



Evolving Advanced Threat Landscape

A close look at PoS Malware Attack Campaigns

Threat Landscape Era's

Network Protocol

1999-2005

- Synflood (Trinoo/TFN)
- Code Red
- Slammer
- Zotob
- Conficker (2008)

Content & Botnets

2006-2010

- Web Browser
- Web Applications
- Doc/PDF/etc.
- Flash/Shockwave
- Java

Advanced Threats

2010-Today

- Aurora
- Operation Payback
- Stuxnet/Flame/Duqu
- Red October
- Cyber Warfare

What is “Advanced Threats”

An Advanced “Threat” is a series of events – a targeted campaign of attacks – that put an organization at risk.

It is...

- ✓ Inclusive of attacks, evasion techniques, diversion processes.
- ✓ Multiple types of attacks.
- ✓ Targeted at a specific organization.
- ✓ Is planned.
- ✓ Includes different stages of attack execution.

It is not...

- ≠ A single attack
- ≠ Just malware or just DDoS
- ≠ Executed by chance.
- ≠ Targeted at a general population.

Why do Threats get Through?

- Huge number of 'ways in'

- Drive By Download
- SPAM/Phishing
- Watering Hole
- Obfuscation
- USB




- Many Threat Vectors

- New AND Old
- IPS / AV Limited coverage
- Patching lag


- Leveraging vulnerabilities in:

- Java applets
- Compound Documents
- Anything Adobe

Threats On Corporate Network



Advanced Threats - Targeted Attack Campaigns



Most vendors are focused on stopping individual attacks – not campaigns

Happy Holidays: PoS Malware Campaign

Target hacked: news and updates on the massive retail breach that affected millions

By **Chris Welch** on January 16, 2014 01:42 pm [Email](#)



Between November 27th and December 15th, 2013, retail giant Target fell victim to a sophisticated hack that compromised data on tens of millions of its shoppers. Information on approximately 40 million credit and debit card accounts was stolen during the breach, and this sensitive financial data quickly appeared on the black market. Target would later reveal that names, mailing addresses, and phone numbers for up to 70 million customers had also been taken during the attack. The retailer is cooperating with the US Secret Service and Department of Justice to find those responsible; those perpetrators currently remain at large. Target's holiday breach ranks as one of the largest retail hacks in history. In response to the ordeal, the company offered affected customers one year of

PoS Malware: Big Picture

- Point of Sale machines
 - Process credit and debit cards
- Malware steals card data
 - Typically by scraping memory
 - PoS malware includes Dexter, Project Hook, Alina, vskimmer, RammScraper & Soraya (discovered on 21 May 2014)



PoS Malware: Dexter and Project Hook

- Dexter & Project Hook
 - Card data → Command & Control server
 - Plausible criminal workflow:
 - Compromised cards → dumps → sold → made into physical credit cards to be used in card present transactions



PoS Campaigns: Compromise Tactics

- Indications suggest the following:
 - Remote Desktop with weak credentials
 - Open wireless networks including PoS machines
 - Social engineering tactics
 - Possible spear phishing attacks
 - Physical attacks (USB drives and autoruns)




Global infection – Dexter & Project Hook



24 Jan 2014

Campaign Discovery




- ASERT Open Directory Crawler tool
 - Crawls directories seen during malware analysis
 - Discovered stolen credit card data

Campaign Discovery

- Another Dexter sample in same timeframe
 - Stored FTP credentials to upload card data

SENSITIVE: Dexter Revelation uses FTP to exfiltrate stolen data. Data files use a zip extension but are not in the clear. The Dexter binary contains credentials and the FTP site IP address in plaintext without any obfuscation. The following screenshots from IDA Pro reveal FTP credentials in the .data section of the binary and the follow-up screenshot shows the actual function using an API call to InternetConnectA.

