

Introducing the Roman Senatorial Debate

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Speech was bestowed upon man
to disguise his thoughts.

—Tiberius (as quoted by Tacitus,
Annals VI.6)

In the Senate, men do not speak
the truth. They speak to win.

—(Paraphrase of sentiments
found throughout Sallust and
Cicero)

The Senate is a council of kings.

—Ennius (quoted by Cicero)

Let arms yield to the toga, the
laurel of the triumph to the
tongue of the orator.

—Cicero, Pro Milone

Senators are not ashamed to
praise whom they must, nor to
attack whom they dare.

—Tacitus, Annals I.74

The more corrupt the state, the
more numerous the laws.

—Tacitus (Ab excessu divi
Augusti)

The parliament passes some acts or decree which may have the most devastating consequences, yet nobody bears the responsibility for it. Nobody can be called to account. For surely one cannot say that a Cabinet discharges its responsibility when it retires after having brought about a catastrophe. Or can we say that the responsibility is fully discharged when a new coalition is formed or parliament dissolved? Can the principle of responsibility mean anything else than the responsibility of a definite person?

—Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf

Parliament can do anything but make a man a woman and a woman a man.

—Sir Edward Coke (attributed)

The British Constitution has always been puzzling and paradoxical. It is an unwritten constitution, and yet it is written all over the place.

—E.M. Forster

The British Parliament is like a curious old clock: its hands move, but no one quite knows why.

—Aneurin Bevan (paraphrased)

The House of Commons is the longest running farce in the West End.

—Clement Attlee (allegedly said in frustration during debates)

Parliament is a talking shop.

—Common saying, derisive or admiring depending on tone

It is the duty of the opposition to oppose.

—Stanley Baldwin

In the Parliament of a free nation, all men are entitled to speak, and all others are entitled not to listen.

—Attributed to Lord Melbourne

Congress is so strange. A man gets up to speak and says nothing. Nobody listens—and then everybody disagrees.

—Boris Marshalov (often misattributed to Will Rogers)

In America, anybody can be president. That’s one of the risks you take.

—Adlai Stevenson

With few exceptions, democracy has not brought good government to new developing countries. What it has done is to disrupt authority and to make it difficult for governments to take decisive action.

—Lee Kuan Yew, *The Wit and Wisdom of Lee Kuan Yew*

I do not believe that democracy necessarily leads to development. I believe what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy.

—Lee Kuan Yew, Interview with Fareed Zakaria, *Foreign Affairs*, 1994

I’m not intellectually convinced that one-man-one-vote is the best. We practice it because that’s what the British bequeathed us and we haven’t really found a need to challenge that. But we have tweaked the system to prevent it from producing a third-world parliament.

—Lee Kuan Yew, *The Man and His Ideas* (interview collection)

If all you have is one man, one vote, then the numerically largest group is going to dominate the rest, and in a multi-racial society, that’s the recipe for disaster.

—Lee Kuan Yew, Quoted in Lee Kuan Yew: *Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going* (2011)

Introduction

I grew up and was trained in the British Parliamentary style during my intellectual youth. It may now seem a little unbecoming—even slightly pathetic—to reminisce about one’s “debating days.” It carries the scent of someone who has plateaued, clinging to a faded glory.

But the British Parliamentary style was incredibly influential to me, on my mode of internal dialectic, my rhetoric style, and substantive philosophical commitments. It was particularly impactful because prior to the British Parliamentary

style, none of the various formats of debate I was acquainted with offered a comparable degree of intellectual challenge, game complexity, or even just speech time for one to really make a pie ¹ out of the motion. I was also convinced that the British Parliamentary style itself could serve as truthseeking, soothsaying machine. I was convinced that it was a successful gameified implementation of the socratic dialectic method. The fact it was culturally contiguous with its namesake and inspiration the British Parliament, and that it shares nontrivial similarities in both operation and evolutionary tendencies (as I observed them when I was a competitive debater), made this position very attractive. The historical and cultural weight of the style, and the respect accorded by the venues in which debates of this style were often held, automatically lends legitimacy to one's speech, and therefore, a sense of responsibility - the British Parliamentary style was the style in which Oxford debated the motion "This House Would fight for King and Country", a debate that Hitler listened to on the radio and a debate that he frequently cited in his military decisions concerning Britain. The demands and standards of dynamism, quickwittedness, and argumentative flare, sanctioned by the rambunctious institution known as the point of information, was entirely alien to the repertoire of Sinitic intellectual discourse methodologies. I was even convinced that a backward, intellectually inferior, vocabulary and logically impoverished language, through the British Parliamentary style, could be beaten like glass - and acquire the latent and subterranean instruments of easy good thinking that the English speaker has taken for granted - what I call "English Rationality". In my eyes, all other debate styles such as All Parliamentary, and World Schools', are mere sloppy imitations of the superior British Parliamentary style, watered down for those with weak intellectual palates.

I no longer agree with this. Or rather, I think although the British Parliamentary style can still deliver some of these promises to young and impressionable minds - particularly the intellectually honest, even if they are immature - these benefits do not scale or carry over into the more advanced stages of the style. Once a person or a society has progressed beyond the novicial stages of the British Parliamentary experience, the style rapidly degrades into a chamber that breeds and amplifies intellectual pathologies.

In this advanced degenerate form, the British Parliament debate emits harmful intellectual radiation, and it gradually irradiates its debaters, its debating community, and poisons even the politics of the state.

What are the problems and ills of the British Parliamentary style? What are the mechanisms and design flaws responsible for them? What kind of higher order downstream impact do they beget and how do they impact society?

- **The Dictatorship of the Adjudicator Class.** It needs to be said that in a chamber where there is a judge or adjudicator, he is God. Indeed, the great difference between a judge's court and a parliament is that the judge's court is a monarchy. It is a dictatorship. Resolutions of a debate pass or fail not by the votes of participating debaters, who play the role of parliamentarians but wield none of their power, but is instead made by the judge. This is a fundamental difference between the competitive debate chamber and an actual parliament.²

¹oeuvre

²As the film *The Great Debaters* puts it:

This is a bug. It is the primary bug that makes the entire game, and its outgrowth ecosystem (debate teams, clubs, debate tutorial schools, national training squads and teams) extremely prone to intellectual capture.

I should note that it's funny that despite being a dictatorship, or a dictatorship of a poliburo if the adjudicating team is greater than 1, adjudication a la private ideological beliefs of the adjudicator is actually an exceedingly rare phenomenon. It is almost unheard of for a judge to rule on a debate based on what is blatantly his own personal belief system. This might be because any judge qua judge must be good at concealing his own personal beliefs by explaining them away. But this is not good enough reason, because debaters often find themselves able to reasonably predict the outcome of a debate and the reasons justifying it.

The British Parliamentary debate organizing authorities and the culture that they themselves and their participants have upheld voluntarily imposes expectations, norms, and customs, on the adjudicator. These norms are toothless in force, as violating them solicits no punishment - non-compliance solicits at best only embarrassment, humiliation, or bin-room adjudication duties.

But the problem is not at all noncompliance with these norms. The vast and overwhelming number adjudicators willingly and happily adhere to the programming instilled upon them from senior and esteemed adjudicators, and noncompliance is almost unfailingly the result of intellectual misfiring, incompetence, or inexperience - not malice or intellectual unyieldiness.

This is to say, that the internal policing is done very well. The adjudication programming and its enforcement mechanism via culture imposition and prestige distribution are very effective. There are extremely rare cases, none actually in my experience, where the adjudicator has ruled entirely based on his own personal belief system entirely untempered by the expectations of the adjudicator class or the debating class. The debater can be reasonably confident what metric the adjudicator will be using to judge the debate, what the conditions of victory and defeat are, and how the adjudicator will apply the metric of adjudication. The outcome is reasonably predictable, and therefore, the game is reasonably fair.

The fact that such a convergence of expectations could be forged is a miracle. It is almost exactly the same as in Common Law courts where Judge, Prosecution, and Defence all operate on the same standards and expectations - and within those expectations all is fair game. Even with the introduction of a jury can one still operate with a stable set of expectations.³

So what's the problem? The problem is that the expectations are not just procedural but they carry content. That content is fundamentally ideological. In other words, British Parliamentary debate is a game of conforming to the ideological demands of the adjudicator class. In other words the adjudicator class is ideologically captured, namely - by leftism.

