Hitlist Worm Detection using Source IP Address History

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Abstract—Internet worms are a growing menace due to their increasing sophistication and speed of propagation. Although there have been many different detection schemes proposed, none of them can detect hitlist worms, which only scan active addresses, in linear time. Hence, we present a new worm detection scheme, History-based IP Worm Detection, that can detect these hitlist worms. It uses the difference in the distribution of source addresses between regular users and scanning hosts to distinguish between worm probes and normal accesses. This property is used to implement a weighted source address counting scheme, and a change point detection technique is used to detect surges in the rate of source addresses seen.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet's easy and wide access has allowed malicious programs, like worms, to propagate in unprecedented ways. The traditional response to new worms has been to manually generate the defining signatures, and distribute these signatures for use in traffic filters. However, worms like Slammer [9], which infected most vulnerable systems in a matter of minutes, indicate this method is becoming infeasible. Motivated by these concerns, the intrusion detection community has proposed various automated worm detection schemes [17] [13] [16] [6] [10] [15] [5].

These detection schemes can be classified into four broad areas: unused address, signature, distributed, and infection pattern based schemes. Schemes based on using unused addresses involve monitoring scans to unused addresses and inactive services. Signature based schemes automatically generate worm signatures. Distributed detection schemes combine information from distributed monitors for detection. Infection pattern based schemes are based on the lifecycle of worms, which describes the process of a worm infection.

Schemes that rely on monitoring probes to unused addresses rely on the observation that legitimate traffic rarely make connection attempts to these addresses [17] [16]. Hosts that make many connection attempts to these unused addresses are flagged as infected hosts. Generally, these schemes are effective against random scanning worms. However, their biggest weakness is their inability to detect worms that do not scan indiscriminately, like hitlist worms [14].

Signature-based schemes automatically extract frequent traffic patterns and consider these as worm signatures [10] [15] [13]. In [13], the authors explored using Rabin fingerprints to automatically generate common signatures of inbound packets. These schemes can detect a wide range of worms, but

suffer from relatively high false positive rates and processing requirements.

Distributed detection schemes combine evidence from multiple distributed sub-networks to increase the address space been monitored, which can decrease the detection time and false positive rates [6]. However, these schemes require a significant percentage of heterogeneous networks in the Internet to buy into the scheme, which is currently unrealistic.

Finally, there are the infection pattern based schemes. Chen and Heidemann [5] proposed a scheme, named DEWP, that matched incoming and outgoing destination ports that have one or more connection requests. Their idea is based on the observation that worms consistently probe for new victims on the same set of destination ports. After matching ports, they searched for large increases in the number of unique destination addresses on those ports. We will show later in our testing that DEWP has a high false positive rate.

There has been work relating to hitlist worms, but it aims to reduce the effectiveness of hitlist worms, rather than detect them. In [1], the gathered address list of hitlist worms are quickly made outdated by periodically randomising the address space of the network.

Hence, there is a need for a detection algorithm that i) only monitors traffic on the network where it is deployed; ii) does not rely on scans to unused addresses, so that it can detect hitlist worms; iii) has low false positive rates; and iv) has low computational requirements.

In this paper, we present a worm detection scheme that has all four characteristics, named *History-based IP Worm Detection* (HIWD). It is based on monitoring the number of unique inbound source and outbound destination addresses seen in a time window. To reduce the false positive rate, HIWD uses the following observations about the access history of inbound connections:

- The group of regular users of a network form a relatively stable set of source addresses. In contrast, during a worm outbreak, the source addresses of connections requests are unlikely to have been seen at the network previously.
- Source addresses that share a common network prefix are usually topologically near. If one of these addresses represents a regular user, it is likely the other addresses represent legitimate users.

When tested on a small network, we found HIWD detected hitlist worms when only 6% of vulnerable hosts were infected,

and with no false positives. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first to be able to detect hitlist worms quickly and efficiently when protecting a local network.

II. BACKGROUND

In this section, we present an introduction to a worm lifecycle proposal, used in the detection scheme. We also describe several types of worms, based on their scanning techniques.

A. Worm Lifecycle

In [3], a four stage worm life-cycle was presented. The first stage, *target selection*, represents an infected host scanning for new victims. In the next stage, *exploitation*, the worm compromises the selected victim. Then in the third stage, *infection*, the worm copies itself onto the compromised host. In the last stage, *propagation*, the newly infected victim scans for new victims to infect. This stage is the same as the target selection stage, except it is from the perspective of the newly infected host.

