

Eigen ZKZRU: A Practical Privacy-specific ZK Rollup

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Abstract

Decentralized Privacy and security are always the most important part of Web3.0. ZCash and Monero have taken great effort to achieve privacy-enabling technology by building their private payment infrastructure and ecosystem. However, it's not easy to achieve programmable privacy on Smart Contract regarding general assets, such as ERC1155.

In this paper, we present Eigen ZKZRU, a privacy-specific ZKRollup solution on ZKRollup on Ethereum ecosystem to achieve low gas-fee, better composability and high privacy enhancement. Eigen ZKZRU proposes an Abstract Balance Leaf Model, using Twisted ElGamal encryption [CMTA20] and Bulletproof range proof [BBB⁺18] under DDH assumption to build the confidential transaction, and constructs the validity proof of batch transactions on account Merkle tree by algebraic composite NIZK, which is built on a Two-tier architecture, the base layer is a ZKRollup, which is built on R1CS constraints system and transpiled to PLONKish Arithmetization [GWC19], which is naturally friendly to utilize Twisted ElGamal encryption with custom gate, and hardware acceleration. The application layer is Pairing-free and easy-to-audit confidential transaction layer.

1 Motivation

Privacy invasion incidents become more and more frequent in Web3.0 world. Observe that the privacy of Web3.0 participants can be categorized into 3 aspects: PII¹-Account Linkage, Transaction's Privacy, and Smart Contract Logic's Privacy.

Eigen Network proposes Eigen ZKZRU, a brand-new approach to implement confidential transaction on EVM-compatible blockchain. Eigen ZKZRU comes up with ABL, Abstract Balance Leaf of account tree, and applies different cryptography primitives to ABL, such as ZK Membership proof, Homomorphic arithmetics, private set interaction, and private comparator etc, thus expose the high-level private user interface to wallet.

1.1 Background: Privacy Issues in Web3.0

1.1.1 Disclosure of PII-Account linkage

The blockchain technology provides an excellent for people to perform anonymous transaction without exposing their ID on internet, but this capability has been broken as the development of on-chain data analysis, such as Nanshan and Dune, this makes it possible for users to exploit the relationship between PII and account. Monaco's paper [Mon15] proposed an new approach Random time-interval(RTI) model to identify and verify Bitcoin users based on the observation of Bitcoin transactions over time. Bonifazi et.al's paper [BCUV22] adopts the social network-based model to represent Ethereum and construct each user's spectrum then classify them into difference clusters on their spectra. All those works taking efforts to link individual with their blockchain addresses deprive a user of anonymity. Furthermore, cracking the public transaction graph is big business: companies like Chainalysis and Nansen run sophisticated forensic analysis to associate various wallets, monitor activity, and make probabilistic assumptions about who owns what.

Those sort of privacy invasion incidents happen frequently. In this March, the Juno Network's proposal 4 was submitted to voted away an whale wallet's funds to the Juno community pool and executed in proposal 16.

1.1.2 Vulnerable privacy and confidentiality of Smart Contract

From the Etherscan, not only can we see all account's balance on different tokens, but also all the counterparties and contracts they interact with. The open and verifiable nature empower the

¹PII: Personally Identifiable Information, see [Personal data](#).

trustless infrastructure of Blockchain, however, this also leads lots of heavy fairness issue in DeFi world.

First notorious issue is [Miner Extractable Value\(MEV\)](#). Miner extractable value (MEV) is a measure of the profit a miner (or validator, sequencer, etc.) can make through their ability to arbitrarily include, exclude, or re-order transactions within the blocks they produce. Through MEV, Miner can make profit from exploiting the transaction in the txpool, and inserting specific transaction before or after user's transaction.

Apart from MEV, Slippage on Uniswap and other popular DEXes is a pain. Slippage is the price difference between when users submit a transaction and when the transaction is confirmed on the blockchain. Slippage can be caused by high trading volume or low liquidity apparently, but the one of the root causes is that miner choosing the high gas-fee transactions to confirming, and the arbitrators can leverage this and make an impact on others by increasing their gas-fee.

The decentralized Smart Contract is the core feature of Ethereum, however, the lack of confidentiality is a major hindrance towards the broad adoption of it, since financial transactions (e.g., insurance contracts or stock trading) are considered by many individuals and organizations as being highly secret.

1.1.3 Dilemma of utility versus privacy protection

Tornado Cash is the leading anonymous payment DApp in Ethereum ecosystem. As a Layer 1 Dapp, it supports ERC20 only currently, and charges about 50Gwei + 100Gwei + 0.2% * 0.05ETH for even a single 0.05ETH from source².

Some well-known public blockchain protocols like Zerocash and Monero provide confidential transaction infrastructure but forgo programmability and unclear a priori how to enable programmability without exposing transaction and data in cleartext to miners.

Another utility issue is Nullifier is not account-friendly. The Nullifier is a public input that is sent on-chain to be checked with the smart contract and the Merkle tree data. It avoids double-spending for instance.

Because the Nullifier is irrelevant to the addresses of sender or receiver. So the receiver can do withdraw with the valid Nullifier, and cutting off the relationship between sender and the receiver.

However, this is not easy to manage such Nullifier, which is secret key for each anonymous payment transaction.

1.2 Vision

Eigen Network aims to facilitate a drop-in privacy preservation protocol for every Web3 participant in EVM-compatible ecosystem.

Eigen Network focuses on building a new privacy-specific ZKRollup protocol to achieve address anonymity, smart contract data and logic confidentiality and offers users capabilities of low gas-fee confidential transaction, full Smart Contract privacy preservation and better composability of supporting most used asset like ERC20, ERC721 and ERC1155, in EVM-compatible ecosystem.

1.3 Related Works

There exists some related works to implement address anonymity, transaction and smart contract privacy preservation.

Hawk[[KMS⁺16](#)] splits a smart contract into a public contract, which runs on-chain, and a private contract executed off-chain. Hawk requires the figure of a manager to execute the private contract. The manager must be trusted by the participants, as it can see the transactions that take place in a private contract. The manager must be considered as trusted party, even it can't affect the outcome of the contract, but could prevent the contract execution, or cause the abortion of the contract.

Zether[[BAZB20](#)] is a private transaction scheme built on top of Ethereum. It can be extended to support a limited class of smart contracts with Input/Output privacy, namely those that can be represented solely via homomorphic addition. This allows us to perform simple sealed-bid auctions (assuming bidders buy all units on offer) and private voting (assuming the votes are binary). Unfortunately, only transactions hiding the users' balances and the transfer amount can currently be implemented on Ethereum due to gas constraints. Unlike previous two constructions, Zether proposes a "transparent" ZKP (i.e. a ZKP with no trusted setup) *Σ -Bullets*. However, the gas

²Fee - how much does it cost to use? <https://torn.community/t/fee-how-much-does-it-cost-to-use/68/3>

Table 1: A comparison of Privacy-preserving Smart Contract Scheme

Scheme	Privacy type	Approach	Expressivity	Extension as
Hawk	I/O	Offchain MPC/TEE	Arbitrary functions	Ethereum L1
Zether	I/O	ElGamal and Σ -Bullet	Additive functions	Ethereum L1
AZTEC	I/O, function	Pairing based homomorphic Commitment	Additive functions	Ethereum L2
Eigen ZKZRU	I/O, function	Pair-free Homomorphic PKE and Range Proof	Arbitrary functions	Ethereum L2

Table 2: A comparison between Eigen Network and AZTEC Network

Feature	Eigen ZKZRU	AZTEC ZK-ZKRollup
EVM Compatibility	Partial/Language Level	Partial/Language Level
Prover Decentralization	Decentralized Eigen Relayer	Wasm in Browser
Circuit DSL	Circom	Noir
Prove System	Plonk	Plonk
Recursive Proof	Yes	Yes
GPU acceleration enable	Yes	No
Anonymous Address	Stealth Address	Nullifier

cost of single transaction may reach the upper bound of block gaslimit, leading to impractical to deploy on Ethereum mainnet.

