


## **Chapter 5**

# **Hardware Trojan**

# Threats




# What is Hardware Trojan?

- **Hardware Trojan:**
  - A malicious addition or modification to the existing circuit elements.
- **What hardware Trojans can do?**
  - Change the functionality
  - Reduce the reliability
  - Leak valuable information
- **Applications that are likely to be targets for attackers**
  - Military applications
  - Aerospace applications
  - Civilian security-critical applications
  - Financial applications
  - Transportation security
  - IoT devices
  - Commercial devices
  - More


# IC/IP Trust Problem

- Chip design and fabrication has become increasingly vulnerable to malicious activities and alterations with globalization.
- **IP Vendor and System Integrator:**
  - IP vendor may place a Trojan in the IP
  - *IP Trust problem*
- **Designer and Foundry:**
  - Foundry may place a Trojan in the layout design.
  - *IC Trust problem*


# Hardware Trojan Threat



# Issues with Third IP Design




# Untrusted Designer and Foundry




# HW Trojan Examples / Models


**Comb. Trojan Example**




**Seq. Trojan Example**




**MOLES\*: Info Leakage Trojan**



**Comb. Trojan model**



**Seq. Trojan Model**




Malicious Off-chip Leakage  
Enabled by Side-channels

*\*Lin et al, ICCAD 2009*




**Why is detection of hardware Trojans  
very difficult?**

# Bug vs. Malicious Change




**Trojan Attacks → BIGGER verification challenge!**

# Silicon Back Door



Untrusted Hardware

Antenna



- Adversary can send and receive secret information
- Adversary can disable the chip, blowup the chip, send wrong processing data, impact circuit information etc.

- Adversary can place an Antenna on the fabricated chip
- Such Trojan cannot be detected since it does not change the functionality of the circuit.



# Silicon Time Bomb



Untrusted Hardware

**Counter**

**Finite state machine (FSM)**

**Comparator to monitor key data**




**Wires/transistors that violate design rules**



- Such Trojan cannot be detected since it does not change the functionality of the circuit.
- In some cases, adversary has little control on the exact time of Trojan action
- Cause reliability issue

# Applications and Threats

**Thousands of chips are being fabricated in untrusted foundries**



# Comprehensive Attack Model

Model	Description	3PIP Vendor	SoC Developer	Foundry
A	Untrusted 3PIP vendor	Untrusted	Trusted	Trusted
B	Untrusted foundry	Trusted	Trusted	Untrusted
C	Untrusted EDA tool or rogue employee	Trusted	Untrusted	Trusted
D	Commercial-off-the-shelf component	Untrusted	Untrusted	Untrusted
E	Untrusted design house	Untrusted	Untrusted	Trusted
F	Fabless SoC design house	Untrusted	Trusted	Untrusted
G	Untrusted SoC developer with trusted IPs	Trusted	Untrusted	Untrusted