

Android Application Pentesting Workshop 1

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whoami

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
Previously testing AppSec in Europe: payments systems, fraud detection, stocks, enterprise software

Sometimes I have interesting projects:

- Bypassing JS-based malware detection (MiTB)
- RE of proprietary network protocols
- Enterprise solutions: Hadoop, HPaaS
- Voice biometrics

Tools

- Android SDK (emulator), API 15
- Apktool
- D2j
- jd-gui
- Android MobSF
- QARK
- sqlite3
- Local proxy (e.g. ZAP, BurpSuite)



Intro


- 2 bln mobile banking users
- 4 mln mobile apps, 25% of them are malicious
- Pentesting mobile apps requires to set up a lab
- A lot of low hanging fruits
- Mobile app developers are not familiar with attack vectors

So, how to attack mobile apps?

Agenda




Attack surface




OS vulnerabilities

- Multiple root techniques in the wild
- Mostly via malicious application
- But: *Over The Air: Exploiting Broadcom's Wi-Fi Stack*
- KingRoot - <https://kingroot.net/>
- Each of those is worth > \$100k




iOS Version Usage Mar 2017

Stats provided by the data.apptelligent.com



ADB

- Root the device
 - Enable USB debugging
 - Enable APK installation from “untrusted sources”
 - Connect with ADB
-
- Some apps will detect root
 - HideMyRoot, RootCloak



ADB with Android emulator

- Download Android SDK
- Create AVD
- Run AVD
- Connect with ADB

DEMO

- Some apps will detect emulator



Static analysis



Quick look at APK

- It can be pulled from a device :


```
adb shell pm list packages
```

```
adb pull /data/app/com.example.someapp-2.apk
```

- There are online services to download APK, e.g. APKpure.com (beware of malware)
- You can sniff the traffic to Google Play and collect it from local proxy
- It's a ZIP file!

DEMO

What to do with DEX?



Demo – what can you find in APK?

~~unzip file.apk~~

apktool decode file.apk # manifest, resources,
views, templates and smali code

DEMO

Decompiling DEX to Java

Convert to JAR and decompile

```
d2j-dex2jar file.apk # output is .jar  
jd-gui file.jar
```

DEMO

Sometimes the source is obfuscated

DEMO

Recompiling APK


```
apktool d -f file.apk -o smali
# change smali code
apktool b -f smali/ -o unaligned.apk
# sign the apk
jarsigner -verbose -sigalg MD5withRSA -digestalg
SHA1 -keystore ~/.android/debug.keystore -storepass
android unaligned.apk androiddebugkey
zipalign -v 4 unaligned.apk smali.apk # if necessary
```

DEMO

Automated static analysis

- OWASP: Android Mobile Security Framework
- QARK: Quick Android Review Kit

DEMO



What should you look for?

- OWASP MASVS – Mobile Application Security Verification Standard
- OWASP Mobile Top 10
- Any vulnerability that can cause damage

DEMO

Static analysis is not enough



Dynamic analysis

- **Logs:**

```
adb logcat
```

DEMO

- **File diff:**

```
adb pull /data/data/package/
```

DEMO

- **Databases:**

```
sqlite3 cache.db
```

DEMO



Traffic proxy

- Wireshark + socat if non-HTTP
- HTTP local proxy (ZAP, BurpSuite):

emulator -avd myavd -http-proxy <http://168.192.1.2:8080>

Real device: connect it to the same Wi-Fi

DEMO

- Install SSL Certificate


```
adb push cert.crt /sdcard/
```

DEMO

SSL MiTM


- Accepts any certificate
- Accepts a trusted certificate issued to other domain
- Weak pinning – e.g. only chain length and CN fields are checked

DEMO



SSL pinning

- Certificate may be hardcoded in APK resources / code
- Simply change it and recompile the app for the purpose of testing



Proxying Android 7.0

res/xml/network_security_config.xml

```
<network-security-config>
  <base-config>
    <trust-anchors>
      <!-- Trust preinstalled CAs -->
      <certificates src="system" />
      <!-- Additionally trust user added CAs -->
      <certificates src="user" />
    </trust-anchors>
  </base-config>
</network-security-config>
```



Thank you

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