

Summer School 2025

# Web Security

bubu



///  
0xDecode  
Deusto Electronic Club Of  
Developers & Engineers

# whoami



Alberto Fernández-de-Retana — bubu (pronounced as boo-boo)

Interested in web security and privacy, as well as browser internals.

CTF player for: TheHackersCrew, ISwearIGoogledIt, **0xDecode** ...




@alberto\_fdr



[albertofdr.github.io](https://github.com/albertofdr)



albertofdr.github.io@gmail.com




# Web




[1] <https://www.demandsage.com/internet-user-statistics/>





# Electron Apps



[1] <https://www.electronjs.org/>



# Electron Apps





[1] <https://www.electronjs.org/apps>


# WEB ARCHIVE

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///  
0x  
□



# Comisiones Obreras (CCOO)



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# Web Basics

HTTP/S, cookies, headers...




# Web Basics

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///  
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## HTTP




# Web Basics

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0x  
□

## HTTPS




# Cookies




# Cookies

## Cookies

First Request





Subsequent Requests




# Cookies

## Cookies (Resources)

### First Navigation




### Second Visit



### Cookies

Domain: foo.com; user\_id=123;  
Domain bar.com; id=abc;



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# Web Basics

#	Host	Method	URL	Params	Edited	Status code	Length	MIME type
1	https://deusto.es	GET	/			302	291	HTML
2	https://www.deusto.es	GET	/			301	394	
3	https://www.deusto.es	GET	/es/inicio			200	77135	HTML

## Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```

1 GET /es/inicio HTTP/2
2 Host: www.deusto.es
3 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
4 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
  Chrome/136.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
6 Accept:
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8
  ,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
7 Sec-Fetch-Site: none
8 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
9 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
10 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
11 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not,A/Brand";v="99", "Chromium";v="136"
12 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?
13 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux"
14 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
15 Priority: u=0, i
16
17

```

## Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```

1 HTTP/2 200 OK
2 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
3 Last-Modified: Tue, 10 Jun 2025 04:01:46 GMT
4 X-Oracle-Dms-Rid: 0
5 Device_type: Desktop
6 Host_service: FutureTenseContentServer:12c
7 X-Oracle-Dms-Ecid: 2c515c86-a65c-49aa-9e42-fb13683ba765-0004695c
8 Vary: Accept-Encoding
9 X-Request-Id: 3d443a521a226f61d227f73798ce6bf0
10 Content-Length: 76439
11 Cache-Control: public, no-store
12 Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2025 08:31:22 GMT
13 Vary: User-Agent
14 Server: Apache
15 Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' https://alud.deusto.es;
  https://biblioguias.biblioteca.deusto.es;
16 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
17 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
18 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
19 X-Xss-Protection: 1
20
21
22
23 <!DOCTYPE html><html lang="es">
24   <head>
25     <!-- feednami -->
26     <script type="text/javascript" src="https://rss2json.com/gfapi.js" defer>
27     </script>
28     <script src="https://cdn.rawgit.com/cockando/feednami-client/master/releases/1.0.2/min.js">

```

# Web Basics (Look into JS)

```
const r = document.getElementById("spinner");
r.style.setProperty("display", "flex");
const a = t({
  url: i,
  scale_factor: "2",
  full_page: "true",
  scroll_page: "true",
  response_type: "json",
  width: String(document.body.clientWidth)
  access_key: String("245a" + 7897e4)
});
fetch("https://api.apiflash.com/v1/urltoimage?" + a).then(e => e.ok ? e.json()
  status: e.status
```




```
6 <head>
7   <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge" />
8   <meta name="google-site-verification" content="QLOAZ1lJPEKDwL2M_pdClBGl2pzRxajNsC5H9RqrDVU" />
9   <!-- Directiva para la previsualización de la plantilla, se borrar, de las páginas -->
10
11
12 <!-- Area visual que contiene parametros del head en cada idioma: title description metas Este VA es OBLIGATORIO!!!! y tiene que estar en la sección HEAD
13
14
15 <!--:*****-->
16 <!--: Euskadi.net: Eusko Jaurlaritza - Gobierno Vasco          :-->
17 <!--: Created by:                                         :-->
18 <!--:      EJIE, S.A. Eusko Jaurlaritzaren Informatika Elkartea :-->
19 <!--:      Avda. Mediterraneo, 14                                :-->
20 <!--:      01010 Vitoria-Gasteiz                            :-->
21 <!--:*****-->
22 <link href="/r01commonresources/styles/r01ClaimStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" />
23
24 <!-- Google Tag Manager --><script>(function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(N
25
26
27
```

