

THESE AREN'T  
AN...DROIDS YOU'RE  
LOOKING FOR

# ABSTRACT

Android is being pushed inside almost everything these days, people say to make things "smart". We tend to do more and more things on our phones, something used only to make calls (and play snake) some time ago, now is used to make bank transfers, store personal files and who knows what more. These small devices tend to get more and more power, but with great power comes great responsibility. The aim of this talk is to look on Android through security lens and check what's there to see.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. ABOUT ME
2. ANDROID – INFO
3. OS SECURITY
4. APPS SECURITY
5. PLAYING WITH APKS
6. NON INSTALLED ACTIVITIES LOADING

# AND I AM...


- JAVA DEV :)
- SECURITY RESEARCHER
- <http://blog.pentests.pl/>
- @PentestsPL

# ANDROID



- LINUX
- „MOBILE” OS
- OPEN SOURCE
- UPDATES – NOT FOR EVERYONE

# WHAT'S INSIDE?



# ANDROID APPS

- JAVA -> „FRONT END”
- DALVIK VIRTUAL MACHINE
- SUPPLIED TO DEVICE AS \*.APK PACKAGE

# ANDROID SECURITY





# REALITY



# ANDROID FRAGMENTATION



# APPS AND SECURITY

- EVERYONE CAN CREATE APP AND PUSH IT TO GOOGLE PLAY STORE
- TWO SIDES:



**CLIENT**

**APP PROVIDER**


# CLIENT (PHONE OWNER)

- „Virus Shield” CASE
- FROM GOOGLE PLAY != 100% SAFE
- FAKE/PIRATED APPS




# APP CREATOR/OWNER

- MOBILE APPS == CLIENT
- SERVER IS A PART OF AN APP
- APP CODE CAN BE REVERSED/CHANGED




# APP CREATOR/OWNER

- MOBILE APPS == CLIENT
- SERVER IS A PART OF AN APP
- APP CODE CAN BE REVERSED/CHANGED



# APP CREATOR/OWNER

- MOBILE APPS == CLIENT
- SERVER IS A PART OF AN APP
- APP CODE CAN BE REVERSED/CHANGED



# OWASP TOP 10 MOBILE

## OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks

M1 – Weak Server Side Controls

M2 – Insecure Data Storage

M3 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

M4 - Unintended Data Leakage

M5 - Poor Authorization and Authentication

M6 - Broken Cryptography

M7 - Client Side Injection

M8 - Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs

M9 - Improper Session Handling

M10 - Lack of Binary Protections




# DIGGING INTO ANDROID APPS

- IT'S TRIVIAL TO EXTRACT APK FROM PHONE
- APK CAN BE ACCESSED, MODIFIED AND PUT BACK INTO PHONE


# APK PACKAGE

- ZIP ARCHIVE
- AndroidManifest.xml
- classes.dex
- lib/
- res/
- other goodies




# CLASSES.DEX

- APP SOURCE CODE IS COMPILED TO CLASS FILES




# CLASSES.DEX

- CLASS FILES ARE CROSSCOMPILED





# CLASSES.DEX

- CLASS FILES ARE CROSSCOMPILED INTO CLASSES.DEX



# BACK TO \*.JAVA?







# PROFIT



# NOT SO FAST...



# SMALI



# SMALI?

```
private boolean isPassCorrect(String
password) {
    //generate random password
    final String correctPass =
getRandomString(8);
    //check if user guessed correct
    return correctPass.equals(password);
}
```

```

.method private isPassCorrect(Ljava/lang/String;)Z
    .registers 4
    .param p1, "password"    # Ljava/lang/String;

    .prologue
    .line 39
    const/16 v1, 0x8

    invoke-direct {p0, v1}, Lpl/com/marcing/android/testreverse/MainActivity;-
>getRandomString(I)Ljava/lang/String;

    move-result-object v0

    .line 40
    .local v0, "correctPass":Ljava/lang/String;
    invoke-virtual {v0, p1}, Ljava/lang/String;->equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z

    move-result v1

    return v1
.end method

```

```
.method private  
isPassCorrect(Ljava/lang/String;)Z  
    .registers 4  
    .param p1, "password"    # Ljava/lang/String;
```

.prologue

.line 39

const/16 v1, 0x8

invoke-direct {p0, v1},  
Lpl/com/marcing/android/testreverse/MainActivi  
ty;->getRandomString()Ljava/lang/String;

move-result-object v0

.line 40

.local v0, "correctPass":Ljava/lang/String;

```
invoke-virtual {v0, p1}, Ljava/lang/String;-  
>equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
```

```
move-result v1
```

```
return v1
```

```
.end method
```

# SMALI TYPES

V	void - can only be used for return types
Z	boolean
B	byte
S	short
C	char
I	int
J	long (64 bits)
F	float
D	double (64 bits)



# ARRAYS

`[[I = int[][]`

`[Ljava/lang/String; = String[]`

# EXAMPLE

```
method(I[[IILjava/lang/String;[Ljava/lang/Object;  
)Ljava/lang/String;
```

# EXAMPLE

```
method(I[[IILjava/lang/String;[Ljava/lang/Object;  
)Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
String method(int, int[][], int, String, Object[])
```

# PLAYING WITH APK

- MULTIPLE „TO SMALI” DECOMPILERS
  - BAKSMALI
  - APKTOOL
- SOME „TO JAVA” (MAYBE EVEN GOOD)
- SMALI TO CLASSES.DEX
  - SMALI
  - APKTOOL
- APK -> DEX -> SMALI -> DEX -> APK

