

The Baseband Basics:

Understanding, Debugging and

Attacking the Mediatek Communication

Processor



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In this talk

- This is the first public research targeting the Mediatek baseband platform
- Mediatek powers most popular phones in Africa
- Disclaimer: Not ready to disclose 0-days yet
- We will show a DOS though




THE GOAL: A FULLY REMOTE ATTACK

- Fully remote attacks do not involve any interaction on behalf of the victim
- Trigger silently without external indication to the victim
- Will lead (possibly as part of an exploit chain) to full device compromise



ATTACKING ANDROID/IOS





Data Execution Prevention (DEP)

- Prevents certain memory sectors, e.g. the stack, from being executed.
- Hardware-enforced DEP works in conjunction with the NX (Never eXecute) bit on compatible CPUs.




Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

- Randomizes the address space positions of key data areas of a process, including the base of the executable and the positions of the stack, heap and libraries
- Makes guessing the location of ROP gadgets and APIs very difficult.



ATTACKING ANDROID/IOS





BASEBANDS

iPhone





Samsung Galaxy and Note

QUALCOMM' SAMSUNG

Google Nexus

OLIALCONNO®

Some LGs and HTCs







Popular phones in Africa

Alcatel

MEDIATEK

Oppo

MEDIATEK

Tecno


MEDIATEK

iTel

MEDIATEK



Attacking Basebands: Introduction





The Challenges

- Closed source, no specs available
- Extensive reversing required
- No debugging interfaces whatsoever, need to build from scratch

MediaTek MTK Kernel Source Code Leaked! Download it from HERE!

MediaTek's full source code has been leaked! Yeah! now you guys can also build Android Kit Kat and other OS for your MediaTek devices.






Common Attack Vector

- Attacking a communication processor (either baseband or Wi-Fi) allows an attacker to form a bridgehead within a system
- Further escalation is possible and has been done in the past: either through writing directly to the kernel (Broadcom Wi-Fi) or exploiting bugs in the RIL (basebands)



EMBEDDED BRIDGEHEAD DEVICES





EBDF: Embedded Bridgehead Devices Framework





Framework was developed for Nitay's WiFi project





- Shannon: the same concept was found to be useful for baseband research
- ♦ Mediatek: worked after some adaptations





The Heart of the Framework: **Hooks**



Hooks. General Idea

- Intercept function call
- Execute our piece of code before any function logic is executed
- Trace \ change function data

Finding a target function

```
; void __cdecl wlc_bss_mac_event(wlc_info_t *wlc, wlc_bsscfq_t *bsscfq,
AM: 0017EBC0
AM: 0017EBC0
                              wlc bss mac event
                                                                         ; CODE XREF: j_wlc_bss_mac_event
AM: 0017EBC0
                                                                         ; sub 17C7C0+40 p ...
AM: 0017EBC0
AM: 0017EBC0
                              a5
                                               = -0x20
AM: 0017EBC0
                              var_1C
                                               = -0x1C
AM: 0017EBC0
                              var_18
                                               = -0x18
AM: 0017EBC0
                              var_14
                                               = -0x14
AM: 0017EBC0
                              var_10
                                               = -0x10
AM: 0017EBC0
                              rxframe data
                                               = -0xC
AM: 0017EBC0
                              result
                              status
AM: 0017EBC0
AM: 0017EBC0
                              auth_type
AM: 0017EBC0
                              data
                                                  0xC
                              datalen
AM: 0017EBC0
                                               = 0x10
AM:0017EBC0
AN:0017EBC0 000 10 B5
                                               PUSH
                                                                {R4, LR}
AM: 0017EBC2 008 86 B0
                                               SUB
                                                                SP, SP, #0x18
AM: 0017EBC4 020 13 2A
                                                                R2, #0x13
                                               CMP
tAM:0017EBC6 020 08 9C
                                               LDR
                                                                R4, [SP,#0x20+result]
tAM:0017EBC8 020 01 D1
                                               BNE
                                                                loc 17EBCE
tAM:0017EBCA 020 03 2C
                                               CMP
                                                                R4, #3
tAM: 0017EBCC 020 OC DO
                                               BEQ
                                                                loc 17EBE8
AM · OO1 TEDCE
```