Who is the judge? The judge is God. Why is he God? Because He decides who wins or loses not my Opponent. Who is your Opponent? He does not exist. Why doesn't he exist? Because he is a mere dissenting voice of the truth I speak.

I don't think the last claim about the opponent means anything substantial. It's some stupid and childish claim cosplaying to be a epistemically sophisticated soup with a bit socratic dialectic salt. But the claim that the judge is God is very true.

³Does Sharia courts have the same convergence of expectations?

It is thoroughly possible for an right-wing ideological to appropriate a British Parliamentary debate tournament for entirely ideological purposes. Set all the motions to be right-leaning; use only right-wing leaning adjudicators; remove all equity policy; and require the national anthem be played before every round, followed by prayer, and execution of some undesirable ethnic minority as sacrifice to gun-wielding Jesus Christ.

But this is probably not practical. Indeed, it's very likely that the British Parliamentary style is fundamentally implicitly left-biased or left-friendly in its design - even though it was very likely not intended to be so. The most obvious candidate reason responsible for this is Conquest's First Law: "Any organization not explicitly right-wing sooner or later becomes left-wing". What's the mechanism though? Well, Conquest's First Law provides the slight impetus to drift to the left, and the adjudicator selection mechanisms provide the the mechanism to homogenize the entirety of the adjudicator class.

Because adjudicators self-replicate through mentorship, feedback, and appointment to "breaking" panels, the ideological DNA of early community leaders becomes canon law. These norms propagate not via formal enforcement but prestige incentives (e.g. who gets to judge finals, give feedback, or train national teams).

BP' s elite adjudicator pool has effectively ossified into a monoculture: university-educated, liberal-globalist, anti-discrimination, pro-minority, suspicious of religion, skeptical of nationalism, technocratic in outlook.

As a result, there is no real judgement. There's only performativity.⁴

- **Stakelessness - the nonexistent bumps against the decrepit** - The game does not have a proxy for a real actual stake that often pushes people into politics, like money or power. People debate because there's politics. There's politics because as a solution to conflict, it's cheaper than violence. There is conflict because people have opposing stakes and interests. Debates abstracts all of that away into just intellectualism, without stakes or interests. At best only the speaker's reputation is at stake.
- **Persuasion** - There is no real room or need for persuasion. The target of persuasion is the judge not the interlocutor. This encourages intellectual antagonism without restraint beyond equity niceties. Why bother agreeing anything the other side has said? You're not in the business of persuading the other side.
- **Intellectual dishonesty, and mindless intellectual outgrowth.** The British Parliamentary style, like all debate formats, impose on the debater a side. The debater does not choose his or her own side. The reason for this is quite straightforwardly obvious - it's pedagogical. "It's about seeing an issue from different sides". That's fair enough, and very probably very important for young and impressionable minds. The confiscation of the debater's choice of a side, forces the debater to confront and come into terms with the arguments of a side he may not necessarily agree with, and in doing so, compels his neuroplasticity to do its magic. Indeed, very

⁴It is probable that the same mechanism is responsible for the ideological capture of Common Law courts in various Common Law jurisdictions - Britain, Hong Kong, Singapore, and elsewhere. They're all 做大戲. The only exception is America, where court battles are still arguably genuine.

probably very important for young individuals. If they are to ever be good at carrying out the dialectic, with others, and more importantly, within themselves, then they must be able to argue from this view, that view, and possibly the view from nowhere. The debater is trained to be the advocate, the devil's advocate, His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Most Loyal Opposition, all at the same time.

What this means fundamentally, is that the British Parliamentary style does not care what you really think. Nobody cares what you think really. And indeed, as a debater does more and more rounds, he himself cares less and less what he really thinks as well. Because the debate tournament is an reiterated game, and a competitive game, with prizes of prestige, recognition, and sometimes possibly money attached. Just search for the argument that can most plausibly win. If that happens to be an argument you like, great - but if not, who cares? Just win the damn debate.

A person, and by extension its debating society, quickly approaches the limits of the British Parliamentary style if they are not intellectually honest or responsible - if they don't check the stuff coming out of their mouths against God - and most people today don't do this, ever in their lives. They never ask "what if I am wrong?" - and they never ever imagine a voice or a being or a mind - God - being there being there to give the ultimate answer. They never test their propositions twice in their head. This laziness is of course common amongst all humans. Intellectual fastidiousness is a rare and precious mutation. And the discipline to commit to that fastidiousness without accidental descension to insanity is even rarer. But the point is, this intellectual laziness, along with other mechanisms and forces, form the prime cause of group mind drift. Since all the minds that make up a tournament have minimal will or intellectual steadfastness of their own, a tournament of minds becomes a brownian motion with drift, as the implicit ideological vectors embedded in the choice of motions, equity policies, adjudication programming, among other things, supervene their latent ideological baggage on the intellectual body of debating individuals.

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The British Parliamentary style does not punish intellectual lazy individuals. In fact, no debating style does. No debating style has a mechanism to impose a duty to be intellectually honest and fastidious to oneself. Nor is there encouragement to do so. And so the downstream problems of that intellectual dishonest multiply. Why is there no such imposition? I think the primary reason is that no debating format has ever come into terms with these problems. The British Parliamentary style is guilty of this failure, only because it is the most advanced style, and has the most developed debating community, and is therefore the first to come into grips with this problem.

Why is this a problem? This is an problem, because it induces the disfigurement of the soul, and of the body polity, given enough time.

(1) The disinvestment of one's soul from the argument.

In the British Parliamentary style, there is little reason to offer arguments grounded in one's own genuine beliefs. The format mildly discourages —and at times punishes —self-forwardance. Why risk your mind on the floor, when you can borrow a prefabricated line of reasoning from some

⁵ 「風行而草偃，披之無令而民從也。」 "When the wind moves, the grass bends; the people follow him without being commanded." — 《荀子·君道》 (Xunzi —On Kingship).

clever intelligence, orga mecha or otherwise, who came before you? Why put a piece of your soul on display, only for it to be ruled against and humiliated by a room full of strangers? Just recycle what works.

When one does make an argument out of true belief, one necessarily invests the soul. That is what makes it costly. That is what makes it real. The argument becomes a kind of vessel, a horcrux of the self. And in turn, when that argument succeeds or fails, something deep within the person is transformed —clarified, wounded, or reborn. And when that happens, the chamber, the tournament, society, transforms along with the individual person.

The debate that disallows the debater from choosing his own position is one that compels the debater to be an actor. The debate compels him to fabricate conviction in a speech he does not necessarily believe. Any doubt must be castrated by the debater himself.⁶

In the absence of that stake - when the soul is withheld from the argument —absurdity finds license. Disconnected from belief, argument becomes play. Not in the noble sense of ludic experimentation, but in the shallow, nihilistic sense of intellectual theatre. The debater learns to perform, not to think. To win, not to discover.

The drive to find new truths, make new mistakes, and therefore new persons —is never activated. The mind never undergoes self-operation. And so the debater is never transformed or clarified as a person.

The intellectual battle, therefore, is always fake. It is never gloves off. No one is bruised and no one bleeds. And this produces a class of thinkers who are apathetic, dishonest, lazy, —all equally disqualified from truth-seeking. In a jury of such epistemic cripples, Condorcet's Theorem guarantees convergence on the wrong answer.

In the worst case scenario, the debater adopts knowingly or unknowingly whatever family of arguments that maximises his probability of winning as his own genuinely privately held belief - so as to reconcile the discomfort, or to make comfortable, that arises from cognitive and intellectual dissonance. This is why university debate tournaments breed so many leftists, because leftists arguments win.

This is disfigurement of the soul, the furthest thing from ennoblement. The strategy favoured by the game theoretic pressure on the debater is one of submission and self-annulment, not domination, self-assertion or self-discovery. Denial and not creation.

Naturally, never is one's belief ever put to the test. One can conjure up arguments, but one has no stake or loyalty to those arguments - when those arguments fall, one's ego is not bruised, if one has learnt to disinvest one's ego from the argument made. Arguments made are not arguments one believes in, and arguments made are made for the sake of victory, not for the sake of announcing sincere belief. You are more less likely to find genuine epistemic discovery in a debate than you are to find the moon made of cheese. Even if you do not treat the debate as an instrument of epistemic discovery, this is still damaging to the individual. Very damaging.