# HTTP Headers

Date	
Device-Memory	
Dictionary-IDExperimental	
DNTNon-standardDeprecated	
DownlinkExperimental	
DPRNon-standardDeprecated	
Early-DataExperimental	
ECTExperimental	
ETag	
Expect	
Expect-CTDeprecated	
Expires	
Forwarded	
From	
Host	
If-Match	
If-Modified-Since	
If-None-Match	
If-Range	
If-Unmodified-Since	
Keep-Alive	
Last-Modified	
Link	
Location	
Max-Forwards	
NELExperimental	
No-Vary-SearchExperimental	
Observe-Browsing-TopicsExperimentalNon-standard	
Origin	
Origin-Agent-Cluster	
Permissions-PolicyExperimental	
PragmaDeprecated	
Prefer	
Preference-Applied	
Priority	
Proxy-Authenticate	
Proxy-Authorization	
Range	
Referer	
Referrer-Policy	
Refresh	
Report-ToNon-standardDeprecated	
Reporting-Endpoints	
Repr-Digest	
Retry-After	
RTTExperimental	
Save-DataExperimental	
	Sec-Browsing-TopicsExperimentalNon-standard
	Sec-CH-Prefers-Color-SchemeExperimental
	Sec-CH-Prefers-Reduced-MotionExperimental
	Sec-CH-Prefers-Reduced-TransparencyExperimental
	Sec-CH-UAExperimental
	Sec-CH-UA-ArchExperimental
	Sec-CH-UA-BitnessExperimental
	Sec-CH-UA-Form-FactorsExperimental
	Sec-CH-UA-Full-VersionDeprecated
	Sec-CH-UA-Full-Version-ListExperimental
	Sec-CH-UA-MobileExperimental
	Sec-CH-UA-ModelExperimental
	Sec-CH-UA-PlatformExperimental
	Sec-CH-UA-Platform-VersionExperimental
	Sec-CH-UA-WoW64Experimental
	Sec-Fetch-Dest
	Sec-Fetch-Mode
	Sec-Fetch-Site
	Sec-Fetch-User
	Sec-GPCExperimental
	Sec-Purpose
	Sec-Speculation-TagsExperimental
	Sec-WebSocket-Accept
	Sec-WebSocket-Extensions
	Sec-WebSocket-Key
	Sec-WebSocket-Protocol
	Sec-WebSocket-Version
	Server
	Server-Timing
	Service-Worker
	Service-Worker-Allowed
	Service-Worker-Navigation-Preload
	Set-Cookie
	Set-Login
	SourceMap
	Speculation-RulesExperimental
	Strict-Transport-Security
	Supports-Loading-ModeExperimental
	TE
	Timing-Allow-Origin
	TkNon-standardDeprecated
	Trailer
	Transfer-Encoding
	Upgrade
	Upgrade-Insecure-Requests
	Use-As-DictionaryExperimental
	User-Agent
	Vary
	Via
	Viewport-WidthNon-standardDeprecated
	Want-Content-Digest
	Want-Repr-Digest
	WarningDeprecated
	WidthNon-standardDeprecated
	WWW-Authenticate
	X-Content-Type-Options
	X-DNS-Prefetch-ControlNon-standard
	X-Forwarded-ForNon-standard
	X-Forwarded-HostNon-standard
	X-Forwarded-ProtoNon-standard
	X-Frame-Options
	X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-PoliciesNon-standard
	X-Powered-ByNon-standard
	X-Robots-TagNon-standard
	X-XSS-ProtectionNon-standardDeprecated