Hooked function

```
ROM: 0017EBBC
                                                sub 45CBC
ROM: 0017EBC0
                                                                 Jump to the hook
ROM: 0017EBC0
                                                loc_1D5254
                               B.W
ROM: 0017EBC4
ROM: 0017EBC4
                START OF FUNCTION CHUNK FOR sub_1B694A
ROM: 0017EBC4
ROM:0017EBC4 loc_17EBC4
                                                          CODE XREF: sub_1B694A+1E46A_j
ROM: 0017EBC4
                                                           ROM: 001D52AC11
                                                           DATA XREF: ...
ROM: 0017EBC4
ROM: 0017EBC4
                                                R2, #0x13
                               CMP
ROM: 0017EBC6
                                                R4, [SP, #0x20+arg_0]
                               LDR
ROM: 0017EBC8
                               BNE
                                                loc_17EBCE
ROM: 0017EBCA
                               CMP
                                                R4, #3
ROM: 0017EBCC
                               BEQ
                                                loc 17EBE8
ROM: 0017EBCE
                                                         ; CODE XREF: sub_1B694A-37D82fj
ROM: 0017EBCE loc_17EBCE
                               CTD
```



Trampoline

- Prepare function arguments for our usage
- Jump to our hook main logic
- Execute the original instructions that was overwritten
- Get back to the normal execution

Hooks: Trampoline

Original instructions -

```
hook(void)
   asm(
        "push {r0-r12,lr}\n"
        "ldr r12, hook info addr\n"
        "str r0, [r12]\n"
        "str r1, [r12, #0x4]\n"
        "str r2, [r12, #0x8]\n"
        "str r3, [r12, #0xc]\n"
        "str r4, [r12, #0x10]\n"
        "str r5, [r12, #0x14]\n"
        "str r6, [r12, #0x18]\n"
        "str r7, [r12, #0x1c]\n"
        "str r8, [r12, #0x20]\n"
        "str r9, [r12, #0x24]\n"
        "str r10, [r12, #0x28]\n"
        "str fp, [r12, #0x2c]\n"
        "str ip, [r12, #0x30]\n"
        "str sp, [r12, #0x34]\n"
        "str lr, [r12, #0x38]\n"
        "str r0, [r12, #0x44]\n"
        "mov r0, r12\n"
        "ldr r12, entry_addr\n"
        "blx r12\n"
        "pop {r0-r12,lr}\n"
        "push {r4,lr}\n" // Replacement
        "sub sp, sp, #0x18\n" // Replacement
       "ldr pc, ret addr\n"
   "hook info_addr:\n"
       ".long " HOOK INFO ADDR "\n"
    "entry addr:\n"
        ".long " ENTRY FUNC ADDR "\n"
    "ret addr:\n"
        ".long " RET_ADDR "\n"
   );
```

Prepare function arguments for the hook

Jmp to main hook logic



```
HOOK_FUNC_ADDR = 0x1d5254
ENTRY_FUNC_ADDR = 0x161b00
```

