


Practical Malware Analysis Chapter 5

-> What is the address of DllMain?

- address of DllMain is **.text:1000D02E**.



```
.text:1000D02E
.text:1000D02E ; ===== SUBROUTINE =====
.text:1000D02E
.text:1000D02E ; BOOL __stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
.text:1000D02E _DllMain@12      proc near          ; CODE XREF: DllEntryPoint+48lp
.text:1000D02E                                     ; DATA XREF: sub_100110FF+2D4o
.text:1000D02E
.text:1000D02E hinstDLL      = dword ptr  4
.text:1000D02E fdwReason     = dword ptr  8
.text:1000D02E lpvReserved  = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:1000D02E
.text:1000D02E
.text:1000D02E mov     eax, [esp+fdwReason]
.text:1000D032 dec     eax
.text:1000D033 jnz     loc_1000D107
.text:1000D039 mov     eax, [esp+hinstDLL]
.text:1000D03D push    ebx
.text:1000D03F mov     ecx, hModule eax
```


-> Use the Imports window to browse to gethostbyname. Where is the import located?

- the address of gethostbyname is **.idata:100163CC**.

100163BC	18	waveInStart	WINMM
100163C4	18	select	WS2_32
100163C8	11	inet_addr	WS2_32
100163CC	52	gethostbyname	WS2_32
100163D0	12	inet_ntoa	WS2_32

-> How many functions call gethostbyname?

- 18



-> Focusing on the call to gethostbyname located at 0x10001757, can you figure out which DNS request will be made?

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```
.text:1000173A      test     eax, eax
.text:1000173C      jz       loc_100017ED
.text:10001742      cmp     dword_1008E5CC, ebx
.text:10001748      jnz     loc_100017ED
.text:1000174E      mov     eax, off_10019040 ; "[This is RDO]pics.practicalmalwareanalys"...
.text:10001753      add     eax, 0Dh
.text:10001756      push    eax ; name
.text:10001757      call    ds:gethostbyname
.text:10001758      ...
```

-> How many local variables has IDA Pro recognized for the subroutine at 0x10001656?

- 24 variables.

```
.text:10001656 var_675          = byte ptr -675h
.text:10001656 var_674          = dword ptr -674h
.text:10001656 hModule         = dword ptr -670h
.text:10001656 timeout         = timeval ptr -66Ch
.text:10001656 name           = sockaddr ptr -664h
.text:10001656 var_654          = word ptr -654h
.text:10001656 in              = in_addr ptr -650h
.text:10001656 Str1            = byte ptr -644h
.text:10001656 var_640          = byte ptr -640h
.text:10001656 CommandLine     = byte ptr -63Fh
.text:10001656 Str             = byte ptr -63Dh
.text:10001656 var_638          = byte ptr -638h
.text:10001656 var_637          = byte ptr -637h
.text:10001656 var_544          = byte ptr -544h
.text:10001656 var_50C          = dword ptr -50Ch
.text:10001656 var_500          = byte ptr -500h
.text:10001656 Buf2            = byte ptr -4FCh
.text:10001656 readfds         = fd_set ptr -4BCh
.text:10001656 buf             = byte ptr -3B8h
.text:10001656 var_3B0          = dword ptr -3B0h
.text:10001656 var_1A4          = dword ptr -1A4h
.text:10001656 var_194          = dword ptr -194h
.text:10001656 WSADATA         = WSADATA ptr -190h
.text:10001656 lpThreadParameter = dword ptr 4
```

-> How many parameters has IDA Pro recognized for the subroutine at 0x10001656?

- 1 : lpThreadParameter

```
.text:10001656 var_194          = dword ptr -194h
.text:10001656 WSADATA         = WSADATA ptr -190h
.text:10001656 lpThreadParameter = dword ptr 4
.text:10001656
.text:10001656                sub     esp, 678h
```

-> Use the Strings window to locate the string \cmd.exe /c in the disassembly. Where is it located?

-address of the string = xdoors_d:10095b34

```
xdoors_d:10095b31          align 4
xdoors_d:10095b34 aCmdExeC      db '\cmd.exe /c ',0      ; DATA XREF: sub_1000FF58+278↑o
xdoors_d:10095b41          align 4
```

-> What is happening in the area of code that references \cmd.exe /c?

- It executes these commands but in reverse order:

quit-exit-cd

-> In the same area, at 0x100101C8, it looks like dword_1008E5C4 is a global variable that helps decide which path to take. How does the malware set dword_1008E5C4? (Hint: Use dword_1008E5C4's cross references.)

- In the beginning I went to the first instruction to use this variable and it was :

```
.text:10001673          call     sub_10003695
.text:10001678          mov     dword_1008E5C4, eax
.text:1000167D          call     sub_100036C3
-----
```

- I noticed that there was a call instruction before moving the eax value of the variable and (any call the return value is stored in the eax) and I detected this function to see the value turns out to take information about the os version

