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



































# Operational notes

Document updated on **July 31, 2022**.

The following colors are **not** part of the final product, but serve as highlights in the editing/review process:

- text that needs attention from the Subject Matter Experts: Mirco, Anna,& Jan
- terms that have not yet been defined in the book
- things that need to be checked only at the very final typesetting stage (and it doesn't make sense to do them before)
- text that needs advice from the communications/marketing team: Aaron & Shane
- text that needs to be completed or otherwise edited (by Sylvia)

# 11 Todo list

12	 Sylvia: This subsection should be in the introduction of the book as it applies to the	
13	entire math part . . . . .	12
14	 zero-knowledge proofs . . . . .	12
15	 add references . . . . .	12
16	 Sylvia: This subsection should be in the introduction of the book as it applies to the	
17	entire math part . . . . .	13
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47	 check reference . . . . .	119
48	 check reference . . . . .	119
49	 add reference . . . . .	120
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## MoonMath manual

100

TechnoBob and the Least Scruples crew

101

July 31, 2022

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

This is dump from other papers as inspiration for the intro:

Zero knowledge proofs are a class of cryptographic protocols in which one can prove honest computation without revealing the inputs to that computation. A simple high-level example of a zero-knowledge proof is the ability to prove one is of legal voting age without revealing the respective age. In a typical zero knowledge proof system, there are two participants: a prover and a verifier. A prover will present a mathematical proof of computation to a verifier to prove honest computation. The verifier will then confirm whether the prover has performed honest computation based on predefined methods. Zero knowledge proofs are of particular interest to public blockchain activities as the verifier can be codified in smart contracts as opposed to trusted parties or third-party intermediaries.

Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are an important privacy-enhancing tool from cryptography. They allow proving the veracity of a statement, related to confidential data, without revealing any information beyond the validity of the statement. ZKPs were initially developed by the academic community in the 1980s, and have seen tremendous improvements since then. They are now of practical feasibility in multiple domains of interest to the industry, and to a large community of developers and researchers. ZKPs can have a positive impact in industries, agencies, and for personal use, by allowing privacy-preserving applications where designated private data can be made useful to third parties, despite not being disclosed to them.

ZKP systems involve at least two parties: a prover and a verifier. The goal of the prover is to convince the verifier that a statement is true, without revealing any additional information. For example, suppose the prover holds a birth certificate digitally signed by an authority. In order to access some service, the prover may have to prove being at least 18 years old, that is, that there exists a birth certificate, tied to the identity of the prover and digitally signed by a trusted certification authority, stating a birthdate consistent with the age claim. A ZKP allows this, without the prover having to reveal the birthdate.

### 1.1 Target audience

This book is accessible for both beginners and experienced developers alike. Concepts are gradually introduced in a logical and steady pace. Nonetheless, the chapters lend themselves rather well to being read in a different order. More experienced developers might get the most benefit by jumping to the chapters that interest them most. If you like to learn by example, then you should go straight to the chapter on Using Clarity.

It is assumed that you have a basic understanding of programming and the underlying logical concepts. The first chapter covers the general syntax of Clarity but it does not delve into what

programming itself is all about. If this is what you are looking for, then you might have a more difficult time working through this book unless you have an (undiscovered) natural affinity for such topics. Do not let that dissuade you though, find an introductory programming book and press on! The straightforward design of Clarity makes it a great first language to pick up.

## 1.2 The Zoo of Zero-Knowledge Proofs

First, a list of zero-knowledge proof systems:

1. Pinocchio (2013): Paper

– Notes: trusted setup

2. BCGTV (2013): Paper

– Notes: trusted setup, implementation

3. BCTV (2013): Paper

– Notes: trusted setup, implementation

4. Groth16 (2016): Paper

– Notes: trusted setup

– Other resources: Talk in 2019 by Georgios Konstantopoulos

5. GM17 (2017): Paper

– Notes: trusted setup

– Other resources: later Simulation extractability in ROM, 2018

6. Bulletproofs (2017): Paper

– Notes: no trusted setup

– Other resources: Polynomial Commitment Scheme on DL, 2016 and KZG10, Polynomial Commitment Scheme on Pairings, 2010

7. Ligero (2017): Paper

– Notes: no trusted setup

– Other resources:

8. Hyrax (2017): Paper

– Notes: no trusted setup

– Other resources:

9. STARKs (2018): Paper

– Notes: no trusted setup

– Other resources:

## 313 10. Aurora (2018): Paper

314 – Notes: transparent SNARK

315 – Other resources:

## 316 11. Sonic (2019): Paper

317 – Notes: SNORK - SNARK with universal and updateable trusted setup, PCS-based

318 – Other resources: Blog post by Mary Maller from 2019 and work on updateable and  
319 universal setup from 2018

## 320 12. Libra (2019): Paper

321 – Notes: trusted setup

322 – Other resources:

## 323 13. Spartan (2019): Paper

324 – Notes: transparent SNARK

325 – Other resources:

## 326 14. PLONK (2019): Paper

327 – Notes: SNORK, PCS-based

328 – Other resources: Discussion on Plonk systems and Awesome Plonk list

## 329 15. Halo (2019): Paper

330 – Notes: no trusted setup, PCS-based, recursive

331 – Other resources:

## 332 16. Marlin (2019): Paper

333 – Notes: SNORK, PCS-based

334 – Other resources: Rust Github

## 335 17. Fractal (2019): Paper

336 – Notes: Recursive, transparent SNARK

337 – Other resources:

## 338 18. SuperSonic (2019): Paper

339 – Notes: transparent SNARK, PCS-based

340 – Other resources: Attack on DARK compiler in 2021

## 341 19. Redshift (2019): Paper

342 – Notes: SNORK, PCS-based

343 – Other resources:

344 **Other resources on the zoo:** Awesome ZKP list on Github, ZKP community with the  
345 reference document

**To Do List**

- Make table for prover time, verifier time, and proof size
- Think of categories - *Achieved Goals*: Trusted setup or not, Post-quantum or not, ...
- Think of categories - *Mathematical background*: Polynomial commitment scheme, ...
- ... while we discuss the points above, we should also discuss a common notation/language for all these things. (E.g. transparent SNARK/no trusted setup/STARK)

**Points to cover while writing**

- Make a historical overview over the "discovery" of the different ZKP systems
- Make reader understand what paper is build on what result etc. - the tree of publications!
- Make reader understand the different terminology, e.g. SNARK/SNORK/STARK, PCS, R1CS, updateable, universal, ...
- Make reader understand the mathematical assumptions - and what this means for the zoo.
- Where will the development/evolution go? What are bottlenecks?

**Other topics I fell into while compiling this list**

- Vector commitments: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/527.pdf>
- Snark1: <http://ace.cs.ohio.edu/~gstewart/papers/snaark1.pdf>
- Virgo?: [https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~kubitron/courses/cs262a-F19/projects/reports/project5\\_report\\_ver2.pdf](https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~kubitron/courses/cs262a-F19/projects/reports/project5_report_ver2.pdf)

## Chapter 2

## Preliminaries

### 2.1 Preface and Acknowledgements

This book began as a set of lecture and notes accompanying the zk-Summit 0x and 0xx .... It arose from the desire to collect the scattered information of snarks [] and present them to an audience that does not have a strong background in cryptography []

### 2.2 Purpose of the book

The first version of this book is written by security auditors at Least Authority where we audited quite a few snark based systems. Its included "what we have learned" destilate of the time we spend on various audits.

We intend to let illustrative examples drive the discussion and present the key concepts of pairing computation with as little machinery as possible. For those that are fresh to pairing-based cryptography, it is our hope that this chapter might be particularly useful as a first read and prelude to more complete or advanced expositions (e.g. the related chapters in [Gal12]).

On the other hand, we also hope our beginner-friendly intentions do not leave any sophisticated readers dissatisfied by a lack of formality or generality, so in cases where our discussion does sacrifice completeness, we will at least endeavour to point to where a more thorough exposition can be found.

One advantage of writing a survey on pairing computation in 2012 is that, after more than a decade of intense and fast-paced research by mathematicians and cryptographers around the globe, the field is now racing towards full maturity. Therefore, an understanding of this text will equip the reader with most of what they need to know in order to tackle any of the vast literature in this remarkable field, at least for a while yet.

Since we are aiming the discussion at active readers, we have matched every example with a corresponding snippet of (hyperlinked) Magma [BCP97] code 1 , where we take inspiration from the helpful Magma pairing tutorial by Dominguez Perez et al. [DKS09].

Early in the book we will develop examples that we then later extend with most of the things we learn in each chapter. This way we incrementally build a few real world snarks but over full fledged cryptographic systems that are nevertheless simple enough to be computed by pen and paper to illustrate all steps in great detail.

## 2.3 How to read this book

Books and papers to read: XXXXXXXXXXXX

Software to try: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Correctly prescribing the best reading route for a beginner naturally requires individual diagnosis that depends on their prior knowledge and technical preparation.

## 2.4 Cryptological Systems

The science of information security is referred to as *cryptology*. In the broadest sense, it deals with encryption and decryption processes, with digital signatures, identification protocols, cryptographic hash functions, secrets sharing, electronic voting procedures and electronic money.  
EXPAND

## 2.5 SNARKS

## 2.6 complexity theory

Before we deal with the mathematics behind zero knowledge proof systems, we must first clarify what is meant by the runtime of an algorithm or the time complexity of an entire mathematical problem. This is particularly important for us when we analyze the various snark systems...

For the reader who is interested in complexity theory, we recommend, or example or , as well as the references contained therein.

### 2.6.1 Runtime complexity

The runtime complexity of an algorithm describes, roughly speaking, the amount of elementary computation steps that this algorithm requires in order to solve a problem, depending on the size of the input data.

Of course, the exact amount of arithmetic operations required depends on many factors such as the implementation, the operating system used, the CPU and many more. However, such accuracy is seldom required and is mostly meaningful to consider only the asymptotic computational effort.

In computer science, the runtime of an algorithm is therefore not specified in individual calculation steps, but instead looks for an upper limit which approximates the runtime as soon as the input quantity becomes very large. This can be done using the so-called *Landau notation* (also called big - $\mathcal{O}$ -notation) A precise definition would, however, go beyond the scope of this work and we therefore refer the reader to .

For us, only a rough understanding of transit times is important in order to be able to talk about the security of cryptographic systems. For example,  $\mathcal{O}(n)$  means that the running time of the algorithm to be considered is linearly dependent on the size of the input set  $n$ ,  $\mathcal{O}(n^k)$  means that the running time is polynomial and  $\mathcal{O}(2^n)$  stands for an exponential running time (chapter 2.4).

An algorithm which has a running time that is greater than a polynomial is often simply referred to as *slow*.

A generalization of the runtime complexity of an algorithm is the so-called *time complexity of a mathematical problem*, which is defined as the runtime of the fastest possible algorithm that can still solve this problem ( chapter 3.1).

Since the time complexity of a mathematical problem is concerned with the runtime analysis of all possible (and thus possibly still undiscovered) algorithms, this is often a very difficult and deep-seated question .

For us, the time complexity of the so-called discrete logarithm problem will be important. This is a problem for which we only know slow algorithms on classical computers at the moment, but for which at the same time we cannot rule out that faster algorithms also exist.

STUFF ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIOND

## 2.7 Software Used in This Book

### 2.7.1 Sagemath

It order to provide an interactive learning experience, and to allow getting hands-on with the concepts described in this book, we give examples for how to program them in the Sage programming language. Sage is a dialect of the learning-friendly programming language Python, which was extended and optimized for computing with, in and over algebraic objects. Therefore, we recommend installing Sage before diving into the following chapters.

The installation steps for various system configurations are described on the sage websit <sup>1</sup>. Note however that we use Sage version 9, so if you are using Linux and your package manager only contains version 8, you may need to choose a different installation path, such as using prebuilt binaries.

We recommend the interested reader, who is not familiar with sagemath to read on the many tutorial before starting this book. For example

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<sup>1</sup><https://doc.sagemath.org/html/en/installation/index.html>

# Chapter 3

## arithmetic

### 3.1 Introduction

#### 3.1.1 Aims and target audience

Sylvia: This subsection should be in the introduction of the book as it applies to the entire math part

How much mathematics do you need to understand **zero-knowledge proofs**? The answer, of course, depends on the level of understanding you aim for. It is possible to describe zero-knowledge proofs without using mathematics at all; however, to read a foundational paper like ? and to understand the internals of snark implementations, some knowledge of mathematics is needed to be able to follow the discussion.

The goal of this chapter is therefore to enable a reader who is starting out with nothing more than basic high school algebra to be able to solve simple tasks in the mathematics underlying most zero knowledge proofs without the need of a computer.

Without a solid grounding in mathematics, someone who is interested in learning the concepts of zero-knowledge proofs, but who has never seen or dealt with, say, a prime field 4.3.1, or an elliptic curve 5, may quickly become overwhelmed. This is not so much due to the complexity of the mathematics needed, but rather because of the vast amount of technical jargon, unknown terms, and obscure symbols that quickly makes a text unreadable, even though the concepts themselves are not actually that complicated. As a result, the reader might either lose interest, or pick up some incoherent bits and pieces of knowledge that, in the worst case scenario, result in immature and unsecure code.

This is why we dedicated this chapter to explaining the mathematical foundations needed to understand the basic concepts underlying snark development. We encourage the reader who is not familiar with basic number theory and elliptic curves to take the time and read this and the following chapters, until they are able to solve at least a few exercises in each chapter.

If, on the other hand, you are already skilled in elliptic curve cryptography, feel free to skip this chapter and only come back to it for reference and comparison. Maybe the most interesting parts are XXX .

We start our explanations at a very basic level, and only assume pre-existing knowledge of fundamental concepts like high school integer arithmetic. At the same time, we'll attempt to teach you to "think mathematically", and to show you that there are numbers and mathematical structures out there that appear to be very different from the things you learned about in high school, but on a deeper level, they are actually quite similar, as we will see in various examples below in this chapter.

Sylvia:  
This subsection should be in the introduction of the book as it applies to the entire math part

zero-knowledge proofs

add references



To make it easier to memorize new concepts and symbols, we might frequently link to definitions in the beginning, but as too many links render a text unreadable, we will assume the reader will become familiar with definitions as the text proceeds at which point we will not link them anymore.

We want to stress, however that this introduction is informal, incomplete and optimized to enable the reader to understand zero-knowledge concepts as efficiently as possible. Our focus and design choices are to include as little theory as necessary, focusing on a wealth of numerical examples. We believe that such an informal, example-driven approach to learning mathematics may make it easier for beginners to digest the material in the initial stages.

For instance, as a beginner, you would probably find it more beneficial to first compute a simple toy **snark** with pen and paper all the way through, before actually developing real-world production-ready systems. In addition, it's useful to have a few simple examples in your head before getting started with reading actual academic papers.

However, in order to be able to derive these toy examples, some mathematical groundwork is needed. This chapter therefore will help the inexperienced reader to focus on what we believe is important, accompanied by exercises that you are encouraged to recompute yourself. Every section usually ends with a list of additional exercises in increasing order of difficulty, to help the reader memorize and apply the concepts.

### 3.1.2 The structure of this chapter

**Sylvia:** This subsection should be in the introduction of the book as it applies to the entire math part

We start with a brief recapitulation of basic integer arithmetic like long division, the greatest common divisor and Euclid's algorithm. After that, we introduce modular arithmetic as **the most important skill** to compute our pen-and-paper examples. We then introduce polynomials, compute their analogs to integer arithmetic and introduce the important concept of Lagrange interpolation.

After this practical warm up, we introduce some basic algebraic terms like groups and fields, because those terms are used very frequently in academic papers relating to zero-knowledge proofs. The beginner is advised to memorize those terms and think about them: Why are they defined the way they are? Can you come up with a better definition? How and why is every rule important and what happens if that rule is dropped?

We define these terms in the general abstract way of mathematics, hoping that the non mathematical trained reader will gradually learn to become comfortable with this style. We then give basic examples and do basic computations with these examples to get familiar with the concepts.

**Sylvia:** This subsection should be in the introduction of the book as it applies to the entire math part

## 3.2 Integer arithmetic

In a sense, integer arithmetic is at the heart of large parts of modern cryptography. Fortunately, most readers will probably remember integer arithmetic from school. It is, however, important that you can confidently apply those concepts to understand and execute computations in the many pen-and-paper examples that form an integral part of the MoonMath Manual. We will therefore recapitulate basic arithmetic concepts to refresh your memory and fill any knowledge gaps.

In what follows, we use many mathematical notations, which we summarized in the following table 3.2:

Symbol	Meaning of Symbol
$=$	equals
$:=$	defining the symbol on the r
$\in$	element from a set
$\Leftrightarrow$	logical equivalence
$\sum_{j=n}^k a_j$	summation

Sylvia: We should put this table into the same introduction as 3.1.1

In this book, we use the symbol  $\mathbb{Z}$  as a short description for the set of all **integers**, that is we write:

$$\mathbb{Z} := \{\dots, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots\} \quad (3.1)$$

Integers are also known as **whole numbers**, that is, numbers that can be written without fractional parts. Examples of numbers that are **not** integers are  $\frac{2}{3}$ , 1.2 and  $-1280.006$ .

If  $a \in \mathbb{Z}$  is an integer, then we write  $|a|$  for the **absolute value** of  $a$ , that is, the the non-negative value of  $a$  without regard to its sign:

$$|4| = 4 \quad (3.2)$$

$$|-4| = 4 \quad (3.3)$$

We use the symbol  $\mathbb{N}$  for the set of all positive integers, usually called the set of **natural numbers** and  $\mathbb{N}_0$  for the set of all non negative integers. So whenever you see the symbol  $\mathbb{N}$ , think of the set of all positive integers excluding the number 0:

$$\mathbb{N} := \{1, 2, 3, \dots\} \quad \mathbb{N}_0 := \{0, 1, 2, 3, \dots\}$$

Let  $n \in \mathbb{N}_0$  be a non negative integer and  $(b_0, b_1, \dots, b_k)$  a string of **bits**  $b_j \in \{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{N}_0$  for some non negative integer  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ , such that the following equation holds:

$$n = \sum_{j=0}^k b_j \cdot 2^j \quad (3.4)$$

In this case, we call  $\text{Bits}(n) := \langle b_0, b_1, \dots, b_k \rangle$  the **binary representation** of  $n$ , say that  $n$  is a  $k$ -bit number and call  $k := |n|_2$  the **bit length** of  $n$ . It can be shown, that the binary representation of any non negative integer is unique. We call  $b_0$  the **least significant bit** and  $b_k$  the **most significant bit** and define the **Hamming weight** of an integer as the number of 1s in its binary representation.

In addition, we use the symbol  $\mathbb{Q}$  for the set of all **rational numbers**, which can be represented as the set of all fractions  $\frac{n}{m}$ , where  $n \in \mathbb{Z}$  is an integer and  $m \in \mathbb{N}$  is a natural number, such that there is no other fraction  $\frac{n'}{m'}$  and natural number  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $k \neq 1$  and

$$\frac{n}{m} = \frac{k \cdot n'}{k \cdot m'} \quad (3.5)$$

The sets  $\mathbb{N}$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}$  and  $\mathbb{Q}$  have a notion of addition and multiplication defined on them. Most of us are probably able to do many integer computations in our head, but this gets more and

Sylvia:  
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put this  
table into  
the same  
introduc-  
tion as  
3.1.1

more difficult as these increase in complexity. We will frequently invoke the SageMath system (2.7.1) for more complicated computations (We define rings and fields later in this book):

```

sage: ZZ # A sage notation for the integers      1
Integer Ring                                     2
sage: NN # A sage notation for the natural numbers 3
Non negative integer semiring                   4
sage: QQ # A sage notation for the rational numbers 5
Rational Field                                   6
sage: ZZ(5) # Get an element from the integers   7
5                                                 8
sage: ZZ(5) + ZZ(3)                             9
8                                                10
sage: ZZ(5) * NN(3)                             11
15                                              12
sage: ZZ.random_element(10**50)                 13
43512631279925398721498371206318709954138232194497 14
sage: ZZ(27713).str(2) # Binary string representation 15
110110001000001                                16
sage: NN(27713).str(2) # Binary string representation 17
110110001000001                                18
sage: ZZ(27713).str(16) # Hexadecimal string representation 19
6c41                                            20

```

One set of numbers that is of particular interest to us is the set of **prime numbers**, which are natural numbers  $p \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $p \geq 2$ , which are only divisible by themselves and by 1. All prime numbers apart from the number 2 are called **odd** prime numbers. We write  $\mathbb{P}$  for the set of all prime numbers and  $\mathbb{P}_{\geq 3}$  for the set of all odd prime numbers. The set of prime numbers  $\mathbb{P}$  is an infinite set and can be ordered according to size, which means that for any prime number  $p \in \mathbb{P}$  one can always find another prime number  $p' \in \mathbb{P}$  with  $p < p'$ . It follows that there is no largest prime number. Since prime numbers can be ordered by size, we can write them as follows:

$$2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, \dots \quad (3.6)$$

As the **fundamental theorem of arithmetic** tells us, prime numbers are, in a certain sense, the basic building blocks from which all other natural numbers are composed. To see that, let  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  be any natural number with  $n > 1$ . Then there are always prime numbers  $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k \in \mathbb{P}$ , such that

$$n = p_1 \cdot p_2 \cdot \dots \cdot p_k. \quad (3.7)$$

This representation is unique for each natural number (except for the order of the factors) and is called the **prime factorization** of  $n$ .

*Example 1* (Prime Factorization). To see what we mean by prime factorization of a number, let's look at the number  $504 \in \mathbb{N}$ . To get its prime factors, we can successively divide it by all prime numbers in ascending order starting with 2:

$$504 = 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 7$$

We can double check our findings invoking Sage, which provides an algorithm to factor natural numbers:

```

590 sage: n = NN(504)
591 sage: factor(n)
592 2^3 * 3^2 * 7

```

21  
22  
23

The computation from the previous example reveals an important observation: Computing the factorization of an integer is computationally expensive, because we have to divide repeatedly by all prime numbers smaller than the number itself until all factors are prime numbers themselves. From this, an important question arises: How fast can we compute the prime factorization of a natural number? This question is the famous **integer factorization problem** and, as far as we know, there is currently no method known that can factor integers much faster than the naive approach that just divides the given number by all prime numbers in ascending order.

On the other hand computing the product of a given set of prime numbers, is fast (just multiply all factors) and this simple observation implies that the two processes "prime number multiplication" on the one side and its inverse process "natural number factorization" have very different computational costs. The factorization problem is therefore an example of a so-called **one-way function**: An invertible function that is easy to compute in one direction, but hard to compute in the other direction.

It should be pointed out, however, that the American mathematician Peter W. Shor developed an algorithm in ? which can calculate the prime factorization of a natural number in polynomial time on a quantum computer. The consequence of this is that cryptosystems, which are based on the prime factor problem, are unsafe as soon as practically usable quantum computers become available .

Do we even need this quantum computing excursion?

*Exercise 1.* What is the absolute value of the integers  $-123$ ,  $27$  and  $0$ ?

*Exercise 2.* Compute the factorization of  $30030$  and double check your results using Sage.

*Exercise 3.* Consider the following equation  $4 \cdot x + 21 = 5$ . Compute the set of all solutions for  $x$  under the following alternative assumptions:

1. The equation is defined over the natural numbers.

2. The equation is defined over the integers.

*Exercise 4.* Consider the following equation  $2x^3 - x^2 - 2x = -1$ . Compute the set of all solutions  $x$  under the following assumptions:

1. The equation is defined over the natural numbers.

2. The equation is defined over the integers.

3. The equation is defined over the rational numbers.

**Euclidean Division** As we know from high school mathematics, integers can be added, subtracted and multiplied and the result is guaranteed to always be an integer again. On the contrary division in the commonly understood sense is not defined for integers, as, for example,  $7$  divided by  $3$  will not be an integer again. However it is always possible to divide any two integers if we consider division with remainder. So for example  $7$  divided by  $3$  is equal to  $2$  with a remainder of  $1$ , since  $7 = 2 \cdot 3 + 1$ .

It is the content of this section to introduce division with remainder for integers which is usually called **Euclidean division**. It is an essential technique underlying many concepts in this book. The precise definition is as follows:

Let  $a \in \mathbb{Z}$  and  $b \in \mathbb{Z}$  be two integers with  $b \neq 0$ . Then there is always another integer  $m \in \mathbb{Z}$  and a natural number  $r \in \mathbb{N}$ , with  $0 \leq r < |b|$  such that

$$a = m \cdot b + r \quad (3.8)$$

This decomposition of  $a$  given  $b$  is called **Euclidean division**, where  $a$  is called the **dividend**,  $b$  is called the **divisor**,  $m$  is called the **quotient** and  $r$  is called the **remainder**. It can be shown that both the quotient and the remainder always exist and are unique, as long as the divisor is different from 0.

*Notation and Symbols* 1. Suppose that the numbers  $a, b, m$  and  $r$  satisfy equation (3.8). Then we often write

$$a \operatorname{div} b := m, \quad a \operatorname{mod} b := r \quad (3.9)$$

to describe the quotient and the remainder of the Euclidean division. We also say that an integer  $a$  is divisible by another integer  $b$  if  $a \operatorname{mod} b = 0$  holds. In this case we also write  $b|a$  and call the integer  $a \operatorname{div} b$  the **cofactor** of  $b$  in  $a$ .

So, in a nutshell Euclidean division is a process of dividing one integer by another in a way that produces a quotient and a non-negative remainder, the latter of which is smaller than the absolute value of the divisor.

A special situation occurs whenever the remainder is zero, because in this case the dividend is divisible by the divisor. Our notation  $b|a$  reflects that.

*Example 2.* Applying Euclidean division and our previously defined notation 3.9 to the dividend  $-17$  and the divisor 4, we get

$$-17 \operatorname{div} 4 = -5, \quad -17 \operatorname{mod} 4 = 3$$

because  $-17 = -5 \cdot 4 + 3$  is the Euclidean division of  $-17$  and 4 (the remainder is, by definition, a non-negative number). In this case 4 does not divide  $-17$ , as the remainder is not zero. The truth value of the expression  $4|-17$  therefore is FALSE. On the other hand, the truth value of  $4|12$  is TRUE, since 4 divides 12, as  $12 \operatorname{mod} 4 = 0$ . We can invoke sage to do the computation for us. We get the following:

```
sage: ZZ(-17) // ZZ(4) # Integer quotient      24
-5                                              25
sage: ZZ(-17) % ZZ(4) # remainder              26
3                                              27
sage: ZZ(4).divides(ZZ(-17)) # self divides other 28
False                                         29
sage: ZZ(4).divides(ZZ(12))                   30
True                                          31
```

*Remark 1.* In 3.9 we defined the notation of  $a \operatorname{div} b$  and  $a \operatorname{mod} b$ , in terms of Euclidean division. It should be noted however that many programming languages like Python and Sage, implement both the operator ( $/$ ) as well as the operator ( $\%$ ) differently. Programmers should be aware of this, as the discrepancy between the mathematical notation and the implementation in programming languages might become the source of subtle bugs in implementations of cryptographic primitives.

To give an example consider the the dividend  $-17$  and the divisor  $-4$ . Note that in contrast to the previous example 2, we have a negative divisor. According to our definition we have

$$-17 \operatorname{div} -4 = 5, \quad -17 \operatorname{mod} -4 = 3$$

because  $-17 = 5 \cdot (-4) + 3$  is the Euclidean division of  $-17$  and  $-4$  (the remainder is, by definition, a non-negative number). However using the operators  $(/)$  and  $(\%)$  in Sage we get

```
sage: ZZ(-17) // ZZ(-4) # Integer quotient      32
4                                              33
sage: ZZ(-17) % ZZ(-4) # remainder            34
-1                                           35
sage: ZZ(-17).quo_rem(ZZ(-4)) # not Euclidean division 36
(4, -1)                                     37
```

Methods to compute Euclidean division for integers are called **integer division algorithms**. Probably the best known algorithm is the so-called **long division**, which most of us might have learned in school.

As long division is the standard method used for pen-and-paper division of multi-digit numbers expressed in decimal notation, the reader should become familiar with it as we use it throughout this book when we do simple pen-and-paper computations. However, instead of defining the algorithm formally, we rather give some examples that will hopefully make the process clear.

In a nutshell, the algorithm loops through the digits of the dividend from the left to right, subtracting the largest possible multiple of the divisor (at the digit level) at each stage; the multiples then become the digits of the quotient, and the remainder is the first digit of the dividend.

*Example 3 (Integer Long Division).* To give an example of integer long division algorithm, let's divide the integer  $a = 143785$  by the number  $b = 17$ . Our goal is therefore to find solutions to equation 3.8, that is, we need to find the quotient  $m \in \mathbb{Z}$  and the remainder  $r \in \mathbb{N}$  such that  $143785 = m \cdot 17 + r$ . Using a notation that is mostly used in Commonwealth countries, we compute as follows:

$$\begin{array}{r} 8457 \\ 17 \overline{) 143785} \\ \underline{136} \phantom{00} \\ 77 \phantom{00} \\ \underline{68} \phantom{00} \\ 98 \phantom{00} \\ \underline{85} \phantom{00} \\ 135 \phantom{00} \\ \underline{119} \phantom{00} \\ 16 \end{array} \quad (3.10)$$

We therefore get  $m = 8457$  as well as  $r = 16$  and indeed we have  $143785 = 8457 \cdot 17 + 16$ , which we can double check invoking Sage:

```
sage: ZZ(143785).quo_rem(ZZ(17))              38
(8457, 16)                                    39
sage: ZZ(143785) == ZZ(8457)*ZZ(17) + ZZ(16) # check 40
True                                           41
```

*Exercise 5 (Integer Long Division).* Find an  $m \in \mathbb{Z}$  as well as an  $r \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $0 \leq r < |b|$  such that  $a = m \cdot b + r$  holds for the following pairs  $(a, b) = (27, 5)$ ,  $(a, b) = (27, -5)$ ,  $(a, b) = (127, 0)$ ,  $(a, b) = (-1687, 11)$  and  $(a, b) = (0, 7)$ . In which cases are your solutions unique?

*Exercise 6* (Long Division Algorithm). Write an algorithm that computes integer long division and handling all edge cases properly.

*Exercise 7* (Binary Representation). Write an algorithm that computes the binary representation 3.4 of any non-negative integer.

**The Extended Euclidean Algorithm** One of the most critical parts in this book is the so called modular arithmetic which we will define in 3.3 and its application in the computations of **prime fields** as defined in 4.3.1. To be able to do computations in modular arithmetic, we have to get familiar with the so-called **extended Euclidean algorithm**. We therefore introduce this algorithm here.

The **greatest common divisor** (GCD) of two non-zero integers  $a$  and  $b$ , is defined as the greatest non-zero natural number  $d$  such that  $d$  divides both  $a$  and  $b$ , that is,  $d|a$  as well as  $d|b$ . We write  $\gcd(a, b) := d$  for this number. Since the natural number 1 divides any other integer, 1 is always a common divisor of any two non-zero integers. However it must not be the greatest.

A common method to compute the greatest common divisor is the so called Euclidean algorithm. However since we don't need that algorithm in this book, we will introduce the Extended Euclidean algorithm which is a method to calculate the greatest common divisor of two natural numbers  $a$  and  $b \in \mathbb{N}$ , as well as two additional integers  $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}$ , such that the following equation holds:

$$\gcd(a, b) = s \cdot a + t \cdot b \quad (3.11)$$

The pseudocode in algorithm 1 shows in detail how to calculate the greatest common divisor and the numbers  $s$  and  $t$  with the extended Euclidean algorithm:

---

**Algorithm 1** Extended Euclidean Algorithm

---

**Require:**  $a, b \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $a \geq b$

**procedure** EXT-EUCLID( $a, b$ )

$r_0 \leftarrow a$  and  $r_1 \leftarrow b$

$s_0 \leftarrow 1$  and  $s_1 \leftarrow 0$

$t_0 \leftarrow 0$  and  $t_1 \leftarrow 1$

$k \leftarrow 2$

**while**  $r_{k-1} \neq 0$  **do**

$q_k \leftarrow r_{k-2} \text{ div } r_{k-1}$

$r_k \leftarrow r_{k-2} \text{ mod } r_{k-1}$

$s_k \leftarrow s_{k-2} - q_k \cdot s_{k-1}$

$t_k \leftarrow t_{k-2} - q_k \cdot t_{k-1}$

$k \leftarrow k + 1$

**end while**

**return**  $\gcd(a, b) \leftarrow r_{k-2}$ ,  $s \leftarrow s_{k-2}$  and  $t \leftarrow t_{k-2}$

**end procedure**

**Ensure:**  $\gcd(a, b) = s \cdot a + t \cdot b$

---

The algorithm is simple enough to be done effectively in pen-and-paper examples, where it is common to write it as a table where the rows represent the while-loop and the columns represent the values of the the array  $r$ ,  $s$  and  $t$  with index  $k$ . The following example provides a simple execution:

*Example 4.* To illustrate algorithm 1, we apply it to the numbers  $a = 12$  and  $b = 5$ . Since  $12, 5 \in \mathbb{N}$  as well as  $12 \geq 5$  all requirements are met and we compute as follows:



k	$r_k$	$s_k$	$t_k$
0	12	1	0
1	5	0	1
2	2	1	-2
3	1	-2	5
4	0		

From this we can see that the greatest common divisor of 12 and 5 is  $\gcd(12, 5) = 1$  and that the equation  $1 = (-2) \cdot 12 + 5 \cdot 5$  holds. We can also invoke sage to double check our findings:

```
sage: ZZ(12).xgcd(ZZ(5)) # (gcd(a,b), s, t)
(1, -2, 5)
```

*Exercise 8* (Extended Euclidean Algorithm). Find integers  $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}$  such that  $\gcd(a, b) = s \cdot a + t \cdot b$  holds for the following pairs  $(a, b) = (45, 10)$ ,  $(a, b) = (13, 11)$ ,  $(a, b) = (13, 12)$ . What pairs  $(a, b)$  are coprime?

*Exercise 9* (Towards Prime fields). Let  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  be a natural number and  $p$  a prime number, such that  $n < p$ . What is the greatest common divisor  $\gcd(p, n)$ ?

*Exercise 10*. Find all numbers  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $0 \leq k \leq 100$  such that  $\gcd(100, k) = 5$ .

*Exercise 11*. Show that  $\gcd(n, m) = \gcd(n + m, m)$  for all  $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ .

**Coprime Integers** Coprime integers are integers that do not have a common prime number as a factor. As we will see in 3.3 those numbers are important for our purposes because in modular arithmetic, computation that involve coprime numbers are substantially different from computations on non-coprime numbers 3.3.

The naive way to decide if two integers are coprime would be to divide both number suces- sively by all prime numbers smaller then those numbers to see if they share a common prime factor. However two integers are coprime if and only if their greatest common divisor is 1 and hence computing the  $\gcd$  is the preferred method.

*Example 5*. Consider example 4 again. As we have seen, the greatest common divisor of 12 and 5 is 1. This implies that the integers 12 and 5 are coprime, since they share no divisor other then 1, which is not a prime number.

*Exercise 12*. Consider exercise 8 again. Which pairs  $(a, b)$  from that exercise are coprime?

### 3.3 Modular arithmetic

**Modular arithmetic** is a system of integer arithmetic, where numbers “wrap around” when reaching a certain value, much like calculations on a clock wrap around whenever the value exceeds the number 12. For example, if the clock shows that it is 11 o’clock, then 20 hours later it will be 7 o’clock, not 31 o’clock. The number 31 has no meaning on a normal clock that shows hours.

The number at which the wrap occurs is called the **modulus**. Modular arithmetic general- izes the clock example to arbitrary moduli and studies equations and phenomena that arise in this new kind of arithmetic. It is of central importance for understanding most modern crypto systems, in large parts because modular arithmetic provides the computational infrastrutute for algebraic types that have cryptographically useful examples of one-way functions.



Although modular arithmetic appears very different from ordinary integer arithmetic that we are all familiar with, we encourage the interested reader to work through the example and to discover that, once they get used to the idea that this is a new kind of calculations, it will seem much less daunting.

**Congruence** In what follows, let  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $n \geq 2$  be a fixed natural number that we will call the **modulus** of our modular arithmetic system. With such an  $n$  given, we can then group integers into classes, by saying that two integers are in the same class, whenever their Euclidean division 3.2 by  $n$  will give the same remainder. We then say that two numbers are **congruent** whenever they are in the same class.

*Example 6.* If we choose  $n = 12$  as in our clock example, then the integers  $-7, 5, 17$  and  $29$  are all congruent with respect to  $12$ , since all of them have the remainder  $5$  if we perform Euclidean division on them by  $12$ . In the picture of an analog 12-hour clock, starting at 5 o'clock, when we add 12 hours we are again at 5 o'clock, representing the number  $17$ . On the other hand, when we subtract 12 hours, we are at 5 o'clock again, representing the number  $-7$ .

We can formalize this intuition of what congruence should be into a proper definition utilizing Euclidean division (as explained previously in 3.2): Let  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$  be two integers and  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  a natural number, such that  $n \geq 2$ . Then  $a$  and  $b$  are said to be **congruent with respect to the modulus  $n$** , if and only if the following equation holds

$$a \bmod n = b \bmod n \quad (3.12)$$

If, on the other hand, two numbers are not congruent with respect to a given modulus  $n$ , we call them **incongruent** w.r.t.  $n$ .

A **congruence** is then nothing but an equation "up to congruence", which means that the equation only needs to hold if we take the modulus on both sides. In which case we write

$$a \equiv b \pmod{n} \quad (3.13)$$

*Exercise 13.* Which of the following pairs of numbers are congruent with respect to the modulus  $13$ :  $(5, 19)$ ,  $(13, 0)$ ,  $(-4, 9)$ ,  $(0, 0)$ .

*Exercise 14.* Find all integers  $x$ , such that the congruence  $x \equiv 4 \pmod{6}$  is satisfied.

**Computational Rules** Having defined the notion of a congruence as an equation "up to a modulus", a follow up question is if we can manipulate a congruence similar to an equation. Indeed we can almost apply the same substitution rules to a congruency then to an equation, with the main difference being that for some non-zero integer  $k \in \mathbb{Z}$ , the congruence  $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$  is equivalent to the congruence  $k \cdot a \equiv k \cdot b \pmod{n}$  only, if  $k$  and the modulus  $n$  are coprime 3.2. The following list gives a set of useful rules:

Suppose that integers  $a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2, k \in \mathbb{Z}$  are given. Then the following arithmetic rules hold for congruencies:

- $a_1 \equiv b_1 \pmod{n} \Leftrightarrow a_1 + k \equiv b_1 + k \pmod{n}$  (compatibility with translation)
- $a_1 \equiv b_1 \pmod{n} \Rightarrow k \cdot a_1 \equiv k \cdot b_1 \pmod{n}$  (compatibility with scaling)
- $\gcd(k, n) = 1$  and  $k \cdot a_1 \equiv k \cdot b_1 \pmod{n} \Rightarrow a_1 \equiv b_1 \pmod{n}$
- $k \cdot a_1 \equiv k \cdot b_1 \pmod{k \cdot n} \Rightarrow a_1 \equiv b_1 \pmod{n}$

•  $a_1 \equiv b_1 \pmod{n}$  and  $a_2 \equiv b_2 \pmod{n} \Rightarrow a_1 + a_2 \equiv b_1 + b_2 \pmod{n}$  (compatibility with addition)

•  $a_1 \equiv b_1 \pmod{n}$  and  $a_2 \equiv b_2 \pmod{n} \Rightarrow a_1 \cdot a_2 \equiv b_1 \cdot b_2 \pmod{n}$  (compatibility with multiplication)

Other rules, such as compatibility with subtraction, follow from the rules above. For example, compatibility with subtraction follows from compatibility with scaling by  $k = -1$  and compatibility with addition.

Another property of congruencies, not known in the traditional arithmetic of integers is **Fermat's Little Theorem**. In simple words, it states that, in modular arithmetic, every number raised to the power of a prime number modulus is congruent to the number itself. Or, to be more precise, if  $p \in \mathbb{P}$  is a prime number and  $k \in \mathbb{Z}$  is an integer, then:

$$k^p \equiv k \pmod{p}, \quad (3.14)$$

If  $k$  is coprime to  $p$ , then we can divide both sides of this congruence by  $k$  and rewrite the expression into the equivalent form

$$k^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \quad (3.15)$$

The following sage code computes example effects of Fermat's little theorem and highlights the effects of the exponent  $k$  being coprime and not coprime to  $p$ :

```
sage: ZZ(137).gcd(ZZ(64))      44
1                                45
sage: ZZ(64)^ZZ(137)%ZZ(137) == ZZ(64)%ZZ(137)  46
True                             47
sage: ZZ(64)^ZZ(137-1)%ZZ(137) == ZZ(1)%ZZ(137)  48
True                             49
sage: ZZ(1918).gcd(ZZ(137))    50
137                             51
sage: ZZ(1918)^ZZ(137)%ZZ(137) == ZZ(1918)%ZZ(137)  52
True                             53
sage: ZZ(1918)^ZZ(137-1)%ZZ(137) == ZZ(1)%ZZ(137)  54
False                            55
```

Let's compute an example that contains most of the concepts described in this section:

*Example 7.* Assume that we consider the modulus 6 and that our task is to solve the following congruence for  $x \in \mathbb{Z}$

$$7 \cdot (2x + 21) + 11 \equiv x - 102 \pmod{6}$$

As many rules for congruencies are more or less same as for integers, we can proceed in a similar way as we would if we had an equation to solve. Since both sides of a congruence contain ordinary integers, we can rewrite the left side as follows:  $7 \cdot (2x + 21) + 11 = 14x + 147 + 11 = 14x + 158$ . We can therefore rewrite the congruence into the equivalent form

$$14x + 158 \equiv x - 102 \pmod{6}$$

In the next step we want to shift all instances of  $x$  to left and every other term to the right. So we apply the "compatibility with translation" rules two times. In a first step we choose  $k = -x$

and in a second step we choose  $k = -158$ . Since “compatibility with translation” transforms a congruence into an equivalent form, the solution set will not change and we get

$$\begin{aligned} 14x + 158 &\equiv x - 102 \pmod{6} \Leftrightarrow \\ 14x - x + 158 - 158 &\equiv x - x - 102 - 158 \pmod{6} \Leftrightarrow \\ 13x &\equiv -260 \pmod{6} \end{aligned}$$

If our congruence would just be a normal integer equation, we would divide both sides by 13 to get  $x = -20$  as our solution. However, in case of a congruence, we need to make sure that the modulus and the number we want to divide by are coprime first – only then will we get an equivalent expression (See rule XXX). So we need to find the greatest common divisor  $\gcd(13, 6)$ . Since 13 is prime and 6 is not a multiple of 13, we know that  $\gcd(13, 6) = 1$ , so these numbers are indeed coprime. We therefore compute

$$13x \equiv -260 \pmod{6} \Leftrightarrow x \equiv -20 \pmod{6}$$

Our task is now to find all integers  $x$ , such that  $x$  is congruent to  $-20$  with respect to the modulus 6. So we have to find all  $x$  such

$$x \bmod 6 = -20 \bmod 6$$

Since  $-4 \cdot 6 + 4 = -20$  we know  $-20 \bmod 6 = 4$  and hence we know that  $x = 4$  is a solution to this congruence. However, 22 is another solution since  $22 \bmod 6 = 4$  as well, and so is  $-20$ . In fact, there are infinitely many solutions given by the set

$$\{\dots, -8, -2, 4, 10, 16, \dots\} = \{4 + k \cdot 6 \mid k \in \mathbb{Z}\}$$

Putting all this together, we have shown that the every  $x$  from the set  $\{x = 4 + k \cdot 6 \mid k \in \mathbb{Z}\}$  is a solution to the congruence  $7 \cdot (2x + 21) + 11 \equiv x - 102 \pmod{6}$ . We double ckeck for, say,  $x = 4$  as well as  $x = 4 + 12 \cdot 6 = 76$  using sage:

```

829 sage: (ZZ(7) * (ZZ(2) * ZZ(4) + ZZ(21)) + ZZ(11)) % ZZ(6) == (ZZ 56
830       (4) - ZZ(102)) % ZZ(6)
831 True
832 sage: (ZZ(7) * (ZZ(2) * ZZ(76) + ZZ(21)) + ZZ(11)) % ZZ(6) == ( 58
833       ZZ(76) - ZZ(102)) % ZZ(6)
834 True

```

Readers who had not been familiar with modular arithmetic until now and who might be discouraged by how complicated modular arithmetic seems at this point, should keep two things in mind. First, computing congruencies in modular arithmetic is not really more complicated than computations in more familiar number systems (e.g. rational numbers), it is just a matter of getting used to it. Second, once we introduce the idea of remainder class representations 3.3, computations become conceptually cleaner and more easy to handle.

*Exercise 15.* Consider the modulus 13 and find all solutions  $x \in \mathbb{Z}$  to the following congruence  $5x + 4 \equiv 28 + 2x \pmod{13}$

*Exercise 16.* Consider the modulus 23 and find all solutions  $x \in \mathbb{Z}$  to the following congruence  $69x \equiv 5 \pmod{23}$

*Exercise 17.* Consider the modulus 23 and find all solutions  $x \in \mathbb{Z}$  to the following congruence  $69x \equiv 46 \pmod{23}$

- 847 *Exercise 18.* Let  $a, b, k$  be integers, such that  $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$  holds. Show  $a^k \equiv b^k \pmod{n}$ .  
 848 *Exercise 19.* Let  $a, n$  be integers, such that  $a$  and  $n$  are not coprime. For which  $b \in \mathbb{Z}$  does the  
 849 congruence  $a \cdot x \equiv b \pmod{n}$  have a solution  $x$  and how does the solution set look in that  
 850 case?

851 **The Chinese Remainder Theorem** We have seen how to solve congruencies in modular  
 852 arithmetic. However, one question that remains is how to solve systems of congruencies with  
 853 different moduli? The answer is given by the **Chinese remainder theorem**, which states that  
 854 for any  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  and coprime natural numbers  $n_1, \dots, n_k \in \mathbb{N}$  as well as integers  $a_1, \dots, a_k \in \mathbb{Z}$ , the  
 855 so-called **simultaneous congruences**

$$\begin{aligned} x &\equiv a_1 \pmod{n_1} \\ x &\equiv a_2 \pmod{n_2} \\ &\dots \\ x &\equiv a_k \pmod{n_k} \end{aligned} \tag{3.16}$$

856 has a solution, and all possible solutions of this congruence system are congruent modulo the  
 product  $N = n_1 \cdot \dots \cdot n_k$ .<sup>1</sup> In fact, the following algorithm computes the solution set:

---

**Algorithm 2** Chinese Remainder Theorem

---

**Require:**  $k \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,  $j \in \mathbb{N}_0$  and  $n_0, \dots, n_{k-1} \in \mathbb{N}$  coprime

**procedure** CONGRUENCE-SYSTEMS-SOLVER( $a_0, \dots, a_{k-1}$ )

$N \leftarrow n_0 \cdot \dots \cdot n_{k-1}$

**while**  $j < k$  **do**

$N_j \leftarrow N / n_j$

$(-, s_j, t_j) \leftarrow EXT - EUCLID(N_j, n_j)$

$$\triangleright 1 = s_j \cdot N_j + t_j \cdot n_j$$

**end while**

$x' \leftarrow \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} a_j \cdot s_j \cdot N_j$

$x \leftarrow x' \bmod N$

**return**  $\{x + m \cdot N \mid m \in \mathbb{Z}\}$

**end procedure**

**Ensure:**  $\{x + m \cdot N \mid m \in \mathbb{Z}\}$  is the complete solution set to 3.16.

---

857

*Example 8.* To illustrate how to solve simultaneous congruences using the Chinese remainder theorem, let's look at the following system of congruencies:

$$\begin{aligned} x &\equiv 4 \pmod{7} \\ x &\equiv 1 \pmod{3} \\ x &\equiv 3 \pmod{5} \\ x &\equiv 0 \pmod{11} \end{aligned}$$

Clearly all moduli are coprime and we have  $N = 7 \cdot 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 11 = 1155$ , as well as  $N_1 = 165$ ,  $N_2 = 385$ ,  $N_3 = 231$  and  $N_4 = 105$ . From this we calculate with the extended Euclidean algorithm

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= 2 \cdot 165 + (-47) \cdot 7 \\ 1 &= 1 \cdot 385 + (-128) \cdot 3 \\ 1 &= 1 \cdot 231 + (-46) \cdot 5 \\ 1 &= 2 \cdot 105 + (-19) \cdot 11 \end{aligned}$$

---

<sup>1</sup>This is the classical Chinese remainder theorem as it was already known in ancient China. Under certain circumstances, the theorem can be extended to non-coprime moduli  $n_1, \dots, n_k$  but this is beyond the scope of this book. Interested readers should consult XXX [add references](#)

check  
algorithm  
floating

so we have  $x = 4 \cdot 2 \cdot 165 + 1 \cdot 1 \cdot 385 + 3 \cdot 1 \cdot 231 + 0 \cdot 2 \cdot 105 = 2398$  as one solution. Because  $2398 \bmod 1155 = 88$  the set of all solutions is  $\{\dots, -2222, -1067, 88, 1243, 2398, \dots\}$ . We can invoke Sage's computation of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) to double check our findings:

```
sage: CRT_list([4,1,3,0], [7,3,5,11])
88
```

60  
61

**Remainder Class Representation** As we have seen in various examples before, computing congruencies can be cumbersome and solution sets are large in general. It is therefore advantageous to find some kind of simplification for modular arithmetic.

Fortunately, this is possible and relatively straightforward once we identify each set of numbers with equal remainder with that remainder itself and call it the **remainder class** or **residue class** representation in modulo  $n$  arithmetic.

It then follows from the properties of Euclidean division that there are exactly  $n$  different remainder classes for every modulus  $n$  and that integer addition and multiplication can be projected to a new kind of addition and multiplication on those classes.

Roughly speaking, the new rules for addition and multiplication are then computed by taking any element of the first remainder class and some element of the second, then add or multiply them in the usual way and see which remainder class the result is contained in. The following example makes this abstract description more concrete:

*Example 9* (Arithmetic modulo 6). Choosing the modulus  $n = 6$ , we have six remainder classes of integers which are congruent modulo 6 (they have the same remainder when divided by 6) and when we identify each of those remainder classes with the remainder, we get the following identification:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &:= \{\dots, -6, 0, 6, 12, \dots\} \\ 1 &:= \{\dots, -5, 1, 7, 13, \dots\} \\ 2 &:= \{\dots, -4, 2, 8, 14, \dots\} \\ 3 &:= \{\dots, -3, 3, 9, 15, \dots\} \\ 4 &:= \{\dots, -2, 4, 10, 16, \dots\} \\ 5 &:= \{\dots, -1, 5, 11, 17, \dots\} \end{aligned}$$

Now to compute the new addition law of those remainder class representatives, say  $2 + 5$ , one chooses arbitrary elements from both classes, say 14 and  $-1$ , adds those numbers in the usual way and then looks at the remainder class of the result.

So we get  $14 + (-1) = 13$ , and 13 is in the remainder class (of) 1. Hence we find that  $2 + 5 = 1$  in modular 6 arithmetic, which is a more readable way to write the congruence  $2 + 5 \equiv 1 \pmod{6}$ .

Applying the same reasoning to all remainder classes, addition and multiplication can be transferred to the representatives of the remainder classes. The results for modulus 6 arithmetic are summarized in the following addition and multiplication tables:

+	0	1	2	3	4	5	·	0	1	2	3	4	5
0	0	1	2	3	4	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	2	3	4	5	0	1	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	2	3	4	5	0	1	2	0	2	4	0	2	4
3	3	4	5	0	1	2	3	0	3	0	3	0	3
4	4	5	0	1	2	3	4	0	4	2	0	4	2
5	5	0	1	2	3	4	5	0	5	4	3	2	1

This way, we have defined a new arithmetic system that contains just 6 numbers and comes with its own definition of addition and multiplication. We call it **modular 6 arithmetic** and write the associated type as  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ .

To see why such an identification of a remainder class with its remainder is useful and actually simplifies congruence computations a lot, let's go back to the congruence from example 7 again:

$$7 \cdot (2x + 21) + 11 \equiv x - 102 \pmod{6} \quad (3.17)$$

As shown in example 7, the arithmetic of congruencies can deviate from ordinary arithmetic: For example, division needs to check whether the modulus and the dividend are coprimes, and solutions are not unique in general.

We can rewrite this congruence as an **equation** over our new arithmetic type  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  by **projecting onto the remainder classes**. In particular, since  $7 \bmod 6 = 1$ ,  $21 \bmod 6 = 3$ ,  $11 \bmod 6 = 5$  and  $102 \bmod 6 = 0$  we have

$$\begin{aligned} 7 \cdot (2x + 21) + 11 &\equiv x - 102 \pmod{6} \text{ over } \mathbb{Z} \\ &\Leftrightarrow 1 \cdot (2x + 3) + 5 = x \text{ over } \mathbb{Z}_6 \end{aligned}$$

We can use the multiplication and addition table above to solve the equation on the right like we would solve normal integer equations:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 \cdot (2x + 3) + 5 &= x \\ 2x + 3 + 5 &= x && \# \text{ addition-table: } 3 + 5 = 2 \\ 2x + 2 &= x && \# \text{ add 4 and } -x \text{ on both sides} \\ 2x + 2 + 4 - x &= x + 4 - x && \# \text{ addition-table: } 2 + 4 = 0 \\ x &= 4 \end{aligned}$$

As we can see, despite the somewhat unfamiliar rules of addition and multiplication, solving congruencies this way is very similar to solving normal equations. And, indeed, the solution set is identical to the solution set of the original congruence, since 4 is identified with the set  $\{4 + 6 \cdot k \mid k \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ .

We can invoke Sage to do computations in our modular 6 arithmetic type. This is particularly useful to double-check our computations:

```
sage: Z6 = Integers(6)          62
sage: Z6(2) + Z6(5)             63
1                                64
sage: Z6(7) * (Z6(2) * Z6(4) + Z6(21)) + Z6(11) == Z6(4) - Z6(102) 65
True                             66
```

*Remark 2 (k-bit modulus).* In cryptographic papers, we sometimes read phrases like “[...] using a 4096-bit modulus”. This means that the underlying modulus  $n$  of the modular arithmetic used in the system has a binary representation with a length of 4096 bits. In contrast, the number 6 has the binary representation 110 and hence our example 9 describes a 3-bit modulus arithmetic system.

*Exercise 20.* Define  $\mathbb{Z}_{13}$  as the the arithmetic modulo 13 analog to example 9. Then consider the congruence from exercise 15 and rewrite it into an equation in  $\mathbb{Z}_{13}$

**Modular Inverses** As we know, integers can be added, subtracted and multiplied so that the result is also an integer, but this is not true for the division of integers in general: for example,  $3/2$  is not an integer anymore. To see why this is, from a more theoretical perspective, let us consider the definition of a multiplicative inverse first. When we have a set that has some kind of multiplication defined on it and we have a distinguished element of that set that behaves neutrally with respect to that multiplication (doesn't change anything when multiplied with any other element), then we can define **multiplicative inverses** in the following way:

Let  $S$  be our set that has some notion  $a \cdot b$  of multiplication and a **neutral element**  $1 \in S$ , such that  $1 \cdot a = a$  for all elements  $a \in S$ . Then a **multiplicative inverse**  $a^{-1}$  of an element  $a \in S$  is defined as follows:

$$a \cdot a^{-1} = 1 \quad (3.18)$$

Informally speaking, the definition of a multiplicative inverse means that it “cancels” the original element to give 1 when they are multiplied.

Numbers that have multiplicative inverses are of particular interest, because they immediately lead to the definition of division by those numbers. In fact, if  $a$  is number such that the multiplicative inverse  $a^{-1}$  exists, then we define **division** by  $a$  simply as multiplication by the inverse:

$$\frac{b}{a} := b \cdot a^{-1} \quad (3.19)$$

*Example 10.* Consider the set of rational numbers, also known as fractions,  $\mathbb{Q}$ . For this set, the neutral element of multiplication is 1, since  $1 \cdot a = a$  for all rational numbers. For example,  $1 \cdot 4 = 4$ ,  $1 \cdot \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{4}$ , or  $1 \cdot 0 = 0$  and so on.

Every rational number  $a \neq 0$  has a multiplicative inverse, given by  $\frac{1}{a}$ . For example, the multiplicative inverse of 3 is  $\frac{1}{3}$ , since  $3 \cdot \frac{1}{3} = 1$ , the multiplicative inverse of  $\frac{5}{7}$  is  $\frac{7}{5}$ , since  $\frac{5}{7} \cdot \frac{7}{5} = 1$ , and so on.

*Example 11.* Looking at the set  $\mathbb{Z}$  of integers, we see that with respect to multiplication the neutral element is the number 1 and we notice that no integer other than 1 or  $-1$  has a multiplicative inverse, since the equation  $a \cdot x = 1$  has no integer solutions for  $a \neq 1$  or  $a \neq -1$ .

The definition of multiplicative inverse works verbatim for addition as well where it is called the additive inverse. In the case of integers, the neutral element with respect to addition is 0, since  $a + 0 = a$  for all integers  $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ . The additive inverse always exist and is given by the negative number  $-a$ , since  $a + (-a) = 0$ .

*Example 12.* Looking at the set  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  of residual classes modulo 6 from example 9, we can use the multiplication table to find multiplicative inverses. To do so, we look at the row of the element and then find the entry equal to 1. If such an entry exists, the element of that column is the multiplicative inverse. If, on the other hand, the row has no entry equal to 1, we know that the element has no multiplicative inverse.

For example in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  the multiplicative inverse of 5 is 5 itself, since  $5 \cdot 5 = 1$ . We can also see that 5 and 1 are the only elements that have multiplicative inverses in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ .

Now, since 5 has a multiplicative inverse in modulo 6 arithmetic, we can divide by 5 in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ , since we have a notation of multiplicative inverse and division is nothing but multiplication by the multiplicative inverse. For example

$$\frac{4}{5} = 4 \cdot 5^{-1} = 4 \cdot 5 = 2$$

From the last example, we can make the interesting observation that while 5 has no multiplicative inverse as an integer, it has a multiplicative inverse in modular 6 arithmetic.

This raises the question which numbers have multiplicative inverses in modular arithmetic. The answer is that, in modular  $n$  arithmetic, a number  $r$  has a multiplicative inverse, if and only if  $n$  and  $r$  are coprime. Since  $\gcd(n, r) = 1$  in that case, we know from the extended Euclidean algorithm that there are numbers  $s$  and  $t$ , such that

$$1 = s \cdot n + t \cdot r \quad (3.20)$$

If we take the modulus  $n$  on both sides, the term  $s \cdot n$  vanishes, which tells us that  $t \bmod n$  is the multiplicative inverse of  $r$  in modular  $n$  arithmetic.

*Example 13* (Multiplicative inverses in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ ). In the previous example, we looked up multiplicative inverses in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  from the lookup-table in Example 9. In real world examples, it is usually impossible to write down those lookup tables, as the modulus is way too large, and the sets occasionally contain more elements than there are atoms in the observable universe.

Now, trying to determine that  $2 \in \mathbb{Z}_6$  has no multiplicative inverse in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  without using the lookup table, we immediately observe that 2 and 6 are not coprime, since their greatest common divisor is 2. It follows that equation 3.20 has no solutions  $s$  and  $t$ , which means that 2 has no multiplicative inverse in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ .

The same reasoning works for 3 and 4, as neither of these are coprime with 6. The case of 5 is different, since  $\gcd(6, 5) = 1$ . To compute the multiplicative inverse of 5, we use the extended Euclidean algorithm and compute the following:

k	$r_k$	$s_k$	$t_k = (r_k - s_k \cdot a) \div b$
0	6	1	0
1	5	0	1
2	1	1	-1
3	0	.	.

We get  $s = 1$  as well as  $t = -1$  and have  $1 = 1 \cdot 6 - 1 \cdot 5$ . From this, it follows that  $-1 \bmod 6 = 5$  is the multiplicative inverse of 5 in modular 6 arithmetic. We can double check using Sage:

```
sage: ZZ(6).xgcd(ZZ(5))
(1, 1, -1)
```

67  
68

At this point, the attentive reader might notice that the situation where the modulus is a prime number is of particular interest, because we know from exercise 9 that in these cases all remainder classes must have modular inverses, since  $\gcd(r, n) = 1$  for prime  $n$  and any  $r < n$ . In fact, Fermat's little theorem provides a way to compute multiplicative inverses in this situation, since in case of a prime modulus  $p$  and  $r < p$ , we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} r^p &\equiv r \pmod{p} \Leftrightarrow \\ r^{p-1} &\equiv 1 \pmod{p} \Leftrightarrow \\ r \cdot r^{p-2} &\equiv 1 \pmod{p} \end{aligned}$$

This tells us that the multiplicative inverse of a residue class  $r$  in modular  $p$  arithmetic is precisely  $r^{p-2}$ .

*Example 14* (Modular 5 arithmetic). To see the unique properties of modular arithmetic when the modulus is a prime number, we will replicate our findings from example 9, but this time for the prime modulus 5. For  $n = 5$  we have five equivalence classes of integers which are



congruent modulo 5. We write this as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &:= \{\dots, -5, 0, 5, 10, \dots\} \\ 1 &:= \{\dots, -4, 1, 6, 11, \dots\} \\ 2 &:= \{\dots, -3, 2, 7, 12, \dots\} \\ 3 &:= \{\dots, -2, 3, 8, 13, \dots\} \\ 4 &:= \{\dots, -1, 4, 9, 14, \dots\} \end{aligned}$$

978 Addition and multiplication can be transferred to the equivalence classes, in a way exactly  
979 parallel to Example 9. This results in the following addition and multiplication tables:

	+	0	1	2	3	4		·	0	1	2	3	4
	0	0	1	2	3	4		0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	1	2	3	4	0		1	0	1	2	3	4
980	2	2	3	4	0	1		2	0	2	4	1	3
	3	3	4	0	1	2		3	0	3	1	4	2
	4	4	0	1	2	3		4	0	4	3	2	1

981 Calling the set of remainder classes in modular 5 arithmetic with this addition and multiplication  
982  $\mathbb{Z}_5$ , we see some subtle but important differences to the situation in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ . In particular, we see  
983 that in the multiplication table, every remainder  $r \neq 0$  has the entry 1 in its row and therefore  
984 has a multiplicative inverse. In addition, there are no non-zero elements such that their product  
985 is zero.

986 To use Fermat's little theorem in  $\mathbb{Z}_5$  for computing multiplicative inverses (instead of using  
987 the multiplication table), let's consider  $3 \in \mathbb{Z}_5$ . We know that the multiplicative inverse is given  
988 by the remainder class that contains  $3^{5-2} = 3^3 = 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 3 = 4 \cdot 3 = 2$ . And indeed  $3^{-1} = 2$ , since  
989  $3 \cdot 2 = 1$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_5$ .

990 We can invoke Sage to do computations in our modular 5 arithmetic type to double-check  
991 our computations:

```

992 sage: Z5 = Integers(5)                                     69
993 sage: Z5(3) ** (5-2)                                       70
994 2                                                         71
995 sage: Z5(3) ** (-1)                                       72
996 2                                                         73
997 sage: Z5(3) ** (5-2) == Z5(3) ** (-1)                   74
998 True                                                       75

```

*Example 15.* To understand one of the principal differences between prime number modular arithmetic and non-prime number modular arithmetic, consider the linear equation  $a \cdot x + b = 0$  defined over both types  $\mathbb{Z}_5$  and  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ . Since in  $\mathbb{Z}_5$  every non-zero element has a multiplicative inverse, we can always solve these equations in  $\mathbb{Z}_5$ , which is not true in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ . To see that, consider the equation  $3x + 3 = 0$ . In  $\mathbb{Z}_5$  we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} 3x + 3 &= 0 && \# \text{ add 2 and on both sides} \\ 3x + 3 + 2 &= 2 && \# \text{ addition-table: } 2 + 3 = 0 \\ 3x &= 2 && \# \text{ divide by 3 (which equals multiplication by 2)} \\ 2 \cdot (3x) &= 2 \cdot 2 && \# \text{ multiplication-table: } 2 \cdot 2 = 4 \\ x &= 4 \end{aligned}$$

So in the case of our prime number modular arithmetic, we get the unique solution  $x = 4$ . Now consider  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ :

$$\begin{array}{ll} 3x + 3 = 0 & \# \text{ add 3 and on both sides} \\ 3x + 3 + 3 = 3 & \# \text{ addition-table: } 3 + 3 = 0 \\ 3x = 3 & \# \text{ division not possible (no multiplicative inverse of 3 exists)} \end{array}$$

So, in this case, we cannot solve the equation for  $x$  by dividing by 3. And, indeed, when we look at the multiplication table of  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  (Example 9), we find that there are three solutions  $x \in \{1, 3, 5\}$ , such that  $3x + 3 = 0$  holds true for all of them.

*Exercise 21.* Consider the modulus  $n = 24$ . Which of the integers 7, 1, 0, 805,  $-4255$  have multiplicative inverses in modular 24 arithmetic? Compute the inverses, in case they exist.

*Exercise 22.* Find the set of all solutions to the congruence  $17(2x + 5) - 4 \equiv 2x + 4 \pmod{5}$ . Then project the congruence into  $\mathbb{Z}_5$  and solve the resulting equation in  $\mathbb{Z}_5$ . Compare the results.

*Exercise 23.* Find the set of all solutions to the congruence  $17(2x + 5) - 4 \equiv 2x + 4 \pmod{6}$ . Then project the congruence into  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  and try to solve the resulting equation in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ .

## 3.4 Polynomial arithmetic

A polynomial is an expression consisting of variables (also called indeterminates) and coefficients that involves only the operations of addition, subtraction and multiplication. All coefficients of a polynomial must have the same type, e.g. being integers or rational numbers etc. To be more precise an *univariate polynomial* is an expression

$$P(x) := \sum_{j=0}^m a_j x^j = a_m x^m + a_{m-1} x^{m-1} + \cdots + a_1 x + a_0, \quad (3.21)$$

where  $x$  is called the **indeterminate**, each  $a_j$  is called a **coefficient**. If  $R$  is the type of the coefficients, then the set of all **univariate<sup>2</sup> polynomials with coefficients in  $R$**  is written as  $R[x]$ . We often simply use **polynomial** instead of univariate polynomial, write  $P(x) \in R[x]$  for a polynomial and denote the constant term  $a_0$  as  $P(0)$ .

A polynomial is called the **zero polynomial** if all coefficients are zero and a polynomial is called the **one polynomial** if the constant term is 1 and all other coefficients are zero.

Given an univariate polynomial  $P(x) = \sum_{j=0}^m a_j x^j$  that is not the zero polynomial, we call the non-negative integer  $\deg(P) := m$  the *degree* of  $P$  and define the degree of the zero polynomial to be  $-\infty$ , where  $-\infty$  (negative infinity) is a symbol with the properties that  $-\infty + m = -\infty$  and  $-\infty < m$  for all non-negative integers  $m \in \mathbb{N}_0$ . In addition, we write

$$Lc(P) := a_m \quad (3.22)$$

and call it the **leading coefficient** of the polynomial  $P$ . We can restrict the set  $R[x]$  of all polynomials with coefficients in  $R$ , to the set of all such polynomials that have a degree that does not exceed a certain value. If  $m$  is the maximum degree allowed, we write  $R_{\leq m}[x]$  for the set of all polynomials with a degree less than or equal to  $m$ .

<sup>2</sup>in our context the term univariate means that the polynomial contains a single variable only

*Example 16* (Integer Polynomials). The coefficients of a polynomial must all have the same type. The set of polynomials with integer coefficients is written as  $\mathbb{Z}[x]$ . Examples of such polynomials are:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 P_1(x) = 2x^2 - 4x + 17 & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_1) = 2 \text{ and } Lc(P_1) = 2 \\
 P_2(x) = x^{23} & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_2) = 23 \text{ and } Lc(P_2) = 1 \\
 P_3(x) = x & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_3) = 1 \text{ and } Lc(P_3) = 1 \\
 P_4(x) = 174 & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_4) = 0 \text{ and } Lc(P_4) = 174 \\
 P_5(x) = 1 & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_5) = 0 \text{ and } Lc(P_5) = 1 \\
 P_6(x) = 0 & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_6) = -\infty \text{ and } Lc(P_6) = 0 \\
 P_7(x) = (x-2)(x+3)(x-5)
 \end{array}$$

In particular, every integer can be seen as an integer polynomial of degree zero.  $P_7$  is a polynomial, because we can expand its definition into  $P_7(x) = x^3 - 4x^2 - 11x + 30$ , which is a polynomial of degree 3 and leading coefficient 1. The following expressions are not integer polynomials:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Q_1(x) &= 2x^2 + 4 + 3x^{-2} \\
 Q_2(x) &= 0.5x^4 - 2x \\
 Q_3(x) &= 2^x
 \end{aligned}$$

1027 In particular  $Q_1$  is not an integer polynomial, because the expression  $x^{-2}$  has a negative expo-  
 1028 nent,  $Q_2$  is not an integer polynomial because the coefficient 0.5 is not an integer and  $Q_3$  is not  
 1029 an integer polynomial because the indeterminate appears in the exponent of of a coefficient.

1030 We can invoke Sage to do computations with polynomials. To do so, we have to specify the  
 1031 symbol for the indeterminate and the type for the coefficients (For the definition of rings see  
 1032 4.2). Note, however that Sage defines the degree of the zero polynomial to be  $-1$ .

```

1033 sage: Zx = ZZ['x'] # integer polynomials with indeterminate x 76
1034 sage: Zt.<t> = ZZ[] # integer polynomials with indeterminate t 77
1035 sage: Zx 78
1036 Univariate Polynomial Ring in x over Integer Ring 79
1037 sage: Zt 80
1038 Univariate Polynomial Ring in t over Integer Ring 81
1039 sage: p1 = Zx([17,-4,2]) 82
1040 sage: p1 83
1041 2*x^2 - 4*x + 17 84
1042 sage: p1.degree() 85
1043 2 86
1044 sage: p1.leading_coefficient() 87
1045 2 88
1046 sage: p2 = Zt(t^23) 89
1047 sage: p2 90
1048 t^23 91
1049 sage: p6 = Zx([0]) 92
1050 sage: p6.degree() 93
1051 -1 94

```

*Example 17* (Polynomials over  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ ). Recall the definition of modular 6 arithmetics  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  as defined in example 9. The set of all polynomials with indeterminate  $x$  and coefficients in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  is symbolized as  $\mathbb{Z}_6[x]$ . Example of polynomials from  $\mathbb{Z}_6[x]$  are:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 P_1(x) = 2x^2 - 4x + 5 & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_1) = 2 \text{ and } Lc(P_1) = 2 \\
 P_2(x) = x^{23} & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_2) = 23 \text{ and } Lc(P_2) = 1 \\
 P_3(x) = x & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_3) = 1 \text{ and } Lc(P_3) = 1 \\
 P_4(x) = 3 & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_4) = 0 \text{ and } Lc(P_4) = 3 \\
 P_5(x) = 1 & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_5) = 0 \text{ and } Lc(P_5) = 1 \\
 P_6(x) = 0 & \# \text{ with } \deg(P_6) = -\infty \text{ and } Lc(P_6) = 0 \\
 P_7(x) = (x-2)(x+3)(x-5) & 
 \end{array}$$

Just like in the previous example,  $P_7$  is a polynomial. However, since we are working with coefficients from  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  now the expansion of  $P_7$  is computed differently, as we have to invoke addition and multiplication in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  as defined in XXX. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (x-2)(x+3)(x-5) &= (x+4)(x+3)(x+1) && \# \text{ additive inverses in } \mathbb{Z}_6 \\
 &= (x^2 + 4x + 3x + 3 \cdot 4)(x+1) && \# \text{ bracket expansion} \\
 &= (x^2 + 1x + 0)(x+1) && \# \text{ computation in } \mathbb{Z}_6 \\
 &= x^3 + x^2 + x^2 + x && \# \text{ bracket expansion} \\
 &= x^3 + 2x^2 + x
 \end{aligned}$$

1052 Again, we can use Sage to do computations with polynomials that have their coefficients in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$   
 1053 (For the definition of rings see 4.2). To do so, we have to specify the symbol for the indertemi-  
 1054 nate and the type for the coefficients:

```

1055 sage: Z6 = Integers(6)                                     95
1056 sage: Z6x = Z6['x']                                       96
1057 sage: Z6x                                                  97
1058 Univariate Polynomial Ring in x over Ring of integers modulo 6 98
1059 sage: p1 = Z6x([5, -4, 2])                                99
1060 sage: p1                                                  100
1061 2*x^2 + 2*x + 5                                           101
1062 sage: p1 = Z6x([17, -4, 2])                               102
1063 sage: p1                                                  103
1064 2*x^2 + 2*x + 5                                           104
1065 sage: Z6x(x-2)*Z6x(x+3)*Z6x(x-5) == Z6x(x^3 + 2*x^2 + x) 105
1066 True                                                    106

```

1067 Given some element from the same type as the coefficients of a polynomial, the poly-  
 1068 nomial can be evaluated at that element, which means that we insert the given element for every  
 1069 occurrence of the indeterminate  $x$  in the polynomial expression.

1070 To be more precise, let  $P \in R[x]$ , with  $P(x) = \sum_{j=0}^m a_j x^j$  be a polynomial with a coefficient  
 1071 of type  $R$  and let  $b \in R$  be an element of that type. Then the **evaluation** of  $P$  at  $b$  is given as  
 1072 follows:

$$P(b) = \sum_{j=0}^m a_j b^j \quad (3.23)$$

*Example 18.* Consider the integer polynomials from example 16 again. To evaluate them at given points, we have to insert the point for all occurrences of  $x$  in the polynomial expression. Inserting arbitrary values from  $\mathbb{Z}$ , we get:

$$\begin{aligned} P_1(2) &= 2 \cdot 2^2 - 4 \cdot 2 + 17 = 17 \\ P_2(3) &= 3^{23} = 94143178827 \\ P_3(-4) &= -4 = -4 \\ P_4(15) &= 174 \\ P_5(0) &= 1 \\ P_6(1274) &= 0 \\ P_7(-6) &= (-6-2)(-6+3)(-6-5) = -264 \end{aligned}$$

1073 Note, however, that it is not possible to evaluate any of those polynomial on values of different  
1074 type. For example, it is not strictly correct to write  $P_1(0.5)$ , since 0.5 is not an integer. We can  
1075 verify our computations using Sage:

```
1076 sage: Zx = ZZ['x'] 107
1077 sage: p1 = Zx([17, -4, 2]) 108
1078 sage: p7 = Zx(x-2)*Zx(x+3)*Zx(x-5) 109
1079 sage: p1(ZZ(2)) 110
1080 17 111
1081 sage: p7(ZZ(-6)) == ZZ(-264) 112
1082 True 113
```

*Example 19.* Consider the polynomials with coefficients in  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  from example again. To evaluate them at given values from  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ , we have to insert the point for all occurrences of  $x$  in the polynomial expression. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} P_1(2) &= 2 \cdot 2^2 - 4 \cdot 2 + 5 = 2 - 2 + 5 = 5 \\ P_2(3) &= 3^{23} = 3 \\ P_3(-4) &= P_3(2) = 2 \\ P_5(0) &= 1 \\ P_6(4) &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

```
1083
1084 sage: Z6 = Integers(6) 114
1085 sage: Z6x = Z6['x'] 115
1086 sage: p1 = Z6x([5, -4, 2]) 116
1087 sage: p1(Z6(2)) == Z6(5) 117
1088 True 118
```

1089 *Exercise 24.* Compare both expansions of  $P_7$  from  $\mathbb{Z}[x]$  and from  $\mathbb{Z}_6[x]$  in example 16 and  
1090 example 19, and consider the definition of  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  as given in example 9. Can you see how the  
1091 definition of  $P_7$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$  projects to the definition over  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  if you consider the residue classes of  
1092  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ ?

