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.7.0**
 - HASSH: **a7a87fbe86774c2e40cc4a7ea2ab1b3c**

HASSH - Use cases



#####

Detect Evasion techniques: SSH Honeypots

- Cowrie hasshServer:

a0fd4bcb0e72b4b21232a486825b6742 and **06046964c022c6407d15a27b12a6a4fb**

hasshServer	string	06046964c022c6407d15a27b12a6a4fb
hasshServerAlgorithms	string	curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,ext-info-c;chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc gcm@openssh.com;umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,sha2-512,hmac-sha1;none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib

```
t.supportedCiphers = [
    b'aes128-ctr',
    b'aes192-ctr',
    b'aes256-ctr',
    b'aes128-cbc',
    b'3des-cbc',
    b'blowfish-cbc',
    b'cast128-cbc',
    b'aes192-cbc',
    b'aes256-cbc'
]
t.supportedPublicKeys = [b'ssh-rsa', b'ssh-dss']
t.supportedMACs = [b'hmac-md5', b'hmac-sha1']
t.supportedCompressions = [b'zlib@openssh.com', b'zlib', b'none']
```

- Cymmetria honeycomb, libssh module:

b5752e36ba6c5979a575e43178908adf

HASSH - Use cases



#####

Detect Evasion techniques used by cred stuffers and brute forcers

1 index=hassh 72d744cee7c48197c1b56973e8600140
 2 | stats values(hassh) as hassh values(id.orig_h) as SourceIP by client

All time ▾ 


✓ 72,013 events (before 21/12/2018 14:00:30.000) No Event Sampling ▾ Job ▾ II ■ ↗ ↘ ↙ ↘ Smart Mode ▾

Events Patterns Statistics (69) Visualization


100 Per Page ▾ Format Preview ▾

client	hassh	SourceIP
SSH-2.0-Go	72d744cee7c48197c1b56973e8600140	139.162.122.110
		177.82.137.149
		178.62.228.250
		18.191.183.129
		18.220.135.136
		18.222.185.225
		18.222.221.116
		182.105.146.42
		185.101.105.134
		192.227.144.213
		35.167.80.162
		35.171.155.77
		35.177.102.99
		35.180.22.136
		35.187.238.155
		54.218.81.20
		80.211.31.226
		80.211.81.156
		89.46.79.57
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_+Zghs	72d744cee7c48197c1b56973e8600140	119.29.145.243
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_/_14mv	72d744cee7c48197c1b56973e8600140	185.232.64.161
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_03s1N	72d744cee7c48197c1b56973e8600140	185.232.64.161
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_01mQq	72d744cee7c48197c1b56973e8600140	176.153.106.196
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_2/A4g	72d744cee7c48197c1b56973e8600140	176.153.106.196


HASSH - Use cases




1) All scans from this one IP address



2) One hassh value,
So it must be only one client application



3) Client Strings are being spoofed
and are cycled through



4) Accounts attempted (all root)



Because defenders can shun connections
based on Client Protocol string

HASSH - Industry support



- Grey Noise
- Binary Edge
- Cowrie
- Shodan
- Trisul NSM
- MISP
- Security Onion
- ExtraHop (soon)
- Suricata (soon)

```
{ □
  "timestamp": "2018-09-29T15:43:09.300627Z",
  "sensor": "0x4d31-nyc3-01",
  "src_ip": "10.1.2.3",
  "eventid": "cowrie.client.kex",
  "message": "SSH client hassh fingerprint: 68e0ba85e1a818f7c49ea3f4b849bd15",
  "hassh": "68e0ba85e1a818f7c49ea3f4b849bd15",
  "hasshAlgorithms": "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp3
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,ext-info-c;chacha20
128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,3des-c
6-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,umac-64@
c-sha1;none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib",
  "session": "3fd36ed0e459",
  "keyAlgs": [ □ ],
  "kexAlgs": [ □ ],
  "macCS": [ □ ],
  "langCS": [ □ ],
  "compCS": [ □ ],
  "encCS": [ □ ]
}
```

HASSH (i.e. SSH Client Fingerprint)

MD5(kexAlgs;encryptionAlgs;macAlgs;compressionAlgs)

HASSH

@benreardon
breardon@salesforce.com



Questions, you will ask



	MD5	SHA-256
Collisions?	Not for our use case	No
Short	Yes, 32 chars	No, 64 chars
Tweetable	Yes	Not friendly at all
Swamps surrounding text	No	Yes
Supported	By everything	Probably by everything
Provides Nett Benefit	Yes	No

<https://github.com/salesforce/hassh>






Open Sourcing HASSH

A profiling method for SSH Clients and Servers



Looking for signals in the initialization of encrypted communication channels is not a new concept. There are many examples of fingerprinting both



THANK YOU






Time Permitting Slides

HASSH - Notes during Development



#####

Host Key Algos



Client

Server

Client first connect, server is unknown.

Client offers supported key algos A,B,C,Z,Y,**X**

Server's host key is **algo X**

Client updates `~/.ssh/known_hosts`

with IP, **algo X** and hostkey

```
11.11.11.11 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoY
```

On subsequent connects, since the server is now “known”,

a **re-ordered** list of client key algos A,B,C,**X**,Y,Z is offered.

HASSH - Use cases



libssh Auth bypass bug

Building a detection case

Step 1: Find **hasshServer**(vuln libssh server)
AND/OR use the Server Identification strings

Even knowing you have libssh servers may
be of interest.

