
Feature: Process Variation

- Do we expect process variation (length, widths, oxide thickness) in circuit and system?
 - Impact circuit performance
 - Functional failure
 - Major obstacle to the continued scaling of integratedcircuit technology in the sub-45 nm regime
- Process variations can be turned into a feature rather than a problem?
 - Each IC has unique properties

Solution


Extract key information from a complex physical system.



Devadas, et. al, DAC02

Physical Unclonable/Random Functions (PUFs)

Generate keys from a complex physical system



- Security Advantage
 - Keys are generated on demand → No non-volatile secrets
 - No need to program the secret
 - Can generate multiple master keys
- What can be hard to predict, but easy to measure?


Definition

A Physical Random Function or Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a function that is:


- Based on a physical system
- Easy to evaluate (using the physical system)
- Its output looks like a random function
- Unpredictable even for an attacker with physical access

WYSINWYG

Sub-Wavelength WYSINWYG



What You See Is Not What You Get




Process variations

No two transistors have the same parameters


Silicon PUF – Proof of Concept

- Because of process variations, no two Integrated Circuits are identical
- Experiments in which *identical circuits with identical layouts* were placed on different FPGAs show that path delays vary enough across ICs to use them for identification.



Metastability – Three Timing Conditions


Too Late




Signal transition occurs after clock edge and minimum t_H:
Ball lands on the old data side.

Clk Data t_{SU} t_H


Just Right




Signal transition meets register t_{SU} and t_H: Ball lands on thenewdata side.




Too Early



Signal violates register t_{SU} or t_H:
Ball balances at top of hill or takes too long to reach the bottom. Output is metastable and violates t_{CO}.



A Candidate: Silicon PUF



- Compare two paths with an identical delay in design
 - Random process variation determines which path is faster
 - An arbiter outputs 1-bit digital response
- Path delays in an IC are statistically distributed due to random manufacturing variations

Experiments

- Fabricated candidate PUF on multiple ICs, 0.18um TSMC
- Apply 100 random challenges and observe responses

Distance between Chip X and Y responses = 24

- Two chips are different because of process variations.
- If the distance between chip X and chip Y are higher then it is good to detect ICs.
- Temperature adds some noise as a result it might give different results at different temperatures.
- There is also measurement noise.

Measurement Attacks and Software Attacks

Can an adversary create a *software clone* of a given PUF chip?

• A software clone of PUF is impossible. Experiment shows that best model for chip X has 10 errors which is almost equal to 50%.

"Best" model for Chip X has error = 10


Physical Attacks

- Make PUF delays depend on overlaid metal layers and package
- Invasive attack (e.g., package removal) changes PUF delays and destroys PUF
- Non-invasive attacks are still possible
 - To find wire delays one needs to find precise relative timing of transient signals as opposed to looking for 0's and 1's
 - Wire delay is not a number but a function of challenge bits and adjacent wire voltages and capacitances

Ring-Oscillator (RO) PUF
• The structure relies on delay loops and counters instead

 The structure relies on delay loops and counters instead of MUX and arbiters

• Better results on FPGA – more stable




RO PUFs (cont'd)

- Easy to duplicate a ring oscillator and make sure the oscillators are identical
 - Much easier than ensuring the racing paths with equal path segments
- How many bits can we generate from the scheme in the previous page?
 - There are N(N-1)/2 distinct pairs, but the entropy is significantly smaller: $log_2(N!)$
 - E.g., 35 ROs can produce 133 bits, 128 ROs can produce 716, and 1024 ROs can produce 8769

Consider the following minimal example, given three ROs: $RO_A.f < RO_B.f$ and $RO_B.f < RO_C.f$ implicates $RO_A.f < RO_C.f$. The total PUF entropy is only $log_2(N!)$ bit as there are N! ways to sort the frequency values.


Reliability of RO PUFS



- Two types of reliability issues:
- Aging:
 - Negative Bias Temperature Instability
 - Hot Carrier Injection (HCI)
 - Temp Dependent Dielectric Breakdown
 - Interconnect Failure
- Temperature
 - Slows down the device

Reliability Enhancement

• Environmental changes have a large impact on the freq. (and even relative ones)



RO PUFs

- ROs whose frequencies are far are more stable than the ones with closer frequencies
 - Possible advantage: do not use all pairs, but only the stable ones
 - It is easy to watch the distance in the counter and pick the very different ones.
 - Can be done during enrollment
- RO PUF allows an easier implementation for both ASICs and FPGAs.
- The Arbiter PUF is appropriate for resource constrained platforms such as RFIDs and the RO PUF is better for use in FPGAs and in secure processor design.