The AZTEC Protocol [Wil18] proposed an Join-split transactions model, and each splits is described as notes, which is UTXO-like and attached with a viewing key and spending key. And the notes can be spent in encrypted state based homomorphic arithmetic and range proof. Like other UTXO model, the users need take special measures to avoid privacy leaks from amount when the number of input note and output note is 1, the protocol or user must make some zero value notes to *mix* the non-zero note. Another issue is that the AZTEC ZK-ZKRollup perform the pairing based proof generation on user’s device, this extremely limit the prove performance.

We proposes Eigen ZKZRU, a practical Privacy-specific ZK Rollup with low gas cost, it’s a Two-tier architecture of privacy layer and Rollup layer. For privacy layer, it’s built on twisted ElGamal with range proof under pairing free assumption and can be performed it on users’ device efficiently. For the Rollup layer, we handle the pairing based NIZK proof generation on decentralized nodes by Plonk proof system. We propose a Abstract Balance Leaf(ABL) model to represent the asset, it’s mutable, encrypted and computable, which makes it easy to apply standard ERC20 and ERC721 operations on ABL based on high-level cryptography primitives, such homomorphic arithmetic and accumulator etc.

To sum up, Table 1 presents the detail on privacy type, approach, expressivity and which blockchain protocol to extend.

For privacy type, I/O is corresponding short for Input/Output privacy. If users encrypt the input, and send it to the miner to run the contract, it’s considered as Input privacy. Otherwise, the end user need run the contract locally with clear input and encrypts the output, then sends the encrypted output to miners.

There are different approaches to obtain privacy enhancement, The typical methods include Homomorphic Encryption, TEE, MPC and NIZK. Homomorphic Encryption(HE) is the conversion of data into ciphertext that can be analyzed and worked with as if it were still in its original form, but Fully HE is still not production ready due to bad performance and fast noises growth. The MPC, creating methods for parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping those inputs private, needs heavy communication complexity, this raises complex interoperability between on-chain and off-chain. The TEE uses special hardware to achieve computing efficiency and code integrity. NIZKs, Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, enable a party, known as the prover, to convince another party, known as the verifier, about knowledge of the witness for an NP statement without revealing any information about the witness (besides what is already implied by the statement being true). HE and NIZK need low communication complexity and is widely used in Blockchain.

Expressivity is the scheme’s capability to protect with regard to the different computational scenario.

A deep comparison with AZTEC from implementation perspective on acceleration and architecture in Table 2. Eigen ZKZRU leverages decentralized proof-Of-Proving mechanism to accelerate the proving computation, and it’s naturally for us to utilize hardware acceleration, too, such as GPU and ASIC for NTT computation in polynomial commitment and multi-scalar multiplications on elliptic curves. The second difference is we adopt Stealth Address to implements the address anonymity.

2 Eigen ZKZRU Design Rationale

Eigen ZKZRU aims to facilitate a drop-in privacy preservation application for every Web3 participant in EVM-compatible ecosystem, provides user the capacities as below.

Low Gas-fee. Free deposit, Batch transfer by ZK-Rollup, Low gas-fee withdrawal.

Composability. Not only ERC20, both ERC721 and Swap are supported.

Privacy Enhancement. Confidential transaction and address anonymity based on ZK-ZKRollup

Easy-to-use. Self-custodial Secret(Private Key/Secret words) Management and Multisig Wallet based Account Abstract.

2.1 Overview of Eigen ZKZRU

Eigen ZKZRU is a Two-Tier architecture, the base layer is ZKRollup layer, which empowers applications with zero-knowledge proofs. The privacy layer is the confidential transaction layer, which provides high-level user interface of confidential assets. The Two-Tier architecture is necessary due to two factors as below.

Privacy-oriented protocol. Eigen ZKZRU is to provide a privacy "Lego" for end-users to protect their asset's confidentiality and security before the asset flowing into other liquidity pool or protocols in DeFi world. Differ from the zkEVM solution, such as ZKSync, we can deploy our confidential transaction layer on other ZKRollup L2s. Hence we design the transaction layer on pair free cryptography scheme to try best to save the gas and lower the implementation complexity, and for privacy concern, we need to generate the Zero-knowledge transaction in user-side, like by browser.

Acceleration of ZK Proving. Proving a computation requires first translating it from a classical program to a ZK-friendly format, then use proof system, such as Groth16, Plonk, STARK, to generate the validity proof. No matter which proof system used, the bottleneck always ends up being either:

- Multiplications over large vectors of number on Group or Fields, especially variable-base and fixed-base multi-scalar multiplications (MSMs);
- Fast Fourier Transforms (FFTs) and Inverse FFTs (although there are techniques for FFT-less proof systems).

In systems where both FFTs and MSMs exist, about 70% of the time generating a proof is spent on MSMs, and the rest is dominated by FFTs. There are some methods to improve the performance, but hardware acceleration does really matter. For the ZKRollup layer, we design a the proof-of-proving model for miner to participant in the computation, and the miner would provide powerful and optimized computation.

2.1.1 Base Layer: ZK Rollup

The ZK Rollup is a very promising approach to scale Ethereum, which consists of L1 Rollup contract and an off-chain computation blockchain. The Rollup blockchain maintains a transaction Merkle tree and a account Merkle tree. Different from Ethereum protocol, the transaction Merkle tree consists of a list of Merkle tree root in L1 Rollup contract, in which each root is the Merkle root of a batch transactions, and fully transactions in off-chain ledger. The account tree consists of a Merkle tree root in L1 and a NIZK proof in L1 Rollup contract, and the fully account status(in encrypted mode) in off-chain ledger.

To achieve the off-chain's security and decentralization on off-chain computation, we propose a Proof-of-Proving model consisting of proving nodes. The proving nodes act as:

- a RPC server for user to interact with ZK Rollup
- a sequencer to sort the transaction and generates the transaction Merkle tree root, submit the root into L1 Rollup contract
- a prover to generate the Rollup block validity proof, and update the global account Merkle tree.




Figure 1: ZKRollup Account Tree

The prover generate the validity proof by the [EigenZKit](#). EigenZkit is our ZKRollup *compiler*, which make it easy for the developer to write constraints by Circom, transpile the circuits to PLONKish Arithmetization [\[GWC19\]](#), optimize the proving with the Lookup table and aggregation proof, and finally generate the proof and solidity verifier on Plonk argument.

The Rollup contract consists of a validity proof verifier and an account merkle tree. The verifier checks the validity of the new proof with public input transaction Merkle tree root and new account Merkle tree root. The depth of account Merkle tree could be scaled to 28 or larger regarding trade-off between number of accounts and proving time complexity.

2.1.2 Confidential Transaction Layer: Abstract Balance Leaf Model

To achieve the goal of transaction confidentiality, we proposes an Abstract Balance Leaf Model. Similar to the "note" in AZTEC, The ABL is also an encrypted representation of abstract value, which maps into high-level digital asset deposited into Eigen ZKZRU. The ABL is an output of the Eigen ZKZRU encryption value from formula 6.