**Polynomial arithmetic** Polynomials behave like integers in many ways. In particular, they can be added, subtracted and multiplied. In addition, they have their own notion of Euclidean division. Informally speaking, we can add two polynomials by simply adding the coefficients of the same index, and we can multiply them by applying the distributive property, that is, by multiplying every term of the left factor with every term of the right factor and adding the results together.

To be more precise let  $\sum_{n=0}^{m_1} a_n x^n$  and  $\sum_{n=0}^{m_2} b_n x^n$  be two polynomials from  $R[x]$ . Then the **sum** and the **product** of these polynomials is defined as follows:

$$\sum_{n=0}^{m_1} a_n x^n + \sum_{n=0}^{m_2} b_n x^n = \sum_{n=0}^{\max\{m_1, m_2\}} (a_n + b_n) x^n \quad (3.24)$$

$$\left( \sum_{n=0}^{m_1} a_n x^n \right) \cdot \left( \sum_{n=0}^{m_2} b_n x^n \right) = \sum_{n=0}^{m_1+m_2} \sum_{i=0}^n a_i b_{n-i} x^n \quad (3.25)$$

A rule for polynomial subtraction can be deduced from these two rules by first multiplying the **subtrahend** with (the polynomial)  $-1$  and then add the result to the **minuend**.

Regarding the definition of the degree of a polynomial, we see that the degree of the sum is always the maximum of the degrees of both summands, and the degree of the product is always the degree of the sum of the factors, since we defined  $-\infty + m = -\infty$  for every integer  $m \in \mathbb{Z}$ .

*Example 20.* To give an example of how polynomial arithmetic works, consider the following two integer polynomials  $P, Q \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$  with  $P(x) = 5x^2 - 4x + 2$  and  $Q(x) = x^3 - 2x^2 + 5$ . The sum of these two polynomials is computed by adding the coefficients of each term with equal exponent in  $x$ . This gives the following:

$$\begin{aligned} (P + Q)(x) &= (0 + 1)x^3 + (5 - 2)x^2 + (-4 + 0)x + (2 + 5) \\ &= x^3 + 3x^2 - 4x + 7 \end{aligned}$$

The product of these two polynomials is computed by multiplication of each term in the first factor with each term in the second factor. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} (P \cdot Q)(x) &= (5x^2 - 4x + 2) \cdot (x^3 - 2x^2 + 5) \\ &= (5x^5 - 10x^4 + 25x^2) + (-4x^4 + 8x^3 - 20x) + (2x^3 - 4x^2 + 10) \\ &= 5x^5 - 14x^4 + 10x^3 + 21x^2 - 20x + 10 \end{aligned}$$

```

sage: Zx = ZZ['x']
sage: P = Zx([2, -4, 5])
sage: Q = Zx([5, 0, -2, 1])
sage: P+Q == Zx(x^3 +3*x^2 -4*x +7)
True
sage: P*Q == Zx(5*x^5 -14*x^4 +10*x^3+21*x^2-20*x +10)
True

```

*Example 21.* Let us consider the polynomials of the previous example but interpreted in modular 6 arithmetic. So we consider  $P, Q \in \mathbb{Z}_6[x]$  again with  $P(x) = 5x^2 - 4x + 2$  and  $Q(x) = x^3 - 2x^2 +$

5. This time we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned}(P + Q)(x) &= (0 + 1)x^3 + (5 - 2)x^2 + (-4 + 0)x + (2 + 5) \\ &= (0 + 1)x^3 + (5 + 4)x^2 + (2 + 0)x + (2 + 5) \\ &= x^3 + 3x^2 + 2x + 1\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}(P \cdot Q)(x) &= (5x^2 - 4x + 2) \cdot (x^3 - 2x^2 + 5) \\ &= (5x^2 + 2x + 2) \cdot (x^3 + 4x^2 + 5) \\ &= (5x^5 + 2x^4 + 1x^2) + (2x^4 + 2x^3 + 4x) + (2x^3 + 2x^2 + 4) \\ &= 5x^5 + 4x^4 + 4x^3 + 3x^2 + 4x + 4\end{aligned}$$

1115

1116	<code>sage: Z6x = Integers(6) ['x']</code>	126
1117	<code>sage: P = Z6x([2, -4, 5])</code>	127
1118	<code>sage: Q = Z6x([5, 0, -2, 1])</code>	128
1119	<code>sage: P+Q == Z6x(x^3 +3*x^2 +2*x +1)</code>	129
1120	<code>True</code>	130
1121	<code>sage: P*Q == Z6x(5*x^5 +4*x^4 +4*x^3+3*x^2+4*x +4)</code>	131
1122	<code>True</code>	132

1123 *Exercise 25.* Compare the sum  $P + Q$  and the product  $P \cdot Q$  from the previous two examples  
 1124 20 and 21 and consider the definition of  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  as given in example 9. How can we derive the  
 1125 computations in  $\mathbb{Z}_6[x]$  from the computations in  $\mathbb{Z}[x]$ ?

1126 **Euklidean Division** The arithmetic of polynomials share a lot of properties with the arith-  
 1127 metic of integers and as a consequence the concept of Euclidean division and the algorithm of  
 1128 long division is also defined for polynomials. Recalling the Euclidean division of integers 3.2,  
 1129 we know that, given two integers  $a$  and  $b \neq 0$ , there is always another integer  $m$  and a natural  
 1130 number  $r$  with  $r < |b|$  such that  $a = m \cdot b + r$  holds.

1131 We can generalize this to polynomials whenever the leading coefficient of the dividend  
 1132 polynomial has a notion of multiplicative inverse. In fact, given two polynomials  $A$  and  $B \neq 0$   
 1133 from  $R[x]$  such that  $Lc(B)^{-1}$  exists in  $R$ , there exist two polynomials  $Q$  (the quotient) and  $P$  (the  
 1134 remainder), such that the following equation holds:

$$A = Q \cdot B + P \tag{3.26}$$

1135 and  $\deg(P) < \deg(B)$ . Similarly to integer Euclidean division, both  $Q$  and  $P$  are uniquely  
 1136 defined by these relations.

1137 *Notation and Symbols 2.* Suppose that the polynomials  $A, B, Q$  and  $P$  satisfy equation 3.26. We  
 1138 often use the following notation to describe the quotient and the remainder polynomials of the  
 1139 Euclidean division:

$$A \operatorname{div} B := Q, \quad A \operatorname{mod} B := P \tag{3.27}$$

1140 We also say that a polynomial  $A$  is divisible by another polynomial  $B$  if  $A \operatorname{mod} B = 0$  holds. In  
 1141 this case, we also write  $B|A$  and call  $B$  a *factor* of  $A$ .

---

**Algorithm 3** Polynomial Euclidean Algorithm

---

**Require:**  $A, B \in R[x]$  with  $B \neq 0$ , such that  $Lc(B)^{-1}$  exists in  $R$

**procedure** POLY-LONG-DIVISION( $A, B$ )

$$Q \leftarrow 0$$
$$P \leftarrow A$$
$$d \leftarrow \deg(B)$$
$$c \leftarrow Lc(B)$$
**while**  $\deg(P) \geq d$  **do**
$$S := Lc(P) \cdot c^{-1} \cdot x^{\deg(P)-d}$$
$$Q \leftarrow Q + S$$
$$P \leftarrow P - S \cdot B$$
**end while****return**  $(Q, P)$ 

**end procedure**

**Ensure:**  $A = Q \cdot B + P$

Analogously to integers, methods to compute Euclidean division for polynomials are called **polynomial division algorithms**. Probably the best known algorithm is the so called **polynomial long division**.

This algorithm works only when there is a notion of division by the leading coefficient of  $B$ . It can be generalized, but we will only need this somewhat simpler method in what follows.

*Example 22* (Polynomial Long Division). To give an example of how the previous algorithm works, let us divide the integer polynomial  $A(x) = x^5 + 2x^3 - 9 \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$  by the integer polynomial  $B(x) = x^2 + 4x - 1 \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$ . Since  $B$  is not the zero polynomial and the leading coefficient of  $B$  is 1, which is invertible as an integer, we can apply algorithm 1. Our goal is to find solutions to equation XXX, that is, we need to find the quotient polynomial  $Q \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$  and the remainder polynomial  $P \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$  such that  $x^5 + 2x^3 - 9 = Q(x) \cdot (x^2 + 4x - 1) + P(x)$ . Using a notation that is mostly used in anglophone countries, we compute as follows:

algorithm-  
floating

$$X^2 + 4X - 1) \overline{\begin{array}{r} X^3 - 4X^2 + 19X - 80 \\ X^5 + 2X^3 - 9 \\ -X^5 - 4X^4 + X^3 \\ \hline -4X^4 + 3X^3 \\ 4X^4 + 16X^3 - 4X^2 \\ \hline 19X^3 - 4X^2 \\ -19X^3 - 76X^2 + 19X \\ \hline -80X^2 + 19X - 9 \\ 80X^2 + 320X - 80 \\ \hline 339X - 89 \end{array}} \quad (3.28)$$

We therefore get  $Q(x) = x^3 - 4x^2 + 19x - 80$  as well as  $P(x) = 339x - 89$  and indeed we have  $x^5 + 2x^3 - 9 = (x^3 - 4x^2 + 19x - 80) \cdot (x^2 + 4x - 1) + (339x - 89)$ , which we can double check invoking Sage:

```
sage: Zx = ZZ['x']
```

```
sage: A = Zx([-9, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1])
```

```
sage: B = Zx([-1, 4, 1])
```

133

134

135



```

1160 sage: Q = Zx([-80, 19, -4, 1]) 136
1161 sage: P = Zx([-89, 339]) 137
1162 sage: A == Q*B + P 138
1163 True 139

```

Example 23. In the previous example, polynomial division gave a non-trivial (non-vanishing, i.e non-zero) remainder. Of special interest are divisions that don't give a remainder. Such divisors are called factors of the dividend.

For example, consider the integer polynomial  $P_7$  from example 16 again. As we have shown, it can be written both as  $x^3 - 4x^2 - 11x + 30$  and as  $(x - 2)(x + 3)(x - 5)$ . From this, we can see that the polynomials  $F_1(x) = (x - 2)$ ,  $F_2(x) = (x + 3)$  and  $F_3(x) = (x - 5)$  are all factors of  $x^3 - 4x^2 - 11x + 30$ , since division of  $P_7$  by any of these factors will result in a zero remainder.

Exercise 26. Consider the polynomial expressions  $A(x) := -3x^4 + 4x^3 + 2x^2 + 4$  and  $B(x) = x^2 - 4x + 2$ . Compute the Euclidean division of  $A$  by  $B$  in the following types:

- 1173 1.  $A, B \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$
- 1174 2.  $A, B \in \mathbb{Z}_6[x]$
- 1175 3.  $A, B \in \mathbb{Z}_5[x]$

Now consider the result in  $\mathbb{Z}[x]$  and in  $\mathbb{Z}_6[x]$ . How can we compute the result in  $\mathbb{Z}_6[x]$  from the result in  $\mathbb{Z}[x]$ ?

Exercise 27. Show that the polynomial  $B(x) = 2x^4 - 3x + 4 \in \mathbb{Z}_5[x]$  is a factor of the polynomial  $A(x) = x^7 + 4x^6 + 4x^5 + x^3 + 2x^2 + 2x + 3 \in \mathbb{Z}_5[x]$  that is show  $B|A$ . What is  $B \operatorname{div} A$ ?

**Prime Factors** Recall that the fundamental theorem of arithmetic 3.7 tells us that every natural number is the product of prime numbers. In this chapter we will see that something similar holds for univariate polynomials  $R[x]$ , too<sup>3</sup>.

The polynomial analog to a prime number is a so called an **irreducible polynomial**, which is defined as a polynomial that cannot be factored into the product of two non-constant polynomials using Euclidean division. Irreducible polynomials are for polynomials what prime numbers are for integer: They are the basic building blocks from which all other polynomials can be constructed. To be more precise, let  $P \in R[x]$  be any polynomial. Then there are always irreducible polynomials  $F_1, F_2, \dots, F_k \in R[x]$ , such that the following holds:

$$P = F_1 \cdot F_2 \cdot \dots \cdot F_k. \quad (3.29)$$

This representation is unique, except for permutations in the factors and is called the **prime factorization** of  $P$ . Moreover each factor  $F_i$  is called a **prime factor** of  $P$ .

Example 24. Consider the polynomial expression  $P = x^2 - 3$ . When we interpret  $P$  as an integer polynomial  $P \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$ , we find that this polynomial is irreducible, since any factorization other than  $1 \cdot (x^2 - 3)$ , must look like  $(x - a)(x + a)$  for some integer  $a$ , but there is no integers  $a$  with  $a^2 = 3$ .

```

1195 sage: Zx = ZZ['x'] 140
1196 sage: p = Zx(x^2-3) 141

```

<sup>3</sup>Strictly speaking this is not true for polynomials over arbitrary types  $R$ . However in this book we assume  $R$  to be a so called unique factorization domain for which the content of this section holds.

```

1197 sage: p.factor()
1198 x^2 - 3

```

On the other hand interpreting  $P$  as a polynomial  $P \in \mathbb{Z}_6[x]$  in modulo 6 arithmetic, we see that  $P$  has two factors  $F_1 = (x - 3)$  and  $F_2 = (x + 3)$ , since  $(x - 3)(x + 3) = x^2 - 3x + 3x - 3 \cdot 3 = x^2 - 3$ .

Points where a polynomial evaluates to zero are called **roots** of the polynomial. To be more precise, let  $P \in R[x]$  be a polynomial. Then a root is a point  $x_0 \in R$  with  $P(x_0) = 0$  and the set of all roots of  $P$  is defined as follows:

$$R_0(P) := \{x_0 \in R \mid P(x_0) = 0\} \quad (3.30)$$

The roots of a polynomial are of special interest with respect to its prime factorization, since it can be shown that for any given root  $x_0$  of  $P$  the polynomial  $F(x) = (x - x_0)$  is a prime factor of  $P$ .

Finding the roots of a polynomial is sometimes called **solving the polynomial**. It is a hard problem and has been the subject of much research throughout history.

It can be shown that if  $m$  is the degree of a polynomial  $P$ , then  $P$  can not have more than  $m$  roots. However, in general, polynomials can have less than  $m$  roots.

*Example 25.* Consider the integer polynomial  $P_7(x) = x^3 - 4x^2 - 11x + 30$  from example 16 again. We know that its set of roots is given by  $R_0(P_7) = \{-3, 2, 5\}$ .

On the other hand, we know from example 24 that the integer polynomial  $x^2 - 3$  is irreducible. It follows that it has no roots, since every root defines a prime factor.

*Example 26.* To give another example, consider the integer polynomial  $P = x^7 + 3x^6 + 3x^5 + x^4 - x^3 - 3x^2 - 3x - 1$ . We can invoke Sage to compute the roots and prime factors of  $P$ :

```

1217 sage: Zx = ZZ['x']
1218 sage: p = Zx(x^7 + 3*x^6 + 3*x^5 + x^4 - x^3 - 3*x^2 - 3*x - 1)
1219
1220 sage: p.roots()
1221 [(1, 1), (-1, 4)]
1222 sage: p.factor()
1223 (x - 1) * (x + 1)^4 * (x^2 + 1)

```

We see that  $P$  has the root 1 and that the associated prime factor  $(x - 1)$  occurs once in  $P$  and that it has the root  $-1$ , where the associated prime factor  $(x + 1)$  occurs 4 times in  $P$ . This gives the following prime factorization:

$$P = (x - 1)(x + 1)^4(x^2 + 1)$$

*Exercise 28.* Show that if a polynomial  $P \in R[x]$  of degree  $\deg(P) = m$  has less than  $m$  roots, it must have a prime factor  $F$  of degree  $\deg(F) > 1$ .

*Exercise 29.* Consider the polynomial  $P = x^7 + 3x^6 + 3x^5 + x^4 - x^3 - 3x^2 - 3x - 1 \in \mathbb{Z}_6[x]$ . Compute the set of all roots of  $R_0(P)$  and then compute the prime factorization of  $P$ .

**Lagrange interpolation** One particularly useful property of polynomials is that a polynomial of degree  $m$  is completely determined on  $m + 1$  evaluation points, which implies that we can uniquely derive a polynomial of degree  $m$  from a set  $S$ :

$$S = \{(x_0, y_0), (x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_m, y_m) \mid x_i \neq x_j \text{ for all indices } i \text{ and } j\} \quad (3.31)$$

1231 Polynomials therefore have the property that  $m + 1$  pairs of points  $(x_i, y_i)$  for  $x_i \neq x_j$  are enough  
 1232 to determine the set of pairs  $(x, P(x))$  for all  $x \in R$ . This “few too many” property of polynomials  
 1233 is used in many places, like for example in erasure codes. It is also of importance in snarks and  
 1234 we therefore need to understand a method to actually compute a polynomial from a set of points.  
 1235 If the coefficients of the polynomial we want to find have a notion of multiplicative inverse,  
 1236 it is always possible to find such a polynomial using a method called **Lagrange interpolation**,  
 1237 which works as follows: Given a set like 3.31, a polynomial  $P$  of degree  $m$  with  $P(x_i) = y_i$  for  
 1238 all pairs  $(x_i, y_i)$  from  $S$  is given by the following algorithm:

 check  
algorithm  
floating

---

**Algorithm 4** Lagrange Interpolation
 

---

**Require:**  $R$  must have multiplicative inverses

**Require:**  $S = \{(x_0, y_0), (x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_m, y_m) \mid x_i, y_i \in R, x_i \neq x_j \text{ for all indices } i \text{ and } j\}$

**procedure** LAGRANGE-INTERPOLATION( $S$ )

**for**  $j \in (0 \dots m)$  **do**

$$l_j(x) \leftarrow \prod_{i=0; i \neq j}^m \frac{x - x_i}{x_j - x_i} = \frac{(x - x_0)}{(x_j - x_0)} \dots \frac{(x - x_{j-1})}{(x_j - x_{j-1})} \frac{(x - x_{j+1})}{(x_j - x_{j+1})} \dots \frac{(x - x_m)}{(x_j - x_m)}$$

**end for**

$$P \leftarrow \sum_{j=0}^m y_j \cdot l_j$$

**return**  $P$

**end procedure**

**Ensure:**  $P \in R[x]$  with  $\deg(P) = m$

**Ensure:**  $P(x_j) = y_j$  for all pairs  $(x_j, y_j) \in S$

---

*Example 27.* Let us consider the set  $S = \{(0, 4), (-2, 1), (2, 3)\}$ . Our task is to compute a polynomial of degree 2 in  $\mathbb{Q}[x]$  with coefficients from the rational numbers  $\mathbb{Q}$ . Since  $\mathbb{Q}$  has multiplicative inverses, we can use the Lagrange interpolation algorithm from 4, to compute the polynomial.

$$\begin{aligned} l_0(x) &= \frac{x - x_1}{x_0 - x_1} \cdot \frac{x - x_2}{x_0 - x_2} = \frac{x + 2}{0 + 2} \cdot \frac{x - 2}{0 - 2} = -\frac{(x + 2)(x - 2)}{4} \\ &= -\frac{1}{4}(x^2 - 4) \\ l_1(x) &= \frac{x - x_0}{x_1 - x_0} \cdot \frac{x - x_2}{x_1 - x_2} = \frac{x - 0}{-2 - 0} \cdot \frac{x - 2}{-2 - 2} = \frac{x(x - 2)}{8} \\ &= \frac{1}{8}(x^2 - 2x) \\ l_2(x) &= \frac{x - x_0}{x_2 - x_0} \cdot \frac{x - x_1}{x_2 - x_1} = \frac{x - 0}{2 - 0} \cdot \frac{x + 2}{2 + 2} = \frac{x(x + 2)}{8} \\ &= \frac{1}{8}(x^2 + 2x) \\ P(x) &= 4 \cdot \left(-\frac{1}{4}(x^2 - 4)\right) + 1 \cdot \frac{1}{8}(x^2 - 2x) + 3 \cdot \frac{1}{8}(x^2 + 2x) \\ &= -x^2 + 4 + \frac{1}{8}x^2 - \frac{1}{4}x + \frac{3}{8}x^2 + \frac{3}{4}x \\ &= -\frac{1}{2}x^2 + \frac{1}{2}x + 4 \end{aligned}$$

1239 And, indeed, evaluation of  $P$  on the  $x$ -values of  $S$  gives the correct points, since  $P(0) = 4$ ,  
 1240  $P(-2) = 1$  and  $P(2) = 3$ . Sage provides the following function:

```

1241 sage: Qx = QQ['x'] 150
1242 sage: S=[(0,4), (-2,1), (2,3)] 151
1243 sage: Qx.lagrange_polynomial(S) 152
1244 -1/2*x^2 + 1/2*x + 4 153

```

*Example 28.* To give another example more relevant to the topics of this book, let us consider the same set  $S = \{(0,4), (-2,1), (2,3)\}$  as in the previous example. This time, the task is to compute a polynomial  $P \in \mathbb{Z}_5[x]$  from this data. Since we know from example 14 that multiplicative inverses exist in  $\mathbb{Z}_5$ , algorithm 4 applies and we can compute a unique polynomial of degree 2 in  $\mathbb{Z}_5[x]$  from  $S$ . We can use the lookup tables from example 14 for computation in  $\mathbb{Z}_5$  and get the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
l_0(x) &= \frac{x-x_1}{x_0-x_1} \cdot \frac{x-x_2}{x_0-x_2} = \frac{x+2}{0+2} \cdot \frac{x-2}{0-2} = \frac{(x+2)(x-2)}{-4} = \frac{(x+2)(x+3)}{1} \\
&= x^2 + 1 \\
l_1(x) &= \frac{x-x_0}{x_1-x_0} \cdot \frac{x-x_2}{x_1-x_2} = \frac{x-0}{-2-0} \cdot \frac{x-2}{-2-2} = \frac{x}{3} \cdot \frac{x+3}{1} = 2(x^2 + 3x) \\
&= 2x^2 + x \\
l_2(x) &= \frac{x-x_0}{x_2-x_0} \cdot \frac{x-x_1}{x_2-x_1} = \frac{x-0}{2-0} \cdot \frac{x+2}{2+2} = \frac{x(x+2)}{3} = 2(x^2 + 2x) \\
&= 2x^2 + 4x \\
P(x) &= 4 \cdot (x^2 + 1) + 1 \cdot (2x^2 + x) + 3 \cdot (2x^2 + 4x) \\
&= 4x^2 + 4 + 2x^2 + x + x^2 + 2x \\
&= 2x^2 + 3x + 4
\end{aligned}$$

1245 And, indeed, evaluation of  $P$  on the  $x$ -values of  $S$  gives the correct points, since  $P(0) = 4$ ,  
1246  $P(-2) = 1$  and  $P(2) = 3$ . We can doublecheck our findings using Sage:

```

1247 sage: F5 = GF(5) 154
1248 sage: F5x = F5['x'] 155
1249 sage: S=[(0,4), (-2,1), (2,3)] 156
1250 sage: F5x.lagrange_polynomial(S) 157
1251 2*x^2 + 3*x + 4 158

```

1252 *Exercise 30.* Consider modular 5 arithmetic from example 14 and the set  $S = \{(0,0), (1,1), (2,2), (3,2)\}$ .  
1253 Find a polynomial  $P \in \mathbb{Z}_5[x]$  such that  $P(x_i) = y_i$  for all  $(x_i, y_i) \in S$ .

1254 *Exercise 31.* Consider the set  $S$  from the previous example. Why is it not possible to apply  
1255 algorithm 4 to construct a polynomial  $P \in \mathbb{Z}_6[x]$ , such that  $P(x_i) = y_i$  for all  $(x_i, y_i) \in S$ ?

# Chapter 4

## Algebra

In the previous chapter, we gave an introduction to the basic computational tools needed for a pen-and-paper approach to SNARKs and in this chapter we provide a more abstract clarification of relevant mathematical terminology such as **groups**, **rings** and **fields**.

Scientific literature on cryptography frequently contain such terms, and it is necessary to get at least some understanding of these terms to be able to follow the literature.

### 4.1 Commutative Groups

Commutative groups are abstractions that capture the essence of mathematical phenomena, like addition and subtraction, or multiplication and division.

To understand commutative groups, let us think back to when we learned about the addition and subtraction of integers in school. We have learned that, whenever we add two integers, the result is guaranteed to be an integer as well. We have also learned that adding zero to any integer means that “nothing happens”, that is, the result of the addition is the same integer we started with. Furthermore, we have learned that the order in which we add two (or more) integers does not matter, that brackets have no influence on the result of addition, and that, for every integer, there is always another integer (the negative) such that we get zero when we add them together.

These conditions are the defining properties of a commutative group, and mathematicians have realized that the exact same set of rules can be found in very different mathematical structures. It therefore makes sense to abstract from integers and to give a formal definition of what a group should be, detached from any concrete examples. This lets us handle entities of very different mathematical origins in a flexible way, while retaining essential structural aspects of many objects in abstract algebra and beyond.

Distilling these rules to the smallest independent list of properties and making them abstract, we arrive at the following definition of a commutative group:

*Sylvia: I would like to have a separate counter for definitions*

**Definition 4.1.0.1.** A **commutative group**  $(\mathbb{G}, \cdot)$  is a set  $\mathbb{G}$ , together with a **map**  $\cdot : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$  called the **group law**, that combines two elements of the set  $\mathbb{G}$  into a third one such that the following properties hold:

- **Commutativity:** For all  $g_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}$ , the equation  $g_1 \cdot g_2 = g_2 \cdot g_1$  holds.
- **Associativity:** For every  $g_1, g_2, g_3 \in \mathbb{G}$  the equation  $g_1 \cdot (g_2 \cdot g_3) = (g_1 \cdot g_2) \cdot g_3$  holds.
- **Existence of a neutral element:** There is a  $e \in \mathbb{G}$  for all  $g \in \mathbb{G}$ , such that  $e \cdot g = g$ .

*Sylvia: I would like to have a separate counter for definitions*

- **Existence of an inverse:** For every  $g \in \mathbb{G}$  there is a  $g^{-1} \in \mathbb{G}$ , such that  $g \cdot g^{-1} = e$ .

If  $(\mathbb{G}, \cdot)$  is a group and  $\mathbb{G}' \subset \mathbb{G}$  is a subset of  $\mathbb{G}$ , such that the restriction of the group law  $\cdot : \mathbb{G}' \times \mathbb{G}' \rightarrow \mathbb{G}'$  is a group law on  $\mathbb{G}'$ , then  $(\mathbb{G}', \cdot)$  is called a **subgroup** of  $(\mathbb{G}, \cdot)$ .

Rephrasing the abstract definition in layman's terms, a group is something where we can do computations in a way that resembles the behavior of the addition of integers. Specifically, this means we can combine some element with another element into a new element in a way that is reversible and where the order of combining elements doesn't matter.

*Notation and Symbols 3.* Since we are exclusively concerned with commutative groups in this book, we often just call them groups, keeping the notation of commutativity implicit. Commutative groups are also called **Abelian groups**. A set  $\mathbb{G}$  with a map  $\cdot$  that satisfies all previously mentioned rules, except for the commutativity law is called a non-commutative group.

If there is no risk of ambiguity (about what the group law of that group is), we frequently drop the symbol  $\cdot$  and simply write  $\mathbb{G}$  as notation for the group, keeping the group law implicit. In this case we also say that  $\mathbb{G}$  is of group type, indicating that  $\mathbb{G}$  is not simply a set but a set together with a group law.

For commutative groups  $(\mathbb{G}, \cdot)$ , we sometimes use the so-called **additive notation**  $(\mathbb{G}, +)$ , that is, we write  $+$  instead of  $\cdot$  for the group law,  $0$  for the neutral element and  $-g := g^{-1}$  for the inverse of an element  $g \in \mathbb{G}$ .

As we will see in the following chapters, groups are heavily used in cryptography and in SNARKs. But let us look at some more familiar examples first:

*Example 29 (Integer Addition and Subtraction).* The set  $(\mathbb{Z}, +)$  of integers with integer addition is the archetypical example of a commutative group, where the group law is traditionally written in additive notation 3.

To compare integer addition against the abstract axioms of a commutative group, we first see that integer addition is commutative and associative, since  $a + b = b + a$  as well as  $(a + b) + c = a + (b + c)$  for all integers  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}$ . The neutral element  $e$  is the number  $0$ , since  $a + 0 = a$  for all integers  $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ . Furthermore, the inverse of a number is its negative counterpart, since  $a + (-a) = 0$ , for all  $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ . This implies that integers with addition are indeed a commutative group in the abstract sense.

To give an example of a subgroup for the group of integers, consider the set  $\mathbb{Z}_{\text{even}} := \{\dots, -4, -2, 0, 2, 4, \dots\}$  of even numbers, including  $0$ . We can see that this set is a subgroup of  $(\mathbb{Z}, +)$ , since the sum of two even numbers is always an even number again, since the neutral element  $0$  is a member of  $\mathbb{Z}_{\text{even}}$  and since the negative of an even number is itself an even number.

*Example 30 (The trivial group).* The most basic example of a commutative group is the group with just one element  $\{\bullet\}$  and the group law  $\bullet \cdot \bullet = \bullet$ . We call it the **trivial group**.

The trivial group is a subgroup of any group. To see that let  $(\mathbb{G}, \cdot)$  be a group with neutral element  $e \in \mathbb{G}$ . Then  $e \cdot e = e$  as well as  $e^{-1} = e$  and it follows that the set  $\{e\}$  is a subgroup of  $\mathbb{G}$ . In particular  $\{0\}$  is a subgroup of  $(\mathbb{Z}, +)$ , since  $0 + 0 = 0$ .

*Example 31.* Consider the addition in modulo 6 arithmetics  $(\mathbb{Z}_6, +)$  as defined in in example 9. As we see, the remainder  $0$  is the neutral element in modulo 6 addition and the inverse of a remainder  $r$  is given by  $6 - r$ , because  $r + (6 - r) = 6$ , which is congruent to  $0$ , since  $6 \bmod 6 = 0$ . Moreover,  $r_1 + r_2 = r_2 + r_1$  as well as  $(r_1 + r_2) + r_3 = r_1 + (r_2 + r_3)$  are inherited from integer addition. We therefore see that  $(\mathbb{Z}_6, +)$  is a group.

The previous example of a commutative group is a very important one for this book. Abstracting from this example and considering residue classes  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$  for arbitrary moduli  $n$ , it can be shown that  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$  is a commutative group with the neutral element  $0$  and the additive

inverse  $n - r$  for any element  $r \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ . We call such a group the **remainder class group** of modulus  $n$ .

*Exercise 32.* Consider example 14 again and let  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  be the set of all remainder classes from  $\mathbb{Z}_5$  without the class 0. Then  $\mathbb{Z}_5^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ . Show that  $(\mathbb{Z}_5^*, \cdot)$  is a commutative group.

*Exercise 33.* Generalizing the previous exercise, consider the general modulus  $n$ , and let  $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$  be the set of all remainder classes from  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  without the class 0. Then  $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{1, 2, \dots, n - 1\}$ . Provide a counter-example to show that  $(\mathbb{Z}_n^*, \cdot)$  is not a group in general.

Find a condition such that  $(\mathbb{Z}_n^*, \cdot)$  is a commutative group, compute the neutral element, give a closed form for the inverse of any element and prove the commutative group axioms.

**Finite groups** As we have seen in the previous examples, groups can either contain infinitely many elements (such as integers) or finitely many elements (as for example the remainder class groups  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$ ). To capture this distinction, a group is called a **finite group** if the underlying set of elements is finite. In that case, the number of elements of that group is called its **order**.

*Notation and Symbols 4.* Let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a finite group. We write  $\text{ord}(\mathbb{G})$  or  $|\mathbb{G}|$  for the order of  $\mathbb{G}$ .

*Example 32.* Consider the remainder class groups  $(\mathbb{Z}_6, +)$  from example 9, the group  $(\mathbb{Z}_5, +)$  from example 14, and the group  $(\mathbb{Z}_5^*, \cdot)$  from exercise 32. We can easily see that the order of  $(\mathbb{Z}_6, +)$  is 6, the order of  $(\mathbb{Z}_5, +)$  is 5 and the order of  $(\mathbb{Z}_5^*, \cdot)$  is 4.

*Exercise 34.* Let  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $n \geq 2$  be some modulus. What is the order of the remainder class group  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$ .

**Generators** The set of elements of a group can be complicated and it is not always obvious how to actually compute elements of a given group. From a practical point of view it is therefore desirable, if a group has a small subset of elements, such that all other elements can be generated by applying the group law repeatedly to the elements of that subset or their inverses only. Sets with these properties are called **generator sets**.

Of course, every group  $\mathbb{G}$  has a trivial set of generators, when we just consider every element of the group to be in the generator set. The more interesting question is to find smallest possible sets of generators for a given group. Of particular interest in this regard are groups that have a generator set that contains a single element only. In this case, there exists a (not necessarily unique) element  $g \in \mathbb{G}$  such that every other element from  $\mathbb{G}$  can be computed by the repeated combination of  $g$  and its inverse  $g^{-1}$  only. Groups with single, not necessarily unique, generators are called **cyclic groups** and any element  $g \in \mathbb{G}$  that is able to generate  $\mathbb{G}$  is called a **generator**.

*Example 33.* The most basic example of a cyclic group is the group of integers  $(\mathbb{Z}, +)$  with integer addition. In this case, the number 1 is a generator of  $\mathbb{Z}$ , since every integer can be obtained by repeatedly adding either 1 or its inverse  $-1$  to itself. For example  $-4$  is generated by 1, since  $-4 = -1 + (-1) + (-1) + (-1)$ . Another generator of  $\mathbb{Z}$  is the number  $-1$ .

*Example 34.* Consider the group  $(\mathbb{Z}_5^*, \cdot)$  from exercise 32. Since  $2^1 = 2$ ,  $2^2 = 4$ ,  $2^3 = 3$  and  $2^4 = 1$ , the element 2 is a generator of  $(\mathbb{Z}_5^*, \cdot)$ . Moreover since  $3^1 = 3$ ,  $3^2 = 4$ ,  $3^3 = 2$  and  $3^4 = 1$ , the element 3 is another generator of  $(\mathbb{Z}_5^*, \cdot)$ . Cyclic groups can therefore have more than one generator. However since  $4^1 = 4$ ,  $4^2 = 1$ ,  $4^3 = 4$  and in general  $4^k = 4$  for  $k$  odd and  $4^k = 1$  for  $k$  even the element 4 is not a generator of  $(\mathbb{Z}_5^*, \cdot)$ . It follows that in general not every element of a finite cyclic group is a generator.

*Example 35.* Consider a modulus  $n$  and the remainder class groups  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$  from exercise 34. These groups are cyclic, with generator 1, since every other element of that group can be constructed by repeatedly adding the remainder class 1 to itself. Since  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  is also finite, we know that  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$  is a finite cyclic group of order  $n$ .

*Exercise 35.* Consider the group  $(\mathbb{Z}_6, +)$  of modular 6 addition from example 9. Show that  $5 \in \mathbb{Z}_6$  is a generator and then show that  $2 \in \mathbb{Z}_6$  is not a generator.

*Exercise 36.* Let  $p \in \mathbb{P}$  be prime number and  $(\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot)$  the finite group from exercise 33. Show that  $(\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot)$  is cyclic.

**The exponential map** Observe that, when  $\mathbb{G}$  is a cyclic group of order  $n$  and  $g \in \mathbb{G}$  is a generator of  $\mathbb{G}$ , then there is the following map with respect to the generator  $g$ :

$$g^{(\cdot)} : \mathbb{Z}_n \rightarrow \mathbb{G} \quad x \mapsto g^x \quad (4.1)$$

In the map above,  $g^x$  means “multiply  $g$   $x$ -times by itself” and  $g^0 = e_{\mathbb{G}}$ . This map, called the **exponential map**, has the remarkable property that it maps the additive group law of the remainder class group  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$  in a one-to-one correspondence to the group law of  $\mathbb{G}$ .

To see this, first observe that, since  $g^0 := e_{\mathbb{G}}$  by definition, the neutral element of  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  is mapped to the neutral element of  $\mathbb{G}$ , and, since  $g^{x+y} = g^x \cdot g^y$ , the map respects the group law.

*Remark 3* (Scalar multiplication). If a group  $(\mathbb{G}, +)$  is written in additive notation 3, then the exponential map is often called **scalar multiplication** and written as

$$(\cdot) \cdot g : \mathbb{Z}_n \rightarrow \mathbb{G} ; x \mapsto x \cdot g \quad (4.2)$$

In this notation the symbol  $x \cdot g$  is defined as “add the generator  $g$   $x$ -times to itself” and the symbol  $0 \cdot g$  is defined to be the neutral element in  $\mathbb{G}$ .

Cryptographic applications often utilize finite cyclic groups of very large order  $n$  and computing the exponential map by repeated multiplication of the generator with itself is infeasible, for very large remainder classes. The following so called **square and multiply** algorithm solves this problem as it computes the exponential map in approximately  $k$  steps, where  $k$  is the bit length of the exponent 3.4:

Because the exponential map respects the group law, it doesn’t matter if we do our computation in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  before we write the result into the exponent of  $g$  or afterwards: the result will be the same in both cases. This is usually referred to as doing computations “in the exponent”. In cryptography in general, and in SNARK development in particular, we often perform computations “in the exponent” of a generator.

*Example 36.* Consider the multiplicative group  $(\mathbb{Z}_5^*, \cdot)$  from exercise 32. We know from 36 that  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  is a cyclic group of order 4, and that the element  $3 \in \mathbb{Z}_5^*$  is a generator. We then know that the following map respects the group law of addition in  $\mathbb{Z}_4$  and the group law of multiplication in  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$ :

$$3^{(\cdot)} : \mathbb{Z}_4 \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_5^* ; x \mapsto 3^x$$

To do an example computation “in the exponent” of 3, let’s perform the calculation  $1 + 3 + 2$  in the exponent of the generator 3:

$$\begin{aligned} 3^{1+3+2} &= 3^2 \\ &= 4 \end{aligned}$$



**Algorithm 5** Cyclic Group Exponentiation**Require:**  $g$  group generator of order  $n$ **Require:**  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ **procedure** EXPONENTIATION( $g, x$ )Let  $(b_0, \dots, b_k)$  be a binary representation of  $x$ 

▷ see example XXX

 $h \leftarrow g$  $y \leftarrow e_{\mathbb{G}}$ **for**  $0 \leq j < k$  **do**  **if**  $b_j = 1$  **then**     $y \leftarrow y \cdot h$ 

▷ multiply

**end if**   $h \leftarrow h \cdot h$ 

▷ square

**end for****return**  $y$ **end procedure****Ensure:**  $y = g^x$ 

1405 What we did is, we first performed the computation  $1 + 3 + 2 = 1$  in the remainder class group  
 1406  $(\mathbb{Z}_4, +)$  and then applied the exponential map  $3^{(\cdot)}$  to the result.

1407 However since the exponential map 4.1 "respects the group law" we also could map each  
 1408 summand into  $(\mathbb{F}_5^*, \cdot)$  first and then apply the group law of  $(\mathbb{F}_5^*, \cdot)$ . The result is guranteed to be  
 1409 the same:

$$\begin{aligned} 3^1 \cdot 3^3 \cdot 3^2 &= 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 4 \\ &= 1 \cdot 4 \\ &= 4 \end{aligned}$$

1410 Since the exponential map is a one-to-one correspondence that respects the group law, it  
 1411 can be shown that this map has an inverse with respect to the base  $g$ , called the **base  $g$  discrete**  
 1412 **logarithm map**:

$$\log_g(\cdot) : \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n \quad x \mapsto \log_g(x) \quad (4.3)$$

1413 Discrete logarithms are highly important in cryptography, because there are finite cyclic groups  
 1414 where the exponential map and its inverse, the discrete logarithm map, are believed to be one-  
 1415 way functions, which informally means that computing the exponential map is fast, while com-  
 1416 puting the logarithm map is slow (We will look into a more precise definition in 4.1.1).

*Example 37.* Consider the exponential map  $3^{(\cdot)}$  from example 36. Its inverse is the discrete logarithm to the base 3 and it is given by the map

$$\log_3(\cdot) : \mathbb{Z}_5^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_4 \quad x \mapsto \log_3(x)$$

In contrast to the exponential map  $3^{(\cdot)}$ , we have no way to actually compute this map, other than by trying all elements of the group until we find the correct one. For example in order to compute  $\log_3(4)$ , we have to find some  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_4$ , such that  $3^x = 4$  and all we can do is repeatedly insert elements  $x$  into the exponent of 3 until the result is 4. To do this let's write down all the images of  $3^{(\cdot)}$ :

$$3^0 = 1, \quad 3^1 = 3, \quad 3^2 = 4, \quad 3^3 = 2$$

Since the discrete logarithm  $\log_3(\cdot)$  is defined as the inverse to this function, we can use those images to compute the discrete logarithm:

$$\log_3(1) = 0, \quad \log_3(2) = 3, \quad \log_3(3) = 1, \quad \log_3(4) = 2$$

Note that this computation was only possible, because we were able to write down all images of the exponential map. However, in real world applications the groups in consideration are too large to write down the images of the exponential map.

*Exercise 37* (Efficient Scalar Multiplication). Let  $(\mathbb{G}, +)$  be a finite cyclic group of order  $n$ . Consider algorithm 5 and define it's analog for groups in additive notation.

**Factor Groups** As we know from the fundamental theorem of arithmetics 3.7, every natural number  $n$  is a product of factors, the most basic of which are prime numbers. This reflects into subgroups of a finite cyclic group in an interesting way: If  $\mathbb{G}$ , is a finite cyclic group of order  $n$ , then every subgroup  $\mathbb{G}'$  of  $\mathbb{G}$ , is finite and cyclic and the order of  $\mathbb{G}'$ , is a factor of  $n$ . Moreover for each factor  $k$  of  $n$ ,  $\mathbb{G}$  has exactly one subgroup of order  $k$ . This is known as the **fundamental theorem of finite cyclic groups**.

*Notation and Symbols 5.* If  $\mathbb{G}$  is a finite cyclic group of order  $n$  and  $k$  is a factor of  $n$ , then we write  $\mathbb{G}[k]$  for the unique finite cyclic group, which is the order  $k$  subgroup of  $\mathbb{G}$  and call it a **factor group** of  $\mathbb{G}$ .

One particular interesting situation occurs if the order of a given finite cyclic group is a prime number. As we know from the fundamental theorem of arithmetics 3.7, prime numbers have only two factors, given by the number 1 and the prime number itself. It then follows from the fundamental theorem of finite cyclic groups 4.1, that those groups have no subgroups other than the trivial group 30 and the group itself.

Cryptographic protocols often assume the existence of finite cyclic groups of prime order but sometimes real world implementations of those protocols are not defined on prime order groups, but on groups where the order consist of a (usually large) prime number that has small cofactors 1. In this case a method called **cofactor clearing** has to be applied to ensure that the computations are not done in the group itself but in its (large) prime order subgroup.

To understand cofactor clearing in detail, let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a finite cyclic group of order  $n$  and let  $k$  be a factor of  $n$  with associated factor group  $\mathbb{G}[k]$ . We can project any element  $g \in \mathbb{G}[k]$  onto the neutral element  $e$  of  $\mathbb{G}$  by multiplying  $g$   $k$ -times with itself:

$$g^k = e \tag{4.4}$$

From this follows that if  $c := n \div k$  is the cofactor 1 of  $k$  in  $n$  then any element from the full group  $g \in \mathbb{G}$  can be projected into the factor group  $\mathbb{G}[k]$  by multiplying  $g$   $c$ -times with itself. This defines the following map, which is often called **cofactor clearing** in the cryptographic literature:

$$(\cdot)^c : \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}[k] : g \mapsto g^c \tag{4.5}$$

*Example 38.* Consider the finite cyclic group  $(\mathbb{Z}_5^*, \cdot)$  from example 34. Since the order of  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  is 4 and 4 has the factors 1, 2 and 4, it follows from the fundamental theorem of finite cyclic groups, that  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  has 3 unique subgroups. In fact the unique subgroup  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*[1]$  of order 1 is given by the trivial group  $\{1\}$  that contains only the multiplicative neutral element 1 and the unique subgroup  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*[4]$  of order 4 is  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  itself, since by definition every group is trivially a subgroup of itself. The unique subgroup  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*[2]$  of order 2 is more interesting and is given by the set  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*[2] = \{1, 4\}$ .

Since  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  is not a prime order group and since the only prime factor of 4 is 2, the "large" prime order subgroup of  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  is  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*[2]$ . Moreover since the cofactor of 2 in 4 is also 2, we have the cofactor clearing map  $(\cdot)^2 : \mathbb{Z}_5^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_5^*[2]$  and indeed applying this map to all elements from  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  we see that it maps onto the elements of  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*[2]$  only:

$$1^2 = 1, \quad 2^2 = 4, \quad 3^2 = 4, \quad 4^2 = 1$$

1454 We can therefore use this map to "clear the cofactor" of any element from  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  which means that  
1455 the element is projected into the "large" prime order subgroup  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*[2]$ .

1456 *Exercise 38.* Consider the previous example 38 and show that  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*[2]$  is a commutative group.

1457 *Exercise 39.* Consider the finite cyclic group  $(\mathbb{Z}_6, +)$  of modular 6 addition from example 35.  
1458 Describe all subgroups of  $(\mathbb{Z}_6, +)$ . Identify the large prime order subgroup of  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ , define its  
1459 cofactor clearing map and apply that map to all elements of  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ .

1460 *Exercise 40.* Let  $(\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot)$  be the cyclic group from exercise 36. Show that for  $p \geq 5$ , not every  
1461 element  $x \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$  is a generator of  $\mathbb{F}_p^*$ .

1462 **Pairings** Of particular importance for the development of SNARKs are so-called pairing maps  
1463 on commutative groups. To see the definition, let  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$  and  $\mathbb{G}_3$  be three commutative groups.  
1464 Then a **pairing map** is a function

$$e(\cdot, \cdot) : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_3 \quad (4.6)$$

1465 This function takes pairs  $(g_1, g_2)$  of elements from  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , and maps them to elements  
1466 from  $\mathbb{G}_3$ , such that the **bilinearity** property holds, which means that for all  $g_1, g'_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and  
1467  $g_2, g'_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2$  the following two identities are satisfied:

$$e(g_1 \cdot g'_1, g_2) = e(g_1, g_2) \cdot e(g'_1, g_2) \quad \text{and} \quad e(g_1, g_2 \cdot g'_2) = e(g_1, g_2) \cdot e(g_1, g'_2) \quad (4.7)$$

1468 Informally speaking, bilinearity means that it doesn't matter if we first execute the group law  
1469 on one side and then apply the bilinear map, or if we first apply the bilinear map and then apply  
1470 the group law in  $\mathbb{G}_3$ .

1471 A pairing map is called **non-degenerate** if, whenever the result of the pairing is the neutral  
1472 element in  $\mathbb{G}_3$ , one of the input values is the neutral element of  $\mathbb{G}_1$  or  $\mathbb{G}_2$ . To be more precise,  
1473  $e(g_1, g_2) = e_{\mathbb{G}_3}$  implies  $g_1 = e_{\mathbb{G}_1}$  or  $g_2 = e_{\mathbb{G}_2}$ .

*Example 39.* One of the most basic examples of a non-degenerate pairing involves  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$  and  
 $\mathbb{G}_3$  all to be the group of integers with addition  $(\mathbb{Z}, +)$ . Then the following map defines a  
non-degenerate pairing:

$$e(\cdot, \cdot) : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z} \quad (a, b) \mapsto a \cdot b$$

1474 Note that bilinearity follows from the distributive law of integers, since for  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}$ , we have  
1475  $e(a + b, c) = (a + b) \cdot c = a \cdot c + b \cdot c = e(a, c) + e(b, c)$  and the same reasoning is true for the  
1476 second argument.

1477 To see that  $e(\cdot, \cdot)$  is non-degenerate, assume that  $e(a, b) = 0$ . Then  $a \cdot b = 0$  implies that  $a$  or  
1478  $b$  must be zero.

1479 *Exercise 41* (Arithmetic laws for pairing maps). Let  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$  as well as  $\mathbb{G}_3$  be finite cyclic groups  
1480 of the same order  $n$  and let  $e(\cdot, \cdot) : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_3$  be a pairing map. Show that for given  $g_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1$   
1481 and  $g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2$  and all  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$  the following identity holds:

$$e(g_1^a, g_2^b) = e(g_1, g_2)^{a \cdot b} \quad (4.8)$$

*Exercise 42.* Consider the remainder class groups  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$  from example 34 for some modulus  $n$ . Show that the map

$$e(\cdot, \cdot) : \mathbb{Z}_n \times \mathbb{Z}_n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n (a, b) \mapsto a \cdot b$$

is a pairing map. Why is the pairing not non-degenerate in general and what condition must be imposed on  $n$ , such that the pairing will be non-degenerate?

### 4.1.1 Cryptographic Groups

In this section, we will look at classes of groups that are believed to satisfy certain **computational hardness assumptions**, namely that it is not feasible to solve a particular problem.

*Example 40.* To give an example for a well-known computational hardness assumption, consider the problem of factorization, i.e. computing the prime factors of a composite integer. If the prime factors are very large, this is infeasible to do, and is expected to remain infeasible. We assume the problem is **computationally hard** or **infeasible**.

Note that in the example, we say that the problem is infeasible to solve *if the prime factors are large enough*. In the cryptographic standard model we have a security parameter and we say that "there exists a security parameter, such that it is not feasible to compute a solution to the problem". In the following examples, the security parameter roughly correlates with the order of the group in consideration. In this book, we do not include the security parameter in our definitions, since we only aim to provide an intuitive understanding of the cryptographic assumptions, not teach the ability to perform rigorous analysis.

Furthermore, understand that these are *assumptions*. Academics have been looking for efficient prime factorization algorithms for a long time, and they have been getting better and better and computers have become faster and faster - but there always was a higher security parameter for which the problem still was infeasible.

In what follows, we will describe a few problems that are assumed to be infeasible that arise in the context of groups in cryptography. We will refer to them throughout the book.

**The discrete logarithm assumption** The so-called **discrete logarithm problem (DLP)** is one of the most fundamental assumptions in cryptography. To define it, let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a finite cyclic group of order  $r$  and let  $g$  be a generator of  $\mathbb{G}$ . We know from 4.1 that there is an exponential map  $g^{(\cdot)} : \mathbb{Z}_r \rightarrow \mathbb{G} ; x \mapsto g^x$  that maps the residue classes from modulo  $r$  arithmetic onto the group in a 1 : 1 correspondence. The **discrete logarithm problem** is the task of finding an inverse to this map, that is, to find a solution  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_r$  to the following equation for some given  $h, g \in \mathbb{G}$ :

$$h = g^x \tag{4.9}$$

There are groups in which the DLP is assumed to be infeasible to solve, and there are groups in which it isn't. We call the former group **DL-secure** groups.

Rephrasing the previous definition, it is believed that in DL-secure groups there is a number  $n$  (as that corresponds to the security parameter), such that it is infeasible to compute some number  $x$  that solves the equation  $h = g^x$  for a given  $h$  and  $g$ , assuming that the order of the group  $n$  is large enough.

*Example 41* (Public key cryptography). One the most basic examples of an application for DL-secure groups is in public key cryptography, where the parties publicly agree on some pair  $(\mathbb{G}, g)$  such that  $\mathbb{G}$  is a finite cyclic group of appropriate order  $n$ , where  $\mathbb{G}$  is believed to be a DL-secure group, and  $g$  is a generator of  $\mathbb{G}$ .

In this setting, a secret key is some number  $sk \in \mathbb{Z}_r$  and the associated public key  $pk$  is the group element  $pk = g^{sk}$ . Since discrete logarithms are assumed to be hard, it is infeasible for an attacker to compute the secret key from the public key, since it is believed to be infeasible to find solutions  $x$  to the following equation:

$$pk = g^x \quad (4.10)$$

As the previous example shows, identifying DL-secure groups is an important practical problem. Unfortunately, it is easy to see that it does not make sense to assume the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in all finite cyclic groups: Counterexamples are common and easy to construct.

**The decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption** Let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a finite cyclic group of order  $n$  and let  $g$  be a generator of  $\mathbb{G}$ . The decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) problem is to distinguish  $(g^a, g^b, g^{ab})$  from the triple  $(g^a, g^b, g^c)$  for uniformly random values  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_r$ . If we assume the DDH problem is infeasible to solve in  $\mathbb{G}$ , we call  $\mathbb{G}$  a **DDH-secure** group.

DDH-security is a stronger assumption than DL-security 4.1.1, in the sense that if the DDH problem is infeasible, so is the DLP, but not necessarily the other way around.

To see why this is the case, assume that the discrete logarithm assumption does not hold. In that case, given a generator  $g$  and a group element  $h$ , it is easy to compute some element  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  with  $h = g^x$ . Then the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption cannot hold, since given some triple  $(g^a, g^b, z)$ , one could efficiently decide whether  $z = g^{ab}$  is true by first computing the discrete logarithm  $b$  of  $g^b$ , then computing  $g^{ab} = (g^a)^b$  and deciding whether or not  $z = g^{ab}$ .

On the other hand, the following example shows that there are groups where the discrete logarithm assumption holds but the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption does not.

*Example 42* (Efficiently computable bilinear pairings). Let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a DL-secure, finite, cyclic group of order  $r$  with generator  $g$  and  $\mathbb{G}_T$  another group, such that there is an efficiently computable pairing map  $e(\cdot, \cdot) : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$  that is bilinear and non degenerate 4.6.

In a setting like this, it is easy to show that solving DDH cannot be infeasible, since given some triple  $(g^a, g^b, z)$ , it is possible to efficiently check whether  $z = g^{ab}$  by making use of the pairing:

$$e(g^a, g^b) \stackrel{?}{=} e(g, z) \quad (4.11)$$

Since the bilinearity properties of  $e(\cdot, \cdot)$  imply  $e(g^a, g^b) = e(g, g)^{ab} = e(g, g^{ab})$ , and  $e(g, y) = e(g, y')$  implies  $y = y'$  due to the non-degenerate property, the equality means  $z = g^{ab}$ .

It follows that the DDH assumption is indeed stronger than the discrete log assumption, and groups with efficient pairings cannot be DDH-secure groups.

**The computational Diffie–Hellman assumption** Let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a finite cyclic group of order  $n$  and let  $g$  be a generator of  $\mathbb{G}$ . The computational Diffie–Hellman assumption stipulates that, given randomly and independently chosen elements  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_r$ , it is not possible to compute  $g^{ab}$  if only  $g, g^a$  and  $g^b$  (but not  $a$  and  $b$ ) are known. If this is the case for  $\mathbb{G}$ , we call  $\mathbb{G}$  a **CDH-secure** group.

In general, we don't know if CDH-security is a stronger assumption than DL-security, or if both assumptions are equivalent. We know that DL-security is necessary for CDH-security, but the other direction is currently not well understood. In particular, there are no DL-security groups known that are not also CDH-secure

To see why the discrete logarithm assumption is necessary, assume that it does not hold. So, given a generator  $g$  and a group element  $h$ , it is easy to compute some element  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  with  $h = g^x$ . In that case, the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption cannot hold, since, given  $g, g^a$  and  $g^b$ , one can efficiently compute  $b$  and hence is able to compute  $g^{ab} = (g^a)^b$  from this data.

The computational Diffie–Hellman assumption is a weaker assumption than the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. This means that there are groups where CDH holds and DDH does not hold, while there cannot be groups in which DDH holds but CDH does not hold. To see that, assume that it is efficiently possible to compute  $g^{ab}$  from  $g, g^a$  and  $g^b$ . Then, given  $(g^a, g^b, z)$  it is easy to decide whether  $z = g^{ab}$  holds or not.

Several variations and special cases of CDH exist. For example, the **square computational Diffie–Hellman assumption** assumes that, given  $g$  and  $g^x$ , it is computationally hard to compute  $g^{x^2}$ . The **inverse computational Diffie–Hellman assumption** assumes that, given  $g$  and  $g^x$ , it is computationally hard to compute  $g^{x^{-1}}$ .

### 4.1.2 Hashing to Groups

**Hash functions** Generally speaking, a hash function is any function that can be used to map data of arbitrary size to fixed-size values. Since binary strings of arbitrary length are a way to represent data in general, we can understand a **hash function** as the following map where  $\{0, 1\}^*$  represents the set of all binary strings of arbitrary but finite length and  $\{0, 1\}^k$  represents the set of all binary strings that have a length of exactly  $k$  bits:

$$H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k \quad (4.12)$$

The **images** of  $H$ , that is, the values returned by the hash function  $H$ , are called **hash values**, **digests**, or simply **hashes**.

*Notation and Symbols* 6. In what follows we call an element  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  a **bit**. If  $s \in \{0, 1\}^*$  is a binary string, we write  $|s| = k$  for its **length**, that is for the number of bits in  $s$ . We write  $\langle \rangle$  for the empty binary string and  $s = \langle b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k \rangle$  for a binary string of length  $k$ .

If two binary strings  $s = \langle b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k \rangle$  and  $s' = \langle b'_1, b'_2, \dots, b'_l \rangle$  are given then we write  $s||s'$  for the **concatenation** that is the string  $s||s' = \langle b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k, b'_1, b'_2, \dots, b'_l \rangle$ .

If  $H$  is a hash function that maps binary strings of arbitrary length onto binary strings of length  $k$  and if  $s \in \{0, 1\}^*$  is a binary string, we write  $H(s)_j$  for the bit at position  $j$  in the image  $H(s)$ .

*Example* 43 ( $k$ -truncation hash). One of the most basic hash functions  $H_k : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$  is given by simply truncating every binary string  $s$  of size  $|s| > k$  to a string of size  $k$  and by filling any string  $s'$  of size  $|s'| < k$  with zeros. To make this hash function deterministic, we define that both truncation and filling should happen “on the left”.

For example, if the parameter  $k$  is given by  $k = 3$  and  $s_1 = \langle 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0 \rangle$  as well as  $s_2 = 1$ , then  $H_3(s_1) = \langle 1, 1, 0 \rangle$  and  $H_3(s_2) = \langle 0, 0, 1 \rangle$ .

A desirable property of a hash function is **uniformity**, which means that it should map input values as evenly as possible over its output range. In mathematical terms, every string of length  $k$  from  $\{0, 1\}^k$  should be generated with roughly the same probability.

Of particular interest are so-called **cryptographic** hash functions, which are hash functions that are also **one-way functions**, which essentially means that, given a string  $y$  from  $\{0, 1\}^k$  it is infeasible to find a string  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$  such that  $H(x) = y$  holds. This property is usually called **preimage-resistance**.

Moreover, if a string  $x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^*$  is given, then it should be infeasible to find another string  $x_2 \in \{0, 1\}^*$  with  $x_1 \neq x_2$  and  $H(x_1) = H(x_2)$

In addition, it should be infeasible to find two strings  $x_1, x_2 \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , such that  $H(x_1) = H(x_2)$ , which is called **collision resistance**. It is important to note, though, that collisions always exist, since a function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$  inevitably maps infinitely many values onto the same hash. In fact, for any hash function with digests of length  $k$ , finding a preimage to a given digest can always be done using a brute force search in  $2^k$  evaluation steps. It should just be practically impossible to compute those values, and statistically very unlikely to generate two of them by chance.

A third property of a cryptographic hash function is that small changes in the input string, like changing a single bit, should generate hash values that look completely different from each other. This is called **diffusion** or the avalanche effect.

Because cryptographic hash functions map tiny changes in input values onto large changes in the output, implementation errors that change the outcome are usually easy to spot by comparing them to expected output values. The definitions of cryptographic hash functions are therefore usually accompanied by some test vectors of common inputs and expected digests. Since the empty string  $<>$  is the only string of length 0, a common test vector is the expected digest of the empty string.

*Example 44* ( $k$ -truncation hash). Consider the  $k$ -truncation hash from example 43. Since the empty string has length 0, it follows that the digest of the empty string is the string of length  $k$  that only contains 0's:

$$H_k(<>) = <0, 0, \dots, 0, 0> \quad (4.13)$$

It is pretty obvious from the definition of  $H_k$  that this simple hash function is not a cryptographic hash function. In particular, every digest is its own preimage, since  $H_k(y) = y$  for every string of size exactly  $k$ . Finding preimages is therefore easy, so the property of preimage resistance does not hold.

In addition, it is easy to construct collisions as all strings  $s$  of size  $|s| > k$  that share the same  $k$ -bits “on the right” are mapped to the same hash value, so this function is not collision resistant, either.

Finally, this hash function does not have a lot of diffusion, as changing bits that are not part of the  $k$  right-most bits don't change the digest at all.

Computing cryptographically secure hash functions in pen-and-paper style is possible but tedious. Fortunately, Sage can import the **hashlib** library, which is intended to provide a reliable and stable base for writing Python programs that require cryptographic functions. The following examples explain how to use hashlib in Sage.

*Example 45.* An example of a hash function that is generally believed to be a cryptographically secure hash function is the so-called **SHA256** hash, which, in our notation, is a function that maps binary strings of arbitrary length onto binary strings of length 256:

$$SHA256 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{256} \quad (4.14)$$

To evaluate a proper implementation of the *SHA256* hash function, the digest of the empty string is supposed to be

$$SHA256(<>) = e3b0c44298fc1c149afb4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855 \quad (4.15)$$

For better human readability, it is common practice to represent the digest of a string not in its binary form, but in a hexadecimal representation. We can use Sage to compute *SHA256* and

freely transit between binary, hexadecimal and decimal representations. To do so, we import hashlib's implementation of SHA256:

```

1647 sage: import hashlib
1648 sage: test = 'e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934
1649         ca495991b7852b855'
1650 sage: empty_string = ""
1651 sage: binary_string = empty_string.encode()
1652 sage: hasher = hashlib.sha256(binary_string)
1653 sage: result = hasher.hexdigest()
1654 sage: type(result) # sage represents digests as strings
1655 <class 'str'>
1656 sage: d = ZZ('0x'+ result) # conversion to an integer
1657 sage: d.str(16) == test # hash is equal to test vector
1658 True
1659 sage: d.str(16) # hexadecimal representation
1660 e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b8
1661     55
1662 sage: d.str(2) # binary representation
1663 111000111011100001100010001000010100110001111110000011100000101
1664     001001101011111011111010011001000100110010110111101110010
1665     01001000010011110101110010000011110010001100100100110111001
1666     00110100110010100100100101011001100100011011011110000101001
1667     01011100001010101
1668 sage: d.str(10) # decimal representation
1669 10298733624955409702953521232258132278979990064819803499337939
1670     7001115665086549

```

**Hashing to cyclic groups** As we have seen in the previous paragraph, general hash functions map binary strings of arbitrary length onto binary strings of some fixed length. However, it is desirable in various cryptographic primitives to not simply hash to binary strings of fixed length but to hash into algebraic structures like groups, while keeping (some of) the properties like preimage resistance or collision resistance.

Hash functions like this can be defined for various algebraic structures, but, in a sense, the most fundamental ones are hash functions that map into groups, because they can be easily extended to map into other structures like rings or fields.

To give a more precise definition, let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a group and  $\{0, 1\}^*$  the set of all finite, binary strings, then a **hash-to-group** function is a deterministic map

$$H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G} \quad (4.16)$$

As the following example shows, hashing to finite cyclic groups can be trivially achieved for the price of some undesirable properties of the hash function:

*Example 46* (Naive cyclic group hash). Let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a finite cyclic group of order  $n$ . If the task is to implement a hash-to-group function, one immediate approach can be based on the observation that binary strings of size  $k$  can be interpreted as integers  $z \in \mathbb{Z}$  in the range  $0 \leq z < 2^k$  using equation 3.4.



1687 To be more precise, let  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$  be a hash function for some parameter  $k$ ,  $g$  a  
 1688 generator of  $\mathbb{G}$  and  $s \in \{0, 1\}^*$  a binary string. Using equation 3.4 and notation 6 the following  
 1689 expression is a non negative integer:

$$z_{H(s)} = H(s)_0 \cdot 2^0 + H(s)_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + H(s)_k \cdot 2^k \quad (4.17)$$

1690 A hash-to-group function for the group  $\mathbb{G}$  can then be defined as a composition of the expo-  
 1691 nential map  $g^{(\cdot)}$  of  $g$  with the interpretation of  $H(s)$  as an integer:

$$H_g : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G} : s \mapsto g^{z_{H(s)}} \quad (4.18)$$

1692 Constructing a hash-to-group function like this is easy for cyclic groups, and it might be  
 1693 good enough in certain applications. It is, however, almost never adequate in cryptographic  
 1694 applications, as a discrete log relation might be constructible between some hash values  $H_g(s)$   
 1695 and  $H_g(t)$ , regardless of whether or not  $\mathbb{G}$  is DL-secure 4.1.1.

a few ex-  
amples?

To be more precise a discrete log relation between the group elements  $H_g(s)$  and  $H_g(t)$  is  
 any element  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ , such that  $H_g(s) = H_g(t)^x$ . To see how such an  $x$  can be constructed, assume  
 that  $z_{H(s)}$  has a multiplicative inverse in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$ . In this case, the element  $x = z_{H(t)} \cdot z_{H(s)}^{-1}$  from  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  is  
 a discrete log relation between  $H_g(s)$  and  $H_g(t)$  since:

$$\begin{aligned} g^{z_{H(t)}} &= g^{z_{H(t)}} && \Leftrightarrow \\ g^{z_{H(t)}} &= g^{z_{H(t)} \cdot z_{H(s)} \cdot z_{H(s)}^{-1}} && \Leftrightarrow \\ g^{z_{H(t)}} &= g^{z_{H(s)} \cdot x} && \Leftrightarrow \\ H_g(t) &= (H_g(s))^x \end{aligned}$$

1696 Therefore applications where discrete log relations between hash values are undesirable  
 1697 need different approaches. Many of these approaches start with a way to hash into the set  $\mathbb{Z}_r$  of  
 1698 modular  $r$  arithmetics.

1699 **Pedersen Hashes** The so-called **Pedersen hash function** [?] provides a way to map fixed  
 1700 size tuples of elements from modular arithmetics onto elements of finite cyclic groups in such  
 1701 a way that discrete log relations 46 between different images are avoidable. Compositions of  
 1702 a Pedersen hash with a general hash function 4.12, then provide hash-to-group functions that  
 1703 maps strings of arbitrary length onto group elements.

1704 To be more precise, let  $j$  be an integer,  $\mathbb{G}$  a finite cyclic group of order  $n$  and  $\{g_1, \dots, g_j\} \subset \mathbb{G}$   
 1705 a uniform and randomly generated set of generators of  $\mathbb{G}$ . Then **Pedersen's hash function** is  
 1706 defined as follows:

$$H_{\{g_1, \dots, g_j\}} : (\mathbb{Z}_r)^j \rightarrow \mathbb{G} : (x_1, \dots, x_j) \mapsto \prod_{i=1}^j g_i^{x_i} \quad (4.19)$$

1707 It can be shown that Pedersen's hash function is collision-resistant under the assumption that  $\mathbb{G}$   
 1708 is DL-secure 4.1.1. It is important to note though, that the following familie of functions does  
 1709 not qualify as a **pseudorandom function family**.

pseudorandom  
function  
family

$$\{H_{\{g_1, \dots, g_j\}} \mid g_1, \dots, g_j \in \mathbb{G}\} \quad (4.20)$$

1710 From an implementation perspective, it is important to derive the set of generators  $\{g_1, \dots, g_k\}$   
 1711 in such a way that they are as uniform and random as possible. In particular, any known discrete  
 1712 log relation between two generators, that is, any known  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$  with  $g_h = (g_i)^x$  must be avoided.

*Example 47.* To compute an actual Pedersen's hash, consider the cyclic group  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  from example 34. We know from example 38, that the elements 2 and 3 are generators of  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$  and it follows that the following map is a Pedersen's hash function:

$$H_{\{2,3\}} : \mathbb{Z}_4 \times \mathbb{Z}_4 \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_5^* ; (x, y) \mapsto 2^x \cdot 3^y$$

1713 To see how this map can be calculated, we choose the input value  $(1, 3)$  from  $\mathbb{Z}_4 \times \mathbb{Z}_4$ . Then  
 1714  $H_{\{2,3\}}(1, 3) = 2^1 \cdot 3^3 = 2 \cdot 2 = 4$ .

To see how the composition of a hash function with  $H_{\{2,3\}}$  defines a hash-to-group function, consider the *SHA256* hash function from example 45. Given some binary string  $s \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , we can insert the two least significant bits  $SHA256(s)_0$  and  $SHA256(s)_1$  from the image  $SHA256(s)$  into  $H_{\{2,3\}}$  to get an element in  $\mathbb{F}_5^*$ . This defines the following hash-to-group function

$$SHA256\_H_{\{2,3\}} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_5^* ; s \mapsto 2^{SHA256(s)_0} \cdot 3^{SHA256(s)_1}$$

1715 To see how this hash function can be calculated, consider the empty string  $\langle \rangle$ . Since we know  
 1716 from the sage computation in example 45, that  $SHA256(\langle \rangle)_0 = 1$  as well as  $SHA256(\langle \rangle)_1 =$   
 1717  $0$ , we get  $SHA\_256H_{\{2,3\}}(\langle \rangle) = 2^1 \cdot 3^0 = 2$ .

1718 Of course computing  $SHA256\_H_{\{2,3\}}$  in a pen and paper style is difficult. However we can  
 1719 easily implement this function in sage in the following way:

```

1720 sage: import hashlib                                     176
1721 sage: def SHA256_H(x) :                                  177
1722     ....:     Z5 = Integers(5) # define the group type    178
1723     ....:     hasher = hashlib.sha256(x) # Compute SHA256 179
1724     ....:     digest = hasher.hexdigest()                 180
1725     ....:     z = ZZ(digest, 16) # cast into integer       181
1726     ....:     z_bin = z.digits(base=2, padto=256) # cast to 256 182
1727     bits
1728     ....:     return Z5(2)^z_bin[0] * Z5(3)^z_bin[1]      183
1729 sage: SHA256_H(b'') # evaluate on empty string           184
1730 2                                                         185
1731 sage: SHA256_H(b'SHA') # possible images are {1,2,3}    186
1732 3                                                         187
1733 sage: SHA256_H(b'Math')                                  188
1734 1                                                         189

```

1735 *Exercise 43.* Consider the multiplicative group  $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^*$  of modular 13 arithmetic from example 33.  
 1736 Choose a set of 3 generators of  $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^*$ , define its associated Pedersen hash function and compute  
 1737 the Pedersen hash of  $(3, 7, 11) \in \mathbb{Z}_{12}$ .

1738 *Exercise 44.* Consider the Pedersen hash from exercise 43. Compose it with the *SHA256* hash  
 1739 function from example 45 to define a hash-to-group function. Implement that function in sage.

1740 **Pseudorandom Function Families in DDH-secure groups** As noted in 4.1.2, the family of  
 1741 Pederson's hash functions, parameterized by a set of generators  $\{g_1, \dots, g_j\}$  does not qualify  
 1742 as a family of pseudorandom functions and should therefore not be instantiated as such. To  
 1743 see an example of a proper family of pseudorandom functions in groups where the decisional  
 1744 Diffie–Hellman assumption 4.1.1 is assumed to hold true, let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a DDH-secure cyclic group of  
 1745 order  $n$  with generator  $g$  and  $\{a_0, a_1, \dots, a_k\} \subset \mathbb{Z}_n^*$  a uniform randomly generated set of numbers

invertible in modular  $n$  arithmetics. Then a family of pseudorandom functions, parameterized by the seed  $\{a_0, a_1, \dots, a_k\}$  is given as follows:

$$F_{\{a_0, a_1, \dots, a_k\}} : \{0, 1\}^{k+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{G} : (b_0, \dots, b_k) \mapsto g^{b_0 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^k a_i^{b_i}} \quad (4.21)$$

*Exercise 45.* Consider the multiplicative group  $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^*$  of modular 13 arithmetic from example 33 and the parameter  $k = 3$ . Choose a generator of  $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^*$ , a seed and instantiate a member of the familie 4.21 for that seed. Evaluate that member on the binary string  $\langle 1, 0, 1 \rangle$ .

## 4.2 Commutative Rings

In the previous section we have seen that integers are a commutative group with respect to integer addition, but as we know there are in fact two arithmetic operations defined on integers: addition and multiplication. However, in contrast to addition, multiplication does not define a group structure, given that integers generally don't have multiplicative inverses. Configurations like these constitute so-called **commutative rings with unit** and the following definition will make the structure explicit:

*Definition 4.2.0.1* (Commutative ring with unit). A **commutative ring with unit**  $(R, +, \cdot, 1)$  is a set  $R$  provided with two maps  $+: R \times R \rightarrow R$  and  $\cdot: R \times R \rightarrow R$ , called **addition** and **multiplication** and an element  $1 \in R$ , called the **unit**, such that the following conditions hold:

- $(R, +)$  is a commutative group, where the neutral element is denoted with 0.
- **Commutativity of multiplication:**  $r_1 \cdot r_2 = r_2 \cdot r_1$  for all  $r_1, r_2 \in R$ .
- **Multiplicative neutral unit:**  $1 \cdot g = g$  for all  $g \in R$ .
- **Associativity:** For every  $g_1, g_2, g_3 \in \mathbb{G}$  the equation  $g_1 \cdot (g_2 \cdot g_3) = (g_1 \cdot g_2) \cdot g_3$  holds.
- **Distributivity:** For all  $g_1, g_2, g_3 \in R$  the distributive law  $g_1 \cdot (g_2 + g_3) = g_1 \cdot g_2 + g_1 \cdot g_3$  holds.

If  $(R, +, \cdot, 1)$  is a commutative ring with unit and  $R' \subset R$  is a subset of  $R$ , such that the restriction of addition and multiplication to  $R'$  define a commutative ring with addition  $+: R' \times R' \rightarrow R'$ , multiplication  $\cdot: R' \times R' \rightarrow R'$  and unit 1 on  $R'$ , then  $(R', +, \cdot, 1)$  is called a **subring** of  $(R, +, \cdot, 1)$ .