⁶Although it should be theoretically possible to argue on the Opposition to any motion by merely asking questions, by evoking doubt, and by skepticism, I have never seen such a thing done in practice. If the motion before the house "This House Believes that God does not exist", it is entirely plausible to argue on the Opposition just by appealing to the intuition of humanity, so as to "see" the implausibility of the motion vis-a-vis an invocation of a feeling of "there's something funny going on here".

It is damaging to the individual via the same mechanisms in which porn damages the expectations and therefore the dynamics of life of the individual, and how video games infects people with hoodish behaviour.

Watch your thoughts, for they become words; watch your words, for they become actions; watch your actions, for they become habits; watch your habits, for they become character; watch your character, for it becomes your destiny. The absolution of the mind from intellectual liability leads to the watchlessness of thoughts. Who cares what you think? No one - not even yourself.

The ultimate cumulative effective of this kind of pressure over many, many rounds of debate, over many, many tournaments, inflicted on class after class of young adults, is mass intellectual drift with no real input or pushback. A mass of mindless evolutionary outgrowth mushrooms into existence.

What is the substantive content of this mindless evolutionary outgrowth? What is it intellectually or dogmatically committed to? Well, whatever it is, there is a name for this kind of phenomenon. It is called "intellectual capture".

One should note that the ultimate reason how intellectual honesty could be enforced is the exercise and administration of violence. Just because a debate format allowing for the debater to choose their own side they want to debate for will not necessarily mean he will put his soul into the argument, nor will it necessarily mean he will make arguments he genuinely believes in. He can still very well fake it all. He can still lie.

Naturally, the raw and real and disproportionate private administration of violence untempered and unrestrained by anything (such as due process), will overtime yield, an network of expectation of violence. This naturally modifies behaviour. This modified behaviour is called "civility", "politeness", "respect", or even "deference". This is why all young parliaments are actually physically violent - think Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and various African parliaments - even the young American Congress. True meaningful debate emerges because both sides are willing to be bruised and battered if it comes to that. The point of a debate is to avoid coming to that. But if the sword of Damocles, the *summum malum* of violence is removed from the equation, then the deepest incentive for civility is also lost. It then only needs one defector to realise their bad behaviour will not be met with punishment to begin the cascade into degenerate and dishonourable behaviour. Therefore, given time, any parliament whose members have been castrated of the capacity or will to administer violence will degenerate into a House of Dishonourables —where words are costless, manners are performative, and accountability vanishes into theater.

Only when liars are punished, and disproportionately punished, will intellectual honesty naturally arise. And only when accusations of lying and dishonesty can be challenged with the threat of violence, will the charge of lying and dishonesty be weighty enough to be taken seriously. Nothing ensures intellectual honesty more than a good punish to the face. This is why the Chinese are such "a people characterised by a marvellous degree of imbecility, avarice, conceit and obstinacy", because their people's capacity for and right to administer violence has been so thoroughly eroded and concentrated in the hands of the state. Tantrums, groundstomping, and victimhood are left as the only viable strategies for self assertion.

"An armed society is a polite society. Manners are good when one may

have to back up his acts with his life.” Equivalently, an armed debate chamber is a honest debater chamber.

- **Intellectual Capture by Leftism**
- Extremely outgroup focused in terms of welfare, big government since there are no costs to debate land government size
- The most vulnerable group argument
- **No Real Clash or Contension - both sides actually agree.** Oftentimes one might find that both sides of the debate actually agreeing with each other. They’re merely disagreeing on the details of the policy. The Opposition often agrees with Government’s philosophical and moral charges - in that we should help the poorest, the blacks, the coloured, the disabled, the gays, the colonised, the oppressed, or even better, etc - all of that is conceded and very nice and dandy, but it’s the Government’s policy that the Opposition finds intolerable.⁷

Therefore, the contension delivered compared to the contension expected, appears anti-climatic, petty and childish, and stratgically clever but intellectually perfunctorious if not mendacious.

It vaguely reminds Marx’s charge against bourgeois parliamentary democracy where the real conflict is not between parties inside parliament but between the bourgeois parliament and the proletariat masses.

Why does this happen? Because (1) it’s strategically clever, if not obligatory, as it renders the other’s side entire stack of points of philosophical and moral grounds irrelevant, as they were conceded. Effectively, the Government has wasted its own time preaching to the Opposition who never intended to not convert; (2) the debaters don’t choose their sides, so they really have no reason

The downstream effect of this is that unless the motion is explicitly philosophical, or in debating parlance a “value motion”, debaters often no longer make any attempt to make a principle argument. Only in Britain do people still occassionally make the odd principle argument thanks to their long but nonetheless deterioriating intellectual tradition of honesty, uprightness, and dignity. In authoritarian cultures with no real sovereign individuals, like China, Singapore, and Japan, the principle argument is a stupid move, an allergens to the judge.

- **Principle arguments are a waste of time.**
- **Utilitarianism is the one true moral theory - the measure of all things.**
- **Pathetic Behaviour**

⁷Note, that the usual charges of White Privilege globally enjoyed by the Whites can easily be refashioned into similar charges against the Chinese in South East Asia society - especially in Singapore and Malaysia - but you won’t find these arguments as fervently and passionately doled out. It’s called the Chinese Privilege. I prophesize, if and once these arguments are made in the South East Asian debating circuit, it will not take long to become a tangible political crisis in the region. Indeed, such discourse has already found itself into Singaporean elections. It must not be allowed to fester to the same degree of prevalence, acceptability, and dispersion as the White Privilege discourse. It will bring disaster to South East Asia.

1. **Ego Hyperinflation.** This is a problem with all competitive debates, and is the chief reason why so many great debaters, clearly endowed with intellectual prowess and potential, ultimately end up plateauing in university. This is a massive waste of talent, and a despicable disservice done to young talent.
 2. **Mistaking bullshitting as intellectualism.** The increased prevalence of bullshitting is an unavoidable byproduct of impromptu debates. And one of the most corrosive features of competitive debating —particularly at higher levels —is the institutionalization of bullshitting as a strategic virtue. You have to have bullshit as a fallback. Sometimes, to impressionable debaters, to emulate the good model debaters, they end up emulating their bullshit.
 3. **Victimhood, Self-pity, and Helplessness.** Leftism is itself prone to this. But the British Parliamentary style, encourages this type of thinking - of appropriating blame on the state, on society, on some oppressing group, (because no one is there to defend them so it's always an easy card to play). Furthermore, since the Government is assumed to have infinite money by fiat, unlike real parliaments, the debate is never grounded by actual financial concerns - and therefore any problem in society is not solved out of difficult but out sheer absence of government will. Therefore, whatever the problem, it's fundamentally the state's fault. This kind of logic to a young university student encourages a philosophy of victimhood, self-pity, helplessness, and by extension, cowardice, risk-aversion, and resentment.
 4. **Cowardice**
 5. **Endless schooling** Ungentlemanly rhetoric, profanity
 6. Divorced from reality
- **Equity** - which basically prevents hate speech. To those who see value in Cicero's deployment of as hominem attacks as effective highlights of praxological inconsistencies, this custom is highly regrettable. The entire custom abstracts the debate away from reality, breaks the connection between the speaker and his speech, notwithstanding the fact that reality is a place populated by instances of fierce burning hatred and irreconcilable differences.
 - Ideological capture by core adjudicators and judges
 - Absence of real stakes (infinite money fiat)
 - Fundamentally leaning towards youthful idealism—leading to leftism drift
 - Performativity—actually both sides agree
 - No room for genuine persuasion—the target of persuasion is the judge not the interlocutor
 - There's no training in politicking
 - There is no force. Therefore the ultimate maintenance and begetter of parliamentary decorum and intellectual honesty—violence, or the threat thereof—is absent

