ABDK CONSULTING

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT

ZKSwap

V3

Solidity

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SMART CONTRACT AUDIT CONCLUSION


by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich 13th April 2022

We've been asked to review files in two ZKSwap repositories, which together comprise ZkSwap V3 version:

- zkswap-v2.
- zkswap-v3.

We found 4 critical, 10 major, and a few less important issues.

All identified critical issues have been fixed. All identified major issues have been fixed or otherwise addressed in collaboration with the client.



Findings

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-1	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-2	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-3	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-4	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-5	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-6	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-7	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-8	Major	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-9	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-10	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-11	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-12	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-13	Minor	Readability	Info
CVF-14	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-15	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-16	Critical	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-17	Critical	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-18	Critical	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-19	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-20	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-21	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-22	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-23	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-24	Critical	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-25	Moderate	Procedural	Info
CVF-26	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-27	Minor	Suboptimal	Info

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-28	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-29	Major	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-30	Moderate	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-31	Minor	Readability	Info
CVF-32	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-33	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-34	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-35	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-36	Major	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-37	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-38	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-39	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-40	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-41	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-42	Major	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-43	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-44	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-45	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-46	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-47	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-48	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-49	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-50	Minor	Flaw	Info
CVF-51	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-52	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-53	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-54	Major	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-55	Moderate	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-56	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-57	Minor	Suboptimal	Info

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-58	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-59	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-60	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-61	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-62	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-63	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Info
CVF-64	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-65	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Info
CVF-66	Major	Unclear behavior	Fixed
CVF-67	Minor	Flaw	Info
CVF-68	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-69	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-70	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-71	Major	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-72	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-73	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-74	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-75	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-76	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-77	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-78	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-79	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-80	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-81	${\sf Moderate}$	Flaw	Info
CVF-82	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-83	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-84	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-85	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-86	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-87	Minor	Documentation	Info

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-88	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-89	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-90	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-91	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-92	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-93	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-94	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-95	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-96	Major	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-97	Minor	Unclear behavior	Info
CVF-98	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-99	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Info
CVF-100	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-101	Minor	Readability	Info
CVF-102	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-103	Major	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-104	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-105	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-106	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-107	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-108	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-109	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-110	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-111	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-112	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-113	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-114	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-115	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-116	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-117	Moderate	Flaw	Info

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-118	Minor	Documentation	Info
CVF-119	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-120	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-121	Major	Flaw	Info





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1 Document properties

Version

Version	Date	Author	Description
0.1	April 13, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Initial Draft
0.2	April 13, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Minor revision
1.0	April 13, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Release

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2 Introduction

The following document provides the result of the audit performed by ABDK Consulting at the customer request. The audit goal is a general review of the smart contracts structure, critical/major bugs detection and issuing the general recommendations. A difference between the next commits was the audit subject:

- commit 72ffa2d
- commit 1cc5b18

We have reviewed the next files:

- witness/mod.rs
- witness/nft approve.rs
- witness/nft deposit.rs
- witness/nft_exchange.rs
- witness/nft_full_exit.rs
- witness/nft mint.rs
- witness/nft transfer to new.rs
- witness/nft transfer.rs
- witness/nft withdraw.rs
- witness/utils.rs
- witness/add liquidity.rs
- witness/change pubkey offchain.rs
- witness/close account.rs
- witness/deposit.rs
- witness/full exit.rs
- witness/remove liquidity.rs
- witness/swap.rs
- witness/tests/mod.rs
- witness/transfer.rs
- witness/transfer to new.rs
- witness/withdraw.rs



- account.rs
- element.rs
- nft_exit_circuit.rs
- exit circuit.rs
- lp exit circuit.rs
- nft/libs/Address.sol
- nft/libs/EnumerableMap.sol
- nft/libs/EnumerableSet.sol
- nft/libs/ERC721.sol
- nft/libs/IERC165.sol
- nft/libs/IERC721.sol
- nft/libs/IERC721Enumerable.sol
- nft/libs/IERC721Metadata.sol
- nft/libs/IERC721Receiver.sol
- nft/libs/Strings.sol
- nft/IZKBoxNFT.sol
- nft/OwnableContract.sol
- nft/ZKBoxNFT.sol
- uniswap/UniswapV2ERC20.sol
- Bytes.sol
- VerifierExit.sol
- ZkBox.sol
- ZkSyncExit.sol

The fixes were provided in a new commit.

2.1 About ABDK

ABDK Consulting, established in 2016, is a leading service provider in the space of blockchain development and audit. It has contributed to numerous blockchain projects, and co-authored some widely known blockchain primitives like Poseidon hash function. The ABDK Audit Team, led by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich, has conducted over 40 audits of blockchain projects in Solidity, Rust, Circom, C++, JavaScript, and other languages.



2.2 Disclaimer

Note that the performed audit represents current best practices and smart contract standards which are relevant at the date of publication. After fixing the indicated issues the smart contracts should be re-audited.