# Web Basics



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# Web Security Vulns

TOP 10



# OWASP TOP 10 2021<sup>1</sup>

1. A01:2021-Broken Access Control
2. A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures
3. A03:2021-Injection
4. A04:2021-Insecure Design
5. A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration
6. A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components
7. A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures
8. A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures
9. A09:2021-Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
10. A10:2021-Server-Side Request Forgery



**TOP10**

[1] <https://owasp.org/Top10/>



# Broken Access Control

“Access control enforces policy such that users cannot act outside of their intended permissions. Failures typically lead to unauthorized information disclosure, modification, or destruction of all data or performing a business function outside the user's limits.”



# Exercise

```
@app.route('/api/user/<int:user_id>', methods=['GET'])
def get_user(user_id):
    """
    User accessing his data.
    """
    if user_id != logged_in_user_id:
        return jsonify({"error": "Unauthorized access"}), 403


    user = users.get(user_id)
    if not user:
        return jsonify({"error": "User not found"}), 404

    return jsonify(user)
```

/Challenges/Web-Server/API-Broken-Access

<http://challenge01.root-me.org:59088/>





# Solution

1. Create account
2. Login
3. Access to your user api/user/ID
4. Try accessing other users [/api/user/1](#)

```
{"note":"RM{E4_ _ _ _ _ PI}","userid":1,"username":"admin"}
```



# Injection

“User-supplied data is not validated, filtered, or sanitized by the application. Hostile data is directly used or concatenated.”

[1] [https://owasp.org/Top10/A03\\_2021-Injection/](https://owasp.org/Top10/A03_2021-Injection/)



# Exercise Local File Inclusion (LFI)

```
● ● ●

@app.route('/files', methods=['GET'])
def serve_file():
    """
    Serve the requested files.
    """
    # Get directory and file name from user input
    base_dir = request.args.get('files', '')
    file_name = request.args.get('f', 'default.txt')

    # Construct the full file path without sanitization
    file_path = os.path.join(base_dir, file_name)

    try:
        # Attempt to read and serve the file
        return send_file(file_path)
    except Exception as e:
        return jsonify({"error": str(e)}), 404
```

/Challenges/Web-Server/Local-File-Inclusion  
<http://challenge01.root-me.org/web-serveur/ch16/>  
admin pass: admin/index.php



# Solution LFI

1. <http://challenge01.root-me.org/web-serveur/ch16/?files=crypto&f=../../admin/index.php>

File viewer v 0.01

| sysadm | reseau | esprit | **crypto** | coding | archives |

ddjcrypt  
codebreakers  
basic\_cryptanalysis  
archives  
hash-lib-algo  
papers  
gnupg-afg-import.jpg  
infosoc  
index.html  
applied-crypto  
readme.cryptarchive.txt  
wordlists  
stegano

File : ../../admin/index.php

```
<?php

function http_digest_parse($txt)
{
    $needed_parts = array('nonce'=>1, 'nc'=>1, 'cnonce'=>1, 'qop'=>1, 'username'=>1, 'uri'=>1, 'response'=>1);
    $data = array();
    $keys = implode('|', array_keys($needed_parts));

    preg_match_all('@(' . $keys . ')=(?:([\"'])((\^\\2)+)\2|([^\s,]+))@', $txt, $matches, PREG_SET_ORDER);

    foreach ($matches as $m) {
        $data[$m[1]] = $m[3] ? $m[3] : $m[4];
        unset($needed_parts[$m[1]]);
    }

    return $needed_parts ? false : $data;
}

function auth($realm){
    header('HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized');
    header('WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="'.$realm.'",qop="auth",nonce="'.uniqid().'",opaque="'.md5($realm).'"');
    die($realm);
}

$realm = 'PHP Restricted area';
$users = array('admin' => '0'.substr(md5('admin'), 0, 16).substr(md5('admin'), -8));

if (!isset($_SERVER['PHP_AUTH_DIGEST'])) {
    auth($realm);
}

if (!isset($data = http_digest_parse($_SERVER['PHP_AUTH_DIGEST']))) {
    auth($realm);
}
```