B. Scanning Methods

- 1) Random Scanning: Many worms in the wild use this scanning strategy. They choose a new host to scan in a random, uniform way.
- 2) Routable Scanning: Propagation can be accelerated by only probing routable addresses. Zou et al [19] found 28.6% of the IPv4 address space has been allocated and routable. Hence, a routable scanning worm can still scan all potential victims, but reduce the scanning space by 71.4%.
- 3) HitList Scanning: All worms suffer from a long initial startup phase. One proposed solution [14] is for the worm author to collect an initial hitlist of targets, and use it to generate probing targets. When the hitlist is exhausted, the worm can revert back to random scanning. If the hitlist only contained existing hosts, hitlist worms can overcome detection techniques that rely on detecting probes to unused addresses. An example of a hitlist worm is the Witty worm [12].

III. HISTORY-BASED IP WORM DETECTION

In this section, we define the scope of our problem, as well as outlining the worm features used for detection. Then we describe the History-based IP Worm Detection (HIWD) scheme, and briefly introduce the theory behind change point detection that we use in our scheme.

Let us define the scope of our problem. We define the *protected network* as the network protected by the detection scheme, and the *rest of the Internet* as the other parts of the Internet. Our worm detection scheme monitors the headers of inbound and outbound packet traffic passing between the protected network and the rest of the Internet. It should output an alert when it detects the infection of one or more protected hosts.

A. Source Address History Detection Feature

Part of the detection algorithm of HIWD requires determining how suspicious a connecting host is. In order to achieve this, we use the history of past accesses to the protected network. It has been observed by Peng et al [11] that many legitimate users of a network form a stable group of source addresses; we dub these addresses as the *regular addresses*. In contrast, Yegneswaran et al [18] observed that worm victims are more or less uniformly distributed across the Internet. Given the focus of our work is on the protection of small to medium sized networks, the size of the set of regular addresses is much smaller than the size of all Internet addresses. Hence, the source address of a worm probe is unlikely to be a regular address. Therefore, whether an address is a regular address determines its likelihood of being suspicious.

We can further differentiate between a suspicious and legitimate source address by considering its subnet. Jung et al [8] observed that a new user to the network is likely to come from the same subnet as a regular user, while a worm victim is much less likely to come from a previously seen subnet. Hence, an address that is not a regular address, but shares a subnet with one or more of the regular addresses, is less suspicious than an address that is not a regular address and does not share a subnet with any of the regular addresses. However, it is still more suspicious than a regular address.

More formally, let s be the source address of the incoming connection, SAD and SSD be the set of regular addresses and the set of subnets of all regular addresses respectively, and $Pr_{sus}(s)$ indicates how suspicious address s is. Then $Pr_{sus}(s|s \in SAD) < Pr_{sus}(s|s \notin SAD, s \in SSD) \ll Pr_{sus}(s|s \notin SAD, s \notin SSD)$.

To evaluate whether regular users form a stable set of addresses, we test what proportion of source addresses of inbound connections are regular. Similar to [11], we define regular addresses as those that were seen at least once in a two week window. We used 24 hour traces collected from the University of Melbourne Computer Science Department network from May 22nd to July 12th 2004 to test the regularity of regular addresses. This involved computing how many addresses and subnets over a four day period (7th June to 10th June) appeared in the previous two weeks. These results are presented in Table I. As the table indicates, 65-75% of addresses and 74-76% of subnets were seen previously. Although there is still a significant number of new addresses, we shall show that our detection scheme is still effective with this level of regular users. Note that Peng et al [11] obtained better results when conducting the same experiment on traces from the University of Auckland WAND project and a class C Australian ISP, where they observed, respectively, 88-90% and 76-81% of the test addresses were previously seen.

B. History-based IP Worm Detection

HIWD consists of two stages, which are based on the target selection and propagation stages of the worm lifecycle. The intuition is that a vulnerable host in the protected network will first have to be scanned, infected, then in turn scan for new

Date	Src IP %	Src Subnet %
07-June-04	65.6%	74.2%
08-June-04	69.4%	73.6%
09-June-04	71.6%	74.1%
10-June-04	75.4%	76.0%

TABLE I: Percentage of source addresses and subnets of prefix width 24 previously seen from 23-May-04 to 06-June-04. Melbourne University Computer Science traces.

victims on the same set of ports it was infected from. To lower the false positive rate, the access history detection feature is incorporated into the first stage. We shall describe each stage next.

The first stage, History-based Detector, detects target selection activity. It monitors for suspicious inbound activity, which is characterised by an above average number of unique source addresses seen in a time window [18]. To increase the efficacy of detection based on source address counting, we associate a weight with each source address. The weight is based on the access history feature. Again, let s be the source address of an incoming connection, and i) S_1 be the weight of s if $s \in SAD$; ii) S_2 be the weight of s if $s \notin SAD$, $s \in SSD$; and iii) S_3 be the weight of s if $s \notin SAD, s \notin SSD$. Then we have $0 < S_1 < S_2 < S_3$, reflecting the probability of the weighted address being suspicious. This weighting assists with reducing false positive rates and detection time, as a few scans/accesses from suspicious hosts will trigger the detector, while many more regular users' accesses are needed to falsely trigger the detector. Each detected, suspicious, destination port is reported to the second stage.

