Android - Bytecode Obfuscation

bringing x86 fuckups to dalvik

Patrick Schulz

thuxnder@dexlabs.org

06.07.2012



Overview

- Introduction
- Reverse Engineering Tools
- Obfuscation techniques
- 4 Conclusion

Introduction



Android


- Operating System for mobile devices
- attractive research field
- Applications (dalvik/native/resources)

Reverse engineering

We want to analyse Android applications.



Application Runtime





Dalvik bytecode

- instructions of various size
- words-aligned (16-bit code unit)
- move, return, const, goto, if, invoke, binop, unop
- new-instance, fill-array, switch



Reverse Engineering Tools



Disassembler

- dexdump: c/cpp, Android SDK, meta information, stdout
- baksmali: java, assembler, jasmin syntax, file output
- Dedexer: java, jasmin syntax, file output
- Androguard: python/cpp, cli
- IDA Pro: closed source, gui, plugins
- Decompiler
 - jad: java decompiler, uses dex2jar
 - jd-gui: java decompiler, uses dex2jar
 - ded: dalvik decompiler

easy to confuse and break;)



Obfuscation techniques




Obfuscation techniques

- String obfuscation
- Identifier mangling
- Dynamic code loading
- Junkbyte insertion
- Self modifying code



Build process





Dalvik Design

Android Applications are

- ... written in Java
- ... highlevel bytecode
- ... clear defined bytecode
- ... strict model assumptions (verifier)

So should be easy to analyze ...



Dalvik Design

Android Applications are

- ... written in Java
- ... highlevel bytecode
- ... clear defined bytecode
- ... strict model assumptions (verifier)

So should be easy to analyze ... mostly;)



my fault

```
adb install test.apk
309 KB/s (13010 bytes in 0.041s)
pkg: /data/local/tmp/test.apk
Failure [INSTALL_FAILED_DEXOPT]
```

- checksum?
- wrong method size?
- wrong "goto" destination?
- unsorted string list
- unknown opcode?



Junk Byte

dexdump:

```
      0003ac:
      |[0003ac] com.junkbyte.JunkByteActivity.calc:()|

      0003bc:
      1250
      |0000:
      const/4 v0, #int 5 // #5

      0003be:
      3c00 0400
      |0001:
      if-gtz v0, 0005 // +0004

      0003c2:
      0001 0000 d800 0001
      |0003:
      packed-switch-data (4 units)

      0003ca:
      0f00
      |0007:
      return v0
```

androguard:

```
0 0x0 const/4 v0 , [ #+ 5 ] // {5}
1 0x2 if-gtz v0 , [ + 4 ]
2 0x6 nop
3 0x8 nop
4 0xa add-int/lit8 v0 , v0 , [ #+ 1 ]
5 0xe return v0
```

dex2jar + jd-gui

```
if (5 <= 0); return 5;
```



Junk Byte

dexdump:

androguard:

```
0 0x0 const/4 v0 , [ #+ 5 ] // {5}
1 0x2 if-gtz v0 , [ + 4 ]
2 0x6 const-wide v0 , [ #+ 0 ] , [ #+ 216 ] , [ #+ 256 ] , [ #+ 15 ] // {2.0865499802}

dex2jar + jd-gui

if (5 <= 0);
```

new instance

new-instance vAA, type@BBBB

what if class index does not exist?



new instance

dexdump

segmentation fault (core dumped) dexdump -d test.dex

baksmali

UNEXPECTED TOP-LEVEL EXCEPTION:

androguard

IndexError: list index out of range

dexdexer

java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException: 16896



Verifier

It's not installable on Android Devices due to verifier rejects such APKs.

not a security feature, but optimization

so, let's mark it as optimized;)



Verifier

It's not installable on Android Devices due to verifier rejects such APKs.

not a security feature, but optimization

so, let's mark it as optimized;)

Ups, verifier bug -> device won't boot




Crypto Loader

DexFile Class enables reflection

- operates on files
- generates and stores optimized dex files
- cool functions are private :(



Crypto Loader



Patrick Schulz

thuxnder@dexlabs.org

Conclusion

Conclusion

- bytecode constrains are nice, but the verifier implementation has bugs
- packer/dropper can be implemented
- disassemblers have still bugs



Questions?

Thank you for your attention.

email thuxnder@dexlabs.org twitter @thuxnder

