



## Smart Contract Program Analysis

- ❑ **Originally: security engineer at Trail of Bits**
  - Focuses: cryptanalysis, program analysis, mathy stuff
  - Went to school for math, liked RE
- ❑ **Suddenly: blockchain bubble!**
  - Wrote a fuzzer/property based testing framework (more later!)
  - Now audit smart contracts + dev tools
    - Still a good bit of the old stuff though

- ❑ **Domain info**
  - EVM
  - Solidity
- ❑ **Static Analysis**
- ❑ **Dynamic Analysis**
  - Fuzzing
  - Symbolic Execution
- ❑ **Questions**

# Domain Info

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- ❑ **A state machine, in consensus**
- ❑ **Two types of entities**
  - People
  - “Contracts”
- ❑ **Either make “transactions”**
- ❑ **Contracts run EVM code when transacted with**
- ❑ **Thus, “World Computer”**



# EVM

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# The Ethereum Virtual Machine

- ❑ Fairly ordinary Von Neumann machine
- ❑ Pay per operation
- ❑ Stack-based (ugh)
- ❑ Contract-local (but can see the whole chain)
- ❑ Storage and memory
- ❑ Has a notion of “reversion”
  - This transaction is messed up, don't let it change stuff
- ❑ **Terribly designed**
  - Example: higher memory addresses cost more to access

# Interaction with the EVM

- ❑ Like hitting an API/ABI
- ❑ Defined set of function names and types
- ❑ Submit “ABI-encoded calldata” in a transaction
- ❑ This means no stdin
- ❑ Most patterns of calldata are meaningless
- ❑ Interaction looks like a web service, not a binary



# Wanna know more?

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- ☐ The Yellow paper is canonical
- ☐ The Jello paper might be better
- ☐ Best: download ethersplay and read some asm

# Solidity

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# The solidity language

- ❑ **Solidity is the EVM lingua franca**
  - Other languages exist (barely)
- ❑ **It's terrible and beyond redemption**
  - Too many flaws for 45 min, let alone this section
- ❑ **Imagine javascript but less sensible**
- ❑ **Compiler has bizarre bugs somewhat frequently**
  - Also just bad as a compiler
  - Computes 1 as 0x100 \*\* 0 sometimes
- ❑ **Essentially every serious contract is written in this**

# Seriously, it's bad

- `for (var i = 0; i < a.length; i ++) { a[i] = i; }`
  - Infinite loop if a is larger than 255 elements
  - i infers to byte, which is max 255
  - Overflows silently
  - Of course there's no warning here
  - i still takes up 256 bits, that's the minimum
- Stuff like this is everywhere in real code

# Static Analysis

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# Right now



- ❑ **Currently, pretty easy**
- ❑ **Trail of Bits wrote a proprietary python script**
- ❑ **More or less a parser with grep bits**
  - Iterate over functions, variables
  - Look for patterns
  - Do two things have the same name?
  - Are there uninitialized variables?
- ❑ **No rich model, mostly heuristic**
- ❑ **Finds tons of IRL bugs**
- ❑ **Currently proprietary :(**

# The future

- **Working on a lifter**
  - Convert stack machine -> SSA
  - Finally get something you can really reverse
- **Working on deeper binja integration**
  - Use existing IL for richer analysis
  - Also you can reverse faster
- **At some point, they might get a real compiler**
  - Clang-style warnings supersede most of this
  - Clang-tidy could probably do it all
  - Not holding my breath though

# Dynamic Analysis

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# Dynamic Analysis: Surprisingly Easy

- ❑ Theory: solidity developers run code less
- ❑ You can't just execute, you must transact
- ❑ Ergo: running their code more finds bugs
- ❑ There exist debuggers
  - I like hevm from dapphub
- ❑ There exist a plethora of symbolic execution tools
- ❑ There exists exactly one fuzzer

# Symbolic Execution

# Symbolic execution: What?

- ❑ **“Executing every possible path at once”**
- ❑ **Different notion of value**
  - Normal execution: values are concrete ( $x = 5$ )
  - Symbolic execution: values can be symbolic ( $x > 3, x < 6, x \neq 4$ )
    - Values accumulate constraints during execution
- ❑ **Different notion of control flow**
  - Forking on a symbolic value executes both paths in parallel
  - Execution is a tree, not a line
- ❑ **Typically solve for eventual values with a SAT solver**

# Applied to EVM

- ❑ **Transactions are symbolic**
  - Tons of symbolic data
  - Usually executors use heuristics
- ❑ **Very fragile (must totally reimplement EVM)**
- ❑ **Often heuristic-heavy**
  - Many (e.g. Oyente) assume all storage is symbolic
  - Leads to many false positives
- ❑ **Great degree of assurance though**
- ❑ **Next steps: reliability and usability by mortals**

# Fuzzing

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- ❑ **EVM programs have no input!**
  - Traditional fuzzers generate/mutate input
  - On EVM, random input is nonsensical
- ❑ **Fuzzing needs an ABI and grammar**
- ❑ **EVM programs never segfault!**
  - Traditional fuzzers know when they've found a bug
  - On EVM, more specification needed
- ❑ **Thus, a fuzzer is just**
  - ABI parser/tool to specify ABI
  - Tool to generate random type occupants
    - Random strings, random addresses, random arrays of ints, etc.
  - Some bug specification
  - VM implementation

# Notes from the real world



- ❑ **Almost no programs need fancy tools**
  - Wrote deep VM introspection
  - Wrote coverage guidance
  - Wrote fancy state machine models
  - None of it really mattered
- ❑ **You can share a fuzzer setup easily!**
  - If two programs share an ABI, they fuzz the same
  - Standardized ABI means massive scalability
- ❑ **Need more than just inputs for many real programs**
  - Temporal logic
  - Complex multi-contract setup
  - Many actors of different privilege levels
  - Contracts can change mid-fuzz!
  - All of these are next steps

# Questions?



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