```
.text:10003695 sub_10003695  proc near          ; CODE XREF: sub_10001656+1D↑p
.text:10003695                                     ; sub_10003B75+7↓p ...
.text:10003695 VersionInformation= _OSVERSIONINFOA ptr -94h
.text:10003695
.text:10003695          push    ebp
.text:10003696          mov     ebp, esp
.text:10003698          sub     esp, 94h
.text:1000369E          lea     eax, [ebp+VersionInformation]
.text:100036A4          mov     [ebp+VersionInformation.dwOSVersionInfoSize], 94h ; ""
.text:100036AE          push    eax          ; lpVersionInformation
.text:100036AF          call    ds:GetVersionExA
.text:100036B5          xor     eax, eax
.text:100036B7          cmp     [ebp+VersionInformation.dwPlatformId], 2
.text:100036BE          setz    al
.text:100036C1          leave
```

- It compares the value of the variable (that contains information about the OS version) and the EBX value.

-> A few hundred lines into the subroutine at 0x1000FF58, a series of comparisons use memcmp to compare strings. What happens if the string comparison to robotwork is successful (when memcmp returns 0)?

- will call the function **sub_100052A2**

```

.text:10010444 ; -----
.text:10010444
.text:10010444 loc_10010444:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_1000FF58+4E0↑j
.text:10010444      push     9                                ; Size
.text:10010446      lea      eax, [ebp+Buf1]
.text:1001044C      push     offset aRobotwork ; "robotwork"
.text:10010451      push     eax                                ; Buf1
.text:10010452      call     memcmp
.text:10010457      add      esp, 0Ch
.text:1001045A      test     eax, eax
.text:1001045C      jnz      short loc_10010468
.text:1001045E      push     [ebp+s]                            ; s
.text:10010461      call     sub_100052A2
.text:10010466      jmp      short loc_100103F6
.text:10010468 ; -----

```

-> What does the export PSLIST do?

- You call the function (**sub_100036C3** (This function takes information about the OS version)) and then execute **test eax, eax** and the eax value is a retrieval from the function before it, and certainly the zero flag status will be 1, and therefore it will go to the location (**loc_1000705B**)

```

.text:10007025
.text:10007025      mov      dword_1008E5BC, 1
.text:1000702F      call     sub_100036C3
.text:10007034      test     eax, eax
.text:10007036      jz       short loc_1000705B
.text:10007038      push     [esp+Str]                            ; Str
.text:1000703C      call     strlen
.text:10007041      test     eax, eax
.text:10007043      pop      ecx
.text:10007044      jnz      short loc_1000704E
.text:10007046      push     eax
.text:10007047      call     sub_10006518
.text:1000704C      jmp      short loc_1000705A


```

```

.text:1000705B loc_1000705B:                                ; CODE XREF: PSLIST+11↑j
.text:1000705B      and      dword_1008E5BC, 0
.text:10007062      retn     10h
.text:10007062 PSLIST      endp

```

-> Use the graph mode to graph the cross-references from sub_10004E79. Which API functions could be called by entering this function? Based on the API functions alone, what could you rename this function?



- GetSystemDefaultLangID – sprintf – sub_100038EE - strlen

```

.text:10004E7C      sub     esp, 400h
.text:10004E82      and     [ebp+Buffer], 0
.text:10004E89      push    edi
.text:10004E8A      mov     ecx, 0FFh
.text:10004E8F      xor     eax, eax
.text:10004E91      lea     edi, [ebp+var_3FF]
.text:10004E97      rep stosd
.text:10004E99      stosw
.text:10004E9B      stosb
.text:10004E9C      call    ds:GetSystemDefaultLangID
.text:10004EA2      movzx   eax, ax
.text:10004EA5      push    eax
.text:10004EA6      lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer]
.text:10004EAC      push    offset aLanguageId0xX ; "\r\n\r\n[Language:] id:0x%x\r\n\r\n"
.text:10004EB1      push    eax ; Buffer
.text:10004EB2      call    ds:sprintf
  
```

Syntax

C++

Copy

```
LANGID GetSystemDefaultUILanguage();
```

Return value


Returns the language identifier for the system default UI language of the operating system. For more information, see the Remarks section.

- From the MSDN description that you identify the default language for the operating system

- After searching MSDN, I understood that the value measured in milliseconds is the time value to execution the function sleep API, and therefore it will be in sleep mode after 1000 milliseconds (1 second) of the function execution, and then it will be in sleep mode for 30 seconds

Syntax

C++

 Copy

```
void Sleep(  
    [in] DWORD dwMilliseconds  
);
```

Parameters

[in] dwMilliseconds

The time interval for which execution is to be suspended, in milliseconds.

-> At 0x10001701 is a call to socket. What are the three parameters?

- protocol – type – af

.text:100016FB	push	6	; protocol
.text:100016FD	push	1	; type
.text:100016FF	push	2	; af
.text:10001701	call	ds:socket	

-> Using the MSDN page for socket and the named symbolic constants functionality in IDA Pro, can you make the parameters more meaningful? What are the parameters after you apply changes?

- **IPPROTO_TCP** : The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). This is a possible value when the af parameter is AF_INET or AF_INET6 and the type parameter is SOCK_STREAM.
- **SOCK_STREAM** : A socket type that provides sequenced, reliable, two-way, connection-based byte streams with an OOB data transmission mechanism. This socket type uses the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) for the Internet address family (AF_INET or AF_INET6).
- **AF_INET** : The Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) address family.