Trampoline After applying

```
ROM: 001D5254
ROM: 001D5254 loc 1D5254
                                                         ; CODE XREF: ROM:0017EBC0fj
                                                {R0-R12, LR}
ROM: 001D5254
                               PUSH.W
ROM: 001D5258
                               LDR.W
                                                R12, =dword_1D7D94
ROM: 001D525C
                                                R0, [R12]
                               STR.W
                                                R1, [R12, #(dword_1D7D98 - 0x1D7D94)]
ROM: 001D5260
                               STR.W
ROM: 001D5264
                               STR.W
                                                R2, [R12,#(dword_1D7D9C - 0x1D7D94)]
                                                R3, [R12, #(dword_1D7DA0 - 0x1D7D94)]
ROM: 001D5268
                               STR.W
ROM: 001D526C
                               STR.W
                                                R4, [R12, \#(dword_1D7DA4 - 0x1D7D94)]
ROM: 001D5270
                               STR.W
                                                R5, [R12, #(dword_1D7DA8 - 0x1D7D94)]
ROM: 001D5274
                               STR.W
                                                R6, [R12, \#(dword 1D7DAC - 0x1D7D94)]
                                                R7, [R12, #(dword_1D7DB0 - 0x1D7D94)]
ROM: 001D5278
                               STR.W
ROM: 001D527C
                                                R8, [R12, #(dword_1D7DB4 - 0x1D7D94)]
                               STR.W
                                                R9, [R12,#(dword_1D7DB8 - 0x1D7D94)]
ROM: 001D5280
                               STR.W
ROM: 001D5284
                                                R10, [R12, #(dword_1D7DBC - 0x1D7D94)]
                               STR.W
                                                R11, [R12, # (dword 1D7DC0 - 0x1D7D94)
ROM: 001D5288
                               STR.W
ROM: 001D528C
                                                R12, [R12, #(dword_1D7DC4 - 0x1D7D94)]
                               STR.W
ROM: 001D5290
                               STR.W
                                                SP, [R12,#(dword_1D7DC8 - 0x1D7D94)]
ROM: 001D5294
                               STR.W
                                                LR, [R12,#(dword_1D7DCC - 0x1D7D94)]
ROM: 001D5298
                               STR.W
                                                R0, [R12, \#(dword 1D7DD8 - 0x1D7D94)]
ROM: 001D529C
                                                RO, R12
                               MOV
ROM: 001D529E
                                                R12, = (sub 1D5354+1)
                               LDR.W
                                                                     Jmp to main hook logic
ROM: 001D52A2
                               BLX
ROM: 001D52A4
                               POP.W
                                                {R0-R12, LR}
                                                {R4, LR}
ROM: 001D52A8
                               PUSH
ROM: 001D52AA
                                                SP, SP, #0x18
                               SUB
                                                PC, = (loc_17EBC4+1)
ROM: 001D52AC
                               LDR.W
ROM: 001D52AC
ROM: 001D52B0 off_1D52B0
                               DCD dword 1D7D94
                                                          DATA XREF: ROM:001D52581r
ROM: 001D52B4 off_1D52B4
                               DCD sub_1D5354+1
                                                               XREF: ROM:001D529Efr
ROM: 001D52B8 off 1D52B8
                               DCD loc 17EBC4+1
                                                          DATA XREF: ROM:001D52ACTr
ROM: 001D52BC
                               DCB 0xBC ; @
ROM: 001D52BD
                               DCB 0x3C
                                         20
```



Hook_info structure

```
struct hook_info {
   struct orig_regs regs;
   void *hook_func;
   void *hook_output;
   unsigned int data_idx;
   unsigned int data[HOOK_DATA_SIZE];
   unsigned int lock;
};
```



Hook main logic

```
void
     entry(struct hook_info *h)
41
42
         unsigned int stub;
43
         struct arg_info *args = (struct arg_info *) h->data;
44
         unsigned int a1 = h->regs.ARM r0;
45
         unsigned int a2 = h->regs.ARM r1;
46
         unsigned int a3 = h->regs.ARM_r2;
47
         unsigned int a4 = h->regs.ARM r3;
48
         unsigned int sp = h->regs.ARM sp;
49
         unsigned int lr = GET OFFSET UINT(sp, 0x34);
50
51
         printf("wlc_bss_mac_event: a1: %08x | a2: %08x | a3: %08x | a4: %08x | lr: %08x\n", a1, a2, a3, a4, lr);
52
53
         printf("Stack trace:\n");
54
         print_stack(&stub, 0x100);
55
56
         return;
```

Hook main After applying

```
sub_1D5354
var_30 = -0x30
var 2C= -0x2C
var 28= -0x28
var 20= -0x20
arg_120= 0x120
PUSH.W
                 {R4-R8, LR}
MOV
                 R7, R0
LDR.W
                 R8, = (off_1D5438 - 0x1D536C)
SUB
                 SP, SP, #0x18
LDR
                 R0, = (aWlc_bss_mac_ev - 0x1D5372)
MOV.W
                 R6, #0xFB00
LDR
                 R3, [R7,#4]
ADD
                 R8, PC; off_1D5438
LDR.W
                 LR, [R7,#0x34]
                         ; "wlc_bss_mac_event: a1: %08x
ADD
                                                            a2: %08x "..
MOV
                 R2, R3
LDR
                 R3, [R7, #0xC]
ADD
                 R4, SP, #0x30+var_20
LDR.W
                 R12, [R7,#8]
ADD
                 R5, SP, #0x30+arg_120
LDR
                 R1, [R7]
MOVT.W
                 R6, #0x1F
STR
                 R3, [SP, #0x30+var_30]
MOV
                 R3, R12
LDR
                 R7, [R7, #0x14]
LDRB
                 R7, [R7,#8]
STR
                 R7, [SP, #0x30+var_2C]
LDR.W
                 R7, [LR, #0x34]
STR
                 R7, [SP, #0x30+var_28]
LDR.W
                 R7, [R8]
BLX
                 R7 ; sub_162BB8
LDR
                 R0, =(aStackTrace - 0x1D53A4)
LDR.W
                 R3, [R8] ; sub_162BB8
LDR
                 R7. = (aFn08x08x_0 - 0x1D53AC)
                 RO, PC ; "Stack trace:\n"
ADD
LDR.W
                 R8, = (off_1D5438 - 0x1D53AE)
BLX
                 R3 ; sub_162BB8
                 R7, PC ; "fn: %08x: %08x\n"
ADD
ADD
                 R8, PC; off_1D5438
В
                 loc_1D53B2
```