- Extremely disrespectful and dismissive towards traditions or rules established through evolution, since their utility may not be readily established through simple speech making made without the intelligence provided by history
- As per the analytic tradition of anglo-american philosophy, the British Parliamentary style is utterly incapable in supporting or even tolerating the admission of institutions whose legitimacy is unclear, whose purpose or justification cannot be articulated, or whose rationality is absent. Institutions of these kinds are often called customs, traditions, or even just prejudices dogmas, and myths. These institutions are not well-justified because they weren't designed by man. They evolved into being, through trial and error. Only that which has no history can be defined, only that can be defined can be designed. But customs, traditions, prejudices, dogmas, and myths, are all the product of history. They are not well-justified because they are undefinable. How can you define a woman? The truth is that any answer appealing to sex organs, chromosomes, biology, are also intellectually irrigorous like, though not as functionally ludicrous as those who claim a woman is what you want a woman to be. But, examples -
- Social Contract Theory
- Gender Roles
- Marriage
- Religion -
- Fancy clothes - legal wigs, and robes
- Property Rights
- Sexual Taboos, Manners
- This is also the problem of modern politics in the English speaking world, and is a broader effect of the Enlightenment project.
- intellectual fictions
- Social Contract Chesterton's Fence (G.K. Chesterton):

We need forms of competitive debate - something far more game theoretically unstable

Senatorial Debate Roman

- each debater carries with themselves a vote
- Weighted by:
 - Their speaker points?
- Each person writes down the side they support initially - this is not to be publicly revealed - if revealed - no problem

- The difference in the pros and cons are to be fought by the debaters
- So if there are 8 people debating, and all 8 voted for “pro”, and nobody changed sides, the 8-0 points will awarded to 8 people, so 1 point each.
- But if it began as 7 for 1 against, then 6 points are to be up for grabs. If it ended as 3 for and 4 against, then the 6 points will be shared amongst the 4 winning, so 1.5 points each
- This is the incentive to switch.
- The first speaker gets 2 votes
- Points to the winning side - points divided
- Points to the person who stuck to the end
- Minor points to people to people who stuck to the end
- Win
- Lose
- T

The winning side confers a certain number of points

We need a structure that incentives to switch

- If all 8 debaters started with pro then the game theoretically wise thing to do is just to vote immediately.

Or rather, we need a system anchors then to a particular position - their “interests”

The guiding philosophy of this attempt to redesign a debate format from scratch, is that reality, with its patchwork of real personal interests and individual philosophical commitments, should somehow serve as anchors to reality in this new debate game that we are designing, in the same way that they anchor actual parliamentary debates. The question is then, how?

Obviously, we should bear in mind that this is still a game. We are designing a game, that mimics reality, but is not a copy of reality. And in reality, it is possible, though rare, that people’s interest do align perfectly. It is possible for a parliament to vote unanimously, without interfeccer or underhand meddling. However, that would not make for a very good debate game. This suggests that while debaters should be allowed to choose their own initial sides, based on their own personal beliefs, we should introduce some kind of entropy to encourage or even force disagreement. In traditional debate formats, this disagreement is completely hardcoded, as teams are allotted proposition and opposition slots with zero agency of their own. Here, I suggest perhaps some kind of soft allotment can be considered here.

In reality, aside from just personal beliefs, individuals are motivated to vote based on their interests - monetary interests, familial obligations, relational

commitments. It would not terribly reductive to coalesce all of that into a number represented by numbers.

Suppose each debater begins with a bag of capital, which represents his interests. His bag is composed entirely of two coins: 1\$ and 2\$. They can either represent “proposition” or “opposition” - which is randomly determined at the beginning of the debate. For illustration, we will take 1\$ to represent proposition and 2\$ to mean opposition.

- At the start of the debate, the debater makes known his view on the motion: whether he’s for the motion, or whether he’s against the motion - with his coins. These coins are then put into their respective sides’ stashes.
 - A debater may choose to offer nothing, in which case he does forgoes the stick-to-the-end bonus points when the ultimate vote comes.
- After each speech, each debater has to vote. If he votes for the proposition he must vote with the 1\$, and vice versa. His bag of coins therefore constrains how he positions himself.
 - He can put in as many coins as there are people debating.
 - He can choose to offer nothing.
- At the end of the debate, the motion is put to a vote.
- And the winning side takes the winning stack of coins and half of the losing side, and divides it amongst the winners. The remaining half of the losing stack is then divided amongst those who voted for the losing side since the beginning.
 - Note that given this
- if there is a tie, the larger stack wins - and is divided amongst the winners. the other stack is then divided amongst those who stuck with their original proposition.

The key is perhaps those who stuck to their guns and won will not get any share of the pot

Successful implementation proposal

Here we present the rules of a round of Roman Senatorial Debate.

1. **Number of debaters.** The standard number of debaters is 8. Speaking time is 7 minutes.
 - The Roman Senatorial Debate format should work from 4 debaters to any number of debaters, even beyond 8, but for the purpose of a tournament, rooms should be assumed to accommodate 8 debaters, so the pace would mirror that of the British Parliamentary style.

2. **Choosing sides.** Before the first speech, each debater must reveal in their hand a number of coins. A sum of 1\$ means they support the motion, and so they're on the proposition, Yay (Y). A sum of 2\$ means they're against the motion, and so they're on the opposition, the Nay side (N). Anything else, including 0\$ indicates they're undecided (U). The sides chosen by the debaters must then be recorded, and so they must be seated appropriately. Rearrange the chairs if necessary so it is clear to everywhere all debaters stand. All sums are then pooled into the jackpot. Then they start the debate.
 - The imbalance is intentionally weighted in favor of the motion, making it easier to support than oppose. This is partly to incentivize whoever sponsoring or organizing the debate to feel that their time, energy, and money have been adequately spent in advancing an ideological position that they themselves favour.
 - The higher cost of opposition is also there to ensure that resisting the motion is a matter of genuine conviction, not casual contrarianism—it makes conscience expensive, and therefore meaningful.
 - The sum could be scaled up to (prop: 10\$, opp: 20\$), or even (prop: 10,000\$, opp: 20,000\$), depending on the tournament's debater demographic. But the ratio should be kept at 1:2.
 - Senators who began
3. **Speaking order.** There are multiple ways to determine the speaking order. Here we present two methods, one simple and one sophisticated.
 - **Simple method.** The speaking queue is ordered by Y, N, U, in that order, until all sides run out. If one side has already run out, the next side continues on the queue.
 - Say you have 8 debaters, 7 Ys, and 1Ns, then the queue is (Y, N, Y, Y, Y, Y, Y, Y).
 - Another example, say you have 8 debaters, 3 Ys, 4 Ns, and 1 U, then the queue is (Y, N, U, Y, N, Y, N, N).
 - One more example, say 2 Ys, 5 Ns, and 1 U, then the queue is (Y, N, U, Y, N, N, N, N).
 - The point of stacking the side where there is a large number of supporting senators towards the "end" of the queue is to (1) give the opposing side more "time" for them to make clear their point earlier, and so their speech can have more impact, and (2) to give the more numerous side more time to reconsider their position.
 - **Sophisticated method.** The speaker order is not determined, but bidded. Whenever the floor is open, senators may bid for the speaking slot. There are three bids. All unsuccessful bids are pooled into the jackpot. The highest bidder gets the speaking slot. If there are no bidders, then the speaker to the left of the last speaker gets the speaking slot.
 - Obviously, this method of determining speaking orders is more monetarily competitive, and involves more strategizing. It also inflates the jackpot.

4. Each senator makes a 7 minute speech. Any sitting may raise points of information during the 1st and 6th minute of the speech. During any time of their speech, they may add money to the pot.
5. **Voting and resolution.** When all speeches have been, the chamber shall undergo a round of voting. This ultimate round of voting involves no monetary commitment. The vote is recorded by name. Each senator must write down on a piece of paper, his name, the side he votes for, and then all the votes are counted and revealed public. Votes with no names are invalid. Senators whose vote are not recorded are considered to have abstained. Senators may vote in favour, in opposition, or abstain or remain undecided. The threshold for winning is 1 + half of the total number of debaters. This means in a chamber of 8 senators, for Proposition or Opposition to win, it must secure 5 votes. The Proposition wins if and only if it has secured 5 votes, in which case we say the motion is passed, or adopted. The Opposition wins if and only if it has secured 5 votes as well, in which case we say the motion is defeated, or rejected. In the case where the vote is split, perhaps evenly 4-4, or 4-3-1 in Y-N-U, then we say the motion is unresolved, in which case we do not say the motion has passed or defeated. In such a case we also say the chamber is tied.
6. **Points and Jackpot** The general philosophy is that points is what counts towards breaks - senators with the highest points break into the elimination rounds. Jackpot is monetary reward, and fuel. They do not count in any way towards breaks.