*Notation and Symbols 7.* Since we are exclusively concerned with commutative rings in this book, we often just call them rings, keeping the notation of commutativity implicit. A set  $R$  with two maps  $+$  and  $\cdot$  that satisfies all previously mentioned rules, except for the commutativity law of the multiplication is called a non-commutative ring.

If there is no risk of ambiguity (about what the addition and multiplication maps of a ring are), we frequently drop the symbols  $+$  and  $\cdot$  and simply write  $R$  as notation for the ring, keeping those maps implicit. In this case we also say that  $R$  is of ring type, indicating that  $R$  is not simply a set but a set together with an addition and a multiplication map.

*Example 48* (The ring of integers). The set  $\mathbb{Z}$  of integers with the usual addition and multiplication is the archetypical example of a commutative ring with unit 1.

**sage: ZZ**  
**Integer Ring**

190

191

1782 *Example 49* (Underlying commutative group of a ring). Every commutative ring with unit  
 1783  $(R, +, \cdot, 1)$  gives rise to a group, if we disregard multiplication.

1784 The following example is somewhat unusual, but we encourage you to think through it  
 1785 because it helps to detach the mind from familiar styles of computation and concentrate on the  
 1786 abstract algebraic explanation.

1787 *Example 50.* Let  $S := \{\bullet, \star, \odot, \otimes\}$  be a set that contains four elements, and let addition and  
 1788 multiplication on  $S$  be defined as follows:

	$\cup$	$\bullet$	$\star$	$\odot$	$\otimes$		$\circ$	$\bullet$	$\star$	$\odot$	$\otimes$
	$\bullet$	$\bullet$	$\star$	$\odot$	$\otimes$		$\bullet$	$\bullet$	$\bullet$	$\bullet$	$\bullet$
1789	$\star$	$\star$	$\odot$	$\otimes$	$\bullet$		$\star$	$\bullet$	$\star$	$\odot$	$\otimes$
	$\odot$	$\odot$	$\otimes$	$\bullet$	$\star$		$\odot$	$\bullet$	$\odot$	$\bullet$	$\odot$
	$\otimes$	$\otimes$	$\bullet$	$\star$	$\odot$		$\otimes$	$\bullet$	$\otimes$	$\odot$	$\star$

Then  $(S, \cup, \circ, \star)$  is a ring with unit  $\star$  and zero  $\bullet$ . It therefore makes sense to ask for solutions to equations like this one: Find  $x \in S$  such that

$$\otimes \circ (x \cup \odot) = \star$$

To see how such a “moonmath equation” can be solved, we have to keep in mind that rings behaves mostly like normal numbers when it comes to bracketing and computation rules. The only differences are the symbols, and the actual way to add and multiply them. With this in mind, we solve the equation for  $x$  in the “usual way”<sup>1</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \otimes \circ (x \cup \odot) &= \star && \# \text{ apply the distributive law} \\
 \otimes \circ x \cup \otimes \circ \odot &= \star && \# \otimes \circ \odot = \odot \\
 \otimes \circ x \cup \odot &= \star && \# \text{ concatenate the } \cup \text{ inverse of } \odot \text{ to both sides} \\
 \otimes \circ x \cup \odot \cup -\odot &= \star \cup -\odot && \# \odot \cup -\odot = \bullet \\
 \otimes \circ x \cup \bullet &= \star \cup -\odot && \# \bullet \text{ is the } \cup \text{ neutral element} \\
 \otimes \circ x &= \star \cup -\odot && \# \text{ for } \cup \text{ we have } -\odot = \odot \\
 \otimes \circ x &= \star \cup \odot && \# \star \cup \odot = \otimes \\
 \otimes \circ x &= \otimes && \# \text{ concatenate the } \circ \text{ inverse of } \otimes \text{ to both sides} \\
 (\otimes)^{-1} \circ \otimes \circ x &= (\otimes)^{-1} \circ \otimes && \# \text{ multiply with the multiplicative inverse} \\
 \star \circ x &= \star \\
 x &= \star
 \end{aligned}$$

1790 So, even though this equation looked really alien at first glance, we could solve it basically  
 1791 exactly the way we solve “normal” equations containing numbers.

1792 Note, however, that whenever a multiplicative inverse would be needed to solve an equation  
 1793 in the usual way in a ring, things can be very different than most of us are used to. For example,  
 1794 the following equation cannot be solved for  $x$  in the usual way, since there is no multiplicative  
 1795 inverse for  $\odot$  in our ring.

$$\odot \circ x = \otimes \tag{4.22}$$

1796 We can confirm this by looking at the multiplication table to see that no such  $x$  exists.

<sup>1</sup>Note that there are more efficient ways to solve this equation. The point of our computation is to show how the axioms of a ring can be used to solve the equation

1797 As another example, the following equation does not have a single solution but two:  $x \in$   
 1798  $\{\star, \otimes\}$ .

$$\odot \circ x = \odot \quad (4.23)$$

1799 Having no solution or two solutions is certainly not something to expect from types like the  
 1800 rational numbers  $\mathbb{Q}$ .

1801 *Example 51* (Ring of Polynomials). Considering the definition of polynomials from 3.4 again,  
 1802 we notice that what we have informally called the type  $R$  of the coefficients must in fact be a  
 1803 commutative ring with a unit, since we need addition, multiplication, commutativity and the  
 1804 existence of a unit for  $R[x]$  to have the properties we expect.

1805 In fact if we consider  $R$  to be a ring and we define addition and multiplication of polyno-  
 1806 mials as in 3.24, the set  $R[x]$  is a commutative ring with a unit, where the polynomial 1 is the  
 1807 multiplicative unit. We call this ring the **ring of polynomials with coefficients in  $R$** .

1808 **sage: ZZ['x']** 192  
 1809 **Univariate Polynomial Ring in x over Integer Ring** 193

1810 *Example 52* (Ring of modular  $n$  arithmetic). Let  $n$  be a modulus and  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +, \cdot)$  the set of all re-  
 1811 mainder classes of integers modulo  $n$ , with the projection of integer addition and multiplication  
 1812 as defined in 3.3. Then  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +, \cdot)$  is a commutative ring with unit 1.

1813 **sage: Integers(6)** 194  
 1814 **Ring of integers modulo 6** 195

1815 *Example 53* (Binary Representations in Modular Arithmetic). TODO (Non unique)

1816 *Example 54* (Polynomial evaluation in the exponent of group generators). As we show in 6.2.3,  
 1817 a key insights in many zero knowledge protocols is the ability to encode computations as poly-  
 1818 nomials and then to hide the information of that computation by evaluating the polynomial "in  
 1819 the exponent" of certain cryptographic groups 8.2.

To understand the underlying principle of this idea, consider the exponential map 44 again.  
 If  $\mathbb{G}$  is a finite cyclic group of order  $n$  with generator  $g \in \mathbb{G}$ , then the ring structure of  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +, \cdot)$   
 corresponds to the group structure of  $\mathbb{G}$  in the following way:

$$g^{x+y} = g^x \cdot g^y \quad g^{x \cdot y} = (g^x)^y \quad \text{for all } x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n \quad (4.24)$$

This correspondence allows polynomials with coefficients in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  to be evaluated "in the ex-  
 ponent" of a group generator. To see what this means, let  $p \in \mathbb{Z}_n[x]$  be a polynomial with  
 $p(x) = a_m \cdot x^m + a_{m-1}x^{m-1} + \dots + a_1x + a_0$  and let  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_n$  be an evaluation point. Then the  
 previously defined exponential laws 4.24 imply the following identity:

$$\begin{aligned} g^{p(s)} &= g^{a_m \cdot s^m + a_{m-1}s^{m-1} + \dots + a_1s + a_0} \\ &= (g^{s^m})^{a_m} \cdot (g^{s^{m-1}})^{a_{m-1}} \cdot \dots \cdot (g^s)^{a_1} \cdot g^{a_0} \end{aligned} \quad (4.25)$$

1820 Utilizing these identities, it is possible to evaluate any polynomial  $p$  of degree  $\deg(p) \leq m$  at a  
 1821 "secret" evaluation point  $s$  in the exponent of  $g$  without any knowledge about  $s$ , assuming that  
 1822  $\mathbb{G}$  is a DL-group. To see this assume that the set  $\{g, g^s, g^{s^2}, \dots, g^{s^m}\}$  is given, but  $s$  is unknown.  
 1823 Then  $g^{p(s)}$  can be computed using 4.25, however it is not feasible to compute  $s$ .

*Example 55.* To give an example of the evaluation of a polynomial in the exponent of a finite cyclic group, consider the exponential map from example 36:

$$3^{(\cdot)} : \mathbb{Z}_4 \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_5^* ; x \mapsto 3^x$$

Choosing the polynomial  $p(x) = 2x^2 + 3x + 1$  from  $\mathbb{Z}_4[x]$ , we first evaluate the polynomial at the point  $s = 2$  and then write the result into the exponent 3 as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} 3^{p(2)} &= 3^{2 \cdot 2^2 + 3 \cdot 2 + 1} \\ &= 3^{2 \cdot 0 + 2 + 1} \\ &= 3^3 \\ &= 2 \end{aligned}$$

This was possible, because we had access to the evaluation point 2. On the other hand, if we only had access to the set  $\{3, 4, 1\}$  and we knew that this set represents the set  $\{3, 3^s, 3^{s^2}\}$  for some secret value  $s$ , we could evaluate  $p$  at the point  $s$  in the exponent of 3 as

$$\begin{aligned} 3^{p(s)} &= 1^2 \cdot 4^3 \cdot 3^1 \\ &= 1 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \\ &= 2 \end{aligned}$$

Both computations agree, since the secret point  $s$  was equal to 2 in this example. However the second evaluation was possible without any knowledge about  $s$ .

**Hashing into Modular Arithmetic** As we have seen in 4.1.2, various constructions for hashing-to-groups are known and used in applications. As commutative rings are commutative groups, when we disregard the multiplicative structure, hash-to-group constructions can be applied for hashing into commutative rings.

One of the most widely used applications of hash-into-ring constructions are hash functions that map into the ring  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  of modular  $n$  arithmetics for some modulus  $n$ . Different approaches to construct such a function are known, but probably the most widely used ones are based on the insight that the images of general hash functions can be interpreted as binary representations of integers, as explained in example 46.

It follows from this interpretation that one simple method of hashing into  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  is constructed by observing that if  $n$  is a modulus with a bit-length 3.4 of  $k = |n|$ , then every binary string  $\langle b_0, b_1, \dots, b_{k-2} \rangle$  of length  $k - 1$  defines an integer  $z$  in the range  $0 \leq z \leq 2^{k-1} - 1 < n$ :

$$z = b_0 \cdot 2^0 + b_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + b_{k-2} \cdot 2^{k-2} \quad (4.26)$$

Now, since  $z < n$ , we know that  $z$  is guaranteed to be in the set  $\{0, 1, \dots, n - 1\}$ , and hence it can be interpreted as an element of  $\mathbb{Z}_n$ . From this it follows that if  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{k-1}$  is a hash function, then a hash-to-ring function can be constructed as follows:

$$H_{|n|_2-1} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n : s \mapsto H(s)_0 \cdot 2^0 + H(s)_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + H(s)_{k-2} \cdot 2^{k-2} \quad (4.27)$$

A drawback of this hash function is that the distribution of the hash values in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  is not necessarily uniform. In fact, if  $n$  is larger than  $2^{k-1}$ , then by design  $H_{|n|_2-1}$  will never hash onto values  $z \geq 2^{k-1}$ . Using this hashing method therefore generates approximately uniform hashes only, if  $n$  is very close to  $2^{k-1}$ . In the worst case, when  $n = 2^k - 1$ , it misses almost half of all elements from  $\mathbb{Z}_n$ .

An advantage of this approach is that properties like preimage resistance or collision resistance of the original hash function  $H(\cdot)$  are preserved.

*Example 56.* To analyze a particular implementation of a  $H_{|n|_2-1}$  hash function, we use a 5-bit truncation of the *SHA256* hash from example 45 and define a hash into  $\mathbb{Z}_{16}$  as follows:

$$H_{|16|_2-5} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{16} : s \mapsto \text{SHA256}(s)_0 \cdot 2^0 + \text{SHA256}(s)_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + \text{SHA256}(s)_4 \cdot 2^4$$


1848 Since  $k = |16|_2 = 5$  and  $16 - 2^{k-1} = 0$ , this hash maps uniformly onto  $\mathbb{Z}_{16}$ . We can invoke Sage  
1849 to implement it:

```


1850 sage: import hashlib                                196
1851 sage: def Hash5(x):                                197
1852     ....:     Z16 = Integers(16)                    198
1853     ....:     hasher = hashlib.sha256(x) # compute SHA56 199
1854     ....:     digest = hasher.hexdigest()            200
1855     ....:     d = ZZ(digest, base=16) # cast to integer 201
1856     ....:     d = d.str(2)[-4:] # keep 5 least significant bits 202
1857     ....:     d = ZZ(d, base=2) # cast to integer     203
1858     ....:     return Z16(d) # cast to Z16            204
1859 sage: Hash5(b' ')                                    205
1860 5                                                      206

```

1861 We can then use Sage to apply this function to a large set of input values in order to plot a  
1862 visualization of the distribution over the set  $\{0, \dots, 15\}$ . Executing over 500 input values gives  
1863 the following plot:




1864  
1865 To get an intuition of uniformity, we can count the number of times the hash function  $H_{|16|_2-1}$   
1866 maps onto each number in the set  $\{0, 1, \dots, 15\}$  in a loop of 100000 hashes, and compare that  
1867 to the ideal uniform distribution, which would map exactly 6250 samples to each element. This  
1868 gives the following result:



1869

1870 The lack of uniformity becomes apparent if we want to construct a similar hash function for  $\mathbb{Z}_n$   
 1871 for any other 5 bit integer  $n$  in the range  $17 \leq n \leq 31$ . In this case, the definition of the hash  
 1872 function is exactly the same as for  $\mathbb{Z}_{16}$ , and hence, the images will not exceed the value 15.  
 1873 So, for example, even in the case of hashing to  $\mathbb{Z}_{31}$ , the hash function never maps to any value  
 1874 larger than 15, leaving almost half of all numbers out of the image range.



1875

1876 A second widely used method of hashing into  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  is constructed by observing the following:  
 1877 If  $n$  is a modulus with a bit-length of  $|n|_2 = k_1$  and  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_2}$  is a hash function that  
 1878 produces digests of size  $k_2$ , with  $k_2 \geq k_1$ , then a hash-to-ring function can be constructed by  
 1879 interpreting the image of  $H$  as a binary representation of an integer and then taking the modulus  
 1880 by  $n$  to map into  $\mathbb{Z}_n$ .

$$H'_{mod_n} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n : s \mapsto \left( H(s)_0 \cdot 2^0 + H(s)_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + H(s)_{k_2} \cdot 2^{k_2} \right) \bmod n \quad (4.28)$$

1881 A drawback of this hash function is that computing the modulus requires some computa-  
 1882 tional effort. In addition, the distribution of the hash values in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  might not be uniform, depend-  
 1883 ing on the number  $2^{k_2+1} \bmod n$ . An advantage of it is that potential properties of the original  
 1884 hash function  $H(\cdot)$  (like preimage resistance or collision resistance) are preserved, and the dis-  
 1885 tribution can be made almost uniform, with only negligible bias depending on what modulus  $n$   
 1886 and images size  $k_2$  are chosen.

*Example 57.* To give an implementation of the  $H_{mod_n}$  hash function, we use  $k_2$ -bit truncation of the SHA256 hash from example 45, and define a hash into  $\mathbb{Z}_{23}$  as follows:

$$H_{mod_{23}, k_2} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{23} : s \mapsto \left( SHA256(s)_0 \cdot 2^0 + SHA256(s)_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + SHA256(s)_{k_2} \cdot 2^{k_2} \right) \bmod 23$$




We want to use various instantiations of  $k_2$  to visualize the impact of truncation length on the distribution of the hashes in  $\mathbb{Z}_{23}$ . We can invoke Sage to implement it as follows:

```

sage: import hashlib
sage: Z23 = Integers(23)
sage: def Hash_mod23(x, k2):
.....:     hasher = hashlib.sha256(x.encode('utf-8')) # Compute
SHA256
.....:     digest = hasher.hexdigest()
.....:     d = ZZ(digest, base=16) # cast to integer
.....:     d = d.str(2)[-k2:] # keep k2+1 LSB
.....:     d = ZZ(d, base=2) # cast to integer
.....:     return Z23(d) # cast to Z23

```

We can then use Sage to apply this function to a large set of input values in order to plot visualizations of the distribution over the set  $\{0, \dots, 22\}$  for various values of  $k_2$ , by counting the number of times it maps onto each number in a loop of 100000 hashes. We get the following plot:



A third method that can sometimes be found in implementations is the so-called “**try-and-increment**” method. To understand this method, we define an integer  $z \in \mathbb{Z}$  from any hash value  $H(s)$  as we did in the previous methods, that is, we define

$$z = H(s)_0 \cdot 2^0 + H(s)_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + H(s)_{k-1} \cdot 2^k$$

Hashing into  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  is then achievable by first computing  $z$ , and then trying to see if  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ . If it is, then the hash is done; if not, the string  $s$  is modified in a deterministic way and the process is repeated until a suitable element  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_n$  is found. A suitable, deterministic modification could be to concatenate the original string by some bit counter. A “try-and-increment” algorithm would then work like in algorithm 6.

Depending on the parameters, this method can be very efficient. In fact, if  $k$  is sufficiently large and  $n$  is close to  $2^{k+1}$ , the probability for  $z < n$  is very high and the repeat loop will almost always be executed a single time only. A drawback is, however, that the probability of having to execute the loop multiple times is not zero.

**Algorithm 6** Hash-to- $\mathbb{Z}_n$ **Require:**  $n \in \mathbb{Z}$  with  $|n|_2 = k$  and  $s \in \{0, 1\}^*$ **procedure** TRY-AND-INCREMENT( $n, k, s$ ) $c \leftarrow 0$ **repeat** $s' \leftarrow s || c\_bits()$  $z \leftarrow H(s')_0 \cdot 2^0 + H(s')_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + H(s')_k \cdot 2^k$  $c \leftarrow c + 1$ **until**  $z < n$ **return**  $x$ **end procedure****Ensure:**  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ 

## 4.3 Fields

We started this chapter with the definition of a group 4.1, which we then expanded into the definition of a commutative ring with a unit 4.2. Such rings generalize the behavior of integers. In this section, we will look at those special cases of commutative rings where every element other than the neutral element of addition has a multiplicative inverse. Those structures behave very much like the rational numbers  $\mathbb{Q}$ . Rational numbers are, in a sense, an extension of the ring of integers, that is, they are constructed by including newly defined multiplicative inverses (fractions) to the integers. The following definition makes the definition of a field precise:

**Definition 4.3.0.1 (Field).** A **field**  $(\mathbb{F}, +, \cdot)$  is a set  $\mathbb{F}$  provided with two maps  $+: \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  and  $\cdot: \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ , called **addition** and **multiplication**, such that the following conditions hold:

- $(\mathbb{F}, +)$  is a commutative group, where the neutral element is denoted by 0.
- $(\mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}, \cdot)$  is a commutative group, where the neutral element is denoted by 1.
- (Distributivity) The equation  $g_1 \cdot (g_2 + g_3) = g_1 \cdot g_2 + g_1 \cdot g_3$  holds for all  $g_1, g_2, g_3 \in \mathbb{F}$ .

If  $(\mathbb{F}, +, \cdot)$  is a field and  $\mathbb{F}' \subset \mathbb{F}$  is a subset of  $\mathbb{F}$ , such that the restriction of addition and multiplication to  $\mathbb{F}'$  define a field with addition  $+: \mathbb{F}' \times \mathbb{F}' \rightarrow \mathbb{F}'$  and multiplication  $\cdot: \mathbb{F}' \times \mathbb{F}' \rightarrow \mathbb{F}'$  on  $\mathbb{F}'$ , then  $(\mathbb{F}', +, \cdot)$  is called a **subfield** of  $(\mathbb{F}, +, \cdot)$  and  $(\mathbb{F}, +, \cdot)$  is called an **extension field** of  $(\mathbb{F}', +, \cdot)$ .

**Notation and Symbols 8.** If there is no risk of ambiguity (about what the addition and multiplication maps of a field are), we frequently drop the symbols  $+$  and  $\cdot$  and simply write  $\mathbb{F}$  as notation for the field, keeping those maps implicit. In this case we also say that  $\mathbb{F}$  is of field type, indicating that  $\mathbb{F}$  is not simply a set but a set together with an addition and a multiplication map that satisfy the field axioms 4.3.0.1.

We call  $(\mathbb{F}, +)$  the **additive group** of the field, write  $\mathbb{F}^* := \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}$  for the set of all elements excluding the neutral element of addition and call the group  $(\mathbb{F}^*, \cdot)$  the **multiplicative group** of the field.

The **characteristic** of a field  $\mathbb{F}$ , represented as  $\text{char}(\mathbb{F})$ , is the smallest natural number  $n \geq 1$  for which the  $n$ -fold sum of the multiplicative neutral element 1 equals zero, i.e. for which  $\sum_{i=1}^n 1 = 0$ . If such an  $n > 0$  exists, the field is also said to have a **finite characteristic**. If, on the other hand, every finite sum of 1 is such that it is not equal to zero, then the field is defined to have characteristic 0.

**S:** Tried to disambiguate the scope of negation between 1. “It is true of

Check  
change of  
wording

every finite sum of 1 that it is not equal to 0” and 2. “It is not true of every finite sum of 1 that it is equal to 0” From the example below, it looks like 1. is the intended meaning here, correct?

*Example 58* (Field of rational numbers). Probably the best known example of a field is the set of rational numbers  $\mathbb{Q}$  together with the usual definition of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. Since there is no natural number  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , such that  $\sum_{j=0}^n 1 = 0$  in the set of rational numbers, the characteristic of the field  $\mathbb{Q}$  is given by  $\text{char}(\mathbb{Q}) = 0$ .

```
sage: QQ
Rational Field
```

216  
217

*Example 59* (Field with two elements). It can be shown that, in any field, the neutral element of addition 0 must be different from the neutral element of multiplication 1, that is,  $0 \neq 1$  always holds in a field. From this, it follows that the smallest field must contain at least two elements. As the following addition and multiplication tables show, there is indeed a field with two elements, which is usually called  $\mathbb{F}_2$ :

Let  $\mathbb{F}_2 := \{0, 1\}$  be a set that contains two elements and let addition and multiplication on  $\mathbb{F}_2$  be defined as follows:

$$\begin{array}{c|cc} + & 0 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{c|cc} \cdot & 0 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \end{array}$$

Since  $1 + 1 = 0$  in the field  $\mathbb{F}_2$ , we know that the characteristic of  $\mathbb{F}_2$  given by  $\text{char}(\mathbb{F}_2) = 2$  and the multiplicative subgroup  $\mathbb{F}_2^*$  of  $\mathbb{F}_2$  is given by the trivial group  $\{1\}$ .

```
sage: F2 = GF(2)
sage: F2(1) # Get an element from GF(2)
1
sage: F2(1) + F2(1) # Addition
0
sage: F2(1) / F2(1) # Division
1
```

218  
219  
220  
221  
222  
223  
224

*Exercise 46.* Consider the ring of modular 5 arithmetics  $(\mathbb{Z}_5, +, \cdot)$  from example 14. Show that  $(\mathbb{Z}_5, +, \cdot)$  is a field. What is the characteristic of  $\mathbb{Z}_5$ ? Proof that the equation  $a \cdot x = b$  has only a single solution  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_5$  for any given  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_5^*$ .

*Exercise 47.* Consider the ring of modular 6 arithmetics  $(\mathbb{Z}_6, +, \cdot)$  from example 9. Show that  $(\mathbb{Z}_6, +, \cdot)$  is not a field.

### 4.3.1 Prime fields

As we have seen in the various examples of the previous sections, modular arithmetics behaves similarly to the ordinary arithmetics of integers in many ways. This is due to the fact that remainder class sets  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  are commutative rings with units 52.

However, we have also seen in 36 that, whenever the modulus is a prime number, every remainder class other than the zero class has a modular multiplicative inverse. This is an important observation, since it immediately implies that, in case the modulus is a prime number, the remainder class set  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  is not just a ring but actually a **field**. Moreover, since  $\sum_{j=0}^n 1 = 0$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$ , we know that those fields have the finite characteristic  $n$ .

*Notation and Symbols 9* (Prime Fields). Let  $p \in \mathbb{P}$  be a prime number and  $(\mathbb{Z}_p, +, \cdot)$  the ring of modular  $p$  arithmetics 52. To distinguish prime fields from arbitrary modular arithmetic rings, we write  $(\mathbb{F}_p, +, \cdot)$  for the ring of modular  $p$  arithmetics and call it the **prime field** of characteristic  $p$ .

Prime fields are the foundation for many of the contemporary algebra-based cryptographic systems, as they have some desirable properties. One of them is that any prime field of characteristic  $p$  contain exactly  $p$  elements which can be represented on a computer with not more than  $\log_2(p)$  many bits. On the other hand fields like the rational numbers, require a potentially unbounded amount of bits for any full-precision representation.

Since prime fields are special cases of modular arithmetic rings, addition and multiplication can be computed by first doing normal integer addition and multiplication, and then considering the remainder in Eucliden division by  $p$  as the result. For any prime field element  $x \in \mathbb{F}_p$ , its additive inverse (the negative) is given by  $-x = p - x \bmod p$ . For  $x \neq 0$  the multiplicative inverse always exists and is given by  $x^{-1} = x^{p-2}$ . Division is then defined by multiplication with the multiplicative inverse as explained in 3.3. Alternative the multiplicative inverse can be computed using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm as explained in 3.20.

*Example 60.* The smallest field is the field  $\mathbb{F}_2$  of characteristic 2 as we have seen in example 59. It is the prime field of the prime number 2.

*Example 61.* The field  $\mathbb{F}_5$  from example 14 as defined by its addition and multiplication table is a prime field.

*Example 62.* To summarize the basic aspects of computation in prime fields, let us consider the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_5$  and simplify the following expression:

$$\left(\frac{2}{3} - 2\right) \cdot 2$$

A first thing to note is that since  $\mathbb{F}_5$  is a field, all rules are identical to the rules we learned in school when we where dealing with rational, real or complex numbers. This means we can use e.g. bracketing (distributivity) or addition as usual:

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{2}{3} - 2\right) \cdot 2 &= \frac{2}{3} \cdot 2 - 2 \cdot 2 && \# \text{ distributive law} \\ &= \frac{2 \cdot 2}{3} - 2 \cdot 2 && 4 \bmod 5 = 4 \\ &= \frac{4}{3} - 4 && \# \text{ multiplicative inverse of 3 is } 3^{5-2} \bmod 5 = 2 \\ &= 4 \cdot 2 - 4 && \# \text{ additive inverse of 4 is } 5 - 4 = 1 \\ &= 4 \cdot 2 + 1 && 8 \bmod 5 = 3 \\ &= 3 + 1 && 4 \bmod 5 = 4 \\ &= 4 \end{aligned}$$

In this computation, we computed the multiplicative inverse of 3 using the identity  $x^{-1} = x^{p-2}$  in a prime field. This is impractical for large prime numbers. Recall that another way of computing the multiplicative inverse is the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (see 3.11). To refresh our memory, the algorithm solves the equation  $x^{-1} \cdot 3 + t \cdot 5 = 1$ , for  $x^{-1}$ , even though in this case  $t$  is irrelevant. We get:

k	$r_k$	$x_k^{-1}$	$t_k$
0	3	1	.
1	5	0	.
2	3	1	.
3	2	-1	.
4	1	2	.

2007

2008 So the multiplicative inverse of 3 in  $\mathbb{Z}_5$  is 2, and, indeed, if we compute the product of 3 with  
 2009 its multiplicative inverse 2 we get the neutral element 1 in  $\mathbb{F}_5$ .

2010 *Exercise 48* (Prime field  $\mathbb{F}_3$ ). Construct the addition and multiplication table of the prime field  
 2011  $\mathbb{F}_3$ .

2012 *Exercise 49* (Prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ ). Construct the addition and multiplication table of the prime field  
 2013  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ .

*Exercise 50.* Consider the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  from exercise 49. Find the set of all pairs  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13}$  that satisfy the equation

$$x^2 + y^2 = 1 + 7 \cdot x^2 \cdot y^2$$

2014 **Square Roots** As we know from integer arithmetics some integers like 4 or 9 are squares of  
 2015 other integers, as for example  $4 = 2^2$  and  $9 = 3^2$ . However we also know that not all integers  
 2016 are squares of other integers, as for example there is no integers  $x \in \mathbb{Z}$  such that  $x^2 = 2$ . If an  
 2017 integer  $a$  is square of another integer  $b$ , then it make sense to define the square-root of  $a$  to be  $b$ .

2018 In the context of prime fields an element that is a square of another element is also called a  
 2019 **quadratic residue** and an element that is not a square of another element is called a **quadratic**  
 2020 **non-residue**. Those notations are of particular importance in our studies on elliptic curves in  
 2021 chapter 5, as only square numbers can actually be points on an elliptic curve.

2022 To make the intuition of quadratic residues and their roots precise, let  $p \in \mathbb{P}$  be a prime  
 2023 number and  $\mathbb{F}_p$  its associated prime field. Then a number  $x \in \mathbb{F}_p$  is called a **square root** of  
 2024 another number  $y \in \mathbb{F}_p$ , if  $x$  is a solution to the following equation:

$$x^2 = y \tag{4.29}$$

2025 In this case,  $y$  is called a **quadratic residue**. On the other hand, if  $y$  is given and the quadratic  
 2026 equation has no solution  $x$ , we call  $y$  a **quadratic non-residue**. For any  $y \in \mathbb{F}_p$ , we denote the  
 2027 set of all square roots of  $y$  in the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$  as follows:

$$\sqrt{y} := \{x \in \mathbb{F}_p \mid x^2 = y\} \tag{4.30}$$

2028 Informally speaking, quadratic residues are numbers such that we can take the square root of  
 2029 them, while quadratic non-residues are numbers that don't have square roots. The situation  
 2030 therefore parallels the familiar case of integers, where some integers like 4 or 9 have square  
 2031 roots and others like 2 or 3 don't (as integers).

2032 If  $y$  is a quadratic non-residue, then  $\sqrt{y} = \emptyset$  (an empty set), and if  $y = 0$ , then  $\sqrt{y} = \{0\}$ .  
 2033 Moreover if  $y \neq 0$  is a quadratic residue then it has precisely two roots  $\sqrt{y} = \{x, p - x\}$  for  
 2034 some  $x \in \mathbb{F}_p$ . We adopt the convention to call the smaller one (when interpreted as an integer)  
 2035 as the **positive** square root and the larger one as the **negative** square root. If  $p \in \mathbb{P}_{\geq 3}$  is an odd  
 2036 prime number with associated prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , then there are precisely  $(p + 1)/2$  many quadratic  
 2037 residues and  $(p - 1)/2$  quadratic non residues.

*Example 63* (Quadratic residues and roots in  $\mathbb{F}_5$ ). Let us consider the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_5$  again. All square numbers can be found on the main diagonal of the multiplication table in example 14. As you can see, in  $\mathbb{F}_5$  only the numbers 0, 1 and 4 have square roots and we get  $\sqrt{0} = \{0\}$ ,  $\sqrt{1} = \{1, 4\}$ ,  $\sqrt{2} = \emptyset$ ,  $\sqrt{3} = \emptyset$  and  $\sqrt{4} = \{2, 3\}$ . The numbers 0, 1 and 4 are therefore quadratic residues, while the numbers 2 and 3 are quadratic non-residues.

In order to describe whether an element of a prime field is a square number or not, the so-called **Legendre symbol** can sometimes be found in the literature, which is why we will summarize it here:

Let  $p \in \mathbb{P}$  be a prime number and  $y \in \mathbb{F}_p$  an element from the associated prime field. Then the *Legendre symbol* of  $y$  is defined as follows:

$$\left(\frac{y}{p}\right) := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y \text{ has square roots} \\ -1 & \text{if } y \text{ has no square roots} \\ 0 & \text{if } y = 0 \end{cases} \quad (4.31)$$

*Example 64.* Looking at the quadratic residues and non residues in  $\mathbb{F}_5$  from example 14 again, we can deduce the following Legendre symbols, from example 63.

$$\left(\frac{0}{5}\right) = 0, \quad \left(\frac{1}{5}\right) = 1, \quad \left(\frac{2}{5}\right) = -1, \quad \left(\frac{3}{5}\right) = -1, \quad \left(\frac{4}{5}\right) = 1.$$

The Legendre symbol provides a criterion to decide whether or not an element from a prime field has a quadratic root or not. This, however, is not just of theoretical use: The so-called **Euler criterion** provides a compact way to actually compute the Legendre symbol. To see that, let  $p \in \mathbb{P}_{\geq 3}$  be an odd prime number and  $y \in \mathbb{F}_p$ . Then the Legendre symbol can be computed as follows:

$$\left(\frac{y}{p}\right) = y^{\frac{p-1}{2}}. \quad (4.32)$$

*Example 65.* Looking at the quadratic residues and non residues in  $\mathbb{F}_5$  from example 63 again, we can compute the following Legendre symbols using the Euler criterion:

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{0}{5}\right) &= 0^{\frac{5-1}{2}} = 0^2 = 0 \\ \left(\frac{1}{5}\right) &= 1^{\frac{5-1}{2}} = 1^2 = 1 \\ \left(\frac{2}{5}\right) &= 2^{\frac{5-1}{2}} = 2^2 = 4 = -1 \\ \left(\frac{3}{5}\right) &= 3^{\frac{5-1}{2}} = 3^2 = 4 = -1 \\ \left(\frac{4}{5}\right) &= 4^{\frac{5-1}{2}} = 4^2 = 1 \end{aligned}$$

*Exercise 51.* Consider the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  from exercise 49. Compute the Legendre symbol  $\left(\frac{x}{13}\right)$  and the set of roots  $\sqrt{x}$  for all elements  $x \in \mathbb{F}_{13}$ .

### Hashing into prime fields

An important problem in cryptography is the ability to hash to (various subsets) of elliptic curves. As we will see in chapter 5, those curves are often defined over prime fields, and hashing

to a curve might start with hashing to the prime field. It is therefore important to understand how to hash into prime fields.

In 4.2, we looked at a few methods of hashing into the modular arithmetic rings  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  for arbitrary  $n > 1$ . As prime fields are just special instances of those rings, all methods for hashing into  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  functions can be used for hashing into prime fields, too.

### 4.3.2 Prime Field Extensions

Prime fields, as defined in the previous section, are basic building blocks in cryptography. However, as we will see in chapter 8 so-called pairing-based SNARK systems are crucially dependent on certain group pairings 4.6 defined on elliptic curves over **prime field extensions**. In this section we therefore introduce those extensions.

Given some prime number  $p \in \mathbb{P}$ , a natural number  $m \in \mathbb{N}$  and an irreducible polynomial  $P \in \mathbb{F}_p[x]$  of degree  $m$  with coefficients from the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , then a prime field extension  $(\mathbb{F}_{p^m}, +, \cdot)$  is defined as follows:

The set  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  of the prime field extension is given by the set of all polynomials with a degree less than  $m$ :

$$\mathbb{F}_{p^m} := \{a_{m-1}x^{m-1} + a_{m-2}x^{m-2} + \dots + a_1x + a_0 \mid a_i \in \mathbb{F}_p\} \quad (4.33)$$

The addition law of the prime field extension  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  is given by the usual addition of polynomials as defined in 3.24:

$$+ : \mathbb{F}_{p^m} \times \mathbb{F}_{p^m} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{p^m}, (\sum_{j=0}^m a_j x^j, \sum_{j=0}^m b_j x^j) \mapsto \sum_{j=0}^m (a_j + b_j) x^j \quad (4.34)$$

The multiplication law of the prime field extension  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  is given by first multiplying the two polynomials as defined in 3.25 and then divided the result by the irreducible polynomial  $P$  and keep the remainder:

$$\cdot : \mathbb{F}_{p^m} \times \mathbb{F}_{p^m} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{p^m}, (\sum_{j=0}^m a_j x^j, \sum_{j=0}^m b_j x^j) \mapsto (\sum_{n=0}^{2m} \sum_{i=0}^n a_i b_{n-i} x^n) \bmod P \quad (4.35)$$

The neutral element of the additive group  $(\mathbb{F}_{p^m}, +)$  is given by the zero polynomial 0 and the additive inverse is given by the polynomial with all negative coefficients. The neutral element of the multiplicative group  $(\mathbb{F}_{p^m}^*, \cdot)$  is given by the unit polynomial 1 and the multiplicative inverse can be computed by the extended Euclidean algorithm.

We can see from the definition of  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  that the field is of characteristic  $p$ , since the multiplicative neutral element 1 is equivalent to the multiplicative element 1 from the underlying prime field, and hence  $\sum_{j=0}^p 1 = 0$ . Moreover,  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  is finite and contains  $p^m$  many elements, since elements are polynomials of degree  $< m$ , and every coefficient  $a_j$  can have  $p$  many different values. In addition, we see that the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$  is a subfield of  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  that occurs when we restrict the elements of  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  to polynomials of degree zero.

One key point is that the construction of  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  depends on the choice of an irreducible polynomial, and, in fact, different choices will give different multiplication tables, since the remainders from dividing a polynomial product by those polynomials will be different.

It can, however, be shown that the fields for different choices of  $P$  are **isomorphic**, which means that there is a one-to-one correspondence between all of them. Consequently, from an abstract point of view, they are the same thing. From an implementations point of view, however, some choices are preferable to others because they allow for faster computations.

*Remark 4.* Similar to the way prime fields  $\mathbb{F}_p$  are generated by starting with the ring of integers and then dividing by a prime number  $p$  and keeping the remainder, prime field extensions  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$

are generated by starting with the ring  $\mathbb{F}_p[x]$  of polynomials and then dividing them by an irreducible polynomial of degree  $m$  and keeping the remainder.

In fact it can be shown that  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  is the set of all remainders when dividing any polynomial  $Q \in \mathbb{F}_p[x]$  by an irreducible polynomial  $P$  of degree  $m$ . This is analogous to how  $\mathbb{F}_p$  is the set of all remainders when dividing integers by  $p$ .

Any field  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  constructed in the above manner is a field extension of  $\mathbb{F}_p$ . To be more general, a field  $\mathbb{F}_{p^{m_2}}$  is a field extension of a field  $\mathbb{F}_{p^{m_1}}$ , if and only if  $m_1$  divides  $m_2$ . From this, we can deduce that, for any given fixed prime number, there are nested sequences of subfields whenever the power  $m_j$  divides the power  $m_{j+1}$ :

$$\mathbb{F}_p \subset \mathbb{F}_{p^{m_1}} \subset \cdots \subset \mathbb{F}_{p^{m_k}} \quad (4.36)$$

To get a more intuitive picture of this, we construct an extension field of the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_3$  in the following example, and we can see how  $\mathbb{F}_3$  sits inside that extension field.

*Example 66* (The Extension field  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$ ). In exercise 48 we have constructed the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_3$ . In this example, we apply the definition of a field extension 4.33 to construct the extension field  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$ . We start by choosing an irreducible polynomial of degree 2 with coefficients in  $\mathbb{F}_3$ . We try  $P(t) = t^2 + 1$ . Possibly the fastest way to show that  $P$  is indeed irreducible is to just insert all elements from  $\mathbb{F}_3$  to see if the result is ever zero. We compute as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} P(0) &= 0^2 + 1 = 1 \\ P(1) &= 1^2 + 1 = 2 \\ P(2) &= 2^2 + 1 = 1 + 1 = 2 \end{aligned}$$

This implies that  $P$  is irreducible, since all factors must be of the form  $(t - a)$  for  $a$  being a root of  $P$ . The set  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$  contains all polynomials of degrees lower than two, with coefficients in  $\mathbb{F}_3$ , which are precisely as listed below:

$$\mathbb{F}_{3^2} = \{0, 1, 2, t, t+1, t+2, 2t, 2t+1, 2t+2\}$$

As expected, our extension field contains 9 elements. Addition is defined as addition of polynomials; for example  $(t+2) + (2t+2) = (1+2)t + (2+2) = 1$ . Doing this computation for all elements gives the following addition table

+	0	1	2	t	t+1	t+2	2t	2t+1	2t+2
0	0	1	2	t	t+1	t+2	2t	2t+1	2t+2
1	1	2	0	t+1	t+2	t	2t+1	2t+2	2t
2	2	0	1	t+2	t	t+1	2t+2	2t	2t+1
t	t	t+1	t+2	2t	2t+1	2t+2	0	1	2
t+1	t+1	t+2	t	2t+1	2t+2	2t	1	2	0
t+2	t+2	t	t+1	2t+2	2t	2t+1	2	0	1
2t	2t	2t+1	2t+2	0	1	2	t	t+1	t+2
2t+1	2t+1	2t+2	2t	1	2	0	t+1	t+2	t
2t+2	2t+2	2t	2t+1	2	0	1	t+2	t	t+1

As we can see, the group  $(\mathbb{F}_3, +)$  is a subgroup of the group  $(\mathbb{F}_{3^2}, +)$ , obtained by only considering the first three rows and columns of this table.

We can use the addition table to deduce the additive inverse (the negative) of any element from  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$ . For example, in  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$  we have  $-(2t+1) = t+2$ , since  $(2t+1) + (t+2) = 0$



Multiplication needs a bit more computation, as we first have to multiply the polynomials, and whenever the result has a degree  $\geq 2$ , we have to apply a polynomial division algorithm like 3 to divide the product by the polynomial  $P$  and keep the remainder. To see how this works, let us compute the product of  $t + 2$  and  $2t + 2$  in  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}(t + 2) \cdot (2t + 2) &= (2t^2 + 2t + t + 1) \bmod (t^2 + 1) \\ &= (2t^2 + 1) \bmod (t^2 + 1) & \# 2t^2 + 1 : t^2 + 1 = 2 + \frac{2}{t^2 + 1} \\ &= 2\end{aligned}$$

2118 This means that the product of  $t + 2$  and  $2t + 2$  in  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$  is 2. Performing this computation for all  
2119 elements gives the following multiplication table:

·	0	1	2	t	t+1	t+2	2t	2t+1	2t+2
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	2	t	t+1	t+2	2t	2t+1	2t+2
2	0	2	1	2t	2t+2	2t+1	t	t+2	t+1
t	0	t	2t	2	t+2	2t+2	1	t+1	2t+1
t+1	0	t+1	2t+2	t+2	2t	1	2t+1	2	t
t+2	0	t+2	2t+1	2t+2	1	t	t+1	2t	2
2t	0	2t	t	1	2t+1	t+1	2	2t+2	t+2
2t+1	0	2t+1	t+2	t+1	2	2t	2t+2	t	1
2t+2	0	2t+2	t+1	2t+1	t	2	t+2	1	2t

2121 As it was the case in previous examples, we can use the table to deduce the multiplicative  
2122 inverse of any non-zero element from  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$ . For example, in  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$  we have  $(2t + 1)^{-1} = 2t + 2$ ,  
2123 since  $(2t + 1) \cdot (2t + 2) = 1$ .

2124 From the multiplication table, we can also see that the only quadratic residues in  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$  are  
2125 from the set  $\{0, 1, 2, t, 2t\}$ , with  $\sqrt{0} = \{0\}$ ,  $\sqrt{1} = \{1, 2\}$ ,  $\sqrt{2} = \{t, 2t\}$ ,  $\sqrt{t} = \{t + 2, 2t + 1\}$  and  
2126  $\sqrt{2t} = \{t + 1, 2t + 2\}$ .

Since  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$  is a field, we can solve equations as we would for other fields, (such as rational numbers). To see that, let us find all  $x \in \mathbb{F}_{3^2}$  that solve the quadratic equation  $(t + 1)(x^2 + (2t + 2)) = 2$ . We compute as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}(t + 1)(x^2 + (2t + 2)) &= 2 & \# 2 \text{ distributive law} \\ (t + 1)x^2 + (t + 1)(2t + 2) &= 2 \\ (t + 1)x^2 + (t) &= 2 & \# 2 \text{ add the additive inverse of } t \\ (t + 1)x^2 + (t) + (2t) &= (2) + (2t) \\ (t + 1)x^2 &= 2t + 2 & \# \text{ multiply with the multiplicative invers of } t + 1 \\ (t + 2)(t + 1)x^2 &= (t + 2)(2t + 2) & \# \text{ multiply with the multiplicative invers of } t + 1 \\ x^2 &= 2 & \# 2 \text{ is quadratic residue. Take the roots.} \\ x &\in \{t, 2t\}\end{aligned}$$

2127 Computations in extension fields are arguably on the edge of what can reasonably be done with  
2128 pen and paper. Fortunately, Sage provides us with a simple way to do the computations.

2129 `sage: Z3 = GF(3) # prime field` 225  
2130 `sage: Z3t.<t> = Z3[] # polynomials over Z3` 226

```

2131 sage: P = Z3t(t^2+1) 227
2132 sage: P.is_irreducible() 228
2133 True 229
2134 sage: F3_2.<t> = GF(3^2, name='t', modulus=P) # Extension 230
2135         field F_3^2
2136 sage: F3_2 231
2137 Finite Field in t of size 3^2 232
2138 sage: F3_2(t+2)*F3_2(2*t+2) == F3_2(2) 233
2139 True 234
2140 sage: F3_2(2*t+2)^(-1) # multiplicative inverse 235
2141 2*t + 1 236
2142 sage: # verify our solution to (t+1)(x^2 + (2t+2)) = 2 237
2143 sage: F3_2(t+1)*(F3_2(t)**2 + F3_2(2*t+2)) == F3_2(2) 238
2144 True 239
2145 sage: F3_2(t+1)*(F3_2(2*t)**2 + F3_2(2*t+2)) == F3_2(2) 240
2146 True 241

```

2147 *Exercise 52.* Consider the extension field  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$  from the previous example and find all pairs of  
 2148 elements  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{3^2}$ , for which the following equation holds:

$$y^2 = x^3 + 4 \quad (4.37)$$

2149 *Exercise 53.* Show that the polynomial  $Q = x^2 + x + 2$  from  $\mathbb{F}_3[x]$  is irreducible. Construct the  
 2150 multiplication table of  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$  with respect to  $Q$  and compare it to the multiplication table of  $\mathbb{F}_{3^2}$   
 2151 from example 66.

2152 *Exercise 54.* Show that the polynomial  $P = t^3 + t + 1$  from  $\mathbb{F}_5[t]$  is irreducible. Then consider the  
 2153 extension field  $\mathbb{F}_{5^3}$  defined relative to  $P$ . Compute the multiplicative inverse of  $(2t^2 + 4) \in \mathbb{F}_{5^3}$   
 2154 using the extended Euclidean algorithm. Then find all  $x \in \mathbb{F}_{5^3}$  that solve the following equation:

$$(2t^2 + 4)(x - (t^2 + 4t + 2)) = (2t + 3) \quad (4.38)$$

2155 *Exercise 55.* Consider the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_5$ . Show that the polynomial  $P = x^2 + 2$  from  $\mathbb{F}_5[x]$  is  
 2156 irreducible. Implement the finite field  $\mathbb{F}_{5^2}$  in sage.

## 2157 4.4 Projective Planes

2158 Projective planes are particular geometric constructs defined over a given field. In a sense,  
 2159 projective planes extend the concept of the ordinary Euclidean plane by including “points at  
 2160 infinity.”

2161 To understand the idea of constructing of projective planes, note that in an ordinary Eu-  
 2162 clidean plane, two lines either intersect in a single point or are parallel. In the latter case, both  
 2163 lines are either the same, that is, they intersect in all points, or do not intersect at all. A projec-  
 2164 tive plane can then be thought of as an ordinary plane, but equipped with additional “point at  
 2165 infinity” such that two different lines always intersect in a single point. Parallel lines intersect  
 2166 “at infinity”.

2167 Such an inclusion of infinity points makes projective planes particularly useful in the de-  
 2168 scription of elliptic curves, as the description of such a curve in an ordinary plane needs an  
 2169 additional symbol “the point at infinity” to give the set of points on the curve the structure of a

group 5.1. Translating the curve into projective geometry includes this “point at infinity” more naturally into the set of all points on a projective plane.

To be more precise, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a field,  $\mathbb{F}^3 := \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$  the set of all tuples of three elements over  $\mathbb{F}$  and  $x \in \mathbb{F}^3$  with  $x = (X, Y, Z)$ . Then there is exactly one *line*  $L_x$  in  $\mathbb{F}^3$  that intersects both  $(0, 0, 0)$  and  $x$ , given by the set  $L_x = \{(k \cdot X, k \cdot Y, k \cdot Z) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}\}$ . A point in the **projective plane** over  $\mathbb{F}$  can then be defined as such a **line** if we exclude the intersection of that line with  $(0, 0, 0)$ . This leads to the following definition of a **point** in projective geometry:

$$[X : Y : Z] := \{(k \cdot X, k \cdot Y, k \cdot Z) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}^*\} \quad (4.39)$$

Points in projective geometry are therefore lines in  $\mathbb{F}^3$  where the intersection with  $(0, 0, 0)$  is excluded. Given a field  $\mathbb{F}$  the **projective plane** of that field is then defined as the set of all points, excluding the point  $[0 : 0 : 0]$ :

$$\mathbb{FP}^2 := \{[X : Y : Z] \mid (X, Y, Z) \in \mathbb{F}^3 \text{ with } (X, Y, Z) \neq (0, 0, 0)\} \quad (4.40)$$

It can be shown that a projective plane over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  contains  $p^{2m} + p^m + 1$  number of elements.

To understand why the projective point  $[X : Y : Z]$  is also a line, consider the situation where the underlying field  $\mathbb{F}$  is the set of rational numbers  $\mathbb{Q}$ . In this case,  $\mathbb{Q}^3$  can be seen as the three-dimensional space, and  $[X : Y : Z]$  is an ordinary line in this 3-dimensional space that intersects zero and the point with coordinates  $X, Y$  and  $Z$ , such that the intersection with zero is excluded.

The key observation here is that points in the projective plane  $\mathbb{FP}^2$  are lines in the 3-dimensional space  $\mathbb{F}^3$ . However it should be kept in mind that, for finite fields, the terms **space** and **line** share very little visual similarity with their counterparts over the set of rational numbers.

It follows from this that points  $[X : Y : Z] \in \mathbb{FP}^2$  are not simply described by fixed coordinates  $(X, Y, Z)$ , but by **sets of coordinates**, where two different coordinates  $(X_1, Y_1, Z_1)$  and  $(X_2, Y_2, Z_2)$  describe the same point if and only if there is some non-zero field element  $k \in \mathbb{F}^*$  such that  $(X_1, Y_1, Z_1) = (k \cdot X_2, k \cdot Y_2, k \cdot Z_2)$ . Points  $[X : Y : Z]$  are called **projective coordinates**.

*Notation and Symbols* 10 (Projective coordinates). Projective coordinates of the form  $[X : Y : 1]$  are descriptions of so-called **affine points**. Projective coordinates of the form  $[X : Y : 0]$  are descriptions of so-called **points at infinity**. In particular, the projective coordinate  $[1 : 0 : 0]$  describes the so-called **line at infinity**.

*Example 67.* Consider the field  $\mathbb{F}_3$  from exercise 48. As this field only contains three elements, it does not take too much effort to construct its associated projective plane  $\mathbb{F}_3\mathbb{P}^2$ , as we know that it only contains 13 elements.

To find  $\mathbb{F}_3\mathbb{P}^2$ , we have to compute the set of all lines in  $\mathbb{F}_3 \times \mathbb{F}_3 \times \mathbb{F}_3$  that intersect  $(0, 0, 0)$ , excluding their intersection with  $(0, 0, 0)$ . Since those lines are parameterized by tuples  $(x_1, x_2, x_3)$ ,

we compute as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
[0 : 0 : 1] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 2)\} \\
[0 : 0 : 2] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(0, 0, 2), (0, 0, 1)\} = [0 : 0 : 1] \\
[0 : 1 : 0] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(0, 1, 0), (0, 2, 0)\} \\
[0 : 1 : 1] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(0, 1, 1), (0, 2, 2)\} \\
[0 : 1 : 2] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 1)\} \\
[0 : 2 : 0] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(0, 2, 0), (0, 1, 0)\} = [0 : 1 : 0] \\
[0 : 2 : 1] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(0, 2, 1), (0, 1, 2)\} = [0 : 1 : 2] \\
[0 : 2 : 2] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(0, 2, 2), (0, 1, 1)\} = [0 : 1 : 1] \\
[1 : 0 : 0] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(1, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0)\} \\
[1 : 0 : 1] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(1, 0, 1), (2, 0, 2)\} \\
[1 : 0 : 2] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(1, 0, 2), (2, 0, 1)\} \\
[1 : 1 : 0] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(1, 1, 0), (2, 2, 0)\} \\
[1 : 1 : 1] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 2)\} \\
[1 : 1 : 2] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(1, 1, 2), (2, 2, 1)\} \\
[1 : 2 : 0] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(1, 2, 0), (2, 1, 0)\} \\
[1 : 2 : 1] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(1, 2, 1), (2, 1, 2)\} \\
[1 : 2 : 2] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(1, 2, 2), (2, 1, 1)\} \\
[2 : 0 : 0] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(2, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0)\} = [1 : 0 : 0] \\
[2 : 0 : 1] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(2, 0, 1), (1, 0, 2)\} = [1 : 0 : 2] \\
[2 : 0 : 2] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(2, 0, 2), (1, 0, 1)\} = [1 : 0 : 1] \\
[2 : 1 : 0] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(2, 1, 0), (1, 2, 0)\} = [1 : 2 : 0] \\
[2 : 1 : 1] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(2, 1, 1), (1, 2, 2)\} = [1 : 2 : 2] \\
[2 : 1 : 2] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(2, 1, 2), (1, 2, 1)\} = [1 : 2 : 1] \\
[2 : 2 : 0] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(2, 2, 0), (1, 1, 0)\} = [1 : 1 : 0] \\
[2 : 2 : 1] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(2, 2, 1), (1, 1, 2)\} = [1 : 1 : 2] \\
[2 : 2 : 2] &= \{(k \cdot x_1, k \cdot x_2, k \cdot x_3) \mid k \in \mathbb{F}_3^*\} = \{(2, 2, 2), (1, 1, 1)\} = [1 : 1 : 1]
\end{aligned}$$

These lines define the 13 points in the projective plane  $\mathbb{F}_3\mathbb{P}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{F}_3\mathbb{P} = \{ & [0 : 0 : 1], [0 : 1 : 0], [0 : 1 : 1], [0 : 1 : 2], [1 : 0 : 0], [1 : 0 : 1], \\
& [1 : 0 : 2], [1 : 1 : 0], [1 : 1 : 1], [1 : 1 : 2], [1 : 2 : 0], [1 : 2 : 1], [1 : 2 : 2] \}
\end{aligned}$$

2201 This projective plane contains 9 affine points, three points at infinity and one line at infinity.

2202 To understand the ambiguity in projective coordinates a bit better, let us consider the point  
 2203  $[1 : 2 : 2]$ . As this point in the projective plane is a line in  $\mathbb{F}_3^3 \setminus \{(0, 0, 0)\}$ , it has the projective  
 2204 coordinates  $(1, 2, 2)$  as well as  $(2, 1, 1)$ , since the former coordinate gives the latter when multi-  
 2205 plied in  $\mathbb{F}_3$  by the factor 2. In addition, note that, for the same reasons, the points  $[1 : 2 : 2]$  and  
 2206  $[2 : 1 : 1]$  are the same, since their underlying sets are equal.

2207 *Exercise 56.* Construct the so-called **Fano plane**, that is, the projective plane over the finite  
 2208 field  $\mathbb{F}_2$ .

## Chapter 5

# Elliptic Curves

Generally speaking, elliptic curves are nothing but geometric objects in projective planes over some given field, made up of points that satisfy certain equations. One of their key features from the point of view of cryptography is that if the underlying field is of positive characteristic, elliptic curves are finite, cyclic groups and it is believed that the discrete logarithm problem on many elliptic curve groups is hard, given that the underlying characteristic is large enough.

A special class of elliptic curves are so-called pairing-friendly curves, which have a notation of a group pairing attached to them, that have cryptographically advantageous properties.

In this chapter, we introduce elliptic curves as they are used in pairing-based approaches to the construction of SNARKs. The elliptic curves we consider are all defined over prime fields or prime field extensions and the reader should be familiar with the content of the previous chapter on those notations.

## 5.1 Short Weierstrass Curves

In this section, we introduce **short Weierstrass** curves, which are the most general types of curves over finite fields of characteristics greater than 3 and start with their so called affine representation. Introducing elliptic curves in their affine representation is probably not the most common and conceptually cleanest way, but has the advantage that in the affine representation an elliptic curve is just a set of pairs of numbers. We believe that such an introduction makes elliptic curves more accessible to the beginner, since potential unfamiliarity with projective coordinates can be avoided. However, the affine representation has the disadvantage that a special “point at infinity”, that is not a point on the curve, is necessary to describe the curve’s group structure.

We then introduce the elliptic curve group law and describe elliptic curve scalar multiplication, which is an instantiation of the exponential map of general cyclic groups. After that, we look at the projective representation of elliptic curves, which has the advantage that no special symbol is necessary to represent the point at infinity. As this representation is conceptually more straight forward, this is how elliptic curves are usually introduced in math classes. We believe that the major drawback from a beginners point of view is that in the projective representation, points are elements from projective planes, which are classes of numbers.


We finish this section with an explicit equivalence that transforms affine representations into projective representations and vice versa.

### 5.1.1 Affine Short Weierstrass form

Probably the least abstract and most straight-forward way to introduce elliptic curves for non-mathematicians and beginners is the so-called affine representation of a short Weierstrass curve. To see what this is, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field of characteristic  $q$  with  $q > 3$  and  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}$  two field elements such that the so called **discriminant**  $4a^3 + 27b^2$  is not equal to zero. Then a **short Weierstrass elliptic curve**  $E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F})$  over  $\mathbb{F}$  in its affine representation is the set of all pairs of field elements  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$  that satisfy the short Weierstrass cubic equation  $y^2 = x^3 + a \cdot x + b$ , together with a distinguished symbol  $\mathcal{O}$ , called the **point at infinity**:

$$E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}) = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \mid y^2 = x^3 + a \cdot x + b\} \cup \{\mathcal{O}\} \quad (5.1)$$

The term “curve” is used here because, if an elliptic curve is defined over a characteristic zero field, like the field  $\mathbb{Q}$  of rational numbers, the set of all points  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{Q}$  that satisfy  $y^2 = x^3 + a \cdot x + b$  looks like a curve. We should note however that visualizing elliptic curves over finite fields as “curves” has its limitations, and we will therefore not stress the geometric picture too much, but focus on the computational properties instead. To understand the visual difference, consider the following two elliptic curves:



Both elliptic curves are defined by the same short Weierstrass equation  $y^2 = x^3 - 2x + 1$ , but the first curve is defined over the rational numbers  $\mathbb{Q}$ , that is, the pair  $(x, y)$  contains rational numbers, while the second one is defined over the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{9973}$ , which means that both coordinates  $x$  and  $y$  are from the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{9973}$ . Every blue dot represents a pair  $(x, y)$ , that is a solution to  $y^2 = x^3 - 2x + 1$ . As we can see, the second curve hardly looks like a geometric structure one would naturally call a curve. This shows that our geometric intuitions from  $\mathbb{Q}$  are obfuscated in curves over finite fields.

The equation  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$  ensures that the curve is non-singular, which loosely means that the curve has no cusps or self-intersections in the geometric sense, if seen as an actual curve. As we will see in 5.1.2, cusps and self-intersections would make the group law potentially ambiguous.

Throughout this book, the reader is advised to do as many computations in a pen-and-paper fashion as possible, as this helps getting a deeper understanding of the details. However, when dealing with elliptic curves, computations can quickly become cumbersome and tedious, and one might get lost in the details. Fortunately, Sage is very helpful in dealing with elliptic curves. The following snippet shows a way to define elliptic curves and how to work with them in Sage:

```
sage: F5 = GF(5) # define the base field
```

242

```

2275 sage: a = F5(2) # parameter a 243
2276 sage: b = F5(4) # parameter b 244
2277 sage: # check discriminant 245
2278 sage: F5(6)*(F5(4)*a^3+F5(27)*b^2) != F5(0) 246
2279 True 247
2280 sage: # short Weierstrass curve over field F5 248
2281 sage: E = EllipticCurve(F5,[a,b]) # y^2 == x^3 + ax +b 249
2282 sage: # point on a curve 250
2283 sage: P = E(0,2) # 2^2 == 0^3 + 2*0 + 4 251
2284 sage: P.xy() # affine coordinates 252
2285 (0, 2) 253
2286 sage: INF = E(0) # point at infinity 254
2287 sage: try: # point at infinity has no affine coordinates 255
2288 .....:     INF.xy() 256
2289 .....: except ZeroDivisionError: 257
2290 .....:     pass 258
2291 sage: P = E.plot() # create a plotted version 259

```

2292 The following three examples give a more practical understanding of what an elliptic curve is  
 2293 and how we can compute it. The reader is advised to read these examples carefully, and ideally,  
 2294 to also carry out the computation themselves. We will repeatedly build on these examples in  
 2295 this chapter, and use the second example throughout the entire book.


2296 *Example 68.* Consider the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_5$  from example 14. To define an elliptic curve over  
 2297  $\mathbb{F}_5$ , we have to choose two numbers  $a$  and  $b$  from that field. Assuming we choose  $a = 1$  and  
 2298  $b = 1$  then  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{5}$  from which follows that the corresponding elliptic curve  
 2299  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  is given by the set of all pairs  $(x, y)$  from  $\mathbb{F}_5$  that satisfy the equation  $y^2 = x^3 + x + 1$ ,  
 2300 together with the special symbol  $\mathcal{O}$ , which represents the “point at infinity”.

2301 To get a better understanding of that curve, observe that if we choose arbitrarily the pair  
 2302  $(x, y) = (1, 1)$ , we see that  $1^2 \neq 1^3 + 1 + 1$  and hence  $(1, 1)$  is not a point on the curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$ .  
 2303 On the other hand choosing for example  $(x, y) = (2, 1)$  gives  $1^2 = 2^3 + 2 + 1$  and hence the pair  
 2304  $(2, 1)$  is a point on the curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  (Remember that all computations are done in modulo 5  
 2305 arithmetics).

Now since the set  $\mathbb{F}_5 \times \mathbb{F}_5$  of all pairs  $(x, y)$  from  $\mathbb{F}_5$  contains only  $5 \cdot 5 = 25$  pairs, we can  
 compute the curve, by just inserting every possible pair  $(x, y)$  into the short Weierstrass equation  
 $y^2 = x^3 + x + 1$ . If the equation holds, the pair is a curve point, if not that means that the point  
 is not on the curve. Combining the result of this computation with the point at infinity gives the  
 curve as follows:

$$E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5) = \{\mathcal{O}, (0, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (0, 4), (2, 4), (3, 4)\}$$

2306 This means that the elliptic curve is a set of 9 elements, 8 of which are pairs of elements from  
 2307  $\mathbb{F}_5$  and one special symbol  $\mathcal{O}$ . Visualizing  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  gives the following plot:



In the development of SNARKs, it is sometimes necessary to do elliptic curve cryptography “in a circuit”, which basically means that the elliptic curve needs to be implemented in a certain SNARK-friendly way. We will look at what this means in chapter 7. To be able to do this efficiently, it is desirable to have curves with special properties. The following example is a pen-and-paper version of such a curve, called **Tiny-jubjub**. We design this curve especially to resemble a well known cryptographically secure curve, called Baby-jubjub, the latter of which is extensively used in real-world SNARKs.

In the literature the Baby-jubjub curve is commonly introduced as a so called twisted Edwards curve, which we will introduce in 5.3. However as we will see in 5.3, every twisted Edwards curve is equivalent to a short Weierstrass curve and hence we start with an introduction of Tiny-Jubjub in its short Weierstrass incarnation. The interested reader is advised to study this example carefully, as we will use it and build on it in various places throughout the book.


**Example 69** (The Tiny-jubjub curve). Consider the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  from exercise 49. If we choose  $a = 8$  and  $b = 8$ , then  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \equiv 6 \pmod{13}$  and the corresponding elliptic curve is given by all pairs  $(x, y)$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  such that  $y^2 = x^3 + 8x + 8$  holds. We call this curve the **Tiny-jubjub** curve (in its affine short Weierstrass representation), or *TJJ\_13* for short.

Since the set  $\mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13}$  of all pairs  $(x, y)$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  contains only  $13 \cdot 13 = 169$  pairs, we can compute the curve by just inserting every possible pair  $(x, y)$  into the short Weierstrass equation  $y^2 = x^3 + 8x + 8$ . We get the following result:

$$\begin{aligned} TJJ_{13} = \{ \mathcal{O}, (1, 2), (1, 11), (4, 0), (5, 2), (5, 11), (6, 5), (6, 8), (7, 2), (7, 11), \\ (8, 5), (8, 8), (9, 4), (9, 9), (10, 3), (10, 10), (11, 6), (11, 7), (12, 5), (12, 8) \} \end{aligned} \quad (5.2)$$

As we can see, the curve consists of 20 points; 19 pairs of elements from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  and the point at infinity. To get a visual impression of the *TJJ\_13* curve, we might plot all of its points (except the point at infinity):





As we will see in what follows, this curve is rather special, as it is possible to represent it in two alternative forms called the **Montgomery** and the **twisted Edwards form** (See sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively).

Now that we have seen two pen-and-paper friendly elliptic curves, let us look at a curve, that is used in actual cryptography. Cryptographically secure elliptic curves are not **qualitatively** different from the curves we looked at so far, but the prime number modulus of their prime field is much larger. Typical examples use prime numbers that have binary representations in the magnitude of more than double the size of the desired security level. If, for example, a security of 128 bits is desired, a prime modulus of binary size  $\geq 256$  is chosen. The following example provides such a curve.

*Example 70* (Bitcoin's secp256k1 curve). To give an example of a real-world, cryptographically secure curve, let us look at curve secp256k1, which is famous for being used in the public key cryptography of Bitcoin. The prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$  of secp256k1 is defined by the following prime number:

$$p = 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007908834671663$$

The binary representation of this number needs 256 bits, which implies that the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$  contains approximately  $2^{256}$  many elements, which is considered quite large. To get a better impression of how large the base field is, consider that the number  $2^{256}$  is approximately in the same order of magnitude as the estimated number of atoms in the observable universe.

The curve secp256k1 is defined by the parameters  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p$  with  $a = 0$  and  $b = 7$ . Since  $4 \cdot 0^3 + 27 \cdot 7^2 \bmod p = 1323$ , those parameters indeed define an elliptic curve given as follows:

$$\text{secp256k1} = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_p \times \mathbb{F}_p \mid y^2 = x^3 + 7\}$$

Clearly, the secp256k1 curve is too large to be useful in pen and paper computations, since it can be shown that the number of its elements is a prime number  $r$  that also has a binary representation of 256 bits:

$$r = 115792089237316195423570985008687907852837564279074904382605163141518161494337$$

Cryptographically secure elliptic curves are therefore not useful in pen-and-paper computations, but fortunately, Sage handles large curves efficiently:

```
sage: p = 1157920892373161954235709850086879078532699846656405 260
      64039457584007908834671663
```

```

2347 sage: # Hexadecimal representation                261
2348 sage: p.str(16)                                   262
2349 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffeffffc 263
2350 2f
2351 sage: p.is_prime()                                264
2352 True                                              265
2353 sage: p.nbits()                                   266
2354 256                                              267
2355 sage: Fp = GF(p)                                  268
2356 sage: secp256k1 = EllipticCurve(Fp, [0, 7])       269
2357 sage: r = secp256k1.order() # number of elements  270
2358 sage: r.str(16)                                    271
2359 fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd03641 272
2360 41
2361 sage: r.is_prime()                                273
2362 True                                              274
2363 sage: r.nbits()                                   275
2364 256                                              276

```

2365 *Exercise 57.* Consider the curve  $E_1(\mathbb{F})$  from example 68 and compute the set of all curve points  
 2366  $(x, y) \in E_1(\mathbb{F})$ .

2367 *Exercise 58.* Consider the curve  $TJJ\_13$  from example 69 and compute the set of all curve  
 2368 points  $(x, y) \in TJJ\_13$ .

2369 *Exercise 59.* Look up the definition of curve BLS12-381, implement it in Sage and compute the  
 2370 number of all curve points.

2371 **Isomorphic affine short Weierstrass curves** As explained in the previous part, elliptic curves  
 2372 are defined by pairs of parameters  $(a, b) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$  for some field  $\mathbb{F}$ . An important question in  
 2373 classifying elliptic curves is then the task to decide which pairs of parameters  $(a, b)$  and  $(a', b')$   
 2374 instantiate equivalent curves in the sense that there is a 1:1 correspondence between the set of  
 2375 curve points.

2376 To be more precise let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a field and  $(a, b)$  as well as  $(a', b')$  two pairs of parameters, such  
 2377 that there is an invertible field element  $c \in \mathbb{F}^*$  with  $a' = a \cdot c^4$  and  $b' = b \cdot c^6$ . Then the elliptic  
 2378 curves  $E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F})$  and  $E_{a',b'}(\mathbb{F})$  are called **isomorphic** and there is a map that maps curve points  
 2379 onto curve points

$$I : E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}) \rightarrow E_{a',b'}(\mathbb{F}) : \begin{cases} (x, y) \\ \mathcal{O} \end{cases} \mapsto \begin{cases} (c^2 \cdot x, c^2 \cdot y) \\ \mathcal{O} \end{cases} \quad (5.3)$$

2380 This map is a 1:1 correspondence and its inverse map is given by mapping the point at infinity  
 2381 onto the point at infinity and each curve point  $(x, y)$  onto the curve point  $(c^{-2}x, c^{-2}y)$ .

*Example 71.* Consider the short Weierstrass elliptic curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  from example 68 and the elliptic curve

$$E_{1,4}(\mathbb{F}_5) := \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_5 \times \mathbb{F}_5 \mid y^3 = x^3 + x + 4\}$$

Inserting all pairs of elements  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_5 \times \mathbb{F}_5$  into the short Weierstrass equation  $y^3 = x^3 + x + 4$  of  $E_{1,4}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  results in the following set of points:

$$E_{1,4}(\mathbb{F}_5) = \{\mathcal{O}, (0, 2), (0, 3), (1, 1), (1, 4), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 3)\}$$

As we can see, both curves are of the same order and indeed since 2 is an invertible element from  $\mathbb{F}_5$  with  $1 = 2^4 \cdot 1$  and  $4 = 2^6 \cdot 1$ ,  $E_{1,4}(\mathbb{F})$  and  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F})$  are isomorphic and the map  $I : E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5) \rightarrow E_{1,4}(\mathbb{F}_5) : (x, y) \mapsto (4x, 4y)$  from 5.3 defines a 1:1 correspondence. For example the point  $(4, 3) \in E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F})$  is mapped onto the point  $I(4, 3) = (4 \cdot 4, 4 \cdot 3) = (1, 2) \in E_{1,4}(\mathbb{F})$ .

*Exercise 60.* Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field and  $(a, b)$  as well as  $(a', b')$  two pairs of parameters, and  $c \in \mathbb{F}^*$  an invertible field element with  $a' = a \cdot c^4$  and  $b' = b \cdot c^6$ . Show that in this case function  $I$  5.3 maps curve points onto curve points.

*Exercise 61.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve from example 69 and the elliptic curve  $E_{5,12}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$  defined as follows:

$$E_{5,12}(\mathbb{F}_{13}) = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13} \mid y^2 = x^3 + 5x + 12\}$$

Show that  $TJJ\_13$  and  $E_{5,12}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$  are isomorphic. Then compute the set of all points from  $E_{5,12}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$ , construct  $I$  and map all points of  $TJJ\_13$  onto  $E_{5,12}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$ .

**Affine compressed representation** As we have seen in example 70, cryptographically secure elliptic curves are defined over large prime fields, where elements of those fields typically need more than 255 bits of storage on a computer. Since elliptic curve points consist of pairs of those field elements, they need double that amount of storage.

However, we can reduce the amount of space needed to represent a curve point by using a technique called **point compression**. To understand this, note that for each given  $x \in \mathbb{F}$ , there are only 2 possible  $y \in \mathbb{F}$ , such that the pair  $(x, y)$  is a point on an affine short Weierstrass curve, since  $x$  and  $y$  have to satisfy the equation  $y^2 = x^3 + a \cdot x + b$ . From this follows that  $y$  can be computed from  $x$ , since it is an element from the set  $\sqrt{x^3 + a \cdot x + b}$  of square roots 4.30, which contains exactly two elements for  $x^3 + a \cdot x + b \neq 0$  and exactly one element for  $x^3 + a \cdot x + b = 0$ .

This implies that we can represent a curve point in **compressed form** by simply storing the  $x$  coordinate together with a single bit called the **sign bit**, the latter of which deterministically decides which of the two roots to choose. One convention could be to always choose the root closer to 0 when the sign bit is 0, and the root closer to the order of  $\mathbb{F}$  when the sign bit is 1. In case the  $y$  coordinate is zero, both sign bits give the same result.

*Example 72 (Tiny-jubjub).* To understand the concept of compressed curve points a bit better, consider the  $TJJ\_13$  curve from example 69 again. Since this curve is defined over the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , and numbers between 0 and 13 need approximately 4 bits to be represented, each  $TJJ\_13$  point on this curve needs 8 bits of storage in uncompressed form. The following set represents the uncompressed form of the points on this curve:

$$TJJ\_13 = \{\mathcal{O}, (1, 2), (1, 11), (4, 0), (5, 2), (5, 11), (6, 5), (6, 8), (7, 2), (7, 11), (8, 5), (8, 8), (9, 4), (9, 9), (10, 3), (10, 10), (11, 6), (11, 7), (12, 5), (12, 8)\}$$

Using the technique of point compression, we can reduce the bits needed to represent the points on this curve to 5 per point. To achieve this, we can replace the  $y$  coordinate in each  $(x, y)$  pair by a sign bit indicating whether or not  $y$  is closer to 0 or to 13. As a result  $y$  values in the range  $[0, \dots, 6]$  will have the sign bit 0, while  $y$ -values in the range  $[7, \dots, 12]$  will have the sign bit 1. Applying this to the points in  $TJJ\_13$  gives the compressed representation as follows:

$$TJJ\_13 = \{\mathcal{O}, (1, 0), (1, 1), (4, 0), (5, 0), (5, 1), (6, 0), (6, 1), (7, 0), (7, 1), (8, 0), (8, 1), (9, 0), (9, 1), (10, 0), (10, 1), (11, 0), (11, 1), (12, 0), (12, 1)\}$$

2406 Note that the numbers  $7, \dots, 12$  are the negatives (additive inverses) of the numbers  $1, \dots, 6$  in  
 2407 modular 13 arithmetics and that  $-0 = 0$ .