# Exercise Command Injection

```
<?php

$flag = "" . file_get_contents("*****"). "";
if(isset($_POST["ip"]) && !empty($_POST["ip"])){
    $response = shell_exec("timeout 5 bash -c 'ping -c 3 ".$_POST["ip"]."'");
    echo $response;
}

?>
```

Challenges/Web-Server/PHP-Command-injection  
<http://challenge01.root-me.org/web-serveur/ch54/index.php>



# Solution Command Injection

1. Command: `127.0.0.1; cat index.php | tr "?" "_"`
2. Command: `127.0.0.1; cat .passwd`

# Exercise SQL Injection (SQLi)

```
● ● ●

@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])
def login():
    username = request.form.get('username')
    password = request.form.get('password')

    if not username or not password:
        return "Fill both inputs", 200

    # Check if the user exists
    query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '{username}' AND password = '{password}'"
    cursor = db_connection.cursor()
    cursor.execute(query)
    user = cursor.fetchone()

    if user:
        # logged
        # set cookie
    else:
        # Who are you?
        return "Login failed!", 401
```

/Challenges/Web-Server/SQL-injection-authentication  
<http://challenge01.root-me.org/web-serveur/ch9/>

Don't forget to also write dummy text in password



# Solution SQL Injection (SQLi)

1. Username: admin';--#-
2. Password: abcde



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# Web Security

## Client-Side



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Developers & Engineers

# Client-Side Web Security



# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

The screenshot shows a web browser window for the euskadi.eus website. The page title is "euskadi.eus" and the subtitle is "Toda la información, trámites y servicios del Gobierno Vasco". A search bar at the top contains the placeholder "Buscar en euskadi.eus" and a "Buscar" button. Below the search bar, the heading "Lo más buscado" is displayed, followed by three items:


- Mi carpeta**: An icon of a folder with a lock. Description: "Permite consultar expedientes, recibir notificaciones, realizar pagos y consultar certificaciones."
- BOPV**: An icon of a globe with a grid. Description: "Boletín Oficial del País Vasco"
- Osakidetza**: An icon of a blue cross inside a circle. Description: "Servicio Vasco de Salud: cita previa, carpeta de salud, Ofertas de Empleo Público (OPE)..."

At the bottom of the page, there is a horizontal navigation bar with various links:

- Fondos Next Generation
- Sede electrónica
- Euskalmet
- Empleo público
- Educación
- Ayudas y subvenciones
- Cita previa Osakidetza
- Lanbide
- Perfil de contratante
- Mi pago online
- Diccionario Elhuyar
- Traductor
- HABE



# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)



How the website knows who are we?



# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Name	Value	Domain	Path	Expir...	Size	Http...	Secure	SameS...	Partit...	Cross...	Priorit...	SameS...
r01euskadiUserCookie	https://www.euskadi.eus	euskadi.eus	/	Sess...	13						Medi...	Medi...
n38lidioma		euskadi.eus	/	Sess...	13						Medi...	Medi...
n38ldioma		euskadi.net	/	Sess...	13						Medi...	Medi...
n38lIdSession		euskadi.net	/	Sess...	25						Medi...	Medi...
n38lIdSession		euskadi.eus	/	Sess...	25						Medi...	Medi...
n38lIdSessionGlobal		euskadi.net	/	Sess...	42						Medi...	Medi...
n38lIdSistemasXLNetS		euskadi.net	/	Sess...	30						Medi...	Medi...
r01PortalInfo		www.euskadi.eus	/	Sess...	29		✓	None			Medi...	Medi...
r01euskadiCookie		euskadi.eus	/	2025...	24		✓	None			Medi...	Medi...
r01euskadiUserCookie	https://www.euskadi.eus	euskadi.eus	/	2025...	47	✓	✓	None			Medi...	Medi...
w43tamouserid		www.euskadi.eus	/	2024...	25							Medi...