- The points are distributed thus, to every senator:

	stay 留	switch 轉軟	abstain 棄權
win 贏	3	1	0
lose 輸	2	0	0
tie 和	0	0	0

- Senators who were undecided at the start of the debate and voted in favour or against the motion are considered to have switched sides, and are rewarded 1 point.
- You can see that those who lost the debate but stuck to their guns are rewarded more highly in terms of points than those who switched sides.
- You can see that ties are very punishing to all senators involved. It basically means they have all wasted time and everyone has lost.

7. **Jackpot money distribution.** The jackpot money is split thus:

- s is the total sum in the pot, which always abides by the following:
 $s = w_{\text{留}} + w_{\text{轉}}$
- v is the total number of votes on the winning side, which always abides by the following: $v = v_{\text{留}} + v_{\text{轉}}$
- $w_{\text{留}}$ and $w_{\text{轉}}$ are defined as such:
 - (a) $w_{\text{留}} = s \cdot \frac{v_{\text{留}} + 1}{v + 1}$
 - (b) $w_{\text{轉}} = s \cdot \frac{v_{\text{轉}}}{v + 1}$

- To say this without justification, this creates a quasi-prisoner's dilemma situation in the following box, where those who switch sides and win, win money but lose out relatively on points.
 - The split of the $w_{\text{留}}$ and $w_{\text{轉}}$ leaves a weird case where everyone switched sides and that side won. In such a case, there'd be nobody to claim the virtual 留贏 share. That share can go to many places: (1) the poorest member, (2) the hosting tournament, (3) divided equally amongst all players...(4) taken by the winning side as well...
 - The point of the dynamic is: some people care about the money, some people care about passing the motion.
8. **The rewards table** Combining the points and jackpot money distribution, the rewards matrix for each senator is:

	stay 留	switch 轉軌	abstain 棄權
win 贏	$(3, \frac{s(v_{\text{留}}+1)}{v_{\text{留}}(v+1)})$	$(1, \frac{sv_{\text{轉}}}{v_{\text{轉}}(v+1)})$	(0,0)
lose 輸	(2,0)	(0,0)	(0,0)
tie 和	(0,0)	(0,0)	(0,0)

As we can see, the switching side has monetary pay out $\frac{sv_{\text{轉}}}{v_{\text{轉}}(v+1)} = \frac{s}{v+1}$.

9. **Chairs & Speakers** Suppose for the sake of decorum, and perhaps for the sake of maintaining accounting validity, you might want to introduce a chair, or a speaker. The chair's role, unlike in British Parliamentary debate, does not involve judging. He is only involved in making sure the outcome properly computed and resolved.




圖 1: Flowchart of a round of the Roman Senatorial Debate

Payout structure by debater count

Recall that the number of senators can arguably be scaled up to any number. And also recall that the number of votes necessary to win is $1 + \text{half of the total}$

number of debaters.

Here we present the payout structure for different numbers of debaters and voting scenarios.

n_{debaters}	v_{win}	$v_{\text{留}}$	$v_{\text{轉}}$	$w_{\text{留}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{留}}+1}{v_{\text{win}}+1}$	$w_{\text{轉}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{轉}}}{v+1}$	$w_{\text{留}}/\text{人}$	$w_{\text{轉}}/\text{人}$
6	4	0	4	20.0	80.0	n/a ^a	20.0
6	4	1	3	40.0	60.0	40.0	20.0
6	4	2	2	60.0	40.0	30.0	20.0
6	4	3	1	80.0	20.0	26.67	20.0
6	4	4	0	100.0	0.0	25.0	0.0
6	5	0	5	16.67	83.33	n/a ^a	16.67
6	5	1	4	33.33	66.67	33.33	16.67
6	5	2	3	50.0	50.0	25.0	16.67
6	5	3	2	66.67	33.33	22.22	16.67
6	5	4	1	83.33	16.67	20.83	16.67
6	5	5	0	100.0	0.0	20.0	0.0
6	6	0	6	14.29	85.71	n/a ^a	14.29
6	6	1	5	28.57	71.43	28.57	14.29
6	6	2	4	42.86	57.14	21.43	14.29
6	6	3	3	57.14	42.86	19.05	14.29
6	6	4	2	71.43	28.57	17.86	14.29
6	6	5	1	85.71	14.29	17.14	14.29
6	6	6	0	100.0	0.0	16.67	0.0

^a n/a, because there are literally no participants who won who stayed on the position that they started with. Obviously this is a degenerate and highly unlikely case. But we still need to figure out how to handle the payout which has no one to receive it. It can either (1) be distributed amongst those who won, (2) go to anyone on the losing side who stuck to their guns, or (3) go to the poorest member, or (4) to the tournament organizer. We are not too interested in the details.

表 1: Payout structure for different numbers of debaters and voting scenarios

n_{debaters}	v_{win}	$v_{\text{留}}$	$v_{\text{轉}}$	$w_{\text{留}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{留}}+1}{v_{\text{win}}+1}$	$w_{\text{轉}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{轉}}}{v+1}$	$w_{\text{留}}/\text{人}$	$w_{\text{轉}}/\text{人}$
7	4	0	4	20.0	80.0	n/a ^a	20.0
7	4	1	3	40.0	60.0	40.0	20.0
7	4	2	2	60.0	40.0	30.0	20.0
7	4	3	1	80.0	20.0	26.67	20.0
7	4	4	0	100.0	0.0	25.0	0.0
7	5	0	5	16.67	83.33	n/a ^a	16.67
7	5	1	4	33.33	66.67	33.33	16.67
7	5	2	3	50.0	50.0	25.0	16.67
7	5	3	2	66.67	33.33	22.22	16.67
7	5	4	1	83.33	16.67	20.83	16.67
7	5	5	0	100.0	0.0	20.0	0.0
7	6	0	6	14.29	85.71	n/a ^a	14.29
7	6	1	5	28.57	71.43	28.57	14.29
7	6	2	4	42.86	57.14	21.43	14.29
7	6	3	3	57.14	42.86	19.05	14.29
7	6	4	2	71.43	28.57	17.86	14.29
7	6	5	1	85.71	14.29	17.14	14.29
7	6	6	0	100.0	0.0	16.67	0.0
7	7	0	7	12.5	87.5	n/a ^a	12.5
7	7	1	6	25.0	75.0	25.0	12.5
7	7	2	5	37.5	62.5	18.75	12.5
7	7	3	4	50.0	50.0	16.67	12.5
7	7	4	3	62.5	37.5	15.62	12.5
7	7	5	2	75.0	25.0	15.0	12.5
7	7	6	1	87.5	12.5	14.58	12.5
7	7	7	0	100.0	0.0	14.29	0.0

^a n/a indicates no 留 voters to receive the payout.

表 2: Payout structure for different numbers of debaters and voting scenarios

n_{debaters}	v_{win}	$v_{\text{留}}$	$v_{\text{轉}}$	$w_{\text{留}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{留}}+1}{v_{\text{win}}+1}$	$w_{\text{轉}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{轉}}}{v+1}$	$w_{\text{留}}/\text{人}$	$w_{\text{轉}}/\text{人}$
8	5	0	5	16.67	83.33	n/a ^a	16.67
8	5	1	4	33.33	66.67	33.33	16.67
8	5	2	3	50.0	50.0	25.0	16.67
8	5	3	2	66.67	33.33	22.22	16.67
8	5	4	1	83.33	16.67	20.83	16.67
8	5	5	0	100.0	0.0	20.0	0.0
8	6	0	6	14.29	85.71	n/a ^a	14.29
8	6	1	5	28.57	71.43	28.57	14.29
8	6	2	4	42.86	57.14	21.43	14.29
8	6	3	3	57.14	42.86	19.05	14.29
8	6	4	2	71.43	28.57	17.86	14.29
8	6	5	1	85.71	14.29	17.14	14.29
8	6	6	0	100.0	0.0	16.67	0.0
8	7	0	7	12.5	87.5	n/a ^a	12.5
8	7	1	6	25.0	75.0	25.0	12.5
8	7	2	5	37.5	62.5	18.75	12.5
8	7	3	4	50.0	50.0	16.67	12.5
8	7	4	3	62.5	37.5	15.62	12.5
8	7	5	2	75.0	25.0	15.0	12.5
8	7	6	1	87.5	12.5	14.58	12.5
8	7	7	0	100.0	0.0	14.29	0.0
8	8	0	8	11.11	88.89	n/a ^a	11.11
8	8	1	7	22.22	77.78	22.22	11.11
8	8	2	6	33.33	66.67	16.67	11.11
8	8	3	5	44.44	55.56	14.81	11.11
8	8	4	4	55.56	44.44	13.89	11.11
8	8	5	3	66.67	33.33	13.33	11.11
8	8	6	2	77.78	22.22	12.96	11.11
8	8	7	1	88.89	11.11	12.7	11.11
8	8	8	0	100.0	0.0	12.5	0.0

^a n/a indicates no 留 voters to receive the payout.