Figure 1: FTP Credentials obtained from MD5 18af3ebfeed704edcf35f4a56723a85d – Dexter Revelation



```
data:00400174      align 8
data:00400178  a80_82_78_24      db 'a80_82_78_24',0 ; DATA XREF: .data:off_40019C↓o
data:00400184  aadata            db 'adata',0        ; DATA XREF: .data:off_4001A4↓o
data:0040018A      align 4
data:0040018C  aFlinstone2004    db 'Flinstone2004',0 ; DATA XREF: .data:off_4001A8↓o
data:0040019A      align 4
data:0040019C  off_40019C        dd offset a80_82_78_24 ; DATA XREF: sub_405AF0+5Atr
```

ATLAS Malware Corral Tracking

Tracking several PoS+ malware families

Tag	Count	Oldest	Newest
dexter	36	2013-05-10 10:23:09	2014-01-02 09:27:20
alina	10	2013-07-19 05:27:20	2013-08-30 11:09:06
alina_v5	10	2013-06-07 03:19:37	2014-01-03 13:36:28
projecthook	6	2013-05-30 16:04:16	2013-11-02 08:36:24
vskimmer	5	2013-07-12 08:31:12	2013-08-19 17:13:37
citadel_krebs	6367	2013-04-18 11:23:19	2013-11-25 10:42:06
citadel_dplohmann	266	2013-10-02 06:53:30	2013-10-16 05:33:56
Citadel_Rain	5	2013-06-19 02:17:38	2013-10-19 05:00:30
citadel	4	2013-05-21 13:20:03	2013-05-25 05:21:45

ASERT Malware Analysis

Available Analysis Reports:

- ▶ [Task-169353943](#) [norman.winxp.dump.inert] on 2014-08-29 @ 23:25:00
- ▶ [Task-166737103](#) [norman.winxp.dumpless] on 2014-05-07 @ 18:46:05
- ▶ [Task-166737065](#) [norman.winxp.dump.default] on 2014-05-07 @ 18:39:34
- ▶ [Task-166736538](#) [norman.sandbox.default] on 2014-05-07 @ 17:13:23
- ▶ [Task-164055930](#) [norman.sandbox.default] on 2014-03-19 @ 18:57:10
- ▶ [Task-164055932](#) [norman.winxp.dumpless] on 2014-03-19 @ 18:02:19
- ▶ [Task-164055931](#) [norman.winxp.dump.default] on 2014-03-19 @ 16:35:04
- ▶ [Task-21773581](#) [norman.win7.dump.comms] on 2013-06-13 @ 08:29:10

Available Dynamic Analysis Log(s):

- ▶ [Task-164055931](#) [dynamic.pluginlog] on 2014-03-19 @ 16:35:07
- ▶ [Task-166737065](#) [dynamic.pluginlog] on 2014-05-07 @ 18:39:40
- ▶ [Task-169353943](#) [dynamic.pluginlog] on 2014-08-29 @ 23:25:19
- ▶ [Task-169353943](#) [dynamic.tasklog] on 2014-08-29 @ 23:25:19
- ▶ [Task-21773581](#) [dynamic.pluginlog] on 2013-06-13 @ 08:29:19

Suricata Alerts:

[[2807327](#)] [ETPRO TROJAN Dexter Variant \(rev: 3\)](#)

Available Commentary:

- ▶ 2013-05-30 16:08:09 by dschwarz
<http://www.xylibox.com/2013/05/projecthook-ram-...> [[DEL](#)]
- ▶ 2014-03-20 08:55:05 by analyzer.strings String-based
detection(s) Task-21773581 / Dump... [[DEL](#)]
- ▶ 2014-05-08 09:03:59 by analyzer.strings String-based
detection(s) Task-166737065 / Dump... [[DEL](#)]
- ▶ 2014-08-30 02:06:48 by analyzer.strings String-based
detection(s) Task-169353943 / Dump... [[DEL](#)]
- ▶ 2014-08-30 02:09:17 by analyzer.strings String-based
detection(s) Task-169353943 / Dump... [[DEL](#)]
- ▶ 2014-08-30 02:10:19 by analyzer.strings String-based
detection(s) Task-169353943 / Dump... [[DEL](#)]

Sample Tags:

[dexter](#) [[DEL](#)]
[dloftus](#) [[DEL](#)]
[projecthook](#) [[DEL](#)]

[Add Sample Tag](#)

Resource Package: [\[Download\]](#)

