

Android Packers:

Separating from the pack

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Area41 - June, 2014

Today's Agenda

- 76 2 Nhat are Packers?
 - ► Known Android Packers
 - ➤ Bangcle
 - Ijiami
 - Packed Malware in the Wild
 - Detection

Packers

What are Packers

- Mainly just compression eg: ZIP, RAR
- Runtime Packers
 - Executable Russian Dolls
 - 'Outer' executable unpacks contents of 'inner' executable into memory and executes
- Widely used in Windows malware : UPX

Packers

Relevance

- ▶ Intended Use Code Protection from
 - Modification
 - Piracy
 - Malicious code injection
- ▶ Flipside
 - Used on malware
 - Anti-hacker = Anti-analyst?

Android Packers

Known Android Packers¹

- ▶ HoseDex2Jar
- ApkProtect
- ► Bangcle
- ▶ Ijiami

As of May, 2014



3d eb 6b 46 bf e2 2b 0e 13 f5 5e 93 85 9c 1f da 5c 65 86 4f 15 5c 62 85 f 85 13 70 1 ed 4d 16 65 27 1 65 65 86 4f 15 65 62 86 4f 15 65 62 87 1 65 65 86 4f 15 65 62 87 1 65 65 87 1 65 87 1

HoseDex2Jar

September, 2012

04 85 85 df 04b e 331 e 6 da f d 4 8 f 0 4 c 2	57 74 1b 59 a7 55 6f 09 b6 f5 17 e2 dd 3a 8e 17 57 57 57 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67	73 ecblc9fc2acfa3377 6b844433347 ecfa467523	58 ae f4 dd 80 32 5e 51 c2 d6 71 52 0e 80 c5 18 ae fc 47	ef 0a b8 4a 55 0b ee 9e cb fc b6 557 28 e4 b6 75 af 8 ee f 6c 03	ab 33 ab c7 24 9a 1d 1e f2 db 9c dd 27 81 bb c ab dd b7	9a ca 1e d8 de c8 9b 85 7f d0 1e d6 c4 17 3d e 26 c3 9a 36 9d	17 c2 12 69 d1 3e c8 66 00 ba d5 11 42 0c 33 e9 d1 f7 88	4e 50 bb bc 289 322 599 544 6e 22 744 a5 844 ce 8aa f77 b2 d4 d9	f9 79 10 a3 411 84 64 159 ad5 dd 48 bad bc 2e a5 79 66 d2	ed 54 48 c 21 b 63 5 4 c e e c 0 c c e 59 c e 59	97 bd 65 d2 b9 61 d9 cf 84 1f 2d 08 b5 a1 c7 2d c9 147 15 97 ad 09	d5 b2 17 e8 1e 62 42 18 91 66 66 66 67 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66	95 09 86 37d 65 7d 5c ff 09 54 eff 7d 5c 55 55 56 c0	1e df 15 63 91 d6 53 20 f7 1a da db d2 d0 1e e1 68	2256b8aded691995e8b627b82c8d8

.J.i. AH. C. 0000134 .2014 .D. 0000135 .J. J. J. J. J. 0000135 .J. J. J. J. 10000135 .FT .E. 0000135 .G. 000135 .G. 000145 .G. 000146 .G. 0001

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HoseDex2Jar

How does it work?

- 0x70 byte Dex header size not enforced
- Original Dex encrypted
- Added at the end of Dex header

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Unpacker

https://github.com/strazzere/dehoser





Obfuscation in Dex

- ► Base64 encoding
- Java Reflection
- DES

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- Base64 encoding
- ► Java Reflection
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Details :

How Android Malware Fights (and we fight back!)

- CARO, May 2014

Props to

- Ocryptax
- Andrubis Analysis Report reveals key


Bangcle

Bangcle

How does it work?

- ApplicationWrapper
- FirstApplication Generic placeholder Activity
- Native libraries Contain code for decrypting Dex
- DexClassLoader Loads decrypted Dex

Bangcle - Static Analysis



Bangcle - Static Analysis

Resistance to Static Analysis


- Main Activity?
- Native libraries contain crux of code
 - Obfuscated library export names
 - Java_com_secapk_wrapper_ACall_r1?
 - Dalvik-JNI function mapping?

07	9a !	3c 81 07 f9 4a b5 94 92 2b 67 XJ+g 00001300	04 00 00 00 08 00 0
	P	.init_proc	0000FFA9
43	*	JNI_OnLoad	00007278
94 94	*	FINI_ARRAY	00020CB8
el Fo	*	INIT_ARRAY	00020CB0
25 55 71	*	_init	0000BC5C
21	*	p01221BF0759EF2385B6C90AB1C269583	0000BA64
75 75	*	p014C8D65D9D2C854C11E605A4A92A4DA	0000E10C
di ee	*	p0E22CF8B99DAF2B695DFC094E7DDEF5D	00021598
50	*	p0ED08F4E91C1942E130BAE6122019015	00021E78
	*	p10DD7C3951E520CEDC5431E9FD263803	0000B3BC

How?