2.3 Methodology

The methodology is not a strict formal procedure, but rather a collection of methods and tactics that combined differently and tuned for every particular project, depending on the project structure and and used technologies, as well as on what the client is expecting from the audit. In current audit we use:

- General Code Assessment. The code is reviewed for clarity, consistency, style, and
 for whether it follows code best practices applicable to the particular programming language used. We check indentation, naming convention, commented code blocks, code
 duplication, confusing names, confusing, irrelevant, or missing comments etc. At this
 phase we also understand overall code structure.
- Entity Usage Analysis. Usages of various entities defined in the code are analysed. This includes both: internal usages from other parts of the code as well as potential external usages. We check that entities are defined in proper places and that their visibility scopes and access levels are relevant. At this phase we understand overall system architecture and how different parts of the code are related to each other.
- Access Control Analysis. For those entities, that could be accessed externally, access control measures are analysed. We check that access control is relevant and is done properly. At this phase we understand user roles and permissions, as well as what assets the system ought to protect.
- Code Logic Analysis. The code logic of particular functions is analysed for correctness and efficiency. We check that code actually does what it is supposed to do, that algorithms are optimal and correct, and that proper data types are used. We also check that external libraries used in the code are up to date and relevant to the tasks they solve in the code. At this phase we also understand data structures used and the purposes they are used for.



3 Detailed Results

3.1 CVF-1

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** EnumerableMap.sol

Description This structure requires two storage reads in order to obtain the value by a key. **Recommendation** Consider storing only the keys in the array, and value+index pairs in the mapping to make mapping access more efficient.

Listing 1:

- 46 +MapEntry[] entries;
- 50 +mapping (bytes32 => uint256) indexes;

3.2 CVF-2

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• Source EnumerableMap.sol

Recommendation This should be done only when to DeleteIndex != lastIndex.

Listing 2:

- 96 +MapEntry storage lastEntry = map. _entries[lastIndex];
- 99 +map. _entries[toDeleteIndex] = lastEntry;
- 101 +map. _indexes[lastEntry._key] = toDeleteIndex + 1; // All \hookrightarrow indexes are 1-based

3.3 CVF-3

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** EnumerableMap.sol

Recommendation The term "size" is more common for maps than "length".

Listing 3:

```
125 +function _length(Map storage map) private view returns (uint256 \leftrightarrow ) {
```



3.4 CVF-4

- Severity Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Info
- **Source** EnumerableMap.sol

Description the semantics of the returned values is unclear. **Recommendation** Consider documenting.

Listing 4:

- 139 +function _at(Map storage map, uint256 index) private view \hookrightarrow returns (bytes32, bytes32) {
- 150 +function _tryGet(Map storage map, bytes32 key) private view \hookrightarrow returns (bool, bytes32) {

3.5 CVF-5

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source EnumerableMap.sol

Description This check is redundant, as Solidity compiler will do the same check at the next line.

Listing 5:

140 +require (map. _entries.length > index, "EnumerableMap: index out → of bounds");

3.6 CVF-6

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** EnumerableMap.sol

Description This index is off by 1 from the index in 'indexes'. This is error prone.

Listing 6:

142 +MapEntry storage entry = map. entries[index];



3.7 CVF-7

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source EnumerableMap.sol

Description There seems to be only one place where these functions are actually used. **Recommendation** Consider rewriting that code to use "tryGet" and removing these functions.

Listing 7:

- 172 +* CAUTION: This function is deprecated because it requires

 → allocating memory for the error
- 260 +* CAUTION: This function is deprecated because it requires

 → allocating memory for the error

3.8 CVF-8

- **Severity** Major
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** EnumerableMap.sol

Description For an enumerable map whose values are addresses a more efficient structure is possible.

Recommendation Such map could be represented as the following two collections: 1. An array of keys 2. A mapping from a key to a 32-bytes word containing the value (address) and the index of the key inside the array As an address occupies only 20 bytes, 12 bytes remain for an index, which allows maps of up to about 8e28 elements.

Listing 8:



3.9 CVF-9

- Severity Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Info
- Source circuit.rs

Description This condition is not properly documented.

Recommendation Consider referring to some documentation where this case is described

Listing 9:

3.10 CVF-10

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source circuit.rs

Description Cloning "is_zero" and "is_four" here is redundant, as these variables are not used below.

Listing 10:

784 +&[is zero.clone(), is two.clone(), is four.clone()],

3.11 CVF-11

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• Source circuit.rs

Description This 'multi_and' construction is redundant as it has only once argument. **Recommendation** Consider removing it and using the argument directly.

Listing 11:



3.12 CVF-12

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

• Source circuit.rs

Recommendation Unused code should be removed.

Listing 12:

```
834 +// // for fullexitNFT, we always select lhs 
+// let is_fullexit_nft = Expression::u64::<CS>(17 as u64); 
+// let is_fullexit_nft_left = multi_and(
+// cs.namespace(|| "is_fullexit_nft_left"), 
+// &[is_transfer_tonew_nft, is_two.not()], 
+// )?; 
840 +
```



3.13 CVF-13

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Readability

• Source circuit.rs

Recommendation A multi-or would be more readable.