<https://www.libssh.org/security/advisories/CVE-2018-10933.txt>



Libssh authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2018-10933)

An analysis of Censys Public Scan 20180807 (only port 22) to estimate the number of servers {potentially} vulnerable to the recent Libssh bug.

- [CVE-2018-10933 Advisory](#)
- [Exploit - Patched Libssh Client](#)
- [CVE-2018-10933-test](#)
- [libSSH-Authentication-Bypass](#)
- [HASSH - an SSH client/server profiling method](#)
- [ssh-hassh nmap script](#)
- [Censys data](#)
- [Hunt for and Exploit the libSSH Authentication Bypass](#)
- A sample Shodan filter: `product:libssh port:22,2222 ssh.hassh:489e30454fb8c5bdc15e54b24a80d109`

The most common hasshServer values for each libssh version:

hasshServer	Server Identification String	Count
489e30454fb8c5bdc15e54b24a80d109	SSH-2.0-libssh-0.6.0	1076
5415e306f43f87ee2a5b9e5211eaefac	SSH-2.0-libssh_0.7.0	406
300791d5ac0d0fe0c11c7591e1216691	SSH-2.0-libssh-0.6.3	321
e80597ec7cbc1477a68bd9117d87dfdd	SSH-2.0-libssh-0.7.2	51
e5c1da26cdde67ec7b2a7759b13b6d28	SSH-2.0-libssh-0.6.5	22
50a0624954cdf5c897aac12b66688dec	SSH-2.0-libssh_0.7.5	16
e80597ec7cbc1477a68bd9117d87dfdd	SSH-2.0-libssh-0.7.3	8
c251cb842064997a986c1bc145aec3bd	SSH-2.0-libssh-0.7.1	6

hasshServer values of all observed libssh versions:

hasshServer	Server Identification String	Count
489e30454fb8c5bdc15e54b24a80d109	SSH-2.0-libssh-0.6.0	1076
300791d5ac0d0fe0c11c7591e1216691	SSH-2.0-libssh-0.6.0, SSH-2.0-libssh-0.6.3	442
5415e306f43f87ee2a5b9e5211eaefac	SSH-2.0-libssh_0.7.0	406
6b52d83483f50b8f01f406a47b0c730c	SSH-2.0-libssh_0.7.0	131
6e3fb87b7382dbced382641f012ced5e	SSH-2.0-libssh-0.7.0	98

HASSH - Use cases



libssh Auth bypass bug

Building a detection case

Step 2 : find `hassh`(exploit tools)

This repository has been archived by the owner. It is now read-only.

[blacknbunny / libSSH-Authentication-Bypass](#)

Code Issues Pull requests Projects Wiki Insights

Branch: master libSSH-Authentication-Bypass / libsshauthbypass.py Find file Copy path

blacknbunny Update libsshauthbypass.py d69e3a2 on 25 Oct 2018 2 contributors

Executable File 62 lines (45 sloc) | 1.7 K

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import paramiko
import socket
import argparse
from sys import exit

parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="libSSH Authentication Bypass")
parser.add_argument('--host', help='Host')
parser.add_argument('-p', '--port', help='libSSH port', default=22)
parser.add_argument('-c', '--command', help='Command to execute', default='id')
parser.add_argument('-l', '--logfile', help='Logfile to write conn logs', default="paramiko.log")

args = parser.parse_args()

def BypasslibSSHwithoutcredentials(hostname, port, command):
    sock = socket.socket()
    try:
        sock.connect((str(hostname), int(port)))
        message = paramiko.message.Message()
```

HASSH - Use cases




#####



libssh Auth bypass bug

Building a detection case

Step 3 : Apply logic (example)



Exploit Attempt



Exploit Success

HASSH - use cases




Detect Trojaned Applications



TimpDoor/Milkdoor uses SSH to tunnel

Fake voice app

When the user clicks on "Download Voice App," the file VoiceApp.apk is downloaded from a remote server. If the victim follows the instructions, the following screens appear to make the app look legitimate:



<https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/android-timpdoor-turns-mobile-devices-into-hidden-proxies/>

YARA sig for private keys in PE files.

```
1 rule adversary_methods_pe_with_openssh_key {
2   meta:
3     author="smiller"
4     description="Looking for PE files with default OpenSSH private key strings"
5   strings:
6     $a1= "[----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----"
7     $a2= {0A2D2D2D2D454E44204F50454E5353482050524956415445204B45592D2D2D2D0A257373682D}
8   condition:
9     uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and all of them
10 }
```

<https://gist.github.com/stvemillertime/f518d598097eb657a215795950ff8b8d>

21 Malware families in OpenSSH



The Dark Side of the ForSSHe

ESET researchers discovered a set of previously undocumented Linux malware families based on OpenSSH. In the white paper, "The Dark Side of the ForSSHe", they release analysis of 21 malware families to improve the prevention, detection and remediation of such threats



Marc-Etienne M. Léveillé 5 Dec 2018 - 02:57PM

<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/05/dark-side-of-the-forsshe/>

Recap - what is HASSH

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Looking for signals in the initialization of encrypted communication channels is not a new concept. There are many examples of fingerprinting both unencrypted and encrypted protocols such as TLS. However somewhat surprisingly, no open source scalable fingerprinting method has been developed for one of our most common and relied upon encrypted protocols SSH—an integral component of the internet. Enter, the HASSH.

Summary



- HASSH *augments*, provides another datapoint that *can* be insightful
- Not a silver bullet
- Value depends on the maturity of the consuming org.
- Knowledge of “what is normal” still critical
- Detection/Hunting/Forensics/Control?
- Contributes to non-repudiation in a Forensic context