

# Security Response in Today's Ecosystem

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# 2017 In Review

**ars** TECHNICA

BIZ & IT —

## NSA-leaking Shadow Brokers just dumped its most damaging release yet

Windows zero-days, SWIFT bank hacks, slick exploit loader among the contents.


The WannaCry code demonstrates how petty criminals can adapt leaked intelligence tools to their uses.

**27 'Petya' Ransomware Outbreak Goes Global**

JUN 17



# of RCE/EOP CVEs by patch year



# Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure



# Security on the Mind

September 27, 2017

Equifax CEO departs, following CSO & CIO; breaches truly a board issue




# Technology in Our Lives



# Transactional Approach

- Vulnerabilities as rare occurrence
- One bug at a time
- Often quick band aids







## 2017 Anomaly?

The common threads:

- How interconnected the ecosystem is becoming
- The need to re-examine how best to do vulnerability disclosure

# Challenges in Evolving Ecosystem

- Multiparty Vulnerability Disclosure
- Mixed environments
- Shared source or vulnerable foundational standards
- Long supply chains
- Government protectionism
- New players awoken to security who don't know where to start





WELCOME  
TO THE  
PARTY!





2017 in Retrospective



# Shadow Brokers & WikiLeaks

- Mass disclosures of cyberweapons
- +8700 documents & files
- They came with the manuals!
- Challenges posed:
  - assessment (from legal to sheer volume)
  - determining how to defend or patch against the cyberweapons
  - ultimately in asset management knowledge
- Subsequent Impact
  - WannaCry (+30 days)
  - Petya (+60 days)




# Infineon TPM



- Multiparty Vulnerability Disclosure
  - Hub Model (Infineon engaged parties separately)
- Documentation at disclosure was vague and disparate
- End users had difficulty understanding what the risk was
- Many TPMs still vulnerable to this issue



# KRAck Attack



- Multiparty Vulnerability Coordination/collaboration
- Industry companies and partnering with organizations like CERT/CC, ICASI, and the WiFi Alliance
- Disclosure tent did not cover everyone
- Confidentiality within the tent was basically maintained
- Still struggle with understanding who all is impacted and how to get those outside the disclosure tent quickly up to speed.

# Uber Breach




**Uber paid hackers \$100,000 to hide year-old breach of 57 million users**

[Elizabeth Weise](#), USATODAY

Published 5:25 p.m. ET Nov. 21, 2017 | Updated 12:09 p.m. ET Nov. 22, 2017



# Meltdown / Spectre



- Multi-vendor vulnerability disclosure
  - 4 teams of researchers
  - Chip makers, software providers, cloud providers
- Confidentiality tent failed as tent enlarged
- Major media pickup
- No panacea for customers to take
- Initial disclosure was only part of known problem
- Quality issues with initial updates
- Researchers and industry came together
- Industry Summit to pool brain power
- Continued efforts to engage on future research



### What happened?

13 Critical Security Vulnerabilities and Manufacturer Backdoors discovered throughout AMD Ryzen & EPYC product lines.

### Am I affected?



### What is this site for?

This site is to inform the public about the vulnerabilities and call on AMD and the security community to fix the vulnerable products.

# AMD




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# Security from a View



# Ecosystem Engagement

- Make it easy for security researchers to engage with Microsoft
- Be predictable in our actions
- Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure
- Go where the researcher are!
  - Sponsoring/Talking/Engaging Conferences
  - Join and contribute to the social media conversation
- Bug Bounty Program
- Contribute back to ISO/ International Standards
- Participate in FIRST, APCERT, ICASI
- BlueHat Security Conference
  - Bring the community and engineering teams together to talk security



## Becoming more accessible

- Continual promotion of where to submit vulnerabilities
- Working with FIRST on standard contact cards
- Translating disclosure and bounty webpages into seven major languages to match our documentation
- Simplifying terms of bounty program to make legal language easier to understand
- Talking more and starting to document what to expect when coordinating multiparty disclosure



# Speculative Execution Side Channel Attack Bounty

- Bounty as a tool to engage research
- New vulnerability class with industry wide impact
- Up to \$250,000 USD for qualified find
  - New classes of speculative execution
  - Bypasses of our mitigations
  - Missed variants
- Commitment to share bounty finds with industry partners



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[aka.ms/bugbounty](https://aka.ms/bugbounty)



# Cloud pivots

- Established Cyber Defense Operations Center
  - Bring all SOC and Threat Intelligence teams together
- Working together with Amazon & Google to curb abuse through common reporting format & sharing
- Sharing expertise through workshops on Azure forensics



# PSIRT Framework

- Forum of Incident Responders and Security Teams (FIRST) initiative
- Microsoft is 1 of 21 organizations contributing
- Creating framework for how to setup and run Product Security Response
- Best Practices spread over small to medium to large organizations





# Big Questions Remain

- With shared components, how do we coordinate?
- How should industry engage with researchers?
- Right time to broaden disclosure?
- What about government disclosure?



# Security Response as Investment

- Fluid engagement, not a static standard
- Realize that human is capital
- Engage even when we don't always agree
- Legal engagement should not be tool of first choice
- Champion customer outcome
- Give back to the community
- Be part of the community

# Thank you



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