The specific protocol of Confidential Transaction Layer will be presented in section [2.2](#), [2.3](#) and [2.4](#).

2.2 Fundamental

Pedersen commitment [\[Ped91\]](#) uses random public generators \mathbb{G} and H of a suitable large group where the DDH3 is hard, for making a blinded, non-interactive commitment to a value. Eigen ZKZRU use Elliptic Curve Pedersen Commitment to hide the secret. Worth to note that we use native Pedersen commitment scheme to describe our algorithm in this paper for easy understanding, and implements by Elliptic Curve Pedersen Commitment.

Definition 1. Discrete logarithm assumption. Let \mathbb{G} be a group of prime order q , a generator $g \in \mathbb{G}$ and an arbitrary element $y \in \mathbb{G}$, it's infeasible to find $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, such that $y = g^x$.

Definition 2. Elliptic Curve Pedersen Commitment[\[Fra15\]](#). An efficient implementation of the Pedersen Commitment will use secure Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite (prime) fields. Let F_p be the group of elliptic curve points, where p is a large prime. Also, let \mathbb{G} be the base point of EC, and H be another EC point, and the discrete logarithm of H no one has to know ($H = qG$). Attackers who know q can produce valid proofs without knowledge of x . To commit to a value $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, we pick a random integer $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and calculate the commitment as:

$$Com(x, r) = xG + rH$$

To open the commitment we simply reveal the values x and r . EC Pedersen is also additive homomorphic, so it has the following properties:

$$\begin{aligned} Com(x + y, rx + ry) &= Com(x, rx) + Com(y, ry) \\ Com(k \cdot x, k \cdot r) &= k \cdot Com(x, r) \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

EC Pedersen Commitment could be used for hide several values in following way:

$$C(r, \bar{a}) = rH + a_1G_1 + a_2G_2 + \dots + a_nG_n \quad (2)$$

where each G_n has to be formed using NUMS[BBC⁺14] approach.

Definition 3. Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Given some group \mathbb{G} , and element g , and the elements g^a , g^b and g^c , determine whether $g^{ab} = g^c$. The DDH assumption holds if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , we have:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(g, g^a, g^b, g^c) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (3)$$

Definition 4. A Non-interactive Zero-knowledge(NIZK) proofs. A zero-knowledge proof of a statement does not reveal any information beyond the validity of the statement. A NIZK proof system for input x in language L , with witness w , is a set of efficient PPT algorithms (K, P, V) such that:

1. *Setup*: generates the common reference string on security parameters λ , $pp \leftarrow K(1^\lambda)$.
2. *Prover*: $\pi \leftarrow P(pp, x, w)$ produces the proof.
3. *Verifier*: $V(pp, x, \pi)$ outputs 0, 1 to accept/reject the proof.

Which satisfy the completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties.

Completeness. $\forall x \in L, w \in R_L$, such that:

$$\Pr[pp \leftarrow K(1^\lambda); \pi \leftarrow P(pp, x, w) : V(pp, x, \pi) = 1] = 1 \quad (4)$$

Soundness. Assume x can be decided when seeing pp .

$$\Pr[pp \leftarrow K(1^\lambda); \exists(x, \pi), \text{s.t. } V(pp, x, \pi) = 1] = \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad (5)$$

Zero-knowledge. There exists a PPT simulator split into two stages S_1, S_2 such that for all PPT attackers \mathcal{A} , the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

$\begin{aligned} 1: & \quad pp \rightarrow K \\ 2: & \quad (x, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp), \text{s.t. } (x, w) \in R_L \\ 3: & \quad \pi \leftarrow P(pp, x, w) \\ 4: & \quad \text{output}(pp, x, \pi) \end{aligned}$

And the simulator output:

$\begin{aligned} 1: & \quad (pp, \tau) \rightarrow S_1(1^\lambda) \\ 2: & \quad (x, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp), \text{s.t. } (x, w) \in R_L \\ 3: & \quad \pi \leftarrow S_2(pp, x, \tau) \\ 4: & \quad \text{output}(pp, x, \pi) \end{aligned}$

Where τ should be thought of as local state stored by the simulator (passed between stages).

2.3 Abstract Balance Leaf Model

Pairing based cryptography vs ECC based cryptography. Pairing-based cryptography(PBC) is a function that maps a pair of points on an elliptic curve into a finite field to construct or analyze cryptographic systems. Bilinear pairings can be used to transport the discrete logarithm problem on a certain class of elliptic curves over a finite field to the discrete logarithm problem on a smaller finite field. PBC is widely used in ZKP, such as the KZG commitment, Groth16 and Plonk etc. However, pairings are notoriously expensive in implementation complexity and processing time, and this is not very friendly to confidential transaction on ZKRollup. Therefore, we try to use the ECC based scheme to implement the confidential transaction layer.

Commitment Scheme VS Public Key Encryption. Pure commitment-based approach suffers from several issues due to lack of decryption capability, senders are required to honestly transmit the openings of outgoing commitments (includes randomness and amount) to receivers in an out-of-band manner. This issue makes the system much more complicated, as it must be assured that

the out-of-band transfer is correct and secure. Second, users must be stateful since they have to keep track of the randomness and amount of each incoming commitment. To solve this, AZTEC utilizes set membership proof commitment scheme [CC⁺08, ALT⁺15], defining a new commitment scheme $Com(k; a) := (\mu_k^a, \mu_k^{ka} h^a)$ on $[1; k_{MAX}] \times \mathbb{Z}_p^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G}$, where a is random in \mathbb{Z}_p and h is generator of group \mathbb{G} , and hide the balance in commitment. This scheme need a universal trust setup. On the other hand, Zether built the confidential transaction on ElGamal Encryption [EIG85], which provides additive homomorphic, computational hiding and unconditionally binding. Zether proposed Σ -bullets to bridge the interoperability between Σ -protocol and Bulletproof [BBB⁺18], with no trust setup. However the brute-force enumeration is necessary to find out the clear balance m on g^m in the extreme case that the receiver received an unknown balance from sender.

Another recent work [CMTA20] proposed PGC(Pretty Good Confidentiality) scheme on twisted ElGamal scheme, admits transparent setup, and its security is based solely on the widely-used discrete logarithm assumption.

Twisted ElGamal encryption [CMTA20]. Twisted ElGamal encryption is a public key encryption scheme improved based on the simplified version of the ElGamal. Twisted ElGamal encryption retains additive homomorphism and is as efficient and secure as the standard exponential ElGamal. More importantly, it is zero-knowledge friendly. Note that the second part of twisted ElGamal ciphertext can be viewed as Pedersen commitment [9] under the same commitment key, whose DL (discrete logarithm) relation is unknown to all users. Such structure of twisted ElGamal makes it compatible with all zero-knowledge proofs whose statement is of the form Pedersen commitment. In particular, one can directly employ Bulletproofs [BBB⁺18] or Back-Maxwell Rangeproof [PBF⁺18] to generate range proofs for values encrypted by twisted ElGamal in a black-box manner, and these proofs can be easily aggregated. Therefore, Twisted ElGamal enables us to easily devise zero-knowledge proofs for essential correctness of transactions and various application-dependent policies in a modular fashion.