表 3: Payout structure for different numbers of debaters and voting scenarios

n_{debaters}	v_{win}	$v_{\text{留}}$	$v_{\text{轉}}$	$w_{\text{留}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{留}}+1}{v_{\text{win}}+1}$	$w_{\text{轉}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{轉}}}{v+1}$	$w_{\text{留}}/\text{人}$	$w_{\text{轉}}/\text{人}$
9	5	0	5	16.67	83.33	n/a ^a	16.67
9	5	1	4	33.33	66.67	33.33	16.67
9	5	2	3	50.0	50.0	25.0	16.67
9	5	3	2	66.67	33.33	22.22	16.67
9	5	4	1	83.33	16.67	20.83	16.67
9	5	5	0	100.0	0.0	20.0	0.0
9	6	0	6	14.29	85.71	n/a ^a	14.29
9	6	1	5	28.57	71.43	28.57	14.29
9	6	2	4	42.86	57.14	21.43	14.29
9	6	3	3	57.14	42.86	19.05	14.29
9	6	4	2	71.43	28.57	17.86	14.29
9	6	5	1	85.71	14.29	17.14	14.29
9	6	6	0	100.0	0.0	16.67	0.0
9	7	0	7	12.5	87.5	n/a ^a	12.5
9	7	1	6	25.0	75.0	25.0	12.5
9	7	2	5	37.5	62.5	18.75	12.5
9	7	3	4	50.0	50.0	16.67	12.5
9	7	4	3	62.5	37.5	15.62	12.5
9	7	5	2	75.0	25.0	15.0	12.5
9	7	6	1	87.5	12.5	14.58	12.5
9	7	7	0	100.0	0.0	14.29	0.0
9	8	0	8	11.11	88.89	n/a ^a	11.11
9	8	1	7	22.22	77.78	22.22	11.11
9	8	2	6	33.33	66.67	16.67	11.11
9	8	3	5	44.44	55.56	14.81	11.11
9	8	4	4	55.56	44.44	13.89	11.11
9	8	5	3	66.67	33.33	13.33	11.11
9	8	6	2	77.78	22.22	12.96	11.11
9	8	7	1	88.89	11.11	12.7	11.11
9	8	8	0	100.0	0.0	12.5	0.0
9	9	0	9	10.0	90.0	n/a ^a	10.0
9	9	1	8	20.0	80.0	20.0	10.0
9	9	2	7	30.0	70.0	15.0	10.0
9	9	3	6	40.0	60.0	13.33	10.0
9	9	4	5	50.0	50.0	12.5	10.0
9	9	5	4	60.0	40.0	12.0	10.0
9	9	6	3	70.0	30.0	11.67	10.0
9	9	7	2	80.0	20.0	11.43	10.0
9	9	8	1	90.0	10.0	11.25	10.0
9	9	9	0	100.0	0.0	11.11	0.0

^a n/a indicates no 留 voters to receive the payout.

表 4: Payout structure for different numbers of debaters and voting scenarios

n_{debaters}	v_{win}	$v_{\text{留}}$	$v_{\text{轉}}$	$w_{\text{留}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{留}}+1}{v_{\text{win}}+1}$	$w_{\text{轉}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{轉}}}{v+1}$	$w_{\text{留}}/\text{人}$	$w_{\text{轉}}/\text{人}$
10	6	0	6	14.29	85.71	n/a ^a	14.29
10	6	1	5	28.57	71.43	28.57	14.29
10	6	2	4	42.86	57.14	21.43	14.29
10	6	3	3	57.14	42.86	19.05	14.29
10	6	4	2	71.43	28.57	17.86	14.29
10	6	5	1	85.71	14.29	17.14	14.29
10	6	6	0	100.0	0.0	16.67	0.0
10	7	0	7	12.5	87.5	n/a ^a	12.5
10	7	1	6	25.0	75.0	25.0	12.5
10	7	2	5	37.5	62.5	18.75	12.5
10	7	3	4	50.0	50.0	16.67	12.5
10	7	4	3	62.5	37.5	15.62	12.5
10	7	5	2	75.0	25.0	15.0	12.5
10	7	6	1	87.5	12.5	14.58	12.5
10	7	7	0	100.0	0.0	14.29	0.0
10	8	0	8	11.11	88.89	n/a ^a	11.11
10	8	1	7	22.22	77.78	22.22	11.11
10	8	2	6	33.33	66.67	16.67	11.11
10	8	3	5	44.44	55.56	14.81	11.11
10	8	4	4	55.56	44.44	13.89	11.11
10	8	5	3	66.67	33.33	13.33	11.11
10	8	6	2	77.78	22.22	12.96	11.11
10	8	7	1	88.89	11.11	12.7	11.11
10	8	8	0	100.0	0.0	12.5	0.0
10	9	0	9	10.0	90.0	n/a ^a	10.0
10	9	1	8	20.0	80.0	20.0	10.0
10	9	2	7	30.0	70.0	15.0	10.0
10	9	3	6	40.0	60.0	13.33	10.0
10	9	4	5	50.0	50.0	12.5	10.0
10	9	5	4	60.0	40.0	12.0	10.0
10	9	6	3	70.0	30.0	11.67	10.0
10	9	7	2	80.0	20.0	11.43	10.0
10	9	8	1	90.0	10.0	11.25	10.0
10	9	9	0	100.0	0.0	11.11	0.0
10	10	0	10	9.09	90.91	n/a ^a	9.09
10	10	1	9	18.18	81.82	18.18	9.09
10	10	2	8	27.27	72.73	13.64	9.09
10	10	3	7	36.36	63.64	12.12	9.09
10	10	4	6	45.45	54.55	11.36	9.09
10	10	5	5	54.55	45.45	10.91	9.09
10	10	6	4	63.64	36.36	10.61	9.09
10	10	7	3	72.73	27.27	10.39	9.09
10	10	8	2	81.82	18.18	10.23	9.09
10	10	9	1	90.91	9.09	10.1	9.09
10	10	10	0	100.0	0.0	10.0	0.0

^a n/a indicates no 留 voters to receive the payout.