2408 To recover the uncompressed counterpart of, say, the compressed point  $(5, 1)$ , we insert the  
 2409  $x$  coordinate 5 into the short Weierstrass equation and get  $y^2 = 5^3 + 8 \cdot 5 + 8 = 4$ . As expected,  
 2410 4 is a quadratic residue in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  with roots  $\sqrt{4} = \{2, 11\}$ . Since the sign bit of the point is 1,  
 2411 we have to choose the root closer to the modulus 13, which is 11. The uncompressed point is  
 2412 therefore  $(5, 11)$ .

### 2413 5.1.2 Affine Group Law

2414 One of the key properties of an elliptic curve is that it is possible to define a group law on the  
 2415 set of its points such that the point at infinity serves as the neutral element and inverses are  
 2416 reflections on the  $x$ -axis. The origin of this law can be understood in a geometric picture and is  
 2417 known as the **chord-and-tangent rule**. In the affine representation of a short Weierstrass curve,  
 2418 the rule can be described in the following way, using the symbol  $\oplus$  for the group law:

- 2419 • (Point at infinity) We define the point at infinity  $\mathcal{O}$  as the neutral element of addition, that  
 2420 is, we define  $P \oplus \mathcal{O} = P$  for all points  $P \in E(\mathbb{F})$ .
- 2421 • (Chord Rule) Let  $P, Q \in E(\mathbb{F}) \setminus \{\mathcal{O}\}$  with  $P \neq Q$  be two distinct points on an elliptic curve,  
 2422 neither of them the point at infinity. The sum of  $P$  and  $Q$  is defined as follows:  
 2423 Consider the line  $l$  which intersects the curve in  $P$  and  $Q$ . If  $l$  intersects the elliptic curve  
 2424 at a third point  $R'$ , define the sum  $R = P \oplus Q$  of  $P$  and  $Q$  as the reflection of  $R'$  at the  $x$ -axis.  
 2425 If the line  $l$  does not intersect the curve at a third point, define the sum to be the point at  
 2426 infinity  $\mathcal{O}$ . Calling such a line a **chord**, it can be shown that no chord will intersect the  
 2427 curve in more than three points. This implies that addition is not ambiguous.
- 2428 • (Tangent Rule) Let  $P \in E(\mathbb{F}) \setminus \{\mathcal{O}\}$  be a point on an elliptic curve, that is not the point at  
 2429 infinity. The sum of  $P$  with itself (the doubling of  $P$ ) is defined as follows:  
 2430 Consider the line which is tangential to the elliptic curve at  $P$ , in the sense that it "just  
 2431 touches" the curve at that point. If this line intersects the elliptic curve at a second point  
 2432  $R'$ , the sum  $P \oplus P$  is the reflection of  $R'$  at the  $x$ -axis. If it does not intersect the curve at  
 2433 a third point define the sum to be the point at infinity  $\mathcal{O}$ . Calling such a line a **tangent**, it  
 2434 can be shown that no such tangent will intersect the curve in more than two points. This  
 2435 implies that doubling is not ambiguous.

2436 It can be shown that the points of an elliptic curve form a commutative group with respect to the  
 2437 previously stated chord-and-tangent rule such that  $\mathcal{O}$  acts the neutral element, and the inverse  
 2438 of any element  $P \in E(\mathbb{F})$  is the reflection of  $P$  on the  $x$ -axis.

2439 The chord-and-tangent rule defines the group law of an elliptic curve geometrically and we  
 2440 just stated it informally as an intuition. In order to apply those rules on a computer we have to  
 2441 translate it into algebraic equations. To do so first observe that for any two given curve points  
 2442  $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2) \in E(\mathbb{F})$  the identity  $x_1 = x_2$  implies  $y_2 = \pm y_1$  as explained in 5.1.1. This shows  
 2443 that the following rules are a complete description of elliptic curve group  $(E(\mathbb{F}), \oplus)$ :

- 2444 • (The neutral element) The point at infinity  $\mathcal{O}$  is the neutral element.
- 2445 • (The inverse element) The inverse of  $\mathcal{O}$  is  $\mathcal{O}$ . For any other curve point  $(x, y) \in E(\mathbb{F}) \setminus \{\mathcal{O}\}$ ,  
 2446 the inverse is given by  $(x, -y)$ .

- (The group law) For any two curve points  $P, Q \in E(\mathbb{F})$ , the group law is defined by one of the following cases:

1. (Neutral element) If  $Q = \mathcal{O}$ , then the group law is defined as  $P \oplus Q = P$ .

2. (Inverse elements) If  $P = (x, y)$  and  $Q = (x, -y)$ , the group law is defined as  $P \oplus Q = \mathcal{O}$ .

3. (Tangent Rule) If  $P = (x, y)$  with  $y \neq 0$ , the group law  $P \oplus P = (x', y')$  is defined as follows:

$$x' = \left( \frac{3x^2 + a}{2y} \right)^2 - 2x \quad , \quad y' = \left( \frac{3x^2 + a}{2y} \right)^2 (x - x') - y$$

4. (Chord Rule) If  $P = (x_1, y_1)$  and  $Q = (x_2, y_2)$  such that  $x_1 \neq x_2$ , the group law  $R = P \oplus Q$  with  $R = (x_3, y_3)$  is defined as follows:

$$x_3 = \left( \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \right)^2 - x_1 - x_2 \quad , \quad y_3 = \left( \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \right) (x_1 - x_3) - y_1$$

*Notation and Symbols* 11. Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a field and  $E(\mathbb{F})$  an elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}$ . We write  $\oplus$  for the group law on  $E(\mathbb{F})$ ,  $(E(\mathbb{F}), \oplus)$  for the commutative group of elliptic curve points and use the additive notation 3 on this group. If  $P$  is a point on a short Weierstrass curve with  $P = (x, 0)$  then  $P$  is called **self-inverse**.

As we can see, it is very efficient to compute inverses on elliptic curves. However, computing the addition of elliptic curve points in the affine representation needs to consider many cases and involves extensive finite field divisions. As we will see in 5.1.3, the addition law is simplified in projective coordinates.

To get some practical impression of how the group law on an elliptic curve is computed, let's look at some actual cases:

*Example 73.* Consider the elliptic curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  from example 68 again. As we have seen, the curve consists of the following 9 elements:

$$E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5) = \{\mathcal{O}, (0, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (0, 4), (2, 4), (3, 4)\}$$

We know that this set defines a group, so we can add any two elements from  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  to get a third element.

To give an example, consider the elements  $(0, 1)$  and  $(4, 2)$ . Neither of these elements is the neutral element  $\mathcal{O}$ , and since, the  $x$  coordinate of  $(0, 1)$  is different from the  $x$  coordinate of  $(4, 2)$ , we know that we have to use the chord rule from definition 5.1.2 to compute the sum

$(0, 1) \oplus (4, 2)$ :

$$\begin{aligned} x_3 &= \left( \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \right)^2 - x_1 - x_2 && \# \text{ insert points} \\ &= \left( \frac{2 - 1}{4 - 0} \right)^2 - 0 - 4 && \# \text{ simplify in } \mathbb{F}_5 \\ &= \left( \frac{1}{4} \right)^2 + 1 = 4^2 + 1 = 1 + 1 = 2 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} y_3 &= \left( \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \right) (x_1 - x_3) - y_1 && \# \text{ insert points} \\ &= \left( \frac{2 - 1}{4 - 0} \right) (0 - 2) - 1 && \# \text{ simplify in } \mathbb{F}_5 \\ &= \left( \frac{1}{4} \right) \cdot 3 + 4 = 4 \cdot 3 + 4 = 2 + 4 = 1 \end{aligned}$$

So, in the elliptic curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  we get  $(0, 1) \oplus (4, 2) = (2, 1)$ , and, indeed, the pair  $(2, 1)$  is an element of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  as expected. On the other hand,  $(0, 1) \oplus (0, 4) = \mathcal{O}$ , since both points have equal  $x$  coordinates and inverse  $y$  coordinates, rendering them inverses of each other. Adding the point  $(4, 2)$  to itself, we have to use the tangent rule from definition 5.1.2:

$$\begin{aligned} x' &= \left( \frac{3x^2 + a}{2y} \right)^2 - 2x && \# \text{ insert points} \\ &= \left( \frac{3 \cdot 4^2 + 1}{2 \cdot 2} \right)^2 - 2 \cdot 4 && \# \text{ simplify in } \mathbb{F}_5 \\ &= \left( \frac{3 \cdot 1 + 1}{4} \right)^2 + 3 \cdot 4 = \left( \frac{4}{4} \right)^2 + 2 = 1 + 2 = 3 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} y' &= \left( \frac{3x^2 + a}{2y} \right)^2 (x - x') - y && \# \text{ insert points} \\ &= \left( \frac{3 \cdot 4^2 + 1}{2 \cdot 2} \right)^2 (4 - 3) - 2 && \# \text{ simplify in } \mathbb{F}_5 \\ &= 1 \cdot 1 + 3 = 4 \end{aligned}$$

2464 So, in the elliptic curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$ , we get the doubling of  $(4, 2)$ , that is,  $(4, 2) \oplus (4, 2) = (3, 4)$ ,  
 2465 and, indeed the pair  $(3, 4)$  is an element of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  as expected. The group  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  has no  
 2466 self-inverse points other than the neutral element  $\mathcal{O}$ , since no point has 0 as its  $y$  coordinate. We  
 2467 can invoke Sage to double-check the computations.

2468	<b>sage:</b> <code>F5 = GF(5)</code>	277
2469	<b>sage:</b> <code>E1 = EllipticCurve(F5, [1, 1])</code>	278
2470	<b>sage:</b> <code>INF = E1(0) # point at infinity</code>	279
2471	<b>sage:</b> <code>P1 = E1(0, 1)</code>	280
2472	<b>sage:</b> <code>P2 = E1(4, 2)</code>	281
2473	<b>sage:</b> <code>P3 = E1(0, 4)</code>	282

```

2474 sage: R1 = E1(2, 1) 283
2475 sage: R2 = E1(3, 4) 284
2476 sage: R1 == P1+P2 285
2477 True 286
2478 sage: INF == P1+P3 287
2479 True 288
2480 sage: R2 == P2+P2 289
2481 True 290
2482 sage: R2 == 2*P2 291
2483 True 292
2484 sage: P3 == P3 + INF 293
2485 True 294

```

*Example 74* (Tiny-jubjub). Consider the *TJJ\_13*-curve from example 69 again and recall that its group of points is given as follows:

$$TJJ\_13 = \{\mathcal{O}, (1, 2), (1, 11), (4, 0), (5, 2), (5, 11), (6, 5), (6, 8), (7, 2), (7, 11), (8, 5), (8, 8), (9, 4), (9, 9), (10, 3), (10, 10), (11, 6), (11, 7), (12, 5), (12, 8)\}$$

In contrast to the group from the previous example, this group contains a self-inverse point, which is different from the neutral element, defined by  $(4, 0)$ . To see what this means, observe that we cannot add  $(4, 0)$  to itself using the tangent rule 3 from definition 5.1.2, as the  $y$  coordinate is zero. Instead, we have to use the rule for additive inverses, since  $0 = -0$ . We get  $(4, 0) \oplus (4, 0) = \mathcal{O}$  in *TJJ\_13* and the point  $(4, 0)$  is therefore the inverse of itself, as adding it to itself results in the neutral element.

```

2492 sage: F13 = GF(13) 295
2493 sage: TJJ = EllipticCurve(F13, [8, 8]) 296
2494 sage: P = TJJ(4, 0) 297
2495 sage: INF = TJJ(0) # Point at infinity 298
2496 sage: INF == P+P 299
2497 True 300
2498 sage: INF == 2*P 301
2499 True 302

```

*Example 75.* Consider the *secp256k1* curve from example 70 again. The following code invokes Sage to generate two random affine curve points and to add these points together:

```

2502 sage: P = secp256k1.random_point() 303
2503 sage: Q = secp256k1.random_point() 304
2504 sage: R = P + Q 305
2505 sage: P.xy() 306
2506 (9926732126284756658758757223851028468294888831279786654484495 307
2507     1190335716744319, 14013560733519830412372776139807572333672
2508     351665742652589569466054143121137527)
2509 sage: Q.xy() 308
2510 (6484567451516578422550483255207498424007497009070784127425677 309
2511     8276144510333505, 64998605571862790224256196646229013221737
2512     885540969489666342685792609510123094)
2513 sage: R.xy() 310

```

2514 (3382226543861201914980317946513067002227612407938675277404716 311  
 2515 5938254358393275, 72377576467879892567204199479345186494871  
 2516 955310775034389324295890925069918998)

2517 *Exercise 62.* Consider the commutative group  $(TJJ\_13, \oplus)$  of the Tiny-jubjub-curve from ex-  
 2518 ample 69.

- 2519 1. Compute the inverse of  $(10, 10)$ ,  $\mathcal{O}$ ,  $(4, 0)$  and  $(1, 2)$ .
- 2520 2. Solve the equation  $x \oplus (9, 4) = (5, 2)$  for some  $x \in TJJ\_13$

2521 **Scalar multiplication** As we have seen in the previous section, elliptic curves  $E(\mathbb{F})$  have the  
 2522 structure of a commutative group associated to them. It can be shown that this group is finite  
 2523 and cyclic whenever the underlying field  $\mathbb{F}$  is finite and as we know from 4.2 this implies, that  
 2524 there is a notation of scalar multiplication associated to any elliptic curve over finite fields.

2525 To understand this scalar multiplication, recall from 4.3 that every finite cyclic group of  
 2526 order  $n$  has a generator  $g$  and an associated exponential map  $g^{(\cdot)} : \mathbb{Z}_n \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ , where  $g^x$  is the  
 2527  $x$ -fold product of  $g$  with itself.

Elliptic curve scalar multiplication is the exponential map written in additive notation. To  
 be more precise, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field,  $E(\mathbb{F})$  an elliptic curve of order  $n$ , and  $P$  a generator of  
 $E(\mathbb{F})$ . Then the **elliptic curve scalar multiplication** with base  $P$  is defined as follows ( where  
 $[0]P = \mathcal{O}$  and  $[m]P = P + P + \dots + P$  is the  $m$ -fold sum of  $P$  with itself ):

$$[\cdot]P : \mathbb{Z}_n \rightarrow E(\mathbb{F}) ; m \mapsto [m]P$$

2528 Therefore, elliptic curve scalar multiplication is an instantiation of the general exponential map  
 2529 using additive instead of multiplicative notation.

2530 **Logarithmic Ordering** As explained in 4.3 the inverse of the exponential map exists and  
 2531 is usually called the **elliptic curve discrete logarithm map**. However we don't know of any  
 2532 efficient way to actually compute this map, which is one reason why some elliptic curves are  
 2533 believed to be DL-secure 4.1.1.

2534 One useful property of the exponential map in regard to the examples in this book is that  
 2535 it can be used to greatly simplify pen-and-paper computations. As we have seen in example  
 2536 73, computing the elliptic curve addition law takes quite a bit of effort when done without a  
 2537 computer. However, when  $g$  is a generator of a small pen-and-paper elliptic curve group of  
 2538 order  $n$ , we can use the exponential map to write the elements of the group in the following  
 2539 way, which we call its **logarithmic order** with respect to the generator  $g$ :

$$\mathbb{G} = \{[1]g \rightarrow [2]g \rightarrow [3]g \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow [n-1]g \rightarrow \mathcal{O}\} \quad (5.4)$$

2540 For small pen and paper groups, the logarithmic order greatly simplifies complicated elliptic  
 2541 curve addition to the much simpler case of modular  $n$  arithmetic. In order to add two curve  
 2542 points  $P$  and  $Q$ , we only have to look up their discrete log relations with the generator  $P = [l]g$   
 2543 and  $Q = [m]g$ , and compute the group law as  $P \oplus Q = [l + m]g$ , where  $l + m$  is addition in  
 2544 modular  $n$  arithmetics.

2545 The reader should keep in mind though, that many elliptic curves are believed to be DL-  
 2546 secure 4.1.1, which implies that in those cases the logarithmic order can not be computed effi-  
 2547 ciently.

2548 In the following example, we will look at some implications of the fact that elliptic curves  
 2549 are finite cyclic groups and apply the logarithmic order:



2550 *Example 76.* Consider the elliptic curve group  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  from example 68. Since it is a finite  
 2551 cyclic group of order 9, and the prime factorization of 9 is  $3 \cdot 3$ , we can use the fundamental  
 2552 theorem of finite cyclic groups 4.1 to reason about all its subgroups. In fact, since the only  
 2553 factors of 9 are 1, 3 and 9, we know that  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  has the following subgroups:

- 2554 •  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)[9]$  is a subgroup of order 9. By definition, any group is a subgroup of itself.
- 2555 •  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)[3] = \{(2, 1), (2, 4), \mathcal{O}\}$  is a subgroup of order 3. This is the subgroup associated  
 2556 to the prime factor 3.
- 2557 •  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)[1] = \{\mathcal{O}\}$  is a subgroup of order 1. This is the trivial subgroup.

Moreover, since  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  and all its subgroups are cyclic, we know from 4.3 that they must have generators. For example, the curve point  $(2, 1)$  is a generator of the order 3 subgroup  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)[3]$ , since every element of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)[3]$  can be generated by repeatedly adding  $(2, 1)$  to itself:

$$\begin{aligned} [1](2, 1) &= (2, 1) \\ [2](2, 1) &= (2, 4) \\ [3](2, 1) &= \mathcal{O} \end{aligned}$$

Since  $(2, 1)$  is a generator, we know from 4.1 that it gives rise to an exponential map from the finite field  $\mathbb{F}_3$  onto  $\mathbb{G}_2$  defined by scalar multiplication:

$$[\cdot](2, 1) : \mathbb{F}_3 \rightarrow E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)[3] : x \mapsto [x](2, 1)$$

To give an example of a generator that generates the entire group  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$ , consider the point  $(0, 1)$ . Applying the tangent rule repeatedly, we compute as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ll} [0](0, 1) = \mathcal{O} & [1](0, 1) = (0, 1) \\ [2](0, 1) = (4, 2) & [3](0, 1) = (2, 1) \\ [4](0, 1) = (3, 4) & [5](0, 1) = (3, 1) \\ [6](0, 1) = (2, 4) & [7](0, 1) = (4, 3) \\ [8](0, 1) = (0, 4) & [9](0, 1) = \mathcal{O} \end{array}$$

Again, since  $(0, 1)$  is a generator, we know from 4.1 that it gives rise to an exponential map. However, since the group order is not a prime number, the exponential map does not map from any field, but from the ring  $\mathbb{Z}_9$  of modular 9 arithmetics:

$$[\cdot](0, 1) : \mathbb{Z}_9 \rightarrow E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5) : x \mapsto [x](0, 1)$$

Using the generator  $(0, 1)$  and its associated exponential map, we can write  $E(\mathbb{F}_1)$  in logarithmic order with respect to  $(0, 1)$  as explained in 5.1.2. We get the following:

$$E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5) = \{(0, 1) \rightarrow (4, 2) \rightarrow (2, 1) \rightarrow (3, 4) \rightarrow (3, 1) \rightarrow (2, 4) \rightarrow (4, 3) \rightarrow (0, 4) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}\}$$

2558 This indicates that the first element is a generator, and the  $n$ -th element is the scalar product of  
 2559  $n$  and the generator. To see how logarithmic orders like this simplify the computations in small  
 2560 elliptic curve groups, consider example 73 again. In that example, we use the chord-and-tangent  
 2561 rule to compute  $(0, 1) \oplus (4, 2)$ . Now, in the logarithmic order of  $E_1(\mathbb{F})$ , we can compute that  
 2562 sum much easier, since we can directly see that  $(0, 1) = [1](0, 1)$  and  $(4, 2) = [2](0, 1)$ . We can  
 2563 then deduce  $(0, 1) \oplus (4, 2) = (2, 1)$  immediately, since  $[1](0, 1) \oplus [2](0, 1) = [3](0, 1) = (2, 1)$ .

2564 To give another example, we can immediately see that  $(3, 4) \oplus (4, 3) = (4, 2)$ , without do-  
 2565 ing any expensive elliptic curve addition, since we know  $(3, 4) = [4](0, 1)$  as well as  $(4, 3) =$   
 2566  $[7](0, 1)$  from the logarithmic ordering of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$ . Since  $4 + 7 = 2$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_9$ , the result must be  
 2567  $[2](0, 1) = (4, 2)$ .

2568 Finally we can use  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  as an example to understand the concept of cofactor clearing  
 2569 from 4.5. Since the order of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  is 9, we only have a single factor, which happen to be the  
 2570 cofactor as well. Cofactor clearing then implies that we can map any element from  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$   
 2571 onto its prime factor group  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)[3]$  by scalar multiplication with 3. For example, taking the  
 2572 element  $(3, 4)$ , which is not in  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)[3]$ , and multiplying it with 3, we get  $[3](3, 4) = (2, 1)$ ,  
 2573 which is an element of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)[3]$  as expected.

2574 In the following example, we will look at the subgroups of the tiny-jubjub curve, define  
 2575 generators, and compute the logarithmic order for pen-and-paper computations. Then we take  
 2576 another look at the principle of cofactor clearing.

2577 *Example 77.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve  $TJJ\_13$  from example 69 again. Since the order of  
 2578  $TJJ\_13$  is 20, and the prime factorization of 20 is  $2^2 \cdot 5$ , we know that the  $TJJ\_13$  contains a  
 2579 “large” prime-order subgroup of size 5 and a small prime order subgroup of size 2.

2580 To compute those groups, we can apply the technique of cofactor clearing in a try-and-repeat  
 2581 loop. We start the loop by arbitrarily choosing an element  $P \in TJJ\_13$ , then multiplying that  
 2582 element with the cofactor of the group that we want to compute. If the result is  $\mathcal{O}$ , we try a  
 2583 different element and repeat the process until the result is different from the point at infinity  $\mathcal{O}$ .

To compute a generator for the small prime-order subgroup  $(TJJ\_13)[2]$ , first observe that  
 the cofactor is 10, since  $20 = 2 \cdot 10$ . We then arbitrarily choose the curve point  $(5, 11) \in TJJ\_13$   
 and compute  $[10](5, 11) = \mathcal{O}$ . Since the result is the point at infinity, we have to try another  
 curve point, say  $(9, 4)$ . We get  $[10](9, 4) = (4, 0)$  and we can deduce that  $(4, 0)$  is a generator of  
 $(TJJ\_13)[2]$ . Logarithmic order then gives the following order:

$$(TJJ\_13)[2] = \{(4, 0) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}\}$$

2584 This is expected, since we know from example 74 that  $(4, 0)$  is self-inverse, with  $(4, 0) \oplus (4, 0) =$   
 2585  $\mathcal{O}$ . We double check the computations using Sage:

2586	<b>sage:</b> <code>F13 = GF(13)</code>	312
2587	<b>sage:</b> <code>TJJ = EllipticCurve(F13, [8, 8])</code>	313
2588	<b>sage:</b> <code>P = TJJ(5, 11)</code>	314
2589	<b>sage:</b> <code>INF = TJJ(0)</code>	315
2590	<b>sage:</b> <code>10*P == INF</code>	316
2591	<b>True</b>	317
2592	<b>sage:</b> <code>Q = TJJ(9, 4)</code>	318
2593	<b>sage:</b> <code>R = TJJ(4, 0)</code>	319
2594	<b>sage:</b> <code>10*Q == R</code>	320
2595	<b>True</b>	321

We can apply the same reasoning to the “large” prime-order subgroup  $(TJJ\_13)[5]$ , which  
 contains 5 elements. To compute a generator for this group, first observe that the associ-  
 ated cofactor is 4, since  $20 = 5 \cdot 4$ . We choose the curve point  $(9, 4) \in TJJ\_13$  again, and  
 compute  $[4](9, 4) = (7, 11)$ . Since the result is not the point at infinity, we know that  $(7, 11)$   
 is a generator of  $(TJJ\_13)[5]$ . Using the generator  $(7, 11)$ , we compute the exponential map

$[\cdot](7, 11) : \mathbb{F}_5 \rightarrow TJJ\_13[5]$  and get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} [0](7, 11) &= \mathcal{O} \\ [1](7, 11) &= (7, 11) \\ [2](7, 11) &= (8, 5) \\ [3](7, 11) &= (8, 8) \\ [4](7, 11) &= (7, 2) \end{aligned}$$

We can use this computation to write the large-order prime group  $(TJJ\_13)[5]$  of the tiny-jubjub curve in logarithmic order, which we will use quite frequently in what follows. We get the following:

$$(TJJ\_13)[5] = \{(7, 11) \rightarrow (8, 5) \rightarrow (8, 8) \rightarrow (7, 2) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}\} \quad (5.5)$$

From this, we can immediately see, for example that  $(8, 8) \oplus (7, 2) = (8, 5)$ , since  $3 + 4 = 2$  in  $\mathbb{F}_5$ .

From the previous two examples, the reader might get the impression that elliptic curve computation can be largely replaced by modular arithmetics. This however, is not true in general, but only an artifact of small groups, where it is possible to write the entire group in a logarithmic order.

*Exercise 63.* Consider example 76 and compute the set  $\{[1](0, 1), [2](0, 1), \dots, [8](0, 1), [9](0, 1)\}$  using the tangent rule only.

*Exercise 64.* Consider example 77 and compute the scalarmultiplications  $[10](5, 11)$  as well as  $[10](9, 4)$  and  $[4](9, 4)$  with pen and paper using the algorithm from exercise 37.

### 5.1.3 Projective short Weierstrass form

As we have seen in the previous section, describing elliptic curves as pairs of points that satisfy a certain equation is relatively straight-forward. However, in order to define a group structure on the set of points, we had to add a special point at infinity to act as the neutral element.

Recalling from the definition of projective planes 4.4, we know that points at infinity are handled as ordinary points in projective geometry. Therefore, it makes sense to look at the definition of a short Weierstrass curve in projective geometry.

To see what a short Weierstrass curve in projective coordinates is, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field of order  $q$  and characteristic  $> 3$ , let  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}$  be two field elements such that  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \bmod q \neq 0$  and let  $\mathbb{FP}^2$  be the projective plane over  $\mathbb{F}$  as introduced in 4.4. Then a **projective short Weierstrass elliptic curve** over  $\mathbb{F}$  is the set of all points  $[X : Y : Z] \in \mathbb{FP}^2$  from the projective plane that satisfy the cubic equation  $Y^2 \cdot Z = X^3 + a \cdot X \cdot Z^2 + b \cdot Z^3$ :

$$E(\mathbb{FP}^2) = \{[X : Y : Z] \in \mathbb{FP}^2 \mid Y^2 \cdot Z = X^3 + a \cdot X \cdot Z^2 + b \cdot Z^3\} \quad (5.6)$$

To understand how the point at infinity is unified in this definition, recall from 4.4 that, in projective geometry, points at infinity are given by projective coordinates  $[X : Y : 0]$ . Inserting representatives  $(x_1, y_1, 0) \in [X : Y : 0]$  from those coordinates into the defining cubic equation 5.6 results in the following identity:

$$\begin{aligned} y_1^2 \cdot 0 &= x_1^3 + a \cdot x_1 \cdot 0^2 + b \cdot 0^3 && \Leftrightarrow \\ 0 &= x_1^3 \end{aligned}$$

This implies  $X = 0$  and shows that the only projective point at infinity, that is also a point on a projective short Weierstrass curve is the class  $[0, 1, 0] = \{(0, y, 0) \mid y \in \mathbb{F}\}$ . The point  $[0 : 1 : 0]$  is the projective representation of the point at infinity  $\mathcal{O}$  in the affine representation. The projective representation of a short Weierstrass curve, therefore, has the advantage that it does not need a special symbol to represent the point at infinity from the affine definition.

*Example 78.* To get an intuition of how an elliptic curve in projective geometry looks, consider curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  from example 68. We know that, in its affine representation, the set of points on the affine short Weierstrass curve is given as follows:

$$E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5) = \{\mathcal{O}, (0, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (0, 4), (2, 4), (3, 4)\} \quad (5.7)$$

This is defined as the set of all pairs  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_5 \times \mathbb{F}_5$  such that the affine short Weierstrass equation  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$  with  $a = 1$  and  $b = 1$  is satisfied.

To find the set of elements of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  in the projective representation of a short Weierstrass curve with the same parameters  $a = 1$  and  $b = 1$ , we have to compute the set of projective points  $[X : Y : Z]$  from the projective plane  $\mathbb{F}_5\mathbb{P}^2$  that satisfy the following homogenous cubic equation for any representative  $(x_1, y_1, z_1) \in [X : Y : Z]$ :

$$y_1^2 z_1 = x_1^3 + 1 \cdot x_1 z_1^2 + 1 \cdot z_1^3 \quad (5.8)$$

We know from 4.4 that the projective plane  $\mathbb{F}_5\mathbb{P}^2$  contains  $5^2 + 5 + 1 = 31$  elements, so we can take the effort and insert all elements into equation 5.8 and see if both sides match.

For example, consider the projective point  $[0 : 4 : 1]$ . We know from 4.39 that this point in the projective plane represents the following line in  $\mathbb{F}_5^3 \setminus \{(0, 0, 0)\}$ :

$$[0 : 4 : 1] = \{(0, 4, 1), (0, 3, 2), (0, 2, 3), (0, 1, 4)\} \quad (5.9)$$

To check whether or not  $[0 : 4 : 1]$  satisfies 5.8, we can insert any representative, in other words, any element from 5.9. Each element satisfies the equation if and only if all other elements satisfy the equation. So, we insert  $(0, 3, 2)$  and get the following result:

$$3^2 \cdot 2 = 0^3 + 1 \cdot 0 \cdot 2^2 + 1 \cdot 2^3 \Leftrightarrow 3 = 3$$

This tells us that the affine point  $[0 : 4 : 1]$  is indeed a solution to the equation 5.8, but we could just as well have inserted any other representative. For example, inserting  $(0, 1, 4)$  also satisfies 5.8:

$$1^2 \cdot 4 = 0^3 + 1 \cdot 0 \cdot 4^2 + 1 \cdot 4^3 \Leftrightarrow 4 = 4$$

To find the projective representation of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$ , we first observe that the projective line at infinity  $[1 : 0 : 0]$  is not a curve point on any projective short Weierstrass curve, since it cannot satisfy the defining equation in 5.6 for any parameter  $a$  and  $b$ . Therefore, we can exclude it from our consideration.

Moreover, a point at infinity  $[X : Y : 0]$  can only satisfy the equation in 5.6 for any  $a$  and  $b$ , if  $X = 0$ , which implies that the only point at infinity relevant for short Weierstrass elliptic curves is  $[0 : 1 : 0]$ , since  $[0 : k : 0] = [0 : 1 : 0]$  for all  $k \in \mathbb{F}^*$ . Therefore, we can exclude all points at infinity except the point  $[0 : 1 : 0]$ .

All points that remain are the affine points  $[X : Y : 1]$ . Inserting all of them into 5.8 we get the set of all projective curve points as follows:

$$E_1(\mathbb{F}_5\mathbb{P}^2) = \{[0 : 1 : 0], [0 : 1 : 1], [2 : 1 : 1], [3 : 1 : 1], [4 : 2 : 1], [4 : 3 : 1], [0 : 4 : 1], [2 : 4 : 1], [3 : 4 : 1]\}$$

If we compare this with the affine representation, we see that there is a 1:1 correspondence between the points in the affine representation in 5.7 and the affine points in projective geometry, and that the projective point  $[0 : 1 : 0]$  represents the additional point  $\mathcal{O}$  in the affine representation.

*Exercise 65.* Consider example 78 and compute the set  $??$  by inserting all points from the projective plane  $\mathbb{F}_5\mathbb{P}^2$  into the defining projective short Weierstrass equation.

*Exercise 66.* Compute the projective representation of the tiny-jubjub curve and the logarithmic order of its large prime-order subgroup with respect to the generator  $[7 : 11 : 1]$  in projective coordinates.

**Projective Group law** As we have seen in section 5.1.2, one of the key properties of an elliptic curve is that it comes with a definition of a group law on the set of its points, described geometrically by the chord-and-tangent rule 5.1.2. This rule was kind of intuitive, with the exception of the distinguished point at infinity, which appeared whenever the chord or the tangent did not have a third intersection point with the curve.

One of the key features of projective coordinates is that, in projective space, it is guaranteed that any chord will always intersect the curve in three points, and any tangent will intersect it in two points. So, the geometric picture simplifies, as we don't need to consider external symbols and associated cases. The price to pay for this mathematical simplification is of course that for a beginner, projective coordinates might be less intuitive.

It can be shown that the points of an elliptic curve in projective space form a commutative group with respect to the tangent-and-chord rule such that the projective point  $[0 : 1 : 0]$  is the neutral element, and the additive inverse of a point  $[X : Y : Z]$  is given by  $[X : -Y : Z]$ . The addition law is usually described by the following algorithm, minimizing the number of necessary additions and multiplications in the base field.

*Exercise 67.* Consider example 78 again. Compute the following expression for projective points on  $E_1(\mathbb{F}_5\mathbb{P}^2)$  using algorithm 7:

- $[0 : 1 : 0] \oplus [4 : 3 : 1]$
- $[0 : 3 : 0] \oplus [3 : 1 : 2]$
- $-[0 : 4 : 1] \oplus [3 : 4 : 1]$
- $[4 : 3 : 1] \oplus [4 : 2 : 1]$

and then solve the equation  $[X : Y : Z] \oplus [0 : 1 : 1] = [2 : 4 : 1]$  for some point  $[X : Y : Z]$  from the projective short Weierstrass curve  $E_1(\mathbb{F}_5\mathbb{P}^2)$ .

*Exercise 68.* Compare the affine addition law for short Weierstrass curves with the projective addition rule. Which branch in the projective rule corresponds to which case in the affine law?

**Coordinate Transformations** As we can see by comparing the examples 78 and 78, there is a close relation between the affine and the projective representation of a short Weierstrass curve. This is not a coincidence. In fact, from a mathematical point of view, projective and affine short Weierstrass curves describe the same thing, as there is a one-to-one correspondence (an isomorphism) between both representations for any parameters  $a$  and  $b$ .

To specify the correspondence, let  $E(\mathbb{F})$  and  $E(\mathbb{F}\mathbb{P}^2)$  be an affine and a projective short Weierstrass curve defined for the same parameters  $a$  and  $b$ . Then the following function maps

Check if  
following  
Alg is  
floated  
too far

**Algorithm 7** Projective short Weierstrass Addition Law

---

**Require:**  $[X_1 : Y_1 : Z_1], [X_2 : Y_2 : Z_2] \in E(\mathbb{F}_{\mathbb{P}^2})$

**procedure** ADD-RULE( $[X_1 : Y_1 : Z_1], [X_2 : Y_2 : Z_2]$ )

**if**  $[X_1 : Y_1 : Z_1] == [0 : 1 : 0]$  **then**

$[X_3 : Y_3 : Z_3] \leftarrow [X_2 : Y_2 : Z_2]$

**else if**  $[X_2 : Y_2 : Z_2] == [0 : 1 : 0]$  **then**

$[X_3 : Y_3 : Z_3] \leftarrow [X_1 : Y_1 : Z_1]$

**else**

$U_1 \leftarrow Y_2 \cdot Z_1$

$U_2 \leftarrow Y_1 \cdot Z_2$

$V_1 \leftarrow X_2 \cdot Z_1$

$V_2 \leftarrow X_1 \cdot Z_2$

**if**  $V_1 == V_2$  **then**

**if**  $U_1 \neq U_2$  **then**  $[X_3 : Y_3 : Z_3] \leftarrow [0 : 1 : 0]$

**else**

**if**  $Y_1 == 0$  **then**  $[X_3 : Y_3 : Z_3] \leftarrow [0 : 1 : 0]$

**else**

$W \leftarrow a \cdot Z_1^2 + 3 \cdot X_1^2$

$S \leftarrow Y_1 \cdot Z_1$

$B \leftarrow X_1 \cdot Y_1 \cdot S$

$H \leftarrow W^2 - 8 \cdot B$

$X' \leftarrow 2 \cdot H \cdot S$

$Y' \leftarrow W \cdot (4 \cdot B - H) - 8 \cdot Y_1^2 \cdot S^2$

$Z' \leftarrow 8 \cdot S^3$

$[X_3 : Y_3 : Z_3] \leftarrow [X' : Y' : Z']$

**end if**

**end if**

**else**

$U = U_1 - U_2$

$V = V_1 - V_2$

$W = Z_1 \cdot Z_2$

$A = U^2 \cdot W - V^3 - 2 \cdot V^2 \cdot V_2$

$X' = V \cdot A$

$Y' = U \cdot (V^2 \cdot V_2 - A) - V^3 \cdot U_2$

$Z' = V^3 \cdot W$

$[X_3 : Y_3 : Z_3] \leftarrow [X' : Y' : Z']$

**end if**

**end if**

**return**  $[X_3 : Y_3 : Z_3]$

**end procedure**

**Ensure:**  $[X_3 : Y_3 : Z_3] == [X_1 : Y_1 : Z_1] \oplus [X_2 : Y_2 : Z_2]$

---

points from the affine representation to points from the projective representation of a short Weierstrass curve. In other words, if the pair of field elements  $(x, y)$  satisfies the affine short Weierstrass equation  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ , then all homogeneous coordinates  $(x_1, y_1, z_1) \in [x : y : 1]$  satisfy the projective short Weierstrass equation  $y_1^2 \cdot z_1 = x_1^3 + ay_1 \cdot z_1^2 + b \cdot z_1^3$ .

$$I : E(\mathbb{F}) \rightarrow E(\mathbb{FP}^2) : \begin{array}{ll} (x, y) & \mapsto [x : y : 1] \\ \mathcal{O} & \mapsto [0 : 1 : 0] \end{array} \quad (5.10)$$

This map is a 1 : 1 correspondence, which means that it maps exactly one point from the affine representation onto one point from the projective representation. It is therefore possible to invert this map in order to map points from the projective representation to points from the affine representation of a short Weierstrass curve. The inverse is given by the following map:

$$I^{-1} : E(\mathbb{FP}^2) \rightarrow E(\mathbb{F}) : [X : Y : Z] \mapsto \begin{cases} (\frac{X}{Z}, \frac{Y}{Z}) & \text{if } Z \neq 0 \\ \mathcal{O} & \text{if } Z = 0 \end{cases} \quad (5.11)$$

Note that the only projective point  $[X : Y : Z]$  with  $Z = 0$  that satisfies the equation in 5.6 is given by the class  $[0 : 1 : 0]$ . A key feature of  $I$  and its inverse is that both maps respect the group structure, which means that the neutral element is mapped to the neutral element, i.e.  $I(\mathcal{O}) = [0 : 1 : 0]$  and that  $I((x_1, y_1) \oplus (x_2, y_2))$  is equal to  $I(x_1, y_1) \oplus I(x_2, y_2)$  and the same holds true for the inverse map  $I^{-1}$ .

Maps with these properties are called **group isomorphisms**, and, from a mathematical point of view, the existence of function  $I$  implies that the affine and the projective definition of short Weierstrass elliptic curves are equivalent and represent the same mathematical thing in just two different views. Implementations can therefore choose freely between both representations.

## 5.2 Montgomery Curves

Both the affine and the projective short Weierstrass forms are the most general ways to describe elliptic curves over fields of characteristics larger than 3. However in certain situations it might be advantageous to consider more specialized representations of elliptic curves for example to get faster algorithms for the group law or the scalar multiplication.

As we will see in this section so called Montgomery curves are a subset of all elliptic curves that can be written in the **Montgomery form**. Those curves allow for constant time algorithms for (specializations of) the elliptic curve scalar multiplication.

To see what a Montgomery curve in its affine representation is, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field of characteristic  $p > 3$ , and let  $A, B \in \mathbb{F}$  be two field elements such that  $B \neq 0$  and  $A^2 \neq 4$ . A **Montgomery elliptic curve**  $M(\mathbb{F})$  over  $\mathbb{F}$  in its affine representation is then the set of all pairs of field elements  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$  that satisfy the **Montgomery cubic equation**  $B \cdot y^2 = x^3 + A \cdot x^2 + x$ , together with a distinguished symbol  $\mathcal{O}$ , called the **point at infinity**.

$$M(\mathbb{F}) = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \mid B \cdot y^2 = x^3 + A \cdot x^2 + x\} \cup \{\mathcal{O}\} \quad (5.12)$$

Despite the fact that Montgomery curves look different from short Weierstrass curves, they are just a special way to describe certain short Weierstrass curves. In fact, every curve in affine Montgomery form can be transformed into an elliptic curve in short Weierstrass form. To see that, assume that a curve is given in Montgomery form  $By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$ . The associated short Weierstrass form is then defined as follows:

$$y^2 = x^3 + \frac{3 - A^2}{3 \cdot B^2} \cdot x + \frac{2 \cdot A^3 - (9 \bmod q) \cdot A}{(27 \bmod q) \cdot B^3} \quad (5.13)$$

2725 On the other hand, not every elliptic curve  $E(\mathbb{F})$  over base field  $\mathbb{F}$  given in short Weierstrass  
 2726 form  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$  can be converted into Montgomery form. For a short Weierstrass curve  
 2727 to be a Montgomery curve the following conditions need to hold:

- 2728 • The number of points on  $E(\mathbb{F})$  is divisible by 4
- 2729 • The polynomial  $z^3 + az + b \in \mathbb{F}[z]$  has at least one root  $z_0 \in \mathbb{F}$
- 2730 •  $3z_0^2 + a$  is a quadratic residue in  $\mathbb{F}^*$ .

2731 When these conditions are satisfied, then for  $s = (\sqrt{3z_0^2 + a})^{-1}$ , a Montgomery curve is  
 2732 defined by the following equation:

$$sy^2 = x^3 + (3z_0s)x^2 + x \quad (5.14)$$

2733 In the following example we will look at the tiny-jubjub curve again, and show that it is  
 2734 actually a Montgomery curve.

2735 *Example 79.* Consider the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  and the tiny-jubjub curve  $TJJ\_13$  from example 69.  
 2736 To see that it is a Montgomery curve, we have to check the requirements from 5.2:

Since the order of  $TJJ\_13$  is 20, which is divisible by 4, the first requirement is met. Moreover, since  $a = 8$  and  $b = 8$ , we have to check that the polynomial  $P(z) = z^3 + 8z + 8$  has a root in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . To see this we simply evaluate  $P$  at all numbers  $z \in \mathbb{F}_{13}$ , and find that  $P(4) = 0$ , so a root is given by  $z_0 = 4$ . In the last step, we have to check that  $3 \cdot z_0^2 + a$  has a root in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}^*$ . We compute as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} 3z_0^2 + a &= 3 \cdot 4^2 + 8 \\ &= 3 \cdot 3 + 8 \\ &= 9 + 8 \\ &= 4 \end{aligned}$$

2737 To see that 4 is a quadratic residue in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , we use Euler's criterion (4.32) to compute the  
 2738 Legendre symbol of 4. We get the following:

$$\left( \frac{4}{13} \right) = 4^{\frac{13-1}{2}} = 4^6 = 1$$

2739 This means that 4 does have a root in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . In fact, computing a root of 4 in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  is easy, since  
 2740 the integer root 2 of 4 is also one of its roots in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . The other root is given by  $13 - 4 = 9$ .

Since all requirements are met, we have shown that  $TJJ\_13$  is indeed a Montgomery curve, and we can use 5.14 to compute its associated Montgomery form. We compute as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} s &= \left( \sqrt{3 \cdot z_0^2 + 8} \right)^{-1} \\ &= 2^{-1} && \# \text{ Fermat's little theorem} \\ &= 2^{13-2} && \# 2048 \bmod 13 = 7 \\ &= 7 \end{aligned}$$



The defining equation for the Montgomery form of the tiny-jubjub curve is then given by the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} sy^2 &= x^3 + (3z_0s)x^2 + x && \Rightarrow \\ 7 \cdot y^2 &= x^3 + (3 \cdot 4 \cdot 7)x^2 + x && \Leftrightarrow \\ 7 \cdot y^2 &= x^3 + 6x^2 + x \end{aligned}$$

2741 So, we get the defining parameters as  $B = 7$  and  $A = 6$ , and we can write the tiny-jubjub curve  
2742 in its affine Montgomery representation as follows:

$$TJJ\_13 = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13} \mid 7 \cdot y^2 = x^3 + 6x^2 + x\} \cup \{\mathcal{O}\} \quad (5.15)$$

Now that we have the abstract definition of the tiny-jubjub curve in Montgomery form, we can compute the set of points by inserting all pairs  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13}$  similarly to how we computed the curve points in its short Weierstrass representation. We get the following:

$$M\_TJJ\_13 = \{\mathcal{O}, (0, 0), (1, 4), (1, 9), (2, 4), (2, 9), (3, 5), (3, 8), (4, 4), (4, 9), (5, 1), (5, 12), (7, 1), (7, 12), (8, 1), (8, 12), (9, 2), (9, 11), (10, 3), (10, 10)\}$$

2743

```

2744 sage: F13 = GF(13)                                     322
2745 sage: L_MTJJ = []                                       323
2746 .....: for x in F13:                                    324
2747 .....:     for y in F13:                                325
2748 .....:         if F13(7)*y^2 == x^3 + F13(6)*x^2 + x:  326
2749 .....:             L_MTJJ.append((x, y))                327
2750 sage: MTJJ = Set(L_MTJJ)                                328
2751 sage: # does not compute the point at infinity          329

```

2752 *Exercise 69.* Consider example 79 and compute the set ?? by inserting every pair of field ele-  
2753 ments  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13}$  into the defining Montgomery equation.

2754 *Exercise 70.* Consider the elliptic curve  $E_1(\mathbb{F})$  from example 68 and show that  $E_1(\mathbb{F})$  is not a  
2755 Montgomery curve.

2756 *Exercise 71.* Consider the elliptic curve *secp256k1* from example 70 and show that *secp256k1*  
2757 is not a Montgomery curve.

2758 **Affine Montgomery coordinate transformation** Comparing the Montgomery representa-  
2759 tion of the previous example 5.15 with the short Weierstrass representation of the same curve  
2760 5.2, we see that there is a 1:1 correspondence between the curve points in both examples. This  
2761 is no accident. In fact, if  $M_{A,B}$  is a Montgomery curve, and  $E_{a,b}$  a short Weierstrass curve with  
2762  $a = \frac{3-A^2}{3B^2}$  and  $b = \frac{2A^2-9A}{27B^3}$  then the following function maps all points in Montgomery represen-  
2763 tation onto the points in short Weierstrass representation:

$$I : M_{A,B} \rightarrow E_{a,b} : (x, y) \mapsto \left( \frac{3x+A}{3B}, \frac{y}{B} \right) \quad (5.16)$$

2764 The point at infinity of the Montgomery form is mapped to the point at infinity of the short  
2765 Weierstrass form. This map is a 1:1 correspondence (an isomorphism), and its inverse map is

2766 given by the following equation (where  $z_0$  is a root of the polynomial  $z^3 + az + b \in \mathbb{F}[z]$  and  
 2767  $s = (\sqrt{3z_0^2 + a})^{-1}$ ).

$$I^{-1} : E_{a,b} \rightarrow M_{A,B} : (x, y) \mapsto (s \cdot (x - z_0), s \cdot y) \quad (5.17)$$

2768 The point at infinity of the short Weierstrass form is mapped to the point at infinity of the  
 2769 Montgomery form. Using this map, it is therefore possible for implementations of Montgomery  
 2770 curves to freely transit between the short Weierstrass and the Montgomery form.

2771 *Example 80.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve again. In 5.2 we defined its short Weierstrass  
 2772 representation and in example 5.15, we derived its Montgomery representation.

To see how the coordinate transformation  $I$  works in this example, let's map points from the Montgomery representation onto points from the short Weierstrass representation. Inserting, for example, the point  $(0, 0)$  from the Montgomery representation 5.15 into  $I$  gives the following:

$$\begin{aligned} I(0, 0) &= \left( \frac{3 \cdot 0 + A}{3B}, \frac{0}{B} \right) \\ &= \left( \frac{3 \cdot 0 + 6}{3 \cdot 7}, \frac{0}{7} \right) \\ &= \left( \frac{6}{8}, 0 \right) \\ &= (4, 0) \end{aligned}$$

As we can see, the Montgomery point  $(0, 0)$  maps to the self-inverse point  $(4, 0)$  of the short Weierstrass representation. On the other hand, we can use our computations of  $s = 7$  and  $z_0 = 4$  from example 79 to compute the inverse map  $I^{-1}$ , which maps points on the short Weierstrass representation to points on the Montgomery form. Inserting, for example,  $(4, 0)$  we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} I^{-1}(4, 0) &= (s \cdot (4 - z_0), s \cdot 0) \\ &= (7 \cdot (4 - 4), 0) \\ &= (0, 0) \end{aligned}$$

2773 As expected, the inverse map maps the short Weierstrass point back to where it originated  
 2774 in the Montgomery form. We can invoke Sage to check that our computation of  $I$  is correct:

```

2775 sage: # Compute I of Montgomery form: 330
2776 sage: L_I_MTJJ = [] 331
2777 sage: for (x,y) in L_MTJJ: # LMTJJ as defined previously 332
2778     ....:     v = (F13(3)*x + F13(6)) / (F13(3)*F13(7)) 333
2779     ....:     w = y/F13(7) 334
2780     ....:     L_I_MTJJ.append((v,w)) 335
2781 sage: I_MTJJ = Set(L_I_MTJJ) 336
2782 sage: # Computation short Weierstrass form 337
2783 sage: C_WTJJ = EllipticCurve(F13,[8,8]) 338
2784 sage: L_WTJJ = [P.xy() for P in C_WTJJ.points() if P.order() > 339
2785     1]
2786 sage: WTJJ = Set(L_WTJJ) 340
```

```

2787 sage: # check I(Montgomery) == Weierstrass 341
2788 sage: WTJJ == I_MTJJ 342
2789 True 343
2790 sage: # check the inverse map I^(-1) 344
2791 sage: L_IINV_WTJJ = [] 345
2792 sage: for (v,w) in L_WTJJ: 346
2793     ....:     x = F13(7)*(v-F13(4)) 347
2794     ....:     y = F13(7)*w 348
2795     ....:     L_IINV_WTJJ.append((x,y)) 349
2796 sage: IINV_WTJJ = Set(L_IINV_WTJJ) 350
2797 sage: MTJJ == IINV_WTJJ 351
2798 True 352

```

### 2799 5.2.1 Montgomery group law

2800 We have seen that Montgomery curves are special cases of short Weierstrass curves. As such,  
 2801 they have a group structure defined on the set of their points, which can also be derived from the  
 2802 chord-and-tangent rule. In accordance with short Weierstrass curves, it can be shown that the  
 2803 identity  $x_1 = x_2$  implies  $y_2 = \pm y_1$ , meaning that the following rules are a complete description  
 2804 of the elliptic curve group law:

- 2805 • (The neutral element) The point at infinity  $\mathcal{O}$  is the neutral element.
- 2806 • (The inverse element) The inverse of  $\mathcal{O}$  is  $\mathcal{O}$ . For any other curve point  $(x, y) \in M(\mathbb{F}_q) \setminus \{\mathcal{O}\}$ ,  
 2807 the inverse is given by  $(x, -y)$ .
- 2808 • (The group law) For any two curve points  $P, Q \in M(\mathbb{F}_q)$ , the group law is defined by one  
 2809 of the following cases:

- 2810 1. (Neutral element) If  $Q = \mathcal{O}$ , then the sum is defined as  $P \oplus Q = P$ .
- 2811 2. (Inverse elements) If  $P = (x, y)$  and  $Q = (x, -y)$ , the group law is defined as  $P \oplus Q =$   
 2812  $\mathcal{O}$ .
3. (Tangent rule) If  $P = (x, y)$  with  $y \neq 0$ , the group law  $P \oplus P = (x', y')$  is defined as  
 follows:

$$x' = \left( \frac{3x_1^2 + 2Ax_1 + 1}{2By_1} \right)^2 \cdot B - (x_1 + x_2) - A, \quad y' = \frac{3x_1^2 + 2Ax_1 + 1}{2By_1} (x_1 - x') - y_1$$

4. (Chord rule) If  $P = (x_1, y_1)$  and  $Q = (x_2, y_2)$  such that  $x_1 \neq x_2$ , the group law  $R =$   
 $P \oplus Q$  with  $R = (x_3, y_3)$  is defined as follows:

$$x' = \left( \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \right)^2 B - (x_1 + x_2) - A, \quad y' = \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} (x_1 - x') - y_1$$

2813 *Exercise 72.* Consider the commutative group  $(M\_TJJ\_13, \oplus)$  of the Tiny-jubjub-curve in its  
 2814 Montgomery form from example ??.

- 2815 1. Compute the inverse of  $(1, 9)$ ,  $\mathcal{O}$ ,  $(7, 12)$  and  $(4, 9)$ .
- 2816 2. Solve the equation  $x \oplus (3, 8) = (10, 3)$  for some  $x \in M\_TJJ\_13$

2817 Choose some element  $x \in M\_TJJ\_13$  and test if  $x$  is a generator of  $M\_TJJ\_13$ . If  $x$  is not a  
 2818 generator repeat until you find some generator  $x$ . Write  $M\_TJJ\_13$  in logarithmic order with  
 2819 respect to  $x$ .

## 5.3 Twisted Edwards Curves

As we have seen in 5.1.2 and 5.2.1 both short Weierstrass and Montgomery curves have somewhat complicated group laws, as many cases have to be distinguished. Cases which translate to branches in computer programs. However in the context of SNARK development, computational models for bounded computations are used 6.2.2, 6.2.1 in which program branches are undesirably costly. To make elliptic curves "SNARK friendly", it is therefore advantageous to look for curves with a group law that requires no branches and utilizes as few field operations as possible.

So called **Snark friendly Twisted Edwards curves** are particularly useful here, as these curves have a compact and easily implementable group law that works for all points including the point at infinity. Implementing this law needs no branching.

To see what a **twisted Edwards curve** in its affine form looks like, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field of characteristic  $> 3$ , and let  $a, d \in \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}$  be two non-zero field elements with  $a \neq d$ . A **twisted Edwards elliptic curve** in its affine representation is then the set of all pairs  $(x, y)$  from  $\mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$  that satisfy the twisted Edwards equation  $a \cdot x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d \cdot x^2 y^2$ :

$$E(\mathbb{F}) = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \mid a \cdot x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d \cdot x^2 y^2\} \quad (5.18)$$

A twisted Edwards curve is called a **SNARK-friendly twisted Edwards curve** if the parameter  $a$  is a quadratic residue and the parameter  $d$  is a quadratic non-residue.

As we can see from the definition, affine twisted Edwards curves look somewhat different from short Weierstrass curves, as their affine representation does not need a special symbol to represent the point at infinity. In fact, the pair  $(0, 1)$  is always a point on any twisted Edwards curve, and it takes the role of the point at infinity.

Despite their different appearances however, twisted Edwards curves are equivalent to Montgomery curves in the sense that, for every twisted Edwards curve, there is a Montgomery curve, and a way to map the points of one curve in a 1:1 correspondence onto the other and vice versa. To see that, assume that a curve in twisted Edwards form is given. The associated Montgomery curve is then defined by the Montgomery equation:

$$\frac{4}{a-d} y^2 = x^3 + \frac{2(a+d)}{a-d} \cdot x^2 + x \quad (5.19)$$

On the other hand, a Montgomery curve  $By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$  with  $B \neq 0$  and  $A^2 \neq 4$  gives rise to a twisted Edwards curve defined by the following equation:

$$\left(\frac{A+2}{B}\right)x^2 + y^2 = 1 + \left(\frac{A-2}{B}\right)x^2 y^2 \quad (5.20)$$

*Example 81.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve from example 69 again. We know from example 79 that it is a Montgomery curve, and, since Montgomery curves are equivalent to twisted Edwards curves, we want to write this curve in twisted Edwards form. We use equation 5.20 and compute

the parameters  $a$  and  $d$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 a &= \frac{A+2}{B} && \# \text{ insert } A=6 \text{ and } B=7 \\
 &= \frac{8}{7} = 3 && \# 7^{-1} = 2 \\
 \\ 
 d &= \frac{A-2}{B} \\
 &= \frac{4}{7} = 8
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we get the defining parameters as  $a = 3$  and  $d = 8$ . Since our goal is to use this curve later on in implementations of pen-and-paper SNARKs, let us show that tiny-jubjub is also a SNARK-friendly twisted Edwards curve. To see that, we have to show that  $a$  is a quadratic residue and  $d$  is a quadratic non-residue. We therefore compute the Legendre symbols of  $a$  and  $d$  using Euler's criterion. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \left( \frac{3}{13} \right) &= 3^{\frac{13-1}{2}} \\
 &= 3^6 = 1
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \left( \frac{8}{13} \right) &= 8^{\frac{13-1}{2}} \\
 &= 8^6 = 12 = -1
 \end{aligned}$$

2848 This proves that tiny-jubjub is SNARK-friendly. We can write the tiny-jubjub curve in its  
2849 affine twisted Edwards representation as follows:

$$TJJ_{13} = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13} \mid 3 \cdot x^2 + y^2 = 1 + 8 \cdot x^2 \cdot y^2\} \quad (5.21)$$

2850 Now that we have the abstract definition of our tiny-jubjub curve in twisted Edwards form,  
2851 we can compute the set of points by inserting all pairs  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13}$ , similarly to how  
2852 we computed the curve points in its short Weierstrass or Edwards representation. We get the  
2853 following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 TE\_TJJ_{13} &= \{(0, 1), (0, 12), (1, 2), (1, 11), (2, 6), (2, 7), (3, 0), (5, 5), (5, 8), (6, 4), \\
 &\quad (6, 9), (7, 4), (7, 9), (8, 5), (8, 8), (10, 0), (11, 6), (11, 7), (12, 2), (12, 11)\}
 \end{aligned} \quad (5.22)$$

2854

```

2855 sage: F13 = GF(13)                                     353
2856 sage: L_ETJJ = []                                       354
2857 ....: for x in F13:                                     355
2858 ....:     for y in F13:                                 356
2859 ....:         if F13(3)*x^2 + y^2 == 1+ F13(8)*x^2*y^2: 357
2860 ....:             L_ETJJ.append((x, y))                 358
2861 sage: ETJJ = Set(L_ETJJ)                               359

```

### 5.3.1 Twisted Edwards group law

As we have seen, twisted Edwards curves are equivalent to Montgomery curves, and, as such, also have a group law. However, in contrast to Montgomery and short Weierstrass curves, the group law of SNARK-friendly twisted Edwards curves can be described by a single computation that works in all cases, no matter if we add the neutral element, the inverse, or if we have to double a point.

To see what the twisted Edwards group law looks like let  $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2)$  be two points on an Edwards curve  $E(\mathbb{F})$ . The sum of those points is then given by the following equation:

$$(x_1, y_1) \oplus (x_2, y_2) = \left( \frac{x_1 y_2 + y_1 x_2}{1 + d x_1 x_2 y_1 y_2}, \frac{y_1 y_2 - a x_1 x_2}{1 - d x_1 x_2 y_1 y_2} \right) \quad (5.23)$$

In order to see what the neutral element of the group law is, first observe that the point  $(0, 1)$  is a solution to the twisted Edwards equation  $a \cdot x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d \cdot x^2 \cdot y^2$  for any parameters  $a$  and  $d$  and hence  $(0, 1)$  is a point on any twisted Edwards curve. It can be shown that  $(0, 1)$  serves as the neutral element and that the inverse of a point  $(x_1, y_1)$  is given by the point  $(-x_1, y_1)$ .

*Example 82.* Lets look at the tiny-jubjub curve in Edwards form from example 5.21 again. As we have seen, this curve is given by

$$TE\_TJJ\_13 = \{(0, 1), (0, 12), (1, 2), (1, 11), (2, 6), (2, 7), (3, 0), (5, 5), (5, 8), (6, 4), (6, 9), (7, 4), (7, 9), (8, 5), (8, 8), (10, 0), (11, 6), (11, 7), (12, 2), (12, 11)\}$$

To get an understanding of the twisted Edwards addition law, let's first add the neutral element  $(0, 1)$  to itself. We apply the group law 5.23 and get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} (0, 1) \oplus (0, 1) &= \left( \frac{0 \cdot 1 + 1 \cdot 0}{1 + 8 \cdot 0 \cdot 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 1}, \frac{1 \cdot 1 - 3 \cdot 0 \cdot 0}{1 - 8 \cdot 0 \cdot 0 \cdot 1 \cdot 1} \right) \\ &= (0, 1) \end{aligned}$$

So, as expected, the neutral element added to itself gives the neutral element again. Now let's add the neutral element to some other curve point. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} (0, 1) \oplus (8, 5) &= \left( \frac{0 \cdot 5 + 1 \cdot 8}{1 + 8 \cdot 0 \cdot 8 \cdot 1 \cdot 5}, \frac{1 \cdot 5 - 3 \cdot 0 \cdot 8}{1 - 8 \cdot 0 \cdot 8 \cdot 1 \cdot 5} \right) \\ &= (8, 5) \end{aligned}$$

Again, as expected, adding the neutral element to any element will result in that element again. Given any curve point  $(x, y)$ , we know that its inverse is given by  $(-x, y)$ . To see how the addition of a point to its inverse works, we compute as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} (5, 5) \oplus (8, 5) &= \left( \frac{5 \cdot 5 + 5 \cdot 8}{1 + 8 \cdot 5 \cdot 8 \cdot 5 \cdot 5}, \frac{5 \cdot 5 - 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 8}{1 - 8 \cdot 5 \cdot 8 \cdot 5 \cdot 5} \right) \\ &= \left( \frac{12 + 1}{1 + 5}, \frac{12 - 3}{1 - 5} \right) \\ &= \left( \frac{0}{6}, \frac{12 + 10}{1 + 8} \right) \\ &= \left( 0, \frac{9}{9} \right) \\ &= (0, 1) \end{aligned}$$

Adding a curve point to its inverse gives the neutral element, as expected. As we have seen from these examples, the twisted Edwards addition law handles edge cases particularly well and in a unified way.

*Exercise 73.* Consider the commutative group  $(TE\_TJJ\_13, \oplus)$  from example 82.

1. Compute the inverse of  $(1, 11)$ ,  $(0, 1)$ ,  $(3, 0)$  and  $(5, 8)$ .

2. Solve the equation  $x \oplus (5, 8) = (1, 11)$  for some  $x \in TE\_TJJ\_13$

Choose some element  $x \in TE\_TJJ\_13$  and test if  $x$  is a generator of  $TE\_TJJ\_13$ . If  $x$  is not a generator repeat until you find some generator  $x$ . Write  $TE\_TJJ\_13$  in logarithmic order with respect to  $x$ .

## 5.4 Elliptic Curve Pairings

As introduced in 4.6, some groups come with the notion of a pairing map. In this section, we discuss **pairings on elliptic curves**, which form the basis of several zk-SNARKs and other zero-knowledge proof schemes, essentially because it allows computations "in the exponent" to be split into different parts computable by different parties.

We start out by defining some important subgroups of the so called full torsion group of an elliptic curve. We then introduce the Weil pairing of an elliptic curve and describe Miller's algorithm, which makes these pairings efficiently computable.

**Embedding Degrees** As we will see in what follows, every elliptic curve gives rise to a pairing map. However, we will also see in example 85 that not every such pairing can be efficiently computed. In order to distinguish curves with efficiently computable pairings from the rest, we need to start with an introduction to the so-called **embedding degree** of a curve.

To see what the embedding degree of an elliptic curve is, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field of order  $|\mathbb{F}| = q$ ,  $E(\mathbb{F})$  an elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}$ , and let  $r$  be a prime factor of the order  $n$  of  $E(\mathbb{F})$ . The embedding degree of  $E(\mathbb{F})$  with respect to  $r$  is then the smallest integer  $k$  such that

$$r \mid q^k - 1 \quad (5.24)$$

Fermat's little theorem 3.3 implies that there always exists an embedding degree  $k(r)$  for every elliptic curve and any factor  $r$  of the curves order  $n$ , since  $k = r - 1$  is always a solution to the congruency  $q^k \equiv 1 \pmod{r}$ . This implies that the remainder of the integer division of  $q^{r-1} - 1$  by  $r$  is 0.

*Notation and Symbols 12.* Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field of order  $q$  and  $E(\mathbb{F})$  an elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}$ , such that  $r$  is a prime factor of the order of  $E(\mathbb{F})$ . We then write  $k(r)$  for the embedding degree of  $E(\mathbb{F})$  with respect to  $r$ .

*Example 83.* To get a better intuition of the embedding degree, let's consider the elliptic curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  from example 68. We know that the order of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  is 9, and, since the only prime factor of 9 is 3, we compute the embedding degree of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  with respect to 3.

To find the embedding degree, we have to find the smallest integer  $k$  such that 3 divides  $q^k - 1 = 5^k - 1$ . We try and increment until we find a proper  $k$ .

$$k = 1 : 5^1 - 1 = 4$$

not divisible by 3

$$k = 2 : 5^2 - 1 = 24$$

divisible by 3

2910 This shows that the embedding degree of the elliptic curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  is 2 relative to the the  
 2911 prime factor 3 of the order of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$ .

2912 *Example 84.* Let us consider the tiny-jubjub curve *TJJ\_13* from example 69. We know that the  
 2913 order of *TJJ\_13* is 20, and that the order therefore has two prime factors. A “large” prime factor  
 2914 5 and a small prime factor 2.

We start by computing the embedding degree of *TJJ\_13* with respect to the large prime factor 5. To find that embedding degree, we have to find the smallest integer  $k$  such that 5 divides  $q^k - 1 = 13^k - 1$ . We try and increment until we find a proper  $k$ .

$k = 1: 13^1 - 1 = 12$	not divisible by 5
$k = 2: 13^2 - 1 = 168$	not divisible by 5
$k = 3: 13^3 - 1 = 2196$	not divisible by 5
$k = 4: 13^4 - 1 = 28560$	divisible by 5

2915 Now we know that the embedding degree of *TJJ\_13* relative to the the prime factor 5 is  $k(5) = 4$ .

2916 In real-world applications, like on pairing-friendly elliptic curves such as BLS\_12-381, usu-  
 2917 ally only the embedding degree of the large prime factor is relevant, which in the case of our  
 2918 tiny-jubjub curve is represented by 5. It should be noted, however that every prime factor of  
 2919 a curve’s order has its own notation of embedding degree despite the fact that this is mostly  
 2920 irrelevant in applications.

To find the embedding degree of the small prime factor 2, we have to find the smallest integer  $k$  such that 2 divides  $q^k - 1 = 13^k - 1$ . We try and increment until we find a proper  $k$ .

$k = 1: 13^1 - 1 = 12$	divisible by 2
------------------------	----------------

2921 Now we know that the embedding degree of *TJJ\_13* is 1 relative to the the prime factor 2.  
 2922 As we have seen, different prime factors can have different embedding degrees in general.

```

2923 sage: p = ZZ(13)                                     360
2924 sage: # large prime factor                             361
2925 sage: r = ZZ(5)                                       362
2926 sage: k = ZZ(1)                                       363
2927 sage: while k < r: # Fermat's little theorem          364
2928 .....:     if (p^k-1)%r == 0:                         365
2929 .....:         break                                   366
2930 .....:         k=k+1                                   367
2931 sage: k                                               368
2932 4                                                       369
2933 sage: # small prime factor                             370
2934 sage: r = ZZ(2)                                       371
2935 sage: k = ZZ(1)                                       372
2936 sage: while k < r: # Fermat's little theorem          373
2937 .....:     if (p^k-1)%r == 0:                         374
2938 .....:         break                                   375
2939 .....:         k=k+1                                   376
2940 sage: k                                               377
2941 1                                                       378

```



*Example 85.* To give an example of a cryptographically secure real-world elliptic curve that does not have a small embedding degree, let's look at curve secp256k1 again. We know from 70 that the order of this curve is a prime number, so we only have a single embedding degree.

To test potential embedding degrees  $k$ , say, in the range  $1 \leq k < 1000$ , we can invoke Sage and compute as follows:

```

2947 sage: p = ZZ(1157920892373161954235709850086879078532699846656 379
2948         40564039457584007908834671663)
2949 sage: r = ZZ(1157920892373161954235709850086879078528375642790 380
2950         74904382605163141518161494337)
2951 sage: k = ZZ(1) 381
2952 sage: while k < 1000: 382
2953     ....:     if (p^k-1)%r == 0: 383
2954     ....:         break 384
2955     ....:     k=k+1 385
2956 sage: k 386
2957 1000 387

```

We see that secp256k1 has at least no embedding degree  $k < 1000$ , which renders secp256k1 a curve that has no small embedding degree. This property will be of importance later on.

**Elliptic Curves over extension fields** Suppose that  $p$  is a prime number, and  $\mathbb{F}_p$  its associated prime field. We know from equation 4.33 that the fields  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  are extensions of  $\mathbb{F}_p$  in the sense that  $\mathbb{F}_p$  is a subfield of  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$ . This implies that we can extend the affine plane that an elliptic curve is defined on by changing the base field to any extension field. To be more precise, let  $E(\mathbb{F}) = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \mid y^2 = x^3 + a \cdot x + b\}$  be an affine short Weierstrass curve, with parameters  $a$  and  $b$  taken from  $\mathbb{F}$ . If  $\mathbb{F}'$  is an extension field of  $\mathbb{F}$ , then we extend the domain of the curve by defining  $E(\mathbb{F}')$  as follows:

$$E(\mathbb{F}') = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}' \times \mathbb{F}' \mid y^2 = x^3 + a \cdot x + b\} \quad (5.25)$$

While we did not change the defining parameters, we consider curve points from the affine plane over the extension field now. Since  $\mathbb{F} \subset \mathbb{F}'$ , it can be shown that the original elliptic curve  $E(\mathbb{F})$  is a sub-curve of the extension curve  $E(\mathbb{F}')$ .

*Example 86.* Consider the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_5$  from example 62 together with the elliptic curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  and its definition from example 68 and the construction the extension field  $\mathbb{F}_{5^2}$  relative to the polynomial  $t^2 + 2 \in \mathbb{F}_5[t]$  from exercise 55. In this example we extend the definition of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  to an elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}_{5^2}$  and compute its set of points:

$$E_1(\mathbb{F}_{5^2}) = \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{5^2} \times \mathbb{F}_{5^2} \mid y^2 = x^3 + x + 1\}$$

Since  $\mathbb{F}_{5^2}$  contains 25 points, in order to compute the set  $E_1(\mathbb{F}_{5^2})$ , we have to try  $25 \cdot 25 = 625$  pairs, which is probably a bit tedious. Instead, we invoke Sage to compute the curve for us. To do, we choose the representation of  $\mathbb{F}_{5^2}$  from 55. We get:

```

2973 sage: F5= GF(5) 388
2974 sage: F5t.<t> = F5[] 389
2975 sage: P_MOD_2 = F5t(t^2+2) 390
2976 sage: P_MOD_2.is_irreducible() 391
2977 True 392

```

TODO:Rewrite  
intro  
together  
with Sven

```

2978 sage: F5_2.<t> = GF(5^2, name='t', modulus=P_MOD_2)          393
2979 sage: E1F5_2 = EllipticCurve(F5_2, [1, 1])                  394
2980 sage: E1F5_2.order()                                         395
2981 27                                                            396

```

The curve  $E_1(\mathbb{F}_{5^2})$  consist of 27 points, in contrast to curve  $E_1(\mathbb{F}_5)$ , which consists of 9 points. Writing those points down gives the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 E_1(\mathbb{F}_{5^2}) = \{ & \mathcal{O}, (0, 4), (0, 1), (3, 4), (3, 1), (4, 3), (4, 2), (2, 4), (2, 1), \\
 & (4t + 3, 3t + 4), (4t + 3, 2t + 1), (3t + 2, t), (3t + 2, 4t), \\
 & (2t + 2, t), (2t + 2, 4t), (2t + 1, 4t + 4), (2t + 1, t + 1), \\
 & (2t + 3, 3), (2t + 3, 2), (t + 3, 2t + 4), (t + 3, 3t + 1), \\
 & (3t + 1, t + 4), (3t + 1, 4t + 1), (3t + 3, 3), (3t + 3, 2), (1, 4t), (1, t) \}
 \end{aligned}$$

2982 As we can see, the set of points from the elliptic curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  is a subset of the sets of points  
 2983 from the elliptic curve  $E(\mathbb{F}_{5^2})$ . This was expected since the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_5$  is a subfield of the  
 2984 finite field  $\mathbb{F}_{5^2}$ .

2985 *Exercise 74.* Consider the short Weierstrass elliptic curve  $E(\mathbb{F}_{5^2})$  from example 86, compute the  
 2986 expression  $(4t + 3, 2t + 1) \oplus (3t + 3, 2)$  using pen and paper and double check the computation  
 2987 using sage. Then solve the equation  $x \oplus (3t + 3, 3) = (3, 4)$  for some  $x \in E(\mathbb{F}_{5^2})$ . After that  
 2988 compute the scalar multiplication  $[5](2t + 1, 4t + 4)$  using the double-and-add algorithm from  
 2989 exercise 37.

2990 *Exercise 75.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve from example 69. Show that the polynomial  $t^4 +$   
 2991  $2 \in \mathbb{F}_{13}[t]$  is irreducible. Then write a sage program to implement the finite field extension  $\mathbb{F}_{13^4}$ ,  
 2992 implement the curve extension  $TJJ_{13}(\mathbb{F}_{13^4})$  and compute the number of curve points.

2993 **Full torsion groups** As we will see in what follows, cryptographically interesting pairings  
 2994 are defined on so called torsion subgroups of elliptic curves. To define **torsion groups** of an  
 2995 elliptic curve, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field,  $E(\mathbb{F})$  an elliptic curve of order  $n$  and  $r$  a factor of  $n$ . Then  
 2996 the  **$r$ -torsion group** of the elliptic curve  $E(\mathbb{F})$  is defined as the set

$$E(\mathbb{F})[r] := \{P \in E(\mathbb{F}) \mid [r]P = \mathcal{O}\} \quad (5.26)$$

2997 The fundamental theorem of finite cyclic groups 4.1 states that every factor  $r$  of a cyclic group's  
 2998 order uniquely defines a subgroup of the size of that factor and those subgroup are important  
 2999 examples of  $r$ -torsion groups. We have seen examples of those subgroups in 76 and 77.

3000 When we consider elliptic curve extensions as defined in 5.25, we could ask what happens  
 3001 to the  $r$ -torsion groups in the extension. One might intuitively think that their extension just  
 3002 parallels the extension of the curve. For example, when  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  is a curve over prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ ,  
 3003 with some  $r$ -torsion group  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$  and when we extend the curve to  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})$ , then there might  
 3004 be a bigger  $r$ -torsion group  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})[r]$  such that  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$  is a subgroup of  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})[r]$ . This might  
 3005 make intuitive sense, as  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  is a subset of  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})$ .