Hooks condition

Read \ Write Primitive

Read \ Write Primitive



	How?	Signature check?
Wifi chip	dhdutil	No ©
Shannon	Bug + ATcommands	Yes ⊗
Mediatek	Trick	No ©



Mediatek: Achieving Debugging Abilities



Conditions of a debugger

- Must have the ability allow reading and writing to memory.
- Must have the ability to change memory permissions of various regions
- Must have ability to change code on runtime



Modem / AT Commands

- Modems use a set of commands that enable them to do various tasks called Modem/AT commands
- AT commands take in a command and respond back to RILD which logs them to the radio logs.
- Syntax AT+ Command=arguments (...mainly)



AT commands

```
john@john: ~ 91x11
john@john:~$ adb shell
shell@htc_e56ml_dtul:/ $ su
root@htc e56ml dtul:/ # echo "AT+CGMM" > /dev/radio/atcil
root@htc e56ml dtul:/ #
                                      john@john: ~ 91x11
田
john@john:~$ adb logcat -b radio | grep -i "E RIL
                                                     : Un"
                                          Unhandled unsolicited result code: +CGMM: MTK2
06-24 10:10:42.626 1216 1237 E RIL
06-24 10:10:42.626 1216 1237 E RIL
                                          Unhandled unsolicited result code: OK
```



AT commands function table

```
ROM:006BD89C E5 64 31 00
                                             DCD rmmi hdlr+1
                             ; RMMI_EXT_CMD_FUNCTION rmmi_extended_validator_ft[]
ROM:006BD8A0
                             rmmi extended validator ft DCD rmmi cacm hdlr+1
ROM:006BD8A0 71 74 31 00
ROM: 006BD8A0
                                                                      ; DATA XREF:
ROM:006BD8A0
                                                                        rmmi extend
                                             DCD rmmi camm hdlr+1
ROM:006BD8A4 11 75 31 00
                                             DCD rmmi clcc hdlr+1
ROM: 006BD8A8 15 76 31 00
ROM: 006BD8AC 49 76 31 00
                                             DCD rmmi vts hdlr+1
                                             DCD rmmi chup hdlr+1
ROM:006BD8B0 D9 76 31 00
                                             DCD rmmi chld hdlr+1
ROM:006BD8B4 C5 77 31 00
ROM:006BD8B8 F5 78 31 00
                                             DCD rmmi ecpi hdlr+1
                                             DCD rmmi eccp hdlr+1
ROM:006BD8BC 4D 79 31 00
                                             DCD rmmi caoc hdlr+1
ROM:006BD8C0 8D 79 31 00
ROM:006BD8C4 8D 7A 31 00
                                             DCD rmmi ccwe hdlr+1
                                             DCD rmmi_ccug_hdlr+1
ROM:006BD8C8 09 7B 31 00
                                             DCD rmmi cpas hdlr+1
ROM:006BD8CC D9 7B 31 00
                                             DCD rmmi cvhu hdlr+1
ROM:006BD8D0 51 7C 31 00
                                             DCD rmmi ctfr hdlr+1
ROM:006BD8D4 C1 7C 31 00
```

```
1 void fastcall rmmi gmm hdlr(rmmi string struct *source string)
  2 {
     rmmi_string_struct *source_string_ptr; // r5
     rmmi_context struct *context; // r6
     signed int v3; // r4
     char *v4; // r1
     kal uint16 v5; // r3
     int v6; // [sp+0h] [bp-88h]
     char v7; // [sp+50h] [bp-38h]
10
11
     source string ptr = source string;
12
     context = rmmi_ptr_g;
     dhl trace(0, 0, 246415620, 0);
13
14
     if ( source string ptr->field D == 4 )
15
16
       v3 = sub_30DB66(source_string_ptr->src_id, 1, (int)&v7);
17
       if ( v3 == 1 )
18
19
         context->arg_list[0] = &v7;
20
         if ( sbp query md feature(38) == 1 )
21
           v4 = "%s";
 22
         else
           \vee 4 = "+CGMM: %5";
23
24
         v5 = rmmi_fast_string_print((kal_uint8 *)&v6, (kal_uint8 *)v4, context->arg_list, 1u);
 25
 26
       else
 27
28
         v5 = 0;
 29
 31
     else
32
33
       v5 = 0;
34
       v3 = 0:
35
36
     rmmi final rsp generator(source string ptr->src id, (kal bool)v3, (kal uint8 *)&v6, v5);
37 }
```