```
.text:100016FB      push     IPPROTO_TCP      ; protocol
.text:100016FD      push     SOCK_STREAM      ; type
.text:100016FF      push     AF_INET          ; af
.text:10001701      call    ds:socket
```

-> Search for usage of the in instruction (opcode 0xED). This instruction is used with a magic string VMXh to perform VMware detection. Is that in use in this malware? Using the cross references to the function that executes the in instruction, is there further evidence of VMware detection?

```
.text:10001650      sub_10001365              xor     ebp, ebp
.text:100030AF      sub_10002CCE              call    strcat
.text:10003DE2      sub_10003DC6              lea     edi, [ebp+var_813]
.text:10004326      sub_100042DB              lea     edi, [ebp+var_913]
.text:10004B15      sub_10004B01              lea     edi, [ebp+var_213]
.text:10005305      sub_100052A2              jmp     loc_100053F6
.text:10005413      sub_100053F9              lea     edi, [ebp+var_413]
.text:1000542A      sub_100053F9              lea     edi, [ebp+var_213]
.text:10005B98      sub_10005B84              xor     ebp, ebp
.text:100061DB      sub_10006196              in      eax, dx
.text:10006305      sub_100062E9              lea     edi, [ebp+var_1290]
.text:10006310      sub_100062E9              mov     [ebp+var_1294], ebx
.text:10006318      sub_100062E9              call    ??2@YAPAXI@Z; operator new(uint)
.text:10006476      sub_100062E9              lea     ecx, [ebp+var_1294]
.text:100064A9      sub_100062E9              push    [ebp+var_1294]
.text:1000671B      sub_1000664C              call    sub_1000620C
.text:10006C43      sub_10006BD5              jnz     short loc_10006C31
```

- **in**: This is the mnemonic of the instruction, which indicates that it is an input operation.

```

;   __try { // __except at loc_100061EF
and     [ebp+ms_exc.registration.TryLevel], 0
push    edx
push    ecx
push    ebx
mov     eax, 'VMXh'
mov     ebx, 0
mov     ecx, 0Ah
mov     edx, 'VX'
in      eax, dx
cmp     ebx, 'VMXh'
setz    [ebp+var_1C]
pop     ebx
pop     ecx
pop     edx
jmp     short loc_100061F6

```

- yes, used.

-> Jump your cursor to 0x1001D988. What do you find?

- I don't know if this ASCII or not.

- I don't understand that.

.data:1001D984	db	0	
.data:1001D985	db	0	
.data:1001D986	db	0	
.data:1001D987	db	0	
.data:1001D988	db	2Dh	; -
.data:1001D989	db	31h	; 1
.data:1001D98A	db	3Ah	; :
.data:1001D98B	db	3Ah	; :
.data:1001D98C	db	27h	; '
.data:1001D98D	db	75h	; u
.data:1001D98E	db	3Ch	; <
.data:1001D98F	db	26h	; &
.data:1001D990	db	75h	; u
.data:1001D991	db	21h	; !
.data:1001D992	db	3Dh	; =
.data:1001D993	db	3Ch	; <
.data:1001D994	db	26h	; &
.data:1001D995	db	75h	; u

-> If you have the IDA Python plug-in installed (included with the commercial version of IDA Pro), run Lab05-01.py, an IDA Pro Python script provided with the malware for this book. (Make sure the cursor is at 0x1001D988.) What happens after you run the script?

- Sorry, the Python version is not compatible with the IDA version.

-> With the cursor in the same location, how do you turn this data into a single ASCII string?

- press of button **A**.

```
.data:1001D985      db      0
.data:1001D986      db      0
.data:1001D987      db      0
.data:1001D988  a1UUU7461Yu2u10 db  '-1:: ',27h,'u<&u!=<&u746>1:: ',27h,'yu&' ',27h,'<;2u106:101u3: ',27h,'u'
.data:1001D98B      db      5
.data:1001D9B4  a46649u      db  27h,'46!<649u'
.data:1001D9BD      db  18h
.data:1001D9BE  a4940u      db  '49"4',27h,'0u'
.data:1001D9C5      db  14h
.data:1001D9C6  a49U      db  ';49,&<&u'
.data:1001D9CE      db  19h
.data:1001D9CF      db  34h ; 4
.data:1001D9D0      db  37h ; 7
.data:1001D9D1      db  75h ; 1
```

-> Open the script with a text editor. How does it work?

- I think it's encrypting something.

```
Lab05-01.py
1  sea = ScreenEA()
2
3  for i in range(0x00,0x50):
4      b = Byte(sea+i)
5      decoded_byte = b ^ 0x55
6      PatchByte(sea+i,decoded_byte)
7
```