Moreover, twisted ElGamal is very efficient. Compared with the most efficient reported implementation of Paillier PKE, twisted ElGamal is an order of magnitude better in key and ciphertext size and decryption speed (for small message space), two orders of magnitude better in encryption speed. Consequently, we achieve an efficient and effective protection approach for account privacy by designing a twist ElGamal-based homomorphic encryption scheme.

Eigen ZKZRU extends a twisted ElGamal encryption on elliptic curve, and combines with EdDSA signature scheme to , and optimizes the Camenisch and Stadler [CS97] notation for proofs of knowledge 6. This scheme can be easily proved that it holds the unconditionally hiding and computational binding same as Pedersen Commitment by the work from [BAZB20, CMTA20] on the DDH Assumption. Hence, the final proof of Zero-knowledge scheme would be as follow in formula 6.

$$PK\{(m, k, r) : PK = g^k \wedge (X, Y) = (PK^r, g^r h^m)\} \wedge (0 \leq m < MAX) \quad (6)$$

There are four primary algorithms in twisted ElGamal, as presented below.

Gen(1^λ) λ is security parameter. Run the Gen(1^λ), choose another generator element $h \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{G}$. Output $pp = (G, g, h, p)$ as global public parameters.

KGen(pp) On input pp , choose a secret key $sk \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_p$, and set the public key $pk = g^{sk}$.

Enc(pk, m) on input the public key pk and a message $m \in M$: pick random $r \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_p$, compute $X = pk^r, Y = g^r \cdot h^m$

Dec($sk, C=(X, Y)$) , calculate $h^m = Y/X^{\frac{1}{sk}}$, then figure out m from h^m by brute-force enumeration with time complexity $\mathcal{O}(MAX)$, where $MAX = 2^{31}$. The Baby-step/Giant-step algorithm [Sha71] with an efficient table lookup scheme would decrease it to $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{MAX})$.

The above scheme can be proved IND-CPA secure(1-plaintext/2-recipient) base on the divisible DDH assumption from [CMTA20].

Furthermore, we construct the set membership proof on this scheme from the work [CC⁺08] and Boneh-Boyen signatures [JY09], and extend it to a pairing free scheme in Appendix B.

Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA³) is a digital signature scheme using a variant of Schnorr signature based on twisted Edwards curves. It is designed to be faster than existing digital signature schemes without sacrificing security. The sketch of EdDSA is presented in Algorithm 1.

³EdDSA: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032>

Algorithm 1: EdDSA signature generation (sketch)

Input: Group parameters (\mathbb{G}, g, p) , signer's key pair $(sk, pk = g^{sk})$, signer's long-term secret n for session-key generation, and message M , pick cryptographic hash function $H: M \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$

Output: Signature (R, s) of M

- 1 $r \leftarrow H(n, M) \bmod p$;
 - 2 $R \leftarrow rG$;
 - 3 $h \leftarrow H(R, M) \bmod p$;
 - 4 $s \leftarrow r + h \cdot sk \bmod p$;
 - 5 return (R, s)
-


Zero-knowledge proofs on ABL. In ABL model, we ensure that the encrypted transaction are correct by using ZKP that claiming correctness without revealing any additional information. Since twisted ElGamal compatible with all zero-knowledge proofs whose statement is of the form Pedersen commitment, we can directly employ range proof [BBB⁺18] to generate the balance's range proof.

We define a language $L_{transfer}$ to describe our ABL model in definition 7.

$$\begin{aligned}
 L_{transfer} = \{ & ((pk_s, pk_r, C_s, C_r, sk_s, v, r_1, r_2)) | \\
 & pk_s = sk_s G \wedge C_s = \text{HPKE.Enc}(pk_s, v, r_1) \wedge \\
 & C_r = \text{HPKE.Enc}(pk_r, v, r_2) \wedge v \in [0, \text{MAX}) \wedge \\
 & \text{HPKE.Dec}(sk_s, \hat{C}_s - C_s) \in [0, \text{MAX}) \}
 \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

The conjunction of $L_{transfer}$ is $\pi_{transfer}$, the sketch of the prove process is described as below in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Interactive Proof of $L_{transfer}$



The Fiat-Shamir transformation is applied here to transmit the interactive proof to non-interactive zero knowledge proof. Easy to prove that such a public coin is Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge Proofs.

Table 3: Simple Confidential Transaction Example		
public key	balance(ABL)	constraints
...
y_{Alice}	$\text{Comm}(b_{Alice} - b_t, y_{Alice})$	$b_{Alice} - b_t \geq 0$
y_{Bob}	$\text{Comm}(b_{Bob} + b_t, y_{Bob})$	$b_{Bob} + b_t \geq b_{Bob}$
y_{Cathe}	$\text{Comm}(b_{Cathe}, y_{Cathe})$...

2.4 Payment Mechanism over Abstract Balance Leaf

We use Twisted ElGamal encryption [CMTA20] and Bulletproof [BBB+18] on DDH assumption to build the confidential transaction, and constructs the validity proof of batch transaction on account Merkle tree by algebraic composite NIZK. Without lose the generality, we also implement set membership proof on our scheme naturally, to support general asset private payment, such as ERC721, and ERC1155. Eigen ZKZRU extends the ABL, and proposes Zero-knowledge computation on ABL to support non-fungible transaction, order-based token exchange etc. For instance, the state in ERC20 token would be describe as below after after transaction t in Table 3.

To stimulate above computation regarding of the constraints, we use homomorphic PKE to encode the balance and transfer amount, use NIZK to enforce senders to build confidential transactions honestly and make validity publicly verifiable, and use digital signature to authenticate transactions. Let $HPKE = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be homomorphic PKE integrated with EdDSA signature scheme on message space \mathbb{Z}_p , the $HPKE$ uses same key for encryption and signing, which proposed a general construction from [PSST11]. And let $NIZK = (\text{Setup}, \text{CRSGen}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ be a NIZK proof system. The privacy-preserving payment mechanism consists of a trusted setup, payment algorithm and a smart contract.

Setup. The setup algorithm calls Setup_{nizk} and Setup_{hpke} as subroutines, which are the setup algorithms for the proof system and the signature scheme, respectively. The former setup could depend on the relations for which proofs are constructed. If these subroutines are trustless, then the whole setup is trustless, meaning that its correctness can be verified publicly. We use Plonk argument and EDDSA, the Plonk argument needs an trust setup and EDDSA is trustless.

Setup algorithm is formally described in Algorithm 2. Apart from setting up the proof system and signature scheme, it initializes account tree accountTree, mimc contract, token registry contract, a last roll over epoch updateNumber to keep track of the last epochs accounts were updated, The setup also specifies an epoch length E and a MAXimum amount value MAX.

Algorithm 2: Payment Mechanism on ABL: Setup

- Input:** Security parameter λ
- 1 $pp_{hpke} \leftarrow \text{HPKE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$;
 - 2 $pp_{nizk} \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Setup}(1^\lambda)$;
 - 3 $crs \leftarrow \text{NIZK.CRSGen}(pp_{nizk})$;
 - 4 $pp = (pp_{hpke}, pp_{nizk}, crs)$;
 - 5 Initialize
 - account Merkle tree contract: accountTree
 - MiMC contract: mimc
 - token registry address: tr
 - updates and updateNumber for keeping track of the rollup blockchain
 - transaction Merkle tree root array: txRoots
 - 6 Deploy Rollup contract with parameters pp , accountTree, txRoots, mimc, tr, MAX, BAL_DEPTH, TX_DEPTH
-

Payment algorithm. A user can run one of the following algorithms to interact with the smart contract. The output of these algorithms are raw transactions. We leave it implicit that they will be signed (using the public key of the Ethereum account from which they are sent) and destined to the Eigen ZKZRU smart contract. All the algorithms get the security parameter as input but we show it explicitly only for the first one. The algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3.