Listing 13:

```
1208
      Boolean::enforce equal(
          cs.namespace (|\cdot| "0 <= fee token < 2^(FEE TOKEN BIT WIDTH-1)
             \hookrightarrow "),
          &op data.fee token.get bits le() [FEE TOKEN BIT WIDTH -1],
1210 —
          &op data.fee token.get bits le() [FEE TOKEN BIT WIDTH -1],

→ // b'0xxxxxxx'

          &Boolean::constant(false),
    +Boolean::enforce equal(
          cs.namespace(|| "0 \leq fee token < 2^{(FEE TOKEN BIT WIDTH-2)}
          &op data.fee token.get bits le() [FEE TOKEN BIT WIDTH -2],
        → // b'00xxxxxx'
          &Boolean::constant(false),
     +)?;
    +Boolean::enforce equal(
1220 +
          cs.namespace (| | "0 \le fee token < 2^(FEE TOKEN BIT WIDTH-3)
        \hookrightarrow "),
          &op data.fee token.get bits le()[FEE TOKEN BIT WIDTH - 3],
       → // b'000xxxxx'
          &Boolean::constant(false),
     +)?;
```



3.14 CVF-14

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source circuit.rs

Recommendation Consider using a flag dedicated to regular accounts rather than check all possible other accounts.

Listing 14:

```
1633 +base_valid_flags.push(is_this_nft_account.not());
1950 + base_valid_flags.push(is_this_nft_account.not());
2083 +is_valid_flags.push(is_this_nft_account.not());
2224 +is_valid_flags.push(is_this_nft_account.not());
2469 +lhs_valid_flags.push(is_this_nft_account.not());
2808 +lhs_valid_flags.push(is_this_nft_account.not());
2996 +rhs_valid_flags.push(is_this_nft_account.not());
```

3.15 CVF-15

• Severity Minor

Status Info

• Category Bad datatype

• Source circuit.rs

Recommendation This should be a named constant.

Listing 15:

1645 assert eq!(pubdata bits.len(), 46 * 8);



3.16 CVF-16

- Severity Critical
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- Source circuit.rs

Description The signature is verified in chunk 0, but "rhs" is verified in chunk 1, thus a malicious relayer may use correct recipient address in the chunk 0 to make the signature verification to succeed, but substitute another address in chunk 1, thus stealing the assets. **Recommendation** Consider using 'op_data.eth_address' instead, and then, when verifying the 'chank1' enforce, that op_data.eth_address' is the same as 'cur.account.address'.

Listing 16:

2786 serialized tx bits.extend(rhs.account.address.get bits be());

3.17 CVF-17

- Severity Critical
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- Source circuit.rs

Description The rhs branch is not verified in chunk 0, where the signature is verified, thus it is possible to supply a malicious rhs.account.address in chunk1 where the signature is not verified, and thus add liquidity to a wrong pair.

Recommendation Consider taking all sensitive data from 'op.data' and verifying the latter against the signature.

Listing 17:

- 3277 serialized tx bits.extend(rhs.account.address.get bits be());
- 3368 chunkO valid flags.push(is sig verified.clone());



3.18 CVF-18

- Severity Critical
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- Source circuit.rs

Description The rhs branch is not verified in chunk 0, where the signature is verified, thus it is possible to supply a malicious rhs.account.address in chunk1 where the signature is not verified, and thus remove liquidity from a wrong pair.

Recommendation Consider taking all sensitive data from 'op.data' and verifying the latter against the signature.

Listing 18:

3849 serialized tx bits.extend(rhs.account.address.get bits be());

3923 chunkO valid flags.push(is sig verified.clone());

3.19 CVF-19

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Documentation
- Source circuit.rs

Recommendation It is less error-prone to have a predicate that specifies which accounts are eligible for swaps, rather than which ones are NFT.

Listing 19:

4145 +is this nft account: &Boolean,

3.20 CVF-20

• **Severity** Minor

- Status Info
- Category Unclear behavior
- Source circuit.rs

Description Is it really required to support this case?

Listing 20:

4633 +* 2/ account/pair account is empty // 2021.06.09

- → pair_account can be non-empty in case account.eth_addr =
- → cur.account.address



3.21 CVF-21

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source circuit.rs

Description This condition is redundant.

Listing 21:

4790 +is account empty.not(),

3.22 CVF-22

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Documentation
- Source circuit.rs

Description The name is ambigiuos.

Recommendation Consider giving more descriptive names to flags.

Listing 22:

4795 +let is_either_valid = multi_or(

3.23 CVF-23

• Severity Minor

Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• Source circuit.rs

Description Both arguments of the "multi_or" operation are conjunctions including "is tx valid" and "is pair account empty".

Recommendation Consider moving them out of the disjunction, i.e. calcualte like: and (is_tx_valid, is_pair_account_empty, or (is_account_empty, is_address_same)).

Listing 23:

4797 +&[is chunk0 valid.clone(), is account exist and valid.clone()],



3.24 CVF-24

- Severity Critical
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- Source circuit.rs

Description This operation doesn't charge fee, but at the same time it doesn't ensure that the fee amount is zero. Thus, a maliciour relayer may execute an NFT deposit with a non-zero fee amount, causing two critical problems: 1. The protocol state will become different from what one would expect looking at the pubdata 2. The relayer will mint tokens in L2 that are not backed by tokens in L1

Recommendation Consider adding a check similar the checks performed by full_exit and deposit operations.

Listing 24:

4864 +fn depositNFT < CS: ConstraintSystem < E>>(

3.25 CVF-25

• **Severity** Moderate

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

Source circuit.rs

Description There is no restriction on 'from_account_id' in this case. **Recommendation** Probably it should be restricted to be a regular account.