表 5: Payout structure for different numbers of debaters and voting scenarios

n_{debaters}	v_{win}	$v_{\text{留}}$	$v_{\text{轉}}$	$w_{\text{留}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{留}}+1}{v_{\text{win}}+1}$	$w_{\text{轉}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{轉}}}{v+1}$	$w_{\text{留}}/\text{人}$	$w_{\text{轉}}/\text{人}$
11	6	0	6	14.29	85.71	n/a ^a	14.29
11	6	1	5	28.57	71.43	28.57	14.29
11	6	2	4	42.86	57.14	21.43	14.29
11	6	3	3	57.14	42.86	19.05	14.29
11	6	4	2	71.43	28.57	17.86	14.29
11	6	5	1	85.71	14.29	17.14	14.29
11	6	6	0	100.0	0.0	16.67	0.0
11	7	0	7	12.5	87.5	n/a ^a	12.5
11	7	1	6	25.0	75.0	25.0	12.5
11	7	2	5	37.5	62.5	18.75	12.5
11	7	3	4	50.0	50.0	16.67	12.5
11	7	4	3	62.5	37.5	15.62	12.5
11	7	5	2	75.0	25.0	15.0	12.5
11	7	6	1	87.5	12.5	14.58	12.5
11	7	7	0	100.0	0.0	14.29	0.0
11	8	0	8	11.11	88.89	n/a ^a	11.11
11	8	1	7	22.22	77.78	22.22	11.11
11	8	2	6	33.33	66.67	16.67	11.11
11	8	3	5	44.44	55.56	14.81	11.11
11	8	4	4	55.56	44.44	13.89	11.11
11	8	5	3	66.67	33.33	13.33	11.11
11	8	6	2	77.78	22.22	12.96	11.11
11	8	7	1	88.89	11.11	12.7	11.11
11	8	8	0	100.0	0.0	12.5	0.0
11	9	0	9	10.0	90.0	n/a ^a	10.0
11	9	1	8	20.0	80.0	20.0	10.0
11	9	2	7	30.0	70.0	15.0	10.0
11	9	3	6	40.0	60.0	13.33	10.0
11	9	4	5	50.0	50.0	12.5	10.0
11	9	5	4	60.0	40.0	12.0	10.0
11	9	6	3	70.0	30.0	11.67	10.0
11	9	7	2	80.0	20.0	11.43	10.0
11	9	8	1	90.0	10.0	11.25	10.0
11	9	9	0	100.0	0.0	11.11	0.0
11	10	0	10	9.09	90.91	n/a ^a	9.09
11	10	1	9	18.18	81.82	18.18	9.09
11	10	2	8	27.27	72.73	13.64	9.09
11	10	3	7	36.36	63.64	12.12	9.09
11	10	4	6	45.45	54.55	11.36	9.09
11	10	5	5	54.55	45.45	10.91	9.09
11	10	6	4	63.64	36.36	10.61	9.09
11	10	7	3	72.73	27.27	10.39	9.09
11	10	8	2	81.82	18.18	10.23	9.09
11	10	9	1	90.91	9.09	10.1	9.09
11	10	10	0	100.0	0.0	10.0	0.0
11	11	0	11	8.33	91.67	n/a ^a	8.33
11	11	1	10	16.67	83.33	16.67	8.33
11	11	2	9	25.0	75.0	12.5	8.33
11	11	3	8	33.33	66.67	11.11	8.33
11	11	4	7	41.67	58.33	10.42	8.33
11	11	5	6	50.0	50.0	10.0	8.33
11	11	6	5	58.33	41.67	9.72	8.33
11	11	7	4	66.67	33.33	9.52	8.33
11	11	8	3	75.0	25.0	9.38	8.33
11	11	9	2	83.33	16.67	9.26	8.33
11	11	10	1	91.67	8.33	9.17	8.33
11	11	11	0	100.0	0.0	9.09	0.0

^a n/a indicates no 留 voters to receive the payout.

表 6: Payout structure for different numbers of debaters and voting scenarios

n_{debaters}	v_{win}	$v_{\text{留}}$	$v_{\text{轉}}$	$w_{\text{留}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{留}}+1}{v_{\text{win}}+1}$	$w_{\text{轉}} = 100 \cdot \frac{v_{\text{轉}}}{v+1}$	$w_{\text{留}}/\text{人}$	$w_{\text{轉}}/\text{人}$
12	7	0	7	12.5	87.5	n/a ^a	12.5
12	7	1	6	25.0	75.0	25.0	12.5
12	7	2	5	37.5	62.5	18.75	12.5
12	7	3	4	50.0	50.0	16.67	12.5
12	7	4	3	62.5	37.5	15.62	12.5
12	7	5	2	75.0	25.0	15.0	12.5
12	7	6	1	87.5	12.5	14.58	12.5
12	7	7	0	100.0	0.0	14.29	0.0
12	8	0	8	11.11	88.89	n/a ^a	11.11
12	8	1	7	22.22	77.78	22.22	11.11
12	8	2	6	33.33	66.67	16.67	11.11
12	8	3	5	44.44	55.56	14.81	11.11
12	8	4	4	55.56	44.44	13.89	11.11
12	8	5	3	66.67	33.33	13.33	11.11
12	8	6	2	77.78	22.22	12.96	11.11
12	8	7	1	88.89	11.11	12.7	11.11
12	8	8	0	100.0	0.0	12.5	0.0
12	9	0	9	10.0	90.0	n/a ^a	10.0
12	9	1	8	20.0	80.0	20.0	10.0
12	9	2	7	30.0	70.0	15.0	10.0
12	9	3	6	40.0	60.0	13.33	10.0
12	9	4	5	50.0	50.0	12.5	10.0
12	9	5	4	60.0	40.0	12.0	10.0
12	9	6	3	70.0	30.0	11.67	10.0
12	9	7	2	80.0	20.0	11.43	10.0
12	9	8	1	90.0	10.0	11.25	10.0
12	9	9	0	100.0	0.0	11.11	0.0
12	10	0	10	9.09	90.91	n/a ^a	9.09
12	10	1	9	18.18	81.82	18.18	9.09
12	10	2	8	27.27	72.73	13.64	9.09
12	10	3	7	36.36	63.64	12.12	9.09
12	10	4	6	45.45	54.55	11.36	9.09
12	10	5	5	54.55	45.45	10.91	9.09
12	10	6	4	63.64	36.36	10.61	9.09
12	10	7	3	72.73	27.27	10.39	9.09
12	10	8	2	81.82	18.18	10.23	9.09
12	10	9	1	90.91	9.09	10.1	9.09
12	10	10	0	100.0	0.0	10.0	0.0
12	11	0	11	8.33	91.67	n/a ^a	8.33
12	11	1	10	16.67	83.33	16.67	8.33
12	11	2	9	25.0	75.0	12.5	8.33
12	11	3	8	33.33	66.67	11.11	8.33
12	11	4	7	41.67	58.33	10.42	8.33
12	11	5	6	50.0	50.0	10.0	8.33
12	11	6	5	58.33	41.67	9.72	8.33
12	11	7	4	66.67	33.33	9.52	8.33
12	11	8	3	75.0	25.0	9.38	8.33
12	11	9	2	83.33	16.67	9.26	8.33
12	11	10	1	91.67	8.33	9.17	8.33
12	11	11	0	100.0	0.0	9.09	0.0
12	12	0	12	7.69	92.31	n/a ^a	7.69
12	12	1	11	15.38	84.62	15.38	7.69
12	12	2	10	23.08	76.92	11.54	7.69
12	12	3	9	30.77	69.23	10.26	7.69
12	12	4	8	38.46	61.54	9.62	7.69
12	12	5	7	46.15	53.85	9.23	7.69
12	12	6	6	53.85	46.15	8.97	7.69
12	12	7	5	61.54	38.46	8.79	7.69
12	12	8	4	69.23	30.77	8.65	7.69
12	12	9	3	76.92	23.08	8.55	7.69
12	12	10	2	84.62	15.38	8.46	7.69
12	12	11	1	92.31	7.69	8.39	7.69
12	12	12	0	100.0	0.0	8.33	0.0

^a n/a indicates no 留 voters to receive the payout.

表 7: Payout structure for different numbers of debaters and voting scenarios

Elimination mechanism

Unlike the British Parliamentary style tournament where you can set the number of rounds depending on how many outrounds you want, and then the teams are exponentially and deterministically eliminated, the Roman Senatorial Debate does not work like that.

A chamber might fail to resolve the motion, in which case every senator gets 0 points. A chamber might also resolve the motion unanimously without switching sides, in which case every senator gets 3 points. These irregularities pose difficulties to a straightforward elimination mechanism like that in the British Parliamentary style tournament, as a chamber might return all 8 senators with 3 points, or all senators with 0 points.

1. **Admission to elimination rounds.** At breaks, teams are admitted into the elimination rounds by virtue of the points they've accumulated.
2. **Tie resolution.** In any case where there is a tie, this is to either be resolved by money, or force. In the case where the option to resolve it by force is enabled, any tied member has the right to resolve it by trial by combat. Women may be allowed to fight, but they are accorded the privilege to find a champion. Men are not accorded the privilege of champerty. Champions must be participating senators. This is in line with the general philosophy of the tournament that debate, politics, and intellectualism makes sense only if it is a game of honour - and honour only emerges if there is an ultimate backstop of violence.
3. **Points carryover.** Senators will continue to inherit their points from the preliminary rounds. Senators WILL NOT have their accumulated points reset to 0 in the breakrounds. The point of this is to give intellectual autonomy to the senators to stand their ground.
4. **Number of participants.** The number of senators the tournament admits into the outrounds is the number of rounds times 8 senators. we have:
 - (a) octos (8 strongest rooms, 4th last round): 64 人 →
 - (b) quarters (4 strongest rooms, 3rd last round): 32 人 →
 - (c) semis (2 strongest rooms, 2nd last round): 16 人 →
 - (d) grand final (last round): 8 人.
5. **Elimination mechanism.** In each of the outrounds, the aggregate half of the rooms with the lowest points are eliminated. So unlike BP where the result of each room individually decides the outcome of the outround, here the aggregate result of all rooms in the outround decides the outcome.
6. **The Market of Speech and Influence.** Since senators carry over their points from the preliminary rounds, those with high scores can speak freely with their immediate fear of elimination heavily discounted. This grants intellectual autonomy to top-performing senators, allowing them to assert their own private views with confidence and demonstrate their full intellectual prowess. This means there is now a privilege to speak, where you can basically air your own views on a topic, and you granted an audience.