Smart Contract. The Smart Contract describe how users interact with Eigen ZKZRU. *Deposit* deposits the token on Rollup contract, and mint on L2, *Withdraw* does the exact opposite by

Algorithm 3: Payment Mechanism on ABL: Payment algorithm

Input: $pp_{nizk}, pp_{hpke}, (\mathbb{G}, p, g, h)$

```
1 Function CreateAccount( $\hat{v}, sn$ ):  
2    $sn \in \{0, 1\}^n$   
3    $(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{HPKE.KeyGen}(pp_{HPKE})$   
4    $\hat{C} \leftarrow \text{HPKE.Enc}(pk, \hat{v}, r)$   
5   return  $sn, (sk, pk), \hat{C}$   
6 Function CreateTX( $sk_s, pk_s, v, pk_r$ ):  
7    $r_1, r_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$   
8    $C_s \leftarrow \text{HPKE.Enc}(pk_s, v; r_1)$   
9    $C_r \leftarrow \text{HPKE.Enc}(pk_r, v; r_2)$   
10   $memo \leftarrow (pk_s, pk_r, C_s, C_r) \in L_{transfer}$   
11   $w \leftarrow (sk_s, v, r_1, r_2)$   
12   $\pi_{transfer} \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(memo, w)$   
13   $\sigma \leftarrow \text{HPKE.Sign}(sk_s, sn, memo, \pi_{transfer})$   
14  return  $sn, memo, \pi_{transfer}, \sigma$   
15 Function BalanceOf( $sk, \hat{C}$ ):  
16   $\hat{v} \leftarrow \text{HPKE.Dec}(sk, \hat{C})$   
17  return  $\hat{v}$   
18 Function VerifyTX( $sn, memo, \pi_{transfer}, \sigma$ ):  
19   $output_1 \leftarrow sn \geq sn^*$   
20   $output_2 \leftarrow \text{HPKE.Verify}(pk_s, (sn, memo, \pi_{transfer}, \sigma))$   
21   $output_3 \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Verify}(crs.memo, \pi_{transfer})$   
22  return  $output_1 \wedge output_2 \wedge output_3$ 
```

burning the token on L2 and returns the token left back to L1. *Transfer* does the updates the cipher balance of both sender and receiver, and creates the proof $\pi_{transfer}$ for the state transition on L2. *BalanceOf* returns the clear balance of the account, and *UpdateAccountTree* generates the proof for each transaction batch, and updates the Rollup chain, which is maintained in Rollup contract.

In our scheme, users need generate a new key pair for each transaction, the private key acts as the blinding factor for the new commitment of the new transaction, and update previous blinding factors locally.

And the π_{block} would be generated by statement 8.

Algorithm 4: Payment Mechanism on ABL: Smart Contract

<pre> Function Deposit($b, \hat{C}, R, type, sn$): // amount b // encrypted amount \hat{C} // blinding factor $R = h^r$ // token type $type$ // serial number sn 1 if $type = 0$ then 2 require $msg.value = 0 \wedge b = 0$ 3 else 4 if $type = 1$ then 5 require $b \geq 0 \wedge msg.value \geq b$ 6 transfer(ETH, msg.sender, 7 address(this), b) 8 else 9 /* transfer ERC20 token */ 10 transfer(tokenAddress, msg.sender, 11 address(this), b) 12 end 13 end 14 $(X, Y) = \hat{C}$ 15 $Y \stackrel{?}{=} g^b \cdot R$ 16 amountComm = \hat{C} 17 depositHash = mimc.hash([y, 18 amountComm, $type$]) 19 accountTree.insertLeaf(depositHash) 20 st = accountTree.getRootFromProof() 21 return st Function Withdraw($pi_{withdraw}, txinfo, pk_r, b$): // withdrawProof $pi_{withdraw}$ // transaction info $txinfo$ // recipient pk_r // amount b 17 uint txLeaf = mimc.hash(txInfo) 18 require txInfo.txRoot == 19 accountTree.getRootFromProof() 20 require $pp_{hpke}.verify(pi_{withdraw})$ 21 if $txinfo.token_type_from == 1$ then 22 transfer(ETH, address(this), pk_r) 23 else 24 transfer(tokenAddress, address(this), 25 pk_r) 26 end </pre>	<pre> Function Transfer($sn, memo, \sigma, \pi_{transfer}$): // sender private key sn // transaction amount $memo$ // sender private key σ // transaction amount $\pi_{transfer}$ 25 $(pk_s, pk_r, C_s, C_r) = memo$ 26 check msg.sender is pk_s 27 $X, Y = acc[y]$ 28 NIZK.VerifyTX($sn, memo, \pi_{transfer}, \sigma$) 29 $acc[pk_s] = acc[pk_s] / C_s$ 30 $acc[pk_r] = acc[pk_r] \cdot C_r$ Function BalanceOf(sk): // private key sk 31 $\hat{C} = acc[y]$ 32 $b = HPKE.BalanceOf(sk, \hat{C})$ 33 return b Function UpdateTxTree($txRoot$): require msg.sender is sequencer require msg.value > MinDeposit txRoots.push(msg, txRoot) Function UpdateAccTree($\pi_{block}, txRoot, accRoot$): // block proof π_{block} // public input $t = txRoot$ // public input $x = accRoot$ 34 require t is in txRoots 35 require prev(t) is confirmed 36 require Verify(π_{block}, x) = true 37 currentRoot = x 38 updateNumber++ 39 updates[currentRoot] = updateNumber </pre>
--	---

2.5 Address Anonymity

Eigen ZKZRU adopts fast dual key exchange based stealth address scheme for address anonymity.

In general, the Stealth address and Nullifier are two widely used scheme for anonymous transaction. Compared to Nullifier used by Tornado Cash and AZTEC, stealth address is account-friendly. Stealth address enables the sender to send the money to an "invisible" recipient, and the actual recipient can derive the private key of the "invisible" recipient's address.

The widely-used Stealth Address protocol is Dual-Key StealthAddress Protocol (DKSAP), which is designed for a wallet solution [ShadowSend](#) uses two pairs of keys, a scan keypair and a spend keypair to provide decentralized anonymous currency. However, the drawback of DKSAP is that it requires the receiver to continuously calculate and determine whether it is the real receiver of the transaction until it detected a transaction that matches. In this process, the receiver needs to perform many time-consuming elliptic curve scalar multiplication operations, which limits the application of DKSAP. Some new Enhanced DKSAP protocols [\[CM17\]](#) proposed more efficient approach to eliminate the intensive curve scalar multiplication, we optimizes the Enhanced DKSAP protocol by binding the *txdata* to random *r*, and combining with the confidential transaction, we can directly move the assets of receivers in the transaction from the one-time address to real address in next section.

In The Enhanced DKSAP protocol shown in Figure 3, the recipient have m keypairs (b_i, B_i) and one view keypair (v, V) on group (\mathbb{G}, p, g) , $m+1$ hash function $H_i, i \in [0, m]$ for previous key, and none of those keys will be open. A proxy server/audit is necessary to monitor the transactions on chain, which includes some *R* value and computes the pk' , and check whether pk' matches pk from corresponding transaction. For each public key pk , only the correct receiver can calculate the private key $H_0(S) + \sum H_i(S)b_i$ and spend the money.




