# All Your Cloud Are Belong to Us

Hunting Compromise in Azure Nate Warfield – Microsoft Security Response Center

#### Whoami: Nate Warfield

- Senior Security Program Manger MSRC
  - Vulnerability Management for Azure, Windows, Hyper-V
  - Battle tested: MS17-010, WannaCry, NotPetya, Spectre/Meltdown
- Background
  - 18 years of Network Engineering
  - Grey hat
  - Internet of Insecurable Things
  - Radio hacking (SDR, BT/BLE, LoRaWAN, RFID/NFC)
  - Twitter: @dk\_effect
  - GitHub: n0x08

# Framing the Problem

You exposed WHAT to the Internet?!?!?

#### Network Security 101

- Limit inbound access from the Internet
  - Default deny
- ACLs on all network devices
- Authentication. Everywhere.
- Install security updates
- Internet-facing servers in DMZ
- All changes to Firewall/ACL done by security team

#### How Cloud Changes This Model

- Every Virtual Machine is exposed to the Internet
  - SSH or RDP, required for administration
- Anyone with access can deploy systems
- Anyone with access can expose BadThings™
- Patch management decentralized
- VM's deploy with predefined firewall configuration
- One insecure image == thousands of insecure deployments
- This is not unique to Azure; AWS & others see similar problems

### 2017: All Your Cloud Are Belong to Us



exposed online that was hosting information about 1,133 National Football League (NFL) players and

cloud services: cryptocurrency mining.

## Scratching the Underbelly

When the past is always with you, it may as well be present; and if it is present, it will be future as well.

— William Gibson, Neuromancer

#### NoSQL - Exposure & Impact

- NoSQL solutions were not designed to be Internet-facing
  - "..it is not a good idea to expose the Redis instance directly to the internet"
  - "Allow only trusted clients to access the network interfaces and ports on which MongoDB instances are available."
  - "Elasticsearch installations are not designed to be publicly accessible over the Internet."
- Naturally, people exposed them to the Internet
- To date: MongoDB, CouchDB, Hadoop, Elastic, Redis
- DB dropped; ransom note added
- 100k+ systems compromised globally
- Azure 2500+ VM's pwned

#### Finding NoSQL Compromise in Azure

- Large attack surface 1.6million IP addresses
- Each NoSQL solution runs on a different port
- Open port != compromise
- DB names are only indication of compromise
- TL;DR I use Shodan.io
  - Can search by organization
  - DB names are indexed & searchable
  - Results downloadable in JSON format for post-processing

#### Extending Shodan

- Tag:compromised automatic tagging of pwned NoSQL DB's
- Added to Shodan in December 2017
- 15k hosts found as of 1/25/2018
- Requires Shodan Enterprise API
- https://gist.github.com/n0x08



### Hunting for Badness

TheShadowBrokers has is having little of each as our auction was an apparent failure. Be considering this our form of protest.
--ShadowBrokers, April 8<sup>th</sup> 2017

#### Exposure & Impact

- [REDACTED] weaponized an SMBv1 exploit (EternalBlue)
- [REDACTED] added it to their Metasploit clone
- [REDACTED] lost control of this tool
- Microsoft patched in March 2017 (MS17-010)
- Nobody in their right mind would expose SMB to the Internet...





#### Finding DoublePulsar in Azure

- "Only" 14k hosts exposing TCP/445
- DoublePulsar implant does not visibly alter the system
- It did allow operators to test for it's existence
- Manually scanned all IP's exposing TCP/445
- Low number of implants (<50)</li>

That means everyone patched!!!



#### WannaCry: Exposure & Impact

- Attack started May 12 2017
- Targeted systems missing MS17-010 patches
- 230k+ systems in 150 countries affected
- Initial infection via Internet-exposed SMB port\*
- Lateral movement via EternalBlue
- Comparatively low-tech

#### NotPetya: Exposure & Impact

- Attack started June 27 2017
- Specifically targeted Ukraine
- Infection rate of ~500 systems/minute
- Initial infection via backdoored MEDocs software
- Lateral movement via psexec, WMIC, mimikatz and MS17-010
- Blast radius increased by VPN links to Ukraine
- Comparatively high-tech

# Exposure & Collateral Damage

#### Lateral Movement via ExpressRoute

- What's ExpressRoute?
  - "Microsoft Azure ExpressRoute lets you extend your on-premises networks into the Microsoft cloud...."
- That sounds like a VPN!
- (spoiler alert: it is)
- Amazon: Direct Connect AWS version of ExpressRoute
- Is the cloud actually isolated from your corporate network?
- Unexplored but interesting attack scenarios

### Network Security Group (Azure)

- Network Security Group is the image firewall
- Firewall config hard-coded by image vendor
- Configurable during deployment but not required
- 46% of Azure Gallery Images expose ports by default
- 96% of those expose more than management
- 500 different ports exposed across Azure Gallery

#### AMI Security Groups (AWS)

- AMI == Amazon Marketplace Image == Azure Gallery Image
- AWS doesn't expose default Security Group config via API\*
  - \*Unless you deploy it
- Feature request filed since November 2017
- Spot checking indicates Amazon Marketplace has same issues
- 21k AMI's in AWS 10x as many as Azure
- Anyone from AWS API team in the audience?

#### Default Passwords

- VM Descriptions occasionally contain a default password
- At least it's a strong\* PW!: P@sswOrd123
  - \*actual PW changed to protect the innocent
- Users are advised to change PW after installation
- Fortunately "only" for services like MySQL, SQL, etc.
- Do databases really need to be Internet facing?

### 2018 - Year of the CryptoMiner?

- Ransomware is low yield; kills the host
- Surreptitiously mining \$COINZ is profitable
- Remotely stealing resources at scale is hard....
- .....until now.



CoinHive Cryptocurrency Miner Is 6th Most Common Malware, Says Report





Questions?