[1] <https://albertofdr.github.io/web-security-class/web.today/cookies>



COOKIES  
(o HTTP Authorization)




# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)




Cookie: user=secret




Cookie: user=secret



# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)



Cookie: user=secret



How an attacker can steal the cookie?



# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

<https://euskadi.eus/fake.html>

```
<html>
<body>
    <div id="output"></div>


    <script>
        const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
        const userInput = params.get('text');

        if (userInput) {
            document.getElementById('output').innerHTML = userInput;
        } else {
            document.getElementById('output').innerHTML = 'No text provided.';
        }
    </script>
</body>
</html>
```




# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

`https://euskadi.eus/fake.html?text=<img src=gatito.jpg>`



# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

`https://euskadi.eus/fake.html?text=<img src=gatito.jpg onload=alert("hola") >`



# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

<https://euskadi.eus/fake.html?text=>

```


```

# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

<https://euskadi.eus/fake.html?text=PAYLOAD>



Cookie: user=secret



Cookie: user=secret

# Mitigations Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

1. Sanitizers (Client or Server)
  - a. DOMPurify
2. Cookie Attributes
  - a. HTTPOnly (no js access)
3. Content-Security-Policy Header (CSP)

*default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net;*

```
●●●  
  
<html>  
<body>  
<div id="output"></div>  
  
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/dompurify@3.1.2/dist/purify.min.js">  
</script>  
  
<script>  
  const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);  
  const userInput = params.get('text');  
  
  if (userInput) {  
    // Sanitize the user input before displaying it  
    const sanitizedInput = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);  
    document.getElementById('output').innerHTML = sanitizedInput;  
  } else {  
    document.getElementById('output').innerHTML = 'No text provided.';  
  }  
</script>  
</body>  
</html>
```

# Finding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) at Scale



EVERYTHING DOCKERIZED WITHOUT ISSUES!



# DOM Clobbering

```
<html>
<body>
<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/dompurify/3.2.1/purify.min.js"></script>
<script>
    window.onload = function(){
        // div
        div = document.createElement('div');

        // Get 'text' parameter
        const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
        const userInput = params.get('text');

        // SUPER SAFE
        // SANITIZATION
        const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);

        // Insert
        if (userInput) {
            div.innerHTML = userInput;
        } else {
            div.innerHTML = 'No text provided.';
        }
        document.body.appendChild(div);

        // Insert
        let someObject = window.someObject || {};
        if (someObject){
            eval(someObject.bubu.value)
        }
    };
</script>
</body>
</html>
```

# DOM Clobbering

```
// Insert
let someObject = window.someObject || {};
if (someObject){
    eval(someObject.bubu.value)
}
```

# DOM Clobbering

```
// Insert
let someObject = window.someObject || {};
if (someObject){
    eval(someObject.bubu.value)
}
```

WINDOW.SOMEOBJECT



# DOM Clobbering

```
<html>
<body>
    <form id="patata"></form>
</body>
</html>
```

# DOM Clobbering

```
<html>
<body>
    <form id="patata"></form>
</body>
</html>
```

```
> window.patata
<form id="patata"></form>
>
```

# DOM Clobbering



```
> window.patata
<-- <form id="patata"></form>
>
```

# DOM Clobbering

```
// Insert
let someObject = window.someObject || {};
if (someObject){
    eval(someObject.bubu.value)
}
```

```
<form id=someObject>
    <input id=bubu value=PAYOUT>
</form>
```

# DOM Clobbering

The screenshot shows a browser developer tools interface with the 'Sources' tab selected. The code editor displays a script file named 'b.html?text=%3C...%3E%3C/form%3E'. Line 25 is highlighted with a red box and contains the following code:

```

24
25 let someObject = window.someObject || {};
26 if (someObject){
27     eval(someObject.bubu.value)
28 }
29 </script>
30 </body>
31 </html>
32