„PATCHING” APKs

# 1. GET APK

- DOWNLOAD FROM INTERNET
- GET FROM PHONE
  - MANUAL
  - BACKUP APP

## 2. DECOMPRESS APK

- USING SOFTWARE LIKE 7ZIP, WINRAR
- APKTOOL WORKS FROM HERE (SKIP 3rd AND 5th STEP)

### 3. DECOMPILE CLASSES.DEX

- BAKSMALI

```
java -jar baksmali-*.jar -o classes classes.dex
```

(\*SMALI FILES WILL APPEAR IN „classes” FOLDER)



## 4. EDIT \*.SMALI FILES

- NOTEPAD, NOTEPAD++

# 5. PACK CLASSES.DEX

- SMALI

```
java -jar smali-*.jar classes -o classes.dex
```

## 6. CREATE \*.APK

- ZIP IT
- APKTOOL

# 7. SIGNING

```
keytool -genkey -v -keystore [KEYSTORE  
NAME]  
-alias [ALIAS] -keyalg RSA -keysize 2048 -  
validity 20000
```

# 7. SIGNING

```
jarsigner -verbose -sigalg SHA1withRSA  
-digestalg SHA1 -keystore [KEYSTORE]  
[APK FILE] [ALIAS]
```

# 7. SIGNING

```
zipalign -v 4 [PATH TO APK] [OUTPUT  
FILENAME]
```

## 8. PUT BACK TO PHONE/EMULATOR

- UINSTALL „UNPATCHED” APP 1st
- FROM PC: adb install [APK FILE]

EXAMPLE



ANDROID NON  
INSTALLED ACTIVITY  
LOADING


# ACTIVITY

- PIECE OF CODE DESIGNED TO DO SOMETHING IN APP
- USUALLY HAS UI
- HAS TO BE DEFINED IN MANIFEST
- MUST BE INSIDE INSTALLED APK IN ORDER TO START IT

# ACTIVITY

- PIECE OF CODE DESIGNED TO DO SOMETHING IN APP
- USUALLY HAS UI
- HAS TO BE DEFINED IN MANIFEST
- ~~MUST BE INSIDE INSTALLED APK IN ORDER TO START IT~~

# STARTING ACITIVITIES



# NONEXISTING ACTIVITY

android.content.ActivityNotFoundException:  
Unable to find explicit activity class  
{pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityload  
er/pl.com.marcing.android.customdex.TestA  
ctivity}; **have you declared this activity in  
your AndroidManifest.xml?**

# XML FIXED

FATAL EXCEPTION: main

Process: pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityloader,  
PID: 14987

java.lang.RuntimeException: Unable to instantiate activity  
ComponentInfo{pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityloader/  
pl.com.marcing.android.customdex.TestActivity}:

java.lang.ClassNotFoundException: **Didn't find class**

**"pl.com.marcing.android.customdex.TestActivity" on path:**

**DexPathList[[zip file**

**"/data/app/pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityloader-**

**2.apk"], nativeLibraryDirectories=[**

**/data/app-lib/pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityloader-**

**2, /system/lib]]**

# APPLICATION CLASSLOADER

```
27. public class BaseDexClassLoader extends ClassLoader {
28.     /** originally specified path (just used for {@code toString()}) */
29.     private final String originalPath;
30.
31.     /** structured lists of path elements */
32.     private final DexPathList pathList;
33.
34.     /**
35.      * Constructs an instance.
36.      *
37.      * @param dexPath the list of jar/apk files containing classes and
38.      * resources, delimited by {@code File.pathSeparator}, which
39.      * defaults to {@code ":"} on Android
40.      * @param optimizedDirectory directory where optimized dex files
41.      * should be written; may be {@code null}
42.      * @param libraryPath the list of directories containing native
43.      * libraries, delimited by {@code File.pathSeparator}; may be
44.      * {@code null}
45.      * @param parent the parent class loader
46.      */
47.     public BaseDexClassLoader(String dexPath, File optimizedDirectory,
48.         String libraryPath, ClassLoader parent) {
```

# MESSING AROUND

- pathList
- private final -> NO ACCESS AND CONSTANT
- Java Reflection API
- CUSTOM CLASSLOADER WITH NEW APK
- TAKE **pathList** FROM CUSTOM CLASSLOADER AND PUT INSIDE APPLICATION CLASSLOADER



# CLASSLOADER FIXED

02-20 11:51:46.742 15359-  
15359/pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityloader  
I/DynamicActivityLoadActivity: Test:  
dalvik.system.DexClassLoader[DexPathList[[zip file  
"/data/data/pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityloader/app\_dex/t  
est.apk", zip file  
"/data/app/pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityloader-  
1.apk"],nativeLibraryDirectories=[/data/app-  
lib/pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityloader-1, /system/lib,  
/system/lib]]]

02-20 11:51:46.750 15359-  
15359/pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityloader I/TestActivity:  
::onStart

02-20 11:51:46.750 15359-  
15359/pl.com.marcing.android.dynamicactivityloader I/TestActivity:  
action inside TestActivity

# FACTS

- NEW ACTIVITY RUNS INSIDE OLD CONTEXT
  - PERMISSIONS
  - RESOURCES
- NEW ACTIVITY MUST BE DEFINED INSIDE MANIFEST
- „PATCHING CODE” CAN BE INSIDE NEW APK (INSTALLED APK NEEDS LOADER).

# POSSIBILITIES

- HIDDEN FEATURES...
- WITH FEW MODS OF SMALI AND MANIFEST ONE CAN INJECT NEW CODE TO APP (ACCESS TO RUNNING APP MEMORY WITHOUT ROOTING DEVICE)

QUESTIONS?