Figure 3: The Enhanced DKSAP protocol

We extend the language $L_{transfer}$ previously in definition 7 to support stealth address. For simplicity, we always withdraw the asset in the stealth address to the B_0 , whose balance is in encryption.

2.6 Proof-of-Proving model

One of the main advantages of the ZK Rollup is the fast finality of transactions that validity proofs guaranteed. To enhance the effectiveness, and decentralize proof generation, the PoP model aims to cover the key properties that such a consensus model for a L2 ZK Rollup requires:

- Permissionless: allow every computing power to participate in.
- Efficiency: sorting batch and generates the batch's validity proof deterministically.
- Decentralization: avoid control from any single party.
- Security: protection from malicious attacks.

Generally speaking, to speed up the transaction finality under L1's equivalent security guarantee as L1, a PoP model provides two basic capabilities:

- Transaction sorting: we first sort the transaction by sequencer, and submit the batch Merkle Proof into Rollup contract.
- Proof generation: the prover generates the block validity proof, update the account tree in Rollup contract.

sequencer. With regard to sequencer, there exists some general solution from Vitalik's Rollup guide⁴. And existing implementations include Chainlink FSS, or Polygon Hermez's Proof-of-Donation. To achieve more decentralization and efficiency, we use HotStuff [YMR⁺18] consensus algorithm to reach a high sorting performance. Once a batch of transaction selected by the a sequencer, it submits the batch as a proposal, if the proposal get the agreement from at least $2f+1$ sequencers(f is the malicious node's size of total n nodes), and then it submits the batch's txRoot into L1 Rollup contract, and puts down a large deposit. The deposit plus a reward will return to the user after the batch confirmed. <https://www.overleaf.com/project/629f47a5c2f962e9b60a9e0f> The sequencers are designed to sort the transactions, and submit the transaction root into L1 after it puts down a large deposit. If that user ever submits a fraudulent batch, that deposit would be part burned and part given as a reward to the honest prover. To realize an decentralized sequencing mechanism, we extend the Chained-Hotstuff algorithm by adding an additional round to check the transaction batch's Merkle root's on-chain proof. Nodes receive transactions from clients and share them with each other through a shared mempool protocol. The extended Chained-Hotstuff protocol then proceeds in a sequence of rounds. In each round, a sequencer takes the role of leader and proposes a batch of transactions to extend a certified sequence of batches that contain the full previous transaction history. A sequencer receives the proposed batches and checks their voting rules(namely safety rules) to determine if it should vote for certifying this batch. After voting, we need another round to check if the batch's Merkle root has been confirmed in L1. If the sequencer intends to vote for this batch, it calculates the batch's transactions Merkle root speculatively and without external effect.

The sequencer then sends a signed vote for the batch to the leader. The leader gathers these votes to form a Quorum Certificate (QC), which provides evidence of $\geq 2f + 1$ votes for this block, submits the batch's Merkle root onto L1 and broadcasts the QC to all sequencers.

A block at round k is committed if it has a QC and is confirmed by two more batches and QCs at rounds $k + 1$, $k + 2$ and $k+3$. The commit rule eventually allows honest sequencers to commit a batch. Extended Chained-Hotstuff guarantees that all honest sequencers will eventually commit the block (and proceeding sequence of blocks linked from it). Once a sequence of blocks has committed, the state that results from executing their transactions can be persisted and the batch's Merkle root should be stored in L1 Rollup contract.

The safety rules and liveness rules check work exact same as HotStuff algorithm. Obviously, this algorithm is permissionless, every nodes can be selected as the candidate. And in the view-change phase, a VRF function is used to generate the next block miner with current block as it's seed.

This algorithm is efficient. Even though each batch's Merkle root must be anchored on L1(which means a view must cut across two L1 blocks), but it allows the leader to propose m batch with batch size s speculatively in each view, so that each layer 1 block consists of m L2 transaction batch's Merkle root. Define L1 blockchain's TPS p_1 , the performance can be measured by $\mathcal{O}(m \cdot s \cdot p_1)$. And the number of L2 transactions depends the size of transaction batch and the

⁴An Incomplete Guide to Rollups: <https://vitalik.ca/general/2021/01/05/rollup.html>

number of L2 transaction batch in one view. The communication complexity to reach a consensus of a transaction batch can be reduced to $\mathcal{O}(n)$, where n is the nodes number. The latency of each batch's confirmation equals to layer 1 block's confirmation latency.

prover. Proof generation is a huge computation intensive work for prover and it's very necessary to get production of ZK validity proofs with high performance so the network can keep its service level. This is why we introduce a decentralized prover cluster, instead of generating the proof via compiling the prover into WebAssembly and running it user's browser as AZTEC.

To propose a new batch to the network, because the transactions have been ordered, The provers generate the proof, then submits the proof and public input to the Rollup contract. And it's easy to observe that, if give a fixed transaction or block gas limit per block, the finality can be quickly reached if and only if the proof is verified successfully.

Once mined, these data availability L1 transactions define the L2 transactions that will be executed and the specific order. This creates a deterministic new state, which can be computed as a virtual future state by network nodes.

Since the roles of prover are permissionless, the malicious provers maybe exist in proof-of-proving model. A malicious prover may tamper the transactions, or generate validity proof of less transactions than expected to save computation power. But this is not possible since the block validity proof includes the transactions' signature proof, and the transaction batch's Merkle proof. The former proof guarantees the individual transaction is valid, and the latter guarantees the transaction batch aggregation proof is valid.

If multiple provers run a race to produce Rollup blocks, the Rollup contract will receive the first one.

2.7 Rollup mechanism

Eigen ZKZRU is an implementation of [Rollup](#) in which the Node does not publish transaction data to the main chain, but only publishes the new Merkle root at every update after confirmation of a batched-up transaction, the basic protocol see [Figure 4](#).

Node. The Nodes provide the standard RPC service for users to interact ZKZRU with native Wallet, like [EigenSecret](#), or Metamask. The node would maintain a transaction pool, and execute the Proof-of-Proving model to reach an consensus of the order of the transactions, and submit the transaction Merkle root in L1 Rollup contract.

Rollup contract. The Rollup contract maintains the Rollup blockchain in L1. Once the block is produced by the Node, and submitted to the L1 Rollup contract, the *updateVerifier* is a ZKRollup to verify the validity of the proof π_{block} under the current account Merkle Tree. The main fields in the Rollup contract include:

- updateNumber: uint256, block number
- currentRoot: uint256, merkle root of account tree
- updateVerifier: NIZK Verifier for validity proof verification

We define the language L_{block} on algebraic composition of $L_{transfer}$ in [Statement 8](#).

$$\begin{aligned}
L_{block} = \bigwedge_{0 < i < \text{TX_DEPTH}} \{ & \\
& \{((pk_s^i, pk_r^i, C_s^i, C_r^i, sk_s^i, v^i, r_1^i, r_2^i))| \\
& pk_s^i = sk_s^i G \wedge C_s^i = \text{HPKE.Enc}(pk_s^i, v^i, r_1^i) \wedge \\
& C_r^i = \text{HPKE.Enc}(pk_r^i, v^i, r_2^i) \wedge v^i \in [0, \text{MAX}) \wedge \\
& \text{HPKE.Dec}(sk_s^i, \hat{C}_s^i - C_s^i) \in [0, \text{MAX})\} \}
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

We translate above constraints into R1CS, transpile R1CS to Plonk Constraints, and generates the final proof π_{block} by PlonK [\[GWC19\]](#), which represents the vector of wire values as well as the different gates selectors as polynomials using interpolation. A polynomial division check ensures that the prover knows satisfying inputs and outputs for each gate, but does not ensure a correct wiring, e.g. that the output of one gate is the input to another. A permutation argument establishes the consistency of the assignment of wires to gates. The main reasons for this transpilation includes the URS setup, Pedersen Commitment/HPKE on custom gate etc.