3006 However, the actual situation is a bit more surprising than that. To see that, let  $\mathbb{F}_p$  be a  
 3007 prime field and let  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  be an elliptic curve of order  $n$ , such that  $r$  is a factor of  $n$ , with  
 3008 embedding degree  $k(r)$  and  $r$ -torsion group  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$ . Then the  $r$ -torsion group  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})[r]$  of a  
 3009 curve extension is equal to  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$ , only as long as the power  $m$  is less than the embedding  
 3010 degree  $k(r)$  of  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ .

For the prime power  $p^{k(r)}$ , the  $r$ -torsion group  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k(r)}})[r]$  might then be larger than  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$  and it contains  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$  as a subgroup. We call it the **full  $r$ -torsion group** of that elliptic curve and write it as follows

$$E[r] := E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k(r)}})[r] \quad (5.27)$$

The  $r$ -torsion groups  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^m})[r]$  of any curve extensions for  $m > k(r)$  are all equal to  $E[r]$ . In this sense  $E[r]$  is already the largest  $r$ -torsion group, which justifies the name. The full  $r$ -torsion group contains  $r^2$  many elements and consists of  $r + 1$  subgroups, one of which is  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$ . The following diagram summarizes the situation:

$$\begin{array}{ccccccccccc} E(\mathbb{F}_p) & \subset & \cdots & \subset & E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k(r)-1}}) & \subset & E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k(r)}})[r] & \subset & E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k(r)+1}})[r] & \subset & \cdots \\ E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r] & = & \cdots & = & E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k(r)-1}})[r] & \subset & E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k(r)}})[r] & = & E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k(r)+1}})[r] & = & \cdots \end{array} \quad (5.28)$$

So, when we consider nested elliptic curve extensions as in 5.28, ordered by the prime power  $m$ , then the  $r$ -torsion group stays constant for every level  $m$  that is smaller than the embedding degree  $k(r)$ , while it suddenly blossoms into a larger group on level  $k(r)$  with  $r + 1$  subgroups, and then all  $r$ -torsion groups on higher levels  $m \geq k(r)$  stay the same. In other words, once the extension field is big enough to find one more curve point  $P$  with  $[r]P = \mathcal{O}$  that is not an element of the curve over the base field, then we actually find all of the points in the full torsion group.

*Example 87.* Consider curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  again. We know from 76 that it contains a 3-torsion group and that the embedding degree of 3 is  $k(3) = 2$ . From this we can deduce that we can find the full 3-torsion group  $E_1[3]$  in the curve extension  $E_1(\mathbb{F}_{5^2})$ , the latter of which we computed in example 86.

Since that curve is small, in order to find the full 3-torsion, we can loop through all elements of  $E_1(\mathbb{F}_{5^2})$  and check the defining equation  $[3]P = \mathcal{O}$ . Invoking Sage and using our implementation of  $E_1(\mathbb{F}_{5^2})$  in sage from 86, we compute as follows:

```
sage: INF = E1F5_2(0) # Point at infinity          397
sage: L_E1_3 = []                                     398
sage: for p in E1F5_2:                               399
.....:     if 3*p == INF:                             400
.....:         L_E1_3.append(p)                         401
sage: E1_3 = Set(L_E1_3) # Full 3-torsion set        402
```

$$E_1[3] = \{\mathcal{O}, (2, 1), (2, 4), (1, t), (1, 4t), (2t + 1, t + 1), (2t + 1, 4t + 4), (3t + 1, t + 4), (3t + 1, 4t + 1)\}$$

As we can see the group  $E_1[3]$  contains  $9 = 3^2$  many elements and the 3-torsion group  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)[3]$  of the curve over the prime field is a subset of the full torsion group.

*Example 88.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve from example 69. We know from example 84 that it contains a 5-torsion group and that the embedding degree of 5 is 4. This implies that we can find the full 5-torsion group  $TJJ\_13[5]$  in the curve extension  $TJJ\_13(\mathbb{F}_{13^4})$ .

To compute the full torsion, first observe that, since  $\mathbb{F}_{13^4}$  contains 28561 elements, computing  $TJJ\_13(\mathbb{F}_{13^4})$  means checking  $28561^2 = 815730721$  elements. From each of these curve points  $P$ , we then have to check the equation  $[5]P = \mathcal{O}$ . Doing this for 815730721 is a bit too slow even on a computer.

Fortunately, Sage has a function that computes all points  $P$ , such that  $[m]P = Q$  for given integer  $m$  and curve point  $Q$ . Using the curve extension from exercise 75, the following Sage code provides a way to compute the full torsion group:

```
sage: # define the extension field          403
```

```

3050 sage: F13= GF(13) # prime field 404
3051 sage: F13t.<t> = F13[] # polynomials over t 405
3052 sage: P_MOD_4 = F13t(t^4+2) # degree 4 irreducible polynomial 406
3053 sage: P_MOD_4.is_irreducible() 407
3054 True 408
3055 sage: F13_4.<t> = GF(13^4, name='t', modulus=P_MOD_4) 409
3056 sage: TJJF13_4 = EllipticCurve(F13_4, [8,8]) # TJJ extension 410
3057 sage: # compute the full 5-torsion 411
3058 sage: INF = TJJF13_4(0) # point at infinity 412
3059 sage: L_TJJF13_4_5 = INF.division_points(5) # [5]P == INF 413
3060 sage: TJJF13_4_5 = Set(L_TJJF13_4_5) 414
3061 sage: TJJF13_4_5.cardinality() # number of elements 415
3062 25 416

```

3063 As expected, we get a group that contains  $5^2 = 25$  elements. To see that the embedding degree 4  
3064 is actually the smallest prime power to find the full 5-torsion group, let's compute the 5-torsion  
3065 group over of the tiny-jubjub curve of the extension field  $\mathbb{F}_{13^3}$ . We get the following:

```

3066 sage: # define the extension field 417
3067 sage: P_MOD_3 = F13t(t^3+2) # degree 3 irreducible polynomial 418
3068 sage: P_MOD_3.is_irreducible() 419
3069 True 420
3070 sage: F13_3.<t> = GF(13^3, name='t', modulus=P_MOD_3) 421
3071 sage: TJJF13_3 = EllipticCurve(F13_3, [8,8]) # TJJ extension 422
3072 sage: # compute the 5-torsion 423
3073 sage: INF = TJJF13_3(0) 424
3074 sage: L_TJJF13_3_5 = INF.division_points(5) # [5]P == INF 425
3075 sage: TJJF13_3_5 = Set(L_TJJF13_3_5) # 5$-torsion 426
3076 sage: TJJF13_3_5.cardinality() # number of elements 427
3077 5 428

```

3078 As we can see, the 5-torsion group of tiny-jubjub over  $\mathbb{F}_{13^3}$  is equal to the 5-torsion group  
3079 of tiny-jubjub over  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  itself.

3080 *Example 89.* Let's look at the curve secp256k1. We know from example 70 that the curve is of  
3081 some prime order  $r$ . Because of this, the only torsion group to consider is the curve itself, so  
3082 the curve group is the  $r$ -torsion.

In order to find the full  $r$ -torsion of secp256k1, we need to compute the embedding degree  $k$ . And as we have seen in 85 it is at least not small. However, we know from Fermat's little theorem 3.3 that a finite embedding degree must exist. It can be shown that it is given by the following 256-bit number:

$$k = 192986815395526992372618308347813175472927379845817397100860523586360249056$$

3083 This means that the embedding degree is very large, which implies that the field extension  $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$   
3084 is very large too. To understand how big  $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$  is, recall that an element of  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$  can be represented  
3085 as a string  $\langle x_0, \dots, x_m \rangle$  of  $m$  elements, each containing a number from the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ .  
3086 Now, in the case of secp256k1, such a representation has  $k$ -many entries, each of them 256 bits  
3087 in size. So, without any optimizations, representing such an element would need  $k \cdot 256$  bits,  
3088 which is too much to be representable in the observable universe. It follows that it is not only  
3089 infeasible to compute the full  $r$ -torsion group of secp256k1, but moreover to even write down  
3090 single elements of that group in general.

3091 *Exercise 76.* Consider the full 5-torsion group  $TJJ\_13[5]$  from example 88. Write down the set  
 3092 of all elements from this group and identify the subset of all elements from  $TJJ\_13(\mathbb{F}_{13})[5]$  as  
 3093 well as  $TJJ\_13(\mathbb{F}_{13^2})[5]$ . Then compute the 5-torsion group  $TJJ\_13(\mathbb{F}_{13^8})[5]$ .

3094 *Exercise 77.* Consider the curve `secp256k1` from example 70 and its full  $r$ -torsion group as  
 3095 introduced in example 89. Write down a single element from the curves full torsion group that  
 3096 is not the point at infinity.

3097 **Pairing groups** As we have stated above, any full  $r$ -torsion group contains  $r + 1$  cyclic sub-  
 3098 groups, two of which are of particular interest in pairing-based elliptic curve cryptography. To  
 3099 characterize these groups, we need to consider the so-called **Frobenius endomorphism** of an  
 3100 elliptic curve  $E(\mathbb{F})$  over some finite field  $\mathbb{F}$  of characteristic  $p$ :

$$\pi : E(\mathbb{F}) \rightarrow E(\mathbb{F}) : \begin{array}{ccc} (x, y) & \mapsto & (x^p, y^p) \\ \mathcal{O} & \mapsto & \mathcal{O} \end{array} \quad (5.29)$$

3101 It can be shown that  $\pi$  maps curve points to curve points. The first thing to note is that, in case  
 3102  $\mathbb{F}$  is a prime field, the Frobenius endomorphism acts as the identity map, since  $(x^p, y^p) = (x, y)$   
 3103 on prime fields due to Fermat's little theorem 3.3. This means that the Frobenius map is more  
 3104 interesting on elliptic curves over prime field extensions.

3105 With the Frobenius map at hand, we can characterize two important subgroups of the full  $r$ -  
 3106 torsion group  $E[r]$  of an elliptic curve. The first subgroup is the group of elements from the full  
 3107  $r$ -torsion group, on which the Frobenius map acts trivially. Since in pairing-based cryptography,  
 3108 this group is usually written as  $\mathbb{G}_1$ , assuming that the prime factor  $r$  in the definition is implicitly  
 3109 given, we define  $\mathbb{G}_1$  as follows:

$$\mathbb{G}_1[r] := \{(x, y) \in E[r] \mid \pi(x, y) = (x, y)\} \quad (5.30)$$

3110 It can be shown that  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is precisely the  $r$ -torsion group  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$  of the unextended elliptic  
 3111 curve defined over the prime field. There is another subgroup of the full  $r$ -torsion group that  
 3112 can be characterized by the Frobenius map and in the context of pairing-based cryptography,  
 3113 this subgroup is often called  $\mathbb{G}_2$ . This group is defined as follows:

$$\mathbb{G}_2[r] := \{(x, y) \in E[r] \mid \pi(x, y) = [p](x, y)\} \quad (5.31)$$

3114 *Notation and Symbols 13.* If  $E(\mathbb{F})$  is an elliptic curve and  $r$  is the largest prime factor of the  
 3115 curves order, we call  $\mathbb{G}_1[r]$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2[r]$  **pairing groups**. If the prime factor  $r$  is clear from the  
 3116 context, we sometimes simply write  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  to mean  $\mathbb{G}_1[r]$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2[r]$ , respectively.

3117 It should be noted that other definitions of  $\mathbb{G}_2$  exists in the literature, too. However, in  
 3118 the context of pairing-based cryptography, this is a common choice as it is particularly useful  
 3119 because we can define efficient hash functions that map into  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , which is not possible for all  
 3120 subgroups of the full  $r$ -torsion.

*Example 90.* Consider the curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  from example 68 again. As we have seen, this curve  
 has the embedding degree  $k = 2$ , and a full 3-torsion group is given as follows:

$$E_1[3] = \{\mathcal{O}, (2, 1), (2, 4), (1, t), (1, 4t), (2t + 1, t + 1), \\ (2t + 1, 4t + 4), (3t + 1, t + 4), (3t + 1, 4t + 1)\} \quad (5.32)$$

3121 According to the general theory,  $E_1[3]$  contains 4 subgroups, and we can characterize the  
 3122 subgroups  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  using the Frobenius endomorphism. Unfortunately, at the time of writing,

Sage does not have a predefined Frobenius endomorphism for elliptic curves, so we have to use the Frobenius endomorphism of the underlying field as a temporary workaround. Using our implementation of  $E_1[3]$  in sage from example 87, we compute  $\mathbb{G}_1$  as follows:

```

3126 sage: L_G1 = []
3127 sage: for P in E1_3:
3128     ....:     PiP = E1F5_2([a.frobenius() for a in P]) # pi(P)
3129     ....:     if P == PiP:
3130     ....:         L_G1.append(P)
3131 sage: G1 = Set(L_G1)

```

As expected, the group  $\mathbb{G}_1 = \{\mathcal{O}, (2, 4), (2, 1)\}$  is identical to the 3-torsion group of the (unextended) curve over the prime field  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$ .

In order to compute the group  $\mathbb{G}_2$  for the curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$ , we can use almost the same algorithm as we used for the computation of  $\mathbb{G}_1$ . Since  $p = 5$  we get the following:

```

3136 sage: L_G2 = []
3137 sage: for P in E1_3:
3138     ....:     PiP = E1F5_2([a.frobenius() for a in P]) # pi(P)
3139     ....:     pP = 5*P # [5]P
3140     ....:     if pP == PiP:
3141     ....:         L_G2.append(P)
3142 sage: G2 = Set(L_G2)

```

Thus, we have computed the pairing group  $\mathbb{G}_2$  of the full 3-torsion group of curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  as the set  $\mathbb{G}_2 = \{\mathcal{O}, (1, t), (1, 4t)\}$ .

*Example 91.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve *TJJ\_13* from example 69. In example 88 we computed its full 5 torsion, which is a group that has 6 subgroups. We compute  $\mathbb{G}_1$  using Sage as follows:

```

3148 sage: L_TJJ_G1 = []
3149 sage: for P in TJJF13_4_5:
3150     ....:     PiP = TJJF13_4([a.frobenius() for a in P]) # pi(P)
3151     ....:     if P == PiP:
3152     ....:         L_TJJ_G1.append(P)
3153 sage: TJJ_G1 = Set(L_TJJ_G1)

```

We get  $\mathbb{G}_1 = \{\mathcal{O}, (7, 2), (8, 8), (8, 5), (7, 11)\}$  and as expected,  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is identical to the 5-torsion group of the (unextended) curve over the prime field *TJJ\_13* as computed in example 5.5.

In order to compute the group  $\mathbb{G}_2$  for the tiny jubjub curve, we can use almost the same algorithm as we used for the computation of  $\mathbb{G}_1$ . Since  $p = 13$  we get the following:

```

3158 sage: L_TJJ_G2 = []
3159 sage: for P in TJJF13_4_5:
3160     ....:     PiP = TJJF13_4([a.frobenius() for a in P]) # pi(P)
3161     ....:     pP = 13*P # [13]P
3162     ....:     if pP == PiP: # pi(P) == [13]P
3163     ....:         L_TJJ_G2.append(P)
3164 sage: TJJ_G2 = Set(L_TJJ_G2)

```

$\mathbb{G}_2 = \{\mathcal{O}, (9t^2 + 7, t^3 + 11t), (9t^2 + 7, 12t^3 + 2t), (4t^2 + 7, 5t^3 + 10t), (4t^2 + 7, 8t^3 + 3t)\}$



*Example 92.* Consider Bitcoin’s curve `secp256k1` again. Since the group  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is identical to the torsion group of the unextended curve, and since `secp256k1` has prime order, we know that, in this case,  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is identical to `secp256k1` itself. However it is infeasible to compute elements from  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , since according to example 89 we can not store average curve points from the extension curve `secp256k1`( $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ ) on any computer, let alone compute their images under the Frobenius map.

*Exercise 78.* Consider the small prime factor 2 of the tiny-jubjub curve. Compute the full 2-torsion group of `TJJ_13` and then compute the groups  $\mathbb{G}_1[2]$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2[2]$ .

**The Weil pairing** Recall the definition of a non-degenerate group pairing from 4.6. In this part, we consider a pairing function defined on the subgroups  $\mathbb{G}_1[r]$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2[r]$  of the full  $r$ -torsion  $E[r]$  of a short Weierstrass elliptic curve. To be more precise, let  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  be an elliptic curve of embedding degree  $k$  such that  $r$  is a prime factor of its order. Then the **Weil pairing** is defined as the following bilinear, non-degenerate map:

$$e(\cdot, \cdot) : \mathbb{G}_1[r] \times \mathbb{G}_2[r] \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{p^k}^* ; (P, Q) \mapsto (-1)^r \cdot \frac{f_{r,P}(Q)}{f_{r,Q}(P)} \quad (5.33)$$

The extension field elements  $f_{r,P}(Q), f_{r,Q}(P) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^k}$  in the definition of the Weil pairing are computed by **Miller’s algorithm**:

Understanding the details of how and why this algorithm works requires the concept of **divisors**, which is outside of the scope this book. The interested reader might look at XXX. As we can see the algorithm is more efficient on prime numbers  $r$ , that have a low Hamming weight 3.4.

We call an elliptic curve  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  **pairing-friendly** if there is a prime factor of the groups order such that the Weil pairing is efficiently computable with respect to that prime factor. In real-world applications of pairing-friendly elliptic curves, the embedding degree is usually a small number like 2, 4, 6 or 12, and the number  $r$  is the largest prime factor of the curve’s order.

*Example 93.* Consider curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  from example 68. Since the only prime factor of the group’s order is 3, we cannot compute the Weil pairing on this group using our definition of Miller’s algorithm. In fact, since  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is of order 3, executing the algorithm will lead to a “division by zero”.

*Example 94.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve `TJJ_13`( $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ ) from example 69 and its associated pairing groups from example 91:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{G}_1[5] &= \{\mathcal{O}, (7, 2), (8, 8), (8, 5), (7, 11)\} \\ \mathbb{G}_2[5] &= \{\mathcal{O}, (9t^2 + 7, t^3 + 11t), (9t^2 + 7, 12t^3 + 2t), (4t^2 + 7, 5t^3 + 10t), (4t^2 + 7, 8t^3 + 3t)\} \end{aligned}$$

Since we know from example 84 that the embedding degree of 5 is 4, we can instantiate the general definition of the Weil pairing for this example as follows:

$$e(\cdot, \cdot) : \mathbb{G}_1[5] \times \mathbb{G}_2[5] \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{13^4}$$

The first if-statement in Miller’s algorithm, implies that  $e(\mathcal{O}, Q) = 1$  as well as  $e(P, \mathcal{O}) = 1$  for all arguments  $P \in \mathbb{G}_1[5]$  and  $Q \in \mathbb{G}_2[5]$ . In order to compute a non-trivial Weil pairing, we choose the argument  $P = (7, 2) \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and  $Q = (9t^2 + 7, 12t^3 + 2t) \in \mathbb{G}_2$ . Invoking sage we get the following computation of the Weil pairing:

**sage:** `F13 = GF(13)`

check  
floating of  
algorithm

add refer-  
ences

---

**Algorithm 8** Miller's algorithm for short Weierstrass curves  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$

---

**Require:**  $r > 3$ ,  $P \in E[r]$ ,  $Q \in E[r]$  and

$b_0, \dots, b_t \in \{0, 1\}$  with  $r = b_0 \cdot 2^0 + b_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + b_t \cdot 2^t$  and  $b_t = 1$

**procedure** MILLER'S ALGORITHM( $P, Q$ )

**if**  $P = \mathcal{O}$  or  $Q = \mathcal{O}$  or  $P = Q$  **then**

**return**  $f_{r,P}(Q) \leftarrow (-1)^r$

**end if**

$(x_T, y_T) \leftarrow (x_P, y_P)$

$f_1 \leftarrow 1$

$f_2 \leftarrow 1$

**for**  $j \leftarrow t - 1, \dots, 0$  **do**

$m \leftarrow \frac{3 \cdot x_T^2 + a}{2 \cdot y_T}$

$f_1 \leftarrow f_1^2 \cdot (y_Q - y_T - m \cdot (x_Q - x_T))$

$f_2 \leftarrow f_2^2 \cdot (x_Q + 2x_T - m^2)$

$x_{2T} \leftarrow m^2 - 2x_T$

$y_{2T} \leftarrow -y_T - m \cdot (x_{2T} - x_T)$

$(x_T, y_T) \leftarrow (x_{2T}, y_{2T})$

**if**  $b_j = 1$  **then**

$m \leftarrow \frac{y_T - y_P}{x_T - x_P}$

$f_1 \leftarrow f_1 \cdot (y_Q - y_T - m \cdot (x_Q - x_T))$

$f_2 \leftarrow f_2 \cdot (x_Q + (x_P + x_T) - m^2)$

$x_{T+P} \leftarrow m^2 - x_T - x_P$

$y_{T+P} \leftarrow -y_T - m \cdot (x_{T+P} - x_T)$

$(x_T, y_T) \leftarrow (x_{T+P}, y_{T+P})$

**end if**

**end for**

$f_1 \leftarrow f_1 \cdot (x_Q - x_T)$

**return**  $f_{r,P}(Q) \leftarrow \frac{f_1}{f_2}$

**end procedure**

---



```

3198 sage: F13t.<t> = F13[] 456
3199 sage: P_MOD_4 = F13t (t^4+2) 457
3200 sage: F13_4.<t> = GF(13^4, name='t', modulus=P_MOD_4) 458
3201 sage: TJJF13_4 = EllipticCurve(F13_4, [8, 8]) 459
3202 sage: P=TJJF13_4([7, 2]) 460
3203 sage: Q=TJJF13_4([9*t^2+7, 12*t^3+2*t]) 461
3204 sage: P.weil_pairing(Q, 5) 462
3205 7*t^3 + 7*t^2 + 6*t + 3 463

```

3206 *Example 95.* Consider Bitcoin's curve secp256k1 again. As we have seen in example 92, it is  
 3207 infeasible to compute elements from the pairing group  $\mathbb{G}_2$  and as we know from example 89  
 3208 it is moreover infeasible to do calculations in the extension field  $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ . It follows that the Weil  
 3209 pairing is not efficiently computable and that secp256k1 is not pairing friendly.

## 3210 5.5 Hashing to Curves

3211 Elliptic curve cryptography frequently requires the ability to hash data onto elliptic curves. If  
 3212 the order of the curve is not a prime number, hashing to prime order subgroups is of importance,  
 3213 too and in the context of pairing-friendly curves, it is sometimes necessary to hash specifically  
 3214 onto the pairing group  $\mathbb{G}_1$  or  $\mathbb{G}_2$  as introduced in 5.4.

3215 As we have seen in section 4.1.2, some general methods are known for hashing into fi-  
 3216 nite cyclic groups and since elliptic curves over finite fields are finite and cyclic groups, those  
 3217 methods can be utilized in this case, too. However, in what follows we want to describe some  
 3218 methods specific to elliptic curves that are frequently used in real-world applications.

3219 **Try-and-increment hash functions** One of the most straight-forward ways of hashing onto  
 3220 an elliptic curve point in a secure way is to use a cryptographic hash function together with one  
 3221 of the hashing into modular arithmetics methods as described in section 4.2.

3222 Both constructions can be combined in such a way that the image provides an element of  
 3223 the base field of the elliptic curve together with a single auxiliary bit. The base field element  
 3224 can then be interpreted as the  $x$ -coordinate of a potential curve point, and the auxiliary bit can  
 3225 be used to determine one of the two possible  $y$  coordinates of that curve point as explained in  
 3226 5.1.1.

3227 Such an approach would be deterministic and easy to implement, and it would conserve the  
 3228 cryptographic properties of the original hash function. However, not all  $x$  coordinates generated  
 3229 in such a way will result in quadratic residues when inserted into the defining equation. It  
 3230 follows that not all field elements give rise to actual curve points.

3231 In fact, on a prime field, only half of the field elements are quadratic residues. Hence,  
 3232 assuming an even distribution of the hash values in the field, this method would fail to generate  
 3233 a curve point in about half of the attempts.

3234 One way to account for this problem is the following so-called **try-and-increment** method.  
 3235 Instead of simply hashing a binary string  $s$  to the field, this method use a try-and-increment hash  
 3236 to the base field as described in 4.2 in combination with a single auxiliary bit derived from the  
 3237 underlying cryptographic hash function.

3238 If any try of hashing to the field does not result in a field element or a valid curve point, the  
 3239 counter is incremented, and the hashing is repeated. This is done until a valid curve point is  
 3240 found.

check if  
the algo-  
rithm is  
floated  
properly

**Algorithm 9** Hash-to- $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ **Require:**  $p \in \mathbb{Z}$  with  $|p| = k$  and  $s \in \{0, 1\}^*$ **Require:** Curve equation  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$  over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ **procedure** TRY-AND-INCREMENT( $r, k, s$ ) $c \leftarrow 0$ 

▷ Try-and-Increment counter

**repeat** $s' \leftarrow s || \text{Bits}(c)$  $x \leftarrow H(s')_0 \cdot 2^0 + H(s')_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + H(s')_k \cdot 2^k$ ▷ potential  $x$  $y^2 \leftarrow x^3 + a \cdot x + b$ ▷ potential  $y^2$  $c \leftarrow c + 1$ **until**  $x < p$  and  $(y^2)^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \bmod p = 1$ ▷ Check  $x$  in field and  $y^2$  has root**if**  $H(s')_{k+1} == 0$  **then**

▷ auxiliary bit decides root

 $y \leftarrow y' \in \sqrt{y^2}$  with  $0 \leq y' \leq (p-1)/2$ **else** $y \leftarrow y' \in \sqrt{y^2}$  with  $(p-1)/2 < y' < p$ **end if****return**  $(x, y)$ **end procedure****Ensure:**  $(x, y) \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ 

The try-and-increment method is relatively easy to implement, and it maintains the cryptographic properties of the original hash function. It should be noted that if the curve is not of prime order, the image of the try-and-increment hash will be a general curve point that might not be an element from the large prime-order subgroup. To map onto the large prime order subgroup it is therefore necessary to apply the technique of cofactor clearing as explained in 4.5.

*Example 96.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve from example 69. We want to construct a try-and-increment hash function that maps a binary string  $s$  of arbitrary length onto the large prime-order subgroup of size 5 from example 5.5.

Since the curve  $TJJ_{13}$  is defined over the field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , and the binary representation of 13 is  $\text{Bits}(13) = \langle 1, 1, 0, 1 \rangle$ , one way to implement a try-and-increment function is to apply SHA256 from Sage's hashlib library on the concatenation  $s || c$  for some binary counter string  $c$ , and use the first 4 bits of the image to try to hash into  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . In case we are able to hash to a value  $x$  such that  $x^3 + 8 \cdot x + 8$  is a quadratic residue in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , we use the fifth bit to decide which of the two possible roots of  $x^3 + 8 \cdot x + 8$  we will choose as the  $y$  coordinate. The result is a curve point different from the point at infinity. To project it onto the large prime order subgroup  $TJJ_{13}[5]$ , we multiply it with the cofactor 4. If the result is not the point at infinity, it is the result of the hash.

To make this concrete, let  $s = \langle 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle$  be our binary string that we want to hash onto  $TJJ_{13}[5]$ . We use a binary counter string starting at zero, that is, we choose  $c = \langle 0 \rangle$ . Invoking Sage, we define the try-hash function as follows:

```

sage: import hashlib                                464
sage: def try_hash(s, c):                          465
....:     s_1 = s+c # string concatenation          466
....:     hasher = hashlib.sha256(s_1.encode('utf-8')) # 467
compute SHA256

```

```

3267     ....:     digest = hasher.hexdigest()                                468
3268     ....:     z = ZZ(digest, 16) # cast into integer                      469
3269     ....:     z_bin = z.digits(base=2, padto=256) # cast to 256          470
3270         bits
3271     ....:     x = z_bin[0]*2^0 + z_bin[1]*2^1 + z_bin[2]*2^2+z_bin      471
3272         [3]*2^3
3273     ....:     return (x, z_bin[4])                                       472
3274 sage: try_hash('1110010000', '0')                                     473
3275 (15, 1)                                                                474

```

As we can see, our first attempt to hash into  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  was not successful, as 15 is not an element in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , so we increment the binary counter by 1 and try again:

```

3278 sage: try_hash('1110010000', '1')                                     475
3279 (3, 1)                                                                476

```

With this try, we found a hash into  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . However, this point is not guaranteed to define a curve point. To see that, we insert  $x = 3$  into the right side of the short Weierstrass equation of the tiny-jubjub curve, and compute  $3^3 + 8 \cdot 3 + 8 = 7$ . However, 7 is not a quadratic residue in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , since  $7^{\frac{13-1}{2}} = 7^6 = 12 = -1$ . This means that the field element 7 is not suitable as the  $x$ -coordinate of any curve point. We therefore have to increment the counter another time:

```

3285 sage: try_hash('1110010000', '10')                                    477
3286 (12, 1)                                                                478

```

Since  $12^3 + 8 \cdot 12 + 8 = 12$ , and we have  $\sqrt{12} = \{5, 8\}$ , we finally found the valid  $x$ -coordinate  $x = 12$  for a curve point hash. Now, since the auxiliary bit of this hash is 1, we choose the larger root  $y = 8$  as the  $y$  coordinate and get the following hash which is a valid curve point on the tiny-jubjub curve:

$$H_{TJJ\_13}(< 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 >) = (12, 8)$$

In order to project this onto the “large” prime-order subgroup, we have to do cofactor clearing, that is, we have to multiply the point with the cofactor 4. Using sage we get

```

3289 sage: P = TJJ_13(12, 8)                                                479
3290 sage: (4*P).xy()                                                       480
3291 (8, 8)                                                                481

```

This implies that hashing the binary string  $< 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 >$  onto the large prime order subgroup  $TJJ\_13[5]$  gives the hash value  $(8, 8)$  as a result.

$$H_{TJJ\_13[5]}(< 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 >) = (8, 8)$$

**Exercise 79.** Use our definition of the *try\_hash* algorithm to implement a hash function  $H_{TJJ\_13[5]} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow TJJ\_13(\mathbb{F}_{13})[5]$  that maps binary strings of arbitrary length onto the 5-torsion group of  $TJJ13(\mathbb{F}_{13})$ .

**Exercise 80.** Implement a cryptographic hash function  $H_{secp256k1} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow secp256k1$  that maps binary strings of arbitrary length onto the elliptic curve *secp256k1*.

## 5.6 Constructing elliptic curves

Cryptographically secure elliptic curves like secp256k1 70 have been known for quite some time. Given the latest advancements of cryptography, however, it is often necessary to design and instantiate elliptic curves from scratch that satisfy certain very specific properties.

For example, in the context of SNARK development, it became necessary to design elliptic curves that can be efficiently implemented inside of a so-called **circuit** in order to enable primitives like elliptic curve **signature schemes** in a zero-knowledge proof. Such a curve is given by the Baby-jubjub curve in XXX, and we have paralleled its definition by introducing the tiny-jubjub curve from example 69. As we have seen, those curves are instances of so-called twisted Edwards curves, and as such have easy to implement addition laws that work without branching. However, we introduced the tiny-jubjub curve out of thin air, as we just gave the curve parameters without explaining how we came up with them.

Another requirement in the context of many so-called **pairing-based zero-knowledge proofing systems** is the existence of a suitable, pairing-friendly curve with a specified security level and a low embedding degree as defined in 5.24. Famous examples are the BLS\_12 and the NMT curves.

The major goal of this section is to explain the most important method of designing elliptic curves with predefined properties from scratch, called the **complex multiplication method**. We will apply this method in section to synthesize a particular BLS\_6 curve, which is one of the most insecure curves, that is particular well suited to serve as the main curve to build our pen-and-paper SNARKs on. As we will see, this curve has a “large” prime factor subgroup of order 13, which implies that we can use our tiny-jubjub curve to implement certain elliptic curve cryptographic primitives in circuits over that BLS\_6 curve.

Before we introduce the complex multiplication method, we have to explain a few properties of elliptic curves that are of key importance in understanding that method.

**The Trace of Frobenius** To understand the complex multiplication method of elliptic curves, we have to define the so-called **trace** of an elliptic curve first.

We know that elliptic curves are cyclic groups of finite order. Therefore, an interesting question is whether it is possible to estimate the number of elements that this curve contains. Since an affine short Weierstrass curve consists of pairs  $(x, y)$  of elements from a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  plus the point at infinity, and the field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  contains  $q$  elements, the number of curve points cannot be arbitrarily large, since it can contain at most  $q^2 + 1$  many elements.

There is however, a more precise estimation, usually called the **Hasse bound**. To understand it, let  $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  be an affine short Weierstrass curve over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  of order  $q$ , and let  $|E(\mathbb{F}_q)|$  be the order of the curve. Then there is an integer  $t \in \mathbb{Z}$ , called the **trace of Frobenius** of the curve, such that  $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{q}$  and the following equation holds:

$$|E(\mathbb{F}_q)| = q + 1 - t \quad (5.34)$$

A positive trace, therefore, implies that the curve contains no more points than the underlying field, whereas a non-negative trace means that the curve contains more points. However, the estimation  $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{q}$  implies that the difference is not very large in either direction, and the number of elements in an elliptic curve is always approximately in the same order of magnitude as the size of the curve’s base field.

*Example 97.* Consider the elliptic curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  from example 68. We know that it contains 9 curve points. Since the order of  $\mathbb{F}_5$  is 5, we compute the trace of  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  to be  $t = -3$ , since

the Hasse bound is given by the following equation:

$$9 = 5 + 1 - (-3)$$

3338 Indeed, we have  $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{q}$ , since  $\sqrt{5} > 2$  and  $|-3| = 3 \leq 4 = 2 \cdot 2 < 2 \cdot \sqrt{5}$ .

3339 *Example 98.* To compute the trace of the tiny-jubjub curve, recall from example 69 that the  
3340 order of  $TJJ\_13$  is 20. Since the order of  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  is 13, we can therefore use the Hasse bound and  
3341 compute the trace as  $t = -6$ :

$$20 = 13 + 1 - (-6) \quad (5.35)$$

3342 Again, we have  $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{q}$ , since  $\sqrt{13} > 3$  and  $|-6| = 6 = 2 \cdot 3 < 2 \cdot \sqrt{13}$ .

*Example 99.* To compute the trace of secp256k1, recall from example 70 that this curve is defined over a prime field with  $p$  elements, and that the order of that group is given by  $r$ :

$$p = 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007908834671663$$

$$r = 115792089237316195423570985008687907852837564279074904382605163141518161494337$$

Using the Hasse bound  $r = p + 1 - t$ , we therefore compute  $t = p + 1 - r$ , which gives the trace of curve secp256k1 as follows:

$$t = 432420386565659656852420866390673177327$$

3343 As we can see, secp256k1 contains less elements than its underlying field. However, the  
3344 difference is tiny, since the order of secp256k1 is in the same order of magnitude as the order  
3345 of the underlying field. Compared to  $p$  and  $r$ , the integer  $t$  is tiny.

```
3346 sage: p = 1157920892373161954235709850086879078532699846656405 482
3347         64039457584007908834671663
3348 sage: r = 1157920892373161954235709850086879078528375642790749 483
3349         04382605163141518161494337
3350 sage: t = p + 1 - r 484
3351 sage: t.nbits() 485
3352 129 486
3353 sage: abs(RR(t)) <= 2*sqrt(RR(p)) 487
3354 True 488
```

3355 **The  $j$ -invariant** As we have seen in XXX, two elliptic curves  $E_1(\mathbb{F})$  defined by  $y^2 = x^3 + ax +$   
3356  $b$  and  $E_2(\mathbb{F})$  defined by  $y^2 + a'x + b'$  are strictly isomorphic if and only if there is a quadratic  
3357 residue  $d \in \mathbb{F}$  such that  $a' = ad^2$  and  $b' = bd^3$ .

3358 There is, however, a more general way to classify elliptic curves over finite fields  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , based  
3359 on the so-called  **$j$ -invariant** of an elliptic curve with  $j(E(\mathbb{F}_q)) \in \mathbb{F}_q$ , as defined below:

$$j(E(\mathbb{F}_q)) = 1728 \cdot \frac{4 \cdot a^3}{4 \cdot a^3 + 27 \cdot b^2} \bmod q \quad (5.36)$$

3360 A detailed description of the  $j$ -invariant is beyond the scope of this book. For our present  
3361 purposes, it is sufficient to note that two elliptic curves  $E_1(\mathbb{F})$  and  $E_2(\mathbb{F}')$  are isomorphic over  
3362 the algebraic closures of  $\mathbb{F}$  and  $\mathbb{F}'$ , if and only if  $\overline{\mathbb{F}} = \overline{\mathbb{F}'}$  and  $j(E_1) = j(E_2)$ .

3363 So, the  $j$ -invariant is an important tool to classify elliptic curves and it is needed in the com-  
3364 plex multiplication method to decide on an actual curve instantiation that implements abstractly  
3365 chosen properties.

add refer-  
ence

algebraic  
closures

*Example 100.* Consider the elliptic curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  from example 68. We compute its  $j$ -invariant as follows:

check  
reference

$$\begin{aligned} j(E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)) &= 1728 \cdot \frac{4 \cdot 1^3}{4 \cdot 1^3 + 27 \cdot 1^2} \bmod 5 \\ &= 3 \frac{4}{4+2} \\ &= 3 \cdot 4 \\ &= 2 \end{aligned}$$

*Example 101.* Consider the elliptic curve  $TJJ\_13$  from example 69. We compute its  $j$ -invariant as follows:

check  
reference

$$\begin{aligned} j(TJJ\_13) &= 1728 \cdot \frac{4 \cdot 8^3}{4 \cdot 8^3 + 27 \cdot 8^2} \bmod 13 \\ &= 12 \cdot \frac{4 \cdot 5}{4 \cdot 5 + 1 \cdot 12} \\ &= 12 \cdot \frac{7}{7+12} \\ &= 12 \cdot 7 \cdot 6^{-1} \\ &= 2 \cdot 7 \\ &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

*Example 102.* Consider secp256k1 from example secp256k1. We compute its  $j$ -invariant using Sage:

```

3366 sage: p = 1157920892373161954235709850086879078532699846656405 489
3369      64039457584007908834671663
3370 sage: F = GF(p) 490
3371 sage: j = F(1728) * ((F(4) * F(0)^3) / (F(4) * F(0)^3 + F(27) * F(7)^2)) 491
3372 sage: j == F(0) 492
3373 True 493

```

**The Complex Multiplication Method** As we have seen in the previous sections, elliptic curves have various defining properties, like their order, their prime factors, the embedding degree, or the cardinality (number of elements) of the base field. The **complex multiplication** (CM) method provides a practical way of constructing elliptic curves with pre-defined restrictions on the order and the base field.

The complex multiplication method starts by choosing a base field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  of the curve  $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  we want to construct such that  $q = p^m$  for some prime number  $p$ , and  $m \in \mathbb{N}$ . We assume  $p > 3$  to simplify things in what follows.

Next, the trace of Frobenius  $t \in \mathbb{Z}$  of the curve is chosen such that  $p$  and  $t$  are coprime, that is,  $\gcd(p, t) = 1$  holds true and  $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{q}$ . The choice of  $t$  also defines the curve's order  $r$ , since  $r = p + 1 - t$  by the Hasse bound 5.34, so choosing  $t$  will determine the large order subgroup as well as all small cofactors. The resulting  $r$  must be such that the curve meets the application's security requirements.

Note that the choice of  $p$  and  $t$  also determines the embedding degree  $k$  of any prime-order subgroup of the curve, since  $k$  is defined as the smallest number such that the prime order  $n$  divides the number  $q^k - 1$ .



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$$D < 0$$

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disambiguate

$$S(D) = \{(A, B, C) \mid A, B, C \in \mathbb{Z}, D = B^2 - 4AC, \gcd(A, B, C) = 1,$$

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$$j: \mathbb{H} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$$

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3438 With a way to compute the  $j$ -function and the precomputed set  $S(D)$  at hand, we can now  
3439 compute the Hilbert class polynomial as follows:

$$H_D(x) = \Pi_{(A,B,C) \in S(D)} \left( x - j \left( \frac{-B + \sqrt{D}}{2A} \right) \right) \quad (5.39)$$

It can be shown that the Hilbert class polynomial is an integer polynomial, but actual computations need high-precision arithmetic to avoid approximation errors that usually occur in computer approximations of the  $j$ -function (as shown above). So, in case the calculated Hilbert class polynomial does not have integer coefficients, we need to round the result to the nearest integer. Given that the precision we used was high enough, the result will be correct.

In the next step, we use the Hilbert class polynomial  $H_D \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$ , and project it to a polynomial  $H_{D,q} \in \mathbb{F}_q[x]$  with coefficients in the base field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  as chosen in the first step. We do this by simply reducing the coefficients modulo  $p$ , that is, if  $H_D(x) = a_m x^m + a_{m-1} x^{m-1} + \dots + a_1 x + a_0$ , we compute the  $q$ -modulus of each coefficient  $\tilde{a}_j = a_j \bmod p$ , which yields the **projected Hilbert class polynomial** as follows:

$$H_{D,p}(x) = \tilde{a}_m x^m + \tilde{a}_{m-1} x^{m-1} + \dots + \tilde{a}_1 x + \tilde{a}_0$$

To compute a curve with the correct order, we have to distinguish a few different cases based on our choice of the root  $j_0 \in \mathbb{F}_q$  and of the CM-discriminant  $D \in \mathbb{Z}$ . If  $j_0 \neq 0$  or  $j_0 \not\equiv 1728 \pmod{q}$ , we compute  $c_1 = \frac{j_0}{(1728 \pmod{q} - j_0)} \in \mathbb{F}_q$ , then we chose some arbitrary quadratic non-residue  $c_2 \in \mathbb{F}_q$ , and some arbitrary cubic non-residue  $c_3 \in \mathbb{F}_q$ .



The following table is guaranteed to define a curve with the correct order  $r = q + 1 - t$  for the fields order  $q$  and the trace of Frobenius  $t$  we initially decided on:

- Case  $j_0 \neq 0$  and  $j_0 \neq 1728 \bmod q$ . A curve with the correct order is defined by one of the following equations:

$$y^2 = x^3 + 3c_1x + 2c_1 \quad \text{or} \quad y^2 = x^3 + 3c_1c_2^2x + 2c_1c_2^3 \quad (5.40)$$

- Case  $j_0 = 0$  and  $D \neq -3$ . A curve with the correct order is defined by one of the following equations:

$$y^2 = x^3 + 1 \quad \text{or} \quad y^2 = x^3 + c_2^3 \quad (5.41)$$

- Case  $j_0 = 0$  and  $D = -3$ . A curve with the correct order is defined by one of the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} y^2 &= x^3 + 1 \quad \text{or} \quad y^2 = x^3 + c_2^3 \quad \text{or} \\ y^2 &= x^3 + c_3^2 \quad \text{or} \quad y^2 = c_3^2c_2^3 \quad \text{or} \\ y^2 &= x^3 + c_3^{-2} \quad \text{or} \quad y^2 = x^3 + c_3^{-2}c_2^3 \end{aligned}$$

- Case  $j_0 = 1728 \bmod q$  and  $D \neq -4$ . A curve with the correct order is defined by one of the following equations:

$$y^2 = x^3 + x \quad \text{or} \quad y^2 = x^3 + c_2^2x \quad (5.42)$$

- Case  $j_0 = 1728 \bmod q$  and  $D = -4$ . A curve with the correct order is defined by one of the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} y^2 &= x^3 + x \quad \text{or} \quad y^2 = x^3 + c_2x \quad \text{or} \\ y^2 &= x^3 + c_2^2x \quad \text{or} \quad y^2 = x^3 + c_2^3x \end{aligned}$$

To decide the proper defining short Weierstrass equation, we therefore have to compute the order of any of the potential curves above, and then choose the one that fits our initial requirements.

To summarize, using the complex multiplication method, it is possible to synthesize elliptic curves with predefined order over predefined base fields from scratch. However, the curves that are constructed this way are just some representatives of a larger class of curves, all of which have the same order. Therefore, in real-world applications, it is sometimes more advantageous to choose a different representative from that class. To do so recall from 5.1.1 that any curve defined by the short Weierstrass equation  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$  is isomorphic to a curve of the form  $y^2 = x^3 + ad^4x + bd^6$  for some invertible field element  $d \in \mathbb{F}_q^*$ .

In order to find a suitable representative (e.g. with small parameters  $a$  and  $b$ ) in the last step, the curve designer might choose an invertible field element  $d$  such that the transformed curve has the properties they wanted.

*Example 103.* Consider curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  from example 68. We want to use the complex multiplication method to derive that curve from scratch. Since  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  is a curve of order  $r = 9$  over the prime field of order  $q = 5$ , we know from example 97 that its trace of Frobenius is  $t = -3$ , which also implies that  $q$  and  $|t|$  are coprime.

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We then have to find parameters  $D, v \in \mathbb{Z}$  such that the criteria in 5.37 hold. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} 4q &= t^2 + |D|v^2 && \Rightarrow \\ 20 &= (-3)^2 + |D|v^2 && \Leftrightarrow \\ 11 &= |D|v^2 \end{aligned}$$

Now, since 11 is a prime number, the only solution is  $|D| = 11$  and  $v = 1$  here. With  $D = -11$  and the Euclidean division of  $-11$  by 4 being  $-11 = -3 \cdot 4 + 1$ , we have  $-11 \bmod 4 = 1$ , which shows that  $D = -11$  is a proper choice.

In the next step, we have to compute the Hilbert class polynomial  $H_{-11}$ . To do so, we first have to find the set  $S(D)$ . To compute that set, observe that, since  $\sqrt{\frac{|D|}{3}} \approx 1.915 < 2$ , we know from  $A \leq \sqrt{\frac{|D|}{3}}$  and  $A \in \mathbb{Z}$  that  $A$  must be either 0 or 1.

For  $A = 0$ , we know  $B = 0$  from the constraint  $|B| \leq A$ . However, in this case, there could be no  $C$  satisfying  $-11 = B^2 - 4AC$ . So we try  $A = 1$  and deduce  $B \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$  from the constraint  $|B| \leq A$ . The case  $B = -1$  can be excluded, since then  $B < 0$  has to imply  $|B| < A$ . The case  $B = 0$  can also be excluded, as there cannot be an integer  $C$  with  $-11 = -4C$ , since 11 is a prime number.

This leaves the case  $B = 1$ , and we compute  $C = 3$  from the equation  $-11 = 1^2 - 4C$ , which gives the solution  $(A, B, C) = (1, 1, 3)$ :

$$S(D) = \{(1, 1, 3)\}$$

With the set  $S(D)$  at hand, we can compute the Hilbert class polynomial of  $D = -11$ . To do so, we have to insert the term  $\frac{-1 + \sqrt{-11}}{2 \cdot 1}$  into the  $j$ -function. To do so, first observe that  $\sqrt{-11} = i\sqrt{11}$ , where  $i$  is the imaginary unit, defined by  $i^2 = -1$ . Using this, we can invoke Sage to compute the  $j$ -invariant and get the following:

$$H_{-11}(x) = x - j \left( \frac{-1 + i\sqrt{11}}{2} \right) = x + 32768$$

As we can see, in this particular case, the Hilbert class polynomial is a linear function with a single integer coefficient. In the next step, we have to project it onto a polynomial from  $\mathbb{F}_5[x]$  by computing the modular 5 remainder of the coefficients 1 and 32768. We get  $32768 \bmod 5 = 3$ , from which it follows that the projected Hilbert class polynomial is considered a polynomial from  $\mathbb{F}_5[x]$ :

$$H_{-11,5}(x) = x + 3$$

As we can see, the only root of this polynomial is  $j = 2$ , since  $H_{-11,5}(2) = 2 + 3 = 0$ . We therefore have a situation with  $j \neq 0$  and  $j \neq 1728$ , which tells us that we have to compute the parameter  $c_1$  in modular 5 arithmetics:

$$c_1 = \frac{2}{1728 - 2}$$

Since  $1728 \bmod 5 = 3$ , we get  $c_1 = 2$ .

Next, we have to check if the curve  $E(\mathbb{F}_5)$  defined by the short Weierstrass equation  $y^2 = x^3 + 3 \cdot 2x + 2 \cdot 2$  has the correct order. We invoke Sage, and find that the order is indeed 9, so it

3496 is a curve with the required parameters. Thus, we have successfully constructed the curve with  
 3497 the desired properties.

Note, however, that in real-world applications, it might be useful to choose parameters  $a$  and  $b$  that have certain properties, e.g. to be as small as possible. As we know from XXX, choosing any quadratic residue  $d \in \mathbb{F}_5$  gives a curve of the same order defined by  $y^2 = x^2 + ak^2x + bk^3$ . Since 4 is a quadratic residue in  $\mathbb{F}_4$ , we can transform the curve defined by  $y^2 = x^3 + x + 4$  into the curve  $y^2 = x^3 + 4^2 + 4 \cdot 4^3$  which gives the following:

$$y^2 = x^3 + x + 1$$

3498 This is the curve  $E_{1,1}(\mathbb{F}_5)$  that we used extensively throughout this book. Thus, using the  
 3499 complex multiplication method, we were able to derive a curve with specific properties from  
 3500 scratch.

3501 *Example 104.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve  $TJJ\_13$  from example 69. We want to use the  
 3502 complex multiplication method to derive that curve from scratch. Since  $TJJ\_13$  is a curve of  
 3503 order  $r = 20$  over the prime field of order  $q = 13$ , we know from example 98 that its trace of  
 3504 Frobenius is  $t = -6$ , which also implies that  $q$  and  $|t|$  are coprime.

We then have to find parameters  $D, v \in \mathbb{Z}$  such that 5.37 holds. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} 4q &= t^2 + |D|v^2 && \Rightarrow \\ 4 \cdot 13 &= (-6)^2 + |D|v^2 && \Rightarrow \\ 52 &= 36 + |D|v^2 && \Leftrightarrow \\ 16 &= |D|v^2 \end{aligned}$$

3505 This equation has two solutions for  $(D, v)$ , namely  $(-4, \pm 2)$  and  $(-16, \pm 1)$ . Looking at the  
 3506 first solution, we know that  $D = -4$  implies  $j = 1728$ , and the constructed curve is defined by a  
 3507 short Weierstrass equation 5.1 that has a vanishing parameter  $b = 0$ . We can therefore conclude  
 3508 that choosing  $D = -4$  will not help us reconstructing  $TJJ\_13$ . It will produce curves with order  
 3509 20, just not the one we are looking for.

So we choose the second solution  $D = -16$ . In the next step, we have to compute the Hilbert class polynomial  $H_{-16}$ . To do so, we first have to find the set  $S(D)$ . To compute that set, observe that since  $\sqrt{\frac{|-16|}{3}} \approx 2.31 < 3$ , we know from  $A \leq \sqrt{\frac{|-16|}{3}}$  and  $A \in \mathbb{Z}$  that  $A$  must be in the range  $0..2$ . So we loop through all possible values of  $A$  and through all possible values of  $B$  under the constraints  $|B| \leq A$ , and if  $B < 0$  then  $|B| < A$ . Then we compute potential  $C$ 's from  $-16 = B^2 - 4AC$ . We get the following two solutions for  $S(D)$ : we get

$$S(D) = \{(1, 0, 4), (2, 0, 2)\}$$

With the set  $S(D)$  at hand, we can compute the Hilbert class polynomial of  $D = -16$ . We can invoke Sage to compute the  $j$ -invariant and get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} H_{-16}(x) &= \left( x - j \left( \frac{i\sqrt{16}}{2} \right) \right) \left( x - j \left( \frac{i\sqrt{16}}{4} \right) \right) \\ &= (x - 287496)(x - 1728) \end{aligned}$$

As we can see, in this particular case, the Hilbert class polynomial is a quadratic function with two integer coefficients. In the next step, we have to project it onto a polynomial from  $\mathbb{F}_5[x]$  by computing the modular 5 remainder of the coefficients 1, 287496 and 1728. We get

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$287496 \bmod 13 = 1$  and  $1728 \bmod 13 = 2$ , which means that the projected Hilbert class polynomial is as follows:

$$H_{-11,5}(x) = (x-1)(x-12) = (x+12)(x+1)$$

3510 This is considered a polynomial from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}[x]$ . Thus, we have two roots, namely  $j = 1$  and  
 3511  $j = 12$ . We already know that  $j = 12$  is the wrong root to construct the tiny-jubjub curve, since  
 3512  $1728 \bmod 13 = 2$ , and that case is not compatible with a curve with  $b \neq 0$ . So we choose  $j = 1$ .

Another way to decide the proper root is to compute the  $j$ -invariant of the tiny-jubjub curve. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} j(TJJ\_13) &= 12 \frac{4 \cdot 8^3}{4 \cdot 8^3 + 1 \cdot 8^2} \\ &= 12 \frac{4 \cdot 5}{4 \cdot 5 + 12} \\ &= 12 \frac{7}{7 + 12} \\ &= 12 \frac{7}{7 + 12} \\ &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

This is equal to the root  $j = 1$  of the Hilbert class polynomial  $H_{-16,13}$  as expected. We therefore have a situation with  $j \neq 0$  and  $j \neq 1728$ , which tells us that we have to compute the parameter  $c_1$  in modular 5 arithmetics:

$$c_1 = \frac{1}{12-1} = 6$$

Since  $1728 \bmod 13 = 12$ , we get  $c_1 = 6$ . Then we have to check if the curve  $E(\mathbb{F}_5)$  defined by the short Weierstrass equation  $y^2 = x^3 + 3 \cdot 6x + 2 \cdot 6$ , which is equivalent to  $y^2 = x^3 + 5x + 12$ , has the correct order. We invoke Sage and find that the order is 8, which implies that the trace of this curve is 6, not  $-6$  as required. So we have to consider the second possibility, and choose some quadratic non-residue  $c_2 \in \mathbb{F}_{13}$ . We choose  $c_2 = 5$  and compute the short Weierstrass equation  $y^2 = x^3 + 5c_2^2 + 12c_2^3$  as follows:

$$y^2 = x^3 + 8x + 5$$

We invoke Sage and find that the order is 20, which is indeed the correct one. As we know from XXX, choosing any quadratic residue  $d \in \mathbb{F}_5$  gives a curve of the same order defined by  $y^2 = x^2 + ad^2x + bd^3$ . Since 12 is a quadratic residue in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , we can transform the curve defined by  $y^2 = x^3 + 8x + 5$  into the curve  $y^2 = x^3 + 12^2 \cdot 8 + 5 \cdot 12^3$  which gives the following:

$$y^2 = x^3 + 8x + 8$$

3513 This is the tiny-jubjub curve that we used extensively throughout this book. So using the  
 3514 complex multiplication method, we were able to derive a curve with specific properties from  
 3515 scratch.

*Example 105.* To consider a real-world example, we want to use the complex multiplication method in combination with Sage to compute secp256k1 from scratch. So based on example 70, we decided to compute an elliptic curve over a prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$  of order  $r$  for the following

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security parameters:

```
p = 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007908834671663
r = 115792089237316195423570985008687907852837564279074904382605163141518161494337
```

According to example 99, this gives the following trace of Frobenius:

```
t = 432420386565659656852420866390673177327
```

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We also decided that we want a curve of the form  $y^2 = x^3 + b$ , that is, we want the parameter  $a$  to be zero. This implies that the  $j$ -invariant of our curve must be zero.

In a first step, we have to find a CM-discriminant  $D$  and some integer  $v$  such that the equation  $4p = t^2 + |D|v^2$  is satisfied. Since we aim for a vanishing  $j$ -invariant, the first thing to try is  $D = -3$ . In this case, we can compute  $v^2 = (4p - t^2)$ , and if  $v^2$  happens to be an integer that has a square root  $v$ , we are done. Invoking Sage we compute as follows:

```
sage: D = -3
sage: p = 1157920892373161954235709850086879078532699846656405
      64039457584007908834671663
sage: r = 1157920892373161954235709850086879078528375642790749
      04382605163141518161494337
sage: t = p+1-r
sage: v_sqr = (4*p - t^2)/abs(D)
sage: v_sqr.is_integer()
True
sage: v = sqrt(v_sqr)
sage: v.is_integer()
True
sage: 4*p == t^2 + abs(D)*v^2
True
sage: v
303414439467246543595250775667605759171
```

The pair  $(D, v) = (-3, 303414439467246543595250775667605759171)$  does indeed solve the equation, which tells us that there is a curve of order  $r$  over a prime field of order  $p$ , defined by a short Weierstrass equation  $y^2 = x^3 + b$  for some  $b \in \mathbb{F}_p$ . Now we need to compute  $b$ .

For  $D = -3$ , we already know that the associated Hilbert class polynomial is given by  $H_{-3}(x) = x$ , which gives the projected Hilbert class polynomial as  $H_{-3,p} = x$  and the  $j$ -invariant of our curve is guaranteed to be  $j = 0$ . Now, looking at 5.6, we see that there are 6 possible cases to construct a curve with the correct order  $r$ . In order to construct the curves in question, we have to choose some arbitrary quadratic and cubic non-residue. So we loop through  $\mathbb{F}_p$  to find them, invoking Sage:

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```
sage: F = GF(p)
sage: for c2 in F:
.....:     try: # quadratic residue
.....:         _ = c2.nth_root(2)
.....:     except ValueError: # quadratic non-residue
.....:         break
sage: c2
```

```

3554 3 534
3555 sage: for c3 in F: 535
3556 .....: try: 536
3557 .....:     _ = c3.nth_root(3) 537
3558 .....: except ValueError: 538
3559 .....:     break 539
3560 sage: c3 540
3561 2 541

```

3562 We found the quadratic non-residue  $c_2 = 3$  and the cubic non-residue  $c_3 = 2$ . Using those  
 3563 numbers, we check the six cases against the the expected order  $r$  of the curve we want to  
 3564 synthesize:

```

3565 sage: C1 = EllipticCurve(F, [0, 1]) 542
3566 sage: C1.order() == r 543
3567 False 544
3568 sage: C2 = EllipticCurve(F, [0, c2^3]) 545
3569 sage: C2.order() == r 546
3570 False 547
3571 sage: C3 = EllipticCurve(F, [0, c3^2]) 548
3572 sage: C3.order() == r 549
3573 False 550
3574 sage: C4 = EllipticCurve(F, [0, c3^2*c2^3]) 551
3575 sage: C4.order() == r 552
3576 False 553
3577 sage: C5 = EllipticCurve(F, [0, c3^(-2)]) 554
3578 sage: C5.order() == r 555
3579 False 556
3580 sage: C6 = EllipticCurve(F, [0, c3^(-2)*c2^3]) 557
3581 sage: C6.order() == r 558
3582 True 559

```

As expected, we found an elliptic curve of the correct order  $r$  over a prime field of size  $p$ . In principle, we are done, as we have found a curve with the same basic properties as secp256k1. However, the curve is defined by the following equation, which uses a very large parameter  $b_1$ , and so it might perform too slowly in certain algorithms.

$$y^2 = x^3 + 86844066927987146567678238756515930889952488499230423029593188005931626003754$$

It is also not very elegant to be written down by hand. It might therefore be advantageous to find an isomorphic curve with the smallest possible parameter  $b_2$ . In order to find such a  $b_2$ , we have to choose a quadratic residue  $d$  such that  $b_2 = b_1 \cdot d^3$  is as small as possible. To do so, we rewrite the last equation into the following form:

$$d = \sqrt[3]{\frac{b_2}{b_1}}$$

3583 Then we invoke Sage to loop through values  $b_2 \in \mathbb{F}_p$  until it finds some number such that  
 3584 the quotient  $\frac{b_2}{b_1}$  has a cube root  $d$  and this cube root itself is a quadratic residue.

```

3585 sage: b1=86844066927987146567678238756515930889952488499230423 560
3586 029593188005931626003754

```

what  
does this  
mean?  
Maybe  
just delete  
it

```

3587 sage: for b2 in F:
3588     ....:     try:
3589     ....:         d = (b2/b1).nth_root(3)
3590     ....:         try:
3591     ....:             _ = d.nth_root(2)
3592     ....:             if d != 0:
3593     ....:                 break
3594     ....:         except ValueError:
3595     ....:             pass
3596     ....:     except ValueError:
3597     ....:         pass
3598 sage: b2
3599 7

```

Indeed, the smallest possible value is  $b_2 = 7$  and the defining short Weierstrass equation of a curve over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  with prime order  $r$  is  $y^2 = x^3 + 7$ , which we might call secp256k1. As we have just seen, the complex multiplication method is powerful enough to derive cryptographically secure curves like secp256k1 from scratch.

*Exercise 81.* Show that the Hilbert class polynomials for the CM-discriminants  $D = -3$  and  $D = -4$  are given by  $H_{-3,q}(x) = x$  and  $H_{-4,q} = x - (1728 \bmod q)$ .

### 5.6.1 The BLS6\_6 pen-and-paper curve

In this paragraph, we summarize our understanding of elliptic curves to derive our main pen-and-paper example for the rest of the book. To do so, we want to use the complex multiplication method to derive a pairing-friendly elliptic curve that has similar properties to curves that are used in actual cryptographic protocols. However, we design the curve specifically to be useful in pen-and-paper examples, which mostly means that the curve should contain only a few points so that we are able to derive exhaustive addition and pairing tables.

A well-understood family of pairing-friendly curves is the the group of BLS curves (STUFF ABOUT THE HISTORY AND THE NAMING CONVENTION), which are derived in [XXX]. BLS curves are particularly useful in our case if the embedding degree  $k$  satisfies  $k \equiv 6 \pmod{0}$ . Of course, the smallest embedding degree  $k$  that satisfies this congruency is  $k = 6$  and we therefore aim for a BLS6 curve as our main pen-and-paper example.

To apply the complex multiplication method from page 114 ff., recall that this method starts with a definition of the base field  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$ , as well as the trace of Frobenius  $t$  and the order of the curve. If the order  $p^m + 1 - t$  is not a prime number, then the order  $r$  of the largest prime factor group needs to be controlled.

In the case of BLS6 curves, the parameter  $m$  is chosen to be 1, which means that the curves are defined over prime fields. All relevant parameters  $p$ ,  $t$  and  $r$  are then themselves parameterized by the following three polynomials:

$$\begin{aligned}
 r(x) &= \Phi_6(x) \\
 t(x) &= x + 1 \\
 q(x) &= \frac{1}{3}(x-1)^2(x^2 - x + 1) + x
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{5.43}$$

In the equations above,  $\Phi_6$  is the 6-th cyclotomic polynomial and  $x \in \mathbb{N}$  is a parameter that the designer has to choose in such a way that the evaluation of  $p$ ,  $t$  and  $r$  at the point  $x$

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gives integers that have the proper size to meet the security requirements of the curve that they want to design. It is then guaranteed that the complex multiplication method can be used in combination with those parameters to define an elliptic curve with CM-discriminant  $D = -3$ , embedding degree  $k = 6$ , and curve equation  $y^2 = x^3 + b$  for some  $b \in \mathbb{F}_p$ .

For example, if the curve should target the 128-bit security level, due to the **Pholaard-rho attack** (TODO) the parameter  $r$  should be prime number of at least 256 bits.

In order to design the smallest BLS\_6 curve, we therefore have to find a parameter  $x$  such that  $r(x)$ ,  $t(x)$  and  $q(x)$  are the smallest natural numbers that satisfy  $q(x) > 3$  and  $r(x) > 3$ .<sup>1</sup>

We therefore initiate the design process of our BLS6 curve by looking up the 6-th cyclotomic polynomial, which is  $\Phi_6 = x^2 - x + 1$ , and then insert small values for  $x$  into the defining polynomials  $r, t, q$ . We get the following results:

$$\begin{array}{lll} x = 1 & (r(x), t(x), q(x)) & (1, 2, 1) \\ x = 2 & (r(x), t(x), q(x)) & (3, 3, 3) \\ x = 3 & (r(x), t(x), q(x)) & (7, 4, \frac{37}{3}) \\ x = 4 & (r(x), t(x), q(x)) & (13, 5, 43) \end{array}$$

Since  $q(1) = 1$  is not a prime number, the first  $x$  that gives a proper curve is  $x = 2$ . However, such a curve would be defined over a base field of characteristic 3, and we would rather like to avoid that. We therefore find  $x = 4$ , which defines a curve over the prime field of characteristic 43 that has a trace of Frobenius  $t = 5$  and a larger order prime group of size  $r = 13$ .

Since the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{43}$  has 43 elements and 43's binary representation is  $43_2 = 101011$ , which consists of 6 digits, the name of our pen-and-paper curve should be BLS6\_6, since its is common to name a BLS curve by its embedding degree and the bit-length of the modulus in the base field. We call BLS6\_6 the **moon-math-curve**.

Based on 5.34, we know that the Hasse bound implies that BLS6\_6 will contain exactly 39 elements. Since the prime factorization of 39 is  $39 = 3 \cdot 13$ , we have a “large” prime factor group of size 13, as expected, and a small cofactor group of size 3. Fortunately, a subgroup of order 13 is well suited for our purposes, as 13 elements can be easily handled in the associated addition, scalar multiplication and pairing tables in a pen-and-paper style.

We can check that the embedding degree is indeed 6 as expected, since  $k = 6$  is the smallest number  $k$  such that  $r = 13$  divides  $43^k - 1$ .