Listing 25:

5078 + // chunk1: cur = from account

3.26 CVF-26

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Documentation
- Source circuit.rs

Description We do not exactly modify the account, just check some equalities.

Listing 26:

5761 + // 9. in chunk2 we modify to account



3.27 CVF-27

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source circuit.rs

Recommendation This is confusing. It might be simpler to set 'approved_account_id' always to 0 except for exchanges.

Listing 27:

6065 +approved_account_id: op_data.to_account_id.clone(), // approved

→ info should be reset after transfer

3.28 CVF-28

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural
- Status Info
- Source circuit.rs

Recommendation These variables can be computed in 'synthesize'.

Listing 28:

```
6962 +let is_chunk0 = Boolean::from(Expression::equals(
6968 +let is_chunk1 = Boolean::from(Expression::equals(
6974 +let is_chunk2 = Boolean::from(Expression::equals(
```

3.29 CVF-29

• **Severity** Major

- Status Info
- Category Unclear behavior
- Source circuit.rs

Description Default approved account ID value equals the value meaning 'everyone can initiate an exchange for this NFT'. It is not straightforward to observe why this does not lead to NFT duplicates or other attack vectors, as the countermeasure relies on special meaning for zero token ID and other fields.

Recommendation Consider using a different value for 'approved to everyone'.

Listing 29:



3.30 CVF-30

- **Severity** Moderate
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Info
- Source circuit.rs

Description This literally makes impossible for an account with 0 id to own any NFT as it could be claimed by anyone.

Recommendation Consider forbidding the zero account id at all.

Listing 30:

3.31 CVF-31

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Info

• Category Readability

Source circuit.rs

Description Tree depths are global constants.

Recommendation Consider using them for readability.

Listing 31:

```
7690 +balance_tree_depth() + account_tree_depth() - 1,

7696 +nft_id_ce.get_bits_le()[balance_tree_depth()..].to_vec(),

7710 +nft_id_ce.get_bits_le()[..balance_tree_depth()].to_vec(),
```

3.32 CVF-32

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

Source circuit.rs

Recommendation This commented code should be removed.

Listing 32:

```
7783 +// let empty_root_padding =
+// AllocatedNum::zero(cs.namespace(|| "allocate zero

→ element for padding"))?;
```



3.33 CVF-33

- Severity Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Info
- **Source** operation.rs

Recommendation If the amount is assumed to be bounded in the protocol, it makes sense to document it here.

Listing 33:

- 27 +pub approved amount: Option<E::Fr>,
- 65 + E:: Fr:: from_str(&nft.approved_amount.to_u128().

 → unwrap().to_string()).unwrap(),

3.34 CVF-34

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Documentation
- **Source** operation.rs

Description This commented line is confusing.

Recommendation Consider removing it or explaining in more details what does it mean.

Listing 34:

84 +// pub nft account witness: NFTAccountWitness<E>,

3.35 CVF-35

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Documentation
- **Source** operation.rs

Recommendation The comment should be modified.

Listing 35:

136 +pub fee2: Option<E::Fr>, // fee

3.36 CVF-36

- Severity Major
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- Source nft deposit.rs

Recommendation The approved token ID and approved amount should be set to 0, and approved account should be equal to 'from account id'.

Listing 36:

187 + . nft_info

3.37 CVF-37

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Info
- Source nft deposit.rs

Recommendation Default token should be a named constant.

Listing 37:

 $219 + let token = 0_u32;$

3.38 CVF-38

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Info
- Source nft approve.rs

Description The operation name is very confusing, as it it not what is usually meant by "approve" regarding tokens. It looks more like placing a sell order.

Recommendation Consider choosing a better name.

Listing 38:

31 +struct NFTApproveData {

3.39 CVF-39

• **Severity** Minor

- Status Info
- Category Unclear behavior
- **Source** nft approve.rs

Description Consider commenting if 'insert' handles duplicates

Listing 39:

197 +acc.nft infos.insert(nft bal id, new nft info.clone());



3.40 CVF-40

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Info
- Source nft approve.rs

Description The declaration of the "nft_infos" field is out of scope for this audit, while it is clearly related to the NFT logic.

Listing 40:

197 +acc.nft_infos.insert(nft_bal_id, new_nft_info.clone());

3.41 CVF-41

Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

• **Source** ZkSync.sol

Description These functions should emit some events.

Listing 41:

3.42 CVF-42

• **Severity** Major

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** ZkSync.sol

Description Limiting individual deposits at small fraction of the maximum total token amount in the system could be very limiting for certain tokens whose total supply is spread among few holders.

Recommendation Consider limiting the total amount directly, by checking the contract's token balance.

Listing 42:

- 388 +require(deposit_amount <= maxDepositAmount, "fd011");
- 396 +require (deposit amount <= maxDepositAmount, "fd013");



3.43 CVF-43

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** ZkSync.sol

Description This requirement makes 'blockNumberFrom' redundant.

Listing 43:

559 + require (blockNumberFrom = totalBlocksChecked + 1, "cw2");

3.44 CVF-44

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad datatype

• Source ZkSync.sol

Recommendation This constant should be named and documented.

Listing 44:

588 +gasReserveValue: 0xff

3.45 CVF-45

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad datatype

Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Recommendation This should have type IERC721.