The second stage (*Scan Detector*) detects propagation stage activity. If an attack is occurring, and some subset of the hosts in the protected network are infected, then it is likely those newly infected hosts will scan outside of the network on the same set of ports they were infected from. Based on this observation, the Scan Detector monitors for suspicious increases in the number of unique outbound destination addresses, for each reported port. Those ports that are deemed to be suspicious by the Scan Detector are likely to be ports that the worms are using to propagate. These ports can be blocked to enable further investigation of infected hosts and cause of infection.

To decide which deviations in the monitored address counts are suspicious, both detectors use a change point detection technique called CUSUM [2]. CUSUM can detect abrupt changes, as well as slower but sustained increases in the monitored addresses, which naive static thresholding cannot achieve without introducing more false positives. By using the CUSUM technique, HIWD can detect slower worms at similar false positive rates. Figure 1 provides an overview of HIWD.

C. Change Point Detection

In this section, we present a summary of the change point detection theory, particularly how it was adapted for worm detection. For a more complete presentation, refer to [2]. In change point detection, the aim is to monitor a random sequence $\{X_n\}$, $n \leq 0$, and detect significant deviations from




Fig. 1: Architecture of History-based IP Worm Detection

the mean α , called change points. For our detection scheme, X_n is the total (weighted) address count at detection time interval n, and $\alpha \geq 0$

We adapted the method presented in [11] for worm detection (for full details, refer to [4]). It uses the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) change point detection algorithm [2]. The basic idea is to accumulate sequential values of the detection feature X_n that are higher than the mean, α . When the accumulated values y_{τ_T} is greater than a threshold T, where τ_T is the earliest time that $y_n > T$, then a change point m has been detected.

Note that the CUSUM algorithm actually accumulates values of X_n greater than 0, as it assumes the mean is negative. That is, any deviation of X_n less than the magnitude of the (negative) mean is considered normal deviation. As the mean $\alpha \geq 0$, we shift it by β ($\beta > 0$) to obtain the necessary negative mean $\omega = \alpha - \beta$. To maintain statistical consistency, we also shift X_n by β . Hence, we can define y_n now as $y_n = (y_{n-1} + X_n - \beta)^+, y_0 = 0$, where $x^+ = x$ if x > 0, or 0 otherwise. The only parameters that require tuning are the shifted mean ω , which measures what is considered abnormal deviation, and the detection delay $\tau_T - m$, which the threshold T can be derived from. The mean α is measured from the network.

IV. EVALUATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this section, we describe the evaluation of our worm detection scheme, including the worm simulation and the testing procedure. We then present the evaluation of the effectiveness of HIWD in detecting worms that do not indiscriminately scan, and compare this with an earlier approach, DEWP [5]. We also provide a worst case time analysis of HIWD.

A. Hybrid Model Simulation and Testing Procedure

Our evaluation approach is to simulate worm traffic between the Internet and the protected network, and integrate realistic background traffic from real-life packet traces. It is based on the hybrid worm propagation model of Chen et al [5]. Figure 2 shows the general schematic of the simulator.

In our hybrid model, we separate the hosts in the protected network and the hosts in the rest of the Internet into two stratified populations. To model worm propagation between the two populations, we used a modified version of the




Fig. 2: Simulator schematic

basic stratified SIR epidemic model [7]. This modification additionally models the worm probing traffic between the two stratified populations.

We measure the performance of our detection scheme in terms of the infection percentage (i.e., the percentage of the network infected when the first alert is raised), and the number of false positives. To examine infection percentages for the inbound History-based Detector, the background trace was switched off, as the background traffic can trigger the detectors earlier than the true detection time. For testing the false positive rate, only the background traffic was used.

The background traffic used was the Computer Science traces. We chose the trace collected on June 2nd 2004 as the background traffic for testing, because it was part of the traces used to calculate the mean (May 23rd to June 6th), and this trace was not used to build the SAD and SSD databases (June 7th to June 30th). For brevity, we chose to replay connections to destination port 80 (HTTP) only, as this port had the highest background traffic and most likely to cause false positives.

B. Detection of Routable and Hitlist Worms

In this section, we examine the hitlist detection performance of HIWD, as well as the performance for random and routable worms. The shifted mean parameter ω of both inbound and outbound detectors were set to -2.75 and -2.0 respectively. At these values, HIWD did not produce any false positives.