Sandbox Report(s): 8
Memory Dump(s): 22
Dropped File(s): 6
PCAP(s): 6
Screenshot(s): 10

3 DNS Lookup(s):

[www.inf0nix.com](#) [[REP](#)] [[POL](#)] [91.208.16.252](#) [[REP](#)] [[POL](#)] [[PROP](#)]
[www.inf0nix.com](#) [[REP](#)] [[POL](#)] [189.38.88.130](#) [[REP](#)] [[POL](#)] [[PROP](#)]
[www.inf0nix.com](#) [[REP](#)] [[POL](#)] [195.3.144.87](#) [[REP](#)] [[POL](#)] [[PROP](#)]

6 Connection(s):

[Task-169353943](#): [TCP/80 www.inf0nix.com](#) LV [dexter_cnc](#) [[DEL](#)]

[Task-21773581](#): [TCP/80 www.inf0nix.com](#) BR

[Task-166737103](#): [TCP/80 www.inf0nix.com](#) RU

[Task-166737065](#): [TCP/80 www.inf0nix.com](#) RU

[Task-164055931](#): [TCP/80 www.inf0nix.com](#) RU

[Task-164055932](#): [TCP/80 www.inf0nix.com](#) RU

HTTP Request(s):

<http://www.inf0nix.com/notify.php> [[REP](#)] [[POL](#)]

[HTTP Header Details](#)

[Add Connection Tag](#)

[Add Connection Tag](#)

[Add Connection Tag](#)

[Add Connection Tag](#)

[Add Connection Tag](#)

[Add Connection Tag](#)

ASERT Response

- Notified financial sector contacts & FBI
- Conference call (financials)
- Sensitive data dumps given to financials
- TLP AMBER (need to know basis) Threat Intelligence document written and distributed to relevant parties
- Contained sensitive data and numerous indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- IOCs useful to help compromises

Threat Intelligence Product and Blog

ASERT issued
*ASERT Threat
Intelligence Brief
2013-6*

in a TLP AMBER
and a TLP GREEN
version, followed by
a later blog post.

Blog post received
significant attention
from the press and
security industry
resulting in several
interviews and
excellent coverage.



Arbor ASERT Threat Intelligence

ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2013-6

Dexter Point of Sale Malware Attack Campaign Indicators

ASERT Threat Intelligence November 11, 2013


This document is **TLP AMBER** and is to be shared only within Arbor Networks and with others who have a need to know. This document contains very sensitive information and is not to be made public or shared further without specific permission. Please see <http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp> for further details on the Traffic Light Protocol regarding sensitive information sharing.

An active Point of Sale (PoS) compromise campaign designed to steal credit card data using the Dexter malware has been detected. Indicators of compromise will be provided for mitigation and detection purposes. Prior to the publication of this Threat Intelligence document, members of the FS-ISAC and major Credit Card vendors were notified. Malicious sites listed herein should not be tampered with except by authorized individuals.

ASERT follow-up actions


- Ongoing monitoring of C&C servers to harvest data & new malware
 - ASERT & card vendors
- ASERT researchers actively tracking and reverse engineering several PoS malwares & obtaining critical insight
 - Malware classifiers for Dexter, Project Hook, Alina
 - Network indicators intended for publication for Arbor Networks products

Arbor Security Engineering Response Team



How can Arbor Help? Threat Intelligence

- Utilise Arbor's visibility, expertise and experience to improve automated threat detection.
 - Threat Intelligence
 - Granular data to prevent false positives
 - Data based on in-depth research and monitoring
 - Understanding of threat 'family' + confidence = better match to risk profile





How can Arbor Help? Broad & Deep Visibility

- Leverage Flow technologies for:
 - Cost-effective, scalable visibility
 - Layer 3/4 picture of internal network
- Use packet capture for deeper visibility
 - Monitor for specific threats at network / data-centre edge.
 - Store forensic data for retrospective analysis
- Correlate
 - With actionable threat intelligence
 - Detect suspicious or malicious activities wherever they occur



How can Arbor Help? Resource Multiplier



A collection of approximately 15 stylized, overlapping leaf shapes in various colors including orange, yellow, green, blue, and red, arranged in a loose, organic pattern on the left side of the slide.

Thank You