Furthermore, the optimization for recursive proof by FRI in the accumulation layer, GPU-based acceleration for EC scalar multiplication and batch opening polynomial commitments, are applied to realize a very fast block validity proof verification on previous confirmed block in Rollup chain. The implementation is presented at [EigenZKit](#).

A Bulletproof protocol

BulletProof doesn't depend on trust setup. BulletProof uses NUMS [E] strategy, where a hash function is utilized to compute the generator for Pedersen Commitment. The main building block of BulletProof is Inner Product Argument (IPA). We use curve Secp256k1 in our implementation.

Algorithm 5: Compute Generator: ComputesGenerators

Input: The elliptic curve public generator $g \in \mathbb{G}$ and an integer n .
Output: The set of generators for Pedersen Commitment $(g, h, \mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h})$

```

1 . Compute  $h = \text{MapToGroup}(\text{'something'}, p)$ 
2  $i = 0$ 
3 while  $i < n$  do
4    $c \leftarrow \$ZZ_p$ 
5    $d \leftarrow \$ZZ_p$ 
6    $\mathbf{g}[i] \leftarrow c \cdot G$ 
7    $\mathbf{h}[i] \leftarrow d \cdot G$ 
8    $i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
9 end
10 return  $(g, h, \mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h})$ ;
```

Algorithm 6: $Setup_{IP}$

Input: the set of generators $(g, h, \mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h})$
Output: $params_{IP}$

```

1  $u \leftarrow \text{MapToGroup}(\text{'something'}, p)$ 
2 return  $params_{IP} = (g, h, \mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h}, u)$ 
```

Algorithm 7: $Setup_{RP}$

Input: the input interval $[a, b)$, and the field modulus p

```

1 . Output:  $params_{RP}$ 
2 if  $b$  is not a power of 2 then
3   | return "b must be a power of 2"
4  $n \leftarrow \log_2 b$ 
5  $(g, h, \mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h}) \leftarrow \text{ComputeGenerators}(g, n)$ 
6  $params_{IP} \leftarrow Setup_{IP}(g, h, \mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h})$ 
7 return  $params_{RP} = (params_{IP}, n)$ 
```

B Boneh-Boyen Signatures without pairings

Boneh-Boyen Signatures scheme [JY09] used by the designated authority (which could be the verifier) to sign each element of the set Φ is the one proposed by Boneh and Boyen. Based on this scheme, which is secure under the q-SDH assumption, it is possible to prove knowledge of a signature on a message, without revealing the signature nor the message.

For a given secret x , and two random generators g_1, g_2 of G_1 , the signature of a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ is obtained by computing $\sigma = g_1^{1/(x+m)}$. Given a bilinear pairing e , a signature σ of m is valid if $e(\sigma, yg_2^m) = e(g_1, g_2)$ holds, where $y = g_2^x$.

[ALT⁺15] proposed BB signature without pairing under the DDH assumption. Let G be a cyclic group with prime order p where the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is assumed to be hard and g_1, g_2 two random generators of \mathbb{G} . The signer's private key is $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and its public key is $y = g^x$, so the signature would be $\sigma = g_1^{1/(x+m)}$, which implies that $A^x = g_1 A^{-m}$. So the signer can prove the signature is valid by generating a ZKPK π :

$$SOK(x : X = g_2^x \wedge A^x = g_1 A^{-m}) \quad (9)$$

which means the discrete logarithm of $(g_1 A^{-m})$ in the base A is equal to the discrete logarithm of x in the base g_2 .

Algorithm 8: Vector Commitment: $Commit_{IP}$

Input: $params_{IP}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}$

- 1 . **Output:** The commitment C
 - 2 Compute $C \leftarrow g^a h^b \in \mathbb{G}$
 - 3 return C .
-

Algorithm 9: Prove of Inner Product: $Prove_{IP}$

Input: $params_{IP}, commit_{IP,c}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}$

- 1 . **Output:** $proof_{IP}$
 - 2 $x \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h}, P, c) \in \mathbb{G}$
 - 3 Compute $P' \leftarrow u^{x \cdot c} P$
 - 4 Allocate arrays $\mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{G}^n$
 - 5 ComputeProof($\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h}, P', u^x, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r}$)
 - 6 $proof_{IP} \leftarrow (\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h}, P', u^x, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r})$
 - 7 return $proof_{IP}$.
-

Algorithm 10: Prove of Inner Product: ComputeProof

Input: $\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h}, P, u, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r}$ **Output:** $\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h}, P, u, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r}$

- 1 $x = \text{Hash}(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h}, P, c \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*);$
 - 2 Compute $P' = u^{x \cdot c} P$;
 - 3 **if** $n = 1$ **then**
 - 4 | return $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h}, P, u, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r})$;
 - 5 **else**
 - 6 | $n' \leftarrow n/2$;
 - 7 | $C_L \leftarrow \langle a_{[n':]}, b_{[n':]} \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}_p;$
 - 8 | $C_R \leftarrow \langle a_{[n':]}, b_{[n':]} \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}_p;$
 - 9 | $L \leftarrow g_{[n':]}^{a_{[n':]}} h_{[n':]}^{b_{[n':]}} u^{C_L} \in \mathbb{G}$;
 - 10 | $R \leftarrow g_{[n':]}^{a_{[n':]}} h_{[n':]}^{b_{[n':]}} u^{C_R} \in \mathbb{G}$;
 - 11 | Append L, R to \mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r} , respectively;
 - 12 | $x \leftarrow \text{Hash}(L, R);$
 - 13 | $g' \leftarrow g_{[n']}^{x^{-1}} g_{[n':]}^x \in \mathbb{G}^{n'}$;
 - 14 | $h' \leftarrow g_{[n']}^x g_{[n':]}^{x^{-1}} \in \mathbb{G}^{n'}$;
 - 15 | $P' \leftarrow L^{x^2} P R^{x^{-2}} \in \mathbb{G}$;
 - 16 | $a' \leftarrow a_{[n']} x + a_{[n':]} x^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{n'}$;
 - 17 | $b' \leftarrow b_{[n']} x + b_{[n':]} x^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{n'}$;
 - 18 | return ComputeProof($\mathbf{g}', \mathbf{h}', P', u, \mathbf{a}', \mathbf{b}', \mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r}$)
 - 19 **end**
-

Algorithm 11: Prove of Inner Product: $Verify_{IP}$

Input: $params_{IP}, commit_{IP}, proof_{IP}$ **Output:** True or false

- 1 $i \leftarrow 0$
 - 2 **while** $i < \log n$ **do**
 - 3 | $n' \leftarrow n/2$
 - 4 | $x \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\mathbf{l}[i], \mathbf{r}[i])$
 - 5 | $g' \leftarrow g_{[n']}^{x^{-1}} g_{[n':]}^x \in \mathbb{G}^{n'}$
 - 6 | $h' \leftarrow g_{[n']}^x g_{[n':]}^{x^{-1}} \in \mathbb{G}^{n'}$
 - 7 | $P' \leftarrow L^{x^2} P R^{x^{-2}} \in \mathbb{G}$
 - 8 | $i \leftarrow i + 1$
 - 9 **end**
 - 10 The verifier computes $c = \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{b}$ and accepts if $P = g^a h^b u^c$.
-