This, on the whole, means that the tournament becomes a market where the commodity of speech and influence can be acquired by a combination of strategic political manoeuvre and careful money management.

7. **The Grand Final.** How is the winner of the Grand Final determined? This is tricky and it depends on what matters to you. The recommendation is that the you still run the debate as a normal round, but depending on the tournament's interest, one may arbitrarily define the "winner(s)" to be whoever stuck to his guns and whose side resolved the motion. But if for reasons of ceremony or competition the tournament must produce a "winner", they might resolve to define the winner as the side that the chamber resolved in favour for.

Emergent phenomenon

It is very likely that this set of rules will yield emergent phenomena. It is my sincere hope that the game, along with its emergent phenomena, will beget and engender virtues in its participants: honour, intellectualism, honesty, duty, and most importantly, the prudent and intelligent use of force. The pen that is dancing is only as mighty as the sword that is at rest.

Bribery

Consider the case where in the first round of votes, the vote distribution is 7 Y and 1 N. This is a highly stable state. The 7 participants have no incentive to switch their vote. Anybody switching would be giving up 3 points for at best 1 point, and the jackpot sum that's already in the bag.

Then, what's the point of the debate here? There is no point. There would only be a point to debate if there's a destabilizing force of some sort.

If things have been left to their own devices, then the inevitable solution will emerge by itself - bribery, vote-buying.

Vote-buying, from other senators, and only from other senators, serves as a reasonable destabilizing force.

If the form of vote-buying enabled involves the inflation of the supply of votes, then debate will become a simple matter of money takes all. This is not a good thing. Vote inflation must not be allowed. It destroys the need to debate, the need to persuade, and the need to offer a bribe. It eliminates politicking and favour-trading - which is the whole point of this exercise. But if vote-buying is restricted to the form of bribing other senators, then there will still be a tug of war between conscience and monetary self-interest.

Since we are dealing with actual money, vote-buying is going to be particularly impactful on less well-off participants. This naturally means there would be a natural incentive for poor participants to join the tournament - for the promise of monetary prizes. Just like how the poker game inevitably attracts the poor university student.

One might wonder, does one need to introduce a mechanism to enforce the promises of bribery? The answer is no. In fact, it absolutely should not be introduced. For if you do, then it eliminates the possibility of creating the culture of honour and promisekeeping. Furthermore, dishonest and lying bribe-offers will likely be punished as the tournament progresses. Reiterated game theory dynamic secures it. If you cheated someone of a promised bribe, what are the chances you will maintain your standing in the tournament? Or in another tournament?

On the other hand, perhaps there is someone you really want to screw over - either because of personal vendetta or because of the repugnance of their views. In these case, one might be highly motivated to engage in treachery.

The capacity for treachery is something we should cultivate—even if its victims find it distasteful. Participants must internalize this, not only because treachery is an unavoidable feature of life, especially in high politics, but also because those with lofty ideals and ambitions will find it a dagger they cannot do without. If our goal is to foster a culture of trust and honour, as well as the capacity to betray and wound—like the Roman senators of old—then we must give participants the space to exercise both. Most importantly, the point is that a man is good not because he is weak and is unable to inflict pain, but because he is strong and is able to do harm, but choses not to do so. *Si vis pacem, para bellum*.

It is therefore no overstatement to say that bribery is the mother of honour in this game.

This begets an interesting question: why are bribes so frowned upon in modern electoral arena?

The most promising answer is that not all bribes are identical. The follow-up is that favour-trading is the equivalent of bribes that we described and enabled in our debate game - and that is never disallowed. Indeed, favour-trading is what politics is all about. If disallowed, politics disintegrates and ceases to be.

So why do we not allow the ordinary voter to sell his vote? Why do we not allow the rich to buy votes from the poor? It seems a very direct way to redistribute wealth, and certainly seems far better than the current system of wealth redistribution through government policy in areas of interest, or the electoral campaign phenomenon where the rich donates huge sums to candidates to either fatten their pockets or to fund their advertisement efforts. Neither the state nor the people are enriched in these transactions.

It seems particularly intuitive why enabling the buying of votes in parliament is not a good idea - it should seem too powerful a mechanism to reorganize interests - it's like staring directly into the sun. To emerge from intuition land, and get into something more rigourous, allowing the bribing of parliamentarians enable embezzlement and cronyism. Embezzlement take the following the form: the government, empowered by the bribed parliamentarian of transferring funds to a service provider whose service is purchased by the government. The parliamentarian then receives a bribe, either directly in the form of cash, or in the form of a kickback. The government is robbed.

The key mechanism is that the parliamentarian increased the price the government is willing to pay for the service than the government would have paid if

there was no bribe. The difference is then split between the service-provider and the bribe paid to the parliamentarian. The service-provider is enriched, the parliamentarian is enriched, and the government is impoverished.

Calling this embezzlement is probably mildly misleading in the sense it seems to suggest it occurs far less often than one would expect. In reality, this is just lobbying - and it undoubtedly happens every day.

Does this mechanism still manifest in some other form if it is the ordinary voter who's bribed, and not the parliamentarian? The voter merely elects the parliamentarian, but the parliamentarian doesn't get any kickbacks - the "kickback" is already spent on buying the votes from the voter, and for the vote-buyer to recuperate his expenditure, the parliamentarian must somehow spend government budget funds more extravagantly than he would have done otherwise on some service from the service-provider. Is the parliamentarian more, or less incentivized to do this, than he would have been if he was not bribed/lobbied?

Nonchalant Speech

In the Roman Senatorial Debate, it is possible to run into local pockets of complete speech freedom, begotten by isolated game-theoretic dynamics. In these instances, senators find themselves in a position to speak whatever they want, without finding their standing in the tournament being in anyway diminished or damaged. If the initial vote is 7Y-1N, and the opposing senator is a penniless and charmless idiot, then one on the Yay side can speak whatever they want, and the other side cannot do anything about it.

This can also manifest in the outrounds. Since senators carry the points they accumulated from the preliminary rounds, the ones who've done really well could afford to say anything, or nothing, in perhaps a round or two in the outrounds - without still being punished.

Note that in the outrounds, a senator's speech carries greater weight, magnified by both their earned prestige and the attentiveness of a larger audience. If so, one can argue that the entire tournament is a platform for one to game and buy their way to be heard, particularly in the outrounds.

Militants

- Honour
- Motivations

Charm, multiround game theoretic dynamics, politics

Virtues bred

virtues bred

Intellectual Capture

The debate tournament's potential for intellectual capture is under-appreciated. If appreciated, I shan't be suprised to see interested parties funding their own debate tournaments for ideological purposes.

The problem with the British Parliamentary format is not that it is open to intellectual capture. Its malaise is that (1) in theory, it is entirely captured by the core adjudicators and the body of judge, and (2) in practice, it is entirely captured by youthful idealism, which is naturally prone to levitate from reality, for there is no mechanical temperance by reality.

All forms of competitive or performative debate are open to intellectual and ideological capture. The Roman Senatorial Debate is no exception - but it is more prone to intellectual capture by ideologies informed by interest, and stakeholderhood.

How can the Roman Senatorial Debate be used to capture the intellectuals?

- motion setting - money -

The overton window.

I estimate, that it takes about 10 years for a debate motion to find its way into the public, national, political discourse.

Recommended Motions

1. This House would introduce the 2nd amendment to the United Kingdom.
2. This House would fight for King and Country.
3. This House believes that the Sovereign should fire the Prime Minister.
4. This House believes that the Common Law should be imposed on all European countries.
5. This House believes supernational states are a bad idea.
6. This House believes the three ideologies of the 20th centuries, communism, fascism, and liberalism, are all bad ideas.
7. This House regrets the dissolution of the British Empire.
8. This House believes that the United Kingdom should be a republic.
9. This House would require the Grand Jury to be used in all criminal cases.
10. This House believes that no taxation without representation and no representation without taxation.