```

The console below shows the following interactions:

```

> window.someObject
< ><form id="someObject">...</form>
> window.someObject.bubu
< <input id="bubu" value="PAYLOAD">
> window.someObject.bubu.value
< 'PAYLOAD'
>

```

# DOM Clobbering

```
<html>
<body>
<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/dompurify/3.2.1/purify.min.js"></script>
<script>
window.onload = function(){
    // div
    div = document.createElement('div');

    // Get 'text' parameter
    const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
    const userInput = params.get('text');

    // SUPER SAFE
    // SANITIZATION
    const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);

    // Insert
    if (userInput) {
        div.innerHTML = userInput;
    } else {
        div.innerHTML = 'No text provided.';
    }
    document.body.appendChild(div);

    // Insert
    let someObject = window.someObject || {};
    if (someObject){
        eval(someObject.bubu.value)
    }
};
</script>
</body>
</html>
```

```
<form id=someObject>
    <input id=bubu value=alert( "XSS" )>
</form>
```

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Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS), SQL Injection (SQLi), DOM clobbering,  
Command Injection, Local File Inclusion (LFI),  
Remote File Inclusion (RFI), Remote Code Execution (RCE),  
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF),  
CSRF Token Validation, Cross-Site Leaks (XS Leaks), Content-Security-Policy (CDP), HTTP  
Strict Transport Security (HSTS), Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR), XML External  
Entity (XXE), Path Traversal, Arbitrary File Upload, JSON Web Token (JWT) Injection, Open  
Redirect, Clickjacking, Session Fixation, Subdomain Takeover, Prototype Pollution,  
Deserialization Attack, Side-Channel Attack, Timing Attack, Same-Origin-Policy (SOP),  
Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS), Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), Cross-Origin  
Opener Policy (COOP), Cross-Origin Embedder Policy (COEP), Access-Control-Allow-Origin  
(ACAO), X-Frame-Options (XFO), Referrer-Policy, Race Conditions, Phishing, GraphQL,  
Single Sign-On (SSO), Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), Two-Factor Authentication (2FA),  
Transport Layer Security (TLS), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),  
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, Cookies, SameSite Cookies, HTTPOnly cookies, Access  
Control List (ACL), Origin, Host, Port, Protocol, Web Application Firewall (WAF), GET, POST,  
PUT, OPTIONS, DELETE, PATCH, HTTP 1.0, HTTP 1.1, HTTP 2.0, HTTP 3.0 Authorization,  
200, 404, 418, 302, 500, WebSocket, X-Content-Type-Options, Proxy, ClientSide Desync,

Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS), SQL Injection (SQLi), DOM clobbering,  
Command Injection, Local File Inclusion (LFI),  
Remote File Inclusion (RFI), Remote Code Execution (RCE),  
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF),

CSRF Token Validation

Strict Transport Security

Entity (XXE), Path Traversal

Redirect, Clickjacking

Deserialization Attacks

Cross-Origin Resource Sharing

Opener Policy (COOP)

(ACAO), X-Frame-Options

Single Sign-On (SSO)

Transport Layer Security

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, Cookies, SameSite Cookies, HTTPOnly cookies, Access

Control List (ACL), Origin, Host, Port, Protocol, Web Application Firewall (WAF), GET, POST,

PUT, OPTIONS, DELETE, PATCH, HTTP 1.0, HTTP 1.1, HTTP 2.0, HTTP 3.0 Authorization,

200, 404, 418, 302, 500, WebSocket, X-Content-Type-Options, Proxy, ClientSide Desync,



-Policy (CDP), HTTP  
IDOR), XML External  
JWT) Injection, Open  
Prototype Pollution,  
-Origin-Policy (SOP),  
n (SSTI), Cross-Origin  
s-Control-Allow-Origin  
Phishing, GraphQL,  
Authentication (2FA),  
ey Infrastructure (PKI),

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# Web Security

## General Knowledge



# URL parsing

<https://euskadi.eus/index.html>

The screenshot shows the homepage of the euskadi.eus website. The URL https://euskadi.eus/index.html is visible in the browser's address bar. The page has a dark blue header with the euskadi.eus logo and a search bar. Below the header, there's a section titled "Lo más buscado" (Most searched) featuring three icons: "Mi carpeta" (file folder), "BOPV" (Boletín Oficial del País Vasco), and "Osakidetza" (Healthcare service). At the bottom, there's a footer with various links like "Fondos Next Generation", "Sede electrónica", "Euskalmet", etc.