As there are no false positives, we concentrate on the infection percentage results for the three different worm probing methods (Figures 3a and 3b). The results indicate that the detector is effective in detecting routing and hitlist worms, which is the focus of this work. The infection percentages were higher for random scanning worms. We hypothesise this was due to the larger address space scanned by random scanning worms and the relatively low scan rates used for testing (Slammer reportedly had a scan rate of 500 scans/s [9]), so that the effective number of infected source addresses seen at the edge of the protected network is below the average. Although the infection percentages are relatively high for the random scanning worm, HIWD can be complemented by detection schemes that rely on scans to unused addresses [17], which are effective against random scanning worms, but not hitlist worms.

C. Comparison with DEWP

Recall DEWP [5] is another localised detection scheme that monitors for surges in the number of unique addresses seen and combines inbound and outbound evidence. As a comparison, we implemented the DEWP scheme, and followed Chen et al's suggestions for parameter values - detection interval of 1s, measurement interval of 8s, $\alpha = 0.125$.

We examine the relationship between the sensitivity parameter δ , false positives and infection percentage. DEWP generated an alert as soon as there was one infection in the protected network, for $\delta \leq 30$ scans/s. This was for random, routable and hitlist scanning worms. The false positive rate was less promising. Figure 3c shows the relationship between δ and false positives at a worm scan rate of 20 scans/s. The relationship is reaching an asymptotic lower bound of 2000 false positives. That is extremely high, and would infer that DEWP cannot distinguish between worm and normal traffic.

D. False Positives and Infection Percentage


In this section, we examine the false positive rate and the infection rate observed as we vary the shifted mean parameter ω of the CUSUM algorithm in the input and output detectors. We also examine the effect of using both the input and output detectors together, and discuss the effect of the source address databases on false positives.

First, we test the false positive rate of the History-based Detector, by turning the Scan Detector off. When the Scan Detector is off and the inbound mean is low, the number of false alerts is high (see Figure 4a). However, when the History-based Detector is combined with the Scan Detector (Figure 4b) and the outbound mean is set to 2.0, all false positives are eliminated. So to obtain a low number of false positives, low mean values are required. Now consider the effect of varying the inbound mean on infection percentages when the outbound detector is off. As Figure 4c shows, as the inbound mean increases, the infection percentage also increases, which indicates it is not possible to have both low false positive rates and infection percentages when only one detector is used. To achieve this, both detectors of HIWD are needed.


In addition, we tested the effectiveness of our scheme without using the source address databases. Due to the lack of space, we do not present the results, but will state that the infection rate of all three types of worms increased by at least 10% when the databases were not used (for the same false positive rates).

E. Complexity Analysis


In this section, we analyse the worst case time complexity of HIWD. The running time is dominated by the searching time of the address databases. For the databases, we used hashing with ordered buckets and binary search. Let N_{SAD} and N_{SSD} denote the number of addresses and subnets in the databases, respectively. Then, the worst case time complexity of HIWD is $O(\log_2(N_{SAD}) + \log_2(N_{SSD}))$. As it can be seen, even when using simple data structures, our scheme has low worst case computational requirements.



(a) Infection percentages in protected network. Inbound mean =-2.75, outbound mean =-2.0




(b) Infection percentages in the rest of the Internet. Inbound mean = -2.75, outbound mean = -2.0




(c) Number of false positives vs. sensitivity for the DEWP [5] scheme.


Fig. 3: Infection percentages for HIWD (Inbound: detection time = 3, outbound: detection time = 2), and false positive rates for DEWP.



(a) False alerts with inbound detector on and outbound detector off. Inbound: detection time = 3. Random scanning worm, scan rate = 20 scans/s.



(b) False alerts with both inbound and outbound detector on. Inbound: mean =-2.75, detection time =3. Outbound: detection time =2. Random scanning worm, scan rate =20 scans/s.



(c) Infection percentages in protected network. Outbound detector off.

Fig. 4: Effect of varying the shift mean parameter ω on the false positives rates and the infection percentages.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have presented a new worm detection scheme, *History-based IP Worm Detection*. History-based IP Worm Detection is based on the idea that the source address of worm scans are distributed widely, hence unlikely to have been previously seen at the network before, while legitimate users of a network form a stable group of seen addresses. Combined with a simple outbound scan detector, we have shown these detection features allow our scheme to detect routing and hitlist worms quickly, while having low false positive rates. We have also presented a complexity analysis, showing our scheme to have low processing requirements. The History-based IP Worm Detection scheme provides a robust approach to detecting both existing and new generations of worm attacks.

Acknowledgements: This work was supported in part by the Australian Research Council.

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