Listing 45:

13 +address tokenContract;



3.46 CVF-46

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Info
- Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description Keys of these mappings are unclear. **Recommendation** Consider documenting.

Listing 46:

```
30 +mapping(uint256 ⇒ L1Info) public infoMapL1;

+mapping(address ⇒ mapping(uint256 ⇒ L2Info)) public infoMapL2

→ ;

36 +mapping(uint256 ⇒ PendingWithdrawal) public pendingWithdrawals
```

36 +mapping(uint256 \Rightarrow PendingWithdrawal) public pendingWithdrawals \leftrightarrow ;

3.47 CVF-47

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Recommendation These low-level constant and functions should be moved to a utility library.

Listing 47:



3.48 CVF-48

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad datatype

• Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Recommendation These should be named constant(s).

Listing 48:

3.49 CVF-49

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad naming

Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description Referring to "zkSync" in identifiers is weird.

Recommendation Consider replacing with "ZKSwap" or making identifiers neutral such as "setCoreAddress".

Listing 49:

62 +function setZkSyncAddress(address zksyncAddress) external {

3.50 CVF-50

Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Flaw

Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description There is no explicit check that "_zksyncAddress" is not zero, thus technically it is possible to initialize several times.

Recommendation Consider adding such check.

Listing 50:

```
63 +require(zksCore == address(0), "ZKBoxNFT: already initialized") \leftrightarrow; +zksCore = _zksyncAddress;
```



3.51 CVF-51

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Info
- Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Recommendation 'c' is a very ambiguous name.

Listing 51:

73 +function onDeposit(IERC721 c, uint256 tokenId, address addr) \hookrightarrow external onlyZksCore returns (Operations.DepositNFT memory \hookrightarrow) {

3.52 CVF-52

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description This variable is redundant as it holds the same value as "c".

Listing 52:

79 +address tokenContractAddress = address(c);

3.53 CVF-53

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description There is already a variable for "address(c)".

Listing 53:

89 +tokenContract: address(c),



3.54 CVF-54

- Severity Major
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description Inputs of this function are known to always be 34 bytes long. This allows significantly optimizing the function by treating the input as an 272-bit integer and converting it into base58 representation using division and modulo operations. The first few iterations will require dealing with numbers longer than 256 bits, but such operations are still quite cheap in ethereum. The vast majority of iterations would deal with numbers that already fit into 256 bits.

Listing 54:

133 +function toBase58(bytes memory source) internal pure returns (

→ string memory) {

3.55 CVF-55

• **Severity** Moderate

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description This function copies bytes one by one, which is inefficient.

Listing 55:

```
166 +function reverse (uint8 [] memory input) internal pure returns (

→ uint8 [] memory) {
```



3.56 CVF-56

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Info
- Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description This function should emit some event.

Listing 56:

175 +function setContractURI(string memory contractURI_) public

→ onlyOwner {

3.57 CVF-57

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description Conversion to "bytes28" perform another shift here. Using "uint224" instead of "bytes28" for withdrawal keys would avoid extra shifts.

Listing 57:

186 +return bytes28((uint224(addr) | (uint224(globalld) \ll 160)));

3.58 CVF-58

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Recommendation 'packWithdrawKey' should be used here.

Listing 58:

191 +bytes28 withdrawKey = bytes28((uint224(addr) | (uint224(\rightarrow globalId) << 160)));



3.59 CVF-59

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description The value of the "numOfPendingWithdrawals" variable is read from the storage twice.

Recommendation Consider using the "++" operator to read it once.

Listing 59:

227 +pendingWithdrawals [numOfPendingWithdrawals] = PendingWithdrawal

→ (wd.target, wd.globalld);
+numOfPendingWithdrawals = numOfPendingWithdrawals + 1;

3.60 CVF-60

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Recommendation 'startIndex + toProcess' can be replaced with 'firstPendingWithdrawal'.

Listing 60:

244 +for (uint32 i = startIndex; i < startIndex + toProcess; ++i) {

3.61 CVF-61

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad datatype

Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Recommendation The first parameter should have type IERC721.

Listing 61:

259 +function onWithdraw(address target, uint64 globalld) external
→ onlyZksCore returns (address, uint256) {



3.62 CVF-62

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source ZKBoxNFT.sol

Description Why one of these functions public and the other external? **Recommendation** Consider using consistent modifiers.

Listing 62:

- 268 +function tokenURI(uint256 tokenId) public view returns (string \hookrightarrow memory) {
- 275 +function getContentHash(uint256 _tokenId) external view returns \hookrightarrow (bytes32) {

3.63 CVF-63

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Source nft mint.rs

Description Overflow is possible here.

Recommendation Consider asserting the ID fits 32 bits explicitly

Listing 63:

56 + seq_id: seq_id.to_u32().unwrap(),

3.64 CVF-64

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad datatype

• Source nft mint.rs

Recommendation This should be a named constant.

Listing 64:

61 +approved_token id: 0,



3.65 CVF-65

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Source nft mint.rs

Description Overflow is possible here.

Recommendation Consider asserting the fee fits 128 bits explicitly.