```
sage: for k in range(1, 42): # Fermat's little theorem
.....:     if (43^k - 1) % 13 == 0:
.....:         break
sage: k
6
```

In order to compute the defining equation  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$  of BLS6-6, we use the complex multiplication method as described in 5.6. The goal is to find  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{43}$  representations that are particularly nice to work with. The authors of XXX showed that the CM-discriminant of every BLS curve is  $D = -3$  and, indeed, the following equation has the four solutions  $(D, v) \in \{(-3, -7), (-3, 7), (-49, -1), (-49, 1)\}$  if  $D$  is required to be negative, as expected:

<sup>1</sup>The smallest BLS curve will also be the most insecure BLS curve. However, since our goal with this curve is ease of pen-and-paper computation rather than security, it fits the purposes of this book.

Pholaard-rho attack

todo

why? Because in this book elliptic curves are only defined for fields of characteristic  $> 3$

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what does this mean?

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$$\begin{aligned}
4p &= t^2 + |D|v^2 && \Rightarrow \\
4 \cdot 43 &= 5^2 + |D|v^2 && \Rightarrow \\
172 &= 25 + |D|v^2 && \Leftrightarrow \\
49 &= |D|v^2
\end{aligned}$$

3660 This means that  $D = -3$  is indeed a proper CM-discriminant, and we can deduce that the  
 3661 parameter  $a$  has to be 0, and that the Hilbert class polynomial is given by  $H_{-3,43}(x) = x$ .

3662 This implies that the  $j$ -invariant of  $BLS6\_6$  is given by  $j(BLS6\_6) = 0$ . We therefore have  
 3663 to look at case XXX in table 5.6 to derive a parameter  $b$ . To decide the proper case for  $j_0 = 0$   
 3664 and  $D = -3$ , we therefore have to choose some arbitrary quadratic non-residue  $c_2$  and cubic  
 3665 non-residue  $c_3$  in  $\mathbb{F}_{43}$ . We choose  $c_2 = 5$  and  $c_3 = 36$ . We check these with Sage:

```

3666 sage: F43 = GF(43)
3667 sage: c2 = F43(5)
3668 ..... try: # quadratic residue
3669 .....      c2.nth_root(2)
3670 ..... except ValueError: # quadratic non-residue
3671 .....      c2
3672 sage: c3 = F43(36)
3673 ..... try:
3674 .....      c3.nth_root(3)
3675 ..... except ValueError:
3676 .....      c3

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3677 Using those numbers we check the six possible cases from 5.6 against the the expected order  
 3678 39 of the curve we want to synthesize:

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```

3679 sage: BLS61 = EllipticCurve(F43, [0, 1])
3680 sage: BLS61.order() == 39
3681 False
3682 sage: BLS62 = EllipticCurve(F43, [0, c2^3])
3683 sage: BLS62.order() == 39
3684 False
3685 sage: BLS63 = EllipticCurve(F43, [0, c3^2])
3686 sage: BLS63.order() == 39
3687 True
3688 sage: BLS64 = EllipticCurve(F43, [0, c3^2*c2^3])
3689 sage: BLS64.order() == 39
3690 False
3691 sage: BLS65 = EllipticCurve(F43, [0, c3^(-2)])
3692 sage: BLS65.order() == 39
3693 False
3694 sage: BLS66 = EllipticCurve(F43, [0, c3^(-2)*c2^3])
3695 sage: BLS66.order() == 39
3696 False
3697 sage: BLS6 = BLS63 # our BLS6 curve in the book


```

3698 As expected, we found an elliptic curve of the correct order 39 over a prime field of size 43,

3699 defined by the following equation:

$$BLS6\_6 := \{(x, y) \mid y^2 = x^3 + 6 \text{ for all } x, y \in \mathbb{F}_{43}\} \quad (5.44)$$

3700 There are other choices for  $b$ , such as  $b = 10$  or  $b = 23$ , but all these curves are isomorphic,  
 3701 and hence represent the same curve in a different way. Since BLS6-6 only contains 39 points, it  
 3702 is possible to give a visual impression of the curve:



3703

3704 As we can see, our curve has some desirable properties: it does not contain self-inverse  
 3705 points, that is, points with  $y = 0$ . It follows that the addition law can be optimized, since the  
 3706 branch for those cases can be eliminated.

3707 Summarizing the previous procedure, we have used the method of Barreto, Lynn and Scott  
 3708 to construct a pairing-friendly elliptic curve of embedding degree 6. However, in order to do  
 3709 elliptic curve cryptography on this curve, note that, since the order of  $BLS6\_6$  is 39, its group  
 3710 of rational points is not a finite cyclic group of prime order. We therefore have to find a suitable  
 3711 subgroup as our main target. Since  $39 = 13 \cdot 3$ , we know that the curve must contain a “large”  
 3712 prime-order group of size 13 and a small cofactor group of order 3.

3713 The following step is to construct this group. One way to do so is to find a generator. We  
 3714 can achieve this by choosing an arbitrary element of the group that is not the point at infinity,  
 3715 and then multiply that point with the cofactor of the group’s order. If the result is not the point  
 3716 at infinity, the result will be a generator. If it is the point at infinity we have to choose a different  
 3717 element.

In order to find a generator for the large order subgroup of size 13, we first notice that the cofactor of 13 is 3, since  $39 = 3 \cdot 13$ . We then need to construct an arbitrary element from  $BLS6\_6$ . To do so in a pen-and-paper style, we can choose some *arbitrary*  $x \in \mathbb{F}_{43}$  and see if there is some solution  $y \in \mathbb{F}_{43}$  that satisfies the defining short Weierstrass equation  $y^2 = x^3 + 6$ . We choose  $x = 9$ , and check that  $y = 2$  is a proper solution:

$$\begin{aligned} y^2 &= x^3 + 6 && \Rightarrow \\ 2^2 &= 9^3 + 6 && \Leftrightarrow \\ 4 &= 4 \end{aligned}$$

3718 This implies that  $P = (9, 2)$  is therefore a point on  $BLS6\_6$ . To see if we can project this  
 3719 point onto a generator of the large order prime group  $BLS6\_6[13]$ , we have to multiply  $P$  with  
 3720 the cofactor, that is, we have to compute  $[3](9, 2)$ . After some computation (**EXERCISE**) we  
 3721 get  $[3](9, 2) = (13, 15)$ . Since this is not the point at infinity, we know that  $(13, 15)$  must be a

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generator of  $BLS6\_6[13]$ . The generator  $g_{BLS6\_6[13]}$ , which we will use in pairing computations in the remainder of this book, is given as follows:

$$g_{BLS6\_6[13]} = (13, 15) \quad (5.45)$$

Since  $g_{BLS6\_6[13]}$  is a generator, we can use it to construct the subgroup  $BLS6\_6[13]$  by repeatedly adding the generator to itself. Using Sage, we get the following:

```

3726 sage: P = BLS6(9, 2)                                609
3727 sage: Q = 3*P                                         610
3728 sage: Q.xy()                                          611
3729 (13, 15)                                             612
3730 sage: BLS6_13 = []                                   613
3731 sage: for x in range(0, 13): # cyclic of order 13     614
3732 .....:     P = x*Q                                   615
3733 .....:     BLS6_13.append(P)                         616

```

Repeatedly adding a generator to itself, as we just did, will generate small groups in logarithmic order with respect to the generator as, explained on page 43 ff. We therefore get the following description of the large prime-order subgroup of  $BLS6\_6$ :

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$$BLS6\_6[13] = \{(13, 15) \rightarrow (33, 34) \rightarrow (38, 15) \rightarrow (35, 28) \rightarrow (26, 34) \rightarrow (27, 34) \rightarrow (27, 9) \rightarrow (26, 9) \rightarrow (35, 15) \rightarrow (38, 28) \rightarrow (33, 9) \rightarrow (13, 28) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}\} \quad (5.46)$$

Having a logarithmic description of this group is tremendously helpful in pen-and-paper computations. To see that, observe that we know from XXX that there is an exponential map from the scalar field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  to  $BLS6\_6[13]$  with respect to our generator, which generates the group in logarithmic order:

$$[\cdot]_{(13, 15)} : \mathbb{F}_{13} \rightarrow BLS6\_6[13] ; x \mapsto [x](13, 15)$$

So, for example, we have  $[1]_{(13, 15)} = (13, 15)$ ,  $[7]_{(13, 15)} = (27, 9)$  and  $[0]_{(13, 15)} = \mathcal{O}$  and so on. The relevant point here is that we can use this representation to do computations in  $BLS6\_6[13]$  efficiently in our head using XXX, as in the following example:

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$$\begin{aligned}
 (27, 34) \oplus (33, 9) &= [6](13, 15) \oplus [11](13, 15) \\
 &= [6 + 11](13, 15) \\
 &= [4](13, 15) \\
 &= (35, 28)
 \end{aligned}$$

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So XXX is really all we need to do computations in  $BLS6\_6[13]$  in this book efficiently. However, out of convenience, the following picture lists the entire addition table of that group, as it

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might be useful in pen-and-paper computations:

$\oplus$	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)
$\mathcal{O}$	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)
(13, 15)	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$
(33, 34)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)
(38, 15)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)
(35, 28)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)
(26, 34)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)
(27, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)
(27, 9)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)
(26, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)
(35, 15)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)
(38, 28)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)
(33, 9)	(33, 9)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)
(13, 28)	(13, 28)	$\mathcal{O}$	(13, 15)	(33, 34)	(38, 15)	(35, 28)	(26, 34)	(27, 34)	(27, 9)	(26, 9)	(35, 15)	(38, 28)	(33, 9)

Now that we have constructed a “large” cyclic prime-order subgroup of *BLS6\_6* suitable for many pen-and-paper computations in elliptic curve cryptography, we have to look at how to do pairings in this context. We know that *BLS6\_6* is a pairing-friendly curve by design, since it has a small embedding degree  $k = 6$ . It is therefore possible to compute Weil pairings efficiently. However, in order to do so, we have to decide the groups  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  as explained in exercise 76.

Since *BLS6\_6* has two non-trivial subgroups, it would be possible to use any of them as the  $n$ -torsion group. However, in cryptography, the only secure choice is to use the large prime-order subgroup, which in our case is *BLS6\_6*[13]. We therefore decide to consider the 13-torsion and define  $G_1[13]$  as the first argument for the Weil pairing function:

$$\mathbb{G}_1[13] = \{(13, 15) \rightarrow (33, 34) \rightarrow (38, 15) \rightarrow (35, 28) \rightarrow (26, 34) \rightarrow (27, 34) \rightarrow (27, 9) \rightarrow (26, 9) \rightarrow (35, 15) \rightarrow (38, 28) \rightarrow (33, 9) \rightarrow (13, 28) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}\}$$

In order to construct the domain for the second argument, we need to construct  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$ , which, according to the general theory, should be defined by those elements  $P$  of the full 13-torsion group *BLS6\_6*[13] that are mapped to  $43 \cdot P$  under the Frobenius endomorphism (equation 5.29).

To compute  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$ , we therefore have to find the full 13-torsion group first. To do so, we use the technique from XXX, which tells us that the full 13-torsion can be found in the curve extension over the extension field  $\mathbb{F}_{43^6}$ , since the embedding degree of *BLS6\_6* is 6:

$$BLS6\_6 := \{(x, y) \mid y^2 = x^3 + 6 \text{ for all } x, y \in \mathbb{F}_{43^6}\} \quad (5.47)$$

Thus, we have to construct  $\mathbb{F}_{43^6}$ , a field that contains 6321363049 elements. In order to do so, we use the procedure of XXX and start by choosing a non-reducible polynomial of degree 6 from the ring of polynomials  $\mathbb{F}_{43}[t]$ . We choose  $p(t) = t^6 + 6$ . Using Sage, we get the following:

```
sage: F43 = GF(43)
sage: F43t.<t> = F43[]
sage: p = F43t(t^6+6)
sage: p.is_irreducible()
```

3762 **True** 621  
 3763 **sage:** `F43_6.<v> = GF(43^6, name='v', modulus=p)` 622

3764 Recall from XXX that elements  $x \in \mathbb{F}_{43^6}$  can be seen as polynomials  $a_0 + a_1v + a_2v^2 + \dots + a_5v^5$  with the usual addition of polynomials and multiplication modulo  $t^6 + 6$ . add reference

3766 In order to compute  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$ , we first have to extend  $BLS6\_6$  to  $\mathbb{F}_{43^6}$ , that is, we keep the  
 3767 defining equation, but expand the domain from  $\mathbb{F}_{43}$  to  $\mathbb{F}_{43^6}$ . After that, we have to find at least  
 3768 one element  $P$  from that curve that is not the point at infinity, is in the full 13-torsion and  
 3769 satisfies the identity  $\pi(P) = [43]P$ . We can then use this element as our generator of  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$  and  
 3770 construct all other elements by repeatedly adding the generator to itself.

3771 Since  $BLS6(\mathbb{F}_{43^6})$  contains 6321251664 elements, it's not a good strategy to simply loop  
 3772 through all elements. Fortunately, Sage has a way to loop through elements from the torsion  
 3773 group directly:

```
3774 sage: BLS6 = EllipticCurve (F43_6, [0 , 6]) # curve extension 623
3775 sage: INF = BLS6(0) # point at infinity 624
3776 sage: for P in INF.division_points(13): # full 13-torsion 625
3777     ....: # PI(P) == [q]P 626
3778     ....:     if P.order() == 13: # exclude point at infinity 627
3779     ....:         PiP = BLS6([a.frobenius() for a in P]) 628
3780     ....:         qP = 43*P 629
3781     ....:         if PiP == qP: 630
3782     ....:             break 631
3783 sage: P.xy() 632
3784 (7*v^2, 16*v^3) 633
```

3785 We found an element from the full 13-torsion that is in the Eigenspace of the Eigenvalue 43,  
 3786 which implies that it is an element of  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$ . As  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$  is cyclic of prime order, this element  
 3787 must be a generator:

$$g_{\mathbb{G}_2[13]} = (7v^2, 16v^3) \quad (5.48)$$

3788 We can use this generator to compute  $\mathbb{G}_2$  in logarithmic order with respect to  $g_{\mathbb{G}_2[13]}$ . Using  
 3789 Sage we get the following:

```
3790 sage: Q = BLS6(7*v^2, 16*v^3) 634
3791 sage: BLS6_13_2 = [] 635
3792 sage: for x in range(0, 13): 636
3793     ....:     P = x*Q 637
3794     ....:     BLS6_13_2.append(P) 638
```

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{G}_2 = \{ & (7v^2, 16v^3) \rightarrow (10v^2, 28v^3) \rightarrow (42v^2, 16v^3) \rightarrow (37v^2, 27v^3) \rightarrow \\ & (16v^2, 28v^3) \rightarrow (17v^2, 28v^3) \rightarrow (17v^2, 15v^3) \rightarrow (16v^2, 15v^3) \rightarrow \\ & (37v^2, 16v^3) \rightarrow (42v^2, 27v^3) \rightarrow (10v^2, 15v^3) \rightarrow (7v^2, 27v^3) \rightarrow \mathcal{O} \} \end{aligned} \quad (5.49)$$

Again, having a logarithmic description of  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$  is tremendously helpful in pen-and-paper computations, as it reduces complicated computation in the extended curves to modular 13

arithmetics, as in the following example:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (17v^2, 28v^3) \oplus (10v^2, 15v^2) &= [6](7v^2, 16v^3) \oplus [11](7v^2, 16v^3) \\
 &= [6 + 11](7v^2, 16v^3) \\
 &= [4](7v^2, 16v^3) \\
 &= (37v^2, 27v^3)
 \end{aligned}$$

So XXX is really all we need to do computations in  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$  in this book efficiently.

To summarize the previous steps, we have found two subgroups,  $\mathbb{G}_1[13]$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$  suitable to do Weil pairings on *BLS6\_6* as explained in 5.33. Using the logarithmic order XXX of  $\mathbb{G}_1[13]$ , the logarithmic order XXX of  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$  and the bilinearity in 5.50, we can do Weil pairings on *BLS6\_6* in a pen-and-paper style:

$$e([k_1]g_{BLS6\_6[13]}, [k_2]g_{\mathbb{G}_2[13]}) = e(g_{BLS6\_6[13]}, g_{\mathbb{G}_2[13]})^{k_1 \cdot k_2} \quad (5.50)$$

Observe that the Weil pairing between our two generators is given by the following identity:

$$e(g_{BLS6\_6[13]}, g_{\mathbb{G}_2[13]}) = 5v^5 + 16v^4 + 16v^3 + 15v^2 + 3v + 41 \quad (5.51)$$

**sage:** `g1 = BLS6([13, 15])`

**sage:** `g2 = BLS6([7*v^2, 16*v^3])`

**sage:** `g1.weil_pairing(g2, 13)`

`5*v^5 + 16*v^4 + 16*v^3 + 15*v^2 + 3*v + 41`

**Hashing to pairing groups** We give various constructions to hash into  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$ .

We start with hashing to the scalar field... **TO APPEAR**

None of these techniques work for hashing into  $\mathbb{G}_2$ . We therefore implement Pederson's Hash for BLS6.

We start with  $\mathbb{G}_1$ . Our goal is to define an 12-bit bounded hash function:

$$H_1 : \{0, 1\}^{12} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$$

Since  $12 = 3 \cdot 4$  we “randomly” select 4 uniformly distributed generators  $\{(38, 15), (35, 28), (27, 34), (38, 28)\}$  from  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and use the pseudo-random function from XXX. Therefore, we have to choose a set of 4 randomly generated invertible elements from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  for every generator. We choose the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (38, 15) &: \{2, 7, 5, 9\} \\
 (35, 28) &: \{11, 4, 7, 7\} \\
 (27, 34) &: \{5, 3, 7, 12\} \\
 (38, 28) &: \{6, 5, 1, 8\}
 \end{aligned}$$

Our hash function is then computed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 H_1(x_{11}, x_1, \dots, x_0) &= [2 \cdot 7^{x_{11}} \cdot 5^{x_{10}} \cdot 9^{x_9}](38, 15) + [11 \cdot 4^{x_8} \cdot 7^{x_7} \cdot 7^{x_6}](35, 28) + \\
 &\quad [5 \cdot 3^{x_5} \cdot 7^{x_4} \cdot 12^{x_3}](27, 34) + [6 \cdot 5^{x_2} \cdot 1^{x_1} \cdot 8^{x_0}](38, 28)
 \end{aligned}$$

3810 Note that  $a^x = 1$  when  $x = 0$ . Hence, those terms can be omitted in the computation. In  
 3811 particular, the hash of the 12-bit zero string is given as follows:

correct  
computa-  
tions

*WRONG – ORDERING – REDO*

$$H_1(0) = [2](38, 15) + [11](35, 28) + [5](27, 34) + [6](38, 28) = \\ (27, 34) + (26, 34) + (35, 28) + (26, 9) = (33, 9) + (13, 28) = (38, 28)$$

The hash of 011010101100 is given as follows:

fill in  
missing  
parts

$$H_1(011010101100) = \text{WRONG – ORDERING – REDO} \\ [2 \cdot 7^0 \cdot 5^1 \cdot 9^1](38, 15) + [11 \cdot 4^0 \cdot 7^1 \cdot 7^0](35, 28) + [5 \cdot 3^1 \cdot 7^0 \cdot 12^1](27, 34) + [6 \cdot 5^1 \cdot 1^0 \cdot 8^0](38, 28) = \\ [2 \cdot 5 \cdot 9](38, 15) + [11 \cdot 7](35, 28) + [5 \cdot 3 \cdot 12](27, 34) + [6 \cdot 5](38, 28) = \\ [12](38, 15) + [12](35, 28) + [11](27, 34) + [4](38, 28) =$$

*TOAPPEAR*

We can use the same technique to define a 12-bit bounded hash function in  $\mathbb{G}_2$ :

$$H_2 : \{0, 1\}^{12} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$$

Again, we “randomly” select 4 uniformly distributed generators  $\{(7v^2, 16v^3), (42v^2, 16v^3), (17v^2, 15v^3), (10v^2, 15v^3)\}$  from  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , and use the pseudo-random function from XXX. Therefore, we have to choose a set of 4 randomly generated invertible elements from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  for every generator:

add refer-  
ence

$$\begin{aligned} (7v^2, 16v^3) & : \{8, 4, 5, 7\} \\ (42v^2, 16v^3) & : \{12, 1, 3, 8\} \\ (17v^2, 15v^3) & : \{2, 3, 9, 11\} \\ (10v^2, 15v^3) & : \{3, 6, 9, 10\} \end{aligned}$$

Our hash function is then computed like this:

$$H_1(x_{11}, x_{10}, \dots, x_0) = [8 \cdot 4^{x_{11}} \cdot 5^{x_{10}} \cdot 7^{x_9}](7v^2, 16v^3) + [12 \cdot 1^{x_8} \cdot 3^{x_7} \cdot 8^{x_6}](42v^2, 16v^3) + \\ [2 \cdot 3^{x_5} \cdot 9^{x_4} \cdot 11^{x_3}](17v^2, 15v^3) + [3 \cdot 6^{x_2} \cdot 9^{x_1} \cdot 10^{x_0}](10v^2, 15v^3)$$

We extend this to a hash function that maps unbounded bitstrings to  $\mathbb{G}_2$  by precomposing with an actual hash function like MD5, and feed the first 12 bits of its outcome into our previously defined hash function, with  $\text{TinyMD5}_{\mathbb{G}_2}(s) = H_2(\text{MD5}(s)_0, \dots, \text{MD5}(s)_{11})$ :

$$\text{TinyMD5}_{\mathbb{G}_2} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$$

For example, since  $\text{MD5}("") = 0xd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e$ , and the binary representation of the hexadecimal number 0x27e is 001001111110, we compute  $\text{TinyMD5}_{\mathbb{G}_2}$  of the empty string as follows:

$$\text{TinyMD5}_{\mathbb{G}_2}("") = H_2(\text{MD5}(s)_{11}, \dots, \text{MD5}(s)_0) = H_2(001001111110) =$$

3812

check  
equation



# Chapter 6

## Statements

As we have seen in the informal introduction XXX, a SNARK is a succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge, where the knowledge-proof attests to the correctness of statements like “The prover knows the prime factorization of a given number” or “The prover knows the preimage to a given SHA2 digest value” and similar things. However, human-readable statements like these are imprecise and not very useful from a formal perspective.

In this chapter we therefore look more closely at ways to formalize statements in mathematically rigorous ways, useful for SNARK development. We start by introducing formal languages as a way to define statements properly (section 6.1). We will then look at algebraic circuits and Rank-1 Constraint Systems [R1CS] as two particularly useful ways to define statements in certain formal languages (section 6.2).

Proper statement design should be of high priority in the development of SNARKs, since unintended true statements can lead to potentially severe and almost undetectable security vulnerabilities in the applications of SNARKs.

### 6.1 Formal Languages

Formal languages provide the theoretical background in which statements can be formulated in a logically rigorous way and where proving the correctness of any given statement can be realized by computing words in that language.

One might argue that the understanding of formal languages is not very important in SNARK development and associated statement design, but terms from that field of research are standard jargon in many papers on zero-knowledge proofs. We therefore believe that at least some introduction to formal languages and how they fit into the picture of SNARK development is beneficial, mostly to give developers a better intuition about where all this is located in the bigger picture of the logic landscape. In addition, formal languages give a better understanding of what a formal proof for a statement actually is.

Roughly speaking, a formal language (or just language for short) is nothing but a set of words and words, in turn, are strings of letters taken from some alphabet and formed according to some defining rules of the language.

To be more precise, let  $\Sigma$  be any set and  $\Sigma^*$  the set of all **strings** of finite length  $\langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle$  of elements  $x_j$  from  $\Sigma$  including the empty string  $\langle \rangle \in \Sigma^*$ . Then, a **language**  $L$ , in its most general definition, is nothing but a subset of the set of all finite strings  $\Sigma^*$ . In this context, the set  $\Sigma$  is called the **alphabet** of the language  $L$ , elements from  $\Sigma$  are called letters and elements from  $L$  are called **words**. If there are rules that specify which strings from  $\Sigma^*$  belong to the language and which don't, those rules are called the **grammar** of the language. If  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  are

Chapter  
1?



two formal languages over the same alphabet, we call  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  **equivalent** if they consist of the same set of words.

While the term language might suggest a deeper relation to the well known **natural languages** like English, formal languages and natural languages differ in many ways. The following two examples will provide some intuition about formal languages and their differences to natural languages:

*Example 106* (The English language). To give a better understanding of formal languages consider the natural language English. The English alphabet is given by the following set

$$\Sigma_{\text{English}} = \{A, a, B, b, C, c, D, d, E, e, F, f, G, g, H, h, I, i, J, j, K, k, L, l, M, m, N, n, O, o, P, p, Q, q, R, r, S, s, T, t, U, u, V, v, W, w, X, x, Y, y, Z, z\}$$

The natural language English does not define words by abstract rules, but by something we might call historical human convention as a word in the language English is distinguished from any other string from the English alphabet by human convention not by formal rules. In that regard strings like “tea” or “eat” are words in English, but “aet” and “tae” are not, because people agree on that. So while the set of all English words is a formal language  $L_{\text{English}} \subset \Sigma_{\text{English}}$  there is no formal grammar that defines what a word in English is and what not.

It should also be recognized that in such a simple definition, the “grammar” of the natural language English is different from the grammar of the formal language English. The grammar of natural English defines how sentences are generated from words, while sentences have no meaning in our simple formal language English.

In order to express natural English sentences in a formal English language, one has to extend the alphabet by a space character together with the set of all punctuations and then include the grammar of the natural language English into the formal language English. It should be noted however that in such a formal language, sentences like “I drink tea, but I don’t eat meat.” from the natural language English are actually words in the formal language English.

*Example 107* (Alternating Binary strings). To consider a very basic formal language with an almost trivial grammar, consider the set of the two letters 0 and 1 as our alphabet  $\Sigma$ :

$$\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$$

Also imply the grammar that a proper word must consist of alternating binary letters of arbitrary length including the empty string. The associated language  $L_{\text{alt}}$  is the set of all finite binary strings, where a 1 must follow a 0 and vice versa. So, for example,  $\langle 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1 \rangle \in L_{\text{alt}}$  is a word in this languages as is  $\langle 0 \rangle \in L_{\text{alt}}$  or the empty word  $\langle \rangle \in L_{\text{alt}}$ . However, the binary string  $\langle 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1 \rangle \in \{0, 1\}^*$  is not a proper word, as it violates the grammar of  $L_{\text{alt}}$ , since the last 3 letters are all 1. Furthermore, the string  $\langle 0, A, 0, A, 0, A, 0 \rangle$  is not a proper word, as not all its letters are from the alphabet  $\Sigma$ .

**Decision Functions** Our previous definition of formal languages is very general and many subclasses of languages are known in the literature. However, in the context of SNARK development, languages are commonly defined as **decision problems** where a so-called **deciding relation**  $R \subset \Sigma^*$  decides whether a given string  $x \in \Sigma^*$  is a word in the language or not. If  $x \in R$  then  $x$  is a word in the associated language  $L_R$  and if  $x \notin R$  then not. The relation  $R$  therefore summarizes the grammar of language  $L_R$ .

Unfortunately, in some literature on proof systems,  $x \in R$  is often written as  $R(x)$ , which is misleading since in general  $R$  is not a function but a relation in  $\Sigma^*$ . For the sake of this book, we

therefore adopt a different point of view and work with what we might call a **decision function** instead:

$$R : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \{true, false\} \quad (6.1)$$

Decision functions decide if a string  $x \in \Sigma^*$  is an element of a language or not. In case a decision function is given, the associated language itself can be written as the set of all strings that are decided by  $R$ , i.e as the set:

$$L_R := \{x \in \Sigma^* \mid R(x) = true\} \quad (6.2)$$

In the context of formal languages and decision problems, a **statement**  $S$  is the claim that language  $L$  contains a word  $x$ , i.e a statement claims that there exists some  $x \in L$ . A constructive **proof** for statement  $S$  is given by some string  $P \in \Sigma^*$  and a proof is **verified** by checking  $R(P) = true$ . In this case,  $P$  is called an **instance** of the statement  $S$ .

*Example 108* (Alternating Binary strings). To consider a very basic formal language with a decision function, consider the language  $L_{alt}$  from example 107. Attempting to write the grammar of this language in a more formal way, we can define the following decision function:

$$R : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{true, false\} ; \langle x_0, x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle \mapsto \begin{cases} true & x_{j-1} \neq x_j \text{ for all } 1 \leq j \leq n \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

We can use this function to decide if given binary strings are words in  $L_{alt}$  or not. Some examples are given below:

$$R(\langle 1, 0, 1 \rangle) = true, \quad R(\langle 0 \rangle) = true, \quad R(\langle \rangle) = true, \quad R(\langle 1, 1 \rangle) = false$$

Given language  $L_{alt}$ , it makes sense to claim the following statement: “There exists an alternating string.” One way to prove this statement constructively is by providing an actual instance, that is, providing an example of an alternating string like  $x = \langle 1, 0, 1 \rangle$ . Constructing string  $\langle 1, 0, 1 \rangle$  therefore proves the statement “There exists an alternating string.”, because one can verify that  $R(\langle 1, 0, 1 \rangle) = true$ .

*Example 109* (Programming Language). Programming languages are a very important class of formal languages. For these languages, the alphabet is usually (a subset) of the ASCII table, and the grammar is defined by the rules of the programming language’s compiler. Words, then, are nothing but properly written computer programs that the compiler accepts. The compiler can therefore be interpreted as the decision function.

To give an unusual example strange enough to highlight the point, consider the programming language Malbolge as defined in XXX. This language was specifically designed to be almost impossible to use and writing programs in this language is a difficult task. An interesting claim is therefore the statement: “There exists a computer program in Malbolge”. As it turned out, proving this statement constructively, that is, providing an example instance of such a program, is not an easy task, as it took two years after the introduction of Malbolge to write a program that its compiler accepts. So, for two years, no one was able to prove the statement constructively.

To look at the high-level description of Malbolge more formally, we write  $L_{Malbolge}$  for the language that uses the ASCII table as its alphabet and its words are strings of ASCII letters that the Malbolge compiler accepts. Proving the statement “There exists a computer program in Malbolge” is then equivalent to the task of finding some word  $x \in L_{Malbolge}$ . The string

$(=<'9876Z4321UT.-Q+*)M' \& \% \$ H''! \} | B z y ? = | \{ z \} K w Z Y 44 E q 0 / \{ m l k **$

$h K s _ d G 5 [ m _ B A \{ ? - Y ; ; V b ' r R 5 4 3 1 M \} / . z H G w E D C B A @ 9 8 \backslash 6 5 4 3 W 1 0 / . R , + O <$

add reference

is an example of such a proof, as it is excepted by the Malbolge compiler and is compiled to an executable binary that displays “Hello, World.” (See XXX). In this example, the Malbolge compiler therefore serves as the verification process.

add reference

*Example 110* (The Empty Language). To see that not every language has even a single word, consider the alphabet  $\Sigma = \mathbb{Z}_6$ , where  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  is the ring of modular 6 arithmetic as derived in example 9. Distinguishing the set  $\mathbb{Z}_6^*$  of all elements in modular 6 arithmetic that have multiplicative inverses from the set  $(\mathbb{Z}_6)^*$  of all finite strings over the alphabet  $\mathbb{Z}_6$ , we define the following decision function:

$$R_0 : (\mathbb{Z}_6)^* \rightarrow \{true, false\} ; \langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle \mapsto \begin{cases} true & n = 1 \text{ and } x \cdot x = 2 \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

We write  $L_0$  for the associated language. As we can see from the multiplication table of  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  in example 9, the ring  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  does not contain any element  $x$  such that  $x \cdot x = 2$ , which implies  $R_0(\langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle) = false$  for all strings  $\langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle \in \Sigma^*$ . The language therefore does not contain any words. Proving the statement “There exists a word in  $L_0$ ” constructively by providing an instance is therefore impossible. The verification will never check any string.

*Example 111* (3-Factorization). We will use the following simple example repeatedly throughout this book. The task is to develop a SNARK that proves knowledge of three factors of an element from the finite field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . There is nothing particularly useful about this example from an application point of view, however, in a sense, it is the most simple example that gives rise to a non trivial SNARK in some of the most common zero-knowledge proof systems.

Formalizing the high-level description, we use  $\Sigma := \mathbb{F}_{13}$  as the underlying alphabet of this problem and define the language  $L_{3, fac}$  to consists of those strings of field elements from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  that contain exactly 4 letters  $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4$  which satisfy the equation  $x_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot x_3 = x_4$ .

So, for example, the string  $\langle 2, 12, 4, 5 \rangle$  is a word in  $L_{3, fac}$ , while neither  $\langle 2, 12, 11 \rangle$ , nor  $\langle 2, 12, 4, 7 \rangle$  nor  $\langle 2, 12, 7, UPS \rangle$  are words in  $L_{3, fac}$  as they don’t satisfy the grammar or are not defined over the alphabet  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ .

Distinguishing the set  $\mathbb{F}_{13}^*$  of all elements in the multiplicative group of  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  from the set  $(\mathbb{F}_{13})^*$  of all finite strings over the alphabet  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , we can describe the language  $L_{3, fac}$  more formally by introducing a decision function:

$$R_{3, fac} : (\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \rightarrow \{true, false\} ; \langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle \mapsto \begin{cases} true & n = 4 \text{ and } x_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot x_3 = x_4 \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

Having defined the language  $L_{3, fac}$ , it then makes sense to claim the statement “There is a word in  $L_{3, fac}$ ”. The way  $L_{3, fac}$  is designed, this statement is equivalent to the statement “There are four elements  $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4$  from the finite field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  such that the equation  $x_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot x_3 = x_4$  holds.”

Proving the correctness of this statement constructively means to actually find some concrete field elements like  $x_1 = 2, x_2 = 12, x_3 = 4$  and  $x_4 = 5$  that satisfy the decision function  $R_{3, fac}$ . The string  $\langle 2, 12, 4, 5 \rangle$  is therefore a constructive proof for the statement that  $L_{3, fac}$  contains words and the computation  $R_{3, fac}(\langle 2, 12, 4, 5 \rangle) = true$  is a verification of that proof. In contrast, the string  $\langle 2, 12, 4, 7 \rangle$  is not a proof of the statement, since the check  $R_{3, fac}(\langle 2, 12, 4, 7 \rangle) = false$  does not verify the proof.

*Example 112* (Tiny-jubjub Membership). In one of our main examples, we derive a SNARK that proves a pair  $(x, y)$  of field elements from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  to be a point on the tiny-jubjub curve in its twisted Edwards form as derived in example 5.21.

jubjub

In the first step, we define a language such that points on the tiny-jubjub curve are in 1:1 correspondence with words in that language.

Since the tiny-jubjub curve is an elliptic curve over the field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , we choose the alphabet  $\Sigma = \mathbb{F}_{13}$ . In this case, the set  $(\mathbb{F}_{13})^*$  consists of all finite strings of field elements from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . To define the grammar, recall from 5.21 that a point on the tiny-jubjub curve is a pair  $(x, y)$  of field elements such that  $3 \cdot x^2 + y^2 = 1 + 8 \cdot x^2 \cdot y^2$ . We can use this equation to derive the following decision function:

$$R_{\text{tiny.jj}} : (\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \rightarrow \{true, false\} ; \langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle \mapsto \begin{cases} true & n = 2 \text{ and } 3 \cdot x_1^2 + x_2^2 = 1 + 8 \cdot x_1^2 \cdot x_2^2 \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

The associated language  $L_{\text{tiny.jj}}$  is then given as the set of all strings from  $(\mathbb{F}_{13})^*$  that are mapped onto *true* by  $R_{\text{tiny.jj}}$ . We get

$$L_{\text{tiny.jj}} = \{ \langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle \in (\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \mid R_{\text{tiny.jj}}(\langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle) = true \}$$

We can claim the statement “There is a word in  $L_{\text{tiny.jj}}$ ” and because  $L_{\text{tiny.jj}}$  is defined by  $R_{\text{tiny.jj}}$ , this statement is equivalent to the claim “The tiny-jubjub curve in its twisted Edwards form has a curve point.”

A constructive proof for this statement is a string  $\langle x, y \rangle$  of field elements from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  that satisfies the twisted Edwards equation. Example 5.21 therefore implies that the string  $\langle 11, 6 \rangle$  is a constructive proof and the computation  $R_{\text{tiny.jj}}(\langle 11, 6 \rangle) = true$  is a proof verification. In contrast, the string  $\langle 1, 1 \rangle$  is not a proof of the statement, since the computation  $R_{\text{tiny.jj}}(\langle 1, 1 \rangle) = false$  does not verify the proof.

**Exercise 82.** Define a decision function such that the associated language  $L_{\text{Exercise}_1}$  consist precisely of all solutions to the equation  $5x + 4 = 28 + 2x$  over  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . Provide a constructive proof for the claim: “There exist a word in  $L_{\text{Exercise}_1}$  and verify the proof.”

**Exercise 83.** Consider modular 6 arithmetic  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  from example 9, the alphabet  $\Sigma = \mathbb{Z}_6$  and the decision function

$$R_{\text{example}_9} : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \{true, false\} ; \langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle \mapsto \begin{cases} true & n = 1 \text{ and } 3 \cdot x_1 + 3 = 0 \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

Compute all words in the associated language  $L_{\text{example}_9}$ , provide a constructive proof for the statement “There exist a word in  $L_{\text{example}_9}$ ” and verify the proof.

**Instance and Witness** As we have seen in the previous paragraph, statements provide membership claims in formal languages, and instances serve as constructive proofs for those claims. However, in the context of **zero-knowledge** proof systems, our notion of constructive proofs is refined in such a way that it is possible to hide parts of the proof instance and still be able to prove the statement. In this context, it is therefore necessary to split a proof into an unhidden, public part called the **instance** and a hidden, private part called a **witness**.

To account for this separation of a proof instance into an instance and a witness part, our previous definition of formal languages needs a refinement. Instead of a single alphabet, the refined definition considers two alphabets  $\Sigma_I$  and  $\Sigma_W$ , and a decision function defined as follows:

$$R : \Sigma_I^* \times \Sigma_W^* \rightarrow \{true, false\} ; (i; w) \mapsto R(i; w) \quad (6.3)$$

Words are therefore strings  $(i; w) \in \Sigma_I^* \times \Sigma_W^*$  with  $R(i; w) = true$ . The refined definition differentiates between inputs  $i \in \Sigma_I$  and inputs  $w \in \Sigma_W$ . The input  $i$  is called an **instance** and the input  $w$  is called a **witness** of  $R$ .

If a decision function is given, the associated language is defined as the set of all strings from the underlying alphabets that are verified by the decision function:

$$L_R := \{(i; w) \in \Sigma_I^* \times \Sigma_W^* \mid R(i; w) = \text{true}\} \quad (6.4)$$

In this refined context, a **statement**  $S$  is a claim that, given an instance  $i \in \Sigma_I^*$ , there is a witness  $w \in \Sigma_W^*$  such that language  $L$  contains a word  $(i; w)$ . A constructive **proof** for statement  $S$  is given by some string  $P = (i; w) \in \Sigma_I^* \times \Sigma_W^*$  and a proof is **verified** by  $R(P) = \text{true}$ .

At this point, it is important to note that, while constructive proofs in languages that distinguish between instance and witness as in don't look very different from constructive proofs in languages from 6.1, we will see in 8 that given some instance, there are proof systems able to prove the statement (at least with high probability) without revealing anything about the witness. In this sense the witness is often called the **private input** and the instance is called the **public input**.

It is worth understanding the difference between statements as defined in 6.1 and the refined notion of statements from this paragraph. While statements in the sense of the previous paragraph can be seen as membership claims, statements in the refined definition can be seen as knowledge-claims, where a prover claims knowledge of a witness for a given instance. For a more detailed discussion on this topic see [XXX sec 1.4]

*Example 113 (SHA256 – Knowledge of Preimage).* One of the most common examples in the context of zero-knowledge proof systems is the **knowledge-of-a-preimage proof** for some cryptographic hash function like *SHA256*, where a publicly known *SHA256* digest value is given, and the task is to prove knowledge of a preimage for that digest under the *SHA256* function, without revealing that preimage.

To understand this problem in detail, we have to introduce a language able to describe the knowledge-of-preimage problem in such a way that the claim “Given digest  $i$ , there is a preimage  $w$  such that  $SHA256(w) = i$ ” becomes a statement in that language. Since *SHA256* is a function

$$SHA256 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$$

that maps binary strings of arbitrary length onto binary strings of length 256 and we want to prove knowledge of preimages, we have to consider binary strings of size 256 as instances and binary strings of arbitrary length as witnesses.

An appropriate alphabet  $\Sigma_I$  for the set of all instances and an appropriate alphabet  $\Sigma_W$  for the set of all witnesses is therefore given by the set  $\{0, 1\}$  of the two binary letters and a proper decision function is given by:

$$R_{SHA256} : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\};$$

$$(i; w) \mapsto \begin{cases} \text{true} & |i| = 256, i = SHA256(w) \\ \text{false} & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

We write  $L_{SHA256}$  for the associated language and note that it consists of words, which are strings  $(i; w)$  such that the instance  $i$  is the *SHA256* image of the witness  $w$ .

Given some instance  $i \in \{0, 1\}^{256}$ , a statement in  $L_{SHA256}$  is the claim “Given digest  $i$ , there is a preimage  $w$  such that  $SHA256(w) = i$ ”, which is exactly what the knowledge-of-preimage problem is about. A constructive proof for this statement is therefore given by a preimage  $w$  to the digest  $i$  and proof verification is achieved by verifying that  $SHA256(w) = i$ .

*Example 114 (3-factorization).* To give another intuition about the implication of refined languages, consider  $L_{3.fac}$  from example 111 again. As we have seen, a constructive proof in

add reference

4000  $L_{3, \text{fac}}$  is given by 4 field elements  $x_1, x_2, x_3$  and  $x_4$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  such that the product in modular  
4001 13 arithmetic of the first three elements is equal to the 4'th element.

4002 Splitting words from  $L_{3, \text{fac}}$  into instance and witness parts, we can reformulate the problem  
4003 and introduce different levels of knowledge-claims into the problem. For example, we could  
4004 reformulate the membership statement of  $L_{3, \text{fac}}$  into a statement where all factors  $x_1, x_2, x_3$  of  
4005  $x_4$  are witnesses and only the product  $x_4$  is the instance. A statement for this reformulation is  
4006 then expressed by the claim: "Given an instance field element  $x_4$ , there are three witness factors  
4007 of  $x_4$ ". Assuming some instance  $x_4$ , a constructive proof for the associated knowledge claim is  
4008 then provided by any string  $(x_1, x_2, x_3)$  such that  $x_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot x_3 = x_4$ .

We can formalize this new language, which we might call  $L_{3, \text{fac\_zk}}$ , by defining the following decision function:

$$R_{3, \text{fac\_zk}} : (\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \times (\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \rightarrow \{true, false\};$$

$$(< i_1, \dots, i_n >; < w_1, \dots, w_m >) \mapsto \begin{cases} true & n = 1, m = 3, i_1 = w_1 \cdot w_2 \cdot w_3 \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

4009 The associated language  $L_{3, \text{fac\_zk}}$  is defined by all strings from  $(\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \times (\mathbb{F}_{13})^*$  that are mapped  
4010 onto *true* under the decision function  $R_{3, \text{fac\_zk}}$ .

4011 Considering the distinction we made between the instance and the witness part in  $L_{3, \text{fac\_zk}}$ ,  
4012 one might ask why we chose the factors  $x_1, x_2$  and  $x_3$  to be the witness and the product  $x_4$  to  
4013 be the instance and why we didn't choose another combination? This was an arbitrary choice  
4014 in the example. Every other combination of instance and witness would be equally valid. For  
4015 example, it would be possible to declare all variables as witness or to declare all variables as  
4016 instance. Actual choices are determined by the application only.

4017 *Example 115 (The Tiny-Jubjub Curve).* Consider the language  $L_{\text{tiny}, \text{jj}}$  from example 112. As  
4018 we have seen, a constructive proof in  $L_{\text{tiny}, \text{jj}}$  is given by a pair  $(x_1, x_2)$  of field elements from  
4019  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  such that the pair is a point of the tiny-jubjub curve in its Edwards representation.

4020 We look at a reasonable splitting of words from  $L_{\text{tiny}, \text{jj}}$  into instance and witness parts. The  
4021 two obvious choices are to either choose both coordinates  $x_1$  as  $x_2$  as instance inputs, or to  
4022 choose both coordinates  $x_1$  as  $x_2$  as witness inputs.

In case both coordinates are instance, we define the grammar of the associated language by introducing the following decision function:

$$R_{\text{tiny}, \text{jj}, 1} : (\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \times (\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \rightarrow \{true, false\};$$

$$(< I_1, \dots, I_n >; < W_1, \dots, W_m >) \mapsto \begin{cases} true & n = 2, m = 0 \text{ and } 3 \cdot I_1^2 + I_2^2 = 1 + 8 \cdot I_1^2 \cdot I_2^2 \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

4023 The language  $L_{\text{tiny}, \text{jj}, 1}$  is defined as the set of all strings from  $(\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \times (\mathbb{F}_{13})^*$  that are mapped  
4024 onto *true* by  $R_{\text{tiny}, \text{jj}, 1}$ .

In case both coordinates are witness inputs, we define the grammar of the associated refined language by introducing the following decision function:

$$R_{\text{tiny}, \text{jj\_zk}} : (\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \times (\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \rightarrow \{true, false\};$$

$$(< I_1, \dots, I_n >; < W_1, \dots, W_m >) \mapsto \begin{cases} true & n = 0, m = m \text{ and } 3 \cdot W_1^2 + W_2^2 = 1 + 8 \cdot W_1^2 \cdot W_2^2 \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

4025 The language  $L_{\text{tiny}, \text{jj\_zk}}$  is defined as the set of all strings from  $(\mathbb{F}_{13})^* \times (\mathbb{F}_{13})^*$  that are mapped  
4026 onto *true* by  $R_{\text{tiny}, \text{jj\_zk}}$ .

*Exercise 84.* Consider the modular 6 arithmetic  $\mathbb{Z}_6$  from example 9 as alphabets  $\Sigma_I$  and  $\Sigma_W$  and the following decision function

$$R_{linear} : \Sigma^* \times \Sigma^* \rightarrow \{true, false\};$$

$$(i; w) \mapsto \begin{cases} true & |i| = 3 \text{ and } |w| = 1 \text{ and } i_1 \cdot w_1 + i_2 = i_3 \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

Which of the following instances  $(i_1, i_2, i_3)$  has a proof of knowledge in  $L_{linear}$ ?

$$(3, 3, 0), \quad (2, 1, 0), \quad (4, 4, 2)$$

4027 *Exercise 85* (Edwards Addition on Tiny-Jubjub). Consider the tiny-jubjub curve together with  
 4028 its twisted Edwards addition law from example 69. Define an instance alphabet  $\Sigma_I$ , a witness  
 4029 alphabet  $\Sigma_W$  and a decision function  $R_{add}$  with associated language  $L_{add}$  such that a string  
 4030  $(i; w) \in \Sigma_I^* \times \Sigma_W^*$  is a word in  $L_{add}$  if and only if  $i$  is a pair of curve points on the tiny-jubjub  
 4031 curve in Edwards form and  $w$  is the sum of those curve points.

4032 Choose some instance  $i \in \Sigma_I^*$ , provide a constructive proof for the statement “There is a  
 4033 witness  $w \in \Sigma_W^*$  such that  $(i; w)$  is a word in  $L_{add}$ ” and verify that proof. Then find some  
 4034 instance  $i \in \Sigma_I^*$  such that  $i$  has no knowledge proof in  $L_{add}$ .

4035 **Modularity** From a developers perspective, it is often useful to construct complex statements  
 4036 and their representing languages from simple ones. In the context of zero-knowledge proof  
 4037 systems, those simple building blocks are often called **gadgets**, and gadget libraries usually  
 4038 contain representations of atomic types like booleans, integers, various hash functions, elliptic  
 4039 curve cryptography and many more (See chapter 7 for that). In order to synthesize statements,  
 4040 developers then combine predefined gadgets into complex logic. We call the ability to combine  
 4041 statements into more complex statements **modularity**.

4042 To understand the concept of modularity on the level of formal languages defined by deci-  
 4043 sion functions, we need to look at the **intersection** of two languages, which exists whenever  
 4044 both languages are defined over the same alphabet. In this case, the intersection is a language  
 4045 that consists of strings which are words in both languages.

4046 To be more precise, let  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  be two languages defined over the same instance and  
 4047 witness alphabets  $\Sigma_I$  and  $\Sigma_W$ . Then the intersection  $L_1 \cap L_2$  of  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  is defined as

$$L_1 \cap L_2 := \{x \mid x \in L_1 \text{ and } x \in L_2\} \quad (6.5)$$

4048 If both languages are defined by decision functions  $R_1$  and  $R_2$ , the following function is a  
 4049 decision function for the intersection language  $L_1 \cap L_2$ :

$$R_{L_1 \cap L_2} : \Sigma_I^* \times \Sigma_W^* \rightarrow \{true, false\}; (i, w) \mapsto R_1(i, w) \text{ and } R_2(i, w) \quad (6.6)$$

4050 Thus, the intersection of two decision-function-based languages is a also decision-function-  
 4051 based language. This is important from an implementations point of view: It allows us to  
 4052 construct complex decision functions, their languages and associated statements from simple  
 4053 building blocks. Given a publicly known instance  $i \in \Sigma_I^*$  a statement in an intersection language  
 4054 then claims knowledge of a witness that satisfies all relations simultaneously.



## 6.2 Statement Representations

As we have seen in the previous section, formal languages and their definitions by decision functions are a powerful tool to describe statements in a formally rigorous manner.

However, from the perspective of existing zero-knowledge proof systems, not all ways to actually represent decision functions are equally useful. Depending on the proof system, some are more suitable than others. In this section, we will describe two of the most common ways to represent decision functions and their statements.

### 6.2.1 Rank-1 Quadratic Constraint Systems

Although decision functions are expressible in various ways, many contemporary proving systems require the decision function to be expressed in terms of a system of quadratic equations over a finite field. This is true in particular for pairing-based proving systems like the one we describe in chapter 8, roughly because it is possible to separate instance and witness and then check solutions to those equations “in the exponent” of pairing-friendly cryptographic groups.

In this section, we will have a closer look at a particular type of quadratic equations called **Rank-1 (quadratic) Constraints Systems**, which are a common standard in zero-knowledge proof systems. We will start with a general introduction to those constraint systems and then look at their relation to formal languages. Then we will look into a common way to compute solutions to those systems.

**R1CS representation** To understand what **Rank-1 (quadratic) Constraint Systems** [R1CS] are in detail, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a field,  $n, m$  and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  three numbers and  $a_j^i, b_j^i$  and  $c_j^i \in \mathbb{F}$  constants from  $\mathbb{F}$  for every index  $0 \leq j \leq n+m$  and  $1 \leq i \leq k$ . Then a Rank-1 Constraint System is defined as the following set of  $k$  many equations:

$$\begin{aligned} (a_0^1 + \sum_{j=1}^n a_j^1 \cdot I_j + \sum_{j=1}^m a_{n+j}^1 \cdot W_j) \cdot (b_0^1 + \sum_{j=1}^n b_j^1 \cdot I_j + \sum_{j=1}^m b_{n+j}^1 \cdot W_j) &= c_0^1 + \sum_{j=1}^n c_j^1 \cdot I_j + \sum_{j=1}^m c_{n+j}^1 \cdot W_j \\ &\vdots \\ (a_0^k + \sum_{j=1}^n a_j^k \cdot I_j + \sum_{j=1}^m a_{n+j}^k \cdot W_j) \cdot (b_0^k + \sum_{j=1}^n b_j^k \cdot I_j + \sum_{j=1}^m b_{n+j}^k \cdot W_j) &= c_0^k + \sum_{j=1}^n c_j^k \cdot I_j + \sum_{j=1}^m c_{n+j}^k \cdot W_j \end{aligned}$$

If a Rank-1 Constraint System is given, the parameter  $k$  is called the **number of constraints** and each equation is called a **constraint**. If a pair of strings  $\langle I_1, \dots, I_n \rangle; \langle W_1, \dots, W_m \rangle$  of field elements satisfies these equations,  $\langle I_1, \dots, I_n \rangle$  is called an **instance** and  $\langle W_1, \dots, W_m \rangle$  is called a **witness** of the system.

*Remark 5 (Matrix notation).* The presentation of Rank-1 Constraint Systems can be simplified using the notation of vectors and matrices, which abstracts over the indices. In fact if  $x = (1, I, W) \in \mathbb{F}^{1+n+m}$  is a  $(n+m+1)$ -dimensional vector,  $A, B, C$  are  $(n+m+1) \times k$ -dimensional matrices and  $\odot$  is the **Schur/Hadamard product**, then a R1CS can be written as

$$Ax \odot Bx = Cx$$

However, since we did not introduce vector spaces and matrix calculus in the book, we use **XXX** as the defining equation for rank-1 constraints systems. We only highlighted the matrix notation, because it is sometimes used in the literature.

It can be shown that every bounded computation is expressible as a Rank-1 Constraint System and R1CS is therefore a universal model for bounded computations. We will derive some

Schur/Hadamard product

add reference



insights into common approaches of how to compile bounded computation into Rank-1 Constraint Systems in chapter 7.

Generally speaking, the idea of a Rank-1 Constraint System is to keep track of all the values that any variable can hold during a computation and to bind the relationships among all those variables that are implied by the computation itself. Once relations between all steps of a computer program are constrained, program execution is then enforced to be computed in exactly in the expected way without any opportunity for deviations. In this sense, solutions to Rank-1 Constraint Systems are proofs of proper program execution.

*Example 116 (R1CS for 3-Factorization).* To provide a better intuition of Rank-1 Constraint Systems, consider the language  $L_{3.fac\_zk}$  from example 114 again. As we have seen,  $L_{3.fac\_zk}$  consists of words  $\langle I_1 \rangle; \langle W_1, W_2, W_3 \rangle$  over the alphabet  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  such that  $I_1 = W_1 \cdot W_2 \cdot W_3$ . We show how to rewrite the problem as a Rank-1 Constraint System.

Since R1CS are systems of quadratic equations, expressions like  $W_1 \cdot W_2 \cdot W_3$  which contain products of more than two factors (which are therefore not quadratic) have to be rewritten in a process often called **flattening**. To flatten the defining equation  $I_1 = W_1 \cdot W_2 \cdot W_3$  of  $L_{3.fac\_zk}$  we introduce a new variable  $W_4$ , which captures two of the three multiplications in  $W_1 \cdot W_2 \cdot W_3$ . We get the following two constraints

$$\begin{aligned} W_1 \cdot W_2 &= W_4 && \text{constraint 1} \\ W_4 \cdot W_3 &= I_1 && \text{constraint 2} \end{aligned}$$

Given some instance  $I_1$ , any solution  $(W_1, W_2, W_3, W_4)$  to this system of equations provides a solution to the original equation  $I_1 = W_1 \cdot W_2 \cdot W_3$  and vice versa. Both equations are therefore equivalent in the sense that solutions are in a 1:1 correspondence.

Looking at both equations from this constraints system, we see how each constraint enforces a step in the computation. In fact, constraint 1 forces any computation to multiply the witness  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  first. Otherwise it would not be possible to compute the witness  $W_4$ , which is needed to solve constraint 2. Witness  $W_4$  therefore expresses the constraining of an intermediate computational state.

At this point, one might ask why equation 1 constrains the system to compute  $W_1 \cdot W_2$  first. In order to compute  $W_1 \cdot W_2 \cdot W_3$ , calculating  $W_2 \cdot W_3$ , or  $W_1 \cdot W_3$  in the beginning and then multiplying the result with the remaining factor gives the exact same result. The reason is purely a matter of choice. For example, the following R1CS would define the exact same language:

$$\begin{aligned} W_2 \cdot W_3 &= W_4 && \text{constraint 1} \\ W_4 \cdot W_1 &= I_1 && \text{constraint 2} \end{aligned}$$

It follows that R1CS are in general **not unique** descriptions of any given situation: many different R1CS are able to describe the same problem.

To see that the two quadratic equations qualify as a Rank-1 Constraint System, choose the parameter  $n = 1$ ,  $m = 4$  and  $k = 2$  as well as

$$\begin{aligned} a_0^1 &= 0 & a_1^1 &= 0 & a_2^1 &= 1 & a_3^1 &= 0 & a_4^1 &= 0 & a_5^1 &= 0 \\ a_0^2 &= 0 & a_1^2 &= 0 & a_2^2 &= 0 & a_3^2 &= 0 & a_4^2 &= 0 & a_5^2 &= 1 \\ b_0^1 &= 0 & b_1^1 &= 0 & b_2^1 &= 0 & b_3^1 &= 1 & b_4^1 &= 0 & b_5^1 &= 0 \\ b_0^2 &= 0 & b_1^2 &= 0 & b_2^2 &= 0 & b_3^2 &= 0 & b_4^2 &= 1 & b_5^2 &= 0 \\ c_0^1 &= 0 & c_1^1 &= 0 & c_2^1 &= 0 & c_3^1 &= 0 & c_4^1 &= 0 & c_5^1 &= 1 \\ c_0^2 &= 0 & c_1^2 &= 1 & c_2^2 &= 0 & c_3^2 &= 0 & c_4^2 &= 0 & c_5^2 &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

With this choice, the Rank-1 Constraint System of our 3-factorization problem can be written in its most general form as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} (a_0^1 + a_1^1 I_1 + a_2^1 W_1 + a_3^1 W_2 + a_4^1 W_3 + a_5^1 W_4) \cdot (b_0^1 + b_1^1 I_1 + b_2^1 W_1 + b_3^1 W_2 + b_4^1 W_3 + b_5^1 W_4) &= (c_0^1 + c_1^1 I_1 + c_2^1 W_1 + c_3^1 W_2 + c_4^1 W_3 + c_5^1 W_4) \\ (a_0^2 + a_1^2 I_1 + a_2^2 W_2 + a_3^2 W_2 + a_4^2 W_3 + a_5^2 W_4) \cdot (b_0^2 + b_1^2 I_1 + b_2^2 W_2 + b_3^2 W_2 + b_4^2 W_3 + b_5^2 W_4) &= (c_0^2 + c_1^2 I_1 + c_2^2 W_2 + c_3^2 W_2 + c_4^2 W_3 + c_5^2 W_4) \end{aligned}$$

4108 *Example 117* (R1CS for the Tiny-Jubjub curve points). Consider the languages  $L_{\text{tiny.jj.1}}$  from  
 4109 example 115, which consist of words  $\langle I_1, I_2 \rangle$  over the alphabet  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  such that  $3 \cdot I_1^2 + I_2^2 =$   
 4110  $1 + 8 \cdot I_1^2 \cdot I_2^2$ .

We derive a Rank-1 Constraint System such that its solutions are in a 1:1 correspondence with words in  $L_{\text{tiny.jj.1}}$ . To achieve this, we first rewrite the defining equation:

$$\begin{aligned} 3 \cdot I_1^2 + I_2^2 &= 1 + 8 \cdot I_1^2 \cdot I_2^2 && \Leftrightarrow \\ 0 &= 1 + 8 \cdot I_1^2 \cdot I_2^2 - 3 \cdot I_1^2 - I_2^2 && \Leftrightarrow \\ 0 &= 1 + 8 \cdot I_1^2 \cdot I_2^2 + 10 \cdot I_1^2 + 12 \cdot I_2^2 \end{aligned}$$

Since R1CSs are systems of quadratic equations, we have to reformulate this expression into a system of quadratic equations. To do so, we have to introduce new variables that constrain intermediate steps in the computation and we have to decide if those variables should be instance or witness variable. We decide to declare all new variables as witness variables and get the following constraints

$$\begin{aligned} I_1 \cdot I_1 &= W_1 && \text{constraint 1} \\ I_2 \cdot I_2 &= W_2 && \text{constraint 2} \\ (8 \cdot W_1) \cdot W_2 &= W_3 && \text{constraint 3} \\ (12 \cdot W_2 + W_3 + 10 \cdot W_1 + 1) \cdot 1 &= 0 && \text{constraint 4} \end{aligned}$$

To see that these four quadratic equations qualify as a Rank-1 Constraint System according to equation ??, choose the parameter  $n = 2$ ,  $m = 3$  and  $k = 4$ :

$$\begin{array}{cccccc} a_0^1 = 0 & a_1^1 = 1 & a_2^1 = 0 & a_3^1 = 0 & a_4^1 = 0 & a_5^1 = 0 \\ a_0^2 = 0 & a_1^2 = 0 & a_2^2 = 1 & a_3^2 = 0 & a_4^2 = 0 & a_5^2 = 0 \\ a_0^3 = 0 & a_1^3 = 0 & a_2^3 = 0 & a_3^3 = 8 & a_4^3 = 0 & a_5^3 = 0 \\ a_0^4 = 1 & a_1^4 = 0 & a_2^4 = 0 & a_3^4 = 10 & a_4^4 = 12 & a_5^4 = 1 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{cccccc} b_0^1 = 0 & b_1^1 = 1 & b_2^1 = 0 & b_3^1 = 0 & b_4^1 = 0 & b_5^1 = 0 \\ b_0^2 = 0 & b_1^2 = 0 & b_2^2 = 1 & b_3^2 = 0 & b_4^2 = 0 & b_5^2 = 0 \\ b_0^3 = 0 & b_1^3 = 0 & b_2^3 = 0 & b_3^3 = 0 & b_4^3 = 1 & b_5^3 = 0 \\ b_0^4 = 1 & b_1^4 = 0 & b_2^4 = 0 & b_3^4 = 0 & b_4^4 = 0 & b_5^4 = 0 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{cccccc} c_0^1 = 0 & c_1^1 = 0 & c_2^1 = 0 & c_3^1 = 1 & c_4^1 = 0 & c_5^1 = 0 \\ c_0^2 = 0 & c_1^2 = 0 & c_2^2 = 0 & c_3^2 = 0 & c_4^2 = 1 & c_5^2 = 0 \\ c_0^3 = 0 & c_1^3 = 0 & c_2^3 = 0 & c_3^3 = 0 & c_4^3 = 0 & c_5^3 = 1 \\ c_0^4 = 0 & c_1^4 = 0 & c_2^4 = 0 & c_3^4 = 0 & c_4^4 = 0 & c_5^4 = 0 \end{array}$$

With this choice, the Rank-1 Constraint System of our tiny-jubjub curve point problem can be

written in its most general form as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} (a_0^1 + a_1^1 I_1 + a_2^1 I_2 + a_3^1 W_1 + a_4^1 W_2 + a_5^1 W_3) \cdot (b_0^1 + b_1^1 I_1 + b_2^1 I_2 + b_3^1 W_1 + b_4^1 W_2 + b_5^1 W_3) &= (c_0^1 + c_1^1 I_1 + c_2^1 I_2 + c_3^1 W_1 + c_4^1 W_2 + c_5^1 W_3) \\ (a_0^2 + a_1^2 I_1 + a_2^2 I_2 + a_3^2 W_1 + a_4^2 W_2 + a_5^2 W_3) \cdot (b_0^2 + b_1^2 I_1 + b_2^2 I_2 + b_3^2 W_1 + b_4^2 W_2 + b_5^2 W_3) &= (c_0^2 + c_1^2 I_1 + c_2^2 I_2 + c_3^2 W_1 + c_4^2 W_2 + c_5^2 W_3) \\ (a_0^3 + a_1^3 I_1 + a_2^3 I_2 + a_3^3 W_1 + a_4^3 W_2 + a_5^3 W_3) \cdot (b_0^3 + b_1^3 I_1 + b_2^3 I_2 + b_3^3 W_1 + b_4^3 W_2 + b_5^3 W_3) &= (c_0^3 + c_1^3 I_1 + c_2^3 I_2 + c_3^3 W_1 + c_4^3 W_2 + c_5^3 W_3) \\ (a_0^4 + a_1^4 I_1 + a_2^4 I_2 + a_3^4 W_1 + a_4^4 W_2 + a_5^4 W_3) \cdot (b_0^4 + b_1^4 I_1 + b_2^4 I_2 + b_3^4 W_1 + b_4^4 W_2 + b_5^4 W_3) &= (c_0^4 + c_1^4 I_1 + c_2^4 I_2 + c_3^4 W_1 + c_4^4 W_2 + c_5^4 W_3) \end{aligned}$$

4111 To see that solutions to this constraints system are in 1:1 correspondence with words in  $L_{tiny.jj.1}$ ,  
 4112 let  $\langle I_1, I_2 \rangle; \langle W_1, W_2, W_3 \rangle$  be a solution, then  $\langle I_1, I_2 \rangle$  is a word in  $L_{tiny.jj.1}$ , since the  
 4113 defining R1CS implies that  $I_1$  and  $I_2$  satisfy the twisted Edwards equation of the tiny-jubjub  
 4114 curve. On the other hand, let  $\langle I_1, I_2 \rangle$  be a word in  $L_{tiny.jj.1}$ . Then  $\langle I_1, I_2 \rangle; \langle I_1^2, I_2^2, 8 \cdot I_1^2 \cdot$   
 4115  $I_2^2 \rangle$  is a solution to our R1CS.

4116 *Exercise 86.* Consider the language  $L_{add}$  from exercise 85. Define an R1CS, such that solutions  
 4117 to this R1CS are in 1:1 correspondence with words in  $L_{add}$ .

4118 **R1CS Satisfiability** To understand how Rank-1 Constraint Systems define formal languages,  
 4119 observe that every R1CS over a field  $\mathbb{F}$  defines a decision function over the alphabet  $\Sigma_I \times \Sigma_W =$   
 4120  $\mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$  in the following way:

$$R_{R1CS} : (\mathbb{F})^* \times (\mathbb{F})^* \rightarrow \{true, false\} ; (I; W) \mapsto \begin{cases} true & (I; W) \text{ satisfies R1CS} \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases} \quad (6.7)$$

4121 Every R1CS therefore defines a formal language. The grammar of this language is encoded  
 4122 in the constraints, words are solutions to the equations and a **statement** is a knowledge claim  
 4123 “Given instance  $I$ , there is a witness  $W$  such that  $(I; W)$  is a solution to the Rank-1 Constraint  
 4124 System”. A constructive proof to this claim is therefore an assignment of a field element to  
 4125 every witness variable, which is verified whenever the set of all instance and witness variables  
 4126 solves the R1CS.

*Remark 6 (R1CS satisfiability).* It should be noted that in our definition, every R1CS defines its own language. However, in more theoretical approaches, another language usually called **R1CS satisfiability** is often considered, which is useful when it comes to more abstract problems like expressiveness or the computational complexity of the class of **all** R1CS. From our perspective, the R1CS satisfiability language is obtained by the union of all R1CS languages that are in our definition. To be more precise, let the alphabet  $\Sigma = \mathbb{F}$  be a field. Then

$$L_{R1CS\_SAT(\mathbb{F})} = \{(i; w) \in \Sigma^* \times \Sigma^* \mid \text{there is a R1CS } R \text{ such that } R(i; w) = true\}$$

4127 *Example 118 (3-Factorization).* Consider the language  $L_{3.fac\_zk}$  from example 114 and the  
 4128 R1CS defined in example 116. As we have seen in 116, solutions to the R1CS are in 1:1 cor-  
 4129 respondence with solutions to the decision function of  $L_{3.fac\_zk}$ . Both languages are therefore  
 4130 equivalent in the sense that there is a 1:1 correspondence between words in both languages.

To give an intuition of what constructive R1CS based proofs in  $L_{3.fac\_zk}$  look like, consider the instance  $I_1 = 11$ . To prove the statement “There exists a witness  $W$  such that  $(I_1; W)$  is a word in  $L_{3.fac\_zk}$ ” constructively, a proof has to provide a solution to the R1CS from example 116, that is an assignments to all witness variables  $W_1, W_2, W_3$  and  $W_4$ . Since the alphabet is  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , an example assignment is given by  $W = \langle 2, 3, 4, 6 \rangle$  since  $(I_1; W)$  satisfies the R1CS

$$\begin{aligned} W_1 \cdot W_2 &= W_4 & \# 2 \cdot 3 &= 6 \\ W_4 \cdot W_3 &= I_1 & \# 6 \cdot 4 &= 11 \end{aligned}$$

4131 A proper constructive proof is therefore given by  $\pi = \langle 2, 3, 4, 6 \rangle$ . Of course,  $\pi$  is not the only  
 4132 possible proof for this statement. Since factorization is not unique in a field in general, another  
 4133 constructive proof is given by  $\pi' = \langle 3, 5, 12, 2 \rangle$ .

*Example 119* (The tiny-jubjub curve). Consider the language  $L_{\text{tiny.jj.1}}$  from example 115 and its associated R1CS from example 117. To see how constructive proofs in  $L_{\text{tiny.jj.1}}$  using the R1CS from example 117 look like, consider the instance  $\langle I_1, I_2 \rangle = \langle 11, 6 \rangle$ . To prove the statement “There exists a witness  $W$  such that  $(\langle I_1, I_2 \rangle; W)$  is a word in  $L_{\text{tiny.jj.1}}$ ” constructively, a proof has to provide a solution to the R1CS 117, which is an assignments to all witness variables  $W_1$ ,  $W_2$  and  $W_3$ . Since the alphabet is  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , an example assignment is given by  $W = \langle 4, 10, 8 \rangle$  since  $(\langle I_1, I_2 \rangle; W)$  satisfies the R1CS

$$\begin{array}{ll} I_1 \cdot I_1 = W_1 & 11 \cdot 11 = 4 \\ I_2 \cdot I_2 = W_2 & 6 \cdot 6 = 10 \\ (8 \cdot W_1) \cdot W_2 = W_3 & (8 \cdot 4) \cdot 10 = 8 \\ (12 \cdot W_2 + W_3 + 10 \cdot W_1 + 1) \cdot 1 = 0 & 12 \cdot 10 + 8 + 10 \cdot 4 + 1 = 0 \end{array}$$

4134 A proper constructive proof is therefore given by  $\pi = \langle 4, 10, 8 \rangle$ , which shows that the instance  
 4135  $\langle 11, 6 \rangle$  is a point on the tiny-jubjub curve.

4136 **Modularity** As we discussed in 6.1, it is often useful to construct complex statements and  
 4137 their representing languages from simple ones. Rank-1 Constraint Systems are particularly  
 4138 useful for this, as the intersection of two R1CS over the same alphabet results in a new R1CS  
 4139 over that same alphabet.

4140 To be more precise, let  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  be two R1CS over  $\mathbb{F}$ , then a new R1CS  $S_3$  is obtained  
 4141 by the intersection  $S_3 = S_1 \cap S_2$  of  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ . In this context, intersection means that both the  
 4142 equations of  $S_1$  **and** the equations of  $S_2$  have to be satisfied in order to provide a solution for the  
 4143 system  $S_3$ .

4144 As a consequence, developers are able to construct complex R1CS from simple ones and  
 4145 this modularity provides the theoretical foundation for many R1CS compilers, as we will see in  
 4146 chapter 7.

## 4147 6.2.2 Algebraic Circuits

4148 As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, Rank-1 Constraint Systems are quadratic equations  
 4149 such that solutions are knowledge proofs for the existence of words in associated languages.  
 4150 From the perspective of a prover, it is therefore important to solve those equations efficiently.

4151 However, in contrast to systems of linear equations, no general methods are known that solve  
 4152 systems of quadratic equations efficiently. Rank-1 Constraint Systems are therefore impractical  
 4153 from a provers perspective and auxiliary information is needed that helps to compute solutions  
 4154 efficiently.

4155 Methods which compute R1CS solutions are sometimes called **witness generator func-**  
 4156 **tions**. To provide a common example, we introduce another class of decision functions called  
 4157 **algebraic circuits**. As we will see, every algebraic circuit defines an associated R1CS and also  
 4158 provides an efficient way to compute solutions for that R1CS.

4159 It can be shown that every space- and time-bounded computation is expressible as an alge-  
 4160 braic circuit. Transforming high-level computer programs into those circuits is a process often  
 4161 called **flattening**. We will look at those transformations in chapter 7.

In this section we will introduce our model for algebraic circuits and look at the concept of circuit execution and valid assignments. After that, we will show how to derive Rank-1 Constraint Systems from circuits and how circuits are useful to compute solutions to associated R1CS efficiently.

**Algebraic circuit representation** To see what algebraic circuits are, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a field. An algebraic circuit is then a directed acyclic (multi)graph that computes a polynomial function over  $\mathbb{F}$ . Nodes with only outgoing edges (source nodes) represent the variables and constants of the function and nodes with only incoming edges (sink nodes) represent the outcome of the function. All other nodes have exactly two incoming edges and represent the field operations **addition** as well as **multiplication**. Graph edges are directed and represent the flow of the computation along the nodes.

To be more precise, in this book, we call a directed acyclic multi-graph  $C(\mathbb{F})$  an **algebraic circuit** over  $\mathbb{F}$  if the following conditions hold:

- The set of edges has a total order.
- Every source node has a label that represents either a variable or a constant from the field  $\mathbb{F}$ .
- Every sink node has exactly one incoming edge and a label that represents either a variable or a constant from the field  $\mathbb{F}$ .
- Every node that is neither a source nor a sink has exactly two incoming edges and a label from the set  $\{+, *\}$  that represents either addition or multiplication in  $\mathbb{F}$ .
- All outgoing edges from a node have the same label.
- Outgoing edges from a node with a label that represents a variable have a label.
- Outgoing edges from a node with a label that represents multiplication have a label, if there is at least one labeled edge in both input path.
- All incoming edges to sink nodes have a label.
- If an edge has two labels  $S_i$  and  $S_j$  it gets a new label  $S_i = S_j$ .
- No other edge has a label.
- Incoming edges to labeled sink nodes, where the label is a constant  $c \in \mathbb{F}$  are labeled with the same constant. Every other edge label is taken from the set  $\{W, I\}$  and indexed compatible with the order of the edge set.

It should be noted that the details in the definitions of algebraic circuits vary between different sources. We use this definition as it is conceptually straightforward and well-suited for pen-and-paper computations.

To get a better intuition of our definition, let  $C(\mathbb{F})$  be an algebraic circuit. Source nodes are the inputs to the circuit and either represent variables or constants. In a similar way, sink nodes represent termination points of the circuit and are either output variables or constants. Constant sink nodes enforce computational outputs to take on certain values.

Nodes that are neither source nodes nor sink nodes are called **arithmetic gates**. Arithmetic gates that are decorated with the “+”-label are called **addition-gates** and arithmetic gates that

are decorated with the “.”-label are called **multiplication-gates**. Every arithmetic gate has exactly two inputs, represented by the two incoming edges.

Since the set of edges is ordered, we can write it as a string  $\langle E_1, E_2, \dots, E_n \rangle$  for some  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  and we use those indices to index the edge labels, too. Edge labels are therefore either constants or symbols like  $I_j$ ,  $W_j$ , where  $j$  is an index compatible with the edge order. Labels  $I_j$  represent instance variables, labels  $W_j$  witness variables. Labels on the outgoing edges of input variables constrain the associated variable to that edge.

*Notation and Symbols* 14. In synthesizing algebraic circuits, assigning instance  $I_j$  or witness  $W_j$  labels to appropriate edges is often the final step. It is therefore convenient to not distinguish these two types of edges in previous steps. To account for that, we often simply write  $S_j$  for an edge label, indicating that the instance/witness property of the label is unspecified and it might represent both an instance or a witness label.

*Example* 120 (Generalized factorization SNARK). To give a simple example of an algebraic circuit, consider our 3-factorization problem from example 114 again. To express the problem in the algebraic circuit model, consider the following function


$$f_{3.fac} : \mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{13}; (x_1, x_2, x_3) \mapsto x_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot x_3$$

Using this function, we can describe the zero-knowledge 3-factorization problem from 114, in the following way: Given instance  $I_1 \in \mathbb{F}_{13}$ , a valid witness is a preimage of  $f_{3.fac}$  at the point  $I_1$ , i.e., a valid witness consists of three values  $W_1$ ,  $W_2$  and  $W_3$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  such that  $f_{3.fac}(W_1, W_2, W_3) = I_1$ .

To see how this function can be transformed into an algebraic circuit over  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , it is a common first step to introduce brackets into the function’s definition and then write the operations as binary operators, in order to highlight how exactly every field operation acts on its two inputs. Due to the associativity laws in a field, we have several choices. We choose

$$\begin{aligned} f_{3.fac}(x_1, x_2, x_3) &= x_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot x_3 && \# \text{ bracket choice} \\ &= (x_1 \cdot x_2) \cdot x_3 && \# \text{ operator notation} \\ &= MUL(MUL(x_1, x_2), x_3) \end{aligned}$$

Using this expression, we can write an associated algebraic circuit by first constraining the variables to edge labels  $W_1 = x_1$ ,  $W_2 = x_2$  and  $W_3 = x_3$  as well as  $I_1 = f_{3.fac}(x_1, x_2, x_3)$ , taking the distinction between witness and instance inputs into account. We then rewrite the operator representation of  $f_{3.fac}$  into circuit nodes and get the following:



4225 In this case, the directed acyclic multi-graph is a binary tree with three leaves (the source  
 4226 nodes) labeled by  $x_1, x_2$  and  $x_3$ , one root (the single sink node) labeled by  $f_{3, fac}(x_1, x_2, x_3)$  and  
 4227 two internal nodes, which are labeled as multiplication gates.

4228 The order we use to label the edges is chosen to make the edge labeling consistent with  
 4229 the choice of  $W_4$  as defined in definition 6.2.2. This order can be obtained by a depth-first  
 4230 right-to-left-first traversal algorithm.

*Example 121.* To give a more realistic example of an algebraic circuit, look at the defining equation of the tiny-jubjub curve 69 again. A pair of field elements  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{13}^2$  is a curve point, precisely if the following equation holds:

$$3 \cdot x^2 + y^2 = 1 + 8 \cdot x^2 \cdot y^2$$

To understand how one might transform this identity into an algebraic circuit, we first rewrite this equation by shifting all terms to the right. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} 3 \cdot x^2 + y^2 &= 1 + 8 \cdot x^2 \cdot y^2 && \Leftrightarrow \\ 0 &= 1 + 8 \cdot x^2 \cdot y^2 - 3 \cdot x^2 - y^2 && \Leftrightarrow \\ 0 &= 1 + 8 \cdot x^2 \cdot y^2 + 10 \cdot x^2 + 12 \cdot y^2 \end{aligned}$$

Then we use this expression to define a function such that all points of the tiny-jubjub curve are characterized as the function preimages at 0.


$$f_{tiny-jj} : \mathbb{F}_{13} \times \mathbb{F}_{13} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{13} ; (x, y) \mapsto 1 + 8 \cdot x^2 \cdot y^2 + 10 \cdot x^2 + 12 \cdot y^2$$

4231 Every pair of field elements  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_{13}^2$  with  $f_{tiny-jj}(x, y) = 0$  is a point on the tiny-jubjub  
 4232 curve, and there are no other curve points. The preimage  $f_{tiny-jj}^{-1}(0)$  is therefore a complete  
 4233 description of the tiny-jubjub curve.

We can transform this function into an algebraic circuit over  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . We first introduce brackets into potentially ambiguous expressions and then rewrite the function in terms of binary operators. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} f_{tiny-jj}(x, y) &= 1 + 8 \cdot x^2 \cdot y^2 + 10 \cdot x^2 + 12y^2 && \Leftrightarrow \\ &= ((8 \cdot ((x \cdot x) \cdot (y \cdot y))) + (1 + 10 \cdot (x \cdot x))) + (12 \cdot (y \cdot y)) && \Leftrightarrow \\ &= ADD(ADD(MUL(8, MUL(MUL(x, x), MUL(y, y))), ADD(1, MUL(10, MUL(x, x))), MUL(12, MUL(y, y)))) \end{aligned}$$

4234 Since we haven't decided which part of the computation should be instance and which part  
 4235 should be witness, we use the unspecified symbol  $S$  to represent edge labels. Constraining all  
 4236 variables to edge labels  $S_1 = x$ ,  $S_2 = y$  and  $S_6 = f_{tiny-jj}$ , we get the following circuit, representing the function  $f_{tiny-jj}$ , by inductively replacing binary operators with their associated  
 4237 arithmetic gates:  
 4238




4239

4240 This circuit is not a graph, but a multigraph, since there is more than one edge between some of  
 4241 the nodes.

4242 In the process of designing of circuits from functions, it should be noted that circuit rep-  
 4243 resentations are not unique in general. In case of the function  $f_{\text{tiny-jj}}$ , the circuit shape is  
 4244 dependent on our choice of bracketing in  $??$ . An alternative design is for example, given by the  
 4245 following circuit, which occurs when the bracketed expression  $8 \cdot ((x \cdot x) \cdot (y \cdot y))$  is replaced by  
 4246 the expression  $(x \cdot x) \cdot (8 \cdot (y \cdot y))$ .

4247



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
4250 Of course, both circuits represent the same function, due to the associativity and commutativity  
 4251 laws that hold true in any field.

4252 With a circuit that represents the function  $f_{\text{tiny-jj}}$ , we can now proceed to derive a circuit  
 4253 that constrains arbitrary pairs  $(x, y)$  of field elements to be points on the tiny-jubjub curve. To do  
 4254 so, we have to constrain the output to be zero, that is, we have to constrain  $S_6 = 0$ . To indicate



4255 this in the circuit, we replace the output variable by the constant 0 and constrain the related edge  
 4256 label accordingly. We get the following:

4257




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4259

4260 The previous circuit enforces input values assigned to the labels  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  to be points on the  
 4261 tiny-jubjub curve. However, it does not specify which labels are considered instance and which  
 4262 are considered witness. The following circuit defines the inputs to be instances, while all other  
 4263 labels represent witnesses:

4264



4265

4266

4267 It can be shown that every space- and time-bounded computation can be transformed into  
 4268 an algebraic circuit. We call any process that transforms a bounded computation into a circuit  
 4269 **flattening**.

**Circuit Execution** Algebraic circuits are directed, acyclic multi-graphs, where nodes represent variables, constants, or addition and multiplication gates. In particular, every algebraic circuit with  $n$  input nodes decorated with variable symbols and  $m$  output nodes decorated with variables can be seen as a function that transforms an input string  $(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  from  $\mathbb{F}^n$  into an output string  $(f_1, \dots, f_m)$  from  $\mathbb{F}^m$ . The transformation is done by sending values associated to nodes along their outgoing edges to other nodes. If those nodes are gates, then the values are transformed according to the gate label and the process is repeated along all edges until a sink node is reached. We call this computation **circuit execution**.

When executing a circuit, it is possible to not only compute the output values of the circuit but to derive field elements for all edges, and, in particular, for all edge labels in the circuit. The result is a string  $\langle S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n \rangle$  of field elements associated to all labeled edges, which we call a **valid assignment** to the circuit. In contrast, any assignment  $\langle S'_1, S'_2, \dots, S'_n \rangle$  of field elements to edge labels that can not arise from circuit execution is called an **invalid assignment**.

Valid assignments can be interpreted as **proofs for proper circuit execution** because they keep a record of the computational result as well as intermediate computational steps.


*Example 122 (3-factorization).* Consider the 3-factorization problem from example 114 and its representation as an algebraic circuit from example 120. We know that the string of edge labels is given by  $S := \langle I_1; W_1, W_2, W_3, W_4 \rangle$ .

To understand how this circuit is executed, consider the variables  $x_1 = 2$ ,  $x_2 = 3$  as well as  $x_3 = 4$ . Following all edges in the graph, we get the assignments  $W_1 = 2$ ,  $W_2 = 3$  and  $W_3 = 4$ . Then the assignments of  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  enter a multiplication gate and the output of the gate is  $2 \cdot 3 = 6$ , which we assign to  $W_4$ , i.e.  $W_4 = 6$ . The values  $W_4$  and  $W_3$  then enter the second multiplication gate and the output of the gate is  $6 \cdot 4 = 11$ , which we assign to  $I_1$ , i.e.  $I_1 = 11$ .


A valid assignment to the 3-factorization circuit  $C_{3, \text{fac}}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$  is therefore given by the following string of field elements from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ :

$$S_{\text{valid}} := \langle 11; 2, 3, 4, 6 \rangle \quad (6.8)$$

We can visualise this assignment by assigning every computed value to its associated label in the circuit as follows:



To see what an invalid assignment looks like, consider the assignment  $S_{\text{err}} := \langle 8; 2, 3, 4, 7 \rangle$ . In this assignment, the input values are the same as in the previous case. The associated circuit is:




4301

4302 This assignment is invalid, as the assignments of  $I_1$  and  $W_4$  cannot be obtained by executing the  
4303 circuit.

4304 *Example 123.* To compute a more realistic algebraic circuit execution, consider the defining  
4305 circuit  $C_{\text{tiny-jj}}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$  from example 121 again. We already know from the way this circuit is  
4306 constructed that any valid assignment with  $S_1 = x$ ,  $S_2 = y$  and  $S_6 = 0$  will ensure that the pair  
4307  $(x, y)$  is a point on the tiny-jubjub curve in its Edwards representation (equation 5.21).

4308 From example 5.21, we know that the pair  $(11, 6)$  is a proper point on the tiny-jubjub curve  
4309 and we use this point as input to a circuit execution. We get the following:



4310

Executing the circuit, we indeed compute  $S_6 = 0$  as expected, which proves that  $(11, 6)$  is a point on the tiny-jubjub curve in its Edwards representation. A valid assignment of  $C_{\text{tiny-jj}}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$  is therefore given by the following string:

$$S_{\text{tiny-jj}} = \langle S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4, S_5, S_6 \rangle = \langle 11, 6, 4, 10, 1, 0 \rangle$$

4311 **Circuit Satisfiability** To understand how algebraic circuits give rise to formal languages, ob-  
4312 serve that every algebraic circuit  $C(\mathbb{F})$  over a fields  $\mathbb{F}$  defines a decision function over the al-

4313 phabet  $\Sigma_I \times \Sigma_W = \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$  in the following way:

$$R_{C(\mathbb{F})} : \mathbb{F}^* \times \mathbb{F}^* \rightarrow \{true, false\} ; (I; W) \mapsto \begin{cases} true & (I; W) \text{ is valid assignment to } C(\mathbb{F}) \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases} \quad (6.9)$$

4314 Every algebraic circuit therefore defines a formal language. The grammar of this language is  
 4315 encoded in the shape of the circuit, words are assignments to edge labels that are derived from  
 4316 circuit execution, and **statements** are knowledge claims “Given instance  $I$ , there is a witness  
 4317  $W$  such that  $(I; W)$  is a valid assignment to the circuit”. A constructive proof to this claim  
 4318 is therefore an assignment of a field element to every witness variable, which is verified by  
 4319 executing the circuit to see if the assignment of the execution meets the assignment of the  
 4320 proof.

4321 In the context of zero-knowledge proof systems, executing circuits is also often called **wit-**  
 4322 **ness generation**, since in applications the instance part is usually public, while its the task of a  
 4323 prover to compute the witness part.

*Remark 7 (Circuit satisfiability).* Similar to 6, it should be noted that, in our definition, every circuit defines its own language. However, in more theoretical approaches another language usually called **circuit satisfiability** is often considered, which is useful when it comes to more abstract problems like expressiveness, or computational complexity of the class of **all** algebraic circuits over a given field. From our perspective the circuit satisfiability language is obtained by union of all circuit languages that are in our definition. To be more precise, let the alphabet  $\Sigma = \mathbb{F}$  be a field. Then

$$L_{CIRCUIT\_SAT(\mathbb{F})} = \{(i; w) \in \Sigma^* \times \Sigma^* \mid \text{there is a circuit } C(\mathbb{F}) \text{ such that } (i; w) \text{ is valid assignment}\}$$

4324 *Example 124 (3-Factorization).* Consider the circuit  $C_{3.fac}$  from example 120 again. We call  
 4325 the associated language  $L_{3.fac\_circ}$ .

4326 To understand how a constructive proof of a statement in  $L_{3.fac\_circ}$  looks like, consider the  
 4327 instance  $I_1 = 11$ . To provide a proof for the statement “There exist a witness  $W$  such that  $(I_1; W)$   
 4328 is a word in  $L_{3.fac\_circ}$ ” a proof therefore has to consists of proper values for the variables  $W_1$ ,  
 4329  $W_2$ ,  $W_3$  and  $W_4$ . Any prover therefore has to find input values for  $W_1$ ,  $W_2$  and  $W_3$  and then  
 4330 execute the circuit to compute  $W_4$  under the assumption  $I_1 = 11$ .

4331 Example 122 implies that  $\langle 2, 3, 4, 6 \rangle$  is a proper constructive proof and in order to verify  
 4332 the proof a verifier needs to execute the circuit with instance  $I_1 = 11$  and inputs  $W_1 = 2$ ,  $W_2 = 3$   
 4333 and  $W_3 = 4$  to decide whether the proof is a valid assignment or not.

4334 *Exercise 87.* Consider the circuit  $C_{tiny-jj}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$  from example 121, with its associated language  
 4335  $L_{tiny-jj}$ . Construct a proof  $\pi$  for the instance  $\langle 11, 6 \rangle$  and verify the proof.

4336 **Associated Constraint Systems** As we have seen in 6.2.1, Rank-1 Constraint Systems define  
 4337 a way to represent statements in terms of a system of quadratic equations over finite fields,  
 4338 suitable for pairing-based zero-knowledge proof systems. However, those equations provide no  
 4339 practical way for a prover to actually compute a solution. On the other hand, algebraic circuits  
 4340 can be executed in order to derive valid assignments efficiently.

4341 In this paragraph, we show how to transform any algebraic circuit into a Rank-1 Constraint  
 4342 System such that valid circuit assignments are in 1:1 correspondence with solutions to the asso-  
 4343 ciated RICS.

4344 To see this, let  $C(\mathbb{F})$  be an algebraic circuit over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$ , with a string of edge labels  
 4345  $\langle S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n \rangle$ . Then we start with an empty RICS and one of the following steps is executed  
 4346 for every edge label  $S_j$  from that set:

- If the edge label  $S_j$  is an outgoing edge of a multiplication gate, the R1CS gets a new quadratic constraint

$$(\text{left input}) \cdot (\text{right input}) = S_j \quad (6.10)$$

In this expression (left input) is the output from the symbolic execution of the subgraph that consists of the left input edge of this gate and all edges and nodes that have this edge in their path, starting with constant inputs or labeled outgoing edges of other nodes.

In the same way (right input) is the output from the symbolic execution of the subgraph that consists of the right input edge of this gate and all edges and nodes that have this edge in their path, starting with constant inputs or labeled outgoing edges of other nodes.

- If the edge label  $S_j$  is an outgoing edge of an addition gate, the R1CS gets a new quadratic constraint

$$(\text{left input} + \text{right input}) \cdot 1 = S_j \quad (6.11)$$

In this expression (left input) is the output from the symbolic execution of the subgraph that consists of the left input edge of this gate and all edges and nodes that have this edge in their path, starting with constant inputs or labeled outgoing edges of other nodes.

In the same way (right input) is the output from the symbolic execution of the subgraph that consists of the right input edge of this gate and all edges and nodes that have this edge in their path, starting with constant inputs or labeled outgoing edges of other nodes.


- No other edge label adds a constraint to the system.

If an algebraic circuit  $C(\mathbb{F})$  is constructed according to the rules from 6.2.2, the result of this method is a Rank-1 Constraint System, and, in this sense, every algebraic circuit  $C(\mathbb{F})$  generates a R1CS  $R$ , which we call the **associated R1CS** of the circuit. It can be shown that a string of field elements  $\langle S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n \rangle$  is a valid assignment to a circuit if and only if the same string is a solution to the associated R1CS. Circuit executions therefore compute solutions to Rank-1 constraint Systems efficiently.

To understand the contribution of algebraic gates to the number of constraints, note that, according to construction 6.2.2, multiplication gates have labels on their outgoing edges if and only if there is at least one labeled edge in both input paths, or if the outgoing edge is an input to a sink node. This implies that multiplication with a constant is essentially free in the sense that it doesn't add a new constraint to the system, as long as that multiplication gate is not an input to an output node.

Moreover, addition gates have labels on their outgoing edges if and only if they are inputs to sink nodes. This implies that addition is essentially free in the sense that it doesn't add a new constraint to the system, as long as that addition gate is not an input to an output node.

*Example 125 (3-factorization).* Consider our 3-factorization problem from example 114 and the associated circuit  $C_{3.fac}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$  from example 120. Our task is to transform this circuit into an equivalent Rank-1 Constraint System.



4382

4383 We start with an empty R1CS, and, in order to generate all constraints, we have to iterate over  
 4384 the set of edge labels  $\langle I_1; W_1, W_2, W_3, W_4 \rangle$ .

Starting with the edge label  $I_1$ , we see that it is an outgoing edge of a multiplication gate, and, since both input edges are labeled, we have to add the following constraint to the system:

$$\begin{aligned} (\text{left input}) \cdot (\text{right input}) &= I_1 && \Leftrightarrow \\ W_4 \cdot W_3 &= I_1 \end{aligned}$$

4385 Next, we consider the edge label  $W_1$  and, since, it's not an outgoing edge of a multiplication or  
 4386 addition gate, we don't add a constraint to the system. The same holds true for the labels  $W_2$   
 4387 and  $W_3$ .

For edge label  $W_4$ , we see that it is an outgoing edge of a multiplication gate, and, since both input edges are labeled, we have to add the following constraint to the system:

$$\begin{aligned} (\text{left input}) \cdot (\text{right input}) &= W_4 && \Leftrightarrow \\ W_2 \cdot W_1 &= W_4 \end{aligned}$$


Since there are no more labeled edges, all constraints are generated, and we have to combine them to get the associated R1CS of  $C_{3, \text{fac}}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$ :

$$\begin{aligned} W_4 \cdot W_3 &= I_1 \\ W_2 \cdot W_1 &= W_4 \end{aligned}$$

4388 This system is equivalent to the R1CS we derived in example 116. The languages  $L_{3, \text{fac\_zk}}$  and  
 4389  $L_{3, \text{fac\_circ}}$  are therefore equivalent and both the circuit as well as the R1CS are just two different  
 4390 ways of expressing the same language.

4391 *Example 126.* To consider a more general transformation, we consider the tiny-jubjub circuit  
 4392 from example 123 again. A proper circuit is given by the following graph, where we highlighted  
 4393 all nodes that contribute a constraint to the R1CS:

4394



4395


4396

4397 To compute the number of constraints, observe that we have 3 multiplication gates that have  
 4398 labels on their outgoing edges and 1 addition gate that has a label on its outgoing edge. We  
 4399 therefore have to compute 4 quadratic constraints.

4400 In order to derive the associated R1CS, we have start with an empty R1CS and then iterate  
 4401 over the set  $\langle S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4, S_5, S_6 = 0 \rangle$  of all edge labels, in order to generate the constraints.

4402 Considering edge label  $S_1$ , we see that the associated edges are not outgoing edges of any  
 4403 algebraic gate, and we therefore have to add no new constraint to the system. The same holds  
 4404 true for edge label  $S_2$ . Looking at edge label  $S_3$ , we see that the associated edges are outgoing  
 4405 edges of a multiplication gate and that the associated subgraph is given by:

4406



4407


4408

Both the left and the right input to this multiplication gate are labeled by  $S_1$ . We therefore have

to add the following constraint to the system:

$$S_1 \cdot S_1 = S_3$$


Looking at edge label  $S_4$ , we see that the associated edges are outgoing edges of a multiplication gate and that the associated subgraph is given by:



Both the left and the right input to this multiplication gate are labeled by  $S_2$  and we therefore have to add the following constraint to the system:

$$S_2 \cdot S_2 = S_4$$

Edge label  $S_5$  is more interesting. To see how it implies a constraint, we have to construct the associated subgraph first, which consists of all edges, nodes, and paths, starting either at a constant input or a labeled edge. We get






The right input to the associated multiplication gate is given by the labeled edge  $S_3$ . However, the left input is not a labeled edge, but has a labeled edge in one of its path. To compute the left factor of that constraint, we have to compute the output of the subgraph associated to the left edge, which is  $S_4 \cdot 8$ . This gives the constraint

$$(S_4 \cdot 8) \cdot S_3 = S_5$$

4420 The last edge label is the constant  $S_6 = 0$ . To see how it implies a constraint, we have to  
 4421 construct the associated subgraph, which consists of all edges, nodes, and paths, starting either  
 4422 at a constant input or a labeled edge. We get

4423



4424

4425

Both the left and the right input are unlabeled, but have a labeled edges in their path. Since the gate is an addition gate, the right factor in the quadratic constraint is always 1 and the left factor is computed by symbolically executing all inputs to all gates in the sub-circuit. We get

$$(12 \cdot S_4 + S_5 + 10 \cdot S_3 + 1) \cdot 1 = 0$$

Since there are no more labeled outgoing edges, we are done deriving the constraints. Combining all constraints together, we get the following R1CS:

$$S_1 \cdot S_1 = S_3$$

$$S_2 \cdot S_2 = S_4$$

$$(S_4 \cdot 8) \cdot S_3 = S_5$$

$$(12 \cdot S_4 + S_5 + 10 \cdot S_3 + 1) \cdot 1 = 0$$

4426 which is equivalent to the R1CS we derived in example 117 both the circuit as well as the R1CS  
 4427 are just two different ways to express the same language.

### 4428 6.2.3 Quadratic Arithmetic Programs

4429 We have introduced algebraic circuits and their associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems as two  
 4430 particular models able to represent bounded computation. Both models define formal languages,

and associated membership as well as knowledge claims can be proofed in a constructive way by executing the circuit in order to compute solutions to its associated R1CS.

One reason why those systems are useful in the context of succinct zero-knowledge proof systems is because any R1CS can be transformed into another computational model called a **Quadratic Arithmetic Program** [QAP], which serves as the basis for some of the most efficient succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge proof generators that currently exist.

As we will see, proving statements for languages that have decision functions defined by Quadratic Arithmetic Programs can be achieved by providing certain polynomials, and those proofs can be verified by checking a particular divisibility property of those polynomials.

**QAP representation** To understand what Quadratic Arithmetic Programs are in detail, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a field and  $R$  a Rank-1 Constraint System over  $\mathbb{F}$  such that the number of non-zero elements in  $\mathbb{F}$  is strictly larger than the number  $k$  of constraints in  $R$ . Moreover, let  $a_j^i, b_j^i$  and  $c_j^i \in \mathbb{F}$  for every index  $0 \leq j \leq n+m$  and  $1 \leq i \leq k$ , be the defining constants of the R1CS and  $m_1, \dots, m_k$  be arbitrary, invertible and distinct elements from  $\mathbb{F}$ .

Then a **Quadratic Arithmetic Program** associated to the R1CS  $R$  is the following set of polynomials over  $\mathbb{F}$ :

$$QAP(R) = \left\{ T \in \mathbb{F}[x], \{A_j, B_j, C_j \in \mathbb{F}[x]\}_{h=0}^{n+m} \right\} \quad (6.12)$$

Here  $T(x) := \prod_{l=1}^k (x - m_l)$  is a polynomial of degree  $k$ , called the **target polynomial** of the QAP and  $A_j, B_j$  as well as  $C_j$  are the unique degree  $k-1$  polynomials defined by the following equation:

$$A_j(m_i) = a_j^i, \quad B_j(m_i) = b_j^i, \quad C_j(m_i) = c_j^i \quad \text{for all } j = 1, \dots, n+m+1, i = 1, \dots, k \quad (6.13)$$

Given some Rank-1 Constraint System, an associated Quadratic Arithmetic Program is therefore nothing but a set of polynomials, computed from the constants in the R1CS. To see that the polynomials  $A_j, B_j$  and  $C_j$  are uniquely defined by the equations 6.13, recall that a polynomial of degree  $k-1$  is completely determined by  $k$  evaluation points and it can be computed for example by Lagrange interpolation 4.

Computing a QAP from any given R1CS can be achieved in the following three steps. If the R1CS consists of  $k$  constraints, first choose  $k$  different, invertible element from the field  $\mathbb{F}$ . Every choice defines a different QAP for the same R1CS. Then compute the target polynomial  $T$  according to its definition 6.12. After that use Lagrange's method 4 to compute the polynomials  $A_j$  for every  $1 \leq j \leq k$  from the set

$$S_{A_j} = \{(m_1, a_j^1), \dots, (m_k, a_j^k)\} \quad (6.14)$$

After that is done, execute the analog computation for the polynomials  $B_j$  and  $C_j$  for every  $1 \leq j \leq k$ .

*Example 127 (Generalized factorization SNARK).* To provide a better intuition of Quadratic Arithmetic Programs and how they are computed from their associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems, consider the language  $L_{3.\text{fac\_zk}}$  from example 114 and its associated R1CS from example 116:

$$\begin{array}{ll} W_1 \cdot W_2 = W_4 & \text{constraint 1} \\ W_4 \cdot W_3 = I_1 & \text{constraint 2} \end{array}$$

In this example we want to transform this R1CS into an associated QAP. According to example 116 the defining constants  $a_j^i$ ,  $b_j^i$  and  $c_j^i$  of the R1CS are given as follows:

$$\begin{array}{llllll} a_0^1 = 0 & a_1^1 = 0 & a_2^1 = 1 & a_3^1 = 0 & a_4^1 = 0 & a_5^1 = 0 \\ a_0^2 = 0 & a_1^2 = 0 & a_2^2 = 0 & a_3^2 = 0 & a_4^2 = 0 & a_5^2 = 1 \\ \\ b_0^1 = 0 & b_1^1 = 0 & b_2^1 = 0 & b_3^1 = 1 & b_4^1 = 0 & b_5^1 = 0 \\ b_0^2 = 0 & b_1^2 = 0 & b_2^2 = 0 & b_3^2 = 0 & b_4^2 = 1 & b_5^2 = 0 \\ \\ c_0^1 = 0 & c_1^1 = 0 & c_2^1 = 0 & c_3^1 = 0 & c_4^1 = 0 & c_5^1 = 1 \\ c_0^2 = 0 & c_1^2 = 1 & c_2^2 = 0 & c_3^2 = 0 & c_4^2 = 0 & c_5^2 = 0 \end{array}$$

Since the R1CS is defined over the field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  and since it has two constraints, we need to choose two arbitrary but invertible and distinct elements  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . We choose  $m_1 = 5$ , and  $m_2 = 7$  and with this choice we get the target polynomial

$$\begin{array}{ll} T(x) = (x - m_1)(x - m_2) & \# \text{ Definition of } T \\ = (x - 5)(x - 7) & \# \text{ Insert our choice} \\ = (x + 8)(x + 6) & \# \text{ Negatives in } \mathbb{F}_{13} \\ = x^2 + x + 9 & \# \text{ expand} \end{array}$$

4462 Then we have to compute the polynomials  $A_j$ ,  $B_j$  and  $C_j$  by their defining equation from the  
4463 R1CS coefficients. Since the R1CS has two constraining equations, those polynomials are of  
4464 degree 1 and they are defined by their evaluation at the point  $m_1 = 5$  and the point  $m_2 = 7$ .

At point  $m_1$ , each polynomial  $A_j$  is defined to be  $a_j^1$  and at point  $m_2$ , each polynomial  $A_j$  is defined to be  $a_j^2$ . The same holds true for the polynomials  $B_j$  as well as  $C_j$ . Writing all these equations down, we get:

$$\begin{array}{llllll} A_0(5) = 0, & A_1(5) = 0, & A_2(5) = 1, & A_3(5) = 0, & A_4(5) = 0, & A_5(5) = 0 \\ A_0(7) = 0, & A_1(7) = 0, & A_2(7) = 0, & A_3(7) = 0, & A_4(7) = 0, & A_5(7) = 1 \\ \\ B_0(5) = 0, & B_1(5) = 0, & B_2(5) = 0, & B_3(5) = 1, & B_4(5) = 0, & B_5(5) = 0 \\ B_0(7) = 0, & B_1(7) = 0, & B_2(7) = 0, & B_3(7) = 0, & B_4(7) = 1, & B_5(7) = 0 \\ \\ C_0(5) = 0, & C_1(5) = 0, & C_2(5) = 0, & C_3(5) = 0, & C_4(5) = 0, & C_5(5) = 1 \\ C_0(7) = 0, & C_1(7) = 1, & C_2(7) = 0, & C_3(7) = 0, & C_4(7) = 0, & C_5(7) = 0 \end{array}$$

4465 Lagrange's interpolation implies that a polynomial of degree  $k$ , that is zero on  $k + 1$  points has  
4466 to be the zero polynomial. Since our polynomials are of degree 1 and determined on 2 points,  
4467 we therefore know that the only non-zero polynomials in our QAP are  $A_2$ ,  $A_5$ ,  $B_3$ ,  $B_4$ ,  $C_1$  and  
4468  $C_5$ , and that we can use Lagrange's interpolation to compute them.

To compute  $A_2$  we note that the set  $S_{A_2}$  in our version of Lagrange's interpolation is given by  $S_{A_2} = \{(m_1, a_2^1), (m_2, a_2^2)\} = \{(5, 1), (7, 0)\}$ . Using this set we get:

$$\begin{array}{ll} A_2(x) = a_2^1 \cdot \left(\frac{x - m_2}{m_1 - m_2}\right) + a_2^2 \cdot \left(\frac{x - m_1}{m_2 - m_1}\right) = 1 \cdot \left(\frac{x - 7}{5 - 7}\right) + 0 \cdot \left(\frac{x - 5}{7 - 5}\right) \\ = \frac{x - 7}{-2} = \frac{x - 7}{11} & \# 11^{-1} = 6 \\ = 6(x - 7) = 6x + 10 & \# -7 = 6 \text{ and } 6 \cdot 6 = 10 \end{array}$$

To compute  $A_5$ , we note that the set  $S_{A_5}$  in our version of Lagrange's method is given by  $S_{A_5} = \{(m_1, a_5^1), (m_2, a_5^2)\} = \{(5, 0), (7, 1)\}$ . Using this set we get:

$$\begin{aligned} A_5(x) &= a_5^1 \cdot \left( \frac{x - m_2}{m_1 - m_2} \right) + a_5^2 \cdot \left( \frac{x - m_1}{m_2 - m_1} \right) = 0 \cdot \left( \frac{x - 7}{5 - 7} \right) + 1 \cdot \left( \frac{x - 5}{7 - 5} \right) \\ &= \frac{x - 5}{2} \quad \# 2^{-1} = 7 \\ &= 7(x - 5) = 7x + 4 \quad \# -5 = 8 \text{ and } 7 \cdot 8 = 4 \end{aligned}$$

4469 Using Lagrange's interpolation, we can deduce that  $A_2 = B_3 = C_5$  as well as  $A_5 = B_4 = C_1$ ,  
 4470 since they are polynomials of degree 1 that evaluate to same values on 2 points. Using this, we  
 4471 get the following set of polynomials

$A_0(x) = 0$	$B_0(x) = 0$	$C_0(x) = 0$
$A_1(x) = 0$	$B_1(x) = 0$	$C_1(x) = 7x + 4$
$A_2(x) = 6x + 10$	$B_2(x) = 0$	$C_2(x) = 0$
$A_3(x) = 0$	$B_3(x) = 6x + 10$	$C_3(x) = 0$
$A_4(x) = 0$	$B_4(x) = 7x + 4$	$C_4(x) = 0$
$A_5(x) = 7x + 4$	$B_5(x) = 0$	$C_5(x) = 6x + 10$

4473 We can invoke Sage to verify our computation. In sage every polynomial ring has a function  
 4474 `lagrange_polynomial` that takes the defining points as inputs and the associated Lagrange  
 4475 polynomial as output.