▶ Using IDA + android_server on Android emulator/device





▶ IDA can't attach to main process



Anti-Debugging Tricks

- ► IDA can't attach to main process
- Can't strace


```
root@android:/ # strace -p 10158
attach: ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, ...): Operation not permitted
```

Anti-Debugging Tricks

Attach to child process

Hooked Standard libc Functions


- __open, read, write, close, munmap, msync
- ► Can't stack backtrace



Bangcle

Security Enforcements by bangcle.com

- ▶ Applications are scanned before packing
- ► LIMITATION: Fails to detect new/unknown malware.



00001160 00001170 00001180 00001190 00001190 00001100 00001100 00001100 0000120 0000120 0000120 0000120 00001230 00001230 00001230 00001230 00001230 00001230	5c c5 e8 4f 15 c c d2 86 88 61 80 69 64 65 90 d6 61 08 a1 9e 99 5c d9 19 64 51 90 d6 10 8 a1 9e 99 5c d9 19 c	78 13 07 1e 4d f4 63 c7 33 4F ad 0c 1b aa 0e 85 fc 8t be 54 55 d5 92 8d 52 93 8e aa 76 2e 1c 8f 54 37 57 c6 4b 76 36 cf 55 c7 63 c0 99 ce 45 77 1c f2 se af af 96 44 6f fe 5a 44 2c 54 88 e7 d8 05 67 7e 19 53 0c 06 0f 49 e0 05 ef 9d 9e fc 0c	kF	00001150 00001160 00001170 00001180 00001190 00001190 00001100 00001100 00001100 00001100 00001200 00001220 *	00 0 41 28 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	69 64 62 69 00 01 48 00 04 04 00 01 64	O.Al. aeabi STE
	bb 3a bf 33 8e 67 ea 84 ef 28 bf 3a bf 33 8e 67 ea 84 ef 28 bf 3a df 1a 03 8e 67 ea 84 ef 28 bf 3a f 36 8e 76 ea 84 ef 28 bf 3a f 3a 68 ef 3a	071 80 00 00 07 11 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	1.3.g f.q V.8 1.2.3 He 1.3. He 1.3. He 1.4.1	0000126 0000126 0000127 0000127 0000131 00001330 00001330 00001330 00001330 00001330 00001330 00001330 00001330 00001330 00001330 00001330 00001330 00001340 00001340 0000140 0000140 0000140 0000140 0000140 0000140 0000140 0000140 0000140 0000140	20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0	10 1 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	

FERTINET.

Ijiami

Dynamically linked shared libraries

Security Enforcements by ijiami.cn

- Accounts reviewed at the time of creation
- Uploaded applications 'audited' before packing
- ► **HIGHER SECURITY?** Rejected app that passed Bangcle's security test

Packed malware in the wild

Known samples

- HoseDex2Jar No known malware
- ► ApkProtect Android/SmsSend.ND!tr SMS sending malware
- Bangcle packed malware
 - ► Android/Feejar.B!tr
 - Android/FakeIns.D
 - ► Adware/Waps!Android etc

eb 61 08 2f 03 45 38 96 aa b4 93 67	e8 80 a1 24 1d 94 fc2 c1 c5	1f 06 9e c2 7d e9 2e 61 92 33 b5	CC 46 5e 26 3f 47 89 C6 9b 8e 75	d2 59 d9 0d 0f be c0 40 4c da 96	86 0d 19 02 6e da 92 e8 f8 73	78 33 fc 22 54 55 1c fe 05 49	13 4f 81 9a 37 c7 f2 6a 67 e0 43	07 ad be 8e 57 63 ae 44 7e 05 7f	1e 0c 54 aa c6 c0 af 2c 19 ef 5c	4d 1b 55 76 4b 99 45 53 96 88	64 d5 2e 76 ce 96 88 0c 9e da	63 0e 92 1c 36 45 44 e7 06 fc 12	.aFY.30

.| 000011 .| 000011 .| 000011 .| 000011 .| 000011 .| 000011 .| 000011 .| 000011 .| 000011 .| 000012

74 65 72 70 00 2e 68 79 6d 00 2e 64 79 6e 61 00 2e 70 72 65 69 00 2e 69 6e 69 74 5f 6e 69 5f 61 72 72 61 2e 64 79 6e 61 6d 69 73 73 00 2e 63 6f 6d 2e 61 74 74 72 69 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

73 | trtab.interp
58 | trtab.interp
59 | ash.dynsym.
55 | str..rel.plt.
59 | xt..rodata.p
57 | nit_array.ini
59 | y.ctors.dyn
59 | y.ctors.dyn
50 | c.got.bss.
52 | ment.ARM.att
50 | utes

DETECTION


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Detection

Visible Signs? Eg: Bangcle

- Application name : com.secapk.wrapper.ApplicationWrapper
- Class names : ACall, FirstApplication
- Assets bangcle_classes.jar
- Native libraries libsecexe and libsecmain

Detection



Detection

Solution

- ► Every new packer in market = ¿ Write new unpacker OR
- Run every sample on emulator or VM

Challenges for Automation

- Must unpack before signing
- ► Time + Resource tradeoff between static & dynamic detection