Listing 65:

3.66 CVF-66

• Severity Major

- Status Fixed
- Category Unclear behavior
- Source nft mint.rs

Description Variable-length arrays are error prone as they should be encoded properly. **Recommendation** Consider using explicit bound for the URI length.

Listing 66:

3.67 CVF-67

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Flaw

• Source nft mint.rs

Recommendation It should be asserted that overflow does not happen at casting.

Listing 67:



3.68 CVF-68

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Info
- Source allocated structures.rs

Recommendation Unused code should be removed.

Listing 68:

3.69 CVF-69

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Info
- **Source** allocated structures.rs

Description This renaming seems incomplete.

Recommendation Consider using consistent naming for all related variables.

Listing 69:



3.70 CVF-70

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Info
- Source allocated structures.rs

Description Aren't the pair balances in reserve tokens equal to the reserve values? If yes one of them is redundant.

Listing 70:

```
353 +pub r0: CircuitElement <E>, // pair.reserve0 
+pub r1: CircuitElement <E>, // pair.reserve1 
+pub b0: CircuitElement <E>, // pair.balance[token0] 
+pub b1: CircuitElement <E>, // pair.balance[token1]
```

3.71 CVF-71

- Severity Major
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** Storage.sol

Description As NFT global IDs are assigned sequentially.

Recommendation It would be more efficient to use a bit mask here, i.e. store flags for 256 tokens in a single slot.

Listing 71:

100 +mapping(uint64 => bool) public nft exited;

3.72 CVF-72

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

• Source Config.sol

Description These values are actually only the default values, while actual values could be set by the governance.

Recommendation Consider adding "DEFAULT" prefix to the constant names.

Listing 72:

- 11 +uint256 constant ERC20 WITHDRAWAL GAS LIMIT = 350000;
- 14 +uint256 constant ERC721 WITHDRAWAL GAS LIMIT = 350000;



3.73 CVF-73

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Info
- Source Config.sol

Description It is a bit unusual that the maximum ID value is a power of two, rather than a power of two minus one. Are NFT IDs one-based? If so, consider defining the "MIN NFT ID" constant as well and using it when checking for validity of an NFT ID.

Listing 73:

53 +uint64 constant MAX NFT ID = 2**(27+16);

3.74 CVF-74

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Unclear behavior
- Source Config.sol

Description These fields occupy 39 bytes rather than 71.

Listing 74:

90 +/// (uint8 isNFTWithdraw uint8 addToPendingWithdrawalsQueue,

→ uint64 globalld, uint32 creator,

+// uint32 seqld, address _toAddr, uint8 isValid)

+uint256 constant ONCHAIN WITHDRAWAL NFT BYTES = 71;

3.75 CVF-75

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Unclear behavior
- Source Config.sol

Description It is a bit unusual that the maximum deposit amount is a power of two, rather than a power of two minus one. Is there any reasoning for this?

Listing 75:

121 +uint128 constant DEFAULT MAX DEPOSIT AMOUNT = 2 ** 85;



3.76 CVF-76

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Info
- Source Operations.sol

Description This field doesn't seem to be ever read. **Recommendation** Consider removing it.

Listing 76:

220 +bool valid; //confirm the necessity of this field

3.77 CVF-77

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• Source ERC721.sol

Description Solidity compiler is smart enough to calculate constant expressions at compile time, even those expressions that calculate hash functions.

Recommendation Consider initializing constants using expressions rather than hardcoded values.

Listing 77:

- 53 +bytes4 private constant $_ERC721_RECEIVED = 0x150b7a02$;
- 69 +bytes4 private constant _INTERFACE_ID_ERC721 = 0x80ac58cd;
- 78 +bytes4 private constant _INTERFACE_ID_ERC721_METADATA = 0

 → x5b5e139f;
- 83 +bytes4 private constant INTERFACE ID ERC165 = 0x01ffc9a7;
- 93 +bytes4 private constant _INTERFACE_ID_ERC721_ENUMERABLE = $0 \leftrightarrow x780e9d63$;

3.78 CVF-78

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** ERC721.sol

Recommendation This value could be obtained as "IERC721Receiver(to).onERC721Received.selector". No need for a separate constant.

Listing 78:

53 +bytes4 private constant $_ERC721$ RECEIVED = 0×150 b7a02;



3.79 CVF-79

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source ERC721.sol

Description These functions wouldn't be needed if the corresponding variable would be declared as public and named appropriately.

Listing 79:

```
135 +function name() public view returns (string memory) {
142 +function symbol() public view returns (string memory) {
```

3.80 CVF-80

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source ERC721.sol

Description This event is logged even if the status has not changed.

Listing 80:

244 +emit ApprovalForAll(msg.sender, operator, approved);

3.81 CVF-81

• **Severity** Moderate

• Status Info

Category Flaw

• Source ERC721.sol

Description Returned values are ignored.

Listing 81:

```
391 +_holderTokens[to].add(tokenId);
393 +_tokenOwners.set(tokenId, to);
418 +_holderTokens[owner].remove(tokenId);
+_tokenOwners.remove(tokenId);
446 +_holderTokens[from].remove(tokenId);
+_holderTokens[to].add(tokenId);
449 + tokenOwners.set(tokenId, to);
```



3.82 CVF-82

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** ERC721.sol

Description This argument is redundant as it could be derived from the "tokenId" value. **Recommendation** Consider removing this argument.

Listing 82:

436 +address from,

3.83 CVF-83

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

• Source ERC721.sol

Description This call emits an Approval event, which is weird.

Listing 83:

444 + approve(address(0), tokenId);

3.84 CVF-84

• **Severity** Minor

Status Info

• Category Procedural

• **Source** ERC721.sol

Recommendation These functions should emit some events.

Listing 84:

```
463 +function _setTokenURI(uint256 tokenId, string memory _tokenURI)

→ internal {

474 +function setBaseURI(string memory baseURI) internal {
```



3.85 CVF-85

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** ERC721.sol

Recommendation This call could be performed in a normal way like this: return IERC721Receiver (to).onERC721Received(msg.sender, from, tokenId, __data) == ERC721 RECEIVED;"

Listing 85:

3.86 CVF-86

• Severity Minor

Status Info

• Category Procedural

• Source Events.sol

Recommendation This parameter should be indexed. As there couldn't be more than three indexed parameters consider either making some other parameter not indexed or indexing a hash of token+tokenId, as tokenId doesn't make much sense without token contract address.

Listing 86:

40 + uint 256 tokenId,

3.87 CVF-87

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Documentation
- Source Bytes.sol

Recommendation Consider explaining why this overflow is impossible in practice, or even better, add an explicit overflow check.

Listing 87:

```
97 +// NOTE: theoretically possible overflow of (_start + 0x8)
```

210 +// NOTE: theoretically possible overflow of (_offset + 8)



3.88 CVF-88

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Info
- Source Bytes.sol

Description Despite the name, this function doesn't convert the whole "_bytes" into uint64, but extracts a uint64 value from it.

Recommendation Consider renaming.

Listing 88:

98 +function bytesToUInt64(bytes memory _bytes, uint256 _start)

→ internal pure returns (uint64 r) {

3.89 CVF-89

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** OwnableContract.sol

Description The first parameter is redundant as it can be derived from the previous event.

Listing 89:

15 +event OwnershipTransferred (address indexed previousOwner, → address indexed newOwner);

3.90 CVF-90

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad naming

• Source OwnableContract.sol

Recommendation Events are usually named via nouns, such as "OwnershipTransfer" or just "Owner".

Listing 90:

15 +event OwnershipTransferred (address indexed previousOwner, → address indexed newOwner);



3.91 CVF-91

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source OwnableContract.sol

Description This variable is redundant, as "msg.sender" is cheaper to access than a local variable.

Listing 91:

21 +address msgSender = msg.sender;

3.92 CVF-92

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

Source OwnableContract.sol

Description This check is redundant as it is always possible to transfer ownership to a dead address.

Recommendation Consider dropping it as well as the 'renounceOwnership' function.

Listing 92:

81 +require (newOwner! = address(0), "Ownable: new owner is the zero → address");

3.93 CVF-93

• **Severity** Minor

- Status Info
- Category Documentation
- Source IZKBoxNFT.sol

Description The role of this interface and the semantics of its functions is unclear. **Recommendation** Consider documenting.

Listing 93:

7 +interface IZKBoxNFT {



3.94 CVF-94

- Severity Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Info
- Source IZKBoxNFT.sol

Description The semantics of the returned values is unclear. **Recommendation** Consider documenting.

Listing 94:

12 +function onWithdraw(address target, uint64 globalld) external

→ returns (address, uint256);

3.95 CVF-95

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Info
- Source IZKBoxNFT.sol

Recommendation The type of this field should be more specific.

Listing 95:

17 +address tokenContract;



3.96 CVF-96

- Severity Major
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- Source nft withdraw.rs

Description Variable-length URI make collisions possible. **Recommendation** Use fixed-length URI.

Listing 96:

```
105 + // append be fixed width (
            &mut pubdata bits,
    +//
            &self.args.nft_info.uri.unwrap(),
    +//
            URI BIT WIDTH,
    +//
    +// );
110 +
    +let uri = self
    +
         .args
         .nft_info
    +
         . uri
    +
         . iter()
         .map(|b| b.unwrap())
    +
         .collect::<Vec<bool>>();
    +pubdata bits.extend(uri);
```

3.97 CVF-97

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Info
- Source nft withdraw.rs

Description These constants should be named.

Listing 97:



3.98 CVF-98

- Severity Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Info
- Source nft withdraw.rs

Recommendation This comment should be removed to avoid confusion.

Listing 98:

$$241 + // bal.value = Fr::zero();$$

3.99 CVF-99

- Severity Minor
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Status Info
- Source nft transfer.rs

Recommendation It should be asserted there is no overflow.

Listing 99:

3.100 CVF-100

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad datatype

• Source nft transfer.rs

Recommendation This should be a named constant.

Listing 100:

3.101 CVF-101

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• **Category** Readability

• Source nft transfer to new.rs

Recommendation Consider asserting that the value fits 128 bits for readability.

Listing 101:



3.102 CVF-102

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Info
- Source nft transfer to new.rs

Recommendation Default constants should be named.

Listing 102:

3.103 CVF-103

• Severity Major

• Status Fixed

• Category Procedural

• Source nft full exit.rs

Description Uri has fixed bit width in the protocol description.

Recommendation Consider using fixed length here or at least prefix the uri with the length.

Listing 103:



3.104 CVF-104

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

• Source nft full exit.rs

Recommendation These constants should be named.

Listing 104:

```
241 + owner: 0,

+ approved_account_id: 0,

+ approved_token_id: 0,

+ approved_amount: 0u64.into(),

258 +let (acc_wit, _, bal_val) = get_pair_account_witness(tree, data

→ .from_account_id, 0u32);

299 +let token = 0_u32;
```

3.105 CVF-105

• **Severity** Minor

- Status Info
- **Category** Documentation
- Source nft full exit.rs

Description This case is not documented in the protocol doc.

Listing 105:

```
249 +// in case this nft does not exist (bal = 0), prover should not

→ update branch

250 +let (_, bal_val) = get_account_witness(tree, nft_acc_id,

→ nft_bal_id as u32);

+if bal_val == Fr::zero() {

+ success = false;

+ args.b = Some(Fr::zero())

+} else {

+ args.b = Some(Fr::one())

+}
```



3.106 CVF-106

- Severity Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Info
- Source nft full exit.rs

Recommendation Consider commenting what 'a' means here.

Listing 106:

3.107 CVF-107

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- Category Documentation
- Source nft full exit.rs

Description This comment is probably incorrect as args.c is not used.

Listing 107:

343 + // args.c indicates whether we should update nft branch +// args.c should equal to plasma update status

3.108 CVF-108

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

• Source nft exchange.rs

Recommendation Default token ID should be a named constant.

Listing 108:

214 + new nft info.approved token id = 0;



3.109 CVF-109

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source Strings.sol

Description This function is quite inefficient.

Recommendation Consider using an approach suggested here: https://stackoverflow.com/a/71095692/2038768

Listing 109:

12 +function to String (uint 256 value) internal pure returns (string → memory) {

3.110 CVF-110

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

Source Strings.sol

Description This loop is redundant.

Recommendation Just allocate a string of 77 chars, fill it right to left and then shop the unused prefix in-place.

Listing 110:

```
21 +while (temp != 0) {
    + digits++;
    + temp /= 10;
    +}
```

3.111 CVF-111

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• Source EnumerableSet.sol

Description This should be executed only when to DeleteIndex != lastIndex.

Listing 111:



3.112 CVF-112

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source EnumerableSet.sol

Recommendation This can be just 'valueIndex'.

Listing 112:

92 +set._indexes[lastvalue] = toDeleteIndex + 1; // All indexes are
$$\hookrightarrow$$
 1-based

3.113 CVF-113

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Info
- Source EnumerableSet.sol

Description The term "size" is more common for sets than "length".

Listing 113:

116 +function _length(Set storage set) private view returns (uint256
$$\hookrightarrow$$
) {

3.114 CVF-114

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source EnumerableSet.sol

Description This check is redundant, as Solidity compiler will do the same check at the next line.

Listing 114:

131 +require(set._values.length > index, "EnumerableSet: index out
→ of bounds");



3.115 CVF-115

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source EnumerableSet.sol

Description This structure and related set of functions is redundant, as "Set" is already a "bytes32" set.

Recommendation Consider removing this structure and corresponding functions, renaming "Set" to "Bytes32Set" and making "Set" functions internal rather than private.

Listing 115:

```
137 +struct Bytes32Set {
     + Set _inner;
     +}
```

3.116 CVF-116

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source Address.sol

Recommendation It would be cheaper to use EXTCODEHASH instead of EXTCODESIZE. Note, that EXTCODEHASH returns different values for a non-existing account and existing non-contract account, so the returned value should be checked against both values. See EIP-1052 for details: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1052

Listing 116:

33 +size := extcodesize(account)

3.117 CVF-117

• **Severity** Moderate

• Status Info

• Category Flaw

• **Source** ZkSyncCommitBlock.sol

Description Note that this way of hashing withdrawals may give the same results for withdrawals of different type, in the case the other data is identical.

Recommendation Consider prefixing the operation type to the input.

Listing 117:

465 +withdrawalsDataHash = keccak256(abi.encode(withdrawalsDataHash,

- \hookrightarrow addToPendingWithdrawalsQueue, fullExitNFTData.owner.
- → fullExitNFTData.globalld));



3.118 CVF-118

• Severity Minor

- Status Info
- **Category** Documentation
- Source utils.rs

Recommendation Consider documenting these functions and their usage

Listing 118:

- 199 +pub fn generate dummy balance branch (
- 213 +pub fn generate_dummy_operation_branch(

3.119 CVF-119

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad naming

• Source utils.rs

Description This name is confusing and harms readability. **Recommendation** Consider calling it 'get account and balance witness'.

Listing 119:

479 pub fn get_pair_account_witness(

3.120 CVF-120

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

• Source VerifierExit.sol

Recommendation The mask size should be a constant defined in a Plonk config file.

Listing 120:

48 + uint256 mask = (~uint256(0)) >> 3;



3.121 CVF-121

- Severity Major
- Category Flaw

- Status Info
- Source nft exit circuit.rs

Description This value is field-dependent. **Recommendation** Consider making it a method for Fr.

Listing 121:

223 +hash_result[0] &= $0 \times 1f$; // temporary solution, this nullifies \hookrightarrow top bits to be encoded into field element correctly