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BlackHat Europe, Amsterdam, NH October 2014



# Agenda

- ► What is this all about? (quick)
- ► Who are we? (quick)
- ▶ Demo
- ► Details!



What is this all about?

Read the title! ;)

What is this all about?

Read the title! ;)
Hiding

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Read the title! ;)
Hiding Android Applications

Read the title! ;)
Hiding Android Applications
in ...

Read the title! ;)
Hiding Android Applications
in ... images

#### Who are we?

```
Axelle
axelle = {
    ''realname'' : ''Axelle Apvrille'',
    ''job'' : ''Mobile/IoT Malware Analyst and Research''
    ''company'' : ''Fortinet, FortiGuard Labs'' }
```

```
Ange
ange = {
    ''realname'': ''Ange Albertini'',
    ''hobby'': ''Corkami''}
```

### What is this?



Nice? Thanks that's GIMP art from me;)

### It's an image!


#### file says...

anakin.png: PNG image data, 636298042 x 1384184774, 19-bit

#### PNG file format

```
89 50 4e 47 0d 0a 1a 0a 00 01 b4 40 61 61 61 61 | .PNG....
25 ed 23 3a 52 80 fb c6 13 cc 54 4d 74 f5 78 87 | %.#:R...
ba 7d b5 f6 93 63 43 f0 e0 b9 99 9b 37 06 cc 8f | .}...cC.
32 59 5b 55 da 14 e2 87 68 f7 89 e5 88 14 fe 76 | 2Y[U....]
3e 0b cd 65 ec c4 7a 71 4d 95 c0 4e de 48 30 91 | >..e..zql
```

### It is more than that!



# Embed this "PNG" in an Android app?

### Imagine...

...if that PNG/APK is malicious!

- (Nearly) invisible to reverse engineering!
- ► The Android app is **encrypted**

#### Arg! What will I see?

- A fat image
- The wrapping application
  - Code that decrypts an asset
  - Code that loads/installs an application

But that depends how well the wrapping app is written It can be *obfuscated*...


Demo

Party time! Demo! Wake up!


# The APK looks genuine

Archive: PocActivity-debug.apk			
Length	Date	Time	Name
508720	2014-09-11	13:41	assets/anakin.png
1272	2014-09-11	14:03	res/layout/main.xml
1988	2014-09-11	14:03	AndroidManifest.xml
1444	2014-09-11	14:03	resources.arsc
7515	2014-09-11	14:03	res/drawable-hdpi/logo.png
2455	2014-09-11	14:03	res/drawable-ldpi/logo.png
4471	2014-09-11	14:03	res/drawable-mdpi/logo.png
8856	2014-09-11	14:03	classes.dex
634	2014-09-11	14:03	META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
687	2014-09-11	14:03	META-INF/CERT.SF
776	2014-09-11	14:03	META-INF/CERT.RSA
538818			11 files

The image looks genuine: assets/anakin.png



The image looks genuine: assets/anakin.png




#### Perhaps a bit 'fat'


508720 bytes ( $\approx$  500K) for 382x385 pixels




adb install WrappingApk.apk








We could use DexClassLoader to hide this



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
We could use DexClassLoader to hide this



Payload gets executed

1. We write a payload APK





2. We encrypt it using AngeCryption: it looks like a valid PNG


- 1. We write a payload APK
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- 1. We write a payload APK
- 2. We encrypt it using AngeCryption: it looks like a valid PNG
- 3. We hack it (a little)
- 4. We implement another APK containing the PNG



# Power: controlling encryption!



Android Package (APK)
Plaintext



Genuine PNG Ciphertext

# Is this possible?

# AES encryption in practice

key: 'MySecretKey12345' block: 'a block of text.'



key:'MySecretKey12346' block:'a block of text.'

gO+¬ ÑëΩcë ▼ LÇk<sup>⊥</sup>î (67 4F C5 BB A5 89 EA 63 89 20 1F 4C 80 6B D0 8C)

key: 'MySecretKey12345' block: 'a block of text!'

wε<sup>\_\_</sup>\_\_y&↓ú@αùαφ♣Ο (77 EE CA 16 DC 79 26 12 A3 40 E0 97 E0 ED 05 4F)

### Can we control the output?

With a **tiny change** in the key in the key or the block, the output block is **completely different** 

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
We can't control the output
The output block is (more or less) 'unpredictable'

Yes, we can!
But there's a **trick** - **AngeCryption** 

# Controlling AES with AngeCryption


### It will look the same ... but be slightly different

The APK will look the same to Android The PNG will look the same to our eyes




Android does not see the diff Your eye does not see the diff Manipulate Plaintext so that it encrypts to this PNG

#### PNG file format 101



#### PNG file format 101



# Crypto background

- ► AES is a block cipher
- ▶ It can only process a block of 16 bytes



# What if my plaintext is longer?!

#### Chaining - 101


- ► We use chaining
- ► We apply **AES** on **block**
- ... well, that's for ECB (Electronic Code Book). Not very good.

#### Other chainings

- ► CBC, CFB, OFB... (see FIPS 81)
- ▶ We'll use CBC : Cipher Block Chaining



### Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) - 101




Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption


#### IV is Initialization Vector


#### First block


- ▶ We have our plaintext P<sub>0</sub> and ciphertext C<sub>0</sub>
- $ightharpoonup C_0 = AES_K(P_0 \oplus IV)$
- ▶ We can choose the **key K** and **IV**!!!











### Another hack

The 'similar' APK is 'perfect'... except Android won't load it! (unzip does not like it either)

EOCD not found, not Zip file 'payload-similar.apk' is not a valid zip file

### Why?

- ► EOCD is **End of Central Directory**: zip marker
- No EOCD at the end
- Too much appended data after EOCD

#### Solution

Let's add another EOCD at the end!





#### YES




















### Thank You!

### Status

Works on Android 4.4.2

June 2014: Android Security Team notified  $\approx$  fixed

#### Contact info

Me: **@cryptax** or aapvrille at fortinet dot com Ange: **@angealbertini** or ange at corkami dot com

#### References

AngeCryption:

http://corkami.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/src/angecryption/

Code: https://github.com/cryptax/angeapk - soon after conf'

Corkami: https://code.google.com/p/corkami/

Fortinet's blog: http://blog.fortinet.com

Thanks to: @veorq, Android Security Team