Hooking the handlers (Strategy)

- Read => AT+command=read=size=address
- Write => AT+command=write=address=raw bytes
- Memory allocation => AT+command=alloc=size

```
john@john:~$ adb logcat -b radio | grep "unsoli"
06-22 07:06:41.612    1216    1243 E RIL       : Unhandled unsolicited
result code: 600021616019ee
06-22 07:06:41.612 1216 1243 E RIL
                                        : Unhandled unsolicited
result code: [+] End of dump
                                        : Unhandled unsolicited
06-22 07:06:41.612 1216 1243 E RIL
result code: 1000 bytes from 0x00000
06-22 07:06:41.613   1216   1243 E RIL      : Unhandled unsolicited
result code: [+] dff81cf0dff81cf0dff81cf0dff81cf0dff81cf0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06-22 07:06:41.613 1216 1243 E RIL
                                        : Unhandled unsolicited
result code: [+] End of dump
```




Changing memory permissions

- The goal is to make the whole memory RWX to the MPU
- Make it possible to write code and execute it
- AT+command=permission=region start address



```
// Set Region;
asm volatile ("MCR p15, 0, %0, c6, c2, 0" : : "r"(region number));
// Read Region Access Control Register
asm volatile ("MRC p15, 0, %0, c6, c1, 4" : "=r"(dracr));
// Region Base Address
asm volatile ("MRC p15, 0, %0, c6, c1, 0" : "=r"(drbar));
dracr \&= ~0 \times 1700;
dracr = 0x300;
// Write Region Access Control Register
asm volatile ("MCR p15, 0, %0, c6, c1, 4" : : "r"(dracr));
```



Architecture




MAUI Runtime Environment

- Mediatek implements "standalone" applications for their MAUI/Nucleus OS.
- Use Kernel Adaptation Layer(KAL) between Real Time
 Operating System (RTOS) and upper layer applications




KAL API's

- Task management
- Task synchronization
- Task communication
- Timer Management
- Memory management





Task Management



ILM STRUCT


```
typedef struct ilm_struct {
 module_type src_mod_id;
 module_type dest_mod_id;
 sap_type
               sap_id;
 msg_type msg_id;
 local_para_struct *local_para_ptr;
 peer_buff_struct *peer_buff_ptr;
} ilm struct;
```



Reverse Engineering the CC Protocol

CC Protocol (Call Control)







CC task routing

```
void fastcall cc route ilm(ilm struct *a1)
 local para struct *v1; // r1
 ilm struct *v2; // r5
 trace class enum v3; // r0
 kal uint32 v4; // r2
 int v5; // r4
 unsigned int8 v6; // r3
 int v7; // r0
 int v8; // r0
 int v9; // r0
 void ( fastcall *v10)(local para struct *, DWORD); // [sp+8h] [bp-28h]
 char v11; // [sp+Ch] [bp-24h]
 unsigned int8 v12; // [sp+Fh] [bp-21h]
 v1 = a1->local para ptr;
 v2 = a1:
 v10 = 0;
 v12 = 7;
 if (!v1)
```