Algorithm 12: Bulletproofs: *Prove_{RP}*

Input: $params_{RP}, v$

Output: $proof_{RP}$

```

1  $\lambda \leftarrow \$_{\mathbb{Z}_p}$ 
2  $V \leftarrow g^v h^\lambda \in \mathbb{G}$ 
3  $a_L \in \{\{0, 1\}\}^n$  s.t.  $\langle a_L, 2^n \rangle = v$ 
4  $a_R - a_L - 1^n \in \mathbb{Z} + p^n$ 
5  $\alpha \leftarrow \$_{\mathbb{Z}_p}$ 
6  $A \leftarrow h^\alpha g^{a_L} h^{a_R} \in \mathbb{G}$ 
7  $s_L, s_R \leftarrow \$_{\mathbb{Z}_p^n}$ 
8  $\rho \leftarrow \$_{\mathbb{Z}_p}$ 
9  $S \leftarrow h^\rho g^{s_L} h^{s_R} \in \mathbb{G}$ 
10  $y \leftarrow Hash(A, S) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ 
11  $z \leftarrow Hash(A, S, y) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ 
12  $\tau_1, \tau_2 \leftarrow \$_{\mathbb{Z}_p}$ 
13  $T_1 \leftarrow g^{\tau_1} h^{\tau_1}$ 
14  $T_2 \leftarrow g^{\tau_2} h^{\tau_2}$ 
15  $x \leftarrow Hash(T_1, T_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ 
16  $\mathbf{l} \leftarrow l(X) = a_L - z1^n + s_L X \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ 
17  $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow r(x) = y^n \cdot (a_R + z1^n + s_R X) + z^2 2^n \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ 
18  $\hat{t} \leftarrow \langle \mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r} \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ 
19  $\tau_x \leftarrow r_2 x^2 + \tau_1 x + z^2 \lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ 
20  $\mu \leftarrow \alpha + \rho x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ 
21  $commit_{IP} \leftarrow Commit_{IP}(params_{IP}, l, r)$ 
22  $proof_{IP} \leftarrow Prove_{IP}(params_{IP}, commit_{IP}, \hat{t}, l, r)$ 
23 return  $proof_{RP} = Prove_{RP}(\tau_x, \mu, \hat{t}, V, A, S, T_1, T_2, commit_{IP}, proof_{IP})$ 

```

Algorithm 13: Bulletproofs: *Verify_{RP}*

Input: $params_{RP}, proof_{rp}$

Output: True or false

```

1  $y \leftarrow Hash(A, S) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ 
2  $z \leftarrow Hash(A, S, y) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ 
3  $x \leftarrow Hash(T_1, T_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ 
4  $h_i \leftarrow h_i^{y^{-i+1}} \in \mathbb{G}, \forall i \in [1, n]$ 
5  $P_l \leftarrow p \cdot h^\mu$ 
6  $P_r \leftarrow A \cdot S^x \cdot g^{-z} \cdot (h')^{z \cdot y^2 + z^2 \cdot 2^n} \in \mathbb{G}$ 
7  $output_1 \leftarrow (P_l \stackrel{?}{=} P_r)$ 
8  $output_2 \leftarrow (g^{\hat{t}} h^{r_x} \stackrel{?}{=} V^{z^2} \cdot g^{\sigma(y, z) \cdot T_1^x \cdot T_2^{x^2}})$ 
9  $output_3 \leftarrow Verify_{IP}(proof_{IP})$ 
10 return  $output_1 \wedge output_2 \wedge output_3$ 

```

C Set Membership Proof on BB Signature without pairing

Definition 5. Borromean ring signature[MP15] let \mathcal{V} be some set of verification keys, and f be a function which maps finite subsets of \mathcal{V} to $0, 1$, we call f an admissibility function, then an admissible set V of verification keys is one for which $f(V) = 1$.

A Borromean ring signature σ is a signature on a message m with a set V of verification keys and admissibility function f which satisfy the following:

1. σ can be produced only by parties who together know all the secret keys to an admissible set V of verification keys.
2. Given only σ , \mathcal{V} , and m , it is statistically indistinguishable which admissible set V was used.

Proving knowledge of a valid BB Signature $A_k = g^{1/y+k}$ on a value k committed in $Com = g_1^k h^v$, without using pairings on the prover's side can be done in Algorithm 14 and Algorithm 15.

Algorithm 14: Set Membership Proof: $Prove_{SM}$

Input: challenge ch , public input=(set Φ), private input = $(k, A_k = g^{1/y+k})$
Output: $proof_{SM}$

- 1 $v \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$;
- 2 $Com \leftarrow g_1^k h^v$;
- 3 $A_k \leftarrow g^{1/(y+k)}$;
- 4 $l \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$;
- 5 $B \leftarrow A_k^l, B_1 \leftarrow B^{-1}, D \leftarrow B_1^k g^l$;
- 6 $k_1, l_1, r_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$;
- 7 $Com_1 \leftarrow g_1^{k_1} h^{r_1}, D_1 = B_1^{k_1} g^{l_1}$;
- 8 $C \leftarrow H(Com, B, D, Com_1, D_1, ch)$;
- 9 $s_1 \leftarrow k_1 + c \times k \mod p$;
- 10 $s_2 \leftarrow r_1 + c \times r \mod p$;
- 11 $s_3 \leftarrow l_1 + c \times l \mod p$;
- 12 $proof_{SM} = (Com, B, D, s_1, s_2, s_3)$

Algorithm 15: Set Membership Proof: $Verify_{SM}$

Input: challenge ch , $proof_{SM}$
Output: True or false

- 1 $\hat{C} \leftarrow g_1^{s_1} h^{s_2}, \hat{D} = B_1^{s_1} g^{s_3} D^{-c}$;
- 2 $output_1 \leftarrow B \neq 1_{G_1}$;
- 3 $output_2 \leftarrow H(Com, B, D, \hat{C}, \hat{D}, ch)$;
- 4 return $output_1 \wedge output_2$

D Back-Maxwell Rangeproof

E Nothing Up My Sleeve

This method enables the generation of verifiable random values. NUMS allows a prover to pick values in a way that demonstrates the values were not selected for a "nefarious purpose" - for example, to create a "backdoor" to the algorithm [BBC⁺14]. The algorithm on curve Secp256k1 is described in Algorithm 16.

Algorithm 16: Nothing Up My Sleeve: MapToGroup

Input: The input string m , and the field prime modules p

Output: AN elliptic curve point if successful or some error

```
1  $i \leftarrow 0$  ;
2 while  $i < 256$  do
3    $x \leftarrow \text{Hash}(m, i)$  ;
4    $\text{rhs} \leftarrow x^3 + 7$  ;
5   if  $\text{rhs}$  is a square (mod  $p$ ) then
6      $y \leftarrow \sqrt{\text{rhs}} \bmod p$  ;
7     if  $(x, y)$  is not the point at infinity then
8       return  $(x, y)$  ;
9    $i \leftarrow i + 1$ ;
10 end
11 return "Can not map to group";
```

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