```

4476 sage: F13 = GF(13)                                     643
4477 sage: F13t.<t> = F13[]                                   644
4478 sage: T = F13t((t-5)*(t-7))                             645
4479 sage: A2 = F13t.lagrange_polynomial([(5,1),(7,0)])       646
4480 sage: A5 = F13t.lagrange_polynomial([(5,0),(7,1)])       647
4481 sage: T == F13t(t^2 + t + 9)                             648
4482 True                                                    649
4483 sage: A2 == F13t(6*t + 10)                               650
4484 True                                                    651
4485 sage: A5 == F13t(7*t + 4)                               652
4486 True                                                    653

```

4487 Combining this computation with the target polynomial we derived earlier, a Quadratic  
 4488 Arithmetic Program associated to the Rank-1 Constraint System  $R_{3.fac\_zk}$  is given as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} QAP(R_{3.fac\_zk}) &= \{x^2 + x + 9, \\ &\quad \{0, 0, 6x + 10, 0, 0, 7x + 4\}, \{0, 0, 0, 6x + 10, 7x + 4, 0\}, \{0, 7x + 4, 0, 0, 0, 6x + 10\}\} \end{aligned}$$

4489 *Exercise 88.* Consider the Rank-1 Constraint System for points on the tiny-jubjub curve from  
 4490 example 117. Compute an associated QAP for this R1CS and double check your computation  
 4491 using sage.

4492 **QAP Satisfiability** One of the major points of Quadratic Arithmetic Programs in proving sys-  
 4493 tems is that solutions of their associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems are in 1:1 correspondence  
 4494 with certain polynomials  $P$  divisible by the target polynomial  $T$  of the QAP. Verifying solutions

to the R1CS and hence, checking proper circuit execution is then achievable by polynomial division of  $P$  by  $T$ .

To be more specific, let  $R$  be some Rank-1 Constraint System with associated variables  $(\langle I_1, \dots, I_n \rangle; \langle W_1, \dots, W_m \rangle)$  and let  $QAP(R)$  be a Quadratic Arithmetic Program of  $R$ . Then the string  $(\langle I_1, \dots, I_n \rangle; \langle W_1, \dots, W_m \rangle)$  is a solution to the R1CS if and only if the following polynomial is divisible by the target polynomial  $T$ :

$$P_{(I;W)} = (A_0 + \sum_j^n I_j \cdot A_j + \sum_j^m W_j \cdot A_{n+j}) \cdot (B_0 + \sum_j^n I_j \cdot B_j + \sum_j^m W_j \cdot B_{n+j}) - (C_0 + \sum_j^n I_j \cdot C_j + \sum_j^m W_j \cdot C_{n+j}) \quad (6.15)$$

To understand how Quadratic Arithmetic Programs define formal languages, observe that every QAP over a field  $\mathbb{F}$  defines a decision function over the alphabet  $\Sigma_I \times \Sigma_W = \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$  in the following way:

$$R_{QAP} : (\mathbb{F})^* \times (\mathbb{F})^* \rightarrow \{true, false\} ; (I;W) \mapsto \begin{cases} true & P_{(I;W)} \text{ is divisible by } T \\ false & \text{else} \end{cases} \quad (6.16)$$

This means that every QAP defines a formal language  $L_{QAP}$ , and, if the QAP is associated to an R1CS, the language generated by the QAP and the language generated by the R1CS are equivalent. In the context of languages generated by Quadratic Arithmetic Programs, a **statement** is then a membership claim “There is a word  $(I;W)$  in  $L_{QAP}$ ”. A proof to this claim is therefore given by a polynomial  $P_{(I;W)}$ , which is verified by dividing  $P_{(I;W)}$  by  $T$ .

Note the structural similarities and differences in the definition of an R1CS and its associated language in ??, of circuits and their associated languages in 6.2.2 and of QAPs and their associated languages as explained in this part. For circuits and their associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems, a constructive proof consists of a valid assignment of field elements to the edges of the circuit, or the variables in the R1CS. However, in the case of QAPs, a valid proof consists of a polynomial  $P_{(I;W)}$ .

To compute a constructive proof for a statement in  $L_{QAP}$  given some instance  $I$ , a prover first needs to compute a constructive proof  $W$  of the associated R1CS, e.g. by executing the circuit of the R1CS. With  $(I;W)$  at hand, the prover can then compute the polynomial  $P_{(I;W)}$  and publish the polynomial as proof.

Verifying a constructive proof in the case of a circuit is achieved by executing the circuit and then by comparing the result against the given proof. Verifying the same proof in the R1CS picture means checking if the elements of the proof satisfy the R1CS equations. In contrast, verifying a proof in the QAP picture is done by polynomial division of the proof  $P$  by the target polynomial  $T$ . The proof is verified if and only if  $P$  is divisible by  $T$ .

*Example 128.* Consider the Quadratic Arithmetic Program  $QAP(R_{3, fac\_zk})$  from example 127 and its associated R1CS from equation 116. To give an intuition of how proofs in the language  $L_{QAP(R_{3, fac\_zk})}$  look like, let's consider the instance  $I_1 = 11$ . As we know from example 122,  $(W_1, W_2, W_3, W_5) = (2, 3, 4, 6)$  is a proper witness, since  $(\langle I_1 \rangle; \langle W_1, W_2, W_3, W_5 \rangle) = (\langle 11 \rangle; \langle 2, 3, 4, 6 \rangle)$  is a valid circuit assignment and hence, a solution to  $R_{3, fac\_zk}$  and a constructive proof for language  $L_{R_{3, fac\_zk}}$ .

In order to transform this constructive proof into a knowledge proof in language  $L_{QAP(R_{3, fac\_zk})}$ , a prover has to use the elements of the constructive proof, to compute the polynomial  $P_{(I;W)}$ .

In the case of  $(\langle I_1 \rangle; \langle W_1, W_2, W_3, W_5 \rangle) = (\langle 11 \rangle; \langle 2, 3, 4, 6 \rangle)$ , the associated proof

is computed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
P_{(I;W)} &= (A_0 + \sum_j^n I_j \cdot A_j + \sum_j^m W_j \cdot A_{n+j}) \cdot (B_0 + \sum_j^n I_j \cdot B_j + \sum_j^m W_j \cdot B_{n+j}) - (C_0 + \sum_j^n I_j \cdot C_j + \sum_j^m W_j \cdot C_{n+j}) \\
&= (2(6x + 10) + 6(7x + 4)) \cdot (3(6x + 10) + 4(7x + 4)) - (11(7x + 4) + 6(6x + 10)) \\
&= ((12x + 7) + (3x + 11)) \cdot ((5x + 4) + (2x + 3)) - ((12x + 5) + (10x + 8)) \\
&= (2x + 5) \cdot (7x + 7) - (9x) \\
&= (x^2 + 2 \cdot 7x + 5 \cdot 7x + 5 \cdot 7) - (9x) \\
&= (x^2 + x + 9x + 9) - (9x) \\
&= x^2 + x + 9
\end{aligned}$$

4532 Given instance  $I_1 = 11$  a prover therefore provides the polynomial  $x^2 + x + 9$  as proof. To verify  
4533 this proof, any verifier can then look up the target polynomial  $T$  from the QAP and divide  $P_{(I;W)}$   
4534 by  $T$ . In this particular example,  $P_{(I;W)}$  is equal to the target polynomial  $T$ , and hence, it is  
4535 divisible by  $T$  with  $P/T = 1$ . The verifier therefore verifies the proof.

```

4536 sage: F13 = GF(13) 654
4537 sage: F13t.<t> = F13[] 655
4538 sage: T = F13t(t^2 + t + 9) 656
4539 sage: P = F13t((2*(6*t+10)+6*(7*t+4))*(3*(6*t+10)+4*(7*t+4)) 657
4540               -(11*(7*t+4)+6*(6*t+10)))
4541 sage: P == T 658
4542 True 659
4543 sage: P % T # remainder 660
4544 0 661

```

To give an example of a false proof, consider the string  $(\langle I_1 \rangle; \langle W_1, W_2, W_3, W_4 \rangle) = (\langle 11 \rangle, \langle 2, 3, 4, 8 \rangle)$ . Executing the circuit, we can see that this is not a valid assignment and not a solution to the R1CS, and hence, not a constructive knowledge proof in  $L_{3, \text{fac\_zk}}$ . However, a prover might use these values to construct a false proof  $P_{(I;W)}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
P'_{(I;W)} &= (A_0 + \sum_j^n I_j \cdot A_j + \sum_j^m W_j \cdot A_{n+j}) \cdot (B_0 + \sum_j^n I_j \cdot B_j + \sum_j^m W_j \cdot B_{n+j}) - (C_0 + \sum_j^n I_j \cdot C_j + \sum_j^m W_j \cdot C_{n+j}) \\
&= (2(6x + 10) + 8(7x + 4)) \cdot (3(6x + 10) + 4(7x + 4)) - (8(6x + 10) + 11(7x + 4)) \\
&= 8x^2 + 6
\end{aligned}$$

Given instance  $I_1 = 11$ , a prover therefore provides the polynomial  $8x^2 + 6$  as proof. To verify this proof, any verifier can look up the target polynomial  $T$  from the QAP and divide  $P_{(I;W)}$  by  $T$ . However, polynomial division has the following remainder:

$$(8x^2 + 6)/(x^2 + x + 9) = 8 + \frac{5x + 12}{x^2 + x + 9}$$

4545 This implies that  $P_{(I;W)}$  is not divisible by  $T$ , and hence, the verifier does not verify the proof.  
4546 Any verifier can therefore show that the proof is false.

```

4547 sage: F13 = GF(13) 662
4548 sage: F13t.<t> = F13[] 663
4549 sage: T = F13t(t^2 + t + 9) 664
4550 sage: P = F13t((2*(6*t+10)+8*(7*t+4))*(3*(6*t+10)+4*(7*t+4))-( 665
4551               8*(6*t+10)+11*(7*t+4)))

```

4552	<b>sage:</b> $P == F13t(8*t^2 + 6)$	666
4553	<b>True</b>	667
4554	<b>sage:</b> $P \% T$ <b># remainder</b>	668
4555	$5*t + 12$	669

## Chapter 7

# Circuit Compilers

As we have seen in the previous chapter, statements can be formalized as membership or knowledge claims in formal languages, and algebraic circuits as well as Rank-1 Constraint Systems are two practically important ways to define those languages.

However, both algebraic circuits and Rank-1 Constraint Systems are not ideal from a developers point of view, because they deviate substantially from common programming paradigms. Writing real-world applications as circuits and the associated verification in terms of Rank-1 Constraint Systems is at least as troublesome as writing any other low-level language like assembler code. To allow for complex statement design, it is therefore necessary to have some kind of compiler framework, capable of transforming high-level languages into arithmetic circuits and associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems.

As we have seen in chapter 6 and in 6.2.1 as well as 6.2.2, both arithmetic circuits and Rank-1 Constraint Systems have a modularity property 6.2.1 by which it is possible to synthesize complex circuits from simple ones. A basic approach taken by many circuit/R1CS compilers is therefore to provide a library of atomic and simple circuits and then define a way to combine those basic building blocks into arbitrary complex systems.

In this chapter, we provide an introduction to basic concepts of so-called **circuit compilers** and derive a toy language which we can “compile” in a pen-and-paper approach into graphical representations of algebraic circuits and their associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems.

We start with a general introduction to our toy programming language, and then introduce atomic types like booleans and unsigned integers. Then we define the fundamental control flow primitives like the if-then-else conditional and the bounded loop. We will look at basic functionality primitives like elliptic curve cryptography. Primitives like these are often called **gadgets** in the literature.

## 7.1 A Pen-and-Paper Language

To explain basic concepts of circuit compilers and their associated high-level languages, we derive an informal toy language and associated “brain-compiler” which we name **PAPER (Pen-And-Paper Execution Rules)**. **PAPER** allows programmers to define statements in Rust-like pseudo-code. The language is inspired by `zokrates` and `circom`.

### 7.1.1 The Grammar

In **PAPER**, any statement is defined as an ordered list of functions, where any function has to be declared in the list before it is called in another function of that list. The last entry in a statement

add references to these languages?



has to be a special function, called `main`. Functions take a list of typed parameters as inputs and compute a tuple of typed variables as output, where `type_functions` are special functions that define how to transform one type into another type, ultimately transforming any type into elements of the base field where the circuit is defined over.

Any statement is parameterized over the field that the circuit will be defined on, and has additional optional parameters of unsigned type, needed to define the size of arrays or the counter of bounded loops. The following definition makes the grammar of a statement precise using a command line language like description:

```
statement <Name> {F:<Field> [ , <N_1: unsigned>, ... ] } {
  [fn <Name> ([[pub]<Arg>:<Type>, ...]) -> (<Type>, ...)] {
    [let [pub] <Var>:<Type> ; ... ]
    [let const <Const>:<Type>=<Value> ; ... ]
    Var<==>(fn ([<Arg>|<Const>|<Var>, ...]) | (<Arg>|<Const>|<Var>)) ;
    return (<Var>, ...) ;
  } ; ... ]
  fn main ([[pub]<Arg>:<Type>, ...]) -> (<Type>, ...) {
    [let [pub] <Var>:<Type> ; ... ]
    [let const <Const>:<Type>=<Value> ; ... ]
    Var<==>(fn ([<Arg>|<Const>|<Var>, ...]) | (<Arg>|<Const>|<Var>)) ;
    return (<Var>, ...) ;
  } ;
}
```

Function arguments and variables are witness variables by default, but can be declared as instance by the `pub` specifier. Declaring arguments and variables as instances always overwrites any previous or conflicting witness declarations. Every argument, constant or variable has a type, and every type is defined as a function that transforms that type into another type. In order for a PAPER program to compile successfully, all type transformations must be composed in such a way that the final type is the base field where the circuit is defined over:

```
type_function <TYPE>( t1 : <TYPE_1>) -> TYPE_2{
  let t2: TYPE_2 <==> fn(TYPE_1)
  return t2
}
```

Many real-world circuit languages are based on a similar, but of course more sophisticated approach than PAPER. The purpose of PAPER is to show basic principles of circuit compilers and their associated high-level languages.

*Example 129.* To get a better understanding of the grammar of PAPER, the following constitutes proper high-level code that follows the grammar of the PAPER language, assuming that all types in that code have been defined elsewhere.

```
statement MOCK_CODE {F: F_43, N_1 = 1024, N_2 = 8} {
  fn foo(in_1 : F, pub in_2 : TYPE_2) -> F {
    let const c_1 : F = 0 ;
    let const c_2 : TYPE_2 = SOME_VALUE ;
    let pub out_1 : F ;
    out_1<==> c_1 ;
    return out_1 ;
  } ;
  fn bar(pub in_1 : F) -> F {
```

```

4637     let out_1 : F ;
4638     out_1<==foo(in_1);
4639     return out_1 ;
4640 } ;
4641
4642 fn main(in_1 : TYPE_1)->(F, TYPE_2){
4643     let const c_1 : TYPE_1  = SOME_VALUE ;
4644     let const c_2 : F = 2;
4645     let const c_3 : TYPE_2  = SOME_VALUE  ;
4646     let pub out_1 : F ;
4647     let out_2 : TYPE_2 ;
4648     c_1 <== in_1 ;
4649     out_1 <== foo(c_2) ;
4650     out_2 <== TYPE_2 ;
4651     return (out_1,out_2) ;
4652 } ;
4653 }

```

### 7.1.2 The Execution Phases

In contrast to normal executable programs, programs for circuit compilers have two modes of execution. The first mode, usually called the **setup phase**, is executed in order to generate the circuit and its associated Rank-1 Constraint System, the latter of which is then usually used as input to some zero-knowledge proof system as explained in 8.

The second mode of execution is usually called the **prover phase**. In this phase, some assignment to all instance variables of the circuit is usually given as input and the task of a prover is to compute a valid assignment to all witness variables of the circuit. Depending on the use case, this valid assignment is then either directly used as constructive proof for proper circuit execution or is transferred as input to the proof generation algorithm of some zero-knowledge proof system, where the full-sized, non hiding constructive proof is processed into a succinct proof with various levels of zero knowledge.

Modern circuit languages and their associated compilers abstract over those two phases and provide a unified **interphase** to the developer, who then writes a single program that can be used in both phases.

To give the reader a clear, conceptual distinction between the two phases, PAPER keeps them separated. PAPER-code can be “brain-compiled” during the **setup-phase** in a pen-and-paper approach into a graphical circuit representation. Once a circuit is derived, it can be executed in a **prover phase** to generate a valid assignment. The valid assignment is then interpreted as a constructive proof for a knowledge claim in the associated language.

**The Setup Phase** In PAPER, the task of the setup phase is to compile code in the PAPER language into a visual representation of an algebraic circuit. Deriving the circuit from the code in a pen-and-paper style is what we call **brain-compiling**.

Given some statement description that adheres to the correct grammar, we start the graphical circuit compilation process with an empty circuit, compile the main function first and then inductively compile all other functions as they are called during the process.

For every function that we currently compile, we draw a box-node for every input argument, every variable and every constant of that function. If the node represents a variable, we label it with that variable’s name, and if it represents a constant, we label it with that constant’s value.

We group arguments into a subgraph labeled “inputs” and return values into a subgraph labeled “outputs”. We then group everything into a subgraph and label that subgraph with the function’s name.

After this is done, we have to do a consistency and type check for every occurrence of the assignment operator `<==`. We have to ensure that the expression on the right side of the operator is well defined and that the types of both side match.

Then we compile the right side of every occurrence of the assignment operator `<==`. If the right side is a constant or variable defined in this function, we draw a dotted line from the box-node that represents the left side of `<==` to the box node that represents the right side of the same operator. If the right side represents an argument of that function we draw a line from the box-node that represents the left side of `<==` to the box node that represents the right side of the same operator.

If the right side of the `<==` operator is a function, we look into our database, find its associated circuit and draw it. If no circuit is associated to that function yet, we repeat the compilation process for that function, drawing edges from the function’s argument to its input nodes and from the functions output nodes to the nodes on the right side of `<==`.

During that process, edge labels are drawn according to the defining rules of algebraic circuits from 6.2.2. If the associated variable represents a witness variable, we use the *W* label to indicate a witness, and if it represents a instance variable, we use the *I* label to indicate an instance. Variables are witnesses by default and the *pub* specifier indicates that the variable is an instance.

Once this is done, we compile all occurring types of all variables in a function, by compiling the `type_function` of each type. We do this inductively until we reach the type of the base field. Circuits have no notion of types, only of field elements; hence, every type needs to be compiled to the field type in a sequence of compilation steps.

The compilation stops once we have inductively replaced all functions by their circuits. The result is a circuit that contains many unnecessary box nodes. In a final **optimization step**, all box nodes that are directly linked to each other are collapsed into a single node, and all box nodes that represent the same constants are collapsed into a single node.

Of course, PAPER’s brain-compiler is not properly defined in any formal manner. Its purpose is to highlight important steps that real-world compilers undergo in their setup phases.

*Example 130 (A trivial Circuit).* To give an intuition of how to write and compile circuits in the PAPER language, consider the following statement description:


```
statement trivial_circuit {F:F_13} {
  fn main{F}{in1 : F, pub in2 : F} -> (F,F){
    let const outc1 : F = 0 ;
    let const incl : F = 7 ;
    let out1 : F ;
    let out2 : F ;
    out1 <== incl;
    out2 <== in1;
    outc1 <== in2;
    return (out1, out2) ;
  }
}
```

To brain-compile this statement into an algebraic circuit with PAPER, we start with an empty circuit and evaluate function `main`, which is the only function in this statement.

We draw box-nodes for every argument, every constant and every variable of the function

and label them with their names or values, respectively. Then we do a consistency and type check for every  $\leq$  operator in the function. Since the circuit only wires inputs to outputs and all elements have the same type, the check is valid.

Then we evaluate the right side of the assignment operators. Since, in our case, the right side of each operator is not a function, we draw edges from the box-nodes on the right side to the associated box node on the left side. To label those edges, we use the general rules of algebraic circuits as defined in 6.2.2. According to those rules, every incoming edge of a sink node has a label and every outgoing edge of a source node has a label, if the node is labeled with a variable. Since nodes that represent constants are implicitly assumed to be private, and since the public specifier determines if an edge is labeled with  $W$  or  $I$ , we get the following circuit:



**The Prover Phase** In PAPER, a so-called **prover phase** can be executed once the setup phase has generated a graphic circuit representation from its associated high-level code. This is done by executing the circuit while assigning proper values to all input nodes of the circuit. However, in contrast to most real-world compilers, PAPER does not tell the prover how to find proper input values to a given circuit. Real-world programming languages usually provide this data by computations that are done outside of the circuit.

*Example 131.* Consider the circuit from example 123. Valid assignments to this circuit are constructive proofs that the pair of inputs  $\langle I_1, I_2 \rangle$  is a point on the tiny-jubjub curve. However, the circuit does not provide a way to actually compute proper values for  $I_1$  and  $I_2$ . Any real-world system therefore needs an auxiliary computation that provides those values.

## 7.2 Common Programing concepts

In this section, we cover concepts that appear in almost every programming language, and see how they can be implemented in circuit compilers.

### 7.2.1 Primitive Types

Primitive data types like booleans, (unsigned) integers, or strings are the most basic building blocks one can expect to find in every general high-level programming language. In order to write statements as computer programs that compile into circuits, it is therefore necessary to implement primitive types as constraint systems, and define their associated operations as circuits.

In this section, we look at some common ways to achieve this. After a recapitulation of the atomic type for the base field where the circuit is defined on, we start with an implementation of the boolean type and its associated boolean algebra as circuits. After that, we define unsigned integers based on the boolean type, and leave the implementation of signed integers as an exercise to the reader.

### The base-field type

Since both algebraic circuits and their associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems are defined over a finite field, elements from that field are the atomic informational units in those models. In this sense, field elements  $x \in \mathbb{F}$  are for algebraic circuits what bits are for computers.

In PAPER, we write  $\mathbb{F}$  for this type and specify the actual instance of the field type in curly brackets after the name of a given statement. Two functions are associated to this type, which are induced by the **addition** and **multiplication** law in the field  $\mathbb{F}$ . We write

$$\text{MUL} : \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F} ; (x, y) \mapsto \text{MUL}(x, y) \quad (7.1)$$

$$\text{ADD} : \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F} ; (x, y) \mapsto \text{ADD}(x, y) \quad (7.2)$$


Circuit compilers have to compile these functions into arithmetic gates, as explained in 6.2.2. Every other function has to be expressed in terms of these two atomic functions.

To represent addition and multiplication in the PAPER language, we define the following two functions:

```
fn MUL(x : F, y : F) -> F{}
```

```
fn ADD(x : F, y : F) -> F{}
```

The compiler then compiles every occurrence of the MUL or the ADD function into the following graphical circuit representations:



*Example 132* (Basic gates). To give an intuition of how a real-world compiler might transform addition and multiplication in algebraic expressions into a circuit, consider the following PAPER statement:


```
statement basic_ops {F:F_13} {
  fn main(in_1 : F, pub in_2 : F) -> (F, F){
    let out_1 : F ;
    let out_2 : F ;
    out_1 <== MUL(in_1, in_2) ;
    out_2 <== ADD(in_1, in_2) ;
    return (out_1, out_2) ;
  }
}
```

To compile this into an algebraic circuit, we start with an empty circuit and evaluate the function `main`, which is the only function in this statement. We draw an inputs subgraph containing box-nodes for every argument of the function, and an outputs subgraph containing box-nodes for every factor in the return value. Since all of these nodes represent variables of the `field` type, we don't have to add any type constraints to the circuit.

We check the validity of every expression on the right side of every  $\leq$  operator including a type check. In our case, every variable is of the `field` type and hence the types match the types of the `MUL` as well as the `ADD` function and the type of the left sides of  $\leq$  operators.


We evaluate the expressions on the right side of every  $\leq$  operator inductively, replacing every occurrence of a function with a subgraph that represents its associated circuit.

According to `PAPER`, every occurrence of the instance specifier `pub` overwrites the associate witness default value. Using the appropriate edge labels we get:



Any real-world compiler might process its associated high-level language in a similar way, replacing functions, or gadgets by predefined associated circuits. This process is often followed by various optimization steps that try to reduce the number of constraints as much as possible.

In `PAPER`, we optimize this circuit by collapsing all box nodes that are directly connected to other box nodes, adhering to the rule that a variable's `pub` specifier overwrites any witness specifier. Reindexing edge labels, we get the following circuit as our pen and paper compiler output:



*Example 133 (3-factorization).* Consider our 3-factorization problem from example 111 and the associated circuit  $C_{3, \text{fac\_zk}}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$  we provided in example 121. To understand the process of replacing high-level functions by their associated circuits inductively, we want define a `PAPER` statement that we brain-compile into an algebraic circuit equivalent to  $C_{3, \text{fac\_zk}}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$ :

```


4819 statement 3_fac_zk {F:F_13} {
4820   fn main(x_1 : F, x_2 : F, x_3 : F) -> F{
4821     let pub 3_fac_zk : F ;
4822     f_3.fac_zk <== MUL( MUL( x_1 , x_2 ) , x_3 ) ;
4823     return 3_fac_zk ;
4824   }
4825 }

```

Using PAPER, we start with an empty circuit and then add 3 input nodes to the input subgraph as well as 1 output node to the output subgraph. All these nodes are decorated with the associated variable names. Since all of these nodes represent variables of the `field` type, we don't have to add any type constraints to the circuit.


We check the validity of every expression on the right side of the single `<==` operator including a type check.

We evaluate the expressions on the right side of every `<==` operator inductively. We have two nested multiplication functions and we replace them by the associated multiplication circuits, starting with the most outer function. We get:



4835


In a final optimization step, we collapse all box nodes directly connected to other box nodes, adhering to the rule that a variable's `public` specifier overwrites any `private` specifier. Reindexing edge labels we get the following circuit:



4839

4840 **The Subtraction Constraint System** By definition, algebraic circuits only contain addition  
 4841 and multiplication gates, and it follows that there is no single gate for field subtraction, despite  
 4842 the fact that subtraction is a native operation in every field.

4843 High-level languages and their associated circuit compilers, therefore, need another way to  
 4844 deal with subtraction. To see how this can be achieved, recall that subtraction is defined by addi-  
 4845 tion with the additive inverse, and that the inverse can be computed efficiently by multiplication  
 4846 with  $-1$ . A circuit for field subtraction is therefore given by



4847

4848 Using the general method from 6.2.2, the circuits associated Rank-1 Constraint System is given  
 4849 by:

$$(S_1 + (-1) \cdot S_2) \cdot 1 = S_3 \quad (7.3)$$

4850 Any valid assignment  $\langle S_1, S_2, S_3 \rangle$  to this circuit therefore enforces the value  $S_3$  to be the  
 4851 difference  $S_1 - S_2$ .

4852 Real-world compilers usually provide a gadget or a function to abstract over this circuit such  
 4853 that programmers can use subtraction as if it were native to circuits. In PAPER, we define the  
 4854 following subtraction function that compiles to the previous circuit:

```
4855 fn SUB(x : F, y : F) -> F{
4856   let rslt : F ;
4857   constant c : F = -1 ;
4858   rslt <== ADD(x , MUL( y , c) );
4859   return rslt ;
4860 }
```

4861 In the setup phase of a statement, we compile every occurrence of the SUB function into an  
 4862 instance of its associated subtraction circuit, and edge labels are generated according to the  
 4863 rules from 6.2.2.




**The Inversion Constraint System** By definition, algebraic circuits only contain addition and multiplication gates, and it follows that there is no single gate for field inversion, despite the fact that inversion is a native operation in every field.

If the underlying field is a prime field, one approach would be to use Fermat’s little theorem 3.3 to compute the multiplicative inverse inside the circuit. To see how this works, let  $\mathbb{F}_p$  be the prime field. The multiplicative inverse  $x^{-1}$  of a field element  $x \in \mathbb{F}$  with  $x \neq 0$  is then given by  $x^{-1} = x^{p-2}$ , and computing  $x^{p-2}$  in the circuit therefore computes the multiplicative inverse.

Unfortunately, real-world primes  $p$  are large and computing  $x^{p-2}$  by repeated multiplication of  $x$  with itself is infeasible. A “square and multiply” approach is faster, as it computes the power in roughly  $\log_2(p)$  steps, but still adds a lot of constraints to the circuit.

Computing inverses in the circuit makes no use of the fact that inversion is a native operation in any field. A more constraints friendly approach is therefore to compute the multiplicative inverse outside of the circuit and then only enforce correctness of the computation in the circuit.

To understand how this can be achieved, observe that a field element  $y \in \mathbb{F}$  is the multiplicative inverse of a field element  $x \in \mathbb{F}$  if and only if  $x \cdot y = 1$  in  $\mathbb{F}$ . We can use this, and define a circuit that has two inputs,  $x$  and  $y$ , and enforces  $x \cdot y = 1$ . It is then guaranteed that  $y$  is the multiplicative inverse of  $x$ . The price we pay is that we can not compute  $y$  by circuit execution, but auxiliary data is needed to tell any prover which value of  $y$  is needed for a valid circuit assignment. The following circuit defines the constraint



Using the general method from 6.2.2, the circuit is transformed into the following Rank-1 Constraint System:

$$S_1 \cdot S_2 = 1 \quad (7.4)$$

Any valid assignment  $\langle S_1, S_2 \rangle$  to this circuit enforces that  $S_2$  is the multiplicative inverse of  $S_1$ , and, since there is no field element  $S_2$  such that  $0 \cdot S_2 = 1$ , it also handles the fact that the multiplicative inverse of 0 is not defined in any field.

Real-world compilers usually provide a gadget or a function to abstract over this circuit, and those functions compute the inverse  $x^{-1}$  as part of their witness generation process. Programmers then don’t have to care about providing the inverse as auxiliary data to the circuit. In PAPER, we define the following inversion function that compiles to the previous circuit:

```

fn INV(x : F, y : F) -> F {
  let x_inv : F ;
  constant c : F = 1 ;
  c <== MUL( x , y ) ;
  x_inv <== y ;
  return x_inv ;
}


```

As we see, this functions takes two inputs, the field value and its inverse. It therefore does not handle the computation of the inverse by itself. This is to keep PAPER as simple as possible.

In the setup phase, we compile every occurrence of the INV function into an instance of the inversion circuit 7.2.1, and edge labels are generated according to the rules from 6.2.2.

**The Division Constraint System** By definition, algebraic circuits only contain addition and multiplication gates, and it follows that there is no single gate for field division, despite the fact that division is a native operation in every field.

Implementing division as a circuit, we use the fact that division is multiplication with the multiplicative inverse. We therefore define division as a circuit using the inversion circuit and constraint system from the previous paragraph. Expensive inversion is computed outside of the circuit and then provided as circuit input. We get



Using the method from 6.2.2, we transform this circuit into the following Rank-1 Constraint System:

$$\begin{aligned} S_2 \cdot S_3 &= 1 \\ S_1 \cdot S_3 &= S_4 \end{aligned}$$

Any valid assignment  $\langle S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4 \rangle$  to this circuit enforces  $S_4$  to be the field division of  $S_1$  by  $S_2$ . It handles the fact that division by 0 is not defined, since there is no valid assignment in case  $S_2 = 0$ .

In PAPER, we define the following division function that compiles to the previous circuit:

```
fn DIV(x : F, y : F, y_inv : F) -> F {
  let DIV : F ;
  DIV <== MUL( x , INV( y, y_inv ) ) ;
  return DIV
}
```

In the setup phase, we compile every occurrence of the binary DIV operator into an instance of the inversion circuit.

**Exercise 89.** Let  $F$  be the field  $\mathbb{F}_5$  of modular 5 arithmetics from example 14. Brain-compile the following PAPER statement into an algebraic circuit:

```
statement STUPID_CIRC {F: F_5} {
  fn foo(in_1 : F, in_2 : F)->(out_1 : F, out_2 : F){
    constant c_1 : F = 3 ;
    out_1<== ADD( MUL( c_1 , in_1 ) , in_1 ) ;
    out_2<== INV( c_1 , in_2 ) ;
  } ;

  fn main(in_1 : F, in_2 : F)->(out_1 : F, out_2 : TYPE_2){
    constant (c_1,c_2) : (F,F) = (3,2) ;
    (out_1,out_2) <== foo(in_1, in_2) ;
  } ;
}
```

*Exercise 90.* Consider the tiny-jubjub curve from example 69 and its associated circuit 120. Write a statement in PAPER that brain-compiles the statement into a circuit equivalent to the one derived in 120, assuming that curve point is the instance and every other assignment is a witness.

*Exercise 91.* Let  $F = \mathbb{F}_{13}$  be the modular 13 prime field and  $x \in F$  some field element. Define a statement in PAPER such that given instance  $x$  a field element  $y \in F$  is a witness for the statement if and only if  $y$  is the square root of  $x$ .

Brain-compile the statement into a circuit and derive its associated Rank-1 Constraint System. Consider the instance  $x = 9$  and compute a constructive proof for the statement.

## The boolean Type


Booleans are a classical primitive type, implemented by virtually every higher programming language. It is therefore important to implement booleans in circuits. One of the most common ways to do this is by interpreting the additive and multiplicative neutral element  $\{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{F}$  as the two boolean values such that 0 represents *false* and 1 represents *true*. Boolean operators like *and*, *or*, or *xor* are then expressible as algebraic circuits over  $\mathbb{F}$ .

Representing booleans this way is convenient, because the elements 0 and 1 are defined in any field. The representation is therefore independent of the actual field in consideration.

To fix boolean algebra notation, we write 0 to represent *false* and 1 to represent *true*, and we write  $\wedge$  to represent the boolean AND as well as  $\vee$  to represent the boolean OR operator. The boolean NOT operator is written as  $\neg$ .

**The boolean Constraint System** To represent booleans by the additive and multiplicative neutral elements of a field, a constraint is required to actually enforce variables of boolean type to be either 1 or 0. In fact, many of the following circuits that represent boolean functions are only correct under the assumption that their input variables are constrained to be either 0 or 1. Not constraining boolean variables is a common problem in circuit design.

In order to constrain an arbitrary field element  $x \in \mathbb{F}$  to be 1 or 0, the key observation is that the equation  $x \cdot (1 - x) = 0$  has only the two solutions 0 and 1 in any field. Implementing this equation as a circuit therefore generates the correct constraint:



Using the method from 6.2.2, we transform this circuit into the following Rank-1 Constraint System:

$$S_1 \cdot (1 - S_1) = 0$$

Any valid assignment  $\langle S_1 \rangle$  to label of this circuit therefore enforces  $S_1$  to be either the field element 0 or 1.

Some real-world circuit compilers (like ZOKRATES or BELLMAN) are typed, while others (like circom) are not. However, all of them have their way of dealing with the binary constraint. In PAPER, we define the boolean type by its type\_function that compiles to the previous circuit:

```


type_function BOOL(b : BOOL) -> F {
  let x : F ;
  let const c1 : F = 0 ;
  let const c2 : F = 1 ;
  let const c3 : F = -1 ;
  c1 <== MUL( b , ADD( c2 , MUL( b , c3 ) ) ) ;
  x <== b ;
  return x ;
}

```

In the setup phase of a statement, we compile every occurrence of a variable of boolean type into an instance of its associated boolean circuit.

**The AND operator constraint system** Given two field elements  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  from  $\mathbb{F}$  that are constrained to represent boolean variables, we want to find a circuit that computes the logical **and** operator  $AND(b_1, b_2)$  as well as its associated R1CS that enforces  $b_1, b_2, AND(b_1, b_2)$  to satisfy the constraint system if and only if  $b_1 \wedge b_2 = AND(b_1, b_2)$  holds true.

The key insight here is that, given three boolean constraint variables  $b_1, b_2$  and  $b_3$ , the equation  $b_1 \cdot b_2 = b_3$  is satisfied in  $\mathbb{F}$  if and only if the equation  $b_1 \wedge b_2 = b_3$  is satisfied in boolean algebra. The logical operator  $\wedge$  is therefore implementable in  $\mathbb{F}$  by field multiplication of its arguments and the following circuit computes the  $\wedge$  operator in  $\mathbb{F}$ , assuming all inputs are restricted to be 0 or 1:



The associated Rank-1 Constraint System can be deduced from the general process 6.2.2 and consists of the following constraint:

$$S_1 \cdot S_2 = S_3 \quad (7.5)$$

Common circuit languages typically provide a gadget or a function to abstract over this circuit such that programers can use the  $\wedge$  operator without caring about the associated circuit. In PAPER, we define the following function that compiles to the  $\wedge$ -operator's circuit:

```


fn AND(b_1 : BOOL, b_2 : BOOL) -> BOOL{
  let AND : BOOL ;
  AND <== MUL( b_1 , b_2 ) ;
  return AND ;
}

```

In the setup phase of a statement, we compile every occurrence of the AND function into an instance of its associated  $\wedge$ -operator's circuit.

**The OR operator constraint system** Given two field elements  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  from  $\mathbb{F}$  that are constrained to represent boolean variables, we want to find a circuit that computes the logical **or** operator  $OR(b_1, b_2)$  as well as its associated R1CS that enforces  $b_1, b_2, OR(b_1, b_2)$  to satisfy the constraint system if and only if  $b_1 \vee b_2 = OR(b_1, b_2)$  holds true.

Assuming that three variables  $b_1, b_2$  and  $b_3$  are boolean constraint, the equation  $b_1 + b_2 - b_1 \cdot b_2 = b_3$  is satisfied in  $\mathbb{F}$  if and only if the equation  $b_1 \vee b_2 = b_3$  is satisfied in boolean algebra. The logical operator  $\vee$  is therefore implementable in  $\mathbb{F}$  by the following circuit, assuming all inputs are restricted to be 0 or 1:



The associated Rank-1 Constraint System can be deduced from the general process 6.2.2 and consists of the following constraints:

$$\begin{aligned} S_1 \cdot S_2 &= S_3 \\ (S_1 + S_2 - S_3) \cdot 1 &= S_4 \end{aligned}$$

Common circuit languages typically provide a gadget or a function to abstract over this circuit such that programers can use the  $\vee$  operator without caring about the associated circuit. In PAPER, we define the following function that compiles to the  $\vee$ -operator's circuit:

```

5017 fn OR(b_1 : BOOL, b_2 : BOOL) -> BOOL {
5018   let OR : BOOL ;
5019   let const c1 : F = -1 ;
5020   OR <== ADD (ADD (b_1, b_2) , MUL (c1, MUL (b_1, b_2) ) ) ;
5021   return OR ;
5022 }
```

In the setup phase of a statement, we compile every occurrence of the OR function into an instance of its associated  $\vee$ -operator's circuit.

**Exercise 92.** Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field and let  $b_1$  as well as  $b_2$  two boolean constrained variables from  $\mathbb{F}$ . Show that the equation  $OR(b_1, b_2) = 1 - (1 - b_1) \cdot (1 - b_2)$  holds true.


Use this equation to derive an algebraic circuit with ingoing variables  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  and outgoing variable  $OR(b_1, b_2)$  such that  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  are boolean constrained and the circuit has a valid assignment, if and only if  $OR(b_1, b_2) = b_1 \vee b_2$ .

Use the technique from 6.2.2 to transform this circuit into a Rank-1 Constraint System and find its full solution set. Define a PAPER function that brain-compiles into the circuit.

**The NOT operator constraint system** Given a field element  $b$  from  $\mathbb{F}$  that is constrained to represent a boolean variable, we want to find a circuit that computes the logical **NOT** operator

$NOT(b)$  as well as its associated R1CS that enforces  $b, NOT(b)$  to satisfy the constraint system if and only if  $\neg b = NOT(b)$  holds true.

Assuming that two variables  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  are boolean constrained, the equation  $(1 - b_1) = b_2$  is satisfied in  $\mathbb{F}$  if and only if the equation  $\neg b_1 = b_2$  is satisfied in boolean algebra. The logical operator  $\neg$  is therefore implementable in  $\mathbb{F}$  by the following circuit, assuming all inputs are restricted to be 0 or 1:



The associated Rank-1 Constraint System can be deduced from the general process 6.2.2 and consists of the following constraints

$$(1 - S_1) \cdot 1 = S_2$$

Common circuit languages typically provide a gadget or a function to abstract over this circuit such that programers can use the  $\neg$  operator without caring about the associated circuit. In PAPER, we define the following function that compiles to the  $\neg$ -operator's circuit:

```

5044 fn NOT(b : BOOL -> BOOL{
5045   let NOT : BOOL ;
5046   let const c1 = 1 ;
5047   let const c2 = -1 ;
5048   NOT <== ADD( c1 , MUL( c2 , b) ) ;
5049   return NOT ;
5050 }

```

In the setup phase of a statement, we compile every occurrence of the NOT function into an instance of its associated  $\neg$ -operator's circuit.

*Exercise 93.* Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field. Derive algebraic circuits and associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems for the following operators: NOR, XOR, NAND, EQU.

**Modularity** As we have seen in chapter 6, both algebraic circuits and R1CS have a modularity property, and as we have seen in this section, all basic boolean functions are expressible in circuits. Combining those two properties shows that it is possible to express arbitrary boolean functions as algebraic circuits.

The expressiveness of algebraic circuits and therefore Rank-1 Constraint Systems is as general as the expressiveness of boolean circuits. An important implication is that the languages  $L_{R1CS-SAT}$  and  $L_{Circuit-SAT}$  as defined in 6 and 6.2.2, are as general as the famous language  $L_{3-SAT}$ , which is known to be  $\mathcal{NP}$ -complete.

*Example 134.* To give an example of how a compiler might construct complex boolean expressions in algebraic circuits from simple ones and how we derive their associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems, let's look at the following PAPER statement:

```

5066 statement BOOLEAN_STAT {F: F_p} {
5067   fn main(b_1:BOOL,b_2:BOOL,b_3:BOOL,b_4:BOOL )-> BOOL {
5068     let pub b_5 : BOOL ;
5069     b_5 <== AND( OR( b_1 , b_2 ) , AND( b_3 , NOT( b_4 ) ) ) ;
5070     return b_5 ;
5071   } ;
5072 }


```

The code describes a circuit that takes four witness input variables  $b_1, b_2, b_3$  and  $b_4$  of boolean type and computes an instance variable output  $b_5$  such that the following boolean expression holds true:

$$(b_1 \vee b_2) \wedge (b_3 \wedge \neg b_4) = b_5$$


During a setup-phase, a circuit compiler transforms this high-level language statement into a circuit and associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems and hence defines a language  $L_{BOOLEAN\_STAT}$ .

To see how this might be achieved, we use PAPER as an example to execute the setup-phase and compile `BOOLEAN_STAT` into a circuit. Taking the definition of the boolean constraint 7.2.1 as well as the definitions of the appropriate boolean operators into account, we get the following circuit:



Simple optimization then collapses all box-nodes that are directly linked and all box nodes that represent the same constants. After relabeling the edges, the following circuit represents the circuit associated to the `BOOLEAN_STAT` statement:

can we rotate this by 90°? Good question. IDK



5086

5087 Given some instance variable  $I_1$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , a valid assignment to this circuit consists of witness  
 5088 variables  $W_1, W_2, W_3, W_4$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  such that the equation  $I_1 = (W_1 \vee W_2) \wedge (W_3 \wedge \neg W_4)$  holds  
 5089 true. In addition, a valid assignment also has to contain witness variables  $W_5, W_6, W_7, W_8, W_9$   
 5090 and  $W_{10}$ , which can be derived from circuit execution. The variables  $W_5, \dots, W_8$  ensure that the  
 5091 first four witnesses are constrained to be either 0 or 1 but not any other field element, and the  
 5092 others enforce the boolean operations in the expression.

To compute the associated R1CS, we can use the general method from 6.2.2 and look at every labeled outgoing edge not coming from a source node in the optimized circuit. We declare the edge going to the single output node as instance, and every other edge as witness. In this case we get:

$$\begin{aligned}
 W_5 : W_1 \cdot (1 - W_1) &= 0 && \text{boolean constraints} \\
 W_6 : W_2 \cdot (1 - W_2) &= 0 \\
 W_7 : W_3 \cdot (1 - W_3) &= 0 \\
 W_8 : W_4 \cdot (1 - W_4) &= 0 \\
 W_9 : W_1 \cdot W_2 &= W_9 && \text{first OR-operator constraint} \\
 W_{10} : W_3 \cdot (1 - W_4) &= W_{10} && \text{AND(.,NOT(.))-operator constraints} \\
 I_1 : (W_1 + W_2 - W_9) \cdot W_{10} &= I_1 && \text{AND-operator constraints}
 \end{aligned}$$

5093 The reason why this R1CS only contains a single constraint for the multiplication gate in the  
 5094 OR-circuit, while the general definition 7.2.1 requires two constraints, is that the second con-  
 5095 straint in ?? only appears because the final addition gate is connected to an output node. In this  
 5096 case, however, the final addition gate from the OR-circuit is enforced in the left factor of the  $I_1$   
 5097 constraint. Something similar holds true for the negation circuit.

During a prover-phase, some public instance  $I_5$  must be given. To compute a constructive proof for the statement of the associated languages with respect to instance  $I_5$ , a prover has to find four boolean values  $W_1, W_2, W_3$  and  $W_4$  such that

$$(W_1 \vee W_2) \wedge (W_3 \wedge \neg W_4) = I_5$$



holds true. In our case neither the circuit nor the PAPER statement specifies how to find those values, and it is a problem that any prover has to solve outside of the circuit. This might or might not be true for other problems, too. In any case, once the prover found those values, they can execute the circuit to find a valid assignment.

To give a concrete example, let  $I_1 = 1$  and assume  $W_1 = 1$ ,  $W_2 = 0$ ,  $W_3 = 1$  and  $W_4 = 0$ . Since  $(1 \vee 0) \wedge (1 \wedge \neg 0) = 1$ , those values satisfy the problem and we can use them to execute the circuit. We get

$$\begin{aligned} W_5 &= W_1 \cdot (1 - W_1) = 0 \\ W_6 &= W_2 \cdot (1 - W_2) = 0 \\ W_7 &= W_3 \cdot (1 - W_3) = 0 \\ W_8 &= W_4 \cdot (1 - W_4) = 0 \\ W_9 &= W_1 \cdot W_2 = 0 \\ W_{10} &= W_3 \cdot (1 - W_4) = 1 \\ I_1 &= (W_1 + W_2 - W_9) \cdot W_{10} = 1 \end{aligned}$$

A constructive proof of knowledge of a witness, for instance,  $I_1 = 1$ , is therefore given by the string  $\pi = \langle W_5, W_6, W_7, W_8, W_9, W_{10} \rangle = \langle 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1 \rangle$ .

## Arrays

The array type represents a fixed-size collection of elements of equal type, each selectable by one or more indices that can be computed at run time during program execution.

Arrays are a classical type, implemented by many higher programing languages that compile to circuits or Rank-1 Constraint Systems. However, most high-level circuit languages support **static** arrays, i.e., arrays whose length is known at compile time only.

The most common way to compile arrays to circuits is to transform any array of a given type  $\mathsf{t}$  and size  $N$  into  $N$  circuit variables of type  $\mathsf{t}$ . Arrays are therefore **syntactic sugar**, with the purpose to make code easier for humans to read, and write. In PAPER, we define the following array type\_function:


```
type_function <Name>: <Type>[N : unsigned] -> (Type, ...) {
  return (<Name>[0], ...)
}
```

In the setup phase of a statement, we compile every occurrence of an array of size  $N$  that contains elements of type  $\mathsf{Type}$  into  $N$  variables of type  $\mathsf{Type}$ .

*Example 135.* To give an intuition of how a real-world compiler might transform arrays into circuit variables, consider the following PAPER statement:

```
statement ARRAY_TYPE {F: F_5} {
  fn main(x: F[2]) -> F {
    let constant c: F[2] = [2, 4] ;
    let out : F <== MUL(ADD(x[1], c[0]), ADD(x[0], c[1])) ;
    return out ;
  } ;
}
```

During a setup phase, a circuit compiler might then replace any occurrence of the array type by a tuple of variables of the underlying type, and then use those variables in the circuit synthesis process instead. To see how this can be achieved, we use PAPER as an example. Abstracting over the sub-circuit of the computation, we get the following circuit:



5132

### 5133 The Unsigned Integer Type

5134 Unsigned integers of size  $N$ , where  $N$  is usually a power of two, represent non-negative integers  
 5135 in the range  $0 \dots 2^N - 1$ . They have a notion of addition, subtraction and multiplication, defined  
 5136 by modular  $2^N$  arithmetics. If some  $N$  is given, we write  $\text{uN}$  for the associated type.

5137 **The  $\text{uN}$  Constraint System** Many high-level circuit languages define the various  $\text{uN}$  types as  
 5138 arrays of size  $N$ , where each element is of boolean type. This parallels their representation on  
 5139 common computer hardware and allows for efficient and straightforward definition of common  
 5140 operators, like the various shift operators, or the logical operators.

5141 Assuming that some unsigned integer  $N$  is known at compile time in PAPER, we define  
 5142 the following  $\text{uN}$  type\_function, which casts a an unsigned integer into an array of boolean  
 5143 variables:

```

5144 type_function uN -> BOOL[N] {
5145   let base2 : BOOL[N] ;
5146   base2[0] <== uN[0] ;
5147   base2[1] <== uN[1] ;
5148   ...
5149   base2[N] <== uN[N] ;
5150   return base2 ;
5151 }
```

To enforce an  $N$ -tuple of field elements  $\langle b_0, \dots, b_{N-1} \rangle$  to represent an element of type  $\text{uN}$  we therefore need  $N$  boolean constraints

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_0 \cdot (1 - S_0) &= 0 \\
 S_1 \cdot (1 - S_1) &= 0 \\
 &\dots \\
 S_{N-1} \cdot (1 - S_{N-1}) &= 0
 \end{aligned}$$


5152 *Remark 8.* Representing the  $\text{uN}$  type as boolean arrays is conceptually clean and works over  
 5153 generic base fields. However, representing unsigned integers in this way requires a lot of space  
 5154 as every bit is represented as a field element and if the base field is large, those field elements  
 5155 require considerable space in hardware.

It should be noted that, in some cases, there is another, more space- and Constraint System efficient approach for representing unsigned integers that can be used whenever the underlying base field is sufficiently large. To understand this, recall that addition and multiplication in a prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$  is equal to addition and multiplication of integers, as long as the sum or the product does exceed neither the modulus  $p$  of the base field nor the modulus  $2^N$  of the unsigned integer type. Under those limitations it is possible to represent the  $\text{uN}$  type inside the base-field type whenever  $N$  is small enough. This however is not safe and care has to be taken to never overflow any of those moduli, or underflow 0.

*Example 136.* To give an intuition of how a real-world compiler might transform unsigned integers into circuit variables, consider the following PAPER statement, which implement the classical ring-shift operator on the  $\text{u4}$  type as a circuit:

```
statement RING_SHIFT{F: F_p, N=4} {
  fn main(x: uN)-> uN {
    let y : uN ;
    y <== [x[1],x[2],x[3],x[0]] ;
    return y ;
  } ;
}
```

During the setup-phase, a circuit compiler might then replace any occurrence of the  $\text{uN}$  type by  $N$  variables of `boolean` type. Using the definition of booleans, each of these variables is then transformed into the `field` type and a boolean constraint system. To see how this can be achieved, we use PAPER as an example and get the following circuit:



During the prover phase, the function `main` is called with an actual input of  $\text{u4}$  type, say  $x=14$ . The Prover then has to transform the decimal value 14 into its 4-bit binary representation  $\text{Bits}(14)_2 = \langle 0, 1, 1, 1 \rangle$  outside of the circuit. Then the array of field values  $x[4] = [0, 1, 1, 1]$  is used as an input to the circuit. Since all 4 field elements are either 0 or 1, the four boolean constraints are satisfied and the output is a ring shift of the input array of the four field elements given by  $[1, 1, 1, 0]$ , which represents the  $\text{u4}$  element 7.

**The Unsigned Integer Operators** Since elements of  $\text{uN}$  type are represented as boolean arrays, shift operators are implemented in circuits simply by rewiring the boolean input variables to the output variables accordingly.

Logical operators, like AND, OR, or NOT are defined on the  $uN$  type by invoking the appropriate boolean operators bitwise to every bit in the boolean array that represents the  $uN$  element.

Addition and multiplication can be represented similarly to how machines represent those operations. Addition can be implemented by first defining the **full adder** circuit and then combining  $N$  of these circuits into a circuit that adds two elements from the  $uN$  type.

*Exercise 94.* Let  $F = \mathbb{F}_{13}$  and  $N=4$  be fixed and let  $x$  be of  $uN$  type. Define circuits and associated R1CS for the left and right bit-shift operators  $x \ll 2$  as well as  $x \gg 2$ . Execute the associated circuit for  $x : u4 = 11$  and generate a constructive proof for R1CS satisfyability.

*Exercise 95.* Let  $F = \mathbb{F}_{13}$  and  $N=2$  be fixed. Define a circuit and associated R1CS for the addition operator  $ADD : uN \times uN \rightarrow uN$ . Execute the associated circuit to compute  $ADD(2, 7)$  for  $2, 7 \in uN$ .

*Exercise 96.* Execute the setup phase for the following PAPER code (That is brain compile the code into a circuit and derive the associated R1CS).