CC task routing

- Tasks are chosen depending on the destination module's ID
- Each task has an array of messages. These are sent one by one to the relevant message handlers
- Some of these messages are under an attacker's full control.

```
cc peer message handlers DCD cc peer alert hdlr+1
ROM:00710DB0 8D 05 60 00
                                                                      ; DATA XREF: cc get peer msg hdlr:loc 60159A1
ROM:00710DB0
                                                                      ; ROM:off 6016141o
ROM:00710DB0
                                             DCD cc_peer_call_proceeding_hdlr+1
ROM:00710DB4 51 06 60 00
ROM:00710DB8 89 04 60 00
                                             DCD cc peer connect hdlr+1
                                             DCD sub 600C50+1
ROM:00710DBC 51 0C 60 00
ROM:00710DC0 B5 0E 60 00
                                             DCD cc peer progress hdlr+1
                                             DCD 0
ROM:00710DC4 00 00 00 00
ROM:00710DC8 00 00 00 00
                                             DCD 0
ROM:00710DCC 59 0D 60 00
                                             DCD cc peer setup hdlr+1
                                             DCD cc peer modify hdlr+1
ROM:00710DD0 55 24 60 00
                                             DCD cc peer modify complete hdlr+1
ROM:00710DD4 D1 24 60 00
                                             DCD cc peer modify reject hdlr+1
ROM:00710DD8 55 25 60 00
                                             DCD sub 6025F0+1
ROM:00710DDC F1 25 60 00
ROM:00710DE0 D5 1A 60 00
                                             DCD sub 601AD4+1
ROM:00710DE4 65 1B 60 00
                                             DCD sub 601B64+1
                                             DCD sub 601D50+1
ROM:00710DE8 51 1D 60 00
                                             DCD sub 601DE0+1
ROM:00710DEC E1 1D 60 00
ROM:00710DF0 5D ED 5F 00
                                             DCD cc peer disconnect hdlr+1
ROM:00710DF4 59 EF 5F 00
                                             DCD cc peer release hdlr+1
                                             DCD cc peer release complete hdlr+1
ROM:00710DF8 69 F1 5F 00
                                             DCD sub 602608+1
ROM:00710DFC 09 26 60 00
ROM:00710E00 F1 C0 5F 00
                                             DCD sub 5FC0F0+1
                                             DCD sub 5FBE88+1
ROM:00710E04 89 BE 5F 00
                                             DCD sub 5FBFAC+1
ROM:00710E08 AD BF 5F 00
                                             DCD sub 5FFC38+1
ROM:00710E0C 39 FC 5F 00
ROM:00710E10 61 FD 5F 00
                                             DCD sub 5FFD60+1
ROM:00710E14 CD FC 5F 00
                                             DCD sub 5FFCCC+1
                                             DCD sub 5FA940+1
ROM:00710E18 41 A9 5F 00
                             aModemNasCcSs 2 DCB "modem/nas/cc-ss/cc/src/cc_hold_proc.c",0
ROM:00710E1C 6D 6F 64 65+
```

```
L|void *__fastcall cc_form_app_setup_ind(void *result, kal_uint32 *a2, int a3)
   BYTE *setup ind; // r5
  kal uint32 *v4; // r4
  unsigned __int8 *buff; // r6
  setup ind = result;
  v4 = a2;
  buff = (unsigned __int8 *)a3;
  if ( *((_BYTE *)a2 + 4) )
     *((_BYTE *)result + 5) = 1;
     *((_BYTE *)result + 6) = *(_BYTE *)a2[2];
  if ( *((_BYTE *)a2 + 12) )
     *(( BYTE *)result + 7) = 1;
    result = cc form app bc from peer(( BYTE *)result + 8, (void *)a2[4]);
  if ( *((_BYTE *)v4 + 20) )
    setup_ind[26] = 1;
    result = cc_form_app_bc_from_peer(setup_ind + 27, (void *)v4[6]);
   if ( *((_BYTE *)v4 + 28) )
    result = (void *)cc_form_app_fac_ie(setup_ind + 48, buff);
    setup_ind[45] = (_BYTE)result;
  if ( *((_BYTE *)v4 + 36) )
    setup_ind[56] = 1;
    result = cc_form_app_progress_indicator(setup_ind + 57, v4[10]);
  if ( *((_BYTE *)v4 + 44) )
    setup_ind[59] = 1;
     setup ind[60] = *( BYTE *)v4[12];
  if ( *((_BYTE *)v4 + 52) )
```



Saving BC IE

```
void *__tastcall cc_torm_app_bc_trom_peer(_BYTE *a1, void *a2)
 unsigned int v2; // r2
 v2 = *(unsigned __int8 *)a2;
 *a1 = v2;
 return memcpy_2(a1 + 2, *((const void **)a2 + 1), v2);
```



Exploitation

DOS on the baseband

- The baseband allocates memory in the control buffer.
- Among the bugs we found was a DOS bug which involved memory allocation via get_ctrl_buffer_ext
- When no heap memory is available, **get_ctrl_buffer_ext** fails to handle the failure gracefully and crashes the whole system
- Causing large allocations via CC messages reliably caused a system crash

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DEMO

Future Steps

- Currently working on a potential RCE bug
- If successful, will release around end of year
- Escalation to application processor: Previous research by Comsecuris showed this to be possible by exploiting bugs in the RIL daemon



QUESTIONS?