# URL parsing

`https://user:pass@euskadi.eus:443/index.html?id=1#~abc`

# URL parsing

Protocol	Domain Hostname	Path	Hash
https	:// user:pass @ euskadi.eus	: 443 /index.html ?id=1	#~abc
Creds	Port	Query Parameters	Search

# URL parsing

`https://web-attacker.com\anything@example.com/`

`https://web-attacker.com#@\example.com/`

`https://foo@web-attacker.com:443@example.com/`

`https://web-attacker.com@@example.com/`

Which one would be the website you visit?



[1] <https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf/url-validation-bypass-cheat-sheet>



# RFC 1738

December 1994

Network Working Group  
Request for Comments: 1738  
Category: Standards Track

T. Berners-Lee  
CERN  
L. Masinter  
Xerox Corporation  
M. McCahill  
University of Minnesota  
Editors  
December 1994

## Uniform Resource Locators (URL)

### Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

### Abstract

This document specifies a Uniform Resource Locator (URL), the syntax and semantics of formalized information for location and access of resources via the Internet.

#### 1. Introduction

This document describes the syntax and semantics for a compact string representation for a resource available via the Internet. These strings are called "Uniform Resource Locators" (URLs).

The specification is derived from concepts introduced by the World-Wide Web global information initiative, whose use of such objects dates from 1990 and is described in "Universal Resource Identifiers in WWW", [RFC 1630](#). The specification of URLs is designed to meet the requirements laid out in "Functional Requirements for Internet Resource Locators" [12].

This document was written by the URI working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force. Comments may be addressed to the editors, or

[1] <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1738>

# URL parsing

LANGUAGE	PARSER	CLAIMS TO FOLLOW...	HTTP://A.TLD\@B.TLD
PHP	cURL	RFC 3986 (with additions)	b.tld
PHP	parse_url	RFC 3986, but not fully	b.tld
NodeJS	url.parse	WHATWG	a.tld
Java	java.net.URL	RFC 3986	b.tld
Go	net/url	RFC 3986	Invalid userinfo
Ruby	uri	RFC 3986	Exception
Python 3	urllib	RFC 3986	a.tld\@b.tld
Python 3	urllib3 / requests	RFC 3986	a.tld

[1] <https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/security-implications-of-url-parsing-differentials/>

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
# Web Privacy

web tracking




# Web Tracking

## Third-Party Cookie Tracking




# Web Tracking

Cookies for Tracking




# Web Tracking CHIPS mitigation



# Web Tracking (HSTS)

## (1) Message (ID)

(Using ASCII) M = yoda  
 $y = 121$  (decimal) = 01111001 (bin)  
 $o = 01101111$   
 $d = 01100100$   
 $a = 01100001$



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# Browser Security


Browser <-> OS



Deusto Electronic Club Of  
Developers & Engineers

# Browser Security


- JavaScript Engine Security Issues V8.
  - Type confusion
  - Use-after-free
  - ...
- **How to communicate with OS.**
  - Open Local Ports
  - Protocol
  - Browser Permissions
  - ...
- ...



# Browser Security

How to communicate with OS [1][2]:

- **Open Local Ports**  
`localhost:6457`
- **Protocol**  
`msteams://`  
`bubuapp://`
- **Browser Permissions**
  - **camera, microphone, usb**
- ...



[1] Treasure Planet: Web-to-App Communication 🚀 <https://albertofdr.github.io/web-security-class/browser/web.to.app>

[2] You Shall Not Get Access 🧑: Browser Permissions <https://albertofdr.github.io/web-security-class/browser/browser.permissions>

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# Web Security

bubu



///  
0xDecode  
  
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