```
statement MASK_MERGE {F:F_5, N=4} {
  fn main(pub a : uN, pub b : uN) -> uN {
    let constant mask : uN = 10 ;
    let r : uN ;
    r <== XOR(a, AND(XOR(a, b), mask)) ;
    return r ;
  }
}
```

Let  $L_{mask\_merge}$  be the language defined by the circuit. Provide a constructive knowledge proof in  $L_{mask\_merge}$  for the instance  $I = (I_a, I_b) = (14, 7)$ .

## 7.2.2 Control Flow

Most programming languages of the imperative or functional style have some notion of basic control structures to direct the order in which instructions are evaluated. Contemporary circuit compilers usually provide a single thread of execution and provide basic flow constructs that implement control flow in circuits. In this part we look at some basic control flow constructions and their implementation in circuits.

### The Conditional Assignment

Writing high-level code that compiles to circuits, it is often necessary to have a way for conditional assignment of values or computational output to variables. One way to realize this in many programming languages is in terms of the conditional ternary assignment operator  $?:$  that branches the control flow of a program according to some condition and then assigns the output of the computed branch to some variable:

```
variable = condition ? value_if_true : value_if_false
```

In this description, *condition* is a boolean expression and *value\_if\_true* as well as *value\_if\_false* are expressions that evaluate to the same type as *variable*.

In programming languages like Rust, another way to write the conditional assignment operator that is more familiar to many programmers is given by

```
variable = if condition then {
  value_if_true
```

```

5230 } else {
5231     value_if_false
5232 }


```

In most programming languages, it is a key property of the ternary assignment operator that the expression `value_if_true` is only evaluated if `condition` evaluates to true and the expression `value_if_false` is only evaluated if `condition` evaluates to false. In fact, computer programs would turn out to be very inefficient if the ternary operator would evaluate both expressions regardless of the value of `condition`.

A simple way to implement conditional assignment operator as a circuit can be achieved if the requirement that only one branch of the conditional operator is executed is dropped. To see that, let  $b$ ,  $c$  and  $d$  be field elements such that  $b$  is boolean constrained. In this case, the following equation enforces a field element  $x$  to be the result of the conditional assignment operator:

$$x = b \cdot c + (1 - b) \cdot d \quad (7.6)$$

Expressing this equation in terms of the addition and multiplication operators from 7.2.1, we can flatten 7.6 into the following algebraic circuit:



5245

Note that, in order to compute a valid assignment to this circuit, both  $S_2$  as well as  $S_4$  are necessary. If the inputs to the nodes  $c$  and  $d$  are circuits themselves, both circuits need valid assignments and therefore have to be executed. As a consequence, this implementation of the conditional assignment operator has to execute all branches of all circuits, which is very different from the execution of common computer programs and contributes to the increased computational effort any prover has to invest, in contrast to the execution in other programming models.

We can use the general technique from 6.2.2 to derive the associated Rank-1 Constraint System of the conditional assignment operator. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_1 \cdot S_2 &= S_3 \\
 (1 - S_1) \cdot S_4 &= S_5 \\
 (S_3 + S_5) \cdot 1 &= S_6
 \end{aligned}$$


*Example 137.* To give an intuition of how a real-world circuit compiler might transform any high-level description of the conditional assignment operator into a circuit, consider the following PAPER code:

```

5256 statement CONDITIONAL_OP {F:F_p} {
5257   fn main(x : F, y : F, b : BOOL) -> F {
5258     let z : F
5259     z <== if b then {
5260       ADD(x,y)
5261     } else {
5262       MUL(x,y)
5263     } ;
5264     return z ;
5265   }
5266 }

```

Brain-compiling this code into a circuit, we first draw box nodes for all input and output variables, and then transform the boolean type into the field type together with its associated constraint. Then we evaluate the assignments to the output variables. Since the conditional assignment operator is the top level function, we draw its circuit and then draw the circuits for both conditional expressions. We get the following:



5272

## Loops

In many programming languages, various loop control structures are defined that allow developers to execute expressions with a specified number of repetitions. In particular, it is often possible to implement unbounded loops like the loop structure give below:

```
while true do { }
```

In addition it is often possible to implement loop structures, where the number of execution steps in the loop depends on execution inputs or intermediate computational steps and is therefore unknown at compile time:

```
x = 0.5
while x != 0 do {
  x = 4*x*(1-x)
}
```

In contrast to this, algebraic circuits and Rank-1 Constraint Systems are not general enough to express arbitrary computation, but bounded computation only. As a consequence, it is not possible to implement unbounded loops, or loops with bounds that are unknown at compile time in those models. This can be easily seen since circuits are acyclic by definition, and implementing an unbounded loop as an acyclic graph requires a circuits of unbounded size. However, circuits are general enough to express bounded loops, where the upper bound on its execution is known at compile time. Those loop can be implemented in circuits by enrolling the loop.


As a consequence, any programing language that compiles to algebraic circuits can only provide loop structures where the bound is a constant known at compile time. This implies that loops cannot depend on execution inputs, but on compile time parameters only.

*Example 138.* To give an intuition of how a real-world circuit compiler might transform any high-level description of a bounded `for` loop into a circuit, consider the following PAPER code:

```
statement FOR_LOOP {F:F_p, N: unsigned = 4} {
  fn main(fac : F[N]) -> F {
    let prod[N] : F ;
    prod[0] <== fac[0] ;
    for unsigned i in 1..N do [{
      prod[i] <== MUL(fac[i], prod[i-1]) ;
    }]
    return prod[N] ;
  }
}
```

Note that, in a program like this, the loop counter `i` has no expression in the derived circuit. It is a high level parameter that tells the compiler how to unroll the loop.

Brain-compiling this code into a circuit, we first draw box nodes for all input and output variables, noting that the loop counter is not represented in the circuit. Since all variables are of `field` type, we don't have to compile any type constraints. Then we evaluate the assignments to the output variables by unrolling the loop into 3 individual assignment operators. We get:



5315

### 7.2.3 Binary Field Representations


5316

5317 In applications, it is often necessary to enforce a binary representation of elements from the  
 5318 field type. To derive an appropriate circuit over a prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , let  $m = |p|_2$  be the smallest  
 5319 number of bits necessary to represent the prime modulus  $p$ . Then a bitstring  $\langle b_0, \dots, b_{m-1} \rangle \in$   
 5320  $\{0, 1\}^m$  is a binary representation of a field element  $x \in \mathbb{F}_p$ , if and only if

$$x = b_0 \cdot 2^0 + b_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + b_{m-1} \cdot 2^{m-1} \quad (7.7)$$

5321 In this expression, addition and exponentiation is considered to be executed in  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , which is well  
 5322 defined since all terms  $2^j$  for  $0 \leq j < m$  are elements of  $\mathbb{F}_p$ . Note, however, that in contrast to  
 5323 the binary representation of unsigned integers  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , this representation is not unique in general,  
 5324 since the modular  $p$  equivalence class might contain more than one binary representative.

5325 Considering that the underlying prime field is fixed and the most significant bit of the prime  
 5326 modulus is  $m$ , the following circuit flattens equation 7.7, assuming all inputs  $b_1, \dots, b_m$  are of  
 5327 boolean type.



5328

Applying the general transformation rule 6.2.2 to compute the associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems, we see that we actually only need a single constraint to enforce some binary representation of any field element. We get

$$(S_0 \cdot 2^0 + S_1 \cdot 2^1 + \dots + S_{m-1} \cdot 2^{m-1} - S_m) \cdot 1 = 0$$

5329 Given an array `BOOL[N]` of  $N$  boolean constrained field elements and another field element  $x$ ,  
 5330 the circuit enforces `BOOL[N]` to be one of the binary representations of  $x$ . If `BOOL[N]` is not  
 5331 a binary representation of  $x$ , no valid assignment and hence no solution to the associated R1CS  
 5332 can exists.



*Example 139.* Consider the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . To compute binary representations of elements from that field, we start with the binary representation of the prime modulus 13, which is  $\text{Bits}(13) = \langle 1, 0, 1, 1 \rangle$  since  $13 = 1 \cdot 2^0 + 0 \cdot 2^1 + 1 \cdot 2^2 + 1 \cdot 2^3$ . So  $m = 4$  and we need up to 4 bits to represent any element  $x \in \mathbb{F}_{13}$ .

To see that binary representations are not unique in general, consider the element  $2 \in \mathbb{F}_{13}$ . It has the following two 4-bit, binary representations  $\text{Bits}(2) = \langle 0, 1, 0, 0 \rangle$  and  $\text{Bits}(2) = \langle 1, 1, 1, 1 \rangle$ , since in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$  we have

$$2 = \begin{cases} 0 \cdot 2^0 + 1 \cdot 2^1 + 0 \cdot 2^2 + 0 \cdot 2^3 \\ 1 \cdot 2^0 + 1 \cdot 2^1 + 1 \cdot 2^2 + 1 \cdot 2^3 \end{cases}$$

This is because the unsigned integers 2 and 15 are both in the modular 13 remainder class of 2 and hence are both representatives of 2 in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ .

To see how circuit the associated circuit works, we want to enforce the binary representation of  $7 \in \mathbb{F}_{13}$ . Since  $m = 4$  we have to enforce a 4-bit representation for 7, which is  $\langle 1, 1, 1, 0 \rangle$ , since  $7 = 1 \cdot 2^0 + 1 \cdot 2^1 + 1 \cdot 2^2 + 0 \cdot 2^3$ . A valid circuit assignment is therefore given by  $\langle S_0, S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4 \rangle = \langle 1, 1, 1, 0, 7 \rangle$  and, indeed, the assignment satisfies the required 5 constraints including the 4 boolean constraints for  $S_0, \dots, S_3$ :

$$\begin{aligned} 1 \cdot (1 - 1) &= 0 & // \text{ boolean constraints} \\ 1 \cdot (1 - 1) &= 0 \\ 1 \cdot (1 - 1) &= 0 \\ 0 \cdot (1 - 0) &= 0 \\ (1 + 2 + 4 + 0 - 7) \cdot 1 &= 0 & // \text{ binary rep. constraint} \end{aligned}$$

## 7.2.4 Cryptographic Primitives


In applications, it is often required to do cryptography in a circuit. To do this, basic cryptographic primitives like hash functions or elliptic curve cryptography needs to be implemented as circuits. In this section, we give a few basic examples of how to implement such primitives.

### Twisted Edwards curves

Implementing elliptic curve cryptography in circuits means to implement the defining curve equations as well as the algebraic operations, like the group law or the scalar multiplication as circuits. To do this efficiently, the curve must be defined over the same base field as the field that is used in the circuit.

For efficiency reasons, it is advantageous to choose an elliptic curve such that that all required constraints and operations can be implement with as few gates as possible. Twisted Edwards curves are particularly useful for that matter, since their group law is particularly simple and the same calculation can be used for all curve points including the point at infinity. This simplifies the circuit a lot.

**Twisted Edwards curve constraints** As we have seen in 5.3, a twisted Edwards curve over a finite field  $F$  is defined as the set of all pairs of points  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$  such that  $x$  and  $y$  satisfy the equation  $a \cdot x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d \cdot x^2 y^2$  and as we have seen in example 121, we can transform this equation into the following circuit:



5357

The circuit enforces the two inputs of `field` type to satisfy the twisted Edwards curve equation and, as we know from example 126, the associated Rank-1 Constraint System is given by:


$$\begin{aligned}
 S_1 \cdot S_1 &= S_3 \\
 S_2 \cdot S_2 &= S_4 \\
 (S_4 \cdot d) \cdot S_3 &= S_5 \\
 (-1 \cdot S_4 + S_5 - a \cdot S_3 + 1) \cdot 1 &= 0
 \end{aligned}$$

5358 *Exercise 97.* Write the circuit and associated Rank-1 Constraint System for a Weierstrass curve  
 5359 of a given field  $\mathbb{F}$ .

**Twisted Edwards curve addition** As we have seen in 5.3.1, a major advantage of twisted Edwards curves is the existence of an addition law that contains no branching and is valid for all curve points. Moreover, the neutral element is not given by any auxiliary symbol but the curve point  $(0, 1)$ . In fact, given two points  $(x_1, y_1)$  and  $(x_2, y_2)$  on a twisted Edwards curve, their sum is defined as

$$(x_3, y_3) = \left( \frac{x_1 y_2 + y_1 x_2}{1 + d \cdot x_1 x_2 y_1 y_2}, \frac{y_1 y_2 - a \cdot x_1 x_2}{1 - d \cdot x_1 x_2 y_1 y_2} \right)$$

5360 We can use the division circuit from 7.2.1 to flatten this equation into an algebraic circuit.  
 5361 Inputs to the circuit are then not only the two curve points  $(x_1, y_1)$  and  $(x_2, y_2)$ , but also the  
 5362 multiplicative inverses of the two denominators  $inv_1 = (1 + d \cdot x_1 x_2 y_1 y_2)^{-1}$  as well as  $inv_2 =$   
 5363  $(1 - d \cdot x_1 x_2 y_1 y_2)^{-1}$ , which any prover needs to compute outside of the circuit. We get



5364

Using the general technique from 6.2.2 to derive the associated Rank-1 Constraint System, we get the following result:

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_1 \cdot S_4 &= S_7 \\
 S_1 \cdot S_2 &= S_8 \\
 S_2 \cdot S_3 &= S_9 \\
 S_3 \cdot S_4 &= S_{10} \\
 S_8 \cdot S_{10} &= S_{11} \\
 S_5 \cdot (1 + d \cdot S_{11}) &= 1 \\
 S_6 \cdot (1 - d \cdot S_{11}) &= 1 \\
 S_5 \cdot (S_9 + S_7) &= S_{14} \\
 S_6 \cdot (S_{10} - a \cdot S_8) &= S_{15}
 \end{aligned}$$

5365 *Exercise 98.* Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a field. Define a circuit that enforces field inversion for a point of a  
 5366 twisted Edwards curve over  $\mathbb{F}$ .

5367 *Exercise 99.* Write the circuit and associated Rank-1 Constraint System for a Weierstrass addi-  
 5368 tion law of a given field  $\mathbb{F}$ .

## Chapter 8

# Zero Knowledge Protocols

A so-called **zero-knowledge protocol** is a set of mathematical rules by which one party, usually called **the prover**, can convince another party, usually called **the verifier**, that given some instance, the prover knows some witness for that instance, without revealing any information about the witness.

As we have seen in chapter 6, given some language  $L$  and instance  $I$ , the knowledge claim “there is a witness  $W$  such that  $(I; W)$  is a word in  $L$ ” is constructively provable by providing the witness  $W$  to the verifier. The verifier can then use the grammar of the language to verify the proof. In contrast, it’s the challenge of any zero-knowledge protocol to enable a prover to prove knowledge of a witness to any verifier, without revealing any information about the witness beyond its existence.

In this chapter, we look at various systems that exist to solve this task. We start with an introduction to the basic concepts and terminology in zero-knowledge proving systems and then introduce the so-called Groth\_16 protocol as one of the most efficient systems. We will update this chapter with other zero-knowledge proof systems in future versions of this book.

## 8.1 Proof Systems

From an abstract point of view, a proof system is a set of rules which models the generation and exchange of messages between two parties, usually called the prover and the verifier. The purpose of a proof system is to ascertain whether a given string belongs to a formal language or not.

Proof systems are often classified by certain trust assumptions and the computational capabilities of the prover and the verifier. In its most general form, the prover usually possesses unlimited computational resources but cannot be trusted, while the verifier has bounded computational power but is assumed to be honest.

Proving membership or knowledge claims of a statement for some string as explained in chapter 6 is executed by the generation of certain messages that are sent between prover and verifier, until the verifier is convinced that the string is a word in the language in consideration.

To be more specific, let  $\Sigma$  be an alphabet, and let  $L$  be a formal language defined over  $\Sigma$ . Then a **proof system** for language  $L$  is a pair of probabilistic interactive algorithms  $(P, V)$ , where  $P$  is called the **prover** and  $V$  is called the **verifier**.

Both algorithms are able to send messages to one another, each algorithm has its own state, some shared initial state and access to the messages. The verifier is bounded to a number of steps which is polynomial in the size of the shared initial state, after which it stops and outputs either `accept` or `reject` indicating that it accepts or rejects a given string to be a word in

$L$  or not. In contrast, in the most general form of a proof system, there are no bounds on the computational power of the prover.

When the execution of the verifier algorithm stops the following conditions are required to hold:

- (Completeness) If the string  $x \in \Sigma^*$  is a word in language  $L$  and both prover and verifier follow the protocol, the verifier outputs `accept`.
- (Soundness) If the string  $x \in \Sigma^*$  is not a word in language  $L$  and the verifier follows the protocol, the verifier outputs `reject`, except with some small probability.

In addition, a proof system is called **zero-knowledge** if the verifier learns nothing about  $x$  other than  $x \in L$ .

The previous definition of proof systems is very general, and many subclasses of proof systems are known in the field. For example, some proof systems restrict the computational power of the prover, while some proof systems assume that the verifier has access to randomness. In addition, proof systems are classified by the number of messages that can be exchanged. If the system only requires to send a single message from the prover to the verifier, the proof system is called **non-interactive**, because no interaction other than sending the actual proof is required. In contrast, any other proof system is called **interactive**.

A proof system is usually called **succinct** if the size of the proof is shorter than the witness necessary to generate the proof. Moreover, a proof system is called **computationally sound** if soundness only holds under the assumption that the computational capabilities of the prover are polynomial bound. To distinguish general proofs from computationally sound proofs, the latter are often called **arguments**.

Since the term **zk-SNARKs** is an abbreviation for "Zero-knowledge, succinct, non-interactive argument of knowledge", proof system able to generate zk-SNARKs therefore have the zero-knowledge property, are able to generate proofs that require less space than the original witness and require no interaction between prover and verifier, other than transmitting the zk-SNARK itself. However those systems are only sound under the assumption that the prover's computational capabilities are polynomial bound.

*Example 140 (Constructive Proofs for Algebraic Circuits).* We have seen in 6.2.2 how algebraic circuit give rise to formal languages and constructive proofs for knowledge claims.

To reformulate this notion of constructive proofs for algebraic circuits into a proof system, let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field, and let  $C(\mathbb{F})$  be an algebraic circuit over  $\mathbb{F}$  with associated language  $L_{C(\mathbb{F})}$ . A non-interactive proof system for  $L_{C(\mathbb{F})}$  is given by the following two algorithms:

**Prover Algorithm:** The prover  $P$  is defined by circuit execution. Given some instance  $I$  the prover executes circuit  $C(\mathbb{F})$  to compute a witness  $W$  such that the pair  $(I; W)$  is a valid assignment to  $C(\mathbb{F})$  whenever the circuit is satisfiable for  $I$ . The prover then sends the constructive proof  $(I; W)$  to the verifier.

**Verifier Algorithm:** On receiving a message  $(I; W)$ , the verifier algorithm  $V$  inserts  $(I; W)$  into the associated R1CS of the circuit. If  $(I; W)$  is a solution to the R1CS, the verifier returns `accepts`, if not, it returns `reject`.

To see that this proof system is complete and sound, let  $C(\mathbb{F})$  be a circuit of the field  $\mathbb{F}$ , and let  $I$  be an instance. The circuit may or may not have a witness  $W$  such that  $(I; W)$  is a valid assignment to  $C(\mathbb{F})$ .

If no  $W$  exists,  $I$  is not part of any word in  $L_{C(\mathbb{F})}$ , and there is no way for  $P$  to generate a valid assignment. It follows that the verifier will not accept any claimed proof sent by  $P$ , since the associated R1CS has no solutions for instance  $I$ . This implies that the system is **sound**.

If, on the other hand,  $W$  exists and  $P$  is honest,  $P$  can use its unlimited computational power to compute  $W$  and send  $(I; W)$  to  $V$ , which  $V$  will accept, since it is a solution to the associated R1CS. This implies that the system is **complete**.

The system is non-interactive because the prover only sends a single message to the verifier, which contains the proof itself. However the proof system is **not** succinct, since the proof is the witness. The proof system is also not zero knowledge, since the verifier has access to the witness and hence learns everything about the witness.

## 8.2 The “Groth16” Protocol

In chapter 6, we have introduced algebraic circuits, their associated Rank-1 Constraint Systems and their induced Quadratic Arithmetic Programs. These models define formal languages, and associated memberships and knowledge claims can be constructively proved by executing the circuit to compute a solution to its associated R1CS. As we have seen in 6.2.3 the proof can then be transformed into a polynomial such that the polynomial is divisible by another polynomial if and only if the proof is correct.

In [Gro16], Jens Groth provides a method, capable to transform constructive proofs into zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge. Assuming that there are groups  $\mathbb{G}_1$ ,  $\mathbb{G}_2$  and  $\mathbb{G}_3$  and an efficiently computable pairing map 4.6

check  
reference

$$e(\cdot, \cdot) : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_3$$

Then the zk-SNARK in Groth’s protocol is of constant size and consist of 2 elements from  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and a single element from  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , regardless of the size of the witness. Verification is non-interactive and the verifier needs to compute a number of exponentiations proportional to the size of the instance, together with 3 group pairings in order to verify a single proof.

The generated zk-SNARK is zero-knowledge, has completeness and soundness in the generic bilinear group model, assuming the existence of a trusted third party that executes a preprocessing phase to generate a **Common Reference String** and a **simulation trapdoor**. This party must be trusted to delete the simulation trapdoor, since everyone in possession of it can simulate proofs.

To be more precise, let  $R$  be a Rank-1 Constraint System defined over some finite field  $\mathbb{F}_r$ . Then **Groth\_16 parameters** for  $R$  are given by the following set:

$$\text{Groth\_16} - \text{Param}(R) = (r, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, e(\cdot, \cdot), g_1, g_2) \quad (8.1)$$

Here,  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  are finite cyclic groups of order  $r$ ,  $g_1$  is a generator of  $\mathbb{G}_1$ ,  $g_2$  is a generator of  $\mathbb{G}_2$  and  $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$  is an efficiently computable, non-degenerate, bilinear pairing for some target group  $\mathbb{G}_T$ . In real-world applications, the parameter set is usually agreed on in advance.

Given some Groth\_16 parameters, a **Groth\_16 protocol** is then a quadruple of probabilistic polynomial algorithms (SETUP, PROVE, VFY, SIM) such that the following conditions hold:

- (Setup-Phase):  $(CRS, \tau) \leftarrow \text{SETUP}(R)$ : Algorithm SETUP takes the R1CS  $R$  as input and computes a **Common Reference String**  $CRS$  and a **simulation trapdoor**  $\tau$ .
- (Prover-Phase):  $\pi \leftarrow \text{PROVE}(R, CRS, I, W)$ : Given a constructive proof  $(I; W)$  for  $R$ , algorithm PROVE takes the R1CS  $R$ , the Common Reference String  $CRS$  and the constructive proof  $(I, W)$  as input and computes an zk-SNARK  $\pi$ .

- Verify:  $\{\text{accept}, \text{reject}\} \leftarrow \text{VFY}(R, \text{CRS}, I, \pi)$ : Algorithm VFY takes the R1CS  $R$ , the Common Reference String  $\text{CRS}$ , the instance  $I$  and the zk-SNARK  $\pi$  as input and returns `reject` or `accept`.
- $\pi \leftarrow \text{SIM}(R, \tau, \text{CRS}, I)$ : Algorithm SIM takes the R1CS  $R$ , the Common Reference String  $\text{CRS}$ , the simulation trapdoor  $\tau$  and the instance  $I$  as input and returns a zk-SNARK  $\pi$ .

We will explain these algorithms together with detailed examples in the remainder of this section.

Assuming a trusted third party for the setup, the protocol is able to compute a zk-SNARK from a constructive proof for  $R$ , provided that the group order  $r$  is sufficiently large, and, in particular, larger than the number of constraints in the associated R1CS.

*Example 141* (The 3-Factorization Problem). Consider the 3-factorization problem from 111 and its associated algebraic circuit 120 as well the Rank-1 Constraint System from 116. In this example, we want to agree on a parameter set  $(r, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, e(\cdot, \cdot), g_1, g_2)$  in order to use the Groth\_16 protocol for our 3-factorization problem.

To find proper parameters, first observe that the circuit 120, as well as its associated R1CS  $R_{3.\text{fac\_zk}}$  116 and the derived QAP 127, are defined over the field  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . We therefore have to choose pairing groups  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  of order 13.

We know from 5.6.1 that the moon-math curve BLS6\_6 has two subgroups  $\mathbb{G}_1[13]$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$ , which are both of order 13. The associated Weil pairing  $e(\cdot, \cdot)$  5.51 is efficiently computable, bilinear as well as non-degenerate. We therefore choose those groups and the Weil pairing together with the generators  $g_1 = (13, 15)$  and  $g_2 = (7v^2, 16v^3)$  of  $\mathbb{G}_1[13]$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2[13]$ , as a parameter set:

$$\text{Groth\_16} - \text{Param}(R_{3.\text{fac\_zk}}) = (13, \mathbb{G}_1[13], \mathbb{G}_2[13], e(\cdot, \cdot), (13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))$$

It should be noted that our choice is not unique. Every pair of finite cyclic groups of order 13 that has an efficiently computable, non-degenerate, bilinear pairing qualifies as a Groth\_16 parameter set. The situation is similar to real-world applications, where SNARKs with equivalent behavior are defined over different curves, used in different applications.

**The Setup Phase** To generate zk-SNARKs from constructive knowledge proofs in the Groth16 protocol, a preprocessing phase is required. This has to be executed a single time for every Rank-1 Constraint System and any associated Quadratic Arithmetic Program. The outcome of this phase is a Common Reference String that prover and verifier need in order to generate and verify the zk-SNARK. In addition, a simulation trapdoor is produced that can be used to simulate proofs.

To be more precise, let  $L$  be a language defined by some Rank-1 Constraint System  $R$  such that a constructive proof of knowledge for an instance  $\langle I_1, \dots, I_n \rangle$  in  $L$  consists of a witness  $\langle W_1, \dots, W_m \rangle$ . Let  $\text{QAP}(R) = \left\{ T \in \mathbb{F}[x], \{A_j, B_j, C_j \in \mathbb{F}[x]\}_{j=0}^{n+m} \right\}$  be a Quadratic Arithmetic Program associated to  $R$ , and let  $\{\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, e(\cdot, \cdot), g_1, g_2, \mathbb{F}_r\}$  be a set of Groth\_16 parameters.

The setup phase then samples 5 random, invertible elements  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta$  and  $s$  from the scalar field  $\mathbb{F}_r$  of the protocol and outputs the **simulation trapdoor**  $\tau$ :

$$\tau = (\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, s) \tag{8.2}$$

In addition, the setup phase uses those 5 random elements together with the two generators  $g_1$  and  $g_2$  and the Quadratic Arithmetic Program to generate a **Common Reference String**

$CRS_{QAP} = (CRS_{\mathbb{G}_1}, CRS_{\mathbb{G}_2})$  of language  $L$ :

$$CRS_{\mathbb{G}_1} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} g_1^\alpha, g_1^\beta, g_1^\delta, \left( g_1^{s^j}, \dots \right)_{j=0}^{deg(T)-1}, \left( g_1^{\frac{\beta \cdot A_j(s) + \alpha \cdot B_j(s) + C_j(s)}{\gamma}}, \dots \right)_{j=0}^n \\ \left( g_1^{\frac{\beta \cdot A_{j+n}(s) + \alpha \cdot B_{j+n}(s) + C_{j+n}(s)}{\delta}}, \dots \right)_{j=1}^m, \left( g_1^{\frac{s^j \cdot T(s)}{\delta}}, \dots \right)_{j=0}^{deg(T)-2} \end{array} \right\}$$

$$CRS_{\mathbb{G}_2} = \left\{ g_2^\beta, g_2^\gamma, g_2^\delta, \left( g_2^{s^j}, \dots \right)_{j=0}^{deg(T)-1} \right\}$$

Common reference strings depend on the simulation trapdoor, and are therefore not unique to the problem. Any language can have more than one Common Reference String. The size of a Common Reference String is linear in the size of the instance and the size of the witness.

If a simulation trapdoor  $\tau = (\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, s)$  is given, we call the element  $s$  a **secret evaluation point** of the protocol, because if  $\mathbb{F}_r$  is the scalar field of the finite cyclic groups  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , then a key feature of any Common Reference String is that it provides data to compute the evaluation of any polynomial  $P \in \mathbb{F}_r[x]$  of degree  $deg(P) < deg(T)$  at the point  $s$  in the exponent of the generator  $g_1$  or  $g_2$ , without knowing  $s$ .

To be more precise, let  $s$  be the secret evaluation point and let  $P(x) = a_0 \cdot x^0 + a_1 \cdot x^1 + \dots + a_k \cdot x^k$  be a polynomial of degree  $k < deg(T)$  with coefficients in  $\mathbb{F}_r$ . Then we can compute  $g_1^{P(s)}$  without knowing what the actual value of  $s$  is:

$$\begin{aligned} g_1^{P(s)} &= g_1^{a_0 \cdot s^0 + a_1 \cdot s^1 + \dots + a_k \cdot s^k} \\ &= g_1^{a_0 \cdot s^0} \cdot g_1^{a_1 \cdot s^1} \cdot \dots \cdot g_1^{a_k \cdot s^k} \\ &= \left( g_1^{s^0} \right)^{a_0} \cdot \left( g_1^{s^1} \right)^{a_1} \cdot \dots \cdot \left( g_1^{s^k} \right)^{a_k} \end{aligned} \tag{8.3}$$

$$\tag{8.4}$$

In this expression, all group points  $g_1^{s^j}$  are part of the Common Reference String, hence, they can be used to compute the result. The same holds true for the evaluation of  $g_2^{P(s)}$ , since the  $\mathbb{G}_2$  part of the Common Reference String contains the points  $g_2^{s^j}$ .

In real-world applications, the simulation trapdoor is often called the **toxic waste** of the setup-phase. As we will see in 8.2, a simulation trapdoor can be used to generate fraud proofs, which are verifiable zk-SNAKS that can be constructed without knowledge of any witness. The Common Reference String is also-called a pair of **prover and verifier key**.

In order to make the protocol secure, the setup needs to be executed in a way that guarantees that the simulation trapdoor is deleted. The most simple approach to achieving deletion of the toxic waste is by a so-called **trusted third party**, where the trust assumption is that the party generates the Common Reference String precisely as defined and deletes the simulation trapdoor afterwards.

However, as trusted third parties are not easy to find, more sophisticated protocols for the setup phase exist in real-world applications. They execute the setup phase as a multi party computation, where the proper execution can be publicly verified and the simulation trapdoor is deleted if at least one participant deletes their individual contribution. Each participant only possesses a fraction of the simulation trapdoor, so it can only be recovered if all participants collude and share their fraction.



*Example 142* (The 3-factorization Problem). To see how the setup phase of a Groth\_16 zk-SNARK can be computed, consider the 3-factorization problem from 111 and the Groth\_16 parameters from example 141. As we have seen in 127, an associated Quadratic Arithmetic Program is given by the following set:

$$\begin{aligned} QAP(R_{3.\text{fac\_zk}}) = \{ & x^2 + x + 9, \\ & \{0, 0, 6x + 10, 0, 0, 7x + 4\}, \{0, 0, 0, 6x + 10, 7x + 4, 0\}, \{0, 7x + 4, 0, 0, 0, 6x + 10\} \} \end{aligned}$$

To transform this QAP into a Common Reference String, we choose the field elements  $\alpha = 6$ ,  $\beta = 5$ ,  $\gamma = 4$ ,  $\delta = 3$ ,  $s = 2$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . In real-world applications, it is important to sample those values randomly from the scalar field, but in our approach, we choose those non-random values to make them more memorizable, which helps in pen-and-paper computations. Our simulation trapdoor is then given as follows:

$$\tau = (6, 5, 4, 3, 2)$$

5548 We keep this secret in order to simulate proofs later on, but we are careful to hide  $\tau$  from  
 5549 anyone who hasn't read this book. Then we instantiate the Common Reference String 8.3 from  
 5550 those values. Since our groups are subgroups of the BLS6\_6 elliptic curve, we use scalar  
 5551 product notation instead of exponentiation.

To compute the  $\mathbb{G}_1$  part of the Common Reference String, we use the logarithmic order of the group  $\mathbb{G}_1$  5.46, the generator  $g_1 = (13, 15)$ , as well as the values from the simulation trapdoor. Since  $\deg(T) = 2$ , we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} [\alpha]g_1 &= [6](13, 15) = (27, 34) \\ [\beta]g_1 &= [5](13, 15) = (26, 34) \\ [\delta]g_1 &= [3](13, 15) = (38, 15) \end{aligned}$$

To compute the rest of the  $\mathbb{G}_1$  part of the Common Reference String, we expand the indexed tuples and insert the secret random elements from the simulation backdoor. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} ([s^j]g_1, \dots)_{j=0}^1 &= ([2^0](13, 15), [2^1](13, 15)) \\ &= ((13, 15), (33, 34)) \\ \left( \left[ \frac{\beta A_j(s) + \alpha B_j(s) + C_j(s)}{\gamma} \right] g_1, \dots \right)_{j=0}^1 &= \left( \left[ \frac{5A_0(2) + 6B_0(2) + C_0(2)}{4} \right] (13, 15), \right. \\ &\quad \left. \left[ \frac{5A_1(2) + 6B_1(2) + C_1(2)}{4} \right] (13, 15) \right) \\ \left( \left[ \frac{\beta A_{j+n}(s) + \alpha B_{j+n}(s) + C_{j+n}(s)}{\delta} \right] g_1, \dots \right)_{j=1}^4 &= \left( \left[ \frac{5A_2(2) + 6B_2(2) + C_2(2)}{3} \right] (13, 15), \right. \\ &\quad \left[ \frac{5A_3(2) + 6B_3(2) + C_3(2)}{3} \right] (13, 15), \\ &\quad \left[ \frac{5A_4(2) + 6B_4(2) + C_4(2)}{3} \right] (13, 15), \\ &\quad \left. \left[ \frac{5A_5(2) + 6B_5(2) + C_5(2)}{3} \right] (13, 15) \right) \\ \left( \left[ \frac{s^j \cdot T(s)}{\delta} \right] g_1 \right)_{j=0}^0 &= \left( \left[ \frac{2^0 \cdot T(2)}{3} \right] (13, 15) \right) \end{aligned}$$

To compute the curve points on the right side of these expressions, we need the polynomials from the associated Quadratic Arithmetic Program and evaluate them on the secret point  $s = 2$ . Since  $4^{-1} = 10$  and  $3^{-1} = 9$  in  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \left[ \frac{5A_0(2) + 6B_0(2) + C_0(2)}{4} \right](13, 15) &= [(5 \cdot 0 + 6 \cdot 0 + 0) \cdot 10](13, 15) = [0](13, 14) \\
 &\quad \mathcal{O} \\
 \left[ \frac{5A_1(2) + 6B_1(2) + C_1(2)}{4} \right](13, 15) &= [(5 \cdot 0 + 6 \cdot 0 + (7 \cdot 2 + 4)) \cdot 10](13, 15) = [11](13, 15) = \\
 &\quad (33, 9) \\
 \left[ \frac{5A_2(2) + 6B_2(2) + C_2(2)}{3} \right](13, 15) &= [(5 \cdot (6 \cdot 2 + 10) + 6 \cdot 0 + 0) \cdot 9](13, 15) = [2](13, 15) = \\
 &\quad (33, 34) \\
 \left[ \frac{5A_3(2) + 6B_3(2) + C_3(2)}{3} \right](13, 15) &= [(5 \cdot 0 + 6 \cdot (6 \cdot 2 + 10) + 0) \cdot 9](13, 15) = [5](13, 15) = \\
 &\quad (26, 34) \\
 \left[ \frac{5A_4(2) + 6B_4(2) + C_4(2)}{3} \right](13, 15) &= [(5 \cdot 0 + 6 \cdot (7 \cdot 2 + 4) + 0) \cdot 9](13, 15) = [10](13, 15) = \\
 &\quad (38, 28) \\
 \left[ \frac{5A_5(2) + 6B_5(2) + C_5(2)}{3} \right](13, 15) &= [(5 \cdot (7 \cdot 2 + 4) + 6 \cdot 0 + 6 \cdot 2 + 10) \cdot 9](13, 15) = [7](13, 15) = \\
 &\quad (27, 9) \\
 \left[ \frac{2^0 \cdot T(2)}{3} \right](13, 15) &= [1 \cdot (2^2 + 2 + 9) \cdot 9](13, 15) = [5](13, 15) = \\
 &\quad (26, 34)
 \end{aligned}$$

5552 Putting all those values together, we see that the  $\mathbb{G}_1$  part of the Common Reference String is  
 5553 given by the following set of 12 points from the BLS6\_6 13-torsion group  $\mathbb{G}_1$ :

$$CRS_{\mathbb{G}_1} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (27, 34), (26, 34), (38, 15), \left( (13, 15), (33, 34) \right), \left( \mathcal{O}, (33, 9) \right) \\ \left( (33, 34), (26, 34), (38, 28), (27, 9) \right), \left( (26, 34) \right) \end{array} \right\} \quad (8.5)$$

To compute the  $\mathbb{G}_2$  part of the Common Reference String, we use the logarithmic order of the group  $\mathbb{G}_2$  5.49, the generator  $g_2 = (7v^2, 16v^3)$ , as well as the values from the simulation trapdoor. Since  $\deg(T) = 2$ , we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 [\beta]g_2 &= [5](7v^2, 16v^3) = (16v^2, 28v^3) \\
 [\gamma]g_2 &= [4](7v^2, 16v^3) = (37v^2, 27v^3) \\
 [\delta]g_2 &= [3](7v^2, 16v^3) = (42v^2, 16v^3)
 \end{aligned}$$

To compute the rest of the  $\mathbb{G}_2$  part of the Common Reference String, we expand the indexed tuple and insert the secret random elements from the simulation trapdoor. We get the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \left( [s^j]g_2, \dots \right)_{j=0}^1 &= \left( [2^0](7v^2, 16v^3), [2^1](7v^2, 16v^3) \right) \\
 &= \left( (7v^2, 16v^3), (10v^2, 28v^3) \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

Putting all these values together, we see that the  $\mathbb{G}_2$  part of the Common Reference String is given by the following set of 5 points from the  $\text{BLS}_{6\_6}$  13-torsion group  $\mathbb{G}_2$ :

$$\text{CRS}_{\mathbb{G}_2} = \left\{ (16v^2, 28v^3), (37v^2, 27v^3), (42v^2, 16v^3), (7v^2, 16v^3), (10v^2, 28v^3) \right\}$$

Given the simulation trapdoor  $\tau$  and the Quadratic Arithmetic Program 127, the associated Common Reference String of the 3-factorization problem is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CRS}_{\mathbb{G}_1} &= \left\{ (27, 34), (26, 34), (38, 15), \left( (13, 15), (33, 34) \right), \left( \mathcal{O}, (33, 9) \right) \right\} \\ &\quad \left\{ \left( (33, 34), (26, 34), (38, 28), (35, 28) \right), \left( (26, 34) \right) \right\} \\ \text{CRS}_{\mathbb{G}_2} &= \left\{ (16v^2, 28v^3), (37v^2, 27v^3), (42v^2, 16v^3), (7v^2, 16v^3), (10v^2, 28v^3) \right\} \end{aligned}$$

5554 We then publish this data to everyone who wants to participate in the generation of a zk-SNARK  
5555 or its verification in the 3-factorization problem.

5556 To understand how this Common Reference String can be used to evaluate polynomials at  
5557 the secret evaluation point in the exponent of a generator, let's assume that we have deleted  
5558 the simulation trapdoor. In that case, assuming that the discrete logarithm problem is hard in  
5559 our groups, we have no way to know the secret evaluation point anymore, hence, we cannot  
5560 evaluate polynomials at that point. However, we can evaluate polynomials of smaller degree  
5561 than the degree of the target polynomial in the exponent of both generators at that point.

To see that, consider e.g. the polynomials  $A_2(x) = 6x + 10$  and  $A_5(x) = 7x + 4$  from the QAP of this problem. To evaluate these polynomials in the exponent of  $g_1$  and  $g_2$  at the secret point  $s$  without knowing the value of  $s$  (which is 2), we can use the Common Reference String and equation 8.2. Using the scalar product notation instead of exponentiation, we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} [A_2(s)]_{g_1} &= [6 \cdot s^1 + 10 \cdot s^0]_{g_1} \\ &= [6](33, 34) + [10](13, 15) && \# [s^0]_{g_1} = (13, 15), [s^1]_{g_1} = (33, 34) \\ &= [6 \cdot 2](13, 15) + [10](13, 15) = [9](13, 15) && \# \text{logarithmic order on } \mathbb{G}_1 \\ &= (35, 15) \\ [A_5(s)]_{g_1} &= [7 \cdot s^1 + 4 \cdot s^0]_{g_1} \\ &= [7](33, 34) + [4](13, 15) \\ &= [7 \cdot 2](13, 15) + [4](13, 15) = [5](13, 15) \\ &= (26, 34) \end{aligned}$$

Indeed, we are able to evaluate the polynomials in the exponent at a secret evaluation point, because that point is encrypted in the curve point  $(33, 34)$  and its secrecy is protected by the discrete logarithm assumption. Of course, in our computation, we recovered the secret point  $s = 2$ , but that was only possible because we know the logarithmic order of our groups with respect to the generators. Such an order is infeasible in cryptographically secure curves. We

can do the same computation on  $\mathbb{G}_2$  and get the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 [A_2(s)]_{g_2} &= [6 \cdot s^1 + 10 \cdot s^0]_{g_2} \\
 &= [6](10v^2, 28v^3) + [10](7v^2, 16v^3) \\
 &= [6 \cdot 2](7v^2, 16v^3) + [10](7v^2, 16v^3) = [9](7v^2, 16v^3) \\
 &= (37v^2, 16v^3) \\
 [A_5(s)]_{g_2} &= [7 \cdot s^1 + 4 \cdot s^0]_{g_1} \\
 &= [7](10v^2, 28v^3) + [4](7v^2, 16v^3) \\
 &= [7 \cdot 2](7v^2, 16v^3) + [4](7v^2, 16v^3) = [5](7v^2, 16v^3) \\
 &= (16v^2, 28v^3)
 \end{aligned}$$

5562 Apart from the target polynomial  $T$ , all other polynomials of the Quadratic Arithmetic Pro-  
 5563 gram can be evaluated in the exponent this way.

5564 **The Prover Phase** Given some Rank-1 Constraint System  $R$  and instance  $I = \langle I_1, \dots, I_n \rangle$ ,  
 5565 the task of the prover phase is to convince any verifier that a prover knows a witness  $W$  to  
 5566 instance  $I$  such that  $(I; W)$  is a word in the language  $L_R$  of the system, without revealing anything  
 5567 about  $W$ .

5568 To achieve this in the Groth\_16 protocol, we assume that any prover has access to the Rank-  
 5569 1 Constraint System of the problem, in addition to some algorithm that tells the prover how  
 5570 to compute constructive proofs for the R1CS. In addition, the prover has access to a Common  
 5571 Reference String and its associated Quadratic Arithmetic Program.

5572 In order to generate a zk-SNARK for this instance, the prover first computes a valid con-  
 5573 structive proof as explained in 6.2.1, that is, the prover generates a proper witness  $W = \langle$   
 5574  $W_1, \dots, W_m \rangle$  such that  $(\langle I_1, \dots, I_n \rangle; \langle W_1, \dots, W_m \rangle)$  is a solution to the Rank-1 Constraint  
 5575 System  $R$ .

5576 The prover then uses the Quadratic Arithmetic Program and computes the polynomial  $P_{(I;W)}$ ,  
 5577 as explained in 6.15. They then divide  $P_{(I;W)}$  by the target polynomial  $T$  of the Quadratic  
 5578 Arithmetic Program. Since  $P_{(I;W)}$  is constructed from a valid solution to the R1CS, we know  
 5579 from 6.15 that it is divisible by  $T$ . This implies that polynomial division of  $P$  by  $T$  generates  
 5580 another polynomial  $H := P/T$ , with  $\deg(H) < \deg(T)$ .

5581 The prover then evaluates the polynomial  $(H \cdot T)/\delta$  in the exponent of the generator  $g_1$  at  
 5582 the secret point  $s$ , as explained in 8.2. To see how this can be achieved, let  $H(x)$  be the quotient  
 5583 polynomial  $P/T$ :

$$H(x) = H_0 \cdot x^0 + H_1 \cdot x^1 + \dots + H_k \cdot x^k \quad (8.6)$$

To evaluate  $(H \cdot T)/\delta$  at  $s$  in the exponent of  $g_1$ , the prover uses the Common Reference String and computes as follows:

$$g_1^{\frac{H(s) \cdot T(s)}{\delta}} = \left(g_1^{\frac{s^0 \cdot T(s)}{\delta}}\right)^{H_0} \cdot \left(g_1^{\frac{s^1 \cdot T(s)}{\delta}}\right)^{H_1} \cdots \left(g_1^{\frac{s^k \cdot T(s)}{\delta}}\right)^{H_k}$$

After this has been done, the prover samples two random field elements  $r, t \in \mathbb{F}_r$ , and uses the Common Reference String, the instance variables  $I_1, \dots, I_n$  and the witness variables  $W_1,$

...,  $W_m$  to compute the following curve points:

$$\begin{aligned}
 g_1^W &= \left( g_1^{\frac{\beta \cdot A_{1+n}(s) + \alpha \cdot B_{1+n}(s) + C_{1+n}(s)}{\delta}} \right)^{W_1} \cdots \left( g_1^{\frac{\beta \cdot A_{m+n}(s) + \alpha \cdot B_{m+n}(s) + C_{m+n}(s)}{\delta}} \right)^{W_m} \\
 g_1^A &= g_1^\alpha \cdot g_1^{A_0(s)} \cdot \left( g_1^{A_1(s)} \right)^{I_1} \cdots \left( g_1^{A_n(s)} \right)^{I_n} \cdot \left( g_1^{A_{n+1}(s)} \right)^{W_1} \cdots \left( g_1^{A_{n+m}(s)} \right)^{W_m} \cdot \left( g_1^\delta \right)^r \\
 g_1^B &= g_1^\beta \cdot g_1^{B_0(s)} \cdot \left( g_1^{B_1(s)} \right)^{I_1} \cdots \left( g_1^{B_n(s)} \right)^{I_n} \cdot \left( g_1^{B_{n+1}(s)} \right)^{W_1} \cdots \left( g_1^{B_{n+m}(s)} \right)^{W_m} \cdot \left( g_1^\delta \right)^t \\
 g_2^B &= g_2^\beta \cdot g_2^{B_0(s)} \cdot \left( g_2^{B_1(s)} \right)^{I_1} \cdots \left( g_2^{B_n(s)} \right)^{I_n} \cdot \left( g_2^{B_{n+1}(s)} \right)^{W_1} \cdots \left( g_2^{B_{n+m}(s)} \right)^{W_m} \cdot \left( g_2^\delta \right)^t \\
 g_1^C &= g_1^W \cdot g_1^{\frac{H(s) \cdot T(s)}{\delta}} \cdot \left( g_1^A \right)^t \cdot \left( g_1^B \right)^r \cdot \left( g_1^\delta \right)^{-r \cdot t}
 \end{aligned}$$

In this computation, the group elements  $g_1^{A_j(s)}$ ,  $g_1^{B_j(s)}$  and  $g_2^{B_j(s)}$  can be derived from the Common Reference String and the Quadratic Arithmetic Program of the problem, as we have seen in 8.2. In fact, those points only have to be computed once, and can be published and reused for multiple proof generations because they are the same for all instances and witnesses. All other group elements are part of the Common Reference String.

After all these computations have been done, a valid zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge  $\pi$  in the Groth\_16 protocol is given by the following three curve points:

$$\pi = (g_1^A, g_1^C, g_2^B) \quad (8.7)$$

As we can see, a Groth\_16 zk-SNARK consists of 3 curve points, two points from  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and 1 point from  $\mathbb{G}_2$ . The argument is specifically designed this way because, in typical applications,  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is a torsion group of an elliptic curve over some prime field, while  $\mathbb{G}_2$  is a subgroup of the full torsion group over an extension field as explained in 5.4. Elements from  $\mathbb{G}_1$  therefore need less space to be stored, and computations in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  are typically faster than in  $\mathbb{G}_2$ .

Since the witness is encoded in the exponent of a generator of a cryptographically secure elliptic curve, it is hidden from anyone but the prover. Moreover, since any proof is randomized by the occurrence of the random field elements  $r$  and  $t$ , proofs are not unique to any given witness.

*Example 143 (The 3-factorization Problem).* To see how a prover might compute a zk-SNARK, consider the 3-factorization problem from 111, our protocol parameters from 141 as well as the Common Reference String from 8.5.

Our task is to compute a zk-SNARK for the instance  $I_1 = \langle 11 \rangle$  and its constructive proof  $\langle W_1, W_2, W_3, W_4 \rangle = \langle 2, 3, 4, 6 \rangle$  as computed in 118. As we know from 127 the associated polynomial  $P_{(I;W)}$  of the Quadratic Arithmetic Program from 127 is given as follows:

$$P_{(I;W)} = x^2 + x + 9$$

Since  $P_{(I;W)}$  is identical to the target polynomial  $T(x) = x^2 + x + 9$  in this example, we know from example 127 that the quotient polynomial  $H = P/T$  is the constant degree 0 polynomial:

$$H(x) = H_0 \cdot x^0 = 1 \cdot x^0$$

We therefore use  $\left[ \frac{s^0 \cdot T(s)}{\delta} \right]_{g_1} = (26, 34)$  from our Common Reference String 8.5 of the 3-factorization problem and compute as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \left[ \frac{H(s) \cdot T(s)}{\delta} \right]_{g_1} &= [H_0](26, 34) = [1](26, 34) \\
 &= (26, 34)
 \end{aligned}$$

In the next step, we have to compute all group elements required for a proper Groth16 zk-SNARK 8.7. We start with  $g_1^W$ . Using scalar products instead of the exponential notation, and  $\oplus$  for the group law on the BLS6\_6 curve, we have to compute the point  $[W]g_1$ :

$$\begin{aligned} [W]g_1 = & [W_1]g_1 \frac{\beta \cdot A_2(s) + \alpha \cdot B_2(s) + C_2(s)}{\delta} \oplus [W_2]g_1 \frac{\beta \cdot A_3(s) + \alpha \cdot B_3(s) + C_3(s)}{\delta} \oplus [W_3]g_1 \frac{\beta \cdot A_4(s) + \alpha \cdot B_4(s) + C_4(s)}{\delta} \\ & \oplus [W_4]g_1 \frac{\beta \cdot A_5(s) + \alpha \cdot B_5(s) + C_5(s)}{\delta} \end{aligned}$$

5603 To compute this point, we have to remember that a prover should not be in possession of  
 5604 the simulation trapdoor, hence, they should not know what  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\delta$  and  $s$  are. In order to  
 5605 compute this group element, the prover therefore needs the Common Reference String. Using  
 5606 the logarithmic order from 5.46 and the witness, we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} [W]g_1 &= [2](33, 34) \oplus [3](26, 34) \oplus [4](38, 28) \oplus [6](27, 9) \\ &= [2 \cdot 2](13, 15) \oplus [3 \cdot 5](13, 15) \oplus [4 \cdot 10](13, 15) \oplus [6 \cdot 7](13, 15) \\ &= [2 \cdot 2 + 3 \cdot 5 + 4 \cdot 10 + 6 \cdot 7](13, 15) = [10](13, 15) \\ &= (38, 28) \end{aligned}$$

5607 In a next step, we compute  $g_1^A$ . We sample the random point  $r = 11$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , using scalar  
 5608 products instead of the exponential notation, and  $\oplus$  for the group law on the BLS6\_6 curve.  
 5609 We then have to compute the following expression:

$$\begin{aligned} [A]g_1 = & [\alpha]g_1 \oplus [A_0(s)]g_1 \oplus [I_1][A_1(s)]g_1 \oplus [W_1][A_2(s)]g_1 \oplus [W_2][A_3(s)]g_1 \\ & \oplus [W_3][A_4(s)]g_1 \oplus [W_4][A_5(s)]g_1 \oplus [r][\delta]g_1 \end{aligned}$$

Since we don't know what  $\alpha$ ,  $\delta$  and  $s$  are, we look up  $[\alpha]g_1$  and  $[\delta]g_1$  from the Common Reference String. According to example 8.5, we have  $[A_2(s)]g_1 = (35, 15)$ ,  $[A_5(s)]g_1 = (26, 34)$  and  $[A_j(s)]g_1 = \mathcal{O}$  for all other indices  $0 \leq j \leq 5$ . Since  $\mathcal{O}$  is the neutral element on  $\mathbb{G}_1$ , we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} [A]g_1 &= (27, 34) \oplus \mathcal{O} \oplus [11]\mathcal{O} \oplus [2](35, 15) \oplus [3]\mathcal{O} \oplus [4]\mathcal{O} \oplus [6](26, 34) \oplus [11](38, 15) \\ &= (27, 34) \oplus [2](35, 15) \oplus [6](26, 34) \oplus [11](38, 15) \\ &= [6](13, 15) \oplus [2 \cdot 9](13, 15) \oplus [6 \cdot 5](13, 15) \oplus [11 \cdot 3](13, 15) \\ &= [6 + 2 \cdot 9 + 6 \cdot 5 + 11 \cdot 3](13, 15) = [9](13, 15) \\ &= (35, 15) \end{aligned}$$

5610 In order to compute the two curve points  $[B]g_1$  and  $[B]g_2$ , we sample another random element  
 5611  $t = 4$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ . Using the scalar product instead of the exponential notation, and  $\oplus$  for the group  
 5612 law on the BLS6\_6 curve, we have to compute the following expressions:

$$\begin{aligned} [B]g_1 &= [\beta]g_1 \oplus [B_0(s)]g_1 \oplus [I_1][B_1(s)]g_1 \oplus [W_1][B_2(s)]g_1 \oplus [W_2][B_3(s)]g_1 \\ &\quad \oplus [W_3][B_4(s)]g_1 \oplus [W_4][B_5(s)]g_1 \oplus [t][\delta]g_1 \\ [B]g_2 &= [\beta]g_2 \oplus [B_0(s)]g_2 \oplus [I_1][B_1(s)]g_2 \oplus [W_1][B_2(s)]g_2 \oplus [W_2][B_3(s)]g_2 \\ &\quad \oplus [W_3][B_4(s)]g_2 \oplus [W_4][B_5(s)]g_2 \oplus [t][\delta]g_2 \end{aligned}$$

Since we don't know what  $\beta$ ,  $\delta$  and  $s$  are, we look up the associated group elements from the Common Reference String. Recall from 8.5 that we can evaluate  $[B_j(s)]_{g_1}$  without knowing the secret evaluation point  $s$ . Since  $B_3 = A_2$  and  $B_4 = A_5$ , we have  $[B_3(s)]_{g_1} = (35, 15)$ ,  $[B_4(s)]_{g_1} = (26, 34)$  according to the computation in 8.5, and  $[B_j(s)]_{g_1} = \mathcal{O}$  for all other indices  $0 \leq j \leq 5$ . Since  $\mathcal{O}$  is the neutral element on  $\mathbb{G}_1$ , we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} [B]_{g_1} &= (26, 34) \oplus \mathcal{O} \oplus [11]\mathcal{O} \oplus [2]\mathcal{O} \oplus [3](35, 15) \oplus [4](26, 34) \oplus [6]\mathcal{O} \oplus [4](38, 15) \\ &= (26, 34) \oplus [3](35, 15) \oplus [4](26, 34) \oplus [4](38, 15) \\ &= [5](13, 15) \oplus [3 \cdot 9](13, 15) \oplus [4 \cdot 5](13, 15) \oplus [4 \cdot 3](13, 15) \\ &= [5 + 3 \cdot 9 + 4 \cdot 5 + 4 \cdot 3](13, 15) = [12](13, 15) \\ &= (13, 28) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} [B]_{g_2} &= (16v^2, 28v^3) \oplus \mathcal{O} \oplus [11]\mathcal{O} \oplus [2]\mathcal{O} \oplus [3](37v^2, 16v^3) \oplus [4](16v^2, 28v^3) \oplus [6]\mathcal{O} \oplus [4](42v^2, 16v^3) \\ &= (16v^2, 28v^3) \oplus [3](37v^2, 16v^3) \oplus [4](16v^2, 28v^3) \oplus [4](42v^2, 16v^3) \\ &= [5](7v^2, 16v^3) \oplus [3 \cdot 9](7v^2, 16v^3) \oplus [4 \cdot 5](7v^2, 16v^3) \oplus [4 \cdot 3](7v^2, 16v^3) \\ &= [5 + 3 \cdot 9 + 4 \cdot 5 + 4 \cdot 3](7v^2, 16v^3) = [12](7v^2 + 16v^3) \\ &= (7v^2, 27v^3) \end{aligned}$$

In a last step, we combine the previous computations to compute the point  $[C]_{g_1}$  in the group  $\mathbb{G}_1$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} [C]_{g_1} &= [W]_{g_1} \oplus \left[ \frac{H(s) \cdot T(s)}{\delta} \right]_{g_1} \oplus [t][A]_{g_1} \oplus [r][B]_{g_1} \oplus [-r \cdot t][\delta]_{g_1} \\ &= (38, 28) \oplus (26, 34) \oplus [4](35, 15) \oplus [11](13, 28) \oplus [-11 \cdot 4](38, 15) \\ &= [10](13, 15) \oplus [5](13, 15) \oplus [4 \cdot 9](13, 15) \oplus [11 \cdot 12](13, 15) \oplus [-11 \cdot 4 \cdot 3](13, 15) \\ &= [10 + 5 + 4 \cdot 9 + 11 \cdot 12 - 11 \cdot 4 \cdot 3](13, 15) = [12](13, 15) \\ &= (13, 28) \end{aligned}$$

5613 Given the instance  $I_1 = \langle 11 \rangle$ , we can now combine these computations and see that the  
5614 following 3 curve points are a zk-SNARK for the witness  $\langle W_1, W_2, W_3, W_4 \rangle = \langle 2, 3, 4, 6 \rangle$ :

$$\pi = ((35, 15), (13, 28), (7v^2, 27v^3)) \quad (8.8)$$

5615 We can now publish this zk-SNARK, or send it to a designated verifier. Note that, if we  
5616 had sampled different values for  $r$  and  $t$ , we would have computed a different zk-SNARK for  
5617 the same witness. The zk-SNARK, therefore, hides the witness perfectly, which means that it  
5618 is impossible to reconstruct the witness from the zk-SNARK.

5619 **The Verification Phase** Given some Rank-1 Constraint System  $R$ , instance  $I = \langle I_1, \dots, I_n \rangle$   
5620 and Groth\_16 zk-SNARK  $\pi$  8.7, the task of the verification phase is to check that  $\pi$  is indeed  
5621 an argument for a constructive proof. Assuming that the simulation trapdoor does not exists  
5622 anymore and the verification checks the proof, the verifier is then convinced that someone knows  
5623 a witness  $W = \langle W_1, \dots, W_m \rangle$  such that  $(I; W)$  is a word in the language of  $R$ .

To achieve this in the Groth\_16 protocol, we assume that any verifier is able to compute the pairing map  $e(\cdot, \cdot)$  efficiently, and has access to the Common Reference String used to produce

the zk-SNARK  $\pi$ . In order to verify the zk-SNARK with respect to the instance  $\langle I_1, \dots, I_n \rangle$ , the verifier computes the following curve point:

$$g_1^I = \left( g_1^{\frac{\beta \cdot A_0(s) + \alpha \cdot B_0(s) + C_0(s)}{\gamma}} \right) \cdot \left( g_1^{\frac{\beta \cdot A_1(s) + \alpha \cdot B_1(s) + C_1(s)}{\gamma}} \right)^{I_1} \cdots \left( g_1^{\frac{\beta \cdot A_n(s) + \alpha \cdot B_n(s) + C_n(s)}{\gamma}} \right)^{I_n}$$

5624 With this group element, the verifier is able to verify the zk-SNARK  $\pi = (g_1^A, g_1^C, g_2^B)$  by check-  
5625 ing the following equation using the pairing map:

$$e(g_1^A, g_2^B) = e(g_1^\alpha, g_2^\beta) \cdot e(g_1^I, g_2^\gamma) \cdot e(g_1^C, g_2^\delta) \quad (8.9)$$

5626 If the equation holds true, the verifier outputs `accept` and if the equation does not hold, the  
5627 verifier outputs `reject`.

5628 *Remark 9.* We know from 5.4 that computing pairings in cryptographically secure pairing  
5629 groups is computationally expensive. As we can see, in the Groth\_16 protocol, 3 pairings  
5630 are required to verify the zk-SNARK, because the pairing  $e(g_1^\alpha, g_2^\beta)$  is independent of the proof,  
5631 meaning that it can be computed once and then stored as an amendment to the verifier key.

5632 In ?, the author showed that 2 is the minimal amount of pairings that any protocol with  
5633 similar properties has to use. This protocol is therefore close to the theoretical minimum. In the  
5634 same paper, the author outlined an adaptation that only uses 2 pairings. However, that reduction  
5635 comes with the price of much more overhead computation. Having 3 pairings is therefore a  
5636 compromise that gives the overall best performance. To date, the Groth16 protocol is the most  
5637 efficient in its class.

5638 *Example 144* (The 3-factorization Problem). To see how a verifier might verify a zk-SNARK  
5639 for some given instance  $I$ , consider the 3-factorization problem from 111, our protocol pa-  
5640 rameters from 141, the Common Reference String from 8.5 as well as the zk-SNARK  $\pi =$   
5641  $((35, 15), (27, 9), (7v^2, 27v^3))$  from example 8.8, which claims to be an argument of knowledge  
5642 for a witness for the instance  $I_1 = \langle 11 \rangle$ .

5643 In order to verify the zk-SNARK for that instance, we first compute the curve point  $g_1^I$ . Us-  
5644 ing scalar products instead of the exponential notation, and  $\oplus$  for the group law on the BLS6\_6  
5645 curve, we have to compute the point  $[I]g_1$  as follows:

$$[I]g_1 = \left[ \frac{\beta \cdot A_0(s) + \alpha \cdot B_0(s) + C_0(s)}{\gamma} \right]_{g_1} \oplus [I_1] \left[ \frac{\beta \cdot A_1(s) + \alpha \cdot B_1(s) + C_1(s)}{\gamma} \right]_{g_1}$$

5646 To compute this point, we have to remember that a verifier should not be in possession of the  
5647 simulation trapdoor, which means that they should not know what  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$  and  $s$  are. In order to  
5648 compute this group element, the verifier therefore needs the Common Reference String. Using  
5649 the logarithmic order from 5.46 and instance  $I_1$ , we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} [I]g_1 &= \left[ \frac{\beta \cdot A_0(s) + \alpha \cdot B_0(s) + C_0(s)}{\gamma} \right]_{g_1} \oplus [I_1] \left[ \frac{\beta \cdot A_1(s) + \alpha \cdot B_1(s) + C_1(s)}{\gamma} \right]_{g_1} \\ &= \mathcal{O} \oplus [11](33, 9) \\ &= [11 \cdot 11](13, 15) = [4](13, 15) \\ &= (35, 28) \end{aligned}$$



5650 In the next step, we have to compute all the pairings involved in equation 8.9. Using the  
 5651 logarithmic order on  $\mathbb{G}_1$  5.46 and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  5.49 as well as the bilinearity of the pairing map we get  
 5652 the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 e([A]_{g_1}, [B]_{g_2}) &= e((35, 15), (7v^2, 27v^3)) = e([9](13, 15), [12](7v^2, 16v^3)) \\
 &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{9 \cdot 12} \\
 &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{108} \\
 e([\alpha]_{g_1}, [\beta]_{g_2}) &= e((27, 34), (16v^2, 28v^3)) = e([6](13, 15), [5](7v^2, 16v^3)) \\
 &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{6 \cdot 5} \\
 &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{30} \\
 e([I]_{g_1}, [\gamma]_{g_2}) &= e((35, 28), (37v^2, 27v^3)) = e([4](13, 15), [4](7v^2, 16v^3)) \\
 &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{4 \cdot 4} \\
 &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{16} \\
 e([C]_{g_1}, [\delta]_{g_2}) &= e((13, 28), (42v^2, 16v^3)) = e([12](13, 15), [3](7v^2, 16v^3)) \\
 &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{12 \cdot 3} \\
 &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{36}
 \end{aligned}$$

5653 In order to check equation 8.9, observe that the target group  $\mathbb{G}_T$  of the Weil pairing is a  
 5654 finite cyclic group of order 13. Exponentiation is therefore done in modular 13 arithmetic.  
 5655 Accordingly, since  $108 \bmod 13 = 4$ , we evaluate the left side of equation 8.9 as follows:

$$e([A]_{g_1}, [B]_{g_2}) = e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{108} = e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^4$$

5656 Similarly, we evaluate the right side of equation 8.9 using modular 13 arithmetic and the  
 5657 exponential law  $a^x \cdot a^y = a^{x+y}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
 e([\alpha]_{g_1}, [\beta]_{g_2}) \cdot e([I]_{g_1}, [\gamma]_{g_2}) \cdot e([C]_{g_1}, [\delta]_{g_2}) &= \\
 e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{30} \cdot e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{16} \cdot e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{36} &= \\
 e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^4 \cdot e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^3 \cdot e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{10} &= \\
 e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{4+3+10} &= \\
 e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^4 &
 \end{aligned}$$

5658 As we can see, both the left and the right side of equation 8.9 are identical, which implies  
 5659 that the verification process accepts the zk-SNARK and the verifier outputs `accept`.

5660 **Proof Simulation** During the execution of a setup phase, a Common Reference String is  
 5661 generated, along with a simulation trapdoor 8.2, the latter of which must be deleted at the end  
 5662 of the setup-phase. In this paragraph, we will show why knowledge of the simulation trapdoor  
 5663 is problematic, and how it can be used to generate zk-SNARKs for a given instance without any  
 5664 knowledge of an associated witness.

5665 To be more precise, let  $I$  be an instance for some R1CS language  $L_R$ . We call a zk-SNARK  
 5666 for  $L_R$  **forged** or **simulated** if it passes a verification but its generation does not require the  
 5667 existence of a witness  $W$  such that  $(I; W)$  is a word in  $L_R$ .

To see how simulated zk-SNARKs can be computed, assume that a forger has knowledge of proper Groth\_16 parameters, a Quadratic Arithmetic Program of the problem, a Common Reference String and its associated simulation trapdoor  $\tau$ :

$$\tau = (\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, s) \quad (8.10)$$

Given some instance  $I$ , the forger’s task is to generate a zk-SNARK for this instance that passes the verification process, without having access to any other zk-SNARKs for this instance and without knowledge of a valid witness  $W$ .

To achieve this in the Groth\_16 protocol, the forger can use the simulation trapdoor in combination with the QAP and two arbitrary field elements  $A$  and  $B$  from the scalar field  $\mathbb{F}_r$  of the pairing groups to compute  $g_1^C$  for the instance  $\langle I_1, \dots, I_n \rangle$  as follows:

$$g_1^C = g_1^{\frac{A \cdot B}{\delta}} \cdot g_1^{-\frac{\alpha \cdot \beta}{\delta}} \cdot g_1^{-\frac{\beta A_0(s) + \alpha B_0(s) + C_0(s)}{\delta}} \cdot \left( g_1^{-\frac{\beta A_1(s) + \alpha B_1(s) + C_1(s)}{\delta}} \right)^{I_1} \cdots \left( g_1^{-\frac{\beta A_n(s) + \alpha B_n(s) + C_n(s)}{\delta}} \right)^{I_n}$$

The forger then publishes the zk-SNARK  $\pi_{\text{forged}} = (g_1^A, g_1^C, g_2^B)$ , which will pass the verification process and is computable without the existence of a witness  $\langle W_1, \dots, W_m \rangle$ .

To see that the simulation trapdoor is necessary and sufficient to compute the simulated proof  $\pi_{\text{forged}}$ , first observe that both generators  $g_1$  and  $g_2$  are known to the forger, as they are part of the Common Reference String, encoded as  $g_1^{s^0}$  and  $g_2^{s^0}$ . The forger is therefore able to compute  $g_1^{A \cdot B}$ . Moreover, since the forger knows  $\alpha, \beta, \delta$  and  $s$  from the trapdoor, they are able to compute all factors in the computation of  $g_1^C$ .

If, on the other hand, the simulation trapdoor is unknown, it is not possible to compute  $g_1^C$ , since, for example, the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption makes the derivation of  $g_1^{\alpha \cdot \beta}$  from  $g_1^\alpha$  and  $g_1^\beta$  infeasible.

**Example 145** (The 3-factorization Problem). To see how a forger might simulate a zk-SNARK for some given instance  $I$ , consider the 3-factorization problem from 111, our protocol parameters from 141, the Common Reference String from 8.5 and the simulation trapdoor  $\tau = (6, 5, 4, 3, 2)$  of that CRS.

In order to forge a zk-SNARK for instance  $I_1 = \langle 11 \rangle$ , we don’t need a constructive proof for the associated Rank-1 Constraint System, which implies that we don’t have to execute the circuit  $C_{3.\text{fac}}(\mathbb{F}_{13})$  from example 120. Instead, we have to choose 2 arbitrary elements  $A$  and  $B$  from  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , and compute  $g_1^A, g_2^B$  and  $g_1^C$  as defined in 8.2. We choose  $A = 9$  and  $B = 3$ , and, since  $\delta^{-1} = 3$ , we compute as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} [A]g_1 &= [9](13, 15) = (35, 15) \\ [B]g_2 &= [3](7v^2, 16v^3) = (42v^2, 16v^3) \\ [C]g_1 &= \left[ \frac{A \cdot B}{\delta} \right]g_1 \oplus \left[ -\frac{\alpha \cdot \beta}{\delta} \right]g_1 \oplus \left[ -\frac{\beta A_0(s) + \alpha B_0(s) + C_0(s)}{\delta} \right]g_1 \oplus \\ &\quad [I_1] \left[ -\frac{\beta A_1(s) + \alpha B_1(s) + C_1(s)}{\delta} \right]g_1 \\ &= [(9 \cdot 3) \cdot 9](13, 15) \oplus [-(6 \cdot 5) \cdot 9](13, 15) \oplus [0](13, 15) \oplus [11][-(7 \cdot 2 + 4) \cdot 9](13, 15) \\ &= [9](13, 15) \oplus [3](13, 15) \oplus [12](13, 15) = [11](13, 15) \\ &= (33, 9) \end{aligned}$$

This is all we need to generate our forged proof for the 3-factorization problem. We publish the simulated zk-SNARK:

$$\pi_{fake} = ((35, 15), (33, 9), (42v^2, 16v^3))$$

Despite the fact that this zk-SNARK was generated without knowledge of a proper witness, it is indistinguishable from a zk-SNARK that proves knowledge of a proper witness.

To see that, we show that our forged SNARK passes the verification process. In order to verify  $\pi_{fake}$ , we proceed as in 8.2 and compute the curve point  $g_1^I$  for the instance  $I_1 = \langle 11 \rangle$ . Since the instance is the same as in example 8.8, we can parallel the computation from that example:

$$\begin{aligned} [I]_{g_1} &= \left[ \frac{\beta \cdot A_0(s) + \alpha \cdot B_0(s) + C_0(s)}{\gamma} \right]_{g_1} \oplus [I_1] \left[ \frac{\beta \cdot A_1(s) + \alpha \cdot B_1(s) + C_1(s)}{\gamma} \right]_{g_1} \\ &= (35, 28) \end{aligned}$$

In a next step we have to compute all the pairings involved in equation 8.9. Using the logarithmic order on  $\mathbb{G}_1$  5.46 and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  5.49 as well as the bilinearity of the pairing map we get

$$\begin{aligned} e([A]_{g_1}, [B]_{g_2}) &= e((35, 15), (42v^2, 16v^3)) = e([9](13, 15), [3](7v^2, 16v^3)) \\ &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{9 \cdot 3} \\ &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{27} \\ e([\alpha]_{g_1}, [\beta]_{g_2}) &= e((27, 34), (16v^2, 28v^3)) = e([6](13, 15), [5](7v^2, 16v^3)) \\ &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{6 \cdot 5} \\ &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{30} \\ e([I]_{g_1}, [\gamma]_{g_2}) &= e((35, 28), (37v^2, 27v^3)) = e([4](13, 15), [4](7v^2, 16v^3)) \\ &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{4 \cdot 4} \\ &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{16} \\ e([C]_{g_1}, [\delta]_{g_2}) &= e((33, 9), (42v^2, 16v^3)) = e([11](13, 15), [3](7v^2, 16v^3)) \\ &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{11 \cdot 3} \\ &= e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{33} \end{aligned}$$

In order to check equation 8.9, observe that the target group  $\mathbb{G}_T$  of the Weil pairing is a finite cyclic group of order 13. Exponentiation is therefore done in modular 13 arithmetics. Using this, we evaluate the left side of the verifier equation as follows:

$$e([A]_{g_1}, [B]_{g_2}) = e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{27} = e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^1$$

since  $27 \bmod 13 = 1$ . Similarly, we evaluate the right side of the verification equation using modular 13 arithmetics and the exponential law  $a^x \cdot a^y = a^{x+y}$ . We get

$$\begin{aligned} e([\alpha]_{g_1}, [\beta]_{g_2}) \cdot e([I]_{g_1}, [\gamma]_{g_2}) \cdot e([C]_{g_1}, [\delta]_{g_2}) &= \\ e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{30} \cdot e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{16} \cdot e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{33} &= \\ e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^4 \cdot e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^3 \cdot e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^7 &= \\ e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^{4+3+7} &= \\ e((13, 15), (7v^2, 16v^3))^1 & \end{aligned}$$

5702      As we can see, both the left and the right side of the verifier equation are identical, which  
5703 implies that the verification process accepts the simulated proof.  $\pi_{fake}$  therefore convinces the  
5704 verifier that a witness to the 3-factorization problem exists. However, no such witness was really  
5705 necessary to generate the proof.

## 5706 **Chapter 9**

## 5707 **Exercises and Solutions**

5708 TODO: All exercises we provided should have a solution, which we give here in all detail.