



Smart contracts security assessment

Final report

[Tariff: Standard](#)

Pulse Rate

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Introduction

The report has been prepared for **Pulse Rate**.

The Pulse Rate project is a Tomb Finance fork, allowing users to acquire PulseRate (PRATE) and PulseShare (PSHARE) tokens. Both PRATE and PSHARE tokens are ERC20 standard tokens, PRATE has privileged account allowed to mint.

PulseShare reward pool (PulseShareRewardPool contract) may charge a fee of up to 4% for each deposit.

The code is available at the @pulserate/pulserate-contracts Github repo and was audited in the [03145a9](#) commit.

The updated code was rechecked after the commit [2a20807](#).

Name	Pulse Rate
Audit date	2023-06-21 - 2023-06-23
Language	Solidity
Platform	Pulse Chain

Contracts checked

Name	Address
pulseRate.sol	
pulseShare.sol	
pulseBond.sol	
boardroom.sol	
pulseShareRewardPool.sol	
treasury.sol	
oracle.sol	

Centralization risks

Procedure

We perform our audit according to the following procedure:

Automated analysis

- Scanning the project's smart contracts with several publicly available automated Solidity analysis tools
- Manual verification (reject or confirm) all the issues found by the tools

Manual audit

- Manually analyze smart contracts for security vulnerabilities
- Smart contracts' logic check

Known vulnerabilities checked

Title	Check result
<u>Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain</u>	passed
<u>Code With No Effects</u>	passed
<u>Message call with hardcoded gas amount</u>	passed
<u>Typographical Error</u>	passed
<u>DoS With Block Gas Limit</u>	passed
<u>Presence of unused variables</u>	passed
<u>Incorrect Inheritance Order</u>	passed
<u>Requirement Violation</u>	passed
<u>Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes</u>	passed

<u>Shadowing State Variables</u>	passed
<u>Incorrect Constructor Name</u>	passed
<u>Block values as a proxy for time</u>	passed
<u>Authorization through tx.origin</u>	passed
<u>DoS with Failed Call</u>	passed
<u>Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee</u>	passed
<u>Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions</u>	passed
<u>Assert Violation</u>	passed
<u>State Variable Default Visibility</u>	passed
<u>Reentrancy</u>	passed
<u>Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction</u>	passed
<u>Unprotected Ether Withdrawal</u>	passed
<u>Unchecked Call Return Value</u>	passed
<u>Floating Pragma</u>	passed
<u>Outdated Compiler Version</u>	passed
<u>Integer Overflow and Underflow</u>	passed
<u>Function Default Visibility</u>	passed

Classification of issue severity

High severity	High severity issues can cause a significant or full loss of funds, change of contract ownership, major interference with contract logic. Such issues require immediate attention.
Medium severity	Medium severity issues do not pose an immediate risk, but can be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited. Medium severity issues may lead to a contract failure and can be fixed by modifying the contract state or redeployment. Such issues require attention.

Low severity

Low severity issues do not cause significant destruction to the contract's functionality. Such issues are recommended to be taken into consideration.

Issues

High severity issues

1. Owner capabilities (Centralization risks)

Status: Partially fixed

The project is fully centralized.

PRATE token is open for minting by operator account, which is assigned by the owner, other contracts are highly dependent on the owner's account.

Recommendation: Renounce ownership wherever possible and/or secure owner's account.

Comment from Pulse Rate team: Upon a smooth and successful launch \$PRATE, \$PSHARE and \$PBOND contracts will be Renounced and the LP Burned!

Medium severity issues

1. Unlimited deposit fee (pulseShareRewardPool.sol)

Status: Fixed

Each pool has individual deposit fee which can be set from 0 to 2% (up to 4% in the updated version) during pool creation. However, the operator can update pool parameters after creation without any restrictions on the `depositFeeBP` parameter.

```
function add(
    uint256 _allocPoint,
    IERC20 _token,
    bool _withUpdate,
    uint256 _lastRewardTime,
```

```

    uint16 _depositFeeBP
) public onlyOperator {
    require(_depositFeeBP <= 200, "add: invalid deposit fee basis points");
    ...
}

function set(
    uint256 _pid,
    uint256 _allocPoint,
    uint16 _depositFeeBP
) public onlyOperator {
    massUpdatePools();
    PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
    if (pool.isStarted)
        totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.sub(pool.allocPoint).add(_allocPoint);
    pool.allocPoint = _allocPoint;
    poolInfo[_pid].depositFeeBP = _depositFeeBP;
}

```

2. Possible reentrancy (pulseShareRewardPool.sol)

Status: Fixed

The `withdraw()` function is guarded by `nonReentrant` modifier, but it doesn't prevent reentrancy to the `deposit()` function. If `pool.token` or `pulseShare` tokens have user calls on transfers, withdraw-to-deposit reentrancy will cause a double reward for attacker since `user.rewardDebt` variable is updating in the very end.

```

function withdraw(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public nonReentrant {
    ...
    uint256 _pending = user.amount
        .mul(pool.accTokensPerShare).div(1e18)
        .sub(user.rewardDebt);
    safePulseShareTransfer(_sender, _pending);
    pool.token.safeTransfer(_sender, _amount);
    user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool.accTokensPerShare).div(1e18);
}

function deposit(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount, address referrer) public {

```

```
...
uint256 _pending = user.amount
    .mul(pool.accTokensPerShare).div(1e18)
    .sub(user.rewardDebt);
safePulseShareTransfer(_sender, _pending);
...
}
```

Low severity issues

No issues were found

Conclusion

Pulse Rate pulseRate.sol, pulseShare.sol, pulseBond.sol, boardroom.sol, pulseShareRewardPool.sol, treasury.sol, oracle.sol, Centralization risks contracts were audited. 1 high, 2 medium severity issues were found.
2 medium severity